t2 b21 lederman- open sources 2 of 2 fdr- oss-net- letter to zelikow and white paper on...

8/14/2019 T2 B21 Lederman- Open Sources 2 of 2 Fdr- OSS-Net- Letter to Zelikow and White Paper on Intelligence- OSINT 786

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OSS.NetOSS.Net, Inc.

Global Intelligence PartnershipInformationcostsmoney,Intelligencemakesmoney.

ARNOLD 14 October 2003Mr. Philip Zelikow, Executive DirectorNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks301 7 th Street, SW , Room 5125Washington, D.C. 20407Dear M r. Zelikow,It may or may not be your intent, but I wish you to know that I have not received any questions via emailto begin the process of supporting your efforts, first with specific reference to what Open SourceIntelligence (OSINT) could have done to prevent 9-11, an d then more broadly, as to the totality of theintegrated intelligence reforms that are required.I am concerned by two aspects of the C omm ission's publicly-visible process. First, you seem to beemphasizing testimony w ith the very people who created and nurtured these problems, i.e. formerDirectors of Central Intelligence, w hil e neglecting the iconoclasts and reform s who brok e ranks in orderto press for reform. Second, you seem to be lim iting your reform objectives to the pedestrian ones thathave been brought up before, and not attempting to strive for a holistic "Goldwater-Nichols" legislativemandate that achieves all twenty of the reform objective s that you will find listed on pages 16-21 of theattached white paper, recently posted to my web site.In my view, your C omm ission should spend less time trying to defeat White H ouse stone-w alling, andmore tim e creating a constituency within Congresss fo r multi-jurisdictional reform legislation thatrestores active inte llige nce analytic capabilities within every department of govenment (includ ingAgriculture an d Interior); that resolves the contradictions in the procurement of information an dinformation technolog y for secret versu s not secret applica tions; that establishes pu bli c standards for boththird part software inter-operability and global mu lti-lingua l multi-m edia data tem plating; and thatrationalizes the U.S. intelligence com mun ity by, at a min imum, creating ag ency-level focal points forcollection, processing, analysis, and counter- intelligenc e.There are limits to what I can know abou t your direction an d your progress. I worry that yo u will no tbreak out of the box, and will be sim ply one more useless Comm ission. The "center of gravity" for yoursuccess is not in the past, but in the futureif you can get Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce,Foreign Affairs, Govern ment Operations, and Judiciary to "buy in" to a National Security Act of 2005such as I proposed in my first book, but refined to include your findings and of course the new nationalcoun terintellige nce agency, then yo u will go down in history as the father of 21 st Century intelligence.I ask that you share this letter and the attached paper with the M embers of your Com mission. It is myhope that you did so with th e earlier briefing materials that I sent you.

lobert David SteeleChief Executive OfficerPost Office Box 369, Oakton, Virginia 22124-0369Voice: (703) 242-1700 - Facsimile: (703) 242-1711

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ON INTELLIGENCERobert David Steele

11 October 2003Table of Contents

What Is Intelligence and Why Does It Matter? 1Four Threats, Four Quadrants 39-11: What Went Wrong and Why? 5Iraq: What Went Wrong an d Why? 8America As Others See Us 9Historical Endeavors to Reform U.S. Intelligence 13Fixing IntelligenceNational Security Act of 2005 16New Rules for the New Craft of Intelligence 19The Emerging Intelligence Renaissance 20Prognosis: Power to the People Through Public Intelligence 22Bibliography 23About the Author 25

What Is Intelligence and Why Does It Matter?America as both a government and a people is confused and uncertain about thedefinition of intel l igence. 1 At a higher level, there is a tendency to confuse spies,satellites, and secrecy with intelligencethis causes the existing $35 bill ion a yearnational intelligence shotgun to completely discount and ignore the 90% of the relevantinternational in format ion that is not online , not in English, and not secret. Absent a goodgrip on open sources of information, the U.S. government can be said to be operating onperhaps 2% of the available relevant national security informat ion, in part because it hasnot mastered the 29 foreign languages that are a minimalist starting point forcomprehensive global coverage.2

' There is no definition in the Nationa l Security Act of 1947. For a useful overview of theconvent ional th inking on the definit ion of intelligence, se e Michael Warner, "Understanding O urCraft, Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence", Studies in Intelligence (CIA, Vo l. 46, No. 3).2 A s a matter of course, I will no t refer back to my previous writings. O N INTELLIGENCE: Spiesan d Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA, 2000), with a Foreword by Senator David Boren, todaythe President of the Universi ty of Oklahoma, and THE NEW CRAFT O F INTELLIGENCE;Personal, Public, & Political (OSS, 2002), with a Foreword by Senator Pat Roberts, todayChairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intell igence, are the basic references. I am pleased


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At a lower level, there is a tendency to believe that only national governments "do"intelligence. While this is somewhat true in that th e private sector (including non-governmental agencies with extraordinary access to ground-truth through directobservation) are generally no t skilled at applying the proven process of intelligence totheir decision-support needs, this has the effect of shutting out the bulk of the globalknowledge available within ou r borders, or from experts resident in other countries. Thefastest way to improve national intelligence is not necessarily by reorganizing the secretbits, bu t perhaps, instead, by expanding the definition and making networked an d trulynational intelligence possiblewe mu st harness the distributed intelligenc e of the W holeEarth, beginning with all of our experts here at home.Here is my definition of intelligence: Intelligence is decision-support, where a provenprocessrequirements definition, collection management, source discovery andvalidation, multi-source fusion, compelling and timely presentationreliespredominantly on open sources of information, burden-sharing among both tribes andnations, and a focus on creating pub lic intelligence that can drive sensible public policy.A process that does no t integrate th e seven tribes3, that does not do multilateral bu rden-sharing fo r global coverage, an d that does not operate routinely an d daily in 29languages, is by contrasting definition, no t intelligence.Now , we mu st ask, why does intelligence matter? Intelligence matters because, asdecision-support, it could an d should (but often does not) play a vital role in how electedand appointed official decide such important issues as whether or not to go to war, how toappropriate and allocate public funds against diverse priorities, an d what kind of militaryto buildat $500 billio n a year, America's national security budget is not only the largestin th e world (larger than th e next twenty nations combined), but it also represents the onepart of the national budget that is "disposable", i.e. that is not tied in entitlements an dother m andates accounts.Here is a simple an d rough example: $100 million can buy a small Navy ship of war, or itcan buy a complete Army battalion with tanks and artillery in support, or it can buy 1000diplomats, or 10,000 Peace Corps volunteers, or a water de salination plant installed in theMiddle East can capable of delivering 10 0 million cubic meters of water to this parchedarea; or it can buy one day of Middle East war abou t water. These are called "trade-offs." When a Republ ic falls victim to a tyranny of the minority, as Alexander Hamiltonalso to have made possible th e publication of an edited work by Ben de Jong, Wies Platje, an dmyself , PEACEK EEPING INTELL IGENCE : Emerging Concepts for the Future (OSS, 2003), an dhave a third personal book in progress, NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE: A GrandStrategy for Coping with Asymm etric C hallenges (OSS 2004). I recommend all of the books byothers as listed at the end of this article.3 National, mili tary, la w enforcement , business, academic , NG O-media , religious-clan-citizen.


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Version 1.7 3warned, and political demagogery instead of informed decision-making, becomes thebasis fo r allocating resources an d going to war, then the public trust ha s been betrayed.Put simply, a government that does no t fully integrate objective intelligence into it sglobal decision process is in e f f e c t betraying the public trust. Objective intell igen ce ispart of the democratic process in that it can and should provide a non -partisan basis fo rinformed public policy debates.4Four Threats, Four QuadrantsA major flaw with national intelligence occurs as a result of obsession with one specifickind of threatthe tradition al nation-state with organ ized armed forces . The obsessio nfurther corrupts intelligence when attention is narrowly focused on what ar e called "hardtargets", those seven states considered to be a strategic nuclear threat or convent ionalstate-sponsored communist or terrorist threat: Russia, China, North Korea, Cuba, Libya,Iraq (m ore o f a threat today than befo re we in vaded), and Pakistan.In the 1980's I conceptualized the below illustration o f four threat classes, each o f whichrequi res co-equal intell igence resources an d intell igence leadership.5

PHVsiraiSTEALTH,PRECISIONTARGETING

HIGHBR U

(BIGECONOMIC

WAR

CYBER -STEALTH.DATABASE

TECH

WAR)

HIGH TECHSEERS(HOME

GUERRILLAWAR

MONEY-RUTHLESSNES

POWER B A S E

KNOWLEDGE-IDEOLOC

CULTURALUUADTARGETING

s

Y

LOW TECHBRUTES(GANGS)

LOW

(K

NATURALSTEALTH,RANDOMTARGETING

TERRORISM

'TECHER SJOR)

IDEO-STEALTH

TARGETING

Four Different Threat ClassesRequire Four Different Intelligence Approaches

Require Four Different National Security Strategies& Structures

4 The failure of the media to fulfill its own ro le as a means of i n f o rming citizens makes nationalintelligence qua public intelligence all the more vital at the dawn of the 21st Century.5 The Director of Central Intelligence (DC1) understands that Global Coverage of the lower tiercountries and issues can be done largely by open sources of i n f o rma t ion at a cost of $ 10 mil l ionper country per year or $1.5 bi l l ion per year. In 1997 he made a deliberate decision to stick tosecrets about hard targets, and f o r e w e n t the opportun ity to radically en hance U.S. in te l l igence .


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Version 1.7 4There i s another way to look at the global intelligence challenge. Taking our lead fromthe above, and thinking in policy terms now, i.e. what should intelligence be able tosupport, I conceptualize four quadrants where America must devise consistent, holistic,sustainable foreign affairs and global security policy.

Global Government Stability Legitimate Governments Democratic Governments Popular GovernmentsHomeland Security Educated Engaged Public Public Health Assurance Critical Infrastructure

Global Law Enforcement Counter-Terrorism Counter-Crime Counter-CorruptionGlobal Sustainment Moral Capitalism Environmental Integrity Human Rights

Four Quadrants of National Security ResponsibilityIt's not about heavy metal anymoreit's about moral legitimacy.

In brief, invadin g another coun try an d w i n n i n g a mili ta ry war with a heavy-metal forcestructure i s not only a last resort in terms of policy, it is also the least likely to result inthe desired outcom e. Natio nal security today is about moral legitimacy, mo ralcapitalism, mor al democracy, en viron men tal integrity, and the sustainmen t of our ownhomeland in te rms of education, public health, an d cri tical infrastructure. The longer weallow our political and corporate and media leaders to lie to us, the longer we fail torevitalize the democratic process by demonstrating that votes can still count for morethan money, th e less likely we are to assure the security an d prosperi ty of our childrenan d what the Native Americans call "the seventh generat ion"this i s the generationwhose n eeds sho uld drive al l major policy de cis ions.66 As I have reviewed over 410 books relevant to national security at Amazon.com, I am reluctantto burden the reader here with a list of books. I will mention just four that have especiallyimpressed me in recent months: Max Manwaring (Contributing Editor^), The Search fo r Security:A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (Praeger, 2003); Clyde Prestowitz, RO GUEN A T I ON : American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (Basic, 2003); W illiamGreider, The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy (Simon & Schuster, 2003);and Jonathan Schell, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of th e People(Metropolitan, 2003). Joe Nye Jr. , Charles Kupchan an d others are reviewed at Amazon.


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Version 1.7 5In summary, intelligence is decision-support and to the extent that intelligence isbalanced, informative, and timely, it can help both the policy-makers and the public toarrive at intelligent conclusions about both the real world and domestic vulnerabilities toattack and subversion. If intelligenc e is not balanced, i.e. if it neglects three of the fourthreat classes; if intelligence is not informative, i.e. it fails to penetrate terrorist groups orread foreign language documents in 29+ languages; if intelligence is not timely, i.e. itreaches th e public as well as the policy-makers before we go to war, no t after, thenintelligence is not making th e contributions th e tax-paying public has a right to expect,and intelligence must be fixed.What can intelligence, properly managed, do for the national security and nationalprosperity of the American Republic? I will m ention just four possible accomplishmentsas a means of emphasizing th e potential benefits of an enlightened intelligence program.First, intelligence can cut Pentagon waste and ineffectiveness in half. It may notcompletely eliminate it, but if we cross-walk the real-world requirements for specifickinds of armed force capabilities, w e very quickly realize that w e have too few "big"systems that are too expensive an d largely irrelvant to the challenges that face us. Mostcompellingly, intelligence has help us redirect the savings into three other nationalsecurity arenas outlined belowwe cannot cut the budget, but we can spend morewisely.Second, intelligence ca n help us become effective in the global environment that ischaracterized b y sub-state instability. This is an environmen t that requires both theability to delive r hum anitaria n assistance und er comba t conditions, an d the ability to huntdown and kil l or contain in dividu al warlords an d criminal king-pins.Third, intelligence can h elp us forecast both the threat and the future cost of dealing withthe threat, from global depredations that stem from our own misbehavior and inattention.Water scacity, disease, starvation, and the instability that stems from unfettereduneducated populations in the Third World are exam ples of threats to America's future.Fourth, intelligence ca n overcome decades worth of inattention and neglect on the homefront. The m ost obvious Am erican vu lnera bility to day is that of critical infrastructure,all of which is above ground and not designed to account fo r mal icious "acts of man."Over the next 20 years, most of this infrastructure needs to be moved underground andm ade redundant. More subtly, Am erican policy-makers have lost sight of the connectionbetween public education and pub lic health, and national security. We have neglectedthese tw o areas, an d must again make them our first priority fo r long-term security.Our challenge in the 21 st Century is to transfer th e proven process of intelligence to allaspects of national l i f e , and to create a "Smart Nation" in which every citizen is anintelligence m inuteman, and every tax d ollar is spent wisely, in the public interest.


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Version 1.7 ft9-11: W hat Went W rong an d Why?9-11 was both an intelligence failure an d a policy failure. It continues to trouble me thatin the two years prior to 9-11, capping decades of Presidential and Congressionalcommissions on intelligence reform, no fewer than fifteen books on intelligencedeficiencies and intelligence reform were pub lished. All were ignored. Un fortu nately, 9-11 and the tragic deaths of over 3,000 Americans, including a number in that previouslyimpregnable bastion, the Pentagon, have failed to inspire mature reflection and thenecessary redirection of intelligence and policy. Absent the election of anunconventional and open-minded President, I predict that America will suffer another5,000 dead in the next five years, both here at home and through devastating attacksagainst hotels, office buildings, tunnels, and mass commercial transportation.With respect to intelligence failures, 9-11 happened because the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) is incompetent at clandestine operations (my former career), incompetentat open source information collection and exploitation in foreign languages (my currentcareer), and incompetent at processing multi-media information such that the dots can bedetected and connected (my avocation). The Federal Bure au of Investigation (FBI) isincompetent at counter-terrorism, inattentive with respect to immigration matters, an dstill in the 1970's with respect to archaic info rmation technology systems.Generic intelligence failures included a failure in intelligence collection caused by a continu ing obsession with satellite-based technical collection (w e process less than 10% of our images, fewer than 6%

of ou r Ru ssian signals, few er than 3% of our European signals, and fewer than 1% ofal l signals); a failure in intelligence data entrynotably a CIA fai lure to report a warning fromthe Taliban foreign minister and two separate FB I failures to take walk-ins one inNewark and one in Orlandoseriously; afailure in intelligence translation, both CIA incompetence and inattention to Farsi,

Urdu, Arabic, Pashto, an d Dari over-all, and FBI refusal to fund the translation of allthe Arabic documen ts captured after the first World Trade Center (car) bombing an din the Philippine arrests;

a failure in intelligence processing, in that there is no one place in the entire U.S.government where al l known information comes together, in part because of out-dated "codeword" restrictions, in part because 80% of what the CIA and FBI knowis still not in digital form;


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Version 1.7 7 a failure in intelligence analysis, in that insufficient resources were applied to the

terrorist target (even after the DCI "declared war" on A l Qaeda); an d finally a failure in intelligence liaison, in that w e permitted Saudi Arabia an d Pakistan,among many others, to sponsor terrorism while giving us chicken feed, at the sametime that we eschewed serious clandestine penetrations of both "friendly"governments exporting radicalized Islamic terrorists, and the internal oppositiongroups themselves.7On the policy side, and here I will be brief, there were five failures: first, in theaftermath of the World Trade Center (car) bombing, a deliberate decision w as made totreat the matter as a law enforcement issue, with no recognition of the true meaning ofth e event as a direct attack on America; second, in the aftermath of the various attacksand loss of life in two Embassy bombings, the US military barracks bombing in SaudiArabia, and the attack on the USS Cole, th e Clinton Administrationand Tony Burgeran d Madeline Albright specifically, down-played the threat an d refused to "alarm" th eAmerican people*; third, after a lucky break in intercepting a terrorist arriving fromCanada to execute a mille nium bom bing, no substantive changes were made in border orimmigration control, and state troopers continued to lack access to any sort of terroristwatchlist (two 9-11 terrorist were stopped prior to 9-11 for traffic violations, and notnoticed as a result); fourth, despite years of warning from terrorism experts, and acommendable job on this specific pointyi by Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart, th eFederal A viation Adm inistration (FAA) y ielded to indu stry pressure and failed todemand substantive improvements to airport security screening or cockpit defenses; an dfifth, fo r lack of the kind of warning that Albright an d Berger prevented, Americansfailed to recognize the terrorists as they integrated themselves into flight trainingprograms and safehousesand even when a f l ight school reported anomalous behavior(i.e. no interest in learning how to land, just how to redirect in mid-air), the FBI ignoredth e warnings because terrorism was not a national priority.

There is in my opinion one secret of the Bush Administration remaining to be exposed:the assignment to Vice President Dick Cheney, immediately following inauguration, ofth e terrorism portfolio. In my judgement , it was Dick Cheney's refusal to listen to DCIGeorge Tenet, and his obsession with catering to his energy pals in the early months ofth e Bush A dministration, that actually allowed the 9-11 terrorist conspiracy to come to itstragic fulf i l lment .7 There are many good books on intelligence shortfalls and the reasons for them, but specificallyrelevant to 9-11 are those of Robert Baer, no t only a career clandestine case officer specializing interrorism, but a highly decorated and much-admired officer as well. SEE NO EVIL: Th e TrueStory of a Ground Soldier in the C IA 's War on Terrorism (Crown, 2002), and SLEEPING WITHTH E DEVIL : H ow Washington Sold Our Soul for S audi C rude (Crown, 2003). The latter bookspecifically examines what could have been known from open sources alone, and the policydecisions as w ell as the intelligence leadership mind-sets that blinded us to A rab realities.


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Version 1.7 8Iraq: What Went Wrong and Why?Iraq is a much greater tragedy than 9-11, for it is we ourselves who have chosen todestroy the U .S. Arm y in the sands of Iraq, to destroy decades worth of mu lti-late ralrelationships an d institutions, and to incur what will eventually be thousands of casualtiesfrom depleted uranium, residual petro-chemical toxicity, and random guerilla attacks.The harm to our economy is equally devastatingwe have now to deal with a self-inflicted wo und, a $250 billion unplann ed budget deficit on top of our $7 trillion budgetdeficit.In my view, an d here we need to wait for more detailed investigations, but thepreliminary results are in, Iraq also w as both an intelligence an d a policy failure.Iraq was an intelligence failure because th e U.S. intelligence community simply did notknow what it needed to know in order to provide both the Executive and the Congresswith essential information. W e know from open sources of information that SaddamHussein distributed most of his experts on weapons of mass destruction in the early1990's, and I find th e report of his defecting program manager, to wit, that he destroyedthe stocks but kept the cookbooks, qu ite credible. I also believe that some of hiscapabilitiesmodest but potentare in concealed storage in Russia,, Syria, an d Algeria,with th e active complicity of those governments.Iraq was a policy failure in two parts: on the one hand, th e Administration w as capturedby a small band of neo-conservative under th e leadership of Dick Cheney an d with th eoperational force being provided by Richard Perle an d Paul Wolfowitzthis groupdecided that 9-11 was the perfect pretext fo r executing their life-long ambition, th ecapture of the Iraqi oil fields and the eradication of radical regimes in Arabia by force.As General Wesley C lark tells th e story publicly, on 9-11, as Americans w ere jumpin g totheir deaths to escape being burned alive, th e White House called him and told him to"pin it on Iraq." The White House had no proof then, when General Clark asked for it,an d they did not develop an y substantive proof in the months leading up to the war. Onth e contrary, the W hite House and its Pentagon leadership chose to tell the Am ericanCongress, the Am erican people, the United Nations, and the other na tional leaderships nofewer than sixty-two (62) documented lies. This is surely a betrayal of the pub lic trustthat merits impeachment, but Republican control of the two chambers of Gemmerceand the naivete of the American public in continuing to believe White House propaganda Qthat would make the Nazi's proud, make impeachment a moot issue as we approach theNovember 2004 elections. For its part, Congress, with the exception of Senator RobertByrd from West Virginia, failed Am erica. Congress proved gutless, inattentive, and allto o wil l ing to be led by specious politicized and fabricated "intelligence" that was


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Version 1.7 gconcocted by a special uni t in the Pentagon, based largely on fabrications fed to them byChalabi and others with their own agenda.8America As Others See UsThomas Jefferson said it first: "A Nation's best defense is an educated citizenry." JamesMadison contributed his views with respect to the importance of an informed citizenry ina democracy that means to be governed by the citizens themselves. More recently,alarmed by the stupendous ignorance of both Congress and the public with respect to thereal world and foreign threats to domestic prosperity and security, both Senator DavidBoren and David Broder have called for the "internationalization of education."9 Theirconcern can be summed up in a South African quoted by Mark Hertsgaard in Eagle'sShadow: "...we know everything about you, and you know nothing about us."In this one section, rather than articulating my own thoughts, I want to highlight severalbooks and one mapin addition to those already notedwhose authors represent thevery best insights available to all Americans. These books are but a small sample of whatcan be known, but is now ignored, at the policy level and by the media. Indeed, surveysof the American people about such issues are now so watered down, according toMatthew Miller, author of The 2% Solution, that the actual scale of problems has beendeleted from most survey questions becauseheavensif folks realized just how badthese problems are, they might insist that we do something about them! Nationalintel l igence m us t serve the public, for only by serving the public can we ensure thatpolicy makers, both elected and appointed, are held accountable for dealing with globalrealities that impact on domestic prosperity and security. Ziauddin Sardar and Merry Wyn Davies, WHY DO PEOPLE HATE AMERICA?

(Icon, 2002)8 Rather than clutter this article with extensive footnotes, I refer the reader to www.oss.net. whereI have posted over 1,000 news stories about intelligence an d policy, with many covering th e liesand the politiciz ation of intelligence in relation to Iraq. Just search for Iraq using site engine. The62 documented lies can be found at ww w.b ush wars .org. where Steven Perry harnessed thedistributed intelligence of the Nation to identify, screen, an d validate th e lies. I also recommendthe book by Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, WEAPONS O F MASS D E CE P TI O N : Th e Useso f Propaganda in Bush 's War on Iraq (Tarcher, 2003), and the more satirical but still valuablebook by Al Franken, Lies and the Lying Liars W ho Tell Them: A Fair an d Balanced Look at theRight (Dutton, 2003). Paul Krugman, in The Great Unravel ing: Los ing O ur W ay in the NewCentury (Norton, 2003) specifically accuses the extreme right of choosing to ignore and subvertthe established democratic process in America, while Mark Hertsgaard, in his book The Eagle 'sShadow: Why America F ascinates an d Infuriates th e World (Picador, 2002),dramatically catalogsth e ignorance and hypocrisy of existing unilateralist policies that are increasing rather thandecreasing the prospects of terrorist attacks. Schell, supra note 6 is also relevant.9 David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins (Contributing Editors), Preparing America's ForeignPol icy for the 2 1 s " Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).


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Version 1.7 1QOpening with a quote from Dr. Sam uel Johnson in 1775, to wit, that "Patriotism is thelast refuge of the scoundrel," the authors are helpful in docum enting how m ost good-hearted Am ericans sim ply have no idea how big the gap is between our perception of ourgoodness and the rest of the world's perception of our badness. According to the authors,a language dies every tw o weeks. Although there ar e differing figures on how m a n ylanguages ar e still active today (between 3,000 an d 5,500), the point is vital. If languageis the ultimate representation of a distinct an d unique culture that is ideally suited to theenvironment in which it has flourished over the past m illenium , then the triple strikes ofEnglish displacing the language, the American "hamburger virus" and city planningdisplacing al l else, an d American policy instrumentsinclusive of the World TradeOrganization and the International Monetary Fundeliminating an y choices before theThird World or even the European policy makers, then America can be said to have beeninvasive, predatory, and repressive. At m ultip le levels, from "hate" by Islamicfundamentalists, to "fear an d disdain" by French purists, to "annoyance" by Asians to"infatuation" by teenagers, the Americans are seen as way too big for their britches-Americans are the proverbial bull in the china shop, an d their leaders lack moralsthefailure of America to ratify treaties that honor th e right of children to food an d health, th efai lure of America to respect international conventionsthe average of two militaryinterventions a year since th e Cold W ar (not to mention tw o countries invaded but notrescued), all add up to "blowback." The authors stress th e urgency of improving publicunderstanding of the world and how the wor ld sees Am erica. They say: "And the powerof the American m edia, as we repeatedly argue, works to keep American people closed toexperience and ideas from the rest of the world and thereby increases the insularity, self-absorption, and ignorance that is the overriding problem the rest of the world has withAmerican." Derek Leebaert, Th e Fifty-Year Wound: Th e True Price of America's Cold Wa r

Victory (Little Brown, 2002)This is an extraordinary book, in part because it forces us to confront the "hangover"effects of the Cold War as we begin an uncertain path into the post 9-11 future. It beginsby em phasizing that the Cold W ar glorified certain types of institutions, personalities, andattitudes, and ends by pointin g out that we paid a very heavy costmuch as General andPresident Eisenhower tried to warn usin perm itting our society to be bound byweaponry, ideology, an d secrecy. The author sums up the costs as follows: "For theUnited States, the price of victory goes far beyond the dollars spend on warheads, foreignaid, soldiers, propaganda, and intelligence. It includes, for instance, tim e wasted, talentm isdirected, secrecy im posed, and confidenc e im paired. Particular costs were imposedon industry, science, and the universities. T rade was distorted and growth im peded." Henotes, toward the end of the book: "So much fai lure could have been avoided if CIA haddone more careful hom ewor k during the 1950s in the run-up to S putnik; during the1960s, when Soviet m arshals were openly publishing their thoughts on nuclear strategy;or dur ing the 1970s an d 1980s, when stagnation could be chronicled in the unclassifiedgray pages of Soviet print. Most expensively, the CIA hardly ever learned anything from


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Version 1.7 JJits mistakes, largely because it would not admit them." (pages 567-568) and also: "CIAworld-order men whose intr igues more often than not started at the incompetent an d wentdown from there, White House claims of 'national security' to conceal deceit, and thecreation of huge special interests in archaic spending all too easily occurred because mostAm ericans w ere not preoccupied with the struggle." (page 643) Robert McNamara an d James Blight, WILSON's GHOST: Reducing the Risk ofConflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21 st Century (Public Affairs, 2001)What most Americans do not understand, what this book makes brilliantly clear, is thattwo-thirds of the rest of the world is glad [9-11] happened. I quote from page 52: "...atleast two-thirds of the world's peopleChinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims, andAfricanssee the United States as the single greatest threat to their societies. They do notregard America as a military threat but as a menace to their integrity, autonomy,prosperity and freedom of action." Whether one agrees with their depiction of two-thirdsor not (or whether they see the Attack as a well-deserved bloody nose or an atrocitybeyond the pale), the fact is that the authors paint a compelling picture of billionsnotmillions bu t billionsof impoverished dispossessed people suffering from failed states,crime, slavery, starvation, water shortagesand an abundance of media as well aspropaganda showing the US fat and happy an d living the consumer society dream on thebacks of these billions. William Shawcross, DELIVER US F R O M EVIL: Peacekeepers, Warlords and aWorld of Endless Conflict (Simon & Schuster, 2001)By the book's own rendering, "good w ill witho ut strength can m ake things worse." M ostcompellingly, the author demonstrates both the nuances and the complexities of "peaceoperations", and the fact that they require at least as much forethought, commitment, an dsustainment as combat operations. Food scarcity and dangerous public health are the rootsymptoms, not the core issues. The most dangerous element is not the competing sides,but the criminal gangs that emerge to "stoke the fires of nationalism an d ethnicity in orderto create an environment of fear an d vuln erab ility" (and great profit). At the same t ime ,humanitarianism has become a big part of the problem-we have not yet learned how todistinguish between those confl icts where intervention is warranted (e.g. massivegenocide campaigns) an d those where internal conflicts need to be settled internally. Infeeding the competing parties, we are both prolonging th e conflict, an d giving rise tocriminal organizations that learn to leverage both th e on-going confl ict and the incomingrelief supplies. Perhaps more troubling, there appears to be a clear double-standardwhether deliberate or circumstantialbetween attempts to bring order to the whitewestern or Arab fringe countries an d what appears to be callous indifference to blackAfrican an d distant Asian turmoil that includes hund reds of thousands vict im to genocidean d tens of thousands victim to living amp utation, mu tilat ion, an d rape. When all is saidand done, an d these are my conclusions from reading this excellent work, 1) there is nointernational intelligence system in place suitable to providin g both th e global coverage


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Version 1.7 J2and public education needed to mobilize and sustain multi-national peacekeepingcoalitions; 2) the United Nations (UN) is not structured, funded, nor capable of carryingout disciplined effective peacekeeping operations, while the contributing nations areunreliable in how and when they will provide incremental assistance; and 3) we still havea long way to go in devising new concepts, doctrines, an d technologies an d programs fo reffectively integrating and app lying preventive diplomacy, transformed defense,transnational law enforcement, and public services (water, food, health and education) ina manner that furthers regionally-based peace an d prosperity instead of feeding th e firesof local unrest. Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg (Contributing Editors),POLICING THE NE W WO RLD DISORDER: Peace Operations and Public Security(National Defense University, 1998)If the Cold War era might be said to have revolved around early perceptions of a "missilegap", the 21 st Century with its Operations Other Than W ar (OOTW) could reasonably besaid to have tw o issuesnatural conditions such as depleted water resources, which isnot the book's focus, and the "globo-cop gap", which isthe book documents in a verycompelling manner the fact that there is a major capabilities (and intelligence) chasmbetween preventive diplomacy on the one side, and armed military forces on the other,and that closure of this gap is essential if we are to improve our prospects for rescuingand m aintain ing pub lic order around the w orld. All the contributors agree that this[globo-cop gap] is a "force structure" issue that no government and certainly not theUnited Nations , has mastered, but most give due credit to UN civilian police operationsfo r being the best available model upon w hich to build a future capability. The summ aryof conclusions by Ambassador Oakley and Colonel Professor Dziedzic are alone worththe price of the book. Berto Jongman, World Conflict & Human Rights M ap 2001/2002 (Goals fo rAmericas Founda tion, 2002)This extraordinary m ap is an annu al or bi-ann ual production by a single D utch researcherwith support from the Goals fo r Americas Foundation. I t integrates, in map form on oneside and in fine print on the other, the a nnu al reports of the top peace research institutes.We learn from this map that in 2002 there were 28 low-intensity conflicts killing over1000 people a year; 79 lo w-inten sity conflicts killing fewer than 1000 people a year, and175 violent internal politica l conflicts killing s tens of thousands. We learn from this mapthat there are 32 countries tha t can be considered failed states as defined by UN "complexemergencies; that there are millions of refugees an d displaced persons across 66countries; that millions are starving across 33 countries; that corruption is common in 80countries, and censorship is very high in 62 countries....and ma ny other things. What them ap does not tell us, which we have learned from other references, is that there aremodern plagues and epidemics in 59 countries and rising; that there are 18 activegenocides today, including two in Russia and three in Indonesia; an d that water scarcity


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Version 1.7 13and ethnic conflict coincide along the Sino-Slavic borders, th e Slavic-Islam borders(Central Asia is Muslim), and the Palestinian-Israeli "borders".10There is no lack of wisdom, knowledge, an d open source information about th e basicproblems that confront both America and all other nations an d populations. What wehave right now is a disconnect between reality, intelligence, an d policy. The problemwith spies is they only know secrets th e problem -with policy makers is they don't wantto listen to anyone w ho disagrees with their pre-set agenda and ideological disposition.It is my view that only a global public intelligence network, relying on open sources ofinformation, ca n break down the barriers to reform of both secret an d open intelligence.Historical Endeavors to Reform U.S. IntelligenceIntelligence reform studies have taken place since th e inception of the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity. Here are a few historical endeavors, with short summaries.111949 First Hoover Com mission Adversarial relationships between CIA, State, and the military7955 Second Hoover Commission Counterintelligence & linguistic training deficiencies CIA to replace State in procurement of foreign publications1961 Taylor Comm ission Failure in comm unication, coordination, and overall planning No single authority short of the President capable of coordinating7977 Schlesinger Report "rise in...size and cost [with the] apparent inability to achieve a commensurateimprovement in the scope and overall quality..." "unproductively duplicative" collection systems and a fa i lure in forward planning tocoordinate th e allocation of resources10 O n disease see Laurie Garrett, BETRAYAL O F TRUST: The Collapse of Global Public Health(Hyperion, 2000), Andrew Price-Smith, TH E HEALTH OF NATIONS: Infectious Disease,Environmental Change, and Their E f f e c t s on N ational Security and Development (MIT, 2001),an d Michael Kodron & Ronald Segal, TH E N EW STATE OF THE WORLD ATLAS (Touchstone,1991 and later editions). O n water se e Marq de Villiers, WATER: The Fate of Our Most PreciousResource (Houghton Mifflin, 2000), and on genocide, N E W CRAFT and Dr. Greg Stanton,Genocide Watch, at www.genocidewatch.org.1 ' I have selected what I consider to be the key points from a larger and superb historical reviewby Richard A. Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew Boestling of the Congressional Research Service,"Proposals fo r Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996," dated 28 February 1996, and included asan appendix to the IC21 Report.


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Version 1.7 J4

1976 Church Committee DCI should have program authority and monies for national intelligence should beappropriated to the DCI rather than the individual agencies

Recommended second DDCI for Community Management State must improve overt collection of economic and political data Raised issue of separating clandestine operations from analysis7992 Boren-McCurdy (Joint Senate and House Intelligence Legislation (Not Passed) National Security Act of 1992 (not adopted because Defense opposed12) DNI, two DDNIs, consolidate DIA and INR analysts with CIA13None of these substantive efforts to achieve reform has the desired effect, in part becauseintelligence does not have a domestic political constituency. The public does not care.In 1996 two extraordinaryand quite well-managedendeavors were completed. Thefirst, a Commission chartered jointly by Congress and the President, known as the Aspin-Brown Commission (Col), carried out two fu l l years of investigation and produced whatis arguably the most important and sensible list of necessary reforms relevant topreventing 9-11 and other strategic surprises. Simultaneously, under the leadership ofRepresentative Porter Goss, then Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee onIntel l igence (HPSCI), a report was prepared by the HPSCI staff, on the intelligencec o m m u n i t y in the 21st Century (IC21).14 Their f indings are largely in agreement and

12 The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), and Senator John Warner in particular, haveconsistently opposed the transfer of the national intel l igence agencies previou sly hidden and nowovertly assigned within the defense bu dget, i.e. the National Security Agency (NSA), the NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIM A). In myview, intel l igence reform will never succeed u nless the SASC, an d especially Senator Warner, canbe offered a Memorandum of Agreement that commits 50% of al l national intel l igence resourcesin peacetime, 85% in wartime, to defense needs; an d a commitment can be made by a serving orprospective DC I that al l reforms wil l be job and revenue neu tral for the various States.13 DNI:Director of National Intel l igence; DDNI: Deputy Director of National Intel l igence; DIA:Defense Intel l igence Agency; INR: Intel l igen ce and Research B ureau within the Department ofState.14 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intel l igence Community,Preparing for the 21 s' Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1 March 1996); IC21:Intelligence Community on Intelligence (HPSCI, 104 th Congress, 4 March 1996). Dr. MarkLowenthal, today acting Associate Deputy Director of Central Intel l igence for Analysis &Production (ADDCI/A&P), was the Staff Director for the HPSCI and the HPSCI study. M r. BrittSnider, Staff Director of the Aspin-Brown Commission, in now in retirement but available to helpimplement these reforms. M r. Kevin Scheid, an Office of Management an d Budget professionalw ho served on the Asp in -Brown Commiss ion , is now a m e m b e r of the staff of the 9 -11Commission, which continues to be s tone-wal led by the W hite Hou se and the Ex ecutive Branch.


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Version 1.7 J5mus t be the starting point for any future legislative effort to reform nationalintelligence.15 Role of IntelligenceCol: Support diplomacy, military operations, defense planningIC21: Too ad hoc today, lacks coherence, can be self-serving Policy/Requirements ProcessCol: State an d Defense dominate guidance, consumers group neededIC21: Dec lining intelligence base an d lost focus on the future, system-driven Global Crime/Law Enforcement

Col: Need more coordination of operations overseas, more sharing of informationIC21: Need more information sharing an d training, global operational coordination OrganizationCol: Need to increase DCI authority, have DDCI/CIA and DDCI/CM 16IC21: Need three ADDCIs for functions of collection, production, infrastructure C IA ItselfCol: Needs better management at all levelsIC21: Must m ove Centers to D CI level, improve quali ty of personnel Budget, Structure, Process

Col: Substantial realignment needed aggregate functions, DCI does not have staff,tools, or procedures fo r perform ing budge t m anagem ent.IC21: Collection stove-pipes dominate resources rather than analysts or end-users;CMS 17 should h ave with holdin g authority an d evaluation ability

Intelligence AnalysisCol: Must im prove focus on consumers, on open sourcesIC21: CIA's core function; assumes departmental capabili t ies okay "Right-Size "andRebuild

Col: Consolidate senior executive service, liberal force reductionIC21: Rationalize NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA18, guide by function. Military Intelligence, Support to Department of Defense (DoD)Col: DoD needs a single s t a f f focal point fo r man aging intell igence support1 5 1 have selected key points from a review of the both reports.16 CM : Comm uni ty Management17 CMS: Comm unity Management Staff18 N FIP : Natio nal Foreign Intelligence Program; JM IP: Joint Military Intelligenc e Program;TIARA: Tactical Exploitation of Intell igence an d Related Activities (the latter is controlled byoperators rather than intelligen ce profession als in the Army, Navy, and Air Force).


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Version 1.7 j^IC21: D/DIA s hould be Director of M ili tary Intelligence

Technical C ollectionCol: Endorsed NIMA, need more coordination between intell igence an d defenseIC21: Eliminate NRO, create Technical Collection Agency and TechnicalDevelopment Office

Clandestine ServiceCol: Merge DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) into CIA HUMINTIC21: Separate enti ty reporting directly to DCI, CIA feeds it (administrative o nly)

International CooperationCol: Burden-sharing needed in space operationsIC21: Not addressed, bu t notes need to buy more open source imagery

Cost of IntelligenceCol: Cost reductions ar e possible bu t need better process to f ind; states that 96% ofthe total U.S. intell igen ce program is within DoD budgetIC21: States that DoD controls 86% of the total national resources, DCI lacksauthority to be effective

Fixing IntelligenceNational Security Act of 2005In th e absence of pub lic outrage an d demands fo r substantive in tell igence reform, I do notbelieve that any candidate for the Presidency, with the possible exception of HowardDean, w ould be disposed to ward substantive intell igence reform . They just do n ot get i t .Having said that, below is the program that I believe Congress mus t enact.1. Special Co mm ittee. Retainin g the existing Congressional com mittees on Intelligencefo r day-to-day oversight of classified intelligence matters, each Committee of theSenate should establish majori ty an d minori ty Member focal points fo r in te l l igencecompr i s ing a Special Committee as the steering group for drafting and enacting aNational Security Act of 2005, in essence a "Goldwater-Nichols Act" forintell igence. This Act will fully integrate and revitalize intelligence qua decision-support within every element of the U.S. Government an d within state an d localgovernm ents, wh ile legislatively mandate the follo win g national ini t iatives.2 . C onsol idated NFIP. Apart f rom movin g NRO, NSA, and NIMA in to the

conso lidated NFIP, there sho uld also be established a separate Homeland DefenseIntell igence Program and a National Security Education Program.3. Hom eland Defe nse Intellige nce Program. Create a central home land defenseinte l l igence center with 24/7 watch teams, an d sin gle Com mun ity Intelligen ceCenters, also 24/7, in each state an d major city, each under the sovereign authority o f


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Version 1.7 17th e Governor or Mayo r. Enhanc e National Guard role. Federally fund state-basedintelligence and counterintelligence forces, and State Intelligence Officers (SIOs).

4. National Security Education Program. "A Nation's best defense in an educatedcitizenry." Program will fund science, technology, foreign area, & foreign languageexperts. Governm ent foreign area experts w ill serve in that capacity for a full career,and not in the Reserve or as an additional duty as is now the case.5. Director-General for Nation al Intelligenc e. Placement of new DGNI on President'sStaff, with oversight over Director of Classified Intelligence (DCI), Chairman of theelevated NIC, and a new Global Know ledge Foun dation.6. Director of Classified Intelligence. Renam e and separate DC I position from that ofagency head positions for each element outlined below . Consolidate managem ent of

personnel, security, training, and general infrastructure functions underDDCI/Administration. Allocate al l funds to the DCI, not to the agencies.7. National Intelligence Cou ncil. Expand to 120, w ith 5-person teams dedicated todefense, foreign affairs, finance & commerce, law enforcement, environment &culture; elevate to Executive O ffice of the President.8. Global Know ledge Foundation. $1.5B a year fund for open source intelligence(OSINT) needs of both 1C and all government departments, includes $500M a yearfor procurement of commercial imagery source material for defense, OSINTprocurement by Country Teams, and new mu ltinationa l regional intelligenc e centersthat share indigenous expertise at foreign language data capture, translation, and

exploitation.199. Technical Collection Agency. Upgrade NRO to manage all technical programs.10. Clandes tine Service Ag ency. Separate from existing CIA, relying exclusively onnon-official cover and no longer responsible for routine declared liaison.11. National Analysis Agency. Upgrade CIA to National An alysis Agen cy w ith restoredimagery, signals, measurem ents, an d open source offices an d funds for analytic tools;20 0 multi-l ingual mid-career analyst hires, 1000 adjunct reserve analysts.

19 This program will also nurture a national public intelligence network that enables citizens totype in a zip code and be immediately informed about th e history, current status, near-term, an dlong-term nature of any issue area of concern to them, at the local, state, national, and globallevels. This one chan ge wi l l spark a global "revolution in intelligence affairs" that will restore th econnection between intelligence, democracy, moral capitalism, an d global peace an d prosperity bycompletely w ipin g out the distorted propaganda and lies that now comprise the basis for mostfalsely-derived consensus (o r apathy) with respect to the most pressing domestic policy issues.


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Version 1.7 19programs fo r global, national, an d local security demand that most intelligence beunclassified an d understandable at the neighborho od level. Presidents can no longertake Nations to war based on manipulated an d inadequate secretsour public can nolonger tolerate decisions "in our name" tha t cannot stand the test of public scrutiny.

New Rules for the New Craft of IntelligenceI conclude NEW CRAFT with a discussion of the twenty-six "new rules for the new craftof intelligence", and I will not repeat that work here.2' I do, however, want to list therules, fo r they, together with the "seven standards fo r seven tribes"22, are in my opinion amost promising basis fo r changing, completely, ou r definition of national intelligence,and hence the benefits we m ight derive from intelligence-driven policy. The rules are:1) Decision-support is the raison d'etre; 2) Value-added comes from analysis, notsecrets; 3) Global coverage matters more; 4) Non-traditional threats are of paramountimportance; 5) Intelligence without translation is ignorant; 6) Source balance mattersmore; 7) Intelligence must go "two levels down" (sub-state); 8) Processing matters more,becomes core competency; 9) Cu ltural intelligence is fund amen tal; 10) Geospatial andtime-tagging is vital; 11) Global open source benchmarking is fundamental; 12)Counterintelligence ma tters more; 13) Cross-fe rtilization ma tters more; 14) Decen tralizedintelligence matters m ore; 15 ) Collaborative work and informal communications rise; 16)New value is in content + context + speed; 17 ) Collection m ust be based on gaps, no tpriorities; 18) Collection doctrine must grow in sophistication23; 19) Citizen "intelligenceminuteman" ar e vital; 20 ) Production should be based on needs, no t capabilities; 21 )Strategic intelligence matters more; 22) Budget intelligence is mandatory 4; 23) Publicintelligence drives pub lic policy; 24) Analysts are managers of experts, sources, money,(Contributing Editor), Environmental Security and Global Stability: Problems and Responses(Lexington, 2002).21 This chapter of NEW CRAFT is available free at www.oss.net, together with a number ofintelligence reform references an d related works by others.22 The seven standards address global open source collection, analytic tools, analytic tradecraft,defensive security and Coun terintelligence, leadership, training, and culture. The seven tribes ar enational (spies), military, law enforcement, business, academia, non-government and media, an dreligions inclusive of clans and citizens.23 Today I C MA P and other similar collection management functions ask the question "whichclassified system should we task?" Three other questions must be (but are not) asked first: 1) Dowe already know this and can we FIND it in our archives? 2) If we do not, can we GET this froman ally or other affiliated organization at no cost? 3) If not, can we BUY this from a commercialsource at low cost, in quick time, without security impediments?24 "It isn't policy until it's in the budget" is a truth taught to me by Mr. Don Gessaman, formerDeputy Associate Director fo r National Security until hi s retirement in 1995. Ergo, if there is adisconnect between intelligence about im minent threats, and the federal budget, intelligence isclearly fail ing to communicate with policy, and the disconnect must be made public.


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Version 1.7 20an d consumer needs; 25) New measures of merit are needed across th e board; 26 ) Mult i -lateral burden-sharin g is vital.The new craft of intelligence will be characterized by two conceptual figures, eachillustrated below .

History in alllanguagesdigitized!

Harness allexperts in theNation

Focus thespies verynarrowly

Share theGlobalCoverage

^National Tribe

fMilitary Tribe

I I IAcademic Tribe%

NGO-Media Tribe

^Police Tribe1Business Tribe

JllReligion Tribe

Quadrant 1: Intelligence Perspectives Circle 1: Who Does Intelligence?

The Emerging Intelligence RenaissanceAlvin Toffler was the first to get it, with his book PowerShif t as a capstone on his earlierworks. Howard Rheingold followed soon after, with books on virtual com mun ity andjust this past year, on Smart Mobs. Many others have contributed to our un derstanding ofthe info rma tion revo lution that is in progress, am ong them Paul Strassmann withInformation PayOff, Harlan Cleveland with The Knowledge Executive, Kevin Kelly withOUT OF CONTROL: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization. Most recently, ThomasStewart has offered up THE WEALTH O F KNO W LEDG E: Intellectual C apital and theTwenty-First Century O rganization , in which he points out that the industrial era metricsan d management protocols ar e counter-productive in this new era.Others have sounded alarms. Clifford Stoll in Silicon Valley Snake O i l, Lawrence Lessigin The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World, A n n eBranscomb in W ho O wns Information? There are many issues yet to be dealt with,among them the misbehavior of corporations seeking to abuse copyright laws and themisbehavior of Microsoft, which is, as more than one authority ha s stated, a threat tonational security.2525 Microsoft 's buggy software and broad adoption subject the nation to a "dutch elm disease" sortof cascading melt-down, at the same t ime that Microsoft's refusal to have stable transparentApplication Program Interfaces (API) precludes normal advances in plug and play third party


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Version 1.7 21Throughout all this, the U.S. Intelligence Com mu nity has slept, passively watch ing therevolution pass it by. As John Perry Barlow quotes a CIA employee in his recent ForbesASAP article, "There ha s been an information revolution, and we missed it."26 The N ROcontinues to build gold-plated systems that transfer wealth to contractors, NSA is stillstuck in the 1970's, CIA still cannot get a grip on either clandestine or open sourceinformation, an d both DIA and IN R are so far gone we might as well close them down.The FBI leadership is mediocre in the extreme, punishing those Special Agents w ho try/to actually implement reforms.There is , however, good news. Around the world, within the most secretive governmentintelligence enterprises, there are pockets of reform . Virtua lly every agency of note,including CIA and NSA and the US theater commandersand especially the U.S.Special Operations Commandhas open source intelligence action officers, or cells, in_some cases even branches. Overseas, from Norway an d Sweden to "old Europe" an ddown to South Africa, across to Australia an d Singapore, there are Open SourceIntelligence (OSINT) centers, often severalAustralia ha s threeone for defense, onefor law enforcement, and one for foreign affairs an d trade. At the same time, despite some desperate times for foreign area academic studies (in thebasement and not yet recovered from the "quantitative analysis" movement),investigative journalism (steal from the stringers, make up the rest), and businessintelligence (slashed budgets, poor management buy-in), I am seeing a resurgence ofinterest in foreign affairs an d national security. I routinely get emails fromlniddle-aged"citizens across the country who, in the aftermath of 9-11, tell me, "If they're that mad atus, I want to know why." I see MeetUp.com beginning to have a huge effect in bringingtogether people who are linked by theirlntelligence needs, not by their organizationalrole. I see Google destroying conventional information paradigms (and their profitmodels). I see foreign intelligence officers meeting annual ly at my Global InformationForum, and over time "com ing clean" w ith one another on w hat they do and whe re theyar e going.In brief, a new global intel l igence community is emerging. It is not going to becontrolled by governments, but governments will be the most structured an d influentialmem bers of that co mm unity, if they act w isely by coordinating generic standards andovert investmen ts. This new intelligence comm unity is using the Internet, andcommercial security measures including steganography, Federal Express, and face to face

analytic toolkits. M icroso ft's "blue screen of death" is in my opinion responsible for a 20% dropin knowledge w orker productivity against what w ould be possible if everyone were using LINU Xan d Open Office wh ile creating shared generic ana lytic tool-kits and distributed secure data bases.26 W hy Spy?; We have the tattletale tech to find out almost everything. What we don't have is away to know what we know. John Perry Barlow 3,931 words 7 October 2002 Forbes ASAP 42Volume 170; Issue 07 . Review at h ttp : / /www.oss.net /extra /news/7m odule instance= I&id= 182.


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Version 1.7 23BibliographyThere ar e numerous books on the history of intelligence that have lessons fo r today'sneeded forms, as well as numerous personal memoirs, evaluations of specific aspects ofintelligence, and so on. I have reviewed many of these books at Amazon .com, andprovide lengthy annotated bibliographies of both intelligence an d intelligence-relevant(e.g. inform ation society, em erging threats) books in all of my books. For the purposesof this concise overview of intelligence, I am listing below what I regard as the "barebones" list for competency in understanding the intelligence challengeif you read thesebooks, yo u will be well-prepared for a serious debate about the future of intelligence. George Allen, NONE SO BLIND: A Personal Account of Intelligence Failure inVietnam (Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 296 pages.

www .amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1566633877/ossnet-20 Robert Baer, SEE NOEVIL: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on ^Terrorism (Crown , 2002), 284 pages.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASrN/0609609874/ossnet-20 Bruce Berkowitz and Allen Goodman, BEST TRUTH: Intelligence in theInformation /Age, (Yale, 2000), 22 4 pages.www .amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0300080115/ossnet-20 John Fialka, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: Econom ic Espionage in Am erica (Norton,1999), 24 2 pp .www. amazon.com/exec/obidos /ASrN/03933182l4/ossnet-20 Robert G ates, From the Shadows: The U ltimate Insider's Story of Five P residentsand How They Won the Cold War (Simon & Schuster, 1996), 608 pageswww.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASrN/0684810816/ossnet-20 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump C ards: U.S. Covert Action &Counterintelligence (Transaction Press, 2001), 338 pages.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASrN/0765806991/ossnet-20 Stuart Herrington, Traitors Am ong U s: Inside the Spy Catchers World (Presidio,1999), 384 pages.www .amazon.com/exec/obidos /ASIN/0891416773/ossnet-20 Arthur Hulnick , Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing Am erican Intelligence for the21st Century (Praeger Publishin g, 2000), 248 pages.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASrN/0275966534/ossnet-20


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Version 1.7 24Loch Johnson, Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America's Quest fo r >/Security, (New York U niversity Press, 2000), 28 8 pages.www.amazon.com/exec /ob idos/ASIN/0814742521/ossnet-2QJong, Ben de, Wies Platje, and Robert David Steele, PEACEKEEPING JINTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future (OSS, 2003), 532 pp.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASrN/0971566127/ossnet-20Michael Levine, DEEP COVER: Th e Inside Story of How DEA Infighting,Incompetence an d Subterfuge Lost Us the Biggest Battle of the Drug W ar (Delacorte,1990)www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0595092640/ossnet-20William E. Odom, FIXING INTELLIGENCE For a More Secure America (Yale, V2003), 230 pageswww.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0300099762/ossnet-20Mark Riebling, WEDGE: Th e Secret W ar Between the FBI and the CIA (Knoph,1994), 563 pages.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/067941471 l /ossnet-20Robert D. Steele, ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies an d Secrecy in an Open World (OSSInternational Press, 2000), 49 5 pages.wvvw.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASrN/09715661 QO/ossnet-20Robert D. Steele, TH E N E W CRAFT O F INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & "Political (OSS International Press, 2002), 438 pages.wvvw.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0971566119/ossnet-20Gregory D. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, I(Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2001), 28 2 pages.wvvw.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/052158096X/ossnet-20Notra Trulock, Code Name KINDRED SPIRIT: Inside th e Chinese NuclearEspionage Scandal (Encounter Books, 2003),www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/l 89355451 l /ossnet-20Cees W iebes, Intelligence an d the War in Bosnia 1992 - 1995 (Lit Verlag London,2003), 463 pp.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASlN/9053527427/ossnet-2QAmy Zegart, Flawed by Design: the Evolution of the CIA, JCS, an d N SC (Stanford , /University Press, 2000), 342 pages.www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/08047413 1 X/ossnet-20


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Version 1.7About the Author

25

Robert David Steele is the Chief Executive Officer of OSS.Net, a public intelligence an dpublic service w eb site an d training company that serves as the hub for a mult i -companyGlobal Intelligence Partnership. He has been a Marine Corps infantry officer, aclandestine operations case officer (one of the first to be assigned the terrorist target), anda senior civilian in Marine Corps intelligence, where he was responsible for designingan d creating th e Marine Corps Intelligence Command, our Nation's newest nationalintelligence production facility. Since 1992 he has been the foremost proponent for OpenSource Intelligence (OSENT), training over 6,000 profes sional in telligence officers fromover 40 countries. He is the author o f N A T O Op en Source Intelligence Handbook, whichcan be found on his w eb site, and the author of two books on intelligence reform. He hasedited an d published the first book on peacekeeping intelligence, an d commissioned newbooks (forthco min g) on comme rcial intelligence and on law enforcem ent intelligence .His cu rrent work in progress, on nation al security intelligence, will make tw o p oints: thatintelligence is not im pa cting on the U.S. budget, and needs to; and that national securityis about much more than a heavy-metal military that is irrelevant and ineffective against90% of the threats that Am erica must face in the 21 st Century.

t2 b21 lederman- open sources 2 of 2 fdr- oss-net- letter to zelikow and white paper on...

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