t7 b1 baer- susan fdr- 10-24-03 mfr 198

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    FO R O P P I C I A .L U 3 G O N L YM E M O R A N D U M FOR T HE R E C O R D

    Event: Susan Baer, N ew Jersey Airports G eneral Manager for the P ort Authority of N ewY ork and New JerseyType: InterviewDate: October 24 , 2003Team: 7Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Lisa SullivanParticipants (non-Com m ission): Susan Baer; E d Begley, C ounsel for P ort Authority forNY and NJ; Amy Revina, Counsel for Gallagher Gosseen Faller and Crowley; MichaelCrowley, Counsel for Gosseen Faller and Crowley; and Karl Lunan, Counsel for PortAuthority of N Y and N JParticipants (Commission): Sam Brinkley, John Raidt, and Lisa SullivanLocation: N Y / N J P ort Authority Building 1 at N ewark Airport, N ew Jersey( E d Begley , Counsel or Po r t Authority began to ld Com miss ion s t a f f that he sent a letterto General Counsel ( M a r c u s ) yesterday inde xing what docum ents wil l be provided to theCom miss ion in response to team 7 's Port Authori ty Docum ent Reque st No. 2 . The letteraddressed do cum ents in developm ent by the Port Authority for i ts awn us and have no tbeen shown to any outside e ntity at the t ime, which regard sec uri ty of a ll Port A uthori tyfacilit ies. The f o rm a t for exchange o f th e documents in quest ion has n ot been decidedyet, There is litigation going on right now that has to be decided f i rst in order to ensurethat security at Port A uthori ty is not compromised by the sharing of such internaldocuments.Begley also wanted to know i f th e Skyscraper Committee had been involved - w i t h team 7 ' sw o r k to date.BackgroundSusan Baer has been the General Manager of New York and New Jersey Port Authorityairports since June of 1998. This includes N ewark L iberty International Airport, Tetcboroairport, and all general aviation airports in the area. Before 1998, she was GeneralManager of La G uardia Airport in New York f r o m 1994-98. For the Port Authority, shehas also managed the Lincoln Tunnel and bus terminals.

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    TO R O F F I C I A L U SE OlIL'fknowledgeable and competent manager. J ohn Jacoby, h er manager of the operationsside, has been promoted to her deputy.

    O f security briefings, Baer said she got them as issues came up . On a monthly basis, sh em et with th e carriers an d others involved with th e security at die airport. This Consortiawas a coordinated effort set up after the TW A 800 crash. She said the Federal SecurityManager (FAA regulatory role) participated, as did the C A SFO o n occasion. Local lawenforcement and the FBI would also brief th e gpoup from t ime to time. M inutes were kepto f these meetings bu t they w ere never detailedG&fe/orgitf to ask for this from Dulles ^about the consortium^ Within th e PA , periodically meetings were held at a high level todiscuss security at all the PA airports. It was high priority, even before 9-11.Newark airport became a category X airport shortly before 9-11. T he airport had alreadybeen operating an d treated as a cat x airport fo r some time, in the sense that annualcomprehensive assessments of the airport were conducted every year. T he biggestchange w as the promotion Ru ssell White received from C A S F U to F S M .O n that note, Baer commented that she was fortunate that White was an active mem ber ofth e airport community.

    rNoth ing she was a ware of gave her the im pression that security was lax at Newark ,^ 9-

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    FOR OFFICIAL USE O N L Yof applicable explanations to prove that person was not in prison. Fingerprinting was themost reliable way to ensure this. That point of credentialing and background test wasonly to determine if the applicant had ever been incarcerated in the United States; shestressed it was not to uncover any potential terrorist affiliations.Baer did not recall anyone applying for a job at the airport and being turned downbecause of a failure to meet the background check requirement, nor did she rememberanyone repeatedly attempting to get a job at the airport.In the event an applicant was not hired, Baer was notified as to why the person was notcredentialed. Again, she didn't recall instances of this. In the case of employees hired bythe air carriers and the screener companies; she only received notifications on applicantsthe carriers were sponsoring. In those instances, the General Manager's office just"signed off' on the request to credential someone, as long as the background check wascompleted (TRUE??).

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    Snow equipmentand contractors' equipment w as used to close the access points.Complicating matters was the huge resource drain because of officials going to assist atground zero. < $ "htijAs^O n that day, the FSM w as /presence. He or she was encountering the same problemswith getting useful inform ation from authorities. "He w ent to av sec 4 but that didn 'tm ake m uch of a difference," she said.She remem bers c alling over to U nited (the local folks) at on e point to see if there w asanything airport could do. By then, the FBI was on the scene working with detectivesan d United. Nothing w as done to screen those passengers that got off the plane. Theywould have walked away. There w as no mechanism in place at that point.Airport did not even think about reverse screening of passengers. They were dealing withthe hum an needs of all the passengers. All the tunne ls were closed, the bridges. The ideaat the tim e was for the planes to g o to the closest airport.After Action Reports, Recommendations:Newark - Baer did not do an after action report. "By the time we could h ave gotten tothat, it w ouldn ' t have m ade an y sense," she said.What was a concern at the time and wo uld have helped w as getting better informationfrom a nation al source (from the FA A security folks). B ecause she was at a loss, herdecisions on that day she characterized as "reactive to the events." If she knew a littlebetter what w as happening, m aybe she wo uld h ave screened passengers coming off theplanes. W ithout the kno wledg e of what was going on, she could only have so muchforesight, she said.Certainly, there have been calls from all sources about how to do this better. Quickly thecongressional decision to establish TS A demonstrates that. Baer reported that her teamha s been w orking closely with them and the new players. "I t is not perfect," she said. Sheis lucky in th at the FSD is great and w orking with her is a good thing. "She has beenwilling to share; there have been frank discussions." Initially, Baer thought there was alack of clarity on roles because Congress established the TSA so quickly. She described itas this: "set up an entity w ith wide power, lacking ability to f u l f i l l it , aad wjithouual]dng_to others about the use of that power;"For instance, she found out in a meeting that M arcus Arroyo can shut down the airport.She didn't know that. I t isn ' t a turf thing, she said. It's a q uestion of jurisdictional lines.Notification processes, and conditions. It hasn't been properly articulated."Adm iral Loy is getting promoted to som ething in DHS. He'sm ade great strides bu t . . , .There is a ways to go," she said.

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    FOR OFFICIAL USB ONLY

    She thinks the TSA "needs to bite a big bullet an d implement CAPPS IE." In theautomated age, airlinereservations systems could be better coordinated.

    9/11 Classified Information

    There is a need to integrate the information that they do have, while maintaining theconfidentiality.JR: "SDs are intrusive; costly mandates..." She thinks the FAA is going to the troublecredentialing someone. At some point, trust needs to be granted. Screening every personthat needs to go out to an airport concourse ("take off your shoes, yada yada...") iscounterproductive. She questions what the appropriate level of screening should be for acredentialed person. Certain people should be taken out of the screening loop each timethey go out on the ramp.She talked about the need to keep people flying, system could run smoother at the airportUni ty ofCommand issues-She doesn't know if you can create a federal bureau that can do all of it. That wouldn'tnecessarily make the situation better, she thought. "TSA has law enforce authority but nofunding for it," she remarked. Port Authority police have overall law enforcementresponsibility for the airport. She doesn t knowif it's better to federalize it. Shecommented, "there is something to be said for knowing the environment and thepassengers that affects the security judgment ofsecurity personnel."She thinks the problem was more (still is) a focus on an outdated paradigm. The systemwas looking for what was tested- grenades, handguns, etc - they were looking at thehijacks of the seventies. "The traditional model was never updated. In comparison, theIsraelis look for terrorists, not weapons. We still look for weapons. Given what it wassupposed to do, it did it well. Detected the lEDs."Baer does not recall the FAA security test results ever showing that failures at Newark.

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