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TA RGETINGTHE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

ANDPROCEDURES FOR TARGETING

T AE VRITICAL TARGETSJSA CGC

AUG 12 1997sCCESSM Nu

' 'PIVL9036MCRP 3-16.1W

1 NWP 2-01.11AFJPAM 10-225

JULY 1997

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approvedfor public release; distrnbution unlimited.

L7 ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

I

MULTISERVICE TACTICS,) TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respectivecommands and other commands as appropriate.

WILLIAM W. HARTZOGGeneral, USACommanderTraining and Doctrine Command

aALL K d, f*"A-PAUL K. VAN RIPERLieutenant General, USMCCommanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat

Development Command

BY ORDER OF THESECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

MICHAEL L. BOWMANRear Admiral, USNCommanderNaval Doctrine Command

JOHN P. JUMPERLt Gen, USAFDCS/Plans and Operations

2

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication describes the jointtargeting process and provides tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) fortargeting surface (land or sea) time-criticaltargets (TCTs). It describes specificprocedures for joint force components in thecoordination, deconfliction, and synchro-nization of rapid targeting and attacks in ajoint environment. Though not prescriptive,this publication recommends procedureswhen multiple components have thecapability to locate, identify, track, attack, andevaluate targets in overlapping areas ofresponsibility. The overall objective of thispublication is to provide the joint forcecommander (JFC) and staff TTP to destroysurface TCTs and coordinate, deconflict, andsynchronize the entire joint effort. By doingso, the JFC can minimize duplication of effortand the potential for fratricide whileaccomplishing the objective of rapid response.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the commander, US ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC);commanding general, Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command (MCCDC);commander, Naval Doctrine Command(NDC); and commander, Air CombatCommand (ACC). It sets forth multiserviceTTP to guide the activities and performanceof their commands when conducting joint,multinational, and interagency operations. Itprovides guidance for geographic combatantcommanders, JFCs, and their staffs. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the JFC. The JFC has fullauthority to organize the force and executethe mission in a manner deemed mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission. Thispublication augments and complementsexisting joint doctrine and joint TTP byproviding additional operational warfighting

procedures, guidance, and information.However, it is not intended for thispublication to supplant any higher joint orcombatant command directives.

3. Application

This publication provides JFCs and theiroperational staffs unclassified guidance forthe joint targeting process and surface TCTtargeting operations. Planners can use thispublication to coordinate, deconflict, andsynchronize targeting operations amongcomponents assigned to a joint force.Accordingly, this document serves as acornerstone for planners to build and executecoordinated and integrated joint operations.Also, it will assist component training effortswhen tasked to support multiple theaters.Finally, this publication provides aperspective on how other components definetheir service targeting process.

This publication is approved for useby the United States Army, Marine Corps,Navy, and Air Force.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating service command offices ofprimary responsibility (OPRs) will reviewthis publication, validate the information,and reference and incorporate it in servicemanuals, regulations, and curricula asfollows:

Army. The Army will incorporate theprocedures in this publication in US Armytraining and doctrinal publications asdirected by the commander, US ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command. Distribu-tion is in accordance with DA Form 12-11E.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps willincorporate the procedures in this publicationin US Marine Corps training and doctrinalpublications as directed by the commandinggeneral, US Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command. Distribution is inaccordance with MCPDS.

Marine Corps: PCN 14400001600 iAir Force Distribution: F

Navy. The Navy will incorporate theseprocedures in US Navy training and doctrinalpublications as directed by the commander,Naval Doctrine Command. Distribution is inaccordance with MILSTRIP Desk Guide andNAVSOP Pub 409.

Air Force. Headquarters Air Forcedelegated approval authority for thispublication to the commander, Air CombatCommand. Air Force units will validate andincorporate appropriate procedures inaccordance with applicable governingdirectives. Distribution is in accordance withAFI 37-160

5. User Information

a. The TRADOC-MCCDC-NDC-ACCAir Land Sea Application (ALSA) Centerdeveloped this publication with the jointparticipation of the approving servicecommands. ALSA will review and updatethis publication as necessary.

b. We encourage recommended changesfor improving this publication. Key yourcomments to the specific page andparagraph and provide a rationale for eachrecommendation. Send comments andrecommendation directly to-

Army

CommanderUS Army Training and Doctrine CommandATTN: ATDO-AFort Monroe VA 23651-5000DSN 680-3153 COMM (757) 727-3153

Marine CorpsCommanding GeneralUS Marine Corps Combat Development CommandATTN: C423300 Russell RoadQuantico VA 22134-5021DSN 278-6234 COMM (703) 784-6234

Navy

Naval Doctrine CommandATTN: N31540 Gilbert StNorfolk VA 23511-2785DSN 565-0563 COMM (757) 445-0563E-mail Address: [email protected]

Air ForceHQ Air Combat CommandATTN: XPJ204 Dodd Boulevard Suite 202Langley AFB VA 23665-2778DSN 574-7763 COMM (757) 764-7763E-mail Address: [email protected]

ALSAALSA CenterATTN: Director114 Andrews StreetLangley AFB VA 23665-2785DSN 574-5934 COMM (757) 764-5934E-mail Address: [email protected]

c. This publication reflects current jointand service doctrine, command and controlorganizations, facilities, personnel, respon-sibilities, and procedures. Changes in service

protocol, appropriately reflected in joint andservice publications, will likewise beincorporated in revisions to this document.

FM 90-36MCRP 3-16.1FNWP 2-01.11

AFJPAM 10-225

US Army Training and Doctrine CommandFort Monroe, Virginia

Marine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia

Naval Doctrine CommandNorfolk, Virginia

Air Combat CommandLangley Air Force Base, Virginia

25 JULY 1997

TARGETINGThe Joint Targeting Process

andProcedures For Targeting Time-Critical Targets

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUM M ARY .................................................................................................... vi

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

APPENDIX A

THE JOINT TARGETING PROCESSBackground ................................................... .............. I-1Joint Targeting Process ........................................ 1-2Organizing for the Joint Targeting Process ....................................... 1-10

PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING TIME-CRITICAL TARGETSSurface Time-Critical Targets .................................................. IlITarget of Opportunity........ .......... .......... ........... 11-2Attacks Against Surface TCTs-The Challenge .................................. 11-2JFC's Objectives and Guidance for Surface TCTs ................................... lII-4Availability of Surface TCT Capable Attack Assets ............................. 11-4Determination of "Best Capable" Surface TCT Asset .......................... Il-5Planned Procedures for Attacking Surface TCTs ................................. 11-6Command and Control Structuring ........................................ 11-34Battle Management System Interconnectivity ...................................... 11-36

CONTINGENCY THEATER AUTOMATED PLANNINGSYSTEM (CTAPS) ..................................................... A-I

FM 90-36

MCRP 3-16.1 F

NWP 2-01.11

AFJPAM 10-225

APPENDIX B ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATASYSTEM (A FATDS) ............................................................................... B-1

APPENDIX C AUTOMATED DEEP OPERATIONS COORDINATIONSYSTEM (ADOCS) ......................................................................... C-1

REFERENCES ........................................ References-1

GLOSSARY ............................................................ Glossary-1

IN D E X ................................................................................................................................ In d ex-1

FIGURES I-1 General Target Categories and Subcategories ....................................- 11-2 The Joint Targeting Process ..................................... 1-31-3 The Army/Marine Corps Targeting Process Overlaid onto the

Joint Targeting Process ..................................................................... 1-3

II-1 Surface TCT Relationship to Planned and Immediate Targets ........ 11-211-2 TOO Relationship to Surface TCTs and Immediate Targets ............ 11-311-3 Standard Baseline Grid Box ..................................... 11-16II-4A Four Quadrant Subdivision Option .................................................. 11-1711-4B Nine Sector Subdivision Option ........................................................ 11-1711-5 Example Theater Layout ........................................ 11-1811-6 Grid Box Labeling and Identification ............................................... 11-1911-7 Grid Box Subdivision Four Quadrant ..................................... 11-2011-8 Grid Box Subdivision Nine Sector .................................................... 11-2011-9 Grid Box Target Refinement ............................................................. 11-2111-10 Separate Grid Box Systems ..................................... 11-2211-11 Multiple Component Attack Operations Using a Single

Grid Box Reference System ............................................................ 11-2311-12 Bullseye Reference System ..................................... 11-2611-13 Bullseye Example #1 .......................................................................... 11-2711-14 Bullseye Example #2 ..................................... 11-2711-15 ATACMS PAH (ROZ) ..................................... 11-2911-16 ATACMS TAH (ROZ) ..................................... 11-31

TABLES A-1 CTAPS Applications and Capabilities ................................................ A-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TARGETINGThe Joint Targeting Process

andProcedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets

Overview

Joint force commanders (JFCs) require common joint targeting procedures to deconflicttargeting operations, prevent duplication of effort, and reduce the potential for fratricidethroughout the fluid, dynamic battlespace. This is especially true when joint force componentshave areas of operations that potentially overlap, as well as mutual interests and capabilitiesto strike targets of common interest. The JFC or component commander may designate thesetargets as time-critical, priority targets. Each component has the ability to view the battlespacewith a multitude of surveillance and reconnaissance assets (organic, joint, and national).However, complicating this problem is the fact that components lack common targetingreferences for the battlespace. Few common targeting reference systems exist that ensure alltargets possess discrete reference numbers universally recognized by all joint force components.One such system is the basic encyclopedia (BE) numbering system. Although this system isnormally limited to fixed targets, BE numbering can be modified for mobile targets. Sometheaters have used locally produced BE numbers for tracking such targets. However, there isno standardized joint procedure to do this. The National MilitaryTarget Intelligence Committee(MTIC) is working solutions to standardize such procedures and developing concepts foruniversal common target numbers (CTNs). But until those concepts are approved, the JFChas no common joint system for mobile targets. Instead, individual component numberingsystems dominate the environment and are not translatable from one component to another.Further complicating this problem is the fact that although current component systems arerobust and continue to grow rapidly, they are considerably "stovepiped" and not interoperable.Currently, the components cannot rapidly share common targeting information. Futuresystems (such as the ContingencyTheaterAutomated Planning System [CTAPS] linked withthe Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS]) could correlate individualcomponent target numbers and communicate them simultaneously to all components. Thosefuture systems, combined with joint force targeting procedures, will facilitate effective andefficient use of all attack assets.

Joint doctrine addresses the need for target coordination, deconfliction, and synchronizationbetween components. Unfortunately, it does not adequately explain "how" to rapidly conductthis coordination. Likewise, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) does not specificallyoutline joint targeting procedures. Instead, it defines overall concepts without delineatingTTP. As a result, each combatant commander has developed procedures that are theaterdependent targeting processes. As an example, the procedures governing Joint TargetingCoordination Boards (JTCBs) and guidance, apportionment, and targeting cells (GATs) varyfrom theater to theater. While this may work for forces permanently assigned to a combatantcommand, it requires nonassigned units to adapt considerably to theater specific procedures.Augmentees adapting to theater/CINC specific procedures will spend time adapting to theaterunique coordination processes before executing time-critical missions.

Components must understand the joint targeting process to fulfill the JFC's intent andobjectives. Effective coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization maximize force againstthe enemy while reducing the potential for fratricide. Components must have effective jointtargeting procedures that ensure-

" Compliance with JFC guidance and objectives." Coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization of attacks." Rapid response to surface time-critical targets (TCTs)." Prevention of fratricide." Minimal duplication of effort." Control of taskings for mutually accessible targets." Expeditious combat assessment." Common perspective of all targeting efforts.

Each component must understand the perspective and target priorities of other componenttargeting efforts throughout the campaign. Component targets may not necessarily be jointtargets; therefore, coordination requirements may seem minimal. However, there may besituations where component organic weapons may be easily available, yet not the most capable.In such cases, coordination with other components may allow more efficient destruction of thetarget through the synchronized use of other available assets. In almost every situation, ifcomponent attacks affect the operations of another component, coordination, deconfliction,and synchronization must occur. The only exception would be those rare instances identifiedby the JFC where overriding concerns (such as theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] equippedwith weapons of mass destruction) warrant bypassing normal coordination to affect immediateresponse. The JFC should make such exceptions only after balancing the threat with thepotential for fratricide.

This publication explains the fundamentals of the joint targeting process and intelligencesupport to that process. It addresses the coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization ofattacks against surface TCTs. The connection is that the joint targeting process serves as thefoundation for the surface TCT targeting procedures.

The Joint Targeting Process

Joint targeting fundamentals are the functions, steps, and actions accomplished whenconducting joint targeting operations. Joint targeting fundamentals include the definition ofa target, explanation of what joint targeting is as a whole, and description of the joint targetingprocess. Joint Publication 1-02 succinctly describes a target as ageographical area, complex,or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. However, targets alsoinclude the wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functionsthat an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. Joint targeting is selecting targetsand matching the appropriate response to them to meet a specified objective. The joint targetingprocess has six basic phases/functions: commander's objectives and guidance, targetdevelopment, weaponeering assessment, force application, execution planning/forceexecution, and combat assessment.1 Although commonly referred to as a "cycle," the jointtargeting process is really a continuous process of overlapping functions independent of aparticular sequence. Joint targeting significantly affects the theater campaign as the JFCmust synchronize targeting efforts throughout the joint force to ensure the effectiveaccomplishment of theater campaign objectives. Further complicating this is targeting occursat all levels within a joint force by all forces capable of attacking targets. Therefore, it mustbe deconflicted, coordinated, and prioritized among components to ensure success.

Organizing for the joint targeting process is extremely dependent on the situation. JFCsmay establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish broad targetingoversight functions or may delegate this responsibility to a subordinate commander.2 TheJFC may assign certain responsibilities associated with targeting to agencies on the staff. Inaddition, the JFC may appoint a JTCB. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB.3 JTCBresponsibilities and authority are defined by JFC directives and should ensure fulfillment ofJFC objectives and intent with respect to targeting. Most importantly, the JFC should directmeasures to coordinate joint targeting efforts among components. Regardless of how the JFCestablishes procedures for joint targeting operations, the procedures must follow the basicprinciples of the joint targeting process and be flexible enough to respond to rapidly changingsituations in the fast tempo of modern warfare.

Procedures For Targeting Time-Critical TargetsA surface TCT is a lucrative, fleeting, land, or sea target of such high priority to friendly

forces that the JFC or component commander designates it as requiring immediate response.Surface TCTs require such immediate response because they pose, or will pose, a significantthreat capable of inflicting casualties on friendly forces and civilians. Surface TCTs, leftunserviced, could significantly delay achievement of the JFC's theater objectives. SurfaceTCTs can either be planned or immediate, requiring rapid response by the joint force. Targetsof opportunity (TOOs) are similar to surface TCTs (that is, lucrative or fleeting), but they mayor may not have been designated a high priority by the JFC or component commander. Forexample, an exposed, moving enemy command vehicle, spotted by a passing friendly aircraft,could be defined as aTOO. Although the opportunity to attack it is fleeting, it is not technicallya surface TCT unless the JFC or component commander has designated enemy commandvehicles as high priority targets. The distinction is a small but important one. The key isJFC/component commander designation as a priority. Otherwise, the joint force could notdistinguish between TOOs and surface TCTs.

Procedures and techniques assist the joint force in the conduct of warfare, especially inregard to surface TCTs. Procedures dealing with surface TCTs include JFC guidance, jointbattlespace control and coordination measures, "grid box" and "bullseye" techniques, andweapon specific procedures. Additionally, the JFC must structure command and control aswell as interconnect battle management systems to ensure optimum conditions for successfuloperations against surface TCTs.

SummaryThe primary goal of joint targeting is to provide the most efficient use of joint force assets

and capitalize on their synergistic effects. Eliminating duplication of effort and fratricide isan important part of that efficiency. Likewise, eliminating the fog of war is critical to meetingthe fratricide challenge while increasing a joint force's operational tempo. The JFC mustensure effective and efficient attacks against high priority surface TCTs, as well as exercisedue caution to avoid fratricide and duplication of effort. Regardless of the threat, a joint forcemust be able to rapidly execute lethal and nonlethal attacks against surface TCTs using thesynergistic power that components contribute, all the while considering that when componentswork together, they each have responsibilities (functional and/or area) that may intersect.Each must depend on and leverage the capabilities of the others to be decisive in battle.Application of these capabilities is enhanced through clear, concise joint targeting proceduresallowing the JFC and components to rapidly coordinate information, deconflict operations,and synchronize attacks. Common target numbers, reference systems, and common picturesof the battlespace are developing technologies that will support joint targeting procedures inthe future. This multiservice TTP offers a procedural fix until those capabilities fully evolve.

NOTES

1 Jt Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, November 14, 1994, p IV-1

2 Jt Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995, p III-26

3 Ibid

I _ _ ___ ___

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTSThe following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:

Joint

Joint Staff - Pentagon, Washington DCJ-8 (Joint Warfighting Assessments Division)J-7 (Joint Doctrine Division)J-33 / J-38 (STOD)J-2P/T (DIA Doctrine, Plans, and Policy Division)

Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division - Ft Monroe, VAJoint Command and Control Warfare Center, OTS - San Antonio, TXJoint TMD Attack Operations - Kirtland AFB, NMJoint Warfare Analysis Center, J-8 - Dahlgren, VA

Unified Command

US Atlantic Command - Norfolk, VAJ-72; J-5; J-3; J-2; Joint Targeting School

US Central Command - Tampa FLCCJ-5; CCJ-33-PP; CCJ-2

US Special Operations Command - Tampa FLJSOFI (Doctrine Directorate)JSOC- J-3 / FSEJ-2

US European Command -Vaihingen, GEECJ5-D; ECJ2

US Pacific Command - Camp Smith, HIJ-38; J-2

US Southern Command - Quarry Heights, PNSCJ-5-PS

US Strategic Command - Offut, NEJ-51 (Strategy and Policy Division)

US Space Command - Peterson AFB, COJ-5X

US Transportation Command - Scott AFB, COTCJ-5-SR

US Forces Japan - Yokota AB, JAJ-3

Combined

ROK-US Combined Forces Command -Yongsan, ROKHQ Fifth Allied Tactical Air Forces -Vicenza, IT

CAOC (Operations Division / FAIT- Intelligence Division)

Army

HQ Department of the Army, DAMO-FDQ - Pentagon, Washington DCHQ Forces Command, CG - Ft McPherson, GAXVIII CORPS, 1st BCD - Ft Bragg, NCXVIII CORPS FSE -Ft Bragg, NCV CORPS FSE - Frankfurt, GEI CORPS FSE - Ft Lewis, WAEigth USA BCD - Osan AB, ROKUSA Europe BCD - Heidelberg, GEUSA Field Artillery School - Ft Sill, OK

WIDD; TSM-FSC3; D&SA BL

USA Air Defense Artillery School, CATD - Ft Bliss, TXUSA Armor School. 16 Cav Rgt - Ft Knox, KYUSA Space Command, TMD Cell / ATMDE Attack Operations - Colorado Springs, COUSA Intelligence Center - Ft Huachuca, AZ

ATZS-TDUSA Command and General Staff College - Ft Leavenworth, KS

ATZL-SWW-L; ATZL-CTB-DUSA Training and Doctrine Command, Ft Monroe VA

ATDO-A; ATCD-G (C4I)Program Manager AFATDS - Ft Monmouth, NJ111th Military Intelligence Bde - Ft Huachuca, AZ

Marine Corps

HQ USMC, DCS for Plans, Policy, and Operations - Pentagon, Washington DCHQ USMC Forces Europe, G-5 (Southern Region Plans Division) - Boblingen, GEMarine Corps Combat Development Command, C42 - Quantico VAMarine Corps Combat Development Command, MSTP - Quantico VA1 Marine Expeditionary Force, G-5, Camp Pendleton, CA

Navy

Department of the Navy, CNO, N511 - Pentagon, Washington DCNaval Doctrine Command, N3 - Norfolk VANaval War College, JMO Department - Newport, RICINCPACFLT N5 - Pearl Harbor, HI

Air Force

HQ USAF/ XOXD / XOFI / XORC - Pentagon, Washington DCUSAF Doctrine Center - Langley Air Force Base, VAHQ Air Combat Command - Langley Air Force Base, VA

XPJD / XP-SAS / SMO-I / INXU / INAA / DRAC / DRCHQ United States Air Forces Europe - Ramstein AB, GE

32 Air Operations Group / 32 Air Operations SquadronHQ United States Central Command Air Forces - Shaw AFB, SC

A5-DOXP (Plans and Operations)HQ Electronic Systems Command, TDIS - Hanscom AFB, MAHQ Seventh Air Force, Plans Division / Intel Division - Osan AB, ROKHQ Twelfth Air Force - Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ

Air Operations Center (Combat Intelligence Division)Space Warfare Center, DOZ - Falcon AFB, CO727th Air Control Squadron (CIC), Hurlburt Fld, FLUSAF Joint Programs Office - Ft Sill, OKUSAF AF Element - Ft Leavenworth, KSUSAF Air Employment Studies Office, USAWC - Carlisle, PA497 Intelligence Group, INOT - Falls Church, VAAir Command and Staff College, Wargaming Division - Montgomery, AL

Other

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) -Arlington, VABallistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) - Pentagon, Washington, DCConsolidated Missile Support Activity (CMSA) - Norfolk, VADefense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) - Pentagon

Chapter I

THE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

"It is not the object of war toannihilate those who have givenprovocation for it, but to cause themto mend their ways."

- PolybiusHistories (2nd century B.C.)

1. Background

a. What is a Target? A target is ageographical area, complex, or installationplanned for capture or destruction by militaryforces?.' Targets include the wide array ofmobile and stationary forces, equipment,capabilities, and functions that an enemycommander can use to conduct operations atany level-strategic, operational, or tactical.Targets fall into two general categories,planned and immediate (Figure I-1).

(1) Planned targets are targets thatare known to exist in an operational area andagainst which fire or attacks have beenscheduled in advance or on-call. Examplesrange from targets on joint target lists (JTLs)in applicable campaign plans, to targetsdetected in sufficient time to list in the airtasking order (ATO) or fire support plans.

PLANNEDTARGETS(KNOWN)

SCHEDULED ON-CALL

(2) Immediate targets are targetswhich fire or attacks have not been scheduledand normally detected too late to be includedin the normal targeting cycle. Immediatetargets have two subcategories: unplannedor unanticipated.

(a) Unplanned immediate tar-gets are those which are known to exist inan operational area but not detected orlocated in sufficient time.

(b) Unanticipated immediatetargets are those that are unknown orunexpected to exist in an operational area.Chapter II discusses planned and immediatetargets in relation to surface time-criticaltargets (TCTs) and targets of opportunity(TOOs).

b. What is Targeting? Targeting is theprocess of selecting targets and matching theappropriate response to them taking intoaccount operational requirements andcapabilities. 2 Targeting occurs at all levelsof command within a joint force and isperformed at all levels by forces capable ofdelivering fires or attacking targets with bothlethal and nonlethal disruptive and

IMMEDIATETARGETS

UNPLANNEDTARGETS(KNOWN)

UNANTICIPATEDTARGETS

(UNKNOWN)

Figure I-1. General Target Categories and Subcategories

-- -- ---- - --

destructive means.3 Targeting is a functionshared by both operations and intelligence.However, the requirement to deconflictduplicative efforts of different echelons withinthe same force and to synchronize the attackof those targets with other components of thejoint force complicates the targeting process.Therefore, an effective and efficient jointtargeting process is essential for the JFC andcomponents to plan and execute operations.

2. Joint Targeting Process

The joint targeting process determines theemployment of military force to achieve adesired objective. It integrates capabilitiesof national assets, geographic combatantcommands (that is, unified combatantcommands), subordinate joint force,multinational, and component commands, allof which possess varying capabilities andrequirements. The joint targeting process isdescribed as a "cyclical process"4 withsequential phases. However, the jointtargeting process is really a continuouslyoperating series of closely related, interacting,and interdependent functions. The sixfunctions/phases are-commander's objec-tives and guidance, target development,weaponeering assessment, force appli-cation, execution planning/forceexecution, and combat assessment (CA).Joint targeting is not a static, inflexibleprocess but rather a dynamic process thatmust be fluidly applied. Each function/phaseof the process can directly affect otherfunctions/phases of the process withoutregard to any specific order. For example,CA directly affects subsequent forceapplication if mission results proveinadequate. Likewise, weaponeeringassessment directly affects execution asweapons will drive execution tactics. Inaddition, specific timelines do not constrainthe joint targeting process. Depending on thesituation, the entire process can last from afew minutes (as in the case of a theatermissile defense [TMD] scenario), to severaldays (such as in the development of an initialJTL for a CINC's campaign plan for a majoroperation), to several months (as in thedevelopment of the Single Integrated

Operations Plan [SIOP]). Figure I-2 depictsthe six basic functions of the joint targetingprocess that applies universally to eachcomponent of a joint force. Equally impor-tant to understand is that Army and MarineCorps service doctrine traditionally definesthe targeting process as having four steps:

DECIDE-DETECT-DELIVER-ASSESS (D3A)

At first glance, when compared to the jointtargeting process, the Army/Marine Corpsservice targeting process appears quitedifferent. However, although labeled withdifferent terms, the Army/Marine Corpsservice targeting process incorporates thesame fundamental functions as the jointtargeting process (Figure 1-3). The functionsof the Army/Marine Corps targeting processcan be easily translated to the functions ofthe joint targeting process. Note that D3Afunctions flow fluidly across the six functionsof the joint targeting process. (Note: In somecases, the functions of D3A may alsooverlap. For further information on D3A,see FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14, TTP for theTargeting Process.) Although componentsmay not desire to eliminate or replace serviceunique doctrinal definitions for theirtargeting process, there must be a commonjoint targeting lexicon to eliminate confusionand provide a common perspective. D3A,once translated into the joint targetingprocess, supports this common lexicon anduniversally recognized "joint language."

a. Commander's Objectives and Guid-ance. Targeting responds to the objectivesand guidance that originate at the nationallevel as broad concepts. Objectives are thedesired position or purpose. Starting at thenational level as broadly defined statements,objectives become more specific and dynamicas commanders interpret and translate theminto specific plans of action. Guidance pro-vides the framework for employing forces toachieve the objectives. Joint forcecommanders (JFCs) refine national guid-ance and provide commander's intent;guidance; and clear, measurable, attainableobjectives that become specific plans of action.JFCs establish broad planning objectives andguidance for attack of enemy strategic andoperational centers of gravity and

Figure 1-2. The Joint Targeting Process

L jFigure 1-3. The Army/Marine Corps Targeting Process Overlaid onto the

Joint Targeting Process

interdiction of enemy forces as an integralpart of joint campaigns and majoroperations.5 Targeting matches objectiveswith inputs from intelligence, operations, andother functional areas (such as logistics andcommunications), to identify the forcesavailable and necessary to accomplish themission.

(1) The National Command Authorities(NCA) communicate national securityobjectives through the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the geographiccombatant commander (unified CINC) asbroad campaign objectives. The unified CINCtranslates the national guidance andprovides clear, measurable, and attainableobjectives to established JFCs andcomponent commanders. (Note: In somecases, the unified CINC and JFC are onein the same. For the purpose of thispublication, the term JFC will be used torepresent the commander of any jointforce.) Part of the objectives includes thearticulation of damage levels and statesdesired for a specific period of operations. Themore specific and measurable the objectives,the greater the likelihood joint force planningstaffs and executing component forces willachieve an economy of force that will enablethe most effective use of assets against theenemy. The objectives and guidance areshaped by the principles of war, the Laws ofArmed Conflict (LOAC), and establishedrules of engagement (ROE).

(2) Intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (IPB) provides the JFC a specificcontext to further specify objectives andguidance. IPB is a systematic, continuousprocess of analyzing the threat andenvironment in a specific geographic area.Included in the production of IPB is thedetailed analysis of all available operationaland intelligence information, to include theenemy situation, capabilities, strengths,composition, disposition, and locations. IPBalso addresses possible courses of action,enemy perception of friendly vulnerabilities,and enemy operational sustainmentcapabilities.

(3) With the advice of the componentcommanders, the JFC sets priorities, providestargeting guidance, and determines theweight of effort for various operations.Subordinate commanders recommend to theJFC how to use their combat power mosteffectively to achieve the JFC's objectives.Weight of effort for any aspect of jointtargeting may be expressed in terms ofpercentage of total available resources,priorities for resources used with respect tothe other aspects of the theater campaign,or as otherwise determined by the JFC.6

(4) The JFC consults often with thecomponent commanders to assess the resultsof the warfighting effort and to discuss thedirection and future plans. This providescomponent commanders an opportunity tointroduce recommendations, state supportrequirements, and provide their ability tosupport other components.

(5) The JFC's objectives and guidanceidentify targeting priorities, planningguidance, and procedures. For example, theJFC states guidance in the air apportionmentdecision. See Joint Publication 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint AirOperations, for more information on airapportionment.

b. Target Development. This part of theprocess is the systematic evaluation ofpotential target systems, individual targets,and the elements of each target. Targets aresystematically evaluated for military,economic, and political importance. Targetdevelopment closely examines enemydoctrine and order of battle as well as takesinto account operational concerns such asfriendly schemes of maneuver, assetsavailable, and battlespace geometry/management. Identification of centers ofgravity (COGs), such as key target systemsand their critical nodes, is an essential partof this process. Personnel tasked to performtarget development must identify andanalyze key target systems relevant to theJFC's changing objectives and guidance.Target validation, target list prioritization,

and collection also occur during this phase.Target development is an objective analysisconducted independently of munitions orplatform availability.

(1) Target development has severalsteps:

(a) Establish information require-ments

(b) Identify potential targetsystems

(c) Identify critical nodes and theiractivities and functions

(d) Develop target system modelsand utility measures

(e) Validate targets and "No-Hit"lists.

(f) Define production requirements

(2) Target development inputs are-

(a) Operation Plan Joint TargetList (OPLAN JTL) Annex. For a givenoperational area, the OPLAN JTL Annexconstitutes a target baseline. OPLAN JTLsare subsets of the military nationalintelligence integrated database/integrateddatabase (MIIDS/IDB) modified to meet jointforce requirements in various regionsthroughout the world. The OPLAN JTL is a"dynamic" database. During peacetime, theunified command J-2 modifies this databasevia inputs from both national agencies as wellas assigned component forces.

(b) Battlespace Geometry Manage-ment. Assessment of battlespace geometryallows intelligence planners to accuratelydevelop targets based on regional andgeographic characteristics.

support.

studies.

(c) All source national agency

(d) Enemy orders of battle (EOBs).

(e) Enemy military capability

ments.

nations.

(f) Current intelligence assess-

(g) Component target nomi-

(h) Joint Targeting CoordinationBoard (JTCB) inputs (if established).

(i) Existing basic encyclopedia

(BE) numbered targets.

(3) Target development outputs are-

(a) JTL. In wartime, the OPLANJTL Annex is updated and serves as aninitial list of campaign targets. The JTL isthe master target list that supports the JFC'sobjectives, guidance, intent, and courses ofaction. Also, it normally lists high-valuetargets (HVTs), which are later incorporatedas high-payoff target (HPT) nominationsduring component wargaming.

SThe JTL is normally constructedby the unified command with support fromcomponents and with inputs from the JointStaff and other national agencies.7

Component commanders will identify andselect fixed and mobile targets that meet theJFC's objectives/guidance and submit themfor inclusion in the JTL. Each componentdevelops such targets to support its ownassigned mission.

• The JTL is not a prioritized listof targets but contains prioritized targetcategories (command and control [C2],airfields, lines of communications, and othersas appropriate) listing specific targets.s TheJFC should prioritize the JTL targetcategories according to the campaign planand focus the intelligence/target materialproduction effort. Upon direction of the JFC,the JTL is updated daily or as required viatarget information report (TGTINFOREP)messages from components. Maintenance ofthe JTL may be conducted by the JFC's staffor as directed by the JFC (e.g., JTCB). 9

(b) Joint Integrated PrioritizedTarget List (JIPTL). Joint doctrine allows

_ _~ ___

the use of a JIPTL for prioritizing specifictargets. (Note: In Combined ForcesCommand, Republic of Korea, this list isdesignated the single integratedprioritized target list [SIPTL].) TheJIPTL is a JFC level product usuallyproduced by the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC). Prioritization refersto a target's relative importance andsignificance within a specific target systemand to other targets. Prioritization does notnecessarily denote operational sequencing.See Joint Pub 2-01.1, JTTP for IntelligenceSupport to Targeting, and Joint Pub 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint AirOperations, for additional information on theJIPTL.

(c) Inputs to intelligence collectionplan.

(d) Restricted targets lists (targetsnot to be struck due to ROE, LOAC, orexploitation requirements).

(e) IPB event template.

(f) Established Target SelectionStandards (TSS). TSS are criteria, appliedto enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefieldinformation), used in deciding whether theactivity is a target. TSS break nominationsinto two categories: targets and suspectedtargets. Targets meet accuracy andtimeliness requirements for attack.Suspected targets must be confirmed beforeany attack.

(g) Target Information. Generally,target information consists of-

SGeneral location (area).

*Target type (category).

SCommon target number (CTN),if available.

SSpecific location.

*Disposition.

*Disposition size.

STarget velocity and direction.

SSurveyed target data.

STarget identification specifics.

*Unit identification.

(4) The J-2 supports target develop-ment with resources of the theater JointIntelligence Center (JIC) at the geographiccombatant command level, or the jointintelligence support element (JISE), at thesubordinate joint task force (JTF) level.Component intelligence assets andintelligence organizations, along withaugmentation from national intelligenceagencies, also contribute. The theater JICprovides the coordination of intelligenceresources, reporting, and services to supportthe tactical commanders.

c. Weaponeering Assessment. The pur-pose of the weaponeering assessment phaseis to provide various force application optionsfor each target based upon desired results.The process depends on detailed intelligenceanalysis of target construction andvulnerabilities combined with operationalassessments of weapons effects and deliveryparameters. Weaponeering assessmentdetermines the quantity, type, and mix oflethal and nonlethal weapons required toproduce a desired effect. It is an analysis ofthe best weapon combination for economy offorce (that is, the best "bang for the buck").Timeliness is also a critical factor inweaponeering decisions. The short dwellnature of TCTs requires the timelyavailability of an attack asset be animportant factor in weapons selection.

(1) Using the JTL from the targetdevelopment phase, intelligence plannersconduct detailed analysis of targetconstruction, system analysis, andinterconnectivity with other systems toreveal key vulnerabilities. Intelligenceplanners also provide an analysis of threat

systems associated with each target toidentify significant risks. Operationalplanners fuse the target and threat analysiswith Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual(JMEM) data and other nonlethal effects inorder to assess expected results. If desireddestruction criteria will be met, and otherfactors are favorable (such as weapons anddelivery system availability), a variety ofoptions with weapons recommendations areassigned to targets on the JTL. Recom-mendations prescribe the amount and typeof ordnance as well as the number and typeof delivery parameters to achieve desiredeffects.

(a) Lethal force weaponeeringparameters include target vulnerability,weapons effects, aimpoint selection, deliveryerrors, weather, damage criteria, and weaponreliability.

(b) Nonlethal force weaponeeringassessment is the assessment of the abilityof friendly systems to observe activity,deceive, jam, affect (as in psychologicaloperations [PSYOP]), disrupt, or deny accessto critical friendly targets. Nonlethalweaponeering is a significant part of C2attack analysis conducted by the joint forcecommand and control warfare (C2W) cell.The C2W cell performs nonlethal targetingand weaponeering (effects and means)analysis to identify and match adversary C2targets to friendly C2W and operationalobjectives.

(2) Weaponeering assessment is not aprediction of results but a statisticalprobability of weapons effects. It includes thedetailed study and refinement of aimpoints,fuse delays, impact angles and velocities,weapons trajectories, number and type ofweapons for employment (both air-to-surfaceand surface-to-surface), and recommendeddamage criteria. Depending on the assets ofthe component attacking the target, natureof the target, and time available to engagethe target, weapons/munitions selectionprocedures can vary. In some cases verydeliberate procedures can be used to

weaponeer attack assets. In other cases,quick (often computer assisted) decisionsmust be made as to what attack assets willbe employed. However, requisite assump-tions in the prediction process may or maynot match actual operational conditions, asvariations in actual force employment maycause the results to vary greatly. Thisdepends on the type of target, type of weapon,delivery system, weather, threat, and rangeto the target. The result in weaponeeringassessment is a probability of damageagainst the designated target and therecommended weapons or weapon systemsrequired to achieve the required level ofdamage.

d. Force Application. Force applicationis the selection of lethal or nonlethal forcesfor the mission. It integrates previous phasesin the cycle and fuses weaponeeringassessment with available forces. Forceapplication is primarily an operationsfunction, but it requires considerableintelligence support. Intelligence andoperations staffs work closely to optimize theforce necessary to achieve the objectiveconsidering operational realities and data(available assets). With guidance from theJFC, component commanders conduct forceapplication planning to fuse target, weaponsystem, munitions, and nonlethal forceoptions. This phase results in the jointlycoordinated selection of forces and associatedweapon systems or platforms.

(1) The primary objectives of forceapplication are to sequence target attacksand synchronize the application of lethal ornonlethal force.

(2) During force application, thecomponents identify primary resources toexecute missions and supporting require-ments. To accomplish force packaging andtask organization, the planners must have aconcise list of assets to include variouscomponent resources available for JTLtargets. During this process, force packagingand task organization may group varioustargets based on geographic location to

facilitate economy of force and unity of effort.Likewise, a relatively high priority targetmay go unserviced because of situationalfactors that render the target too force-intensive to execute.

(3) Intelligence provides plannersupdated threat analysis for intended targets.This includes air and ground threats en routeto targets. Intelligence estimates of the threatmust reveal situational factors indicatingwhether or not the threat is too high forsuccessful mission accomplishment. If so, thetarget may require reevaluation for either adifferent weapon system to attack it; adifferent target in the target system; orpostponement of the attack until the threatis diminished. In either case, an accurateintelligence assessment of the current threatis a critical aspect of the force applicationprocess.

(4) The key products from the forceapplication phase are the master air attackplan/ATO shell for the air effort or an attackguidance matrix (AGM) for the ground effort.

e. Execution Planning/Force Execution.The JFC will issue mission type ordersdirecting component commanders to executethe operation.

(1) Execution Planning. Componentcommanders and their staffs, upon receipt ofthe execution order from the JFC, conductmission planning and preparation forengagement. The ATO and AGM guiderespective components in the preparation ofschedules, missions, route planning, andtactics to execute attacks. Due to inevitablechanges in the enemy situation (thereby theassumptions used in the force applicationphase), 'intelligence and operations personnelneed to analyze the ATO andAGM to validatewhether or not they accurately address thecurrent enemy situation. This analysis andvalidation are an ongoing functionthroughout execution planning, as IPB is acontinuous process. IPB can significantlyenhance the targeting process for surfaceTCTs by identifying the probable locations

or operating areas where surface TCTs mayemerge. Depending on the seriousness of thethreat, resources available, and level ofconfidence in the IPB, componentcommanders may elect to position or posturetarget acquisition and strike assets to rapidlyrespond to the forecasted areas. Duringexecution planning, intelligence also closelymonitors target status in order to updatefinal planning before execution. It mustidentify changes required to current taskings,as well as provide changes to follow-on targetdevelopment phases and weaponeeringphases. Inputs from intelligence plannersupdate enemy threat assessments anddirectly impact a broad area, such as taskingorders, operations orders (OPORDs) andassociated annexes, deconfliction plans,decision support templates (DSTs), schedulesof fires, and support OPORDs. Intelligenceplanners also play a major role in missionplanning support. This includes threatlocations, target materials, graphics, maps,charts, geodesy products, and surveyed datapoints.

(2) Force Execution. As directed, com-ponents and their assigned forces executetheir operations while monitoring othercomponents. Components report laterally toeach other and vertically to the JFC.Component commanders monitor theexecution phase and provide real-timerecommendations for redirection of forces,reattack, and other taskings as the situationwarrants. Intelligence must also monitor theexecution of the plan and be prepared toprovide immediate threat and target updatesshould a change in the plan occur. Missionexecution requires the flexibility to impactunforeseen surface TCTs. The intelligencearchitecture and collection plan must rapidlyaddress these types of threats.

f. Combat Assessment. CA directlyaffects all other phases of the joint targetingcycle. CA is the determination of the overalleffectiveness of force employment duringmilitary operations.'10 At the JFC level, theCA effort should be a joint program,supported at all levels, designed to determine

if the required effects on the adversaryenvisioned in the campaign plan are beingachieved by the joint force components tomeet the JFC's overall concept."

(1) CA seeks to determine if the JFC'sobjectives for an operation are being or havebeen met and provides information that helpsdetermine if they need to be modified. Threequestions make this determination: Were thestrategic operational and tactical objectivesmet by force employment? Did the forcesemployed perform as expected? If the aboveanswers are no, what will fix the problem?CA provides the JFC information on pastperformance so operations can decide how toapply future planning.

(2) CA is accomplished at all levels inthe joint force. JFCs should establish adynamic system to support CA for allcomponents. Normally, the joint force J-3 willbe responsible for coordinating CA, assistedby the joint force J-2.12 Also, the JTCB (ifestablished) should receive CA informationin order to fulfill their assignedresponsibilities.

(3) Intelligence supports CA byproviding objective assessments on theoverall impact of military operations againstadversary forces, possible enemy courses ofaction (COAs), and predictions of enemyintent. These assessments come from avariety of sources, to include mission reports(MISREPs), aircraft in-flight reports(INFLTREPs), reconnaissance reports,intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), nationalsystems, and reports from joint recon-naissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition (RSTA) systems.

(4) CA includes battle damage assess-ment (BDA), munitions effect assessment(MEA), and reattack recommendation (RR).(Note: Some services also include theevolving concept of mission assessment[MA] as part of the CA phase.)

(a) BDA. BDA is a principalsubordinate element of CA. BDA attemptsto determine the impact of operations against

individual targets and target systems. BDAis the estimate of physical, functional, andtarget system damage resulting from theapplication of military force, either lethal ornonlethal, against a predetermined objective.Although primarily an intelligenceresponsibility, accurate BDA depends on thecoordination and integration betweenoperations and intelligence. BDA uses allsource intelligence to assess target damageand response. During each phase of the BDAprocess, determinations are made on whatadjustments, if any, are required in otherphases of the joint targeting process.

SPhase I BDA-Initial. Phase IBDA is an initial analysis, based primarilyon visual observation of the target andusually derived from a single source. Inputscome from aircrew MISREPs and debriefs,weapon systems video, manned andunmanned imagery reconnaissance, andother sources. The unit controlling theweapon system develops Phase I BDA.Reports should state whether a target washit or missed and include an initial estimateof damage. Phase I is usually the firstindicator of problems with weapon systemsor tactics assessed during MEA.

*Phase II BDA - Supplemental.Phase II BDA reviews all phase I damageassessments and amplifies the initialanalysis. Phase II draws on all sourceintelligence and operational data todetermine functional damage to a target andan estimate of impact on the target system.This phase requires the integration of theaterand national source information. The theaterJIC has access to these sources and providessignificant support. Signals intelligence(SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), andmeasurement and signature intelligence(MASINT) sources are useful during thisphase.

SPhase III BDA - Target SystemAssessment. Primarily performed in large-scale operations, Phase III BDA produces atarget system assessment by fusing allsupplemental BDA with the experience of

subject matter experts. It provides the JFCwith an estimate of the remainingcapabilities of the targeted system. Itsfundamental use is an input for determiningif objectives are being met. The fundamentaldetermination made during phase III BDAis how successful efforts have been to degradeor deprive the enemy's warfighting capability.The bottom line question is-How successfulhave our efforts been to degrade or deprivethe enemy's warfighting capability?

(b) MEA. MEA provides feedbackon how well ordnance, tactics, weaponsystems, and platforms performed in combat.MEA is primarily an operationsresponsibility requiring inputs from theintelligence community. MEA is conductedconcurrently and interactively with BDA toevaluate ordnance, weapon system, andtactics performance and continues over anextended period of time beyond the BDAprocess. MEA evaluates weapons parameterssuch as delivery accuracy, fusing, and damagemechanisms (blast, fragmentation, andpenetration). In the MEA process, analystsidentify weapons and tactics/munitionsdeficiencies. Once a deficiency is identified,the analysts make recommendations eitherfor procedural changes, different tactics, orsystem modifications.

(c) RR. RR is a combinedoperations and intelligence function. Itprovides:the JFC specific advice on reattackof targets and further target selection toachieve objectives. RR develops recom-mendations on which targets may requirereattack, based upon the enemy's remainingcapability, capacity, and potential forrecuperation. In doing so, it also attemptsto solve deficiencies identified during theBDA and MEA processes. Reassessment ofobjectives, target selection, vulnerabilities,timing, tactics, weapons, and munitionsfactors into the new recommendations.Reattack recommendations are passed backinto the joint targeting cycle at the targetdevelopment, force application, and executionplanning/force execution phases. In addition,RR provides significant indications for the

further exploitation of the ongoing operations,thus "restarting" the targeting process withthe development and definitions of newobjectives.

(d) MA. Though not a formallyrecognized part of CA, some services arebeginning to use the evolving concept of MAto address the effectiveness of the overalloperation in light of commander's objectivesand guidance. MA gives the JFC a broadperspective of the comprehensive impact ofoperations against the enemy and evaluatesmission accomplishment on the enemy'swarfighting and war sustaining capabilities.

3. Organizing for the Joint TargetingProcess

The JFC conducts the joint targetingprocess within an established organizationalframework optimized for targetingoperations. A primary consideration inorganizing this framework is the joint force'sability to coordinate, deconflict, andsynchronize joint targeting operations. Thestructure established by the JFC mustfacilitate the joint targeting processthroughout the entire spectrum ofanticipated targeting timelines. It mustconduct effective joint targeting for long-term, daily, and rapidly changing time-criticalsituations. The JFC defines this structurebased upon assigned, attached, supportingforces; threat; mission; and operational area.The structure must focus on enemy COGs toexpedite campaign success. It must alsoidentify those critical vulnerabilities thatdirectly or indirectly lead to the degradationof enemy COGs. Also, it must be responsiveenough to react to rapidly changing events.A targeting structure that quicklycoordinates and synchronizes joint targetingoperations will effectively counter highpriority, time-critical threats. Likewise, itshould execute all phases of the jointtargeting process efficiently and continuously.

a. Intelligence Division (J-2). The J-2oversees the intelligence operations of thejoint force and provides intelligence to all

1-10

levels of the command for planning, directing,and conducting operations. The J-2 is thestaff agency with the primary responsibilityfor prioritization of intelligence collectionefforts, target detection, validation, and BDAfor all operations. Also, the J-2 is a majorparticipant in the detection of targets and thetarget prioritization process.

b. Theater JIC. The theater JIC islocated at combatant command level andintegrates all national and DOD supportingcapabilities to develop a current intelligencepicture. The National Military JointIntelligence Center (NMJIC) supports theirefforts. The theater JIC is the center ofintelligence activities supporting the JFC,J-2, and components and provides the all-source analysis and target materials tosupport the targeting and BDA process. Atthe subunified command and JTF level, aJISE assists in coordinating JIC operations.

c. Operations Division (J-3). The J-3assists the commander in the dischargeresponsibility of the direction and control ofoperations, beginning with the planning andfollow-through until specific operations arecompleted. In this capacity, the J-3 plans,coordinates, and integrates operations. Theflexibility and range of modern forces requireclose coordination and integration foreffective unity of effort. When the joint staffincludes a Plans Division (J-5), it alsoperforms the long range or future planningresponsibilities. 13

d. Joint Targeting Coordination Board.JFCs may establish and task an organizationwithin their staffs to accomplish broadtargeting oversight functions or may delegatethe responsibility to a subordinatecommander. Typically, JFCs organize JTCBs.If the JFC designates, a JTCB may be anintegrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, itneeds to be a joint activity composed ofrepresentatives from the staff, allcomponents, and, if required, theirsubordinate units. JFCs task commandersor staff officers with the JTCB function basedon the JFC's concept of operations and the

individual's experience, expertise, andsituational awareness appropriate to thesituation. The JFC defines the role of theJTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews targetinginformation, develops targeting guidance andpriorities, and may prepare and refine JTLs.The JTCB should also maintain a completelist of restricted targets and areas wherespecial operations forces (SOF) are operatingto avoid endangering current or futureoperations.'14

(1) The JTCB maintains a macro-levelview of the area of responsibility (AOR)/jointoperations area (JOA) and ensures targetingnominations are consistent with the JFC'scampaign plan. 15 This view encompasses allcomponent operations and all joint forcetargeting (not solely air targeting). Itsprincipal focus is on the strategic andoperational level of war.

(2) The JTCB must maintain acampaign-level perspective and should notinvolve itself at levels of detail best left tothe component commanders, such asselecting specific targets and aimpoints, ordevelopment of attack packages. 16 They donot write master air attack plans, developATOs, develop AGMs, or make appor-tionment decisions. Components areresponsible for planning and execution.

(3) The JTCB generally focuses onoperations beyond a 24-hour cycle. It mayhave difficulty monitoring operations shortof a 24-hour period and may have little or noability to affect real-time targetingoperations. Other solutions, such ascomponent to component direct coordination,must occur to fulfill the role of rapiddeconfliction, synchronization, andcoordination.

(4) The JTCB as a planning supportfunction helps components follow the JFC'sintent in the execution of operations bypreparing targeting guidance, refining jointtarget lists, and reviewing target information. 7

(5) The JFC may direct the JTCB tomaintain the JTL.18

I-11

(6) The JTCB may serve as a focal pointto coordinate joint force/component targetingoperations with other operations, such aslogistics and space/national asset support.

(7) In multinational operations, theJTCB may be subordinate to a MultinationalTargeting Coordination Board, with JFCs ortheir agents representing the joint force onthe multinational board. 19

e. Component Commanders. Com-ponent commanders are instrumental in theexecution of targets resulting from the jointtargeting process and identifying targetscritical to their operations. They areinstrumental in assisting the JFC informulating guidance, controlling many of thecollection assets, executing operationsagainst targets, and providing feedback aspart of combat assessment. These functionsremain constant regardless of joint forceorganization (functional or service).Coordination and communication betweencomponents are especially critical in regardtoTCTs. JFCs establish common procedures,communications, and target referencesystems to enable them to quickly react whena TCT presents itself. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine

for Joint Operations, provides furtherinformation on component commandertargeting responsibilities. Joint Pub 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint AirOperations, explains JFACC targetingresponsibilities. Joint Pub 3-05.5, SpecialOperations Targeting/Mission PlanningResponsibilities, explains joint specialoperations task force (JSOTF) targetingresponsibilities.

f. Delegation Of Targeting. JFCs willnormally delegate the authority to conductexecution planning, coordination, anddeconfliction associated with targeting andwill ensure that this process is also a jointeffort involving applicable subordinatecommands. Whoever is designated thisresponsibility must possess or have access toa sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequatefacilities, and ready availability of jointplanning expertise. Should such an agencybe charged with joint functional commandresponsibilities, a joint targeting mechanismis also needed to facilitate this process at thislevel. All components are normally involvedin targeting and should establish proceduresand mechanisms to manage the targetingfunction.2 o

1-12

NOTES

1 Jt Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994, p 364


3 Ibid

4 Ibid, p III-26

5 Ibid, p III-25

6 Ibid, p III-26


8 Ibid

9 Ibid

10 Jt Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995, p IV-16

11 Ibid

12 Ibid

' 3 Jt Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), February 24, 1995, p IV-20



16 CSAF/CSA Article, The Army-Air Force Team: Leveraging Our Strengths, p 5

17 Ibid


's Jt Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995, p III-26

20 Ibid, pp III-26 and III-27

1-13

Chapter II

PROCEDURES FOR TARGETING TIME-CRITICAL TARGETS

'When you see a rattlesnake poised tostrike, you do not wait until he hasstruck before you crush him."

-Franklin D. Roosevelt'11 September 1941

1. Surface Time-Critical Targets

A TCT is a lucrative, fleeting, air, land, or

sea target of such high priority to friendlyforces that the JFC/component commanderdesignates it as requiring immediateresponse. TCTs pose, or will pose, animminent threat to friendly forces or presentan exceptional operational or tacticalopportunity. Other adjectives commonly usedto describe a TCT are emerging, perishable,high payoff, short dwell, or time-sensitive (asdefined in Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms). Thischapter deals exclusively with surface (landor sea) TCTs. Most surface TCTs typically

move rapidly and hide throughout thebattlefield, limiting their exposure time. Interms of the joint targeting process, the JFC/component commander sets surface TCTs aspriorities during the commander's objectives

and guidance phase. Target developmentdedicates sensors for detection andidentification, and weaponeering assessmentprovides the JFC options for attack. Forceapplication assigns attack assets, after whichthe execution planning/force execution phaseemploys force. CA follows through with

feedback for subsequent engagements.

a. Examples of surface TCTs includemobile rocket launchers (MRLs), mobile highthreat surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),theater ballistic missiles (TBMs), supportinglaunchers, mobile weapons of massdestruction (WMD), or mobile C2 vehicles andfacilities.

b. Surface TCTs may also be fixedtargets, such as operational-level commandcenters that, once their location isdetermined, must be destroyed quickly toallow further friendly force actions. Otherfixed-surface TCTs may be nuclear orchemical weapons depots, (whentransportation of the stored weapons isimminent, or if hidden, once they aredetected), or fixed surface-to-surface missile(SSM) sites (when detected and threateningto launch). Under certain circumstances,ordinary fixed-surface targets may beclassified as time-critical if they present alucrative opportunity that the JFC/component commander determines is apriority. For example, an enemy airfield maybecome a surface TCT if it is determined(through intelligence sources) it will soonsupport aircraft equipped with WMD.Likewise, a bridge, previously left standingto channel enemy movement, may become asurface TCT once the commander determinesit is time to destroy it and seal off an avenueof escape.

c. Surface TCTs are classified as eitherplanned or immediate (Figure II-i).

(1) Planned surface TCTs areordinarily fixed targets, known to exist in anoperational area, that have been upgradedto time-critical status due to JFC/componentcommander priority. This is normally due toa newly acquired "short dwell" status thatpresents an exceptional operational ortactical opportunity. Fires and attacks areplaced on-call against planned surfaceTCTs.Generally, surface TCTs (as planned targets)are limited in number.

(2) Immediate surface TCTs aremobile TCTs against which fire or attackshave not been scheduled. Some fixed TCTsmay also be immediate. Immediate surfaceTCTs have two subcategories-unplannedand unanticipated.

_ _ I __ _ _ _ I


SCHEDULED BON-CALL

IMMEDIATETARGETS



(UNKNOWN)

Figure I1-1. Surface TCT Relationship to Planned and Immediate Targets

(a) Unplanned immediate sur-face TCTs are those known to exist inoperational areas but have no fire or attacksscheduled. They are generally the largestcategory of surface TCTs. They requireestablished procedures for proactive, timelyacquisition by sensors and immediateresponse once acquired. The JFC directscomponent commanders to assign adequateattack assets to respond to all unplannedimmediate surface TCTs in an operationalarea. In situations where a JFC orcomponent commander does not havesufficient attack assets, prioritization mustoccur.

(b) Unanticipated immediatesurface TCTs are those surface TCTs notexpected or unknown to exist in anoperational area. This category of surfaceTCT is the most dangerous as response isextremely reactive due to the element ofsurprise. Established procedures forproactive, timely acquisition and immediateresponse are still required. JFC/componentcommanders can minimize this element ofsurprise by ensuring procedures are flexibleto responses against this type of target,regardless of target location or type.

2. Target of Opportunity

A TOO is a target visible to a surface,airborne, or space based sensor or observer,within range of available weapons, andagainst which fire or attacks have not beenscheduled or requested.' It is either an

unplanned or unanticipated target that maynot be a danger to friendly forces. Also, itmay present a narrow window of opportunityfor attack due to limited time of exposure. ATOO may have the same lucrative, fleetingcharacteristics as a surface TCT. However,the key discriminator between a TOO and asurface TCT is JFC/component commanderpriority and dwell time. For example, if asensor acquires a "short-dwell" commandvehicle against which no fires or attacks havebeen scheduled or requested (that is, "on-call"), the command vehicle is a TOO. If theJFC/component commander has notdesignated such command vehicles as highpriorities requiring immediate response, it isnot considered a surfaceTCT. However, if thesensor acquires such a command vehicleunder the same conditions (no scheduled orrequested/"on-call" fires or attacks), and thesetargets have been designated high prioritiesrequiring immediate response, then thecommand vehicle is aTOO and a surfaceTCT.TOOs are classified as immediate targets,either unplanned or unanticipated. MostTOOs are unanticipated. See Figure 11-2.

3. Attacks Against Surface TCTs-TheChallenge

Attacks against surface TCTs arecharacterized by preemptive or reactiveoffensive actions intended to destroy land orsea TCTs as part of counterair, strategicattack, interdiction, fire support, maneuver,antisurface warfare, strike warfare,amphibious operations, or special operations.

11-2


ON-CALL

IMMEDIATETARGETS



(UNKNOWN)

Figure 11-2. TOO Relationship to Surface TCTs and Immediate Targets

Attacks against surface TCTs are similar toattack operations as defined in Joint Pub3-01.5, Doctrine for TMD, but are not solelylimited to enemy operational area TBMcapabilities. Each component has thecapability to locate and attack surface TCTsin mutually accessible areas of interest.Given the state of current and future sensorsystems, a surface TCT could be identifiedby more than one component simultaneously.As such, the JFC must establish means toeffectively eliminate the threat withoutcausing fratricide or duplication of effortamong components. All the while, this mustbe accomplished across several levels ofcommand within and across component/service lines.

a. Joint force planning and execution ofsurface TCT targeting operations require adelicate balance of flexibility and control thatmust be maintained over large operationalareas and numerous complex weaponsystems. Synergy, momentum, and unity ofeffort must be maintained in order to achievethe JFC's intent.

b. Ideally, a common "picture" of thebattlefield shared by all components focusesthe targeting effort, especially if near-real-time (NRT) information (such as thatavailable from the Joint Surveillance TargetAttack Radar System [Joint STARS]) isavailable. National and operational areasensors, data links, and C2 systems providethe information on which the joint force andcomponent commanders are able to make

decisions and exercise control over theirforces. However, current JTF C2 systems donot allow unified, real-time coordination anddeconfliction of all forces. Likewise, nationaland in-theater sensors do not necessarilyprovide all components with a "commonpicture" of the battlefield.

(1) For example, the Joint STARSplatform, considered to be a critical JFC toolfor real-time surface surveillance, providestwo separate data links to differentcomponents. The surveillance control datalink (SCDL) sends "preprocessed" data toland and amphibious (ground element)component operations center ground stationmodules (GSMs) while JTIDS "filtered" datais transmitted to the air component andamphibious (air element) operations centers.Essentially, the ground elements have adifferent picture of the battlespace than theair elements.

(2) Similarly, theAll SourceAnalysisSystem (ASAS) cannot transmit the land/amphibious component's view of thebattlespace to the air component's TheaterIntegrated Situation Display (TISD). As aresult, each component views the battlespacefrom their unique perspective.

c. This deficit in structure and systemsmay make it difficult to efficiently apply jointforce assets against potential targets on areal-time or NRT basis with completesituational awareness, economy of force, andsynchronization of effort. Until C2 structures

11-3

SCHEDULED

and sensor systems are improved, JFCs mustestablish procedural fixes to effectively dealwith surface TCTs.

4. JFC's Objectives and Guidance forSurface TCTs

During the commander's objectives andguidance phase, the JFC/componentcommander designates specific surfaceTCTsas priority requiring immediate response.Also, the JFC establishes specific guidanceon how coordination, deconfliction, andsynchronization will occur amongcomponents assigned in the operational area.Once this guidance is set forth, planned andreactive procedures for attacking surfaceTCTs are established. JFC guidance sets thebasic procedural framework for thecomponents to comply with the commander'sintent and expedite targeting of surfaceTCTs. JFC objectives and guidance tocomponent commanders enable and supportdifferent phases of the joint targeting process.Examples are-

a. Identification and assignment ofprimary sensors and weapon systemsspecifically assigned to support attacks onsurface TCTs (target development).

b. Establishment of planned, decon-flicted fire areas (with definable triggerevents) against specific surface TCTs (targetdevelopment).

c. Directives to component commandersto task assets for standby or secondarymissions as backup to primary sensors andweapon systems. An example would be theJFACC designating aircraft most likely tobe diverted to assist attack operations(weaponeering and force application).

d. Determination of surface TCTengagement authority based on eithercomponent commander area of operations(AO), component commander assignedmission, or combination thereof (forceapplication).

e. If necessary, specification of those few,exceptional circumstances when componentcommanders who first acquire specificsurface TCTs have authority for immediateengagement responsibility regardless ofassigned AO or mission. In other words, theJFC should determine those situations, if any,where immediate destruction of theimminent surface TCT threat outweighs thepotential for fratricide or duplication of effort.Inherently, this determination, to whateverdegree, may allow a component to bypass therequirement for informing, coordinating,deconflicting, and synchronizing. However,if time allows, these efforts should beaccomplished before engagement. The JFCmust carefully balance the risk between thesurface TCT threat and the potential forfratricide (force application and executionplanning/force execution).

f. Identification of specific com-munication/data links between componentC2 elements to conduct rapid coordination.This includes authorizing direct liaison andcoordination authority (execution plan-ning/force execution).

g. Establishment of priority "quickfire"sensor to shooter communication links withdefined conditions for circumventing/bypassing normal command/coordinationchannels, to improve timeliness of response(execution planning/force execution).

5. Availability of Surface TCT CapableAttack Assets

Generally, the primary weapon systemssuitable for surface TCT attacks in anoperational area are fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft, attack helicopters, the ArmyTactical Missile System (ATACMS), MultipleLaunch Rocket System (MLRS), conventionalartillery, conventional air launched cruisemissiles (CALCMs), Navy Tomahawk LandAttack Missiles (TLAMs), naval surface firesupport (NSFS), and SOF. If the numericalavailability of surface TCT capable attackassets within the operational area isweighted significantly in favor of one weapon

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system, it will greatly affect JFC guidancein regard to the weaponeering assessmentphase for surface TCT attacks. As such, theJFC may be required to adapt guidancebased upon available weapon systems. Ifforces within the operational area are notsignificantly weighted toward one weaponsystem or the other, the JFC should considerprocedures that allow maximum flexibilityin the attack of surface TCTs afterconsidering all weapon system options. If onecomponent cannot strike a surface TCT (dueto reloading, weather, limited rangecapability, etc.), procedures must allow forrapid handover to another component formission execution.

6. Determination of "Best Capable"Surface TCT Asset

Determination of "best capable" surfaceTCT asset (such as fixed-wing aircraft,ATACMS, TLAM, etc.) begins during theweaponeering assessment phase andcontinues through the force applicationphase. Individual component commandersprovide recommendations to the JFChighlighting the pros and cons of theiravailable weapon systems based upon thecurrent situation. The JFC also providesguidance to component commanders to allowthem the flexibility to make the properdecision regarding rapid selection of "bestcapable" attack asset. (Note: The land andamphibious component commanders usethe AGM for this purpose, as it offersprimary and alternate weapon selectionoptions, thereby expediting executiondecisions.) Determination of"best capable"requires the assessment of five subjectivefactors:

a. Effectiveness. Depending on thedesired effects, appropriate weapons must beselected. Some surface TCT attack assetsmay be highly effective in destroyingunhardened surface TCTs (such as TLAM orcurrent version ATACMS). Destruction ofhardened surface TCTs (that is, sheltered)may require other attack assets such asaircraft delivered precision-guided munitions

(PGMs), laser guided bombs (LGBs), or SOFinfiltration and sabotage.

b. Responsiveness. Once surfaceTCTsare detected, weapon responsiveness iscritical to ensure the attack opportunities arenot lost. Responsiveness can be measuredin the elapsed time required from receipt ofan execution order to weapons impacts/effects, including the time required forweapons deconfliction, if applicable.Responsiveness is also measured by whetheror not the chosen weapon system can operateunder the current weather/illuminationconditions (such as all-weather, day-nightsystems versus day only and fair weathersystems).

c. Range.must have thethem to attack.a factor foroperations.)

Selected weapon systemsrange capability to enable(Note: Range may not bein-country SOF team

d. Accuracy. The weapon system mustbe able to accurately acquire the target.Moving targets, with large target locationerrors (TLEs), require accurate predictedlocations. End game accuracy is accom-plished by weapon systems able to refine thesearch for moving targets once overhead(such as fixed-wing aircraft) or weaponsystems with area coverage submunitionsthat compensate for anticipated targetmovement (such as ATACMS).

e. Threat. PotentialTCTs may emergein heavily defended areas.

(1) The existence of a significant airdefense threat may obviate the use ofmanned nonstealthy fixed-wing aircraft,rotary-wing aircraft, and cruise missiles asstrike assets. The employment of guns,rockets, missile artillery, or stealth aircraftmay be required to achieve an acceptableprobability of damage. If air-deliveredprecision munitions must be employedagainst such heavily defended TCTs toensure adequate destruction, suppression ofenemy air defenses (SEAD) fires, or ECsupport may be required.

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(2) The existence of a significantground threat may preclude the insertion oroperations of SOF teams.

Overall, the JFC has several surface TCTcapable attack assets with varying degreesof effectiveness, responsiveness, range,accuracy, and threat. However, no oneweapon system encompasses the best of allof these characteristics under all conditions.No one weapon system is always "bestcapable" to deal with the surfaceTCT threat.

7. Planned Procedures for AttackingSurface TCTs

The extent of planned procedures forattacking surface TCTs determines theprobability of joint force success in carryingout the mission. The more planningaccomplished, the higher the probability ofmission success. The transient or fleetingnature of surface TCTs requires shorterexecution cycles for attacks to be successful.The majority of surface TCTs, as immediatetargets, are difficult to insert into traditionaltargeting mechanisms for planned targets.However, the JTF can compensate for thisthrough the use of various fixes, such as on-call ATACMS fire missions, airborne surfaceTCT combat air patrols (CAPs), and airborneattack aircraft divert procedures. Duringthese immediate taskings, the joint targetingprocess described in Chapter I still applies,yet occurs on a very accelerated timeline.Timely execution of the joint targetingprocess may require preestablished,streamlined C2 arrangements tailored to

Sexpedite the flow of targeting informationand execution decisions. Timely execution ofattacks against immediate surface TCTsrequires the JFC to establish, in advance,procedures for components to effectively carryout attacks. Planned procedures include butare not limited to-

SControl and coordinating measures.

*FSCL procedures.

*Attack options with an FSCL.

*Attack options without an FSCL.

.Airspace coordination area (ACA)options.

*.Common reference systems.

*Weapon system procedures.

a. Control and Coordinating Mea-sures. JFCs employ various maneuver andmovement control and fire supportcoordinating measures to facilitate effectivejoint operations.2 These measures may beused to expedite attacks against surfaceTCTs. Joint control and coordinationmeasures apply to all JTF components, andas such, the JFC has final approval authority.The JFC is responsible for ensuringcoordination measures are appropriate,function as designed, and are wellunderstood. These measures include use ofboundaries, fire support coordinationmeasures (FSCMs), and airspace controlmeasures (ACMs).

(1) Boundaries. Boundaries aremaneuver control measures that definesurface areas to facilitate coordination anddeconfliction of operations. JFCs use lateral,rear, and forward boundaries to define AOsfor land and naval forces. Boundaries givethe JFC the ability to clearly define areasrequiring coordination and deconfliction ofsurface TCT attacks between componentsand units. The JFC will normally establishthe land or amphibious force commander'sforward boundary, and adjust as necessary,to balance the land force commander's needto rapidly maneuver with the JFACC's needto rapidly mass and employ airpower withminimal constraints.

(a)Theater air sorties are notconstrained by land boundaries, per se.However, because the airspace above surfaceareas is used by all components of the jointforce, JFCs promulgate ACMs to deconflictthe multiple uses required of this space. 4

Airspace is not constrained by boundaries interms of movement of aircraft; however,attacks by aircraft that occur within a surfaceforce's boundary require an appropriatedegree of coordination.

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(b)A naval boundary may bedesignated for seas adjacent to the area ofland conflict to enhance coordination andexecution of naval operations.5

(c) Boundaries may requirerelatively frequent adjustment based on theactual and projected rate of maneuver andthe operational environment.6 The frequencyof change will have direct impact on thedeconfliction of firepower employment withinthe joint force. Change of these boundariesby the JFC must be communicated to allaffected components of the joint force.

(2) FSCMs. FSCMs and associatedprocedures assist in the C2 of joint forces.Within their AOs, land and amphibiouscommanders employ permissive andrestrictive FSCMs to enhance the expeditiousattack of targets; protect forces, populations,critical infrastructure, and sites of religiousor cultural significance; and set the stage forfuture operations. Commanders position andadjust FSCMs consistent with theoperational situation and in consultationwith superior, subordinate, supporting, andaffected commanders. 7 FSCMs are identifiedby location and date/time effective (as wellas termination date/time, if applicable).FSCMs, when used properly, aid in the rapidengagement of surfaceTCTs. FSCMs shouldnot be used to constrain operational flexibilitybut rather enhance the operational scheme.At the JTF level their use must be carefullyconsidered and closely coordinated becauseof the impacts on component efforts tosupport JFC objectives.

(a) Permissive Measures. Thesemeasures are normally used to authorize theattack of targets without coordination fromthe establishing commander (within thecommander's applicable boundaries) ifcertain circumstances are met. While thecircumstances are situationally dependent,it is imperative they be closely coordinatedwith the other components of the joint force.Permissive measures provide the JFC theability to rapidly coordinate and synchronizefires and attacks between components and

units. Permissive measures include free fireareas (FFAs), coordinated fire lines (CFLs),and the fire support coordination line (FSCL).

SFFAs are specifically designatedareas into which any weapon system may befired without any additional coordination.FFAs do not adequately deconflict betweenair and surface attacks on surface TCTsunless they are combined with adequateACMs. FFAs are established by theappropriate ground commander.

* CFLs are lines beyond whichconventional surface fire support means(such as ATACMS, TLAM, or NSFS) may fireat any time within the zone of theestablishing headquarters without additionalcoordination.8 Typically, CFLs are used byland and amphibious forces. CFLs expeditesurface TCTs attacks as long as indirect fire(surface to surface) means are used. (Note:A CFL is sometimes referred to as a no-fire line by other nations.) CFLs do notadequately deconflict surface TCT attacks byfixed-wing aircraft. CFLs are established bythe appropriate ground commander andshould be placed as close as practical to theforward line of own troops (FLOT).

*An FSCL is a permissive FSCM.See subparagraphs b, c, and d for furtherinformation on the FSCL.

(b) Restrictive Measures. Restric-tive measures are used to restrict the use offire support assets in particular areas. Theymay be established by any componentcommander and are normally applicable toall subordinate elements. Restrictivemeasures also provide the JFC the ability todeconflict fires and attacks betweencomponents and units. Commanders employrestrictive measures to enhance theprotection of friendly forces operating beyondan FSCL.9 This applies to measures bothinside and outside AO/amphibious objectivearea (AOA) boundaries. Examples ofrestrictive measures are no fire areas (NFAs),restrictive fire lines (RFLs), restrictive fireareas (RFAs), and ACAs.

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SNFAs are areas into which nofires or effects can enter. The purpose of anNFA is to protect forces operating forward ofthe FLOT or to protect areas, friendly orenemy, that may serve a purpose in futureoperations. SOF NFAs are of particularimportance. An NFA will be identified by acentral grid coordinate and a radius innautical miles from that point. Fire orattacks into an NFA are authorized undertwo exceptions:

* *The establishing head-quarters approve on a mission-by-missionbasis.

e Immediate force protectionis necessary and the response used is theminimum force required.

As such, component attacks against surfaceTCTs located in NFAs require either approvalor disregard for coordination. Therefore, toexpedite attacks, NFA use should beminimized in areas of expected surface TCTlocations. NFAs are established by theappropriate ground commander.

*RFLs are lines establishedbetween converging forces that prohibit firesor the effects of fires across the lines withoutcoordination from the establishingheadquarters. RFLs deconflict componentsurface TCT attacks "by default." RFLs aidin deconfliction but limit the JFC's flexibilityand responsiveness by increasing the amountof coordination required. RFLs assist in theprevention of fratricide among conventionalforces. RFLs are established by theappropriate ground commander.

SRFAs regulate and control fireand attacks into an area according to statedrestrictions. Surface TCTs acquired withinan RFA may only be attacked in accordancewith the firing restrictions, unless theestablishing authority approves otherwise.As with RFLs, RFAs similarly aid indeconfliction but limit the JFC's flexibilityand responsiveness in coordinating othercomponent attacks into the area. RFAs areestablished by the appropriate groundcommander.

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*ACAs are three-dimensionalblocks of airspace with defined dimensionsthat significantly enhance deconfliction ofsurface TCT attacks among components.Friendly aircraft are reasonably free fromfriendly surface fires, with artillery,helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft givenspecific lateral or vertical airspace withinwhich to operate. Timely implementation ofthe area is dependent on the groundsituation. Burden ofdeconfliction rests withthe ground commander. An ACA isestablished by the airspace control authorityat the request of the appropriate groundcommander.10 Also see subparagraph e,Airspace Coordination Area Options, formore information onACAs. (Note: Airspacecontrol area and airspace controlauthority are defined by the acronym"ACA. ")

(3) ACMs. The airspace in a combatzone is a crucial dimension of the battlespaceused by all components of the joint and alliedforces to conduct assigned missions. A highconcentration of friendly surface, subsurface,and air-launched weapon systems must sharethis airspace without unnecessarilyhindering combat power that is being appliedin accordance with the JFC's campaign oroperational plan. The goal of combat zoneairspace control is to enhance air, land,maritime, and SOF effectiveness inaccomplishing the JFC's objectives." TheJFC designates the airspace control authority(normally the JFACC) who is responsible fordeveloping, coordinating, and publishingairspace control procedures and for operationof the airspace control system in the AOR/JOA. The airspace control authorityestablishes an airspace control plan (ACP)that includes procedural ACMs. SpecificACMs useful for surface TCT attacks arerestricted operation areas (ROAs), highdensity airspace control zones (HIDACZs),minimum risk routes (MRRs), and special useairspace. Airspace coordination areas (asrestrictive FSCMs) are also published in theACP.

(a) A ROA is airspace of defineddimensions created in response to specificoperational situations or requirements

within which the operation of one or moreairspace users is restricted. It is also knownas a restricted operations zone (ROZ). 12

ROAs/ROZs significantly aid in thedeconfliction of surface TCT attacks andprevent duplication of effort and potentialfratricide by closely restricting airspaceaccess over a designated surface area. ROAs/ROZs are established by the airspace controlauthority.

SDuring surface TCT attacks,ROAs/ROZs can be used to restrict airoperations over ATACMS battery launchareas, also referred to as platoon airspacehazard areas (PAHs). Similarly, they can beused over predicted ATACMS munitionsimpact points, also referred to as targetairspace hazard areas (TAHs).

*ROAs/ROZs can be used tosanitize and limit airspace to only aviationoperations (similar to an ACA).

SROAs/ROZs are effective inprotecting SOF operations areas.

(b)An HIDACZ is an area inwhich there is a concentrated employmentof numerous and varied weapons or airspaceusers. An HIDACZ has defined dimensionsthat usually coincide with geographicalfeatures or navigational aids. An HIDACZrestricts use of the airspace because of thelarge volume and density of fires supportingthe ground operations within the describedgeographic area. 13 An HIDACZ is nominatedby the ground commander and approved bythe airspace control authority.14 An HIDACZmay be used similar to ROAs/ROZs andACAs.

(c) MRRs. An MRR is a tem-porary corridor of defined dimensionsrecommended for use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that presents the minimumknown hazards to low-flying aircrafttransiting the combat zone. MRRs areestablished considering the threat, friendlyoperations, known restrictions, known firesupport locations, and terrain.15 MRRs mayalso be used by rotary-wing aircraft. MRRsare established by the airspace controlauthority.

(d) Special use airspace is aterm used to define airspace for a specificpurpose. It may also designate airspace inwhich no flight activity is authorized.' 6

Special use airspace is typically applied toCAP/orbit areas. CAP/orbit areas provide theJFC with flexibility for responsive aircraftattacks against surface TCTs. CAP/orbitareas are defined by location, orientation,altitude, and vulnerability time, and allowthe JFACC and other componentcommanders to preposition air assets forsurveillance, reconnaissance, air defense,battle management, and anticipatedairstrikes. Special use airspace is establishedby the airspace control authority.

(e) Normally, ROAs/ROZs and CAP/orbit areas are under the control of anairborne element of the Theater Air ControlSystem (AETACS). AETACS includesplatforms such as the Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) and AirborneBattlefield Command and Control Center(ABCCC). Additionally, E-2C surveillanceaircraft and direct air support center-airborne(DASC-A) aircraft may control ROAs/ROZsand CAPs/orbit areas as assigned by theairspace control authority.

(f) Further information on ACMsmay be found in Joint Pub 3-52, Doctrine forJoint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone;Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control forJoint Air Operations; and FM 100-103-1/FMFRP 5-61/NDC TACNOTE 3-52.1/ACCP50-38/PACAFP 50-38/USAFEP 50-38,ICAC2-Integrated Combat AirspaceCommand and Control.

b. FSCL Procedures. FSCLs arepermissive FSCMs. They are established andadjusted by appropriate land or amphibiousforce commanders within their boundaries inconsultation with superior, subordinate,supporting, and affected commanders. Forcesattacking targets beyond an FSCL mustinform all affected commanders in sufficienttime to allow necessary reaction to avoidfratricide, both in the air and on the ground. 7

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(1) The FSCL is not a boundary-thesynchronization of operations on either sideof the FSCL is the responsibility of theestablishing commander out to the limits ofthe land or amphibious force boundary. 8 TheFSCL does not divide AOs. In particular, itis not a boundary between the land oramphibious commander and the JFACC.

(2) Use of an FSCL is not mandatory.However, the land or amphibious commandermust realize that not using a FSCL willrequire other components to extensivelycoordinate all attacks into the AO.

(3) Situations may arise where twoor more components establish separateFSCLs. For example, the land componentcommander establishes an FSCL in the AO,and the amphibious commander establishesan FSCL in the AOA. In cases such as these,if the components share a mutual boundary,the JFC may choose to establish a mutualFSCL applicable to the joint force as a whole.

(4) By establishing an FSCL atsufficient depth so as to not limit high-tempomaneuver, land or amphibious forcecommanders ease the coordination require-ments for attack operations within theirAOsby forces not under their control, such asnaval gunfire or air interdiction. 19

(a)Placement of the FSCL isbased on the type of mission, threat, terrain,and concept of the operation, as well asorganic weapons capabilities, location offriendly and enemy forces, anticipated ratesof movement, and tempo of the operation.Careful consideration and judiciousplacement should be exercised as there aresignificant trade-offs between close and deepFSCLs.

SClose placement of the FSCLmay be used in defensive operations andwhen rapid movement of land componentforces is not expected. The benefit of a closeFSCL would be the greater ability forsupporting components to execute attackswithout the requirement of extensivecoordination.

*Deep placement of the FSCLfacilitates high-tempo maneuver and maybe used in rapidly advancing, offensivesituations. However, it will limit operationalfreedom for supporting component operationsbehind the FSCL, due to the requirementsfor increased coordination and tighter,positive and procedural controls (for example,close air support [CAS] or air interdiction [AI]behind the FSCL).

(b) It is up to the land oramphibious force commander to place theFSCL so as not to inhibit operational tempoand maximize the use of all organic andsupporting component assets. Funda-mentally, FSCL placement is situational andmay be changed as required to maximizesuccess of the campaign. It is incumbentupon each component commander to providekey inputs to aid in placing the FSCL in thebest location to support the JFC's objectives.

(5) The land or amphibious forcecommander adjusts the location of the FSCLas required to keep pace with operations. Inhigh-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCLmay change frequently, such as every severalhours. The establishing commander quicklytransmits the change to higher, lower,adjacent, and supporting headquarters toensure attack operations are appropriatelycoordinated by controlling agencies.Anticipated adjustments to the location of theFSCL are normally transmitted to otherelements of the joint force sufficiently earlyto reduce potential disruptions in theircurrent and near-term operations.2 0

Component commanders must receivenotification of pending FSCL change as soonas possible. Timely notification (normally 6-8 hours) of a change in the FSCL status orlocation will allow effective coordination withother components. However, some tacticalsituations could result in less advance notice.

(6) "On-Order" FSCLs. The land oramphibious force commander may choose toplan "on-order" FSCLs throughout the AO/AOA which can be rapidly established andadjusted. These "on-order" FSCLs are similar

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to movement phase lines established atdesignated distances across the AO/AOA.The advantage of "on-order" FSCLs is thatthey allow the land or amphibious forcecommander the flexibility to rapidlycoordinate the change of the currentlyestablished FSCL to another planned FSCLas the tempo of land operations/movementincreases. This is equally advantageous inoffensive operations as it is in defensive,retrograde operations. Coordination amongother component C2 agencies is simplified ifthe locations of these "on-order" FSCLs havebeen previously transmitted to the joint forcein advance. Use caution not to clutteroperational graphics/maps with too many"on-order" FSCLs, as this may lead toconfusion and outweigh the benefits of theplanned measure.

(7) The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. It should also bedefined by a series of latitude and longitudepoints for ease of transmission via componentC2 agencies. However, FSCLs do not have tofollow traditional "straight-line" paths.Curved and enclosed, "circular" FSCLs haveapplications in nonlinear joint operations.

c. Attack Options With an FSCL.With an established FSCL, there are twogeographic areas requiring deconflictedsurface TCT attacks:

(1) Attacks Short of the FSCL. Shortof an FSCL, all air-to-surface and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled bythe appropriate land or amphibious forcecommander.21 This area also has the highestpotential for fratricide. Surface TCT attackoperations conducted in this area mayrequire similar coordination and deconflictionprocedures as those required for CAS ifdetailed integration and friendly forces arefactors. To ensure sufficient control andsafety of friendly forces, a componentdesiring to attack a surface TCT short of theFSCL must receive permission from the AO/AOA component commander and operateunder positive control measures whennecessary. See Joint Pub 3-09.3, JTTP forCAS, for additional information.

(a) Positive control is normallycoordinated through the corps fire supportelement (FSE) or the Marine air ground taskforce (MAGTF) fire support coordinationcenter (FSCC).

(b) Fighter/attack assets attack-ing surface TCTs short of the FSCL firstcoordinate with a designated C2 platform orcenter, such as an ABCCC, a DASC-A, an airsupport operations center (ASOC), or directair support center (DASC). These elementswill then coordinate with the FSE/FSCC.

(c) Approved missions willnormally be handed off for positive terminalcontrol by a forward air controller-airborne(FAC-A), tactical air control party (TACP), orair naval gunfire liaison company(ANGLICO), if required. Missions nothanded off to a FAC-A, TACP, or ANGLICOwill only be those surface TCT attackmissions (such as AI) where close integrationwith ground forces is not required andfriendlies are not a factor in the intendedtarget area. Although rare, this maysometimes occur between the FLOT andFSCL.

(2) Attacks Between the FSCL andthe Forward Boundary. Coordination ofattacks beyond the FSCL is especially criticalto commanders of air, land, and SOF. Theirforces may now be operating beyond an FSCLor may plan to maneuver on that territory inthe future. Such coordination is alsoimportant when attacking forces areemploying wide-area munitions or munitionswith delayed effects. Finally, thiscoordination assists in avoiding conflicting orredundant attack operations. In exceptionalcircumstances, the inability to conduct thiscoordination will not preclude the attack oftargets beyond the FSCL. However, failureto do so may increase the risk of fratricideand could waste limited resources.22

(a) Normally, when the land oramphibious force commander establishes anFSCL, it facilitates the JFACC's ability torapidly conduct attacks between the FSCLand forward boundary as the JFC assigned

1I-1

supported commander for overall airinterdiction, counterair, and strategic attackmissions. The land or amphibious forcecommander may conduct attacks within thesame area. Consequently, the potential existsfor conflict between air and land forcesconducting attacks. It is crucial theappropriate degree of coordination,deconfliction, and synchronization takesplace between respective C2 centers toprevent fratricide and duplication of effort,manage risks, and maximize results duringattacks between the FSCL and the forwardboundary. To assist in this coordination, theland/amphibious component commandershould relay target priority, effects, andtiming of interdiction operations within theirAO/AOA to the JFACC and other componentcommanders.

(b)Attacks on surface TCTsbetween the FSCL and the forward boundaryshould not violate established FSCMs, ACMs,directives, or protected target lists. Suchmeasure may be sufficient coordination forsurface TCT attacks. However, rapiddeconfliction of attacks sometimes requiresfurther information be passed amongcomponents in order to keep the affectedcomponent commander informed of activitieswithin the AO/AOA and their potentialimpact on planned future operations.

* Component commanders mayestablish rapid coordination and deconflictionvia direct voice and data links between anycombination of airborne and surface C2

. agencies. Typical links may include (but arenot limited to) ABCCC to FSE, DASC-A toFSCC, and Joint STARS to the forceprojection tactical operations center (FPTOC)and combat operations division (COD) of thejoint air operations center (JAOC).

* Minimum elements of infor-mation to be transmitted are-

**Target description.

* *Target coordinates (lati-tude (LAT)/longitude (LONG) and/oruniversal transversal mercator [UTM]).

* Target number or identifier(as assigned).

* .Common reference system(grid box/bullseye).

* *Weapon type/effects desired.

* *Weapon firing position/attack origination.

S**Time of attack/weapon timeof flight.

* CA of attack once complete(BDA).

d. Attack Options Without an FSCL.If an FSCL is not established, componentcommanders must develop procedures forcoordination and deconfliction ofsurfaceTCTattacks. These procedures will be approvedby the JFC. In those cases without anestablished FSCL, there are two geographicareas requiring deconflicted surface TCTattacks:

(1) Attacks Inside the AO/AOA.Normally, an AO/AOA without an FSCLseverely restricts rapid attacks againstsurface TCTs. Since an AO/AOA with noFSCL is restrictive in nature, componentcommanders may make use of permissiveand restrictive FSCMs (such as ACAs, FFAs,and RFAs) and airspace control measures(such as MRRs and ROZs) to coordinate anddeconflict attacks. (Note: CAS missions willbe conducted per Joint Pub 3-09.3, JTTPfor CAS.)

(2) Attacks Outside the AO/AOA.FSCLs are not normally established outsideof an AO/AOA. Coordination of attacks onsurface TCTs outside component AOs/AOAswill be as directed by the JFC and inaccordance with the supported andsupporting component commanderrelationships established in Joint Pub 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations and Joint Pub3-56.1, Command and Control of Joint AirOperations.

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e. Airspace Coordination AreaOptions. ACAs allow simultaneouscomponent attacks of surface TCTs in closeproximity to each other by multiple attackmeans, of which one is normally air. ACAsare designed with a minimum altitude,maximum altitude, specified width/length,and defined off of a line between twocoordinate points. Friendly fires are notpermitted through established ACAs. Firesabove, below, and outside the boundaries ofan established ACA are authorized. The FSE/FSCC must advise the applicable Armyairspace command and control (A2C2)/Marine airspace control element of fires inclose proximity to ACA entry and exit points.The A2C2/Marine element will coordinatewith the ASOC/DASC, ABCCC/DASC-A,AWACS/E-2C, or the airspace managers inthe JAOC to ensure aircraft using the ACAare aware of the close proximity of fires.Formal and informal ACAs exist, with severaltechniques for deconfliction.

(1) Formal ACA.The airspace controlauthority establishes formal ACAs at therequest of the appropriate groundcommander. Formal ACAs require detailedplanning. Though not always necessary,formal ACAs should be considered. Thevertical and lateral limits of the ACA aredesigned to allow freedom of action for airand surface fire support for the greatestnumber of foreseeable targets. Since only thefire direction center (FDC) can determine thetrajectory for a specific battery firing at aspecific target, each target must be evaluatedin the FDC to ensure the trajectories of theartillery rounds do not penetrate the ACA.The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD [USArmy] or FSC [USMC]) should consult theFDC when deciding the altitude of an ACAto determine if that altitude would allow themajority of targets to be attacked withoutinterference or problems.23

(2) Informal ACA. Informal ACAscan be established using separation plansand may be established by any maneuvercommander. Aircraft and surface fires maybe separated by distance (lateral, altitude,and combination of lateral and altitude) or

by time. Distance separation requires lessdetailed coordination between aircraft andfiring units but can be the most restrictivefor aircraft routing. Fire support personnelshould select the separation technique thatrequires the least coordination withoutadversely affecting the aircrew's ability tosafely complete the mission.24

(a)Lateral Separation. Lateralseparation is effective for coordinating firesagainst targets that are adequatelyseparated from flight routes to ensureaircraft protection from the effects of friendlyfires. This is an appropriate technique whenaircrews and firing units engage separatetargets (at least 500 meters apart) andaircraft will not cross gun-target lines.25 Safelateral separation between ATACMS andaircraft engaging separate surfaceTCTs mayrequire more than 500 meters distance.

(b) Altitude Separation. Altitudeseparation is effective for coordinating fireswhen aircrews will remain above indirect firetrajectories and their effects. This techniqueis effective when aircrews and firing unitsengage the same or nearby targets. 26 Thistechnique works exceptionally well whensimultaneous indirect fire and air attacks areexecuted on surface TCTs.

(c) Altitude and Lateral Sep-aration. Altitude and lateral separation isthe most restrictive technique for aircrewsand may be required when aircraft mustcross the firing unit's gun-target line.27 Thistechnique is especially effective fordeconflicting aircraft attacking surfaceTCTsunderneath the flight path of an overflyingATACMS trajectory.

(d) Time Separation. Time sep-aration requires the most detailedcoordination and may be required whenaircrews must fly near indirect firetrajectories or ordnance effects. The timingof surface fires must be coordinated withaircraft routing. This ensures that eventhough aircraft and surface fires may occupythe same space, they do not do so at the sametime. All timing for surface fires will be basedon the specific aircraft event time (time on

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target [TOT]/time to target [TTT]). Thistechnique is appropriate when aircrews andfiring units engage the same or nearbytargets. Consider weapons fragmentationenvelope and the likelihood of secondaryexplosions when deconflicting sorties.2 8

Though normally used in a CAS scenario witha terminal controller, this technique may beused in coordinated attacks against surfaceTCTs. However, its usefulness in decon-fliction is excessively complicated by the needfor detailed timing. In deep attack scenarios,a terminal controller may not be available tocoordinate the time separation. Attackaircraft may require a radio relay platform(such as an AETACS) to communicate withthe FDC. The inherent delays of radio relaymay result in a loss of a timely opportunity

to attack the surface TCT.

f. Common Reference Systems. Com-mon reference systems provide a universal,joint perspective with which to define specificareas of the battlespace, enabling the JFCand component commanders to efficientlycoordinate, deconflict, and synchronizesurface TCT attacks. These referencesystems are especially useful when used todescribe mutually accessible areas of attackand rapidly deconflict assigned attackoperations. Once identified, these areas maybe protected by control and coordinatingmeasures (in particular FSCMs and ACMs),thereby enabling unhampered precisionattack and flexibility of weapon systememployment. Common reference systemsresult in rapid, deconflicted surface TCTattacks, enhanced probability of missionsuccess, and reduced potential for duplicationof effort and fratricide. Also, they allow forrapid coordination of joint engagement andthe employment of combined arms.Additionally, they are flexible enough to beused for a variety of other purposes, such asgeographically identifying search andsurveillance areas, identification of restrictedzones, and designation of high threat areas(such as enemy SAM battery locations). Theprimary purpose of these stems is to providea common frame of reference for joint forcesituational awareness.

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(1) "Grid Box" Reference System.The "grid box" reference system is anadministrative measure highly useful infacilitating rapid attacks on surface TCTs.This reference system may be used to rapidlyand clearly define geographical location forattack coordination, deconfliction, andsynchronization. Components may use thegrid box system to identify the area ofintended attack to other components. Aftera target is acquired and areas of intendedattack are designated by alphanumeric grid,the identifying component establishesappropriate control and coordinatingmeasures (such as FSCMs and/or ACMs) toexpedite and deconflict attacks with othercomponents. Grid boxes themselves are notFSCMs or ACMs but simply a commonreference system that complementsestablished fire support/airspace controlsystems and measures. Normally, FSCMsand/or ACMs established in grid box areasshould be of a temporary nature, protectingsingular component attack operations onlyfor as long as operationally necessary. Thepurpose is rapid deconfliction. As such, gridbox identification is only temporary. Somesituations warrant simultaneous jointengagements within a single grid box area.Appropriately constructed FSCMs and/orACMs (such as informal ACAs with altitudeseparation) allow for massed attacks againstsurface TCTs. Unlike the "kill box" conceptused solely by the JFACC during DesertStorm, each component commander, as wellas the JFC, can use a joint "grid box"reference system to facilitate deconflictionand execution of attacks against surfaceTCTs throughout the operational area. Thisreference system allows the JFC andcomponent commanders to clearlycommunicate information, establish acommon frame of reference, and enable jointforce prosecution of surface TCTs withmultiple weapon systems. The grid boxreference system is extremely useful in thearea between the FSCL and the forwardboundary, where it is highly possible morethan one component may be conductingattacks. This system, when properlyemployed by the joint force, facilitatescomponent commander requirements to

! i

inform all other affected commanders whenattacking targets both inside and beyond anFSCL (as directed in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrinefor Joint Operations, page 111-34.)

(a) Basic Considerations. Gridboxes designate specific horizontal surfaceareas and their associated volumes ofairspace. Design is situationally dependenton mission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and support available, and timeavailable (METT-T) and IPB. Basicconsiderations when designing grid boxes areplanned weapons effects and plannedweapon system employment tactics.

SPlanned Weapons Effects.Weapons effects, attack profiles, and attacksystem maneuverability determine the sizeof a grid box.

* For indirect fires, this sizeis dependent on the munition and associatedsubmunition; number of rounds; single tube(or launcher) verses massed fires (platoon/battery/battalion); accuracy/precision of fires;and safety/buffer zones incorporatingfragmentation patterns.

* For air delivered munitionsfrom fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, grid boxsize is dependent on maneuver requirements,aircraft per flight; accuracy/precisioncapability of the aircraft and/or weapon;munition; quantity of weapons delivered peraircraft; and maximum fragment traveldistances.

*Planned Weapon System Em-ployment Tactics. Weapon system employ-ment tactics also determine the size of a gridbox.

* For indirect fire weapons,this size is dependent on the number ofsystems in effect; associated gun-targetline(s), projectile trajectory(ies); and missileflight path(s).

" *Aircraft considerations aredependent on the airspace required to safelyand effectively maneuver the aircraft (orflight of aircraft) during weapons delivery,

based on delivery tactics and parameters.Dimensions should allow for freedom ofaircraft movement within the grid boxwithout inhibiting precision targeting anddelivery.

(b)Dimensions. Basic consid-erations of planned weapons effects andweapon system employment tacticsdetermine the appropriate size of a grid boxbased on the employment of a single weaponsystem. However, since the grid box systemshould be a common reference for all jointforce components, it must be simple andflexible enough to adapt to the requirementsof any available weapon system. As such,the JFC may determine the optimumdimensions of a grid box and use it as astandard baseline applicable to the majorityof joint force operations where rapiddeconfliction is required. Dimensions shouldbe based on the largest order of magnitudeexpected and allow for further adjustmentand downsizing as necessary. Optimum gridbox sizes should accommodate the mostrestrictive weapon system employment tactic,yet allow flexibility (through furthersubdivision), so as to not overly restrict otherweapon system employment. In order for thegrid box system to be simple and easy to use,the grid boxes should be based on lines oflatitude and longitude that are printed onthe maps in use in the theater.

SHorizontal Dimensions. Theoptimum horizontal dimensions of astandard baseline grid box are 15 minutes oflatitude by 15 minutes of longitude. This isthe surface area required to accommodatemost fixed-wing employment tactics(normally, the largest order of magnitude forweapon system employment tactics). Such agrid box will measure approximately 15nautical miles (NM) x 15 NM. Exact size mayvary depending on latitude (Figure 11-3).LAT/LONG references easily define gridboxes since they are common and exist onmost military operational graphics andcharts.

* Of particular use are1:250,000 scale Joint Operational Graphic-

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Air (JOG-Air) charts, that display both LAT/LONG and UTM scales.

S15 x 15 minute LAT/LONGgrid box dimensions are particularlyadvantageous because they also encompassa single 1:50,000 UTM topographical linechart.

* In the absence of chartswith both LAT/LONG and UTM coordinates,handheld precision locating ground reference(PLGR) devices can be used to convert LAT/LONG coordinates into UTM coordinates andvice versa.

* *All grid box dimensionsshould be defined using World GeodeticSurvey (WGS)-84 Datum Plane charts unlessoperational requirements dictate otherwise.In cases where only WGS-72 Datum Planecharts exist, use caution in the conversion ofWGS-72 data to WGS-84 data.

*Horizontal Subdivision. Ifdesired, and as necessary, the standardbaseline grid box may be further subdividedso as to not overly restrict other weaponsystem employment. Two such methodsare-

**Four subdivisions, 7.5 x 7.5minute LAT/LONG.

**Nine subdivisions, 5 x 5minute LAT/LONG.

For example, attack helicopter operationsmay only require a 7.5 x 7.5 minute LAT/LONG subdivided grid box. (Figure II-4A).Similarly, ATACMS do not require an ACM(PAH/TAH ROZ) the size of a standardbaseline grid box. Most ATACMS PAH/TAHROZ will fit within the size of a 5 x 5 minutesubdivided grid box. SOF operations ROZs,like ATACMS, also may only require a 5 x 5minute surface area (Figure II-4B). Theadvantage of subdividing a grid boxreference area (and establishing FSCMsand/orACMs in these smaller areas) is thatunused space is made available for otheradjacent operations. It allows componentsto use one or more subdivisions of a standardgrid box, in any combination, as necessary.Subdivision allows the employment ofseveral different weapon systems onmultiple targets within a standard grid box.However, subdivision should be used asnecessary, and care should be exercised notto overly complicate the grid box system, assimplicity is key to its success.

*Vertical Dimensions. As withhorizontal dimensions, the verticaldimensions of a grid box are dependent onplanned weapon system employment tactics.However, they are also very dependent onthe control and coordinating measures usedduring the attack. Consequently, the opti-mum vertical dimensions of a baseline gridbox are difficult to standardize. Vertical

Figure 11-3. Standard Baseline Grid Box

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15 MIN

15 MIN

dimensions are much more situationallydependent. Generally, FSCMs (in this case,ACAs) and/orACMs are used to facilitate theplanned weapon system employment tactic.Typical measures include establishingACAs(formal and informal), RFAs, HIDACZ,MRRs, and ROAs/ROZs. In doing so, the JFCand component commanders should givecareful consideration to the maximumvertical dimensions of the measureestablished in the grid box so as not tounnecessarily restrict or inhibit otheraffected component operations.

S*Indirect fire weaponsystems require vertical dimensions toaccommodate maximum ordnance altitudesalong the gun-target line or route of flight ofthe missile. In the case of ATACMS, thealtitude along the missile's flight path mustbe deconflicted. Appropriately subdivided

grid box sectors may be used to identifyestablished PAHs and TAHs (normally asROAs/ROZs) for ATACMS launch positionsand target areas.

* *Aircraft require grid boxvertical dimensions to accommodate plannedminimum and maximum altitudes foreffective employment (normally an ACA).

* eThe vertical dimensions ofany measure established in a grid box shouldbe carefully planned so as to not inhibitoverflight of weapon systems en route toother targets in other grid boxes.Occasionally, adjacent grid boxes may beidentified for attacks by differentcomponents. In such cases, FSCMs and/orACMs must be properly established toadequately deconflict neighboring operations.These situations require the establishment

Figure lI-4A. Four Quadrant Subdivision Option

15 MINp

Figure 11-4B. Nine Sector Subdivision Option

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15 MIN

15 MIN

15 MIN5 MIN

5 MIN

of appropriate measures to deconflict weaponsystem flight paths (aircraft, missile, orprojectile) en route to geographicallyseparated grid boxes.

* Aircraft have the flexibilityto move around most vertical restrictions(such as an ATACMS TAH or ROZ) en routeto a target area or grid box. MRRs protectsuch aircraft movements. Likewise, someTLAMs and CALCMs can be planned tomaneuver within MRR restrictions.

e "ATACMS engagementsgenerally do not have the flexibility tomaneuver around ACAs. Therefore, carefulconsideration should be exercised beforeestablishing vertical restrictions in the pathof expected ATACMS routes of flight.

(c) Theater Layout. The grid boxreference systems may be used anywhere inthe operational area. Placement of the gridsystem is situationally dependent on IPB andthe location of known (planned andunplanned immediate) surface TCTs. Inother words, grid boxes should be establishedin potential surface TCT areas where rapidcomponent to component coordination anddeconfliction will be required. The gridsystems may be small and limited in size,covering separate areas, or the JFC may elect

to group grid boxes together to form a"patchwork quilt" or "lattice" covering theentire AOR/JOA. The second option allowsmaximum flexibility to rapidly coordinateand deconflict attacks/airborne surveillanceoperations against both known and unknown(immediate unanticipated) surface TCTsanywhere they are located. If the JFC sodesires, grid boxes may be used to extendfrom the rear areas of the AO, across theFLOT, through the area between the FLOTand FSCL, and beyond the FSCL (toinclude areas past the AO boundary[Figure 11-5]).

(d) Labeling and Identification.Grid boxes should be labeled with a simple,common, universal identifier recognizable byeach component and their associated C2 andattack assets. Coordination and deconflictionof attacks is simplified by procedurallycommunicating grid boxes labeled byalphanumeric identifiers rather thancomplicated and detailed series of LAT/LONG coordinates. A simple alphanumericsystem allows for a common "language" andperspective when components communicatein time-critical situations (example: Grid BoxD-8 [Figure 11-6]).

* Grid boxes subdivided into fourquadrants may be identified by their

FLOT FSCL FORWARD BOUNDARY

Figure 11-5. Example Theater Layout

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respective cardinal position-northwest,northeast, southeast, and southwest(example: Grid Box D-8, northwestquadrant or D-8, northwest [Figure 11-7]).

*Grid boxes subdivided intonine sectors may be identified by respectivecardinal positions as well (example: GridBox D-8, north sector or D-8, north [FigureII-8]).

*Refinement of a specific targetlocation within a grid box quadrant maybe accomplished by adding the actualminutes of latitude and longitude (example:Grid Box D-8, northwest quadrant, 40 minx 20 min or for brevity: D-8, northwest, 40min x 20 min [Figure II-9]) or transmitdetailed coordinates (example: Grid BoxD-8, north xxxx.xx east xxxx.xx). (Note:Transmitting LATILONG coordinatesover unsecured nets may compromise thelocation of planned attacks.)

* Grid boxes may be assignedTADIL-J/A/B numbers in addition to theiralphanumeric designation for ease ofdissemination across specific operationalarea data links.

* Grid box reference systemshave a communications(COMSEC) advantage. Unlike

securitystand alone

LAT/LONG or UTM coordinates, grid boxalphanumerics may be communicated overunsecured channels (voice or data) without riskof compromise as long as the actual coordinatesof the areas are not associated. (Initial gridreference systems and their associatedgeographic coordinates should be published inclassified orders and instructions, to include theACP.) Also, grid box alphanumeric codingshould be regularly changed to ensure enemyforces have not deduced and correlatedunsecure grid box identification transmissionswith executed attacks (that is, the ability ofthe enemy to correlate areas recently attackedby friendly forces with intercepted grid boxtransmissions).

(e) Grid Box Reference SystemDevelopment. The JFC should appoint acomponent commander (normally the JFACC,as the airspace control authority) to developthe grid box reference system for the entireAOR/JOA. Similar to land/amphibious forcecommander establishment of the FSCL, theairspace control authority should develop thegrid box reference system (although it is not aFSCM in and of itself) in consultation withsuperior, subordinate, supporting, and affectedcommanders. Guidance from the JFC andinputs from other component commanders arecritical to ensuring the reference system fitsthe needs of the joint force and more

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15I-1r-r- I II

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FLOT FSCL FORWARD BOUNDARY

GRID BOX D-8Figure 11-6. Grid Box Labeling and Identification

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D-8

NW

SW

Grid Box

NE

____________ I ________________ SE

D-8, Northwest Quadrant

Figure 1-7. Grid Box Subdivision Four Quadrant

Figure lI-8. Grid Box Subdivision Nine Sector

D=8N

NW NE

W E

SW SE

S

Grid Box D-8, North Sector

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Figure 11-9. Grid Box Target Refinement

importantly accepted as a mutual tool. Oncedeveloped, the JFC should evaluate thesystem for its, potential to expeditecoordination, deconfliction, andsynchronization within the applicableoperational area. Once approved, thereference system is passed to eachcomponent and their associated C2 andattack assets.

SGrid box reference systemsshould be incorporated into operationalgraphics and overlays of component C2systems. With the Advanced Field ArtilleryTactical Data System (AFATDS) (AppendixB), the land or amphibious component canenter the reference system as anoperational graphic in the same manner asboundaries or phase lines are entered. Mostimportantly, AFATDS accepts input ofFSCMs andACMs. With the joint approvedContingency Theater Automated PlanningSystem (CTAPS), the JFACC can similarlyenter the reference system in the theaterintegrated situation display (TISD). Also,the JFACC should ensure the informationis entered into AETACS databases, as wellas published in the ACP.

(f) No Assigned EstablishingAuthority. It is important to recognize thatgrid boxes are a reference system and notcontrol and coordinating measures. Assuch, there is no "establishing authority" forany specific grid box, as they are not"established" or "activated" as control andcoordinating measures. (Note: As stated insubparagraph (e), the JFC appoints a singlecomponent commander only to develop thegrid box reference system for theAOR/JOA.)The usefulness of this system is that it allowscomponents to establish appropriate controland coordination measures, as authorized, thatcan be mutually coordinated, deconflicted, andsynchronized via a simple, common, mutuallyunderstood, and agreed upon reference system.

(g) Grid Box Reference SystemManagement. Once developed and approved,each component uses the common grid boxreference system to rapidly coordinate,deconflict, and synchronize attack operationswith other components. In a time-criticalsituations, components use grid boxes toreference where they plan to establish FSCMsand/or ACMs and execute attack operations.Unilateral activation of FSCMs and/or ACMS

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D-8

NW XNE

SW SE

Grid Box D-8, Northwest 40 x 20

within grid box areas without coordinatingand deconflicting with other componentsseverely risks the potential for duplicationof effort and fratricide.

(h) Separate Grid Box Systems.In some cases, the JFC may elect to establishseparate grid box systems. Reasons for doingthis rely heavily on geographic separation ofthe battlespace (that is, two distinct,geographically separate AOs/AOAs) wheretwo distinct grid box reference systems arein place [Figure II-10]).

(i) Grid Box Status. Grid boxesidentify ongoing attack operations andestablished FSCMs and/or ACMs. Undernormal circumstances, the airspace and/orsurface areas identified by a grid box areunder prior established control andcoordinating measures and applicablesupported/supporting commander relation-ships apply. However, once a grid box is usedto identify appropriate airspace and/orsurface areas, operations within the grid boxare temporarily restricted in accordance withthe established FSCMs and/or ACMs withinthe area.

(j) Grid Box Execution. Once acomponent acquires a surface TCT, they

identify the grid box (along with the specifiedgrid box quadrant). Next, the componenttransmits their intent to fire on or attack thesurface TCT, along with their intent toestablish an appropriate FSCM and/orACM,to the other components. After detailedcoordination with component liaison/coordination elements, the componentestablishes the desired control measure.Coordination will require verification thatthere are no other airspace/surface areaconflicts in the intended grid box. Dependingon the level of situational awareness andaccess to sensors (such as AWACS, controland reporting center [CRC], or Joint STARS),this coordination could take several minutes.Components are responsible for transmittinggrid box areas with FSCMs/ACMs to affectedunits via C2 agencies and systems. Requiredinformation includes grid box identification,type of attack, and established FSCMs and/or ACMs (to include appropriate applicabletimes). Once the attack is complete, theoriginating component informs the othercomponents that the FSCMs and/or ACMsin the grid box are deactivated.

*Depending on the intensity ofthe active surface TCT threat and the levelof component attack execution, it is possibleto have multiple component attacks occurringthroughout the grid box reference area at the

iFORWARD BOUNDARY

FSCL

LAND FORCE AO

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AOA

Figure 11-10. Separate Grid Box Systems

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same time. Carefully managed, numerousgrid boxes can be used simultaneously withvarious FSCMs and/or ACMs in effect. Thecomplexity of coordinating, deconflicting, andsynchronizing multiple component opera-tions against a significant surfaceTCT threatis simplified through the use of this flexiblereference system that can provide immediatesituational awareness to all players. Thereference system further enhances a commonjoint force perspective when it is translatedonto real-time command and control datasystems, such as CTAPS, AFATDS, andADOCS (Figure II-11).

*The JFACC can transmit gridbox information to fighters, sectors, and wingoperations centers (WOCs) via AETACsplatforms (such as AWACS, ABCCC, JointSTARS, or DASC-A) or ground coordinationagencies (such as theASOC, DASC, CRC, andcontrol and reporting element [CRE]).CTAPS may also be used to communicate thisinformation via the TISD.

*The land and amphibiousforce commander can transmit similar

information via the FSE, FSCC, force firescoordination center (FFCC), deep operationscoordination cell (DOCC), or FPTOC. TheAFATDS and Army Automated DeepOperations Coordination System (ADOCS)(Appendix C) serve as rapid means tocommunicate this information via estab-lished tactical fire direction system nets andlocal area network (LAN) systems.

SThe naval component com-mander or JFMCC, if designated, cantransmit this information via the supportingarms coordination center (SACC), tactical aircommand (or control) center (TACC), E-2Cand DASC-A platforms, and AEGIS cruisers.

(k) Blanket Grid Box Use. Theremay be instances where it is prudent to usegrid boxes to identify blanket FSCMs and/or ACMs in advance of surface TCTacquisition. Grid boxes can be assigned tospecific weapon systems for immediate attackonce the surface TCT is acquired within thegrid box. For example, a series of grid boxesmay be assigned directly to fighter aircraftfor interdiction purposes. Similarly, gridboxes may be assigned to a FAC-A. Likewise,

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15AA A HELB SOF

B TLAM

FLOT FSCL FORWARD BOUNDARYFigure II-11. Multiple Component Attack Operations Using a Single

Grid Box Reference System

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grid boxes may also be assigned to anATACMS battery for preplanned firemissions. Once the target is acquired,coordination is minimized and the missioncan be executed on a NRT basis.

(1) Grid Box Examples:

*Example #1. Joint STARSacquires a surface TCT and transmits itslocation to the FSE/FSCC GSM, battlefieldcoordination detachment (BCD) GSM, andJAOC. The BCD and JAOC mutually decideto assign fighter assets (holding on CAPstations) to attack the TCT.

* The BCD requests the FSEto terminate all indirect surface to surfacefires (if any) into the intended grid box.

* *The JAOC, acting as theagent for the airspace control authority, andas requested by the BCD (if appropriate),establishes an ACA in the intended grid box.The JAOC also determines which MRRs (ifnecessary) should be used en route, as wellas determines if any other conflicting gridboxes are active.

**The BCD transmits theACA and MRR information via AFATDS tothe FSE for deconfliction.

* The JAOC directs thefighter controlling agency (normallyAWACS,ABCCC, or the DASC-A) to execute thefighters, transmitting all appropriatetargeting and deconfliction information usingthe grid box system as a common reference.Specific targeting information (such asdetailed coordinates) is passed once the gridbox focuses the area of intended attack (thatis, the "big to small" concept).

* *The fighters depart the CAPand follow MRRs (if any) en route to theassigned grid box, maintaining situationalawareness and not entering any other FSCM/ACM in any other grid box. Upon arrival atthe assigned grid box and established ACA,the attack begins.

* Once the fighters havecompleted their attacks and the target isdestroyed, the AWACS/ABCCC/DASC-Aadvises the JAOC it is ready to deactivatethe ACA in the grid box and associatedMRRs.

SOnce fighters are clear, theJAOC, in coordination with the BCD,deactivates the ACA in the grid box andtransmits the information to all components.The BCD transmits this information viaAFATDS.

* Example #2. The land com-ponent has acquired a target throughnational assets. The FSE identifies whichgrid box the surface TCT is located in andplans for an ATACMS attack.

S* The FSE transmits grid boxinformation to its BCD, advising them whichgrid box they intend to attack.

S**The BCD coordinates thisinformation with the JAOC, and theymutually identify the intended grid box.

S**The BCD, in coordinationwith the land component commander,establishes an RFA over theTAH. The JAOC,as agent for the airspace control authorityand in coordination with the BCD, similarlyestablishes a ROZ over the ATACMSlauncher (PAH) and ROZ over the surfaceTCT (TAH) in the intended grid box.

S*The JAOC and the BCDdetermine if any other FSCMs/ACMs areactive that might conflict with the ATACMSflight path en route from the PAH (ROZ) tothe TAH (ROZ).

S**The JAOC advises allaffected aircraft of the pendingATACMS firemission via AWACS, ABCCC, or DASC-A(as appropriate). The grid box referencesystem is used to rapidly identify the PAH(ROZ) and TAH (ROZ) locations. The gridbox system is particularly useful for passingthese locations to aircrews of fixed- and

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rotary-wing aircraft, since they do not needto plot coordinates to determine if they arein potential conflict. (During missionplanning, the aircrew can plot the grid boxes/quadrants of their planned flight route, andwhen a warning is transmitted, they willimmediately be able to determine whethertheir route of flight is in potential conflict.Likewise, for immediate, unplanned airbornediverts, the grid box system is a useful toolfor quick reference, coordination, anddeconfliction of flight paths from otheroperations.)

* oTheATACMS mission fires.

**Once the mission iscomplete, the FSE advises the BCD it is readyto deactivate the FSCM in the grid box. TheJAOC and BCD deactivate the ROZs andRFA (respectively).

(2) "Bullseye" Reference System. Thebullseye reference system is similar to thegrid box reference system in that it can beused to provide components with a commonperspective of the battlespace and allow forcommon identification of mutually accessibleattack areas. In addition, it can be used toidentify the center point for theestablishment of an appropriate FSCM/ACM.The bullseye reference system is normallyused during counterair engagements forsituational awareness on targeted anduntargeted airborne threats. However, it hasapplication in attacks against surface TCTs.The bullseye concept is similar to the USArmyTerrain Index Reference System (TIRS)as well as the target reference point (TRP)concept, that are used to quickly identify atarget off of a known geographic point.

(a) Bullseye Design. Bullseyesmay be established throughout the AO/AOAby selecting geographic points of referenceand encoding them with code words oralphanumerics. If multiple bullseyes arerequired, each bullseye can be labeled witha specific code word. For example, threebullseyes can be designated as BullseyeAlpha, Bravo, and Charlie (Figure II-12).

These geographic points should beincorporated into operational graphics andoverlays of component C2 systems, such asAFATDS, CTAPS, AETACS databases, andthe ACP.

(b) Bullseye Development. Anycomponent can develop bullseyes. To beeffective during cross-componentcoordination and deconfliction, thesebullseyes must be communicated to othercomponents, preferably in advance of combatoperations.

(c) Bullseye Execution. Any sur-face TCT or attack can be referenced by itsbearing and distance from a selected bullseye.Bearings should be described referencemagnetic north and distance in nauticalmiles. Selected targets or attacks can thenbe rapidly coordinated and deconflicted usingthe bullseye as a common reference.

(d) Bullseye Errors. The utilityof a bullseye system is greatly hamperedwhen targets are identified a significantdistance from the specified bullseye point. Asdistance from the point increases, the largerthe surface area per degree occurs, andconsequently, the higher probability of error.The formula for error is as follows:

One degree of azimuth error = oneNM of horizontal distance error at arange of 60 NM ("60 to 1" rule)

Therefore, a one degree of azimuth error at arange of 12 NM from a selected bullseye isequivalent to a 0.2 NM location error.However, a one degree of azimuth error at arange of 120 NM from a selected bullseyeresults in a significantly greater locationerror. In this case, it equates to 2 NM.Essentially, the potential for error increasesin direct proportion to any increase in range.If the range increases by a factor of 10,any degree of azimuth error will likewiseincrease the location error by a factor of10. Therefore, it is best to use the bullseyetechnique in smaller areas/AOs/AOAs.

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ALPHA0

Figure 11-12. Bullseye Reference System

(e) Bullseye Examples. Thefollowing are examples of componentdescriptions of surface TCT targets whileusing a bullseye reference system. Providedthat each component understands thecommon bullseye reference points,coordination and deconfliction can occur.However, this process is much more fluid andinexact than the grid box procedure.

*Example #1. A surface TCTlocated 20 NM south of bullseye alphashould be referred to as Target, BullseyeAlpha, 180 degrees for 20 NM (Figure II-13).Fighter aircraft are then assigned to searchfor and attack the surface TCT. AppropriateFSCMs and/or ACMs can be established asin the grid box procedure.

*Example #2. ATACMS attacksintended for a target northwest of bullseyeCharlie should be coordinated anddeconflicted with other components bycommunicating ATACMS attack, BullseyeCharlie, 335 degrees for 55 NM (Figure II-14). (Note: Actual targeting data [that is,specific target coordinates] is much moredetailed. This information does not haveto be transmitted for area deconfliction.)

Similarly, ATACMS PAH, route of flight, andTAH can be cleared via the BCD and theJAOC. Appropriate FSCMs and/orACMs canbe established as before (RFAs and ROZs).

*Example #3. In extreme cases,bullseye calls can be transmitted on GUARDfrequencies (UHF 243.0 and VHF 122.5) towarn aircraft of impending ATACMS,CALCM, orTLAM attacks in their area. Thisshould only be used as a last resort when priorcoordination and deconfliction could not havebeen accomplished.

g. Weapon Systems Procedures. Var-ious weapon systems carry out attacksagainst surface TCTs. Specific proceduresoriented toward this mission enhance overallsuccess. This section describes some of theprimary weapon systems procedures thatmay be used against surfaceTCTs: ATACMS,fighter/attack aircraft, AC-130s, and attackhelicopters.

(1) ATACMS Procedures. The land oramphibious force commander may choose touse the ATACMS when assigned theresponsibility to engage surface TCTs as aspecific target set.

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CHARLIE

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Figure 11-13. Bullseye Example #1

Figure 11-14. Bullseye Example #2

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FORWARD BOUNDARY

(a) Tasking. Using the AGM, theland or amphibious force commander directsthe desired number of ATACMS launchers(battery, battalion, or brigade) to maintain ahot (ready to fire) posture. Some ATACMSswill normally be controlled by corps artilleryin support of the deep battle.

(b) Identification of AnticipatedEngagement Areas. The AGM sets forth apriority matrix listing HPTs, normallysurface TCTs. Anticipated engagement areasare defined as named areas of interest (NAIs)which focus surveillance efforts for collectionassets. These areas are also defined as targetareas of interest (TAIs) and assigned toATACMSs with specific trigger events. NAIs,TAIs, and trigger events are all listed in theDST. TAIs should be forwarded to othercomponent commanders, particularly theJFACC, for advance deconfliction planning.

(c) Specified Engagement Win-dows. The land or amphibious forcecommander may be able to set forth plannedengagement windows for these potentialengagement areas tied to the AGM,commander's intent, IPB, and availability ofintelligence sensors. These windows wouldnot preclude aircraft from operating in thearea, but it would alert them to the possibilitythat the zone could go hot with very littleadvance notice. AETACS platforms, as wellas Joint STARS and CRC/CRE/ASOC/directair support center (DASC) agencies shouldalso be advised of the time windows.

(d) Firing Positions. For respon-siveness, PAHs may be computed andprecoordinated using anticipated targetlocations and engagement areas. PAHs forplanned ATACMS missions should bepublished, whenever possible, in the airspacecontrol order (ACO). Additional PAHs (ROZs)may be computed and designated on theACOfor activation on an "as needed" basis for "on-call" and immediate fire missions. This willfacilitate ATACMS battery flexibility toemploy "shoot and scoot" tactics. However,restricting all ATACMS PAHs (ROZs) to bepublished on the ACO for on-call andimmediate fire missions may not always befeasible, as restricting an ATACMS firing

unit to a position designated by theACO willincrease their vulnerability and reduce theirresponsiveness to the flow of the battle. Withfire missions that cannot be anticipated,immediate PAHs (ROZs) should becoordinated and deconflicted via the grid boxtechnique described earlier.

*The ATACMS fire directionsystem computes the PAH (ROZ) based onthe size and deployment of the ATACMSplatoon, desired exit altitude, and missiletrajectory. This information is transmittedto appropriate agencies (such as the FSE andBCD) via AFATDS.

SDimensions vary from 3kilometer (km) (1.5 NM) to 10 km (5.5 NM)radius from platoon center. Typical altitudeof the PAH (ROZ) can be as low as 5000meters (16,500 feet above ground level[AGL]) to 15,000 meters (49,200 feetAGL).29

Fire direction system defaults are 3000meters radius (1.5 NM) and 10,000 meters(32,800 feet AGL). Coordination for thesePAHs (ROZs) occurs through the BCD andthe A2C2 element to the JAOC.

*Although the PAH (ROZ) ismeasured horizontally by a radius fromplatoon center, the fire direction computerdefines the PAH (ROZ), using trajectoryinformation for the mission, as four-cornercoordinates and an altitude. The PAH (ROZ)contains the missile trajectory from launchpoint to the desired altitude. The sides ofthe PAH (ROZ) correspond to the location ofthe missile, projected on the ground, when itachieves the desired altitude (Figure 11-15).

*The total time an ATACMSmissile transits the PAH (ROZ), from launchto desired altitude, is approximately 15seconds.

(e) ATACMS En Route Altitudes.The ATACMS missile is above the PAH(ROZ) altitude en route to the TAH (ROZ).Desired exit altitude and missile trajectory(key elements for computing the PAH [ROZ])are determined by the FDC based on anumber of factors, primarily range to thespecific surfaceTCT. However, the FDC must

11-28

evaluate the desired exit altitude and missiletrajectory to ensure they result in a computedflight path that will not conflict with anyestablished FSCMs and/orACMs, specificallythose established for fighter and attack

helicopter operations.

*The FDC should consult theFSE/FSCC (in contact with the BCD) todetermine the requirement (if any) for flightpath deconfliction.

* There should be no requirementto clear the flight path of the missile unlessairspace above the PAH/TAH (ROZ) altitudeswill be used. The high altitude flight pathcharacteristics of an ATACMS missile placeit in a different category than classic indirectfire projectiles. By comparison, the missile'sflight path is similar to that of a high-altitude,fixed-wing aircraft, with a maximum altitudeof greater than 30 km (approximately 98,000feet AGL). Total ATACMS missile time offlight between the PAH (ROZ) and TAH(ROZ) is 3-6 minutes.

3000 m (1.5 NM) DEFAULT10,000 m (5.5 NM) MAX

Figure 11-15. ATACMS PAH (ROZ)

11-29

DESIRED ALTITUDE

5000 m (16,500 ft AGL) MIN10,000 m (32,800 ft AGL) DEFAULT

15,000 m (49,200 ft AGL) MAX

a::-o i

TIME IN PAH -15 SECONDS

RADIUS FROM PLATOON CENTERI dill--

SIf necessary, this flight path maybe deconflicted by establishing temporarycoordinating altitudes for any given profileor series of profiles. Grid box references andcoordinated high altitude ACAs along theroute of flight are one such method toaccomplish deconfliction. Typically, the onlyreason this would be necessary would be todeconflict the missile's flight path fromhigh-altitude surveillance aircraft, such asa U-2.

(f) Target Area Deconfliction. Forresponsiveness, TAHs (ROZs), like PAHs(ROZs) should be computed and precoor-dinated using anticipated target locationsand engagement areas. However, sincesurface TCT location is not precisely knownuntil shortly before launch, most ATACMSTAHs (ROZs) may not be published in theACO. Consequently, deconfliction of theimpact area occurs on very short notice. Useof grid box or bullseye reference systemprocedures are valid techniques to deconflictattacks in such situations. Dimensions ofATACMS TAHs (ROZs) are computedsimilarly to PAHs (ROZs).

*The ATACMS fire directionsystem computes the TAH (ROZ) based onthe size and deployment of the ATACMSplatoon, desired reentry altitude, and missiletrajectory. As with the PAH (ROZ), thisinformation is transmitted via AFATDS.

SDimensions vary from 1000meters (.5 NM) to 10,000 meters (5.5 NM)radius from missile canister function/impactcenter. Typical altitude of the TAH (ROZ)can be as low as 5000 meters (16,500 feetabove ground level [AGLI) to 15,000 meters(49,200 feet AGL).30 Fire direction systemdefaults are 1000 meters radius (.5 NM) and10,000 meters (32,800 feet AGL). As withPAH (ROZs), coordination for TAHs (ROZs)occurs through the BCD and the A2C2element to the JAOC.

*The TAH (ROZ) contains themissile trajectory from reentry point tomissile canister function altitude/impact

center. It is measured horizontally by aradius from missile canister function/impactcenter. However, the fire direction computerdefines the TAH (ROZ)-using trajectoryinformation for the mission-as four-cornercoordinates and an altitude. The sides of theTAH (ROZ) correspond to the location of themissile, projected on the ground, when itenters the TAH (ROZ) (Figure 11-16).

*The total time an ATACMSmissile transits the TAH (ROZ), from entryto function/impact time, is approximately 35seconds.

(g) Joint STARS Support. JointSTARS supports ATACMS through directtargeting information via deployed GSMs.See MTTP for Joint STARS for moreinformation.

(2) Fighter/Attack Aircraft Pro-cedures. Fighter/attack aircraft can rapidlyrespond to surface TCTs provided they areairborne and in communication with the C2platform and/or agencies that receive NRTtargeting information. This targetinginformation can be received directly (via voiceor data link) from airborne surveillanceplatforms (such as a direct strike directionnet with Joint STARS) or C2 platforms (suchas an indirect strike direction net with anAWACS/ABCCC/DASC-A receiving off-boardtargeting information).

(a)Surface TCT Combat AirPatrol Procedures. Surface TCT CAP pointsare special use airspace ACMs that defineorbit/holding areas for fighter/attack aircraftassigned to surface TCT attack missions.Fighter/attack aircraft are most responsivewhen airborne and holding in thesepreestablished areas. This technique shouldnormally be used in specific conditions andtimes when surface TCTs are known to existand air employment is a critical factor foraccomplishment of JFC objectives. Thesesurface TCT CAP points should be locatedclose to expected surface TCT engagementareas so as to minimize en route time (Note:surface TCT CAP points should not expose

11-30

DESIRED REENTRY ALTITUDE

5000 m (16,500 ft AGL) MIN10,000 m (32,800 ft AGL) DEFAULT

15,000 m (49,200 ft AGL) MAX

TIME IN TAH-,35 SECONDS

MUNITION CANNISTERFUNCTION ALTITUDE

(As Computed)

SUBMUNITION IMPACT DANGER ZONE(RADIUS FROM IMPACT CENTER)

1000 m (.5 NM) DEFAULT10,000 m (5.5 NM) MAX

Figure 11-16. ATACMS TAH (ROZ)

holding fighters to surface threats norshould they be located in areas requiringpossible deconfliction with other weaponsystems). Surface TCT CAP points shouldnot be over grid boxes or plannedATACMSPAH ROZs. Fighter/attack aircraft shouldbe placed on ground alert to backfill surfaceTCT CAPs once the original aircraft havebeen committed against surface TCTs.Aircraft on ground alert may be used fordirect surface TCT tasking, yet theirresponse time will be longer.

(b) General Fighter/Attack Air-craft Capabilities. As directed by the JFC,

the JFACC should assign fighters withoptimum capabilities for surface TCT attack.Consideration should be given to theavailability of the following:

*Day-night sensors, such as nightvision devices (NVDs) and forward-lookinginfrared (FLIR) systems.

*Precision navigation and firecontrol systems, such as global positioningsystem (GPS), inertial navigation system(INS), fire control computer (FCC), highresolution map (HRM), and synthetic apertureradars (SAR)

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SPrecision guided munitions,such as LGBs and MAVERICK Missiles

(c) Airborne Divert. Fighter/attack aircraft en route to planned targetsmay be diverted to attack surface TCTs bybattle management directors aboardAETACS (AWACS, ABCCC, E-2C, or DASC-A). Primary considerations for divert taskingis priority of the surface TCT versus that ofthe original planned target, distance fromdivert aircraft to the surface TCT, time enroute from divert location, aircraft fuel state,weapons load, precision targeting capability,and en route threats. Airborne divert is avalid option for surface TCT attack providedconditions are such that rapid response canoccur and the probability of mission successis high. However, airborne divert should onlybe exercised when no other option isavailable.

(d)Deconfliction from OtherOperations. Once fighter/attack aircraft havebeen directed to attack a specific TCT, theJAOC (through AETACS) must ensure safepassage from surface TCT CAP location ordivert points to the assigned target area.Using the grid box reference system,AETACS can quickly advise aircraft whichareas are currently active with other attacks(aircraft, ATACMS, etc.) and which areashave established FSCMs and/or ACMs thatwould affect route of flight.

" Aircraft should use establishedMRRs, if appropriate, en route to the assignedtarget.

* There may be many cases whereestablished MRRs do not exist between theaircraft's present location (surface TCT CAPor divert point) and the assigned target. Insuch cases, aircraft should determine, withthe assistance of AETAC battle managementdirectors, the safest route of flight to thetarget. Using the grid box reference system,aircrews can plot and fly a route with thecharacteristics of an informal, temporaryMRR.

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(e) Air Refueling Support.Fighter/attack aircraft assigned to surfaceTCT CAPs in support of surface TCT attackmissions require dedicated airborne tankersupport. Air refueling support extends thesortie duration of assigned fighters andincreases their ability to remain on stationfor longer periods of time. Tanker tracksshould be close enough to established CAPpoints to allow fighters to refuel quickly andresume CAP responsibilities. Also, suchtanker tracks allow fighters to terminate airrefueling operations on short notice and berelatively close to ingress points, allowingthem to quickly initiate attack operations.

(f) Joint STARS Support. Ifdesignated by the JFC, Joint STARSplatforms may direct fighter/attack aircraftmissions against surface TCTs. However,targets designated by Joint STARS shouldbe verified and positively identified by othercross-cued sensors, such as unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs).

SFighter/attack aircraft can beassigned directly to the Joint STARSplatform for targeting information. The JointSTARS mission crew is informed, via theATO or voice communications from theJAOC, of attack aircraft available, weaponsloads, and on-station times. Weaponsdirectors on-board the Joint STARS direct theattack aircraft against available targets.Weapons directors on-board the aircraft canpredict and display the surface TCT's time ofarrival at a specific geographic point or canpredict the future position of a surface TCTat a specified time. This ability enablesweapons directors to provide accurate surfaceTCT information to the attack aircraft.Additionally, ifAWACS or CRC/CRE groundradar is tracking the attack aircraft, andtransmits that track over JTIDS/TADIL-J,the weapons directors on-board the JointSTARS know the approximate position of theattack aircraft for easier coordination.

*The following list is an exampleof advisory and directive information theJoint STARS should provide to fighter attackaircraft:

S**Target coordinates/eleva-tion in LAT/LONG (degrees/minutes/seconds), UTM, or geographic referencepoints. Elevation is estimated in feet (AGLand/or mean sea level [MSL])

**Target description (quan-tity, formation, and classification)

* *Target direction (cardinal)and speed (nautical miles per hour [NMPH]or kilometers per hour [kph])

* Choke point assessments

**Location of friendlies

S**Location of threats

**Time-over target coordina-tion and deconfliction (grid box identificationand establishment of FSCMs and/or ACMs)

**Clearance to drop, ifconfirmed hostile through outside sources

(3) AC-130H/AC-130U Gunship Pro-cedures. The AC-130H and AC-130Ugunships are highly adaptable to a varietyof special missions and offer the JFC uniquecapabilities in attacks against surface TCTs.Through the use of surgical firepowercapabilities and precision night surveillancesensors, the AC-130, with its air refuelingcapability, can conduct extended autonomousoperations within threat permissiveenvironments.

(a) As directed by the JFC, thejoint special operations task force (JSOTF)commander (in coordination with the JFACC)may assign AC-130 gunships to specificsurface TCT attack responsibilities. Theprimary limiting factor to such an operationis the intensity of area threats.

(b)The AC-130 has the advan-tage of being able to loiter over known areasof surface TCTs with the ability to provideNRT response. AC-130 aircraft work best inplanned engagement areas duringanticipated engagement times.

(c) The airspace control authorityshould deconflict AC-130 orbits through theuse of ACMs such as ROAs/ROZs and/orspecial use airspace. Normally, these orbitsshould be published in the ACO.

(d) Due to the slower speed of theAC-130 (as compared to fighter/attackaircraft), responsiveness may suffer if taskedto traverse considerable distance beforeengaging an acquired surface TCT.

(4) Attack Helicopter Procedures.Attack helicopters can launch rapidly toattack surfaceTCTs; however, slower en routetimes and range limitations must beconsidered when the decision to employ themis contemplated. To compensate, these assetsshould be placed on strip alert at either alaager site or at a more forward holding areain closer proximity to TCTs. Once alerted,the aircraft can be airborne in minutes.

(a) Most attack helicopters arecapable of night operations with NVDs andFLIR in clear weather conditions. When lowclouds and overcast conditions are present,helicopters may operate under lower ceilingsthan fighters or attack aircraft. Due to theirslower speed, rotary-wing aircraft can oftenoperate safely in poorer visibility than fixed-wing aircraft.

(b) Attack helicopter assets arecontrolled by the land or amphibious forcecommander. They may also be directlycontrolled by the JFC in support of specificjoint force missions.

(c) Attack helicopter missions toand from surface TCTs should be deconflictedvia MRRs. Coordination and deconflictionoccur in theA2C2 element in the BCD, whichin turn coordinates and deconflicts with theJAOC.

8. Command and Control Structuring

Command and control response to TCTsmust be streamlined to meet timeconstraints. Though the overall respon-

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sibility for the mission will remain with thevarious supported commanders, theauthority to engage should be delegated tothe C2 node that has the best information orsituational awareness to perform the missionand direct communications to weapons.Placing the appropriate level of battlespaceawareness at subordinate C2 nodes canstreamline the C2 cycle and allow timelyengagement of these targets. Thedecentralized C2 nodes can exchange sensor,status, and target information with a fidelitythat permits them to operate as a single,integrated C2 entity. Tied together by widearea networks and common interactivedisplays, they can effectively performdecentralized, coordinated execution of timecritical attacks. The JFC has several optionsto structure C2 operations for attacks againstsurface TCTs. Normally, the JFC directscomponent commanders to establishinteroperable and collocated (if possible) C2centers. Additionally, the JFC must ensurethe JSOTF commander effectively integratesSOF C2 operations with other components.

a. Interoperable Air/Ground Oper-ations. The Theater Air-Ground System(TAGS) is the functional architecture throughwhich interoperable air/ground operationsoccur. Joint air operations are normallydirected from a JAOC. Depending on theappointed JFACC, the JAOC may either bean Air Force forces (AFFOR) air operationscenter (AOC), Marine forces aviation combatelement (MARFOR ACE) TACC, or Navyforces (NAVFOR) TACC. Ground operationsare normally directed through an operationscenter, such as the Army forces (ARFOR)tactical operations center (TOC) or MARFORcombat operations center (COC). Other keyARFOR agencies for ground operations arethe FSE, Army Theater Missile DefenseElement (ATMDE), DOCC, and FPTOC. KeyMARFOR agencies include the groundcontrol element (GCE) FFCC, FSCC, andFDC. The NAVFOR supports groundoperations with the SACC. Interoperableair/ground operations ensure-

*Deconfliction of the battlespace.

* Coordination and synchronization ofattack assets.

*Expeditious joint target coordination.

,Transmission ofjoint battlespace controland coordination measures.

*Conversion of target coordinatesbetween LAT/LONG and UTMs.

*Exchange of component commander'starget lists.

*Employment of common grid references(grid boxes).

*Enhancement of mutual air/groundsituational awareness.

(1) Liaison Agencies. Between theJFACC and the land or amphibiouscomponent commander, liaison agencies existto conduct coordination, deconfliction,synchronization, and integration ofoperations. At an established JAOC, theARFOR operate a BCD. The MARFOR andNAVFOR are represented by liaison officers,as appropriate. At the ARFOR TOC, theAFFOR operate an ASOC. Similarly, theMARFOR operate a DASC to coordinate airoperations with land operations, either withthe MARFOR COC or ARFOR TOC, asappropriate.

(2) Unique Air/Ground C2 Capa-bilities. The ARFOR and AFFOR employunique capabilities which enhance surfaceTCT attacks.

(a) Deep Operations Coordina-tion Cell. The ARFOR may deploy a DOCCinto the AO. The DOCC is a C2 node thatplans, coordinates, and manages deepoperations, to include surface TCT attacks,within the land force commander's AO. TheDOCC develops deep attack plans based onidentified HPTs. The DOCC selects attackassets based on several factors including thelocation of attack assets with respect totargets, the operational status of attackassets, target ranges, the number and typeof missions in progress, munitions available,the enemy air defense threat, and theaccuracy of the targeting acquisition data.This target-weapon pairing process isautomatic. Targets that can be better

11-34

serviced by joint or other component assetswill be nominated to joint headquarters forprosecution (such as a JAOC). DOCCs mayrecommend direct sensor-to-shooterdissemination of targeting information tomeet critical timelines associated withsurface TCTs. The DOCC may employ anFPTOC to decentralize execution of surfaceTCT attacks. Future connectivity to theAFFOR/JFACC combat integration capa-bility (CIC) will provide the means tocoordinate and deconflict surface TCT attackoperations.

(b) Combat Integration Capa-bility. CIC is an AFFOR capabilityundergoing development. When fielded, theCIC will consolidate relevant sensor,intelligence, and air tasking information atthe CRC and AOC (or JAOC, if the AFFORis the JFACC). The CIC will providebattlespace awareness at the node at whichthe JFACC wishes to place executionauthority for the attack of surfaceTCTs. TheCIC is normally located at the AOC/JAOCCOD. If placed at the CRC, it becomes anexecution level extension of the COD. TheCIC contributes to battlespace awarenessthrough installation of a Combat IntelligenceSystem (CIS) gateway that will provideenemy order of battle, active threat, surfaceTCT data, airspace deconfliction, andweather information. The CIC identifiesattack assets for tasking against surfaceTCTs, much like AFATDS. Connectivity tothe Army BCD, DOCC, and FPTOC providesthe means to coordinate and deconflictsurface TCT attacks. See Air CombatCommand Concept and Operations (ACCCONOPS) for C2 of the Attack Operationsand Active Defense Phases of Theater AirDefense and Combat Air Forces (CAF)CONOPS for the CIC for more information.

(3) Interconnectivity. Current tech-nology limits electronic interconnectivity andautomated data planning between the JAOC(whether it be the USAFAOC, USMC TACC,or USNTACC) and the BCD. Presently, onlyverbal coordination and deconfliction occurs.Similar limitations exist between theARFORTOC/MARFOR COC and ASOC/DASC. The

level of interoperability is solely dependenton the ability of officers in both organizationsto work with each other. However, componentunique C2 system exist:

(a) CTAPS. CTAPS is the acceptedjoint standard air planning and C2 systemwhich provides connectivity and overallsituational awareness for the JFACC. Itserves as a significant link between the JAOCand theASOC/DASC. With CTAPS and otherassociated communications capability, theJAOC and ASOC/DASC have direct linkswith AETACS for rapid coordination anddeconfliction of surface TCT attacks. SeeAppendix A for more information.

(b)AFATDS. AFATDS is theprimary C2 fire support system for theARFOR/MARFOR. AFATDS digitally linksthe land/amphibious force commander withtheir respective operations centers, FSE/FSCC, and firing units (to includeATACMS).AFATDS enables timely and automated C2connectivity, sharing of situationalawareness, and coordination and decon-fliction of surfaceTCT attacks. SeeAppendixB and TTP for AFATDS ST 6-3+ for moreinformation.

(c) AFATDS - CTAPS Interface.Currently, AFATDS and CTAPS areundergoing modification to enable eachsystem to share key elements of information.Initially, AFATDS and CTAPS will be able toshare preplanned air information (such as theATO and ACP) and real-time indirect firetrajectories (to include ATACMS PAH/TAHROZs) for coordination and deconfliction ofsurface TCT attacks. This preplannedinformation will enhance componentcapabilities to develop preplanned FSCMsandACMs. Eventually, AFATDS and CTAPS(and the follow-on Theater BattleManagement Core System [TBMCS]) will beable to share real-time air information (suchas the air situation picture) and enable rapiddevelopment and coordination of NRTFSCMS and ACMs. Such a system willrapidly and efficiently deconflict flightoperations and indirect fires during surfaceTCT attacks.

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(4) Information Requirements: Inter-operable air/ground operations in the pursuitof surface TCT attacks require specificinformation passed between air and groundC2 agencies. The following is a notional listof key information requirements:

(a) From an air C2 agency:

*The ATO

*The ACO and ACP

*Actionable targets

*Airborne/ground threats

* Combined friendly/enemyair picture

*Fighter surface TCT CAP points

*Fighter taskings to surfaceTCT targets

* Surface TCT engagement areas

* Grid box activation intentions

*Target lists and nominations

* Enemy order of battle

(b) From a ground/surface C2agency:

*Rotary-wing aviation routes (ifapplicable)

*Attack helicopter laager/stagingareas

*SEAD plans

*Artillery locations and readi-ness status

*Actionable targets

*ATACMS locations and readystates

targets*ATACMS fires on surface TCT

*ACPs

*Airspace control requests

*Engagement areas

*NFAs, FSCL, phase lines, andother control measures

* Maneuver unit locations

* Surface TCT engagement areas

*Target lists and nominations

SFriendly force locations

b. Coordinating SOF Operations.SOF operations must be coordinated anddeconflicted with surface TCT attacks. Theprimary method to accomplish this is vialiaison with established conventional C2agencies. The special operations liaisonelement (SOLE) is linked with the JAOC forinterface with regard to air operations. Thespecial operations coordinator (SOCOORD)or special operations C2 element (SOCCE),if established, is linked with surface C2agencies (DOCC/FSE/FSCC/SACC) forground operations. The SOLE, SOCOORD,and SOCCE have situation awareness on theSOF locations and activities in and outsideof the AO/AOA. Most SOF operations areascan be protected by RFAs, NFAs, or in someinstances, ROAs/ROZs. Clandestine SOFoperations, where published control andcoordinating measures may not be permitted,will require direct coordination anddeconfliction with friendly forces by theSOLE, SOCOORD, or SOCCE. If conven-tional force operations put SOF operationsat risk (for example, anATACMS attack), theSOLE, SOCOORD, or SOCCE is responsiblefor deconfliction and/or recommendingdisapproval due to the potential for fratricide.

9. Battle Management SystemInterconnectivity

Battle management systems should allowthe JFC and component commanders to passtargeting information on surfaceTCTs on anNRT basis. Effective targeting of TCTsrequires common targeting terminology andnotation as well as lateral and verticalconnectivity between all component C2agencies. Secure, jam resistant, automateddata systems are critical for the NRTexchange of surface TCT information.Current service unique data link standards

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and targeting notations inhibit true jointinteroperability. Presently, the JFC's optionsare limited. The JFC can locate common dataterminals at each component's C2 agencies(as available) or attempt to establish anetwork of dissimilar system data terminals.Battle management systems should allow theJFC and component commanders to passtargeting information on surfaceTCTs on anNRT basis. Currently, however, thesesystems are limited to internal componentoperations only. Effective targeting of surfaceTCTs requires lateral and verticalconnectivity between all component C2agencies. Secure, jam resistant, automateddata systems are critical to support thisconnectivity. Presently, the only options aJFC has to connect component battlemanagement systems is to provide commonterminals at each component C2 agency orconnect dissimilar component terminalstogether.

a. Common Terminal Connectivity.

Locating common data terminals at eachcomponent C2 agency allows immediate andsimplified direct connectivity. The JFCshould decide which terminal should befielded based upon capabilities in theoperational area.

(1) Locations. Common terminalsmay be located at the following componentC2 agencies:

(a) JAOC/TACC/ASOC/DASC/SACC

(b)AETACS platforms (AWACS/ABCCC/DASC-A/E-2C)

(c) CRC/CRE/AEGIS/tactical air

operations center (TAOC)

(d) BCD/FSE/FSCC/DOCC/FPTOC

(2) Terminals. Common terminalsthat may be assigned to each location aresituationally dependent on availability in theoperational area and mission requirements.However, the JFC should consider-

(a) CTAPS.

(b)Joint Tactical InformationData System (JTIDS.)

(c) GSMs.

(d) ADOCS.

(e) AFATDS.

b. Dissimilar Terminal Connectivity.Connecting dissimilar battle managementsystems generally requires the developmentof data translation programs to bridge onesystem's language with another. Expectedresults would be the ability of dissimilarsystems to "talk" to one another and therebyrapidly share information. Battle manage-ment systems fall into two general categories:air tactical digital information systems andground digital information systems. JTIDSand CTAPS are air tactical informationsystems that have been designated as jointsystems for use by all services. However,JTIDS and CTAPS have limited useapplications for the land or amphibious forcecommander and associated maneuver forces.Instead, they predominantly use grounddigital tactical information systemssupported by fire support data systems suchas theAFATDS or the experimental ADOCS.Connecting JTIDS and CTAPS workstationsto AFATDS/ADOCS terminals is a viabletechnique provided data buffers canadequately transfer information. Once theconnection is made, acquired surface TCTscan be communicated real time betweencomponents via JTIDS/CTAPS andAFATDS/ADOCS. Dissimilar terminals require eithercommon target numbers, common targetidentification information, or correlatedtarget numbers.

c. Common Target Numbers. Commontarget numbers allow each component toprecisely identify targets and communicatewith other components via a common frameof reference. However, common targetnumbers only exist for two categories oftargets:

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*Fixed installations (as basic encyc-lopedia numbers [BE#s])

.Enemy order of battle (as individual unitidentification codes [UICs])

BE#s and UICs are unfeasible for surfaceTCTs. Components normally assign theirown arbitrary, unique target numbers tosurface TCTs. However, this leads to severalproblems. First, these target numbers differfrom other target numbers assigned to thesame target by other components. Second,components use these unique target numberssolely within their individual componentbattle management systems-that arepresently incompatible with other componentsystems. Thus, confusion and duplicationoften occurs. True universal common targetnumbers, beyond BE#s and UICs, have notbeen established.

(1) Basic Encyclopedia Number. ABE# is a 10 character number unique toeach fixed installation (example: BE#0000XX0000). The first 4 characters identifythe world area code (WAC) where theinstallation is located. The next 6 spacesuniquely label the identifying source of theinstallation with the fifth and sixth spacesserving as identifying agency codes. Forexample, if United States Central Command(USCENTCOM) adds an installation to themilitary intelligence database, it uses the twoalpha characters assigned to it for thispurpose.

(2) Unit Identification Code. UICsare 10 character codes that are used totrack enemy order of battle (example: UIC-XXXXX00000). The first 2 characters identifythe responsible producer. The third andfourth spaces identify the country code forthe unit. The fifth character is used toidentify the type of unit (that is, air, ground,naval). The remaining 5 characters aresequentially assigned.

*Field initiated soft UICs have beenused to track unidentifiable enemy units.Soft UICs include a character that identifiesthe component which first located the enemyunit.

(3) Temporary CTN Solutions. Somegeographic combatant commanders (UnifiedCINCs) have had success in establishingtemporary CTN solutions in simple jointoperations with limited target sets. SuchCTNs were simple, alphanumeric characters,tracked manually:

EXAMPLE: JM 003J = joint targetM = mobile target003 = sequential number

(4) Long Term CTN Solutions. Longterm CTN solutions must be able towithstand a more dynamic and complexoperation with large target sets, supportedby data processing and multiple recon-naissance and surveillance inputs. One suchCTN format being experimented with is theintegrated database (IDB) unit identificationnumbering method. This method works wellin identifying mobile targets. Since majorunits assigned to garrison locations receivea unique 7-10 digit IDB identifier, mobilesubordinate elements of these units could beassigned the parent unit identifier coupledwith an alphanumeric character representingfunction and element:

EXAMPLE #1: ICACU03892-L1IC = responsible producerA = airCU = country code03892 = number assigned in IDB tied

to garrison BE#L =launcher

1 = first detached

EXAMPLE #2 : ICACU03892-003AIC = responsible producerA = airCU = country code03892 = number assigned in IDB tied togarrison BE#

003 = IDB code for the mobile rocketbattalion with equipment code

A= alpha character to delineate individuallaunchers

11-38

d. Correlated Target Numbers. Cor-related target numbers offer a partialsolution to the CTN problem. Methods tocorrelate individual component targetnumbers are relatively simple. Essentially,one component's target number is "tagged"with another component's number and inputinto each battle management system. Thecorrelated pair of numbers is transmittedacross data nets to all component users ofeach system. Once received, the user canidentify the target by recognizing thecomponent target number that operateswithin the operating data system and thenreference the other component's number as

necessary via accompanying data or remarks.This allows for common situationalawareness and provides the avenue forcoordination and deconfliction. Respon-sibility for correlating target numbers doesnot have to be assigned to a centralizedagency. Each component can accomplish thisfunction independently without redundant orduplicated numbers. Each component can beallocated blocks of other component numbersto tag with their primary component targetnumber. Once the tagged numbers aretransmitted across data links, othercomponents can easily recognize the sourceof the target by its correlated number.

11-39

NOTES

1 Jt Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994, p 366


3 Ibid

4 Ibid

5 Ibid

6 Ibid

7 Ibid

8 FM 101-5-1, Army Operational Terms and Symbols, October 21, 1985, p I-19


o10 Jt Pub 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, December 3, 1993,p B-3

11 Ibid, pv

12 Ibid, p B-7

13 Ibid, p B-5

14 Ibid, p B-6

15 Ibid

16 Ibid


18 Ibid

19 Ibid

20 Ibid, p III-35

21 Ibid, p III-34

22 Ibid

23 Jt Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, p IV-11

24 Ibid

25 Ibid

26 Ibid, p IV-12

27 Ibid, p IV-13

28 Ibid

29 ST 6-60-36, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Tactics; Techniques, and Procedures,March 17, 1995, p 17

30 Ibid

11-40

Appendix A

CONTINGENCY THEATER AUTOMATED PLANNING SYSTEM (CTAPS)

1. CTAPS is a joint force level computerizedcommand and control backbone system cur-rently implemented by the USAF, USN, andUSMC. It consists of common, modular, deploy-able communications-computer equipment andsoftware applications. The software applica-tions described below run on the CTAPSstandard workstation (Sun Sparc). CTAPS isdesigned to interface the joint air operationscenter (JAOC), air support operations centers(ASOC), and control and reporting centers(CRC), and connect functional areas withinthese centers using a local area network (LAN).

2. CTAPS provides automated data exchange;processing and display capabilities for friendlyand enemy combat information; support toATO planning, generation and dissemination;mission execution monitoring; and, mission

reporting/assessment. System implementationwill be incremental, with various functions andcapabilities being added to the core system inmodular fashion.

3. Inputs to CTAPS include messages andCINC/JFACC tasking and directives,information provided by the various force levelfunctional areas, and user support requestsfrom other command centers. Outputs includethe combat information and data provided bylinked functional centers/areas and theirassociated support systems; theATO/ACO; andvarious direction and coordination actionmessages/reports. Planned enhancementsinclude a battlefield situation display capabilityfor situation awareness, full interconnectivitybetween command centers and functional areas,and additional automated functions.

Table A-1. CTAPS Applications and CapabilitiesADS: Airspace * Plans requested airspace.Deconfliction System * Identifies airspace by time, altitude, and position.

* Builds an airspace control order (ACO).TISD: Theater * Provides a NRT radar-sourced air picture for the AOC planningIntegrated Situation and execution functions.Display * Air picture capability will eventually be incorporated into the

battlefield situation display (BSD).CIS: Combat * Supports data correlation/fusion, situation assessment/ display,Intelligence System order of battle (OB) database maintenance, imagery, and

collection management.* Identifies and assesses targets from intelligence database.* Analyzes effects of various targeting combinations.* Accesses JMEM to perform weaponeering, and create a target

nomination list for inputs to APS for ATO planning.APS: Advanced * Provides an automated capability to develop air battle plans andPlanning System create combat and support mission taskings.

* Provides graphic displays of the developing ATO.* Loads the CTAPS master database, enabling execution

applications access to the completed ATO.JPT: Joint Planning Tool * Enables rapid development, visualization, and evaluation of airand ACPT: Air Campaign campaign options; provides results and assessments.Planning Tool * Provides access to maps, imagery, country studies, target

analyses, and OB information.* Graphically displays information allowing JFACC to visualize large

amounts of data and analyze updates.( Primary outputs are overall air campaign plan and daily master

attack plan.JDSS: Joint Decision * Provides graphically oriented presentation of C41 data in user-Support System selectable and combinable on-screen displays.

* Has access to local C41 database directories and generates queryscripts for other databases.

FLEX: Force-Level * Central module serving AOC's combat operations staff.Execution * Provides capability to respond to the tactical situation by(Combat Operations replanning the ATO and disseminating changes.Automation) * Provides tailorable mission and status alarm capabilities to

monitor progress of ongoing air campaign activities.BSD: Battlefield * Displays tailorable view of air and ground (land) situations.Situation Display * Provides common identification of targets and other objects and

access through the view to underlying data.

A-1

Appendix B

ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (AFATDS)

1. AFATDS is a multiservice (Army andMarine Corps) fire support software systemthat runs on the Army's common hardwarefor theArmy battle command system (ABCS).AFATDS provides the land or amphibiousforce commander with a robust ability toconduct automatic digital coordination on allland/amphibious fire support requestsincluding ATACMS missions, CAS missions,attack helicopter operations, naval gunfiremissions, and mortar/cannon/rocket missions.This coordination allows the commander toautomatically prioritize and engage targetsin the fastest time possible with positivecoordination across the battlespace and haveflexibility in using available resources. It alsocan deconflict fires from other airspaceoperations. AFATDS prioritizes multiplemissions to ensure the most importantmissions are processed first. It also checksincoming fire missions against FSCMs,ACMs, and unit boundaries/zones ofresponsibility. AFATDS notifies the operatorand automatically, electronically requestsclearance from the unit that established thecontrol measure. That unit must approve ordeny the mission before processing continues.

2. AFATDS is equipped with a situationalawareness screen. The screen is able todisplay range fans, FSCMs, ACMs, targetoverlays, battlefield geometry, and commonreference systems. The graphics can betailored using up to seven separate overlays.By clicking on a target, a commander canreview all mission and target informationand digitally track the status of each mission.

a. Version 1 of AFATDS allows forautomated digital coordination and replacesthe initial fire support automation system(IFSAS) and tactical fire direction system(TACFIRE). Version 1 digitally automatesthe following:

(1) All on-line army battle commandsystems

(2) Shared fire support situation aware-ness distributed databases

(3) Fire planning

(4) Weapon target pairing in accordancewith command guidance

(5) Execution of fires on surface targets

b. Version 2 (in development) will featurea tactical air support module (TASM) toassist in the joint targeting process andprovide joint interoperability. Eventually,AFATDS will provide an automated,comprehensive tactical fire support decisionsupport system. AFATDS TASM will easedaily coordination and planning by providingautomated access to the JFACC's ATO. Theoperator will be able to use ATO informationto keep missions from conflicting, includingthose involvingATACMS. AFATDS will alsobe able to provide future input to ATOs, aswell as incorporate ATO sortie informationto prevent target conflicts. TASM processestarget nominations from the DOCC/FSE/FSCC to the BCD for coordination with theJAOC. TASM can also process targetnominations and send them directly intoCTAPS for rapid coordination. TASM has thecapability to enable AFATDS to pass digitalrequests for CAS and AI support directly tothe BCD and JAOC via CTAPS. This doesaway with the requirement to pass requestsfor air support via voice.

3. AFATDS can rapidly coordinate attackson surface TCTs. Intelligence data on thesurface TCT is passed via ASAS to AFATDSat the DOCC/FSE/FSCC or directly toAFATDS from Joint STARS. AFATDSautomatically verifies the surface TCT withthe high payoff target list and conductsweapon-target pairing. AFATDS displays tothe DOCC/FSE/FSCC operators if the targetviolates any fire support coordinationmeasures or airspace control measures.

B-1

(Note: Such established measures, onceidentified and deconflicted by the grid boxreference system, may be inserted intoAFATDS.) If the target violates establishedFSCMs andACMs, then the operator receivesan amber warning light on his interventionwindow, meaning that coordination musttake place. The operator would OK themission request, sending an automaticmessage to the BCD for coordination. TheBCD coordinates with the JAOC, and thenthe BCD approves or denies the request.

Similar coordination and deconfliction canoccur between the FPTOC and the COD(equipped with CIC), or other component firesupport centers (such as the USMC FFCC).Once deconflicted and approved, the missionis sent digitally to the firing unit forprocessing. Firing units who acquire theidentical target and send identical requestswill be sorted by the system and disapprovedautomatically via a red light in theintervention window.

B-2

Appendix C

AUTOMATED DEEP OPERATIONS COORDINATION SYSTEM (ADOCS)

ADOCS is a LAN system developed by theAdvanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)and in field testing/use by the US Army. Thefunctions of ADOCS are-

a. Coordination, planning, and executiondatabases (to include targeting, aviationroutes, air control points, ACPs, and deepbattle synchronization).

b. Interface with US Army systems suchas TACFIRE, Fire Direction System (FDS),Fire Direction Data Management (FDDM),ASAS-W, MCS, and the Target AcquisitionFire Support Model.

c. Display of situational graphics such asorder of battle and threats, friendly maneuverand artillery units, phase lines, engagementareas, RFAs, and TAIs.

d. Display of mission coordination andexecution status.

e. Interface with AFATDs.

f. Conduct targeting operations.

g. Exercise control and alerting procedures.

h. Coordinate aviation planning and air-space control measures.

i. Collect data on selected targets.

j. Provide mission reports, to includeATACMS missions fired and target lists.

C-1

References

Joint

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 Jan 95

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 Feb 95

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 24 Mar 95

Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 5 May 95

Joint Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 20 Nov 96

Joint Publication 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Intelligence Supportto Targeting (in development)

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Feb 95

Joint Publication 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats

Joint Publication 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, 30 Mar 94

Joint Publication 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations (in development)

Joint Publication 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Pro-cedures, '10 Aug 93

Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support (in development)

Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support,1 Dec 95

Joint Publication 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 3 Dec 93

Joint Publication 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target AcquisitionSupport for Joint Operations (RSTA), 14 Apr 93

Joint Publication 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations (in develop-ment)

Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 Nov 94

Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 Apr 95

Joint Publication, 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 1 Sep 91

Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer(C4) System Support to Joint Operations, 3 Jun 92

Unified Command

USACOM Joint Targeting Concept of Operations, 7 Sep 93

ROK-USCFCAir Ground Operations Standing Operating Procedures, (AGOSOP),Jun 95

ROK-USCFC Concept of Operations forAir Support in the Korean Theater, 15 Dec 93

ROK-USCFC Concept of Operations forACC Support to the Rear Area, 23 Jun 94

ROK-USCFC Deep Operations Primer

ROK-USCFC Handbook for Command and Control ofAir Support in the Korean Theater,15 Feb 94

References-1

Multiservice

FM 100-103-1/FMFRP 5-61/NDC TACNOTE 3-52.1/ACCP 50-38/PACAFP 50-38/USAFEP50-38, Multiservice Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control(ICAC2), 3 Oct 94

FM 100-103-2/FMFRP 5-62/NDC TACNOTE 3-56.2/ACCP 50-54/PACAFP 50-54/USAFEP50-54, Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air Ground System (TAGS), 31 Oct 94

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System (Joint STARS), classification of publication is SECRET, Aug 97

FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-16.14, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process,8 May 96

FM 6-60/FMFRP 6-6-60, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Multiple Launch RocketSystem (MLRS) Operations

Army

FM 100-12, Army Theater Missile Defense Operations (in development)

FM 100-13, Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) (in development)

FM 100-103, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, 1 Oct 87

FM 101-5-1, Army Operational Terms and Symbols, 21 Oct 85

ST 6-3+, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFTADS) Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures

ST 6-60-36,Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,17 Mar 95

1st Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) Tactical SOP, 1 May 93

XVIIIAirborne Corps Joint Targeting Procedures, 1 May 92

USAEUR Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), Standing Operation Procedures,11 Oct 94

Marine

FMFM 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination, 27 Mar 92

Air Force

Air Combat Command Concept of Operations for Command and Control of the AttackOperations and Active Defense Phases of Theater Air Defense (Draft Mar 96)

Combat Air Forces Concept of Operations for the Combat Integration Capability (CIC), Feb 95

AFPAM 200-17, An Introduction to Air Force Targeting, 23 Jun 89

Other

CSAF/CSA Article, The Army-Air Force Team: Leveraging Our Strengths, 22 Feb 96

References-2

Glossary

ACRONYMS

A2C2ABCCCABCSACA

ACCACEACMACOACPACPTADMADOCSADPADSAETACSAFATDSAFFORAFIAFJPAMAGLAGMAIALSAANGLICOAOAOAAOCAORAPSARFORARNGARPAASASASAS-WASOCatkATACMSATDO-JATMDEATOattnAWACS

army airspace command and controlairborne battlefield command and control centerarmy battle command systemairspace control area; airspace control authority; airspace

coordination areaAir Combat Commandaviation combat element (MAGTF)airspace control measuresairspace control orderairspace control planair campaign planning toolair defense measureAutomated Deep Operations Coordination Systemautomated data processingAirspace Deconfliction SystemAirborne Elements of the Theater Air Control SystemAdvanced Field Artillery Tactical Data SystemAir Force forcesAir Force InstructionAir Force Joint Pamphletabove ground levelattack guidance matrixair interdictionAir Land Sea Applicationair/naval gunfire liaison companyarea of operationsamphibious objective areaair operations centerarea of responsibilityAdvanced Planning SystemArmy forcesArmy National GuardAdvanced Projects Research AgencyAll Source Analysis SystemAll Source Analysis System-Warriorair support operations centerattackArmy Tactical Missile SystemJoint Doctrine Division, TRADOCArmy Theater Missile Defense Elementair tasking orderattentionAirborne Warning And Control System

B.C.

BCDBDA

before Christbattlefield coordination detachmentbattle damage assessment

Glossary-1

BE basic encyclopediabn battalionBSD Battlefield Situation DisplayC2 command and controlC2W command and control warfareC3 command, control, and communicationsC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence

C42 Joint Doctrine Division, MCCDCCA combat assessmentCAF Combat Air ForcesCALCM conventional air launched cruise missileCAP combat air patrolCAS close air supportCCT combat control teamsCFC Combined Forces Command (Korea)CFL coordinated fire lineCIC combat integration capabilityCINC commander in chief; combatant commanderCIS Combat Intelligence SystemCJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffCOA course of actionCOC combat operations centerCOD combat operations divisionCOG center of gravitycomm commercialCOMSEC communications securityCONOPS concept of operationsCRC control and reporting centerCRE control and reporting elementCTAPS Contingency Theater Automated Planning SystemCTN common target number

D3A decide-detect-deliver-assessDA Department of the ArmyDASC direct air support centerDASC-A direct air support center-airborneDOCC deep operations coordination cellDOD Department of DefenseDSN Defense Switched NetworkDST decision support templateDZ drop zone

E-mail electronic mailEC electronic combate.g. for exampleEOB enemy order of battleEW electronic warfare

FA field artillery

Glossary-2

FACFAC-AFCCFDCFDDMFDSFFAFFCCFLEXFLIRFLOTFMFMFMFMFRPFPTOCFSCFSCCFSCLFSCMFSCOORDFSEft

GATGCEGPSGSM

HIDACZHPTHPTLHRMHVTHVTL

ICAC2IDBIFSASIMIMINTINFLTREPSINSINTSUMIPBITO

J-2J-3J-4J-5

forward air controllerforward air controller (airborne)fire control computerfire direction controlfire direction data managerfire direction systemfree fire areasforce fires coordination centerforce-level executionforward looking infraredforward line of own troopsfield manualFleet Marine Force ManualFleet Marine Force Reference Publicationforce projection tactical operations centerfire support coordinator (USMC)fire support coordination centerfire support coordination linefire support coordination measurefire support coordinator (US Army)fire support elementfoot; feet

guidance, apportionment, and targetingground control elementglobal positioning systemground station module

high-density airspace control zonehigh-payoff targethigh-payoff target listhigh resolution maphigh-value targethigh-value target list

Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Controlintegrated data baseinitial fire support automated systeminformation managementimagery intelligencein-flight reportsinertial navigation systemintelligence summaryintelligence preparation of the battlespaceintegrated tasking order

Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffOperations Directorate of a joint staffLogistics Directorate of a joint staffStrategic Plans and Policy Directorate of a joint staff

Glossary-3

J-6JAGJAOCJDSSJFACCJFCJFMCCJICJIPTLJISEJMEMJOAJOGJoint STARSJPOTFJPTJSOTFjtJTCBJTFJTIDSJTLJTTP

i.e.

km

kph

Command, Control, Communications, and Computerjudge advocate generaljoint air operations centerJoint Decision Support Systemjoint force air component commanderjoint force commanderjoint force maritime component commanderjoint intelligence centerjoint integrated prioritized target listjoint intelligence support elementjoint munitions effectiveness manualjoint operations areajoint operation graphicJoint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systemjoint political operations task forceJFACC planning tooljoint special operations task forcejointjoint targeting coordination boardjoint task forceJoint Tactical Information Distribution Systemjoint target listjoint tactics, techniques, and procedures

that is

kilometerkilometers per hour

local area networklow altitude navigation and targeting for nightlatitudeland component commanderlaser guided bomblaw of armed conflictlongitude

metermission assessmentMarine air ground task forceMarine forcesMarine liaison officermeasurement and signature intelligencemaximumMarine Corps Combat Development CommandMarine Corps Publication Distribution SystemMarine Corps Reference Publicationmaneuver control systemmunitions effective assessmentmission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, and time available

LANLANTIRNLATLCCLGBLOACLONG

mMAMAGTFMARFORMARLOMASINTmaxMCCDCMCPDSMCRPMCSMEAMETT-T

Glossary-4

MIIDS/IDBMILSTRIPminMISREPSMLPMLRSMRLMRRMSLMTICMTTP

NAINAVFORNAVSOPNCANDCNFANGFSNMNMJICNMPHNRTNSFSNVDNWP

OBOPLANOPORDOPR

military intelligence integrated database/integrated databaseMilitary Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedureminutemission reportsmissile launch pointMultiple Launch Rocket Systemmobile rocket launcherminimum-risk routemean sea levelMilitary Targeting Intelligence Committeemultiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures

named areas of intentNavy forcesNavy Standing Operatin ProceduresNational Command AuthoritiesNaval Doctrine Commandno-fire areanaval gunfire supportnautical mileNational Military Joint Intelligence Centernautical miles per hournear-real-timenaval surface fire supportnight vision deviceNaval Warfare Publication

order of battleoperation planoperation orderoffice of primary responsibility

PAHPCNPGMPINPLGRPOLADpubPSYOP

platoon airspace hazard areapublication control numberprecision guided munitionspublication inventory numberprecision location ground referencepolitical advisorpublicationpsychological operations

quantityqty

RFARFLROAROEROKROZ

restricted fire areasrestricted fire linerestricted operations arearules of engagementRepublic of Korearestricted operations zone

Glossary-5

RRRSTA

SACCSADOSAMSARSCDL'SEADSIGINTSIOPSIPTLSOCCESOCOORDSOFSOJSOLESPINSSM

TACC

TACFIRETACMEMOTACPTADIL-JTAGSTAHTAITAOCTASMTBMTBMCSTCTTGTINFOREPTIRSTISDTLAMTLETMDTOCTOOTOTTPTRADOCTRPTSSTTPTTT

reattack recommendationreconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

supporting arms coordination centerSenior Air Defence Officersurface-to-air missilesynthetic aperture radarsurveillance control data linksuppression of enemy air defensessignals intelligenceSingle Integrated Operations PlanSingle Integrated Prioritized Target Listspecial operations command and control elementspecial operations coordinatorspecial operations forcesstandoff jammingspecial operations liaison elementspecial instructionsurface-to-surface missile

tactical air command center (USMC); TACC tactical aircontrol center (USN)

tactical fire direction systemtactical memorandumtactical air control partytactical data link-jointtheater air-ground systemtarget airspace hazard areatarget area of interesttactical air operations centertactical air support moduletheater ballistic missiletheater battle management core systemtime-critical targettarget information reportterrain index reference systemTheater Integrated Situation DisplayTomahawk Land Attack Missiletarget location errortheater missile defensetactical operations centertarget of opportunitytime-on-targettest publicationUnited States Army Training and Doctrine Commandterrain reference pointtarget selection standardstactics, techniques, and procedurestime-to-target

Glossary-6

UAVUHFUICUSUSAUSAFUSARUSCENTCOMUSMCUSNUTM

VAVHF

WACWGSWMDWOC

XPJ

unmanned aerial vehicleultra high frequencyunit identification codeUnited StatesUnited States ArmyUnited States Air ForceUnited States Army ReserveUnited States Central CommandUnited States Marine CorpsUnited States Navyuniversal transverse mercator

Virginiavery high frequency

world area codeworld geodetic surveyweapons of mass destructionwing operations center

Joint Matters and Arms Control Division, ACC

number

Glossary-7

INDEX

A

AC-130HAC-i30U Gunship ProceduresII-33

ACA 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, II-12, II-13, II-17,II-18, 11-24, 11-30, Glossary-i,

ACM 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, II-12, II-14,II-16, II-17, II-21, 11-22, 11-23, 11-24,11-25, 11-26, 11-27, 11-29, 11-30, 11-32,11-33, 11-35, B-i, B-2, C-i, Glossary-i

advanced field artillery tactical datasystem (see AFATDS)

advanced field artillery tactical datasystem contingency theater automatedplanning system interface (see

AFATDS CTAPS interface)AFATDS v, vi, xi, II-21, 11-23, 11-24,

11-25, 11-28, 11-30, 11-35, 11-37, B-i, B-2,C-i, Glossary-i, References-2

AFATDS CTAPS interface II-36AGM 1-8, 11-5, 11-28, Glossary-iair refueling support II-32air tasking order (see ATO)airspace control area 11-8, Glossary-iairspace control authority 11-8, 11-9, II-13,

II-19, 11-24, 11-33, Glossary-iairspace control measures (see ACM)airspace coordination area (see ACA)airspace coordination area options 11-8,

II-13altitude and lateral separation II-13anticipated engagement areas II-28army tactical missile system (see ATACMS)Army Tactical Missile System En Route

Altitudes (see ATACMS En RouteAltitudes)

army tactical missile system procedures(see ATACMS procedures)

attack guidance matrix (see AGM)ATACMS v, II-4, II-5, II-6, 11-7, 11-9, 11-13,

11-16, II-17, 11-18, 11-24, 11-25, 11-26,11-28, 11-29, 11-30, 11-31, 11-32, 11-35,11-36, 11-40, B-i, C-i, References-2,Glossary-i

ATACMS En Route Altitudes II-28ATACMS procedures II-26

ATO I-i, 1-8, 11-32, 11-35, 11-36, A-i, B-i,Glossary-i

attack options with an fire suppportcoordination line (see attack optionswith an FSCL)

attack options with an FSCL 11-6, II-11

B

battle damage assessment (see BDA)battlefield coordination detachment (see

BCD)battlespace geometry management 1-4, 1-5BCD x, 11-24, 11-25, 11-26, 11-28, 11-29,

11-30, 11-33, 11-34, 11-35, 11-37, B-i, B-2,References-2, Glossary-i

BDA 1-9, 1-10, I-i, 11-12, Glossary-ibest capable attack asset II-5boundaries 11-6, 11-7, 11-9, 11-13, 11-21, B-ibullseye reference system v, II-25, 11-26,

II-30

C

C2W x, 1-7, Glossary-2CALCMs 11-4, II-18, 11-26, Glossary-2CAP 11-9, 11-24, 11-30, II-31, 11-32, 11-36,

Glossary-2centers, of gravity (see COG)CFL 11-7, Glossary-2CIC xi, II-35, B-2, References-2,

Glossary-2COG 1-2, 1-4, Glossary-2combat air patrol(see CAP)combat integration capability (see CIC)command and control warfare (see C2W)common reference systems 11-6, 11-14, B-icommon target number (see CTN)common terminal connectivity II-37component commanders 1-4, 1-5, 1-7, 1-8,

I-1i, 1-12, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-9,II-10, 11-12, 11-14, 11-17, 11-19, 11-28,11-34, 11-36, II-37

contingency theater automated planningsystem (see CTAPS)

Index-1

control and coordinating measures II-6,II-14, II-16, II-21, II-22, II-36

conventional air launched cruise missiles(see CALCMs)

coordinating SOF operations II-36coordinating special operations forces

operations (see coordinating SOFoperations)

coordinated fire line (see CFL)correlated target numbers II-37, II-39CTAPS iv, v, vi, II-21, II-23, II-25, II-35,

II-37, A-1, B-1, Glossary-2CTN I-6, II-38, II-39, Glossary-2

D

deep operations coordination cell (seeDOCC)

delegation of targeting I-12DOCC II-23, II-34, II-35, II-36, II-37, B-l,

Glossary-2

F

FFAs II-7, II-12, Glossary-3Fighter/Attack Aircraft Procedures II-30fire support coordination line (see FSCL)fire support coordination line procedures

(see FSCL procedures)fire support coordination measure (see

FSCM)firing positions II-28formal ACA II-13formal airspace coordination area (see

formal ACA)free fire areas (see FFAs)FSCL II-6, II-7, II-9, II-10, II-11, II-12,

II-14, II-15, II-18, II-19, II-36,Glossary-3

FSCL procedures II-6, II-9FSCM II-6, 11-7, II-8, II-9, II-12, II-14,

II-16, II-17, II-19, II-21, II-22, II-23,II-24, II-25, II-26, II-29, II-32, II-33,II-35, B-1, B-2, Glossary-3

G

grid box reference system v, II-14, II-19,II-21, II-24, II-25, II-32, B-2

H

HIDACZ II-9, II-17, Glossary-3high-density airspace control zone (see

HIDACZ)

I

immediate targets v, I-1, II-2, II-6in-flight reports (see INFLTREPs)INFLTREPs I-9, Glossary-3informal air control area (see informal

ACA)informal ACA II-13intelligence center xi, I-6, I-11, Glossary 4,

Glossary-5intelligence directorate of a joint staff (see

J2)intelligence division xi, I-10intelligence preparation of the battlespace

(see IPB)intelligence supports CA I-9intelligence supports combat assessment

(see intelligence supports CA)interconnectivity iv, I-6, II-35, II-36, A-1Interoperable Air/Ground Operations II-34IPB I-4, I-6, I-8, 11-15, II-18, II-28,

Glossary-3

J

J2 x, I-5, I-6, I1-9, I-10, I-11, Glossary-3J3 x, I-9, I-11, Glossary-3JIC I-6, I-9, I-11, Glossary 4, Glossary-5JIPTL I-5, I-6, Glossary-4JISE I-6, I-11, Glossary-4joint integrated prioritized target list (see

JIPTL)joint intelligence center (see JIC)joint intelligence support element (see

JISE)joint STARS support II-31, II-33joint targeting coordination board (see

JTCB)joint target list (see JTL)joint targeting process i, iv, v, vi, vii, viii

I-2, I-9-I-10, 1-12, II-1, II-4, II-6, B-1JTCB viii, 1-5, I1-9, I-11, 1-12, Glossary-4JTL I-2, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-11, Glossary-4

Index-2

lateral separation II-13liaison agencies II-34

M

MA xi, 1-9, 1-10, Glossary-4MEA 1-9, 1-10, Glossary-4minimum risk route (see MRR)MISREPs 1-9, C-i, Glossary-4mission assessment (see MA)mission reports (see MISREPs)MRR 11-8, 11-9, 11-12, 11-17, 11-18, 11-24,

11-32, 11-33, Glossary-4munitions effectiveness assessment (see

MEA)

N

national command authorities (see NCA)naval surface fire support (see NSFS)NCA 1-4, Glossary-5NFA II-7, II-8, II-36, Glossary-5no-fire area (see NFA)NSFS 11-4, 11-7, Glossary-5

0

operations division x, I-1i, 11-12,Glossary-2

operations directorate of a joint staff (seeJ3)

Organizing for the Joint Target Process1-10

P

permissive measures II-7phase I battle damage assessment (see

phase I BDA)phase II battle damage assessment (see

phase II BDA)phase III battle damage assessment (see

phase III BDA)phase I BDA 1-9phase II BDA 1-9phase III BDA 1-9, 1-10planned targets I-i, II-i, 11-6, 11-32

reattack recommendation (see RR)reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition (see RSTA)restricted fire areas (see RFA)restricted fire line (see RFL)restricted operations area (see ROA)restricted operations zone (see ROZ)restrictive measures II-7RFA 11-7, 11-8, 11-12, 11-17, 11-24, 11-25,

11-26, 11-36, C-i, Glossary-5RFL 11-7, 11-8, Glosssary-5ROA 11-8, 11-9, 11-17, 11-33, 11-36,

Glossary-5ROZ v, II-9, II-12, II-16, 11-17, 11-18, 11-24,

11-25, 11-26, 11-28, 11-29, 11-30, 11-31,11-33, 11-35, 11-36, Glossary-5

RR 1-9, 1-10, Glossary-5RSTA I-9, References-i, Glossary-5

S

special use airspace 11-8, 11-9, 11-30, II-33specified engagement windows II-28surface time-critical targets iv, vii, I-i, II-1

T

target iv, v, vi, vii, viii, I-i, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6,1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, I-1i, 1-12, Il-i, 11-2,11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-9, II-1, 11-12, 11-13,11-14, II-17, 11-18, 11-19, 11-21, 11-24,11-25, 11-26, 11-28, 11-30, 11-32, 11-33,11-34, 11-36, 11-37, 11-38, 11-39, B-i, B-2,C-1, References-1, References-2,Glossary-2, Glossary-3, Glossary-4,Glossary-5, Glossary-6

target area deconfliction II-30targets of opportunity (see TOO)target selection standards (see TSS)TCT i,iv,v, vii, viii, 1-12, Il-i, 11-2, 11-3,

11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7, 11-8, 11-9, II-11,11-12, II-14, 11-18, 11-22, 11-23, 11-24,11-25, 11-26, 11-28, 11-30, 11-31, 11-32,11-33, 11-34, 11-35, 11-36, B-i,Glossary-6

theater JIG 1-6, 1-9, I-i

Index-3

theater joint intelligence center (seetheater JIG)

time-critical target (see TCT)time separation 11-13, II-14TLAMs II-4, I1-18tomahawk land attack missiles (see

TLAMs)TOO v, vi, vii, viii, I-1, 1-8, 11-2, 11-3, II-11,

Glossary-6

TSS I-6, Glossary-6

U

unanticipated immediate targets I-iunplanned immediate targets I-i

Index-4

FOTCOMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBR043 ARYFORT LEAVENWORTH. KS

1113111 1~1 1 1111111lkliS1695 00493 4105

FM 90-36MCRP 3-16.1F

NWP 2-01.11AFJPAM 10-225

25 JULY 1997

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army03671

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed inaccordance with the initial distribution number 115475, requirements for FM 90-36.

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1997- 527-027/60081

C Se , Sn

MARINE CORPS PCN: 14400001600 PIN: 075513-000

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