t5 b43 jan 26-27 hearing notes 1 of 2 fdr- team 5 staff statement outline- draft 101

8/14/2019 T5 B43 Jan 26-27 Hearing Notes 1 of 2 Fdr- Team 5 Staff Statement Outline- Draft 101

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BORDERS, TRANSPORTATION, A ND M ANAGING RISKJanuary 26-27, 2004TEAM 5 STAFF STATEMENT OUTLINE - DRAFTComm ission Sensitive

Staff Statement One: The Border Security System Prior to September 11(JKR and TE)I. IntroductionII . The U.S. Border Security System pre-9-1 1 (Exhibit - simple chart).rou* The State Depa rtment: visas, watchlists, rel. w/ FBI and CIA (TE) The INS: role in CT and entry (primary an d secondary) (JKR) Interior En forcement such as it was (JKR) Imm igration Benefits such as it was (JKR)III. How the hijackers got into the United States - debunking the myth of clean

operatives, clean visas, clean entries, and clean stays. Clean operatives? No. Al Qaeda's tactics (including any document andpassport fraud) learned from the detainee reports and CIA finishedintelligence. (Exhibit - hijackers' passports, and possibly, notebook)(SG)

Discussion of how the hijackers gained "legal" access to the U.S. Clean visas? Not really. Opp ortunities at the consulates. Visas for the 1 9hijackers (Exhibit - visa applications). Clean applicants? Not entirely.A brief bit on Saudi visa policy and its origins. 214(b)'s prominence. Visaexpress in Saudi Arabia. Issues with their visa applications an dopportunities to catch the hijackers. Exam ples of Khalid Al Mihdhar,KSM show flaws. (TE) Clean entries? At least not for the pilots. Opportunities at our border.Total numbers on entries for all hijackers (eg opportunities lost w/o intel);3 referrals to secondary inspection (explain what that is) out of these andopportunities to exclude two of the pilots. Entry of the 19 hijackers

(Exhibit - Secondary report(s)). Atta for his unapproved M -lapplication; S. Al Ghamdi b/Q_he listed no address on his 1-94, spoke littleEnglish, and had a one way ticket; and Al Shehhi to determine whetherhad legit extension/change of status from B2 to Ml. (JKR) Clean stays? Not entirely. Opportunities fo r interior enforcement. Focuson Jarrah and Ha njou r, and N. Al-Hazm i. Student visa and interior


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enforcement issues with particular focus on the pilots (Exhibit - changeof status applications o f Atta an d Al Shehhi) . Absolutely not. 3overstays (Atta, Ha njo ur, N. al- Hazm i). Student applicationviolations (Atta abdicated his when left th e U.S., Hanjour failed to showup). Local law enforcem ent could have detected them had they beenlooking. (JKR)IV . W hat went right? A description of hijackers and plotters who didn 't makeit in and why. (Exhibit - chart o f runner-ups and what happened to them). [Note:Need to figure out what to do with Moussaoui.] (TE, JKR)

Visas: Jihad A l Ghamdi, Binalshibh, Essabar, Ali Aziz, Entry: Qahtani Other: Al Ham lan, Saud Al Rasheed, Zuhair Al Thubaiti

V. A critical assessment of the reasons for success and opportun ities lostincluding consideration of programs such as entry-exit and student tracking (Exhibit -opportunities and how many indicators applied) (All)Panel One: Ma in Points we w ant to elicit from each witnessRyan (TE):The law did not present ay obstacles to denying visas to terrorists before 9-11. Althoughth e standards fo r keeping out terrorist w as high, if they lied, you could always use 214(b).Tipoff was a major innovation and success that kept out a lot of terrorists.State did not give great scrutiny to the visa applicants from Saudi Arabia , UAE, Egypt,an d Lebanon. Visa Express was consistent with State's mandates and beliefs abut theintelligence. CO's were m ostly concerned with 214(b).The computer system was not designed to check the truth of assertions on visaapplications.The State Department compartmentalized security in the visa process, and believedreasonably that they were getting all the intelligence they needed. [Note: hard to finessewatchlist issue here to be discussed later in staff statement.]Interviewing fo r terrorists is difficult and not something CO's had been trained to do. Aninterview can provide useful information, but interviewing everyone creates a great drainon resources, and may not be the best way to manage risk an d balance commerce an dsecurity. Interviewing everyone was not an option for CA prior to 9-1 1 .Visa waiver was helpful to State, and, although it posed risks, State believed they wereaddressed adequately.


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Biometrics will help, but will not solve the intelligence problem.State was responsive and helpful in developing pilot student tracking program , but in theen d the INS pulled th e plug.Meissner (JKR):There was adequate la w available to exclude or remove the hijacker pilots; however,some of the laws key to exclusion or removal failed to be implemented, eg entry-exit andstudent tracking.Visa issuance inform ation was not available at primary.CT was not given a high priority in INS pre 9-11; the NS U Unit had solid personnel, bu twere self-tasked and under resourced.The INS was wholly reliant on State for its terrorist lookouts, and State in turn waswholly dependent on the intelligence community.The INS was an extremely complicated myriad of services an d enforcement, and haddifficulty creating or implementing holistic strategies or programs. student tracking (fully piloted, with biometric id card, but denied developmentbecause of lack of support from senior management) entry-exit (no pilot, Canada, trade groups and N Border governors not in favor of

it ) fraud and backlogs in timely adjudication required a holistic approach, but neverconsidered, despite the well publicized problems in both areasAccess to intelligence was extremely limited, and there was no effort to collect andanalyze C T information from inspectors, Border Patrol, or interior enforcement prior to9-11.Full immigration information integration was never considered which would create"border bios" of aliens. The databases were difficult to use, informationally inadequate,no t available to all users who needed them and the technology supporting them wasinadequate.Inspectors were never given adequate or continuing training on document fraud orinterview techniques.No entity with oversight over the INS ever took interior enforcement seriously, so thepossibly of actually enforcing the law against those who managed to get within USborders was minimal .Visa Waiver was an additional burde n on an already stressed border system.Panel Two; An Incident in Florida


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Main Points we want to elicit from Melendez-Perez (JKR)Hum an beings, not just technology, ar e critical in countering terrorism.Interviews by CBP officers conducted by those well trained in behavior and interviewtechniques can yield significant results. M P relied on a DOJ Arab language translator and his own military training ininterviewing. The docum ents looked clean so no FDL support, and no Customsor JTTF involvement.

Q looked like a hit man, told inconsistent stories, and seemed evasive. Q's demeanor and respon ses indicated he was lying, and conf irmed M P's growingsuspicion that he was a secur ity risk to the US.

The fingerprint and photo taken in secondary inspection helped confirm that the Qremoved on August 4, 2001 at Orlando was the sam e Q at Gitmo.MP an d other inspectors have broad discretion to turn people around at the border.However, the culture at the border has been to err on the side of admission, not exclusion,despite the letter of the law being the opposite. G ive exam ple.Initiative like M P's was not always rewarded. Saudis, who flew directly into Orlandoduring the sum m er months, were presum ed adm issible and "untouchable", as most werefamilies on their way to Disney W orld.Q had a numbe r of indicators that led to his being pulled into secondary - call it profilingon intending im m igrants and drug couriers.M P received unusual support for his request to rem ove Q, and attempt to place Q underoath and creatively use existing law to rem ove him .The FBI never followed up with M P, even after Q ended up at Gitmo and his link to 9/11was established, despite MP providing the local JTTF Q's secondary inspection report on9/11 itself.In the new CBP, immigration officers need to be treated with dignity, or good ones likeM P m a y resign.Statement Two: The Hijackers and Watchlists (SG)

I. The W atchlist IssueWhat is a watchlist and how does it work?The story of State an d Tipof f , the Blind Sheikh and ViperThe CIA and watchlistingThe FBI and watchlisting


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The Hazmi and Mihdhar story (as best we can tell it publicly) (SG, BG)II . A critical assessment of the opportunities lost, to include the earliermaterial on border system s, State an d INS.

Panel Three; Visas and Watchlist ins TodayMain Points we want to elicit from each witnessZiglarPre 9/11: job assigned by Ashcroft was to restructure the INS; CT was not on the bill oflading.On 9/11: the borders were not shut down, they were put on high threat level, meaning everyperson and vehicle was searched. This did slow things down significantly. Ziglar had to give new authority at headquarters to get command and control inthe field, via Border Patrol. A tremendous strain w as placed on human resources at the border, with BorderPatrol and the National Guard soon called in for backup In attempting to address th e 9/11 investigation, INS was given certain chores In attempting to address prevention of another 9/11, strong ideas w ere put forwardin the SIOC that later bore fruition in four alien initatives, mostly imposed uponZiglar without prior discussion.Post 9/11:

Ziglar quantifies what it would take for the INS to truly secure the borders, whilecontinuing the attempt at restructure. Ultimately, the restructure is not permittedto move forward, as Ziglar receives a call from Andy C ard that DHS is supportedby the WH. Interagency coordination on border security.

BonnerPre 9/11: job as seen by Bonner was to increase the private public partnership on tradewhile enforcing the law.O n 9/11:

Not sworn in until 9/20, but Verrone agreed with Ziglar to declare threat level atPOEs . Any "emergency response" on 9/11 conducted by Customs. Interagen cy coordination on border security.

Versa


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Pre 9/11 border support: Posse Com itatus defined at the border Border Patrol w ith equipment, personnel and technology. Personnel pull back after fatal use of weapon, which was maintained even after9/11

9/11: ??Post 9/11: Request from Ashcroft and response, ie use of National Guard andequipment/technology and February MO U Intelligence integration w ithin US to support borders

Panel Four: The Response on the borders to September 11Main Points we want to elicit from each witnessHarty (SG. TE)Harty has made m any changes since 9-11,Resnick (SG. TE)Bucella (SG, TE)

t5 b43 jan 26-27 hearing notes 1 of 2 fdr- team 5 staff statement outline- draft 101

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