t7 b4 excerpts of joint inquiry report fdr- entire contents- team 7 related excerpts of ji report w...

8/14/2019 T7 B4 Excerpts of Joint Inquiry Report Fdr- Entire Contents- Team 7 Related Excerpts of JI Report w Notes and Und

1/100


2/100

^ ABRIDGED FINDINGS ANDCONCLUSIONSFACTUAL FINDINGS

1.Finding: While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuableintelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified thetime, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11,2001.Nonetheless, the Communitydid have information that was clearly relevant to theSeptember 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance.2. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experienceda significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida intended tostrike against U.S. interests in the very near future.3. Finding: Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the IntelligenceCommunity received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting thatindicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States. Nonetheless, testimonyand interviews confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence Community, in thespring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks would most likely occur

V against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and intentions to attack in theJf domestic United States.4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the IntelligenceCommunity received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, amongother means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulateany specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reactionto, this form of threat.5. Finding: Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regarding theattacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11,2001, theCommunity too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate itscollective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither did the IntelligenceCommunity demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new transnationalthreats. Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data being collectedwere overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at the time andtherefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the part of foreigngovernments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have been established. For allthose reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully capitalize on available, andpotentially important, information. The sub-findings below identify each category of thisinformation.

XI


3/100

information or any of the other intelligence information pertaining to al-Mihdhar an dal-Hazmi, prior to September 11, 2001. As a result, the FBI missed the opportunity totask a uniquely well-positioned informant who denies having any advanceknowledge of the plot to collect information about the hijackers an d their planswithin the United States].

The Phoenix Electronic Communication5.e. On July 10,2001, an FBI Phoenix field office agent sent an "ElectronicCommunication" to 4 individuals in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) and twopeople in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI headquarters, and to two agentson International Terrorism squads in the New York Field Office. In thecommunication, the agent expressed his concerns, based on his first-hand knowledge,that there was a coordinated effort underwayby Bin Ladin to send students to theUnited States for civil aviation-related training. He noted that there was an"inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" in this type oftraining inArizona and expressed his suspicion that this was an effort to establish a cadre ofindividuals in civil aviation who would conduct future terrorist activity. The PhoenixEC requested that FBI Headquarters consider implementing four recommendations: accumulate a list of civil aviation university/colleges around the country; establish liaison with these schools; discuss the theories contained in the Phoenix EC with the Intelligence Community; and consider seeking authority to obtain visa information concerning individuals seeking toattend flight schools.However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action requested by the Phoenixagent prior to September 11,2001. The communication generated little or no interest ateither FBI Headquarters or the FBI's NewYork field office.

The FBI Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui5.f. In August 2001, the FBI's Minneapolis field office, in conjunction with the INS,detained Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national who had enrolled in flight training inMinnesota. FB I agents there also suspected that Moussaouiwas involved in a^hijacking plot. FBI Headquarters attorneys determined that there was not probableV^cause to obtain a court order to [page x iv ] search Moussaoui's belongings under the

< ^ j * Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel at FBI Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalism Unit and the National SecurityLaw Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolis field office, misunderstood the legalstandard for obtaining an order under FISA. As a result, FBI Minneapolis FieldOffice personnel wasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect theChechen rebels to al-Qa'ida. Finally, no one at the FBI apparently connected the

Moussaoui investigation with the heightened threat environment in the summer of

TOP SECRET xiii


4/100

.. F

< r/#-p

X .>**/ ~

^

14. Finding: [Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to use U.S. military assets toconduct offensive counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, or to support or participate inCIA operations directed against al-Qa'ida prior to September 11. At least part of thisreluctance was driven by the military's view that the Intelligence Community was unable toprovide the intelligence needed to support military operations. Although the U.S. militarydid participate in [ ] counterterrorism efforts to counter Usama Bin Ladin's terroristnetwork prior to September 11,2001, most of the military's focus was on force protection].

15. Finding: The Intelligence Community depended heavily on foreign intelligence and lawenforcement services for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct ofother counterterrorism activities. The results were mixed in terms of productiveintelligence, reflecting vast differences in the ability and willingness of the various foreignservices to target the Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida network. Intelligence Community agenciessometimes failed to coordinate their relationships with foreign services adequately, eitherwithin the Intelligence Community or with broader U.S. Government liaison and foreignpolicy efforts. This reliance on foreign liaison services also resulted in a lack of focus on thedevelopment of unilateral human sources.16. Finding: [The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the United States appear tohave been financed, in large part, from monies sent to them from abroad and also brought inv on their persons. Prior to I page s ix ) September 11, there was no coordinated U.S.

J \e strategyto track terrorist funding andclose down their financial supportV of networks. There was also a reluctance in some parts of the U.S. Government to trackOvjQterro"st funding and close down their financial support networks. As a result, the U.S.jf Government was unable to disrupt financial support for Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist^ activities effectively.]

RELATED FINDINGS

17. Finding: Despite intelligence reporting from 1998 through the summer of 2001indicating that Usama Bin Ladin's terrorist network intended to strike inside the UnitedStates, the United States Government did not undertake a comprehensive effort toimplement defensive measures in the United States.

f 18. Finding: Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterrorism strategy adopted bythe U. S. Government did not succeed in eliminating Afghanistan as a sanctuary and/training ground forUsama BinLadin's terrorist network. A range of instruments wasused

to counter al-Qa'ida, with law enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because otherxviii


5/100

means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to produce results. While generatingnumerous successful prosecutions, law enforcement efforts were not adequateby themselvesto target or eliminate Bin Ladin's sanctuary. The United States persisted in observing therule of law and accepted norms of international behavior, but Bin Ladin and al-Qa'idarecognized no rules and thrived in the safe haven provided by Afghanistan.19. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community and the U.S. Governmentlabored to prevent attacks by Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist network against the UnitedStates, but largely without the benefit of an alert, mobilized and committed Americanpublic. Despite intelligence information on the immediacy of the threat level in the springand summer of 2001, the assumption prevailed in the U.S. Government that attacks of themagnitude of September 11 could not happen here. As a result, there was insufficient effortto alert the American public to the reality and gravity of the threat.20. Finding: Located in Part Four Entitled "Finding, Discussion and Narrative RegardingCertain Sensitive National Security Matters."

xx


6/100

the attacks that occurred on that day. The record that has been established through thisInquiry leads to the following factual findings and conclusions.1. Finding; While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuableintelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of itidentified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned forSeptember 11,2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information that wasclearly relevant to the September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for itscollective significance.

Discussion: This Inquiry has uncovered no intelligence information in thepossession of the Intelligence Community prior to the attacks of September 11 that, iffully considered, would have provided specific, advance*warning of the details of thoseattacks. The task of the Inquiry was not, however, limited to a search for the legendary,and often absent, "smoking gun." The facts surrounding the September 11 attacksdemonstrate the importance of strengthening the Intelligence Community's ability todetect and prevent terrorist attacks in what appears to be the more common, but also farmore difficult, scenario. Within the huge volume of intelligence reporting that wasavailable prior to September 11, there were various threads and pieces of informationthat, at least in retrospect, are both relevant and significant. The degree to which theCommunity was or was not able to build on that informationto discern the bigger picture[page 8] successfully is a critical part of the context for the September 11 attacks and isaddressed in the findings that follow.2. Finding; During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Communityexperienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.

Discussion: The National Security Agency (NSA), for example, reported at least33 communications indicatinga possible, imminent terrorist attack in 2001. Senior U.S.government officials were advised by the Intelligence Community on June 28 and July10, 2001, that the attacks were expected, among other things, to "have dramaticconsequences on governments or cause major casualties" and that "[a]ttack preparationshave been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning."


7/100

K

[Of particular interest to the Joint Inquiry was w hether and to wha t extent the Presidentreceived threat-specific w arnings during this period. The Joint Inquiry was advised by arepresentative of the Intelligence Community that, in August 2001, a closely held intelligencereport for senior government officials included information that Bin Ladin had wanted toconduct attacks in the United States since 1997. The inform ation included discussion of thearrest of Ahmed Ressam in December 1999 at the U.S.-Canadian border and the 1998 bom bingsof U.S. embassies in K enya and Tanzania. It mentioned that members of al-Qa'ida, includingsome U.S. citizens, had resided in or traveled to the United States for years and that the groupapparen tly maintained a support structure here. The report cited uncorrobo rated informationfobtained and disseminated in 1998 that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack airplanes to gain the releaseo/U.S.-held extremists; FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations forhijackings or other types of attacks; as well as information acquired in May 2001 that indicated a

,- > /. group of Bin Ladin supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives].[Page 10]4. Finding; From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, theIntelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists werecontemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. Thisinformation did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, orcollective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat.

Discussion: [While the credibility of the sources was sometimes questionab le andthe information often sketchy, the Inquiry confirmed that the Intelligence Com munity didreceive intelligence reporting concerning the potential use of aircraft as weapons. Forexample, the Com munity received information in 1998 about a Bin Ladin operation thatwould involve flying an explosive- laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and, in summer 2001,about a plot to bomb a U.S. embassy from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. TheFB I and CIA were also aware that convicted terrorist Abdul Hakim M urad and severalothers had discussed the possibility of crashing an airplane into CIAHeadquarters as partof "the Bojinka Plot" in the Philippines, discussed later in this report. Some, but

National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice stated in a May 16, 2002 press briefing that, on August 6, 2001, thePresident's Daily Brief (PDB) included information about Bin Ladin's methods of operation from a historicalperspective dating back to 1997. One of the methods was that Bin Ladin might choose to highjack an airliner in orderto hold passengers hostage to gain release of one of their operatives. She stated, however, that the report did notcontain specific warning information, but only a generalized warning, and did not contain information that al-Qa'idawas discussing a particular planned attack against a specific target at any specific time, place, or by any specificmethod.


8/100

apparently not all, of these reports were disseminated within the Intelligence CommunityX O and to other agencies].

The Transportation Security Administration, for example, advised the Committeesthat the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not received three of these reports,' ""jT ---. ' " " ' ~ : j, that two others were received by the FAA but through State Department cables^and thatone report was received by the FAA, but only after September 11, 2001. Many*

< j > Even within the Intelligence Community, the possibility of using aircraft asweapons was apparently not widely known. At the FBI, for instance, the FBI Phoenixfield office agent who wrote the so-called "Phoenix memo" testified that he was aware of

^the plot to crash a plane into CIA Headquarters, but not the other reports of terrorist-, groups considering the use of aircraft as weapons. The Chief of the Radical

Fundamentalist Unit in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division also confirmed, in an JointInquiry interview, that he was not aware of such reports.

5. Finding; Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regardingthe attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11,2001, the Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider andappreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neitherdid the Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips

10


9/100

Again, in that meeting, the CIA had missed yet another opportunity to advise theFBI about al-Mihdhar's visa and possible travel to the United States and, again, the CIAtook no action to w atchlist these individuals. Just two days later, al-Mihdhaf obtained anew U .S. visa and, on July 4, 2001, he re-entered the U nited States.

It was not until mid July 2001, that a concerned CIA officer assigned to the FBItriggered a CIA review of its cables regarding the Malaysia meeting, a task that, [page 16]ironically, fell to an FBI analyst assigned to the CTC. Working w ith the Imm igration andNaturalization Service (INS), the FBI analyst determined that both al-Mihdhar and al-

,f\ihad entered the United States. As a result of that effort, onAugust 23, 2001, the.J *CIA finally notified the FBI and requested of the State Department that the two individuals\^lr should be watchlisted.

Jj ^ Even then, there wasless than an all-out effort to locate what amounted to twoBin Ladin-associated terrorists in the United States during a period when the terroristthreat level had escalated to a peak level. For example, neither CIA, FBI, nor S tate

\ Department informed the FA/y On-Augnst 21^-3001 n cniriddentallv. FAA had issued aSecurity Directive, entitled "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators." That Direc tive alertedcommercial airlines that nine named terrorism-associated individuals - none of whomwere connected to the 19 hijackers^- were planning com mercial air travel and shouldreceive additional security scrutinyjf they attempted to board an aircraft^The Directivewas updated on August 24 and A ugust 28, 2001. Had FAA been advised of the presenceof al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in the United States, a similardirective could have beenissued, subjecting the two, their luggage and any carry-on items to detailed, FAA -directed searches.

Further, only the FBI's New Y ork field office received a request from FB IHeadquarters to con duct a search for the two prior to September 11, 2001. TheHeadquarters written instruction to the New York field office only identified al-Mihdharin its subject line. Nawaf al-Hazmi was mentioned in the text, and it is not clear whetherit was intended that he be a subject of the search as well. It was not until September 11,2001 that the Los Angeles FBI field office was asked to conduct a search. Other FB I

15


10/100

SECRET

or *j?

cvV t


11/100

dealing with real-time threats, real-timer issues trying to render fugitivesback to the United States from overseas for justice. And again, it is aresource issue.

The Phoenix agent was correct, and his communication did fall to the bottom of the pile.

He sent the communication to four individuals in the Radical FundamentalistUnit, two individuals in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit, and two agents on Internationalterrorism squads in the New York field office. Only three of the eight addressees recallreading the communication prior to September 11, 2001. Neither of the two IntelligenceOperations Specialists who reviewed it at FBI Headquarters undertook a comprehensivenational analysis of the theories it set forth. Nor did they send the communication to theFBI's analytic unit or the Intelligence Community, as requested by the Phoenix agent.Instead, it was forwarded to the Portland FBI field office, not primarily because ofconcerns about flight school theories, but rather because that field office had a possibleinvestigative interest in one of the individuals who were named in the communication.

Similarly, the New York field office personnel who reviewed the communicationsaid they found it to be speculative and not particularly significant. That office had beenone of the recipients of a 1999 FBI Headquarters request to track Islamic flight studentsin its area of jurisdiction.[Page 23]

The Chief of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit testified that he did not see thecommunication prior to September 11, 2001. In his testimony before the Joint Inquiry,FBI Director Mueller acknowledged that: "the Phoenix [communication] should havebeen disseminated to all field offices and to our sister agencies, and it should havetriggered a broader analytical approach."

After September 11, the FBI discovered that [- -], one of the individualswho was identified in the Phoenix communication, was an associate of hijacker Hani

The identities of several individuals whose activities are discussed in this report have been deleted by theJoint Inquiry. While the FBI has provided the Joint Inquiry with these names and those names arecontained in the classified version of this final report, the Joint Inquiry has decided to delete them from thisunclassified version due to the as yet unresolved nature of much of the information regarding theiractivities.

21


12/100

TOP SECRETHanjour. [This individual] left the United States in April 2000 and returned in June 2001remaining in the United States for approximately one month. The FBI now speculatesthat [the individual] may have returned to the United States either to evaluate Hanjour'sflying skills, or to provide Hanjour with his final training on the flight simulator beforethe September 11 attacks. [The individual] was an experienced flight instructor who wascertified to fly Boeing 737s.

The FBI also has determined since September 11, 2001 that another individualmentioned hi thePhoenix communication - [ ] is also connectedto the al-Qa'ida network. [ ] was arrested at an al-Qa'ida safehouse in

-], one of the most prominent al-Qa'idaakistan hi 2002 along with [-facilitators.

The FBI Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui5.f. In August 2001, the FBI's Minneapolis field office, in conjunctionwith the INS, detained Zacarias Moussaoui, a French national whohad enrolled in flight training in Minnesota. FBI agents there alsosuspected that Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot. FBIHeadquarters attorneys determined that there was not probable causeto obtain a court order to search Moussaoui's belongings under theForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, personnel atFBI Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalist Unit andthe National Security Law Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolisfield office, misunderstood the legal standard for obtaining an orderunder FISA. As a result, FBI Minneapolis field office personnelwasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect the Chechenrebels to al-Qa'ida. Finally, no one at the FBI apparently connectedthe Moussaoui investigation with the heightened threat environment[page 24] in the summer of 2001, the Phoenix communication, or theentry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States.Discussion: On February 23,2001, Moussaoui entered the United States at

Chicago's O'Hare Airport, traveling on a French passport that allowed him to stay in thecountry without a visa for 90 days, until May 22, 2001. On August 11 , 2001, Moussaouiand his roommate arrived in Eagan, Minnesota to begin classes at Pan Am, a flight schoolthat offered training on a Boeing 747 flight simulator used by professional pilots.

22


13/100

According to FBI documents, on Augu st 15, an employee at Pan Am called the F BI'sMinneapolis field office because he and other employees w ere suspicious of Moussaoui,who met none of the usual qualifications for Pan Am students. The FBI's Minneapolisfield office opened an international terrorism investigation and determined that, sinceMoussaoui had been authorized to stay in the United States only un til May 22, 2001, hewas no longer inproper legal status. ^'\*taa$- .j ^v vvOn the same day the Minneapolis field office learned about Moussaoui, it askedboth the CIA and the FBI's legal attache in Paris for any information about Moussaouiand informed FB I Headquarters of the investigation. The FBI Headquarters agent whowas responsible for the contact suggested that the Minneapolis field office put Moussaouiunder surveillance. How ever, a Minneapolis field office supervisory agent testified to theJoint Inquiry that:

... .[m]y background in the criminal arena suggests that when a violationoccurs and you can stop further or potential criminal activity, you act onthat. So that is exactly what I instructed the agents to do. ... Because Idid n't wan t him to get any additional time on a flight simulator that wouldallow him to hav e the knowledg e that we could no longer take back fromhim to operate an aircraft.INS agents took Moussaoui into custody onAugust 16 because his authority to

stay in the United States had expired. Moussaoui declined to consent to a search of hisbelongings. On Saturday, Aug ust 18, the Minneapolis field office sent a detailedmem orandum to an agent in the Radical Fundamentalist U nit (RFU) at FBI H eadquartersdescribing the investigation.[Page 25]

The mem orandum stated that Moussaoui had two knives, padded gloves and shinguards in his possession when he was arrested; had told his roommate that "true Muslimsmust prepare themselves to fight;" and had begun exercise and martial arts training. Inaddition, the mem orandum stated that the Minneapolis field office believed thatMoussaoui and his roommate were part of a larger international radical fundamentalistgroup. Based on Moussaoui's "possession of weapons and his preparation throughphysical training for violent co nfrontation," the Minneapolis filed office stated it hadreason to believe that M oussaoui, his roommate, "and others yet unknown," wereconspiring to seize control of an airplane.


14/100


15/100

0>TOP SECRETsearch Moussaoui's belongings under F ISA. The Minneapolis field office agent testifiedto the Joint Inquiry that he had had no training in FISA, bu t that he believed, based onadvice from FBI Headquarters, that "we needed to identify a - and the term that wasthrown around was 'recognized foreign power' and so that was our operational theory."As the FBI's Deputy G eneral Counsel has testified, however, this was incorrect. The FBIm ay obtain a search warrant under FIS A for an agent of any international terrorist group,including the Chechen rebels. Because of this misunderstanding, the Minneapolis fieldoffice expended valuable time and effort trying to establish a connection between theChechen rebels and al-Qa'ida, which it believed was a "recognized" foreign power].

The FBI H eadquarters supervisory agent briefed the FBI's Deputy GeneralCounsel, who testified that he agreed with the Headquarters agent that there wasinsufficient information to show that M oussaoui was an agent of a foreign power. TheFBI's focus shifted to arranging for Moussaoui's deportation to France on Septem ber 17,2001, at which point French officials would search his belongings and provide the resultsto the FBI. Althou gh the FBI was no longer considering a search warrant under FISA , noone revisited the idea of attem pting to obtain a crim inal search warrant.

~t r'a '11 ~~~~"dgt .L ! j

Thus, during the summer of 2001 a time when the Intelligence Community was on thehighest state of alert, disparate parts of the FBI had information about Zacarias Moussaoui - asuspected suicide hijacker, a Phoenix field office agent's suspicions about radicalfundamentalists engaging in flight training, and the entry into the United States of Naw af al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who would become two of the September 11 hijackers. The FBIfield office agents in Minneapolis who were investigating M oussaoui knew nothing about thePhoenix com m unication or al-Hazm i and al-Mihdhar. The Phoenix field office agent had neverheard about Moussaoui or the two future hijackers. The FBI agents in New Y ork who wereinformed on Au gust 23, 2001 that al-Hazm i and al-Mihdhar had entered the United States knewnothing about the other events of that sum m er. And, finally, the Chief of the RFU at FBIHeadquarters, which had handled bo th the Moussaoui investigation and the Phoenixcommunication, acknowledged in testimony to the Joint Inquiry on September 24,2001, that noone at FBI Headquarters connected those events.

TOP-SECRET- 25


16/100

TOP SECRETcommunity during their time in San Diego, some of whom were also known to the FBIthrough counterterrorist inquiries and investigations].

Future hijacker Hani Hanjour also may have received flight-related assistancefrom [an individual], who, was also known to the FBI and was, in fact, included amongthe individuals discussed in the Phoenix communication. As noted earlier, [thisindividual] left the United States in April 2000, and returned in June 2001, remaining inthe United States for approximately one month. [The individual] was an associate ofHanjour's and the FBI now speculates that [the individual] may have returned to theUnited States either to evaluate Hanjour's flying skills, or to provide Hanjour his finaltraining on the Cessna simulator before the attacks. This individual was an experiencedflight instructor and was certified to fly Boeing 737s.

When some of the future hijackers relocated to the East Coast, it appears that theyreceived assistance similar to that provided to them on the West Coast. Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar's spiritual advisor relocated to the East Coast, and, when Hanjour and al-Hazmiarrived at his mosque, one of the mosque's members helped them find an apartment inthe area. After approximately a month, this same individual drove Hanjour and al-[page 30] Hazmi, along with two other hijackers, to Connecticut, and then to Paterson,New Jersey. From the hotel in Connecticut where they stayed for two nights, a total of75 calls were made in attempts to locate apartments, flight schools, and car rentalagencies for the future hijackers. The hijackers were also in contact with a number ofother people during their time on the East Coast.

[The fact that these future hijackers could rely on this type of support within the/ United States is consistent with other information that was available to the Intelligence( vs.' - Community prior to September 11,2001. That information also points to the existence of

an al-Qa'ida support network within the United States. An August 2001 IntelligenceCommunity publication for senior U.S. government policy officials (called a "SEIB"), forexample, indicated that al-Qa'ida members, including some U.S. citizens, have resided inor traveled to the U.S. for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure inthe United States. The FBI Phoenix field office agent who authored the Phoenixcommunication also testified that, based on his experience, he had developed an


17/100

TOP SECRETbeen seeking more information about Darkazanli. [

After September 11, 2001, it was determined that these same two individuals hadbeen associates in Hamburg of hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and ZiadJarrah, as well as other individuals, such as Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who are now believed tohave been involved in the September 11 plot. In fact, the FBI now believes that Zammarrecruited Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah into Al Qaeda, and encouraged their participation inthe September 11 attacks.[Page 3 2 ]

Khalid Shaykh Mohammad

5.i. Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linkingKhalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the IntelligenceCommunity as the mastermind of the attacks, to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans touse aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the United States. TheIntelligence Community, however, relegated KSM to rendition target statusfollowing his 1996 indictment in connection with the Bojinka Plot and, as aresult, focused primarily on his location, rather than his activities andplace inthe al-Qa'ida hierarchy. The Community also did not recognize thesignificanceof reporting in June 2001 concerning KSM's active role in sending terrorists toJ3ie United States, or the facilitation of their activities upon arriving in theUnited States. Collection efforts were not targeted on information about KSMthat might have helped better understand al-Qa'ida's plans and intentions, andKSM's role in the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the IntelligenceCommunity.

Discussion: [According to information obtained by the Intelligence Community froseveral sources after September 11, 2001, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) - also knownas "Mukhtar" (Arabic for "The Brain") -- masterminded the September 11 attacks. Theinformation indicates that KSM presented a plan to Usama Bin Ladin to mount an attackusing small rental aircraft filled with explosives. Usama Bin Ladin reportedly suggestedusing even larger planes. Thus, the idea of hijacking commercial airliners took hold.

I

30


18/100

Thereafter, KSM reportedly instructed and trained the hijackers for their mission, including>V,

/"vr

directing them to undergo pilot training].

KSM came to the attention of the Intelligence Community as a terrorist in early 1995when he was linked to Ramzi Yousef s "Bojinka Plot" in the Philippines. One portion of thatplot involved the idea of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters. Through additionalintelligence and investigative efforts in 1995, KSM was also connected to the first WorldTrade Center bombing. He was indicted by a U.S. grand jury in January 1996. Theindictment was kept under seal until 1998 while the FBI and CIA attempted to locate him andarrange to take him into custody. Subsequently, indications were received that he might have< *been involved in the East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings.

[In June 2001, [ ] disseminated a report to all Intelligence CommunityP' agencies, [ ], military commanders, andcomponents in the Treasury andJustice

[page 33] Departments emphasizing KSM's ties to Bin Ladin as well as his continuing travelto the United States. The report explained that KSM appears to be one of Bin Ladin's mosttrusted lieutenants and was active in recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan,including to the United States, on behalf of Bin Ladin. According to the report, he traveledfrequently to the United States, including as recently as May 2001, and routinely told othersthat he could arrange their entry into the United States as well. Reportedly, these individualswere expected to establish contact with colleagues already there. The clear implication of hiscomments, according to the report, was that they would be engaged in planning terrorist-related activities].

Although this particular report was sent from the CIA to the FBI, neither agencyapparently recognized the significance of a Bin Ladin lieutenant sending terrorists to theUnited States and asking them to establish contacts with colleagues already there. CTCquestioned this report at the time and commented: "We doubt the real [KSM] would dothis.. .because if it is [KSM], we have both a significant threat and an opportunity to pick himup." Neither the CIA nor the FBI has been able to confirm whether KSM had in fact beentraveling to the United States or sending recruits here prior to September 11.

[Terrorist Communications in September 2001]31


19/100

Qa'ida posed an increasing threat to United States interests, investigations in the UnitedStates of those who raised funds for other terrorist groups continued to consumeconsiderable field resources and attention prior to September 11.

While the FBI devoted considerable resources to the criminal inyestigationsof theterrorist attacks overseas, substantial efforts to prevent similar attacks at hom e were

%A< v 7

lacking. Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told the Joint Inquiry: ".. . ifthere was a flood of intelligence information [on terrorism] from the CIA, there washardly a trickle from the FBI." In some FBI field offices, there was little focus on, orawareness of, Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida. This included the San Diego field officewhere FB I agents w ould discover, after September 11, that there had been numerouslocal connections to at least two of the hijackers.[Page 48] 'The Execu tive A ssistant Director of the FB I's Cou nterterrorism Division testifiedto the Joint Inquiry that the FBI had no w ar plan against B in Ladin: "Did we have a warplan, a five-paragraph ops order issued on Usama Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida? Absolutely,we did not at that time." When asked how the FBI's counterterrorism program fit intothe overall Intelligence Comm unity cou nterterrorism program, the same AssistantDirector replied: "I am not sure if I know the answer to that. I talked to [the DCI] brieflyabou t this. I have talked to [the CT C Chief] prior to the answer to your question is, Idon't know the answer." Without a comprehensive strategy in place for the wholeIntelligence Comm unity, there was no assurance that agencies like the FB I were focusedon the DCFs "war" effort.

Consistent with the absence of any comprehensive strategy, a recent Department ofJustice Inspector General (IG) report found that: "The FBI has never performed acomprehensive written assessment of the risk of the terrorist threat facing the United States."

^ ^ ^ ^r^^^^ _J^ _ _ __M___^___ jAs the IG report explained: "Such an assessment wou ld be useful not only^o define the nature,likelihood, and severity of the threat but also to identify intelligence gaps that need to beaddressed. Moreover, we believe that comprehensive threat and risk assessments w ould beuseful in determining where to allocate attention and resources...on programs and initiatives to

pyr combat terrorism." This kind of assessment still had not been completed as recently asDirector M ueller's testimony on October 17, 2002. Nor did the DCI's National Intelligence

* /*'v - VJ J JN TOF-SISCmT- 45* *s,


20/100

Another CIA official indicated, post-September 11: "The second thing that wasclear, as I showed [CTC personnel] the cable from March 5, [2000] just the look ontheir face told me everything I needed to know. They just hadn't seen it. It passed themby." The former CTC Chief added:

We have asked everyone have you seen this and what action was taken. Itdid not attract appropriate attention so that they could have beenwatchlisted. I think the Director has already mentioned that that was notdone at the time. I think that it was reasonable by certainly March 5 that wewould have been in the position, w e should have been in a position to firmlywatchlist this. Ijust have to underscore that we do this hundreds of times amon th. It should have been done. It was not. We have very good peopleworking this issue. It was not done, and it was not done because of the pressof lots of other work. We probably should have picked up on this in earlyMarch, but we'd gone by for two months. The delay in that, sir, was the [], took about six weeks to get that information to us, and in M arch weshould have picked up on it. All things being equal, they should have beenwatchlisted; I think that month we watchlisted about 150 people. It shouldhave been done. It wasn't. It was a fact of life. And I think what contributedto that was these same officers watching this operation were also doing a lotof other things. So it's like balls in the air. There gets to a point where youdon't treat each one with the attention that it deserves.

There was also a March 6, 2001 cable from the field that called attention to the portion ofthe M arch 5 cable regarding al-Hazmi's travel to the U nited States, but C TC personnelalso did not read that cable at the time.

Senior NSA and CIA officials have acknowledged that, in hindsight, they wouldhave devoted m any more personnel resources to the al-Qa'ida target and expedited thedevelopm ent of certain collection capabilities. How ever, they testified that the operatingenvironment prior to September 1 1 - a combination of escalating requirements andlimited resources - limited their ability to respond to the growing terrorist threat.[Page 55]

Those problems w ere aggravated by shortcomings that existed in the IntelligenceCommunity's budgeting practices. The President annually submits to Congress anIntelligence Community budget for the coming fiscal year. Included in that request areboth ongoing and new program s that are subject to long established, well understoodoversight and accountability procedures. Supplemental appropriations usually aregranted in reaction to unforeseen events that are not part of the President's budget

51


21/100

unit. So there is a lot of duplication... .[T]he system is very cumbersome,and people unfortunately have just become very frustrated with it, to thepoint where . . . [w]hat will frequently happen, for example, is eventhough a field division sends a lead to headquarters and ACS,'they are alsoe-mailing that communication to the particular FB I headquarters[supervisory special agent]. So they are getting it and working on it viathe e-mail but not necessarily within the ACS system.... Even though acouple of years ago . . . there was a directive that went out to the fieldtelling them to stop sending hard copies to headquarters because theyshould be retrieved electronically, it was well known, both in the field andat headquarters, that you wouldn't g et the communication or there was agood chance that you weren 't going to get it. As such, the field wouldroutinely still send hard copy.

ACS requires that FBI analysts search for infornlation relevant to their analyticalresponsibilities. This is in stark contrast to the CIA's automated system, whiciT''

^automatically routes communications to analysts that are relevant trjTfietr interests.Before September 11, 2001, many FBI field agents did not include sensitive informationin ACS because they believed the system was not secure. In addition, many agents whodid include information in ACS blocked access to it in order to limit the num ber of FBI[page 61 ] personnel who could obtain the information. Given these limitations, ACSdoes not provide assured retrieval of complete, authoritative information on any subject.The fact that many FBI personnel do not understand how to make maximum use of thelimited capabilities of ACS an d the FBI's other databases compounds the problem .

Because of its limitations, man y agents simply did not use ACS as a research orcase management tool. When the Phoenix FBI field office agent was drafting his July2001 Electronic Communication, he had no easy or reliable way of querying a centralFBI system to determine whether there w ere other reports on radical fundamentaliststaking flight training or whether other FBI field offices were investigating similar cases.As a result, the agent did not know that another FBI field office had voiced concern aboutMiddle Eastern men taking flight lessons in 1998 or that an operational uni t in theCounterterrorism Section at FBI Headq uarters had directed twen ty-four field offices(including Phoenix) to pay close attention to certain Islamic students engaged in aviationtraining in 1999.

57


22/100

/"

also being used to support other high priority targets in the region and to translateintelligence originating in the region and elsewhere].

Elsewhere in the Intelligence Community, other agencies dedicated varyingnumbers of analysts to the al-Qa'ida issue prior to September 11, 2001. The other twoprimary all-source analysis centers, DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force, CombatingTerrorism, and State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) focused onanti-terrorism and force protection analysis to protect overseas equities. INR dedicatedone analyst solely to al Qa'ida, and, at Secretary of State direction, provided a dailysummary of intelligence relating to Usama bin Ladin and his activities. DIA devoted 30analysts to Sunni Extremism and, on anygiven day, several of them - augmentedbyReservists - would be involved with Usama binLadin-related issues.[Page 64]

Other agencies and organizations maintained at least an awareness of al-Qa'idaand performed roles such as financial tracking and training camp observation consistentwith their charters. One non-Intelligence Community organization, the FAA, dedicatedas many as five analysts at any one time to al Qa'ida. In late 2000, according to FAAofficials, FAA offered CTC Chief Cofer Black the support of its nearly two-dozenanalysts regarding transportation security issues in exchange forbroader informationsharing, but this offer was not accepted because of CTC concerns about protecting itssources and methods. The Joint Inquiry was told that a similar offer of analytic supportwas made to CTC Chief Black by DIA in 2000, but with similar results. FAA and DIAare both represented at CTC.

The Intelligence Community's focus was also farmore oriented toward tacticalanalysis of al-Qa'ida in support of operations than on the strategic analysis needed todevelop a broader understanding of the threat and the organization. For example, asmentioned earlier, the DCI's National Intelligence Council never produced a NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE) on the threat to the United States posed by al-Qa'ida andUsama Bin Ladin. Active analytic efforts to identify the scope and nature of the threat,particularly in the domestic United States, were clearly inadequate.

SEC-ftK-T 60


23/100

As noted in an August 2001 CIA Inspector G eneral report, analysts assigned toCTC only had time to focus on crises or short-term demands, and "did not have the timeto spot trends or to knit together the threads from the flood of information." ;Theseshortcomings, unfortunately, had an impact on areas that were directly relevant to theSeptember 1 1attacks. The Joint Inquiry record confirms, for example, that theIntelligence Com munity had devoted little or no analytic focus prior to September 1 1 tothe terrorist use of aircraft as weapons or to the significant role in al-Qa'ida that was ,o vplayed by Khalid Shaykh Mohammed.

Consequence management (Department of Justice/Federal Emergency ManagementAgency);

Transportation security (Department of Transportation); Protection of critical infrastructure an d cybersystems (National Security Council); Continuity of operations (National Security Council); Countering the foreign terrorist threat in the United States (Department of Justice);

and [page 246] Protection of Americans overseas (Departments of State and Defense).

TOP-SECRET 234


74/100


75/100

y

TOP SECRET

Nonetheless, there are challenges to coordinating relations with liaison services. Forinstance, liaison on counterterrorism has not always been integrated into overall U.S. regionalgoals. Senior policy makers told the Joint Inquiry that, before September 11, they had not alwayssucceeded in incorporating the struggle against al-Qa'ida into U.S. policy toward key states [

]. As a result, other issues often diverted attention from terrorism.

There are also many channels through different agencies for U.S. Government liaison withforeign governments. These range from CIA and FBI to the Agriculture and CommerceDepartments. As former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger noted, U.S. ambassadors oftenlack control over these relationships and, consequently, the U.S. Government does not alwaysproperly consider the priorities of all the requests it makes of foreign governments.

Mr. Clarke also noted that there exists a "gentleman's agreement" with friendly liaisonservices: "you don't spy in the United States and we don't spy in your country." In his view,[page 292] however, this arrangement can put the U.S. at "some disadvantage when [foreignliaison services] are not terribly aggressive on our behalf."

[This disadvantage was compounded by the decision at the end of the Cold War to cut CIApresence in some Western countries dramatically. [

[The CIA is responsible for coordinating the overall intelligence liaison relationship, butFBI Legats and Defense Department attaches do not need CIA permission to interact with theirlocal partners when, for example, a U.S. citizen overseas is involved in terrorism. Weaknesses hiinter-agency coordination overseas can also reflect lack of coordination within the United States.For example, during Joint Inquiry interviews abroad, it was determined that ajoint planningmeeting to target al-Qa'ida leader [ ], which was to include CIA officersand their foreign liaison service counterparts, did not include the local FBI Legat. In fact, he wasnot aware of the meeting, although the Bureau plays a major role in tracking [ ]. In

277TOP-SECRET


76/100

Community knew of KSM's support for terrorism since 1995 and later learned of his links to al-Qa'ida, he was not recognized as a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant. In April 2002, the IntelligenceCommunity learned that KSM and his group conceived the September 11 plot. KSM is alsoknown as Mukhtar or "the Brain]."

The efforts the Intelligence Community took against KSM illustrate the difficulties it hadin understanding al-Qa'ida's activities and structure and formulating a coherent response. TheCommunity devoted few analytic or operational resources to tracking KSM or understanding his[page 326] activities. Coordination within the Community was irregular at best, and the littleinformation that was shared was usually forgotten or dismissed.

A. KSM's Links to Terrorist Attacks before September 11 ,

KSM and his followers played a major role in several Islamist extremist plots beforeSeptember 11. These plots are notable for the large number of casualties they sought to create, theuse of airplanes, and focus on symbolic targets such as the World Trade Center and U.S.government facilities, all characteristics of the September 11 attacks.

Investigators determined in 1995 that KSM was linked to the February 1993 bombing ofthe World Trade Center. Federal prosecutors gave CIA a copy of a financial wire transaction for$660 between Qatar and the U.S., dated several days before the blast, from "Khaled Shaykh" inDoha to Muhammad Salameh, one of four defendants convicted in the World Trade Centerbombing. With additional information that emerged from the Philippines investigation describedbelow, CIA was able to determine that Khaled was KSM, that KSM was an uncle of RamziYousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing plot, and that KSM had marriedthe sister of Yousef s wife.

[In 1995, Yousef s plots to bomb twelve U.S. airplanes flying Asian routes, kill the Pope,and crash a plane into CIA Headquarters were thwarted by Philippine police when a fire erupted inan apartment where Yousef was preparing explosives. The police seized a list of names andtelephone numbers and found a notation for "Khalid Doha" with telephone and facsimile numbersin Qatar. [

310TQP-SEGRCT


77/100

T O P SECRET- . ]. Yet another link to

KSM was made when Y ousef, who was apprehended shortly after fleeing the Philippines, made acall from detention to Q atar and asked to speak with "Khalid." This n um ber was similar to theon e found by the Philippine police. [

^ [ P a g e 3 2 7 JB. The Hunt for KSM

The Intelligence Com munity agencies worked together to apprehend K SM during his timein Qatar and in the Balkans. However, KSM's frequent travels, and the slow pace of efforts to

t >learn his whereabouts, [ ].

C. Finding KSM and Building theCase

continue to assist the FBI by using its assets to help establish the case. [--]. [Prosecutors asked that CIA

[It was determined that KSM was a top priority. The FBI was poised to take a photographabroad for identification purposes. If KSM were identified from the photograph, an indictment

311T9P-SEGRET


78/100

concerning how CTC, CIA field personnel, and other agencies reacted to this information. Thatinformation has not been received.

H. The Hunt for KSM Continues

[Since September 11, the CIA has come to believe that KSM may have been responsiblefor all Bin Ladin operations outside Afghanistan. In Spring 2002, intelligence indicated that heplayed a leading role in the USS Cole bombing. In the Summer 2002, CIA created a new HighValue Target Team to track and target terrorist masterminds such as KSM. In the summer of2002, KSM appeared along with Ramzi Bin al-Shibh in a taped al-Jazeera interview. Despite Binfal-Shibh's capture in Pakistan shortly thereafter, KSM has not yet been found].

VI. The FBI's Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Before September 11

Zacarias Moussaoui came to the attention of the FBI as the Intelligence Community wasdetecting numerous signs of an impending terrorist attack against U.S. interests somewhere in theworld. He was in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on September11, 2001. The Joint Inquiry examined whether information resulting from the FBI's investigationof Moussaoui could have alerted the government to the scope and nature of the attacks on^ September 11.

x\m interviews with flight school personnel andwith Moussaoui himself in August 2001,

the FBI pieced together the details of his arrival in the United States. Moussaoui contacted theAirman Flight School in Oklahoma by e-mail on September 29, 2000 and expressed interest intaking lessons to fly a small Cessna aircraft. OnFebruary 23,2001, he entered the United Statesat Chicago's O'Hare Airport, traveling on a French passport that allowed him to stay in [page 33 I ]the country without a visa for 90 days until May 22, 2001. OnFebruary 26, he began flightlessons at Airman Flight School.

On March 1, 2003, Khalid Shaykh Mohamm ed was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan as a result of a joint operationby Pakistani an d U.S. authorities.315TQP-SEGRFiT


79/100

Moussaoui was unhappy with the training and, at the end of May, contacted Pan AmericanInternational Flight School in Minneapolis. While Airman provided flight lessons in pilotingCessnas and similar small aircraft, Pan Am provided ground training and access to a Boeing 747flight simulator used by professional pilots.

Most of Pan Am's students were newly hired airline pilots, who used the flight simulatorfor initial training, or active airline pilots, whoused the equipment for refresher training.Although anyone can sign up for lessons at Pan Am, the typical student has a pilot's license, isemployed by an airline, and has several thousand flight hours. Moussaoui had none of thesequalifications.

On August 11, Moussaoui and his roommate^ Hussein al-Attas, arrived in Egan, Minnesota , .and checked into a hotel. Moussaoui began classes atJ^anAmon/August 13. On Wednesday,August 15, a Pan Am employee called the FBI's Minneapolis Field Office because he and otherPan Am employees had become suspicious of Moussaoui.

Before September 11, the FBI determined that Moussaoui had paid approximately $6,800in cash for training on the Boeing 747 simulator, but met none of the usual criteria for students atthe flight school. Moussaoui had no aviation background and, apparently, no pilot's license. Itwas also considered odd that Moussaoui simply wanted to learn the most challenging elements offlying, taking off and landing a 747, which he referred to as an "ego boosting thing."

Based on information from the flight school, the FBI field office opened an internationalterrorism investigation of Moussaoui. Agents within that office saw him as a threat to nationalsecurity. Because the FBI field office in Minneapolis hosts and is part of a Joint Terrorism TaskForce, INS agents, who share space and work closely with the FBI in Minneapolis, were able todetermine immediately that Moussaoui had been authorized to stay in the United States until May22, 2001 and, thus, was "out of status" when the FBI began to investigate him in August.[Page 3 3 31 On the day the Minneapolis field office learned about Moussaoui, it asked both theCIA and the FBI's legal attache in Paris for information about him. The FBI field office alsoinformed FBI Headquarters about the investigation.

316


80/100

FBI documents indicate Moussaoui's instructors thought that he had what theycharacterized as a "legitimate" interest in aircraft. Nonetheless, he was unlike any other studentwith whom his flight instructor had worked. Moussaoui began the ground schoolportion of thetraining w ith a Power Point presentation on aircraft systems. The instruction was reportedlyuseless for Moussaoui, who had no background in sophisticated aircraft systems and, apparently,had only approximately 50 hours of flight training in light civil aircraft. In addition, Moussaouiwas extremely interested in the operation of the plane's doors and control panel. Pan Am foundthat suspicious. Further, Moussaoui reportedly said that he would "love" to fly a simulated flightfrom Heathrow Airport in England to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Thus, theMinneapolis FB I office decided to arrest Moussaoui.

In a Joint Inquiry interview, a M inneapolis FBI field office agent said that a SupervisoryAgent at Headquarters had suggested that M oussaoui be put und er surveillance, but M inneapolisdid not have enough agents to do that. In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, however, theMinneapolis agent said that he had relied on his criminal experience in deciding to arrestMoussaoui, rather than surveilling him:

The decision on whether or not we were going to put Mr. M oussaoui und ersurveillance rested with me. And I made the decision that he was going to bearrested because we had a violation. The INS was participating as a member, a fullmember of our joint terrorism task force. My background in the criminal arenasuggests that when a violation o ccurs and you can stop further or potential criminalactivity, you act on that. So that is exactly what I instructed the agents to do. If wehad the possibility of arresting him, we were going to arrest him. If we needed tosurveil him, we certainly could have instituted a surveillance plan.... It was notappropriate to do [so] in this case.

In response to questions, the agent explained in more detail why he decided to arrestMoussaoui, rather than put him under surveillance: [Page 334]

Because I didn't want him to get any additional time on a flight simulator thatwould allow him to have the knowledge that we could no longer take back fromhim to operate an aircraft. This provided us the opp ortunity to freeze the situationas it was going on right there, prevent him from gaining the kno wledge that hecould use at some point in the future. And, if ultimately we determined all wecould do, after interviewing him and doing some other investigative steps, if all wecould do was deport him, then we would be sensitized to the fact that he wasinterested in doing something else and he could be put hi the Tip-off System. Hewould be put in the appropriate notifications could have been made if he attemptedto reenter the United States. But our focus was on preventing him g etting theknowledge that he would have needed... .317


81/100

[I]t is important to remember the circumstances that were present before Septemberllth. We had no real incidents of airplane hijacking that had happened domesticallywithin the preceding decade. We now have a different perspective, that it is very,very difficult to go back and forget and not acknowledge. But, again, I speak to mycriminal background in saying if a violation has occurred, and we can take furthersteps to stop what could speak to a continued violation, we will act. And thosewere the circumstances under which I made that decision.

Thus, on August 16, 2001, FBI agents, along with two INS agents, went to Moussaoui'shotel. The INS agents temporarily detained Moussaoui and his roommate, Hussein al-Attas, whilechecking to determine if they were legally in the United States. Al-Attas showed the INS agents avalid student visa and agreed to allow the agents to search hi*property in the hotel room.

Moussaoui showed the agents his passport case, which included his passport, a British idriver's license, a bank statement showing a deposit of $32,000 in cash to an Oklahoma account,and a notification from INS acknowledging his request to extend his stay in the United States.The INS agents determined that Moussaoui had not received an extension beyond May 22,2001,and they therefore took him into custody.

Moussaoui declined to allow the agents to search his belongings. When the agents toldhim that he would be deported, Moussaoui agreed to let the agents take his belongings to the INSoffice for safekeeping. In packing those items, the agents noticed that Moussaoui had a laptopcomputer.[Page 335]

The agents interviewed Moussaoui at the INS office in Minneapolis. He told them that hehad traveled to Morocco, Malaysia, and Pakistan for business, although he could not providedetails of his employment or convincingly explain the $32,000 bank balance.

After Moussaoui's detention, the Minneapolis case agent called the field office's legalcounsel and asked if there was any way to search Moussaoui's possessions without his consent.He was told that he had to obtain a search warrant. Over the ensuing days, Minneapolis agentsconsidered several alternatives, including a criminal search warrant and a Foreign IntelligenceSurveillance Act (FISA) Court search order. They also considered deporting Moussaoui toFrance, after arranging for French authorities to search his possessions and share their findings

318


82/100

with the FBI. Adding to the sense of urgency, a supervisor in the INS Minneapolis office told theFBI that INS typically does not hold visa-waiver violators like Moussaoui for more than 24 hoursbefore returning them to their home countries. Under the circumstances, however, the supervisorsaid that INS would hold Moussaoui for seven to ten days.

After August 17, the FBI did not conduct additional interviews of Moussaoui. OnSaturday, August 18, Minneapolis sent a detailed memorandum to FBI Headquarters describingthe Moussaoui investigation and concluding that Minneapolis had reason to believe thatMoussaoui, al-Attas "and others yet unknown" were conspiring to seize control of an airplane,based on Moussaoui's "possession of weapons and his preparation through physical training forviolent confrontation."

In Joint Inquiry interviews, FBI Minneapolis field office agents said that FBI Headquartersadvised against trying to obtain a criminal search warrant as that might prejudice subsequentefforts to obtain a FISA Court order. Under FISA, an order warrant could be obtained if theagents could establish probable cause to believe that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign powerand that he had engaged in international terrorism or was preparing to do so. FBI Headquarterswas concerned that if a criminal warrant were denied and the agents then tried to obtain a FISACourt order, the FISA Court would think the agents were trying to use authority for an intelligenceinvestigation to pursue a criminal case.[Page 336]

Around this time, an attorney in the National Security Law Unit at FBI Headquarters askedthe Chief Division Counsel in the Minneapolis field office whether she had considered trying toobtain a criminal warrant. The Chief Division Counsel replied that a FISA order would be thesafer course. Minneapolis also wanted to notify, through the local U.S. Attorney's Office, theCriminal Division within the Department of Justice about Moussaoui, believing it was obligated todo so under Attorney General guidelines that require notification when there is a "reasonableindication" of a felony. FBI Headquarters advised the Minneapolis field office that there was notenough evidence to justify notifying the Criminal Division.

The Minneapolis field office agent became increasingly frustrated with what he perceivedas a lack of assistance from the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at Headquarters. He had had

319TOP-SECRET


83/100

conflicts with the RFU agent over FISA issues earlier and believed that Headquarters was notbeing responsive to the threat Minneapolis had identified. At the suggestion of a Minneapolissupervisor, the agent contacted an FBI officer who had been detailed to the CTC. The agent

:d the details of the Moussaoui investigation with the CTC detailee and provided the names ofMoussaoui's associates. The agent explained hi a Joint Inquiry interview that he was looking for

any information CTC could provide to strengthen the case linking Moussaoui to internationalterrorism.

On August 21, the Minneapolis field office agent sent an e-mail to the RFU SupervisorySpecial Agent handling this matter:

[It's] imperative that the [U.S. Secret Service] be apprised of this threat potentialindicated by the evidence.... If [Moussaoui] seizes an aircraft flying fromHeathrow to NYC, it will have the fuel on board to reach D.C. i

The RFU supervisory special agent sent a teletype to several U.S. Government agencies onSeptember 4, 2001, recounting the interviews of Moussaoui and al-Attas and other information theFBI had obtained in the meantime. The teletype, however, merely described the investigation. Itdid not place Moussaoui's actions in the context of the increased level of terrorist threats duringthe summer of 2001, and it did not analyze Moussaoui's actions or plans or present informationabout the type of threat he might have presented.[Page 337]

A CIA officer detailed to FBI Headquarters learned of the Moussaoui investigation fromCTC personnel in the third week of August. The officer was alarmed about Moussaoui for severalreasons. First, Moussaoui had denied being a Muslim to the flight instructor, while al-Attas,Moussaoui's companion at the flight school, informed the FBI that Moussaoui was afundamentalist. Further, the fact that Moussaoui was interested in using the Minneapolis flightschool simulator to learn to fly from Heathrow to Kennedy Airport made the CIA officer suspectthat Moussaoui was a potential hijacker. As a result of these concerns, CIA Stations were advisedby cable of the facts known about Moussaoui and al-Attas and were asked to provide informationthey had. Based on information received from the FBI, CIA described the two in the cable as"suspect 747 airline attackers" and "suspect airline suicide attackerfs]," who might be "involved ina larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to the U.S."

320


84/100

On Wedn esday, August 22, the FBI Legat in Paris provided a report that [ ] started a series of discussions

between Minneapolis and Headquarters RFU as to whether a specific group of Chechen rebels wasa "recognized" foreign power, that is, was on the State Department's list of terrorist groups and forwhich the FISA Court had previously granted orders.

The RFU agent told Joint Inquiry staff that, based on advice he received from the NSLU,he believed that the Chechen rebels were not a "recognized" foreign power and that, even ifMoussaoui w ere to be linked to them, the FBI could not obtain a search order under FISA. TheRFU agent told the Minneapolis agents that they had to connect Moussaoui to al-Qa'ida, which hebelieved was a "recognized" foreign powe r. The Minneapolis case agent later testified before theJoint Inquiry that he had had no training inFISA, but that he believed that "we needed to identifya - and the term that was thrown around was 'recognized foreign power' and so that was ouroperational theory."

As the FBI's D eputy Gen eral Counsel would later testify, the agents were incorrect. TheFBI can obtain a search warrant under FISA for an agent of any international terrorist group,including Chechen rebels. Because of this m isunderstanding, the Minneapolis field office spent[page 338] valuable time and resources trying to connect the Chechen group to al-Qa'ida. TheMinneapolis field office agent contacted CTC, asking for additional inform ation regardingconnections between the group and al-Qa'ida. The Minneapolis supervisor also suggested that theRFU agent contact CTC for assistance on the issue. The RFU agent responded that he had all theinformation he needed and requested that Minneapolis work through FBI Headquarters whencontacting CTC in the future. Ultimately, the RFU agent agreed to submit Minneapolis' FISArequest to attorneys in the FBI's NSLU for review.

In interviews, several FB I attorneys with w hom the RFU agent consulted confirmed thatthey advised the RFU agent that the evidence was insufficient to link M oussaoui to a foreignpower. One of the attorneys noted that Chechen rebels w ere not an international foreign terrorismgroup under FISA. The Deputy General Counsel, however, testified before the Joint Committeethat "no one in the national security lawarena said that Chechens were not a power that. . . couldqualify as a foreign power under the FISA statute." The FBI attorneys also said that, had they had

321TOP-SECRET


85/100

been aware of the July 2001 communication from the Phoenix field office raising concerns aboutal-Qa'ida flight training in the U.S., they would have forwarded the FISA request to the JusticeDepartment's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.

Two FBI agents assigned to the Oklahoma City field office's international terrorism squadvisited Airman Flight School on August 23 as part of the Moussaoui investigation. In September1999, one of the agents had been assigned a lead from the Orlando field office to inquire at theflight school about another individual, who had been identified as Usama Bin Ladin's personalpilot and who had received flight training at Airman Flight School. The agent had not been givenany background information about this individual, and he did^not know that the person hadcooperated with the Bureau during the East Africa U.S. embassy bombings trial. Although theagent told the Joint Inquiry that this lead had been the most significant terrorism information hehad seen in Oklahoma City, he did not remember it when he returned to the flight school two yearslater to ask questions about Moussaoui. The agent acknowledged that he should have connectedthe two visits but he did not have time to do so.['Page 339]

[The Joint Inquiry also confirmed that an individual, who attempted to post bond forMoussaoui's roommate, had been the subject of a full-field FBI international terrorisminvestigation in the Oklahoma City Field Office. According to FBI reports, this individual was aVice President of Overseas Operations and Recruiting for al-Fatah, the Palestinian group, and amember of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was also a close associate of [ ],the imam at the Islamic Center [ ], which hijackers al-Hazmi and al-Midhar attendedwhen they lived there. That imam was also a close associate of the imam in San Diego whoserved as the hijackers' spiritual leader. The Minneapolis field office agent and the head of theRFU both testified that neither of them knew that the individual who had attempted to post bondfor Moussaoui's roommate was the subject of a terrorism investigation before September 11].

On August 27, the RFU agent told the Minneapolis supervisor that the supervisor wasgetting people "spun up" over Moussaoui. According to his notes and his statement to the JointInquiry, the supervisor replied that he was trying to get people at FBI Headquarters "spun up"because he was trying to make sure that Moussaoui "did not take control of a plane and fly it intothe World Trade Center." The Minneapolis agent said that the Headquarters agent told him:

322TQP-SEGRET


86/100

[TJhat's not going to happen. We don 't know he's a terrorist. You don't haveenough to show he is a terrorist. Youhave a guy interested in this type of aircraft -that is it.[On August 28, the RFU agent edited, and returned to Minneapolis for comment, the

requfest for a FISA Court order that Minneapolis had prepared. The RFU agent told the JointInquiry that it was not unusual for FBI Headq uarters agents to make changes to field submissions.The major substantive change w as removal of information that tried to make c onnections betweenthe Chec hen rebels and al-Qa'ida. After the edit was com plete, the RFU agent briefed the FB IDeputy General Counsel, who told the Joint Inquiry that he agreed with the agent that there wasinsufficient information to show that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power].^

The Bureau's focus shifted to arranging for Moussaoui's planned deportation to France,aimed for September 17 . French officials had agreed to search his belongings and provide the

results to the FBI. Although the FBI was no longer considering a FISA C ourt order, no oneage 340] revisited the idea of attempting to obtain a criminal search warrant, even though the

inly reason for not attempting to obtain a criminal search warrant earlier - concern that it wouldTejudice a request under FISA - no longer existed.

On Thursday, Septernbgx.4, Headquarters sent a teletype to the Intelligence Communityand other government agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), providinginformation about the Moussaoui investigation. The teletype noted that Moussaoui_was beingjieldincustody, but did not describe any particular threat that the FBI thought he posed for example,that he might be connec ted to a larger plot. The teletype also did not recommend that theaddressees take action or look for additional indicators of a terrorist attack. It also did not provideany analysis of a possible hijac king threat or specific warnings. The following day, theMinneapolis field office agent hand-carried the teletype to two employees of the FAA'sBloomington, Minnesota office and briefed them on the investigation. The two FAA employeestold the Joint Inquiry that the agent did not convey any urgency about the teletype and did not askthem to take specific action. The final preparations for Moussaoui's deportation were underwayon September 11.

323


87/100

The Joint Inquiry record demonstrates that the FBI's focus when Moussaoui was taken intocustody appears to have been almost entirely on investigating specific crimes and not onidentifying links between investigations or on sharing information with other agencies withcounterterrorist responsibilities. The RFU chief testified that no one at Headquarters saw aconnection between the Moussaoui case and the Phoenix communication, the possible presence ofal-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi in the United States, and the flood of warnings about possible terroristsattacks hi the United States, some using airplanes as weapons, all of which developed in the springand summer of 2001. Moreover, as the RFU Chief testified, before September 11, the FBI did notcanvass persons in custody and cooperating with the government in terrorist investigations to seewhether they knew Moussaoui. After September 11, FBI agents showed one of those persons aphotograph of Moussaoui and asked him what he knew of Moussaoui. He asserted that he hadmet Moussaoui in an al-Qa'ida terrorist camp in Afghanistan. When asked about this during[page 341 ] testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the RFU Chief admitted that "[t]he photograph wasnot shown before 9/11 and it should have been."

[The indictment against Moussaoui, which was filed on December 11, 2001, alleges thatMoussaoui possessed a number of items on August 16, 2001. On that day, which is when FBI andIN S agents first interviewed him, the INS took Moussaoui's possessions fo r safekeeping. Absentsearch authority, however, the possessions were no t examined at that time. As it turned out,according to the indictment, Moussaoui's possessions included letters indicating that Moussaouiwas a marketing consultant in the United States fo r Infocus Tech. The letters had been signed inOctober 2000 by Yazid Sufaat, whom the Intelligence Community was aware was the owner ofthe Malaysian condominium used for the January 2000 al-Qa'ida meeting attended by hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. The indictment also alleges that Moussaoui possessed a notebook listingtwo German telephone numbers and the name "Ahad Sabet," which the indictment states was usedby Ramzi Bin al-Shibh to send funds to Moussaoui. Bin al-Shibh, who was apprehended inPakistan in September 2002, is named in the indictment as a supporting conspirator.]

324


88/100

VII. The Phoenix Electronic Communication

In July 2001, an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office sent an "Electronic Communication"EC) to the Usama Bui Ladin and the Radical Fundamentalist Units at Headquarters and to several

agents on an International Terrorism squad in the New York field office. The agent outlined hisconcerns about a coordinated effort by Bin Ladin to send students to the United States for aviationtraining. He noted an "inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest" taking suchtraining in Arizona and speculated that this was part of an effort to establish a cadre of persons,trained in aviation, who could conduct terrorist activity. The EC contained a number ofrecommendations the agent asked FBI Headquarters to consider.

The FBI's handling of the Phoenix EC is symptomatic of its focus on short-termoperational priorities, often at the expense of long-term strategic analysis. The Bureau's ability tohandle strategic analytic products, such as the EC, was limited before September 11, 2001. TheEC also highlights inadequate information sharing within the FBI, particularly betweenoperational and analytic units. Several addressees on the EC, especially at the supervisory level,did not receive it before September 11 because of limitations in the electronic dissemination [page342 ] system. The Joint Inquiry repeatedly heard such complaints about the FBI's informationtechnology. Finally, the FBI's case-driven approach, while extremely productive in the Bureau'straditional law-enforcement mission, does not generally encourage FBI personnel to pay attentionto preventive analysis and strategy, particularly when the matter appears to have no direct,immediate impact on ongoing counterterrorism investigations.

A. The Phoenix EC

The Special Agent in Phoenix who wrote the EC told the Joint inquiry he first becameconcerned about aviation-related terrorism in the early 1990s, while he was investigating Libyanswith suspected terrorist ties who were working for U.S. aviation companies. Possible terroristswith easy access to aircraft conjured up for the agent visions of Pan Am Flight 103, whichterrorists had blown up years before. His primary concern was that Islamic extremists, studyingaviation subjects ranging from security to piloting, could learn how to hijack or destroy aircraft

325T0P-SBGRET


89/100

and evade airport security. However, the agent told the Joint Inquiry that, in writing the EC, henever imagined terrorists using airplanes as was done on September 11.

The Phoenix EC focused on ten individuals who were subjects of FBI investigations, SunniMuslims from Kenya, Pakistan, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, India, and Saudi Arabia. Notall were in flight training; several were aeronautical engineering students, and one was studyinginternational aviation security.

The Phoenix agent testified that in April 2000 he interviewed the primary subject of theEC. Inthe agent's experience, young foreign nationals wliuUfe~subjects of interviews tend to besomewhat intimidated in their first contact with the FBI. By contrast, this subject told the agentthat he considered the U.S. Government and military to be legitimate targets of Islam. The agentnoticed a poster of Bin Ladin and another poster of wounded Chechen mujahideen fighters in thesubject's apartment. He was also concerned that the subject, who was taking expensive aviationtraining, was from a poor Middle Eastern country and had not studied aviation before his arrival inthe United States.[Page 343]

The agent described to the Joint Inquiry another incident that increased his suspicion aboutMiddle Eastern flight students in the Phoenix area. During a physical surveillance, the agentdetermined mat the primary subject of the Phoenix EC was using a vehicle registered to anotherperson, who in 1999 had been detained with a third person after trying to gain access to thecockpit of a commercial airliner on a domestic flight. The two told FBI agents who questionedthem that they thought the cockpit was the bathroom, and they accused the Bureau of racism.After an investigation, they were released and the case was closed. In November 2000, thesubject's name was added to the State Department's watchlist after intelligence information was1received that he may have received explosive and car bomb training in Afghanistan. In August2001, the same person applied for a visa to re-enter the United States and, as a result of thewatchlisting, was denied entry.

Finally, the Phoenix agent's concern about Middle Eastern flight students in Arizona wasfueled by suspicion that al-Qa'ida had an active presence in Arizona. Several Bin Ladinoperatives had lived and traveled to the Phoenix area, and one of them Wadih El-Hage, a Bin

326TOP-SECRET


90/100


91/100

TOP SECRETOn August 7, 2001, the Specialists in the two units decided that the matter should be

closed. The Specialist in the UBLU told the Joint inquiry that she intended to return to the projectonce she had time to do additional research, but on September 11, she had not yet had anopportunity to do so. Both Specialists also said that they had considered assigning the Phoenixcommunication to a Headquarters analytic unit, but had decided against it.

The Chiefs of both the RFU and UBLU informed the Joint Inquiry that they did not see thePhoenix EC before September 11. They do not remember even hearing about the flight schoolissue until after September 11. An FBI audit of the central records system requested by the JointInquiry supports their statements. *[Page 345]

The Phoenix EC was also not shared with other agencies before September 11, although j,the former Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section explained in testimonyto the Joint Inquiry:

One of the great frustrations is that [the Phoenix Communication] talks aboutairlineswe have FAA people in the [International Terrorism Operations Section];it talks about intelligencewe have CIA people; it talks about visasthere areState Department people and immigration people in that unit. That informationshould have been shared, if only for [informational] purposes, with all those peopleat our Headquarters. And it wasn't done, and it should have been done.

In fact, Transportation Security Administration Assistant Undersecretary for IntelligenceClaudio Manno testified at a Joint Inquiry hearing that "the first time that we saw [the PhoenixEC] was when it was brought to our attention by [the Joint Inquiry Staff]. Had the FAA receivedthe memo before September 11, Mr. Manno believes that:

[W]e would have started to ask a lot more probing questions of FBI as to what thiswas all about, to start with. There were a number of things that were done later totry to determine what conne

t7 b4 excerpts of joint inquiry report fdr- entire contents- team 7 related excerpts of ji report w...

Documents