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September/October 14: SportsTopic Primer

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Table of Contents

Definitions- Public Subsidy 1Pro- Public Subsidies Inevitable 2Pro- Economy- Development 3-4Pro- Economy- Housing Values 5-6Pro- Economy- Jobs 7Pro- Economy- Multiplier Effect 8Pro- Economy- Property Taxes 9Pro- Economy- Public Subsidies Decreasing 10Pro- Economy- Quality of Life 11Pro- Economy- Relocation Bad 12Pro- Economy- Tax Benefits 13Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy 14-15Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy: Economy 16Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy: Environment 17Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy: Infrastructure 18Pro- Economy- Urban Revitalization 19Pro- Economy- AT: Leakages 20Pro- Economy- AT: Spending Tradeoff 21Pro- Quality of Life 22-23Pro- Quality of Life- Community Visibility 24Pro- Quality of Life- Culture 25-26Pro- Quality of Life- Image 27Pro- Quality of Life- Image/Symbols 28Pro- Quality of Life- Outweigh Museums 29Pro- Quality of Life- Social Bonds 30-31Pro- Generic- Baade Indict 32Pro- Generic- Context Key 33

Con- Coercion- Wash D.C. 34Con- Democracy 35Con- Democracy- Wash D.C. 36-37Con- Economy- Consensus 38-39Con- Economy- Local Economies 40-43Con- Economy- Lose Money 44Con- Economy- Pension Trade-offs 45-47Con- Economy- Spending Trade-offs 48Con- Economy- Spiral 49Con- Economy- Studies 50-51Con- Economy- AT: Economic Development 52-56Con– Economy- AT: Employment 57Con- Economy- AT: Income 58Con- Economy- AT: Multiplier Effect 59Con- Economy- AT: Operations/Ad Revenue 60Con- Economy- AT: Publicity 61Con- Economy- AT: Relocation Bad 62Con- Economy- AT: Tax Revenue 63-64Con- Economy- AT: Tax Revenue – Trade Off 65Con- Economy- AT: Teams not exist w/o subsidies 66Con- Economy- AT: Travel/Tourism 67Con- Economy- AT: Trickle Down 68Con- Economy- AT: Urban Revitalization 69Con- Eminent Domain- Wash D.C. 70-71Con- Inequality- Wash D.C. 72-73Con- Quality of Life- Bad Science 74Con- Quality of Life- AT: Intangible Benefits 75Con- Quality of Life- AT: Community/Social Bonds 76-77Alternatives to Subsidies – Remove Gov Monopolies 78Alternatives to Subsidies - Non-Profit & Broadcasts 79Alternatives to Subsidies – Change Broadcast Rights 80


Page 1

Definitions- Public Subsidy

A public subsidy for professional athletic organizations include:Geraint, University of Michigan; 2000 (“Sports stadiums + public subsidies”;http://www.umich.edu/~econdev/stadium_subsidy/)

Forms of Subsidy:Public subsidies for stadium construction or rehabilitation come in a myriad of ways including cash payments, taxabatements, infrastructure improvements, and operating cost subsidies. Through the 1960's these types of subsidies werevirtually non-existent, but due to the aforementioned shifts in market conditions and precedents set forth by citiesthroughout the country, subsidies of this nature continue to grow.


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Pro- Public Subsidies Inevitable

It’s impossible to break the cycle of public subsidies for professional athletic organizations. Even if onecity says no, another city and taxpayers will be waiting to offer money.Ziller, writer for SBNation; 11/21/13 (Tom; SBNation; “Pay to play: Why we gladly give franchises our money for newsporting venues, and how citizens for and against those projects can find common ground”;http://www.sbnation.com/2013/11/21/5129434/stadium-arena-public-funding-kings-sonics-braves)

The cycle of public funding for sports arenas and stadiums won't be broken by some heroic mayor standing upto a team owner. It won't be broken, period. If Cobb County has taught us anything in the week since itannounced it plans to pay a premium to take the Braves from Atlanta proper, it's that there will always beanother mayor or county executive or governor with open arms and an open checkbook. There will always befans to offer cold cash and warm loyalty. Pro sports are the dominant force in our current cultural landscape,and there are enough of us who refuse to be without a team to call our own.

Humanity has always publicly subsidized sportsChema, academic administrator and lawyer, 1996 (Thomas V., Journal of Urban Affairs, “When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy,” vol. 18 no. 1)

Since virtually the dawn of recorded history the public has been digging into its collective pockets to subsidizethe construction of sports venues. Granted, this has not always been a voluntary effort, but then the niceties ofdemocracy were often lost on pharaohs, kings, emperors, and other potentates. The rationale for the publicsubsidy has varied over time and geography but, with relatively few exceptions, sports have consistently beensubsidized.


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Pro- Economy- Development

Sports facilities generate proximate development, Indianapolis provesCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

It was noted previously that sports facilities are increasingly conceptualized as being part of an integratedredevelopment package which includes substantial proximate development. These facilities do afford urbanplanners the opportunity to steer their development to a desired location, and to try and use them to “jump-start”economic development there.The renaissance of downtown Indianapolis was stimulated by sports projects, and they do appear to have been asuccessful catalyst for subsequent development (Schimmel, 1995, 2001). From 1980 to 1984, the years whenthe initial major investment in sports facilities was committed in Indianapolis, sixteen new restaurants wereadded to the downtown, and in those years the city had the fastest population growth of any of the ten largestMidwest cities. The old deserted buildings were converted into condominiums and luxury apartments, and theupper-middle class residents who moved into them provided support for retail and service business thatemerged.

Stadia generate complementary development, Denver provesCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Complementary development refers to the upgrading or initiation of businesses as a result of the demand fortheir services which is directly created by a sports facility or event. In the case of most sports facilities,complementary development is likely to take the form of restaurants, bars and souvenir stores. Coors Field, thehome of the Colorado Rockies is an example of this type of catalyst role (Greenberg & Gray, 1996). It iscredited with helping the revitalization of Denver’s Lower Downtown or “LoDo” district. Restaurants, sportsbars, and sports memorabilia stores opened with Coors Field to serve the more than three million fans whoattend Rockies games.


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Pro- Economy- Development

Jacksonville proves that added exposure increase potential to attract businessCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Such a positive outcome seems improbably since the publicity or the “winning image” of a team does notchange any of the cost and market factors that influence business relocation decisions, and economicdevelopment and growth (Rosentraub, 1997). Nevertheless, after Jacksonville was awarded the thirtieth NFLteam franchise, the city dubbed itself “The Expansion City.” It launched a campaign featuring a Jaguars helmetand the slogan, “Get inside the NFL’s head,” and it claimed that more than 150 inquiries were received fromcompanies asking about relocation possibilities (Thurow, 1995).

Urban stadia create jobsChema, academic administrator and lawyer, 1996 (Thomas V., Journal of Urban Affairs, “When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy,” vol. 18 no. 1)

The key to sports venues being a catalyst for economic development is locating them in an urban setting andintegrating them into the existing city infrastructure. It is the spin-off development generated by two million ormore people visiting a specific area of a city during a concentrated timeframe which is critical. The return onthe public investment in a ballpark or arena, in dollar and cents terms as opposed to the intangible entertainmentvalue comes not from the facility itself, but from the jobs created in new restaurants, taverns, retail, hotels, etc.,that spring up on the periphery of the sports venue.

Cleveland proves ballparks are unique economic catalystsChema, academic administrator and lawyer, 1996 (Thomas V., Journal of Urban Affair,s “When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy,” vol. 18 no. 1)

In Cleveland, for example, since the opening of Jacobs Field, 20 new restaurants employing nearly 900 peoplehave opened within two blocks of second base. There are two new retail establishments on Prospect Avenuewhere there had been none since World War II. There are six projects to convert vacant upper stories of officeand commercial buildings to market rate apartments and condominiums and the Gateway facility is only twoyears old.This development is materializing because 5,000,000 visitors are coming to games and entertainment and theyare spending their money outside the walls of the sports venues before and after the event. Moreover, they arediscovering for the first time in 30 years, that downtown has much to offer. They are coming even when thereare no sporting events.


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Pro- Economy- Housing Values

Public subsidies for professional athletic organizations spillover to increase the value of houses close tostadiums.Feng, Economics @ College of William & Mary, & Humphreys, Economics @ Univ Alberta; 2012 (Xia &Brad; City, Culture & Society; “The impact of professional sports facilities on housing values: Evidence from census block groupdata”; Vol. 3; Pp. 189-200)

These results indicate that sports facilities generate positive spillover effects on the local economy, and that these spillovereffects are capitalized into the value of owner occupied residential housing. The positive and statistically significant signon the stadium age variable supports the idea of positive spillovers, as this parameter suggests the longer a sports facilityhas been at a given location, the greater the increase in median housing values near the facility. These results differ fromthe results in Kiel et al. (2010), who also analyze the relationship between housing values and sports facilities. However,Kiel et al. only examine proximity to NFL stadiums in the 1990s and do not control for spatial dependence. We examineproximity to NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB facilities and correct for spatial dependence, which may explain the difference.

The increase in value to houses close to stadiums ranges between $11.2 million within one mile and $277million within a four-mile radius.Feng, Economics @ College of William & Mary, & Humphreys, Economics @ Univ Alberta; 2012 (Xia &Brad; City, Culture & Society; “The impact of professional sports facilities on housing values: Evidence from census block groupdata”; Vol. 3; Pp. 189-200)

How large are the increases in property values, in aggregate, in cities with professional sports facilities? The results incolumn 3 of Table 3 suggest that moving a residential housing unit one mile closer to a sports facility would increase itsvalue by $793. The total increase in housing values in a city would depend on the number of residences in the city and theproximity of these residences to the sports facility. In order to provide an estimate of the total value of the increase inhousing values in a city attributable to a sports facility, we performed the following thought experiment/back of theenvelope calculation: if every occupied housing unit within X miles of a sports facility in a city were moved to adjacent tothe facility, by how much would housing values increase in that city?Table 4 shows the results of this calculation, using data from the 2000 Census. The unit of observation is a metropolitanarea; the housing density and location of the facility differs across metropolitan areas, leading to different values for thecalculation. We have performed this calculation for four different impact areas: all occupied residences within one, two,three and four miles of the facility. Table 4 shows the average and median increase in total housing values, and thesmallest and largest increases across the metropolitan areas in the sample. Note that in some metropolitan areas theincrease in aggregate housing values is relatively small, and that a few very large metropolitan areas with high housingdensity skew the estimated average increase in aggregate housing values well above the median increase. The medianincrease in aggregate housing value is modest, ranging from $11.2 million in a one mile radius to $277 million in a fourmile radius. Eleven new professional sports facilities were opened in the US in 2000 and 2001, a banner period for suchopenings. The average cost of these facilities was $316 million (and the median cost was $339 million), so the increase inaggregate housing values would only equal the cost of a facility in the largest cities.


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Pro- Economy- Housing Values

Stadium projects increase the value of surrounding propertyCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland and dept. of recreation, sport, andtourism at Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006 (Dennis and Brad R., Journal of Urban Economics,“Proximity Benefits and Voting on Stadium and Arena Subsidies,” March, vol. 59 no. 2)

What factors induce voters to support or oppose public subsidies for the construction or renovation ofprofessional sports facilities? Economic models of voting decisions assume that ballots reflect expected utilitymaximization. When voting whether or not to subsidize construction of a sports facility, voting models predictthat the electorate would vote in favor of subsidies if the expected benefits were positive and vote against thesubsidies otherwise. A large body of research has found that sports teams and facilities have little direct impacton personal income, wages, and employment in host cities.1 This evidence suggests that voting in favor ofsubsidies for professional sports must be based on other benefits. Carlino and Coulson [8] found that thepresence of NFL teams raises rents in the core of cities by approximately 8%, indicating that the net economicbenefits of hosting a professional sports franchise are capitalized into property values and that this effect isstrongest in proximity to sports facilities. This result suggests an alternative source of economic benefitsflowing from professional sports to the urban economy. We examine voting on subsidies for construction ofprofessional sports facilities to learn more about consumer’s implicit valuation of professional sports and thespatial dimension of the economic impact of professional sports.

Sports may generate little income on their own but they are the only way to bring investment to neglectedurban areasWeiner, Ph.D and assistant prof. of economics at CCNY, 2004 (Ross D., Journal of Urban Technology,“Financing Techniques and Stadium Subsidies in the United States,” August, vol. 11 no. 2)

Professional sports can be considered as part of a tourism, hospitality, and entertainment package designed todraw people to the urban core. Since sports form a small part of an already small industry (tourism andentertainment), they cannot do much to alter the course of a city’s economy. For example, Rosentraub arguesthat under the most generous of assumptions, sports rep resents only 1.1 percent of the Indianapolis economy.This is even more so the case in larger urban areas, such as New York City, where professional sports representapproximately 0.09 percent of the city’s overall economy. What professional sports and stadiums canaccomplish is to allow private interests to capitalize on the social and cultural benefits that accrue from thepresence of a team. This provides for the presence of a common point to hold together a coalition of otherwisedisparate interests that might otherwise vacate the downtown area. Sports help to make the downtown a “placeto be.” This is much like the redevelopment of Times Square in New York City, with its shift from small (andarguable, tawdry) shops to gigantic national retailers and entertainers, aimed at attracting high-incomeindividuals from both New York City and the surrounding wealthy suburbs. The creation of a controlled, “safe”urban environment is the goal of this type of redevelopment strategy.


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Pro- Economy- Jobs

Net job creation has an average value of $375,000 per year.Diedrich, Deputy Finance Director U.S. Senate Campaign & Univ Minn Law School; 2007 (Christopher;PolicyMatters; 4:2; “Homefield economics: The public financing of stadiums”; Pp. 2-27)

Robert Baade and Allen Sanderson examined ten major metropolitan areas with major sports franchises and foundevidence of positive net job creation in only three of them.6 Other economists place the number of net number ofpermanent jobs created somewhere between zero and 1,000.7 Accounting for altered tax rates, property values, and wageincreases, economists have estimated that the value of these jobs ranges from $0 to $1,500 per net job created.8 Therefore,a fair estimate of the economic benefit of job creation is approximately $375,000 per year, the product of the midpoint ofthe job creation and job value ranges.9


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Pro- Economy- Multiplier Effect

Stadiums have a multiplier effect on the local communityKISHNER AND HOFFMAN EXPLAIN IN 2010 (Kishner, Irwin A; Hoffman, David R.The Entertainment and SportsLawyer 28.3 (Fall 2010): 20-22. “The Benefits of Public and Private Cooperation in Financing Professional Sports Stadiums “)

The second category of arguments made by critics of public stadium finance typically center around a belief that newstadiums do not provide sufficient economic benefits for the communities in which they are built, and that all of thefinancial gains from a new stadium flow to the ownership of the team(s) using the stadium. While improved attendanceand increased revenues certainly result in financial success for the team(s) that use the stadium, new stadiums alsosignificantly benefit the communities in which they are built. Under the venerable Keynesian view of economics, it isunderstood that increases in public spending result in a rise in total economic activity by a multiple of that increase (theso-called Keynesian multiplier). In other words, the money spent on building facilities, the dollars paid by fans, and otherrevenues (including from tourism and taxes) are multiplied to arrive at the total amount of economic activity generated bya new professional sports stadium.13 According to one industry analyst, for each $1 spent on professional sports, anadditional $1.75 is created in the economy and household income rises 17 cents.14 This same analyst also posits that foreach $1 million spent on professional sports, 76 jobs are created. 1^ New jobs are produced by stadium construction,stadium operation, and tourist expenditures. By way of example, an estimated 450 to 550 jobs were created in Baltimoreby out-of-state tourist expenditures alone, owing to the development of Camden Yards. At any given Orioles game,approximately 3 1 percent of those in attendance will have come from outside Maryland; this figure towers over the 10percent of out-of-state attendees present at Orioles games prior to the opening of Camden Yards.16 With increasedtourism come increased tax revenue, booked hotel rooms, crowded bars and restaurants, and retail sales.


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Pro- Economy- Property Taxes

Increased value of houses generates around $254 million more in property taxes for cities with stadiums.Feng, Economics @ College of William & Mary, & Humphreys, Economics @ Univ Alberta; 2012 (Xia &Brad; City, Culture & Society; “The impact of professional sports facilities on housing values: Evidence from census block groupdata”; Vol. 3; Pp. 189-200)

However, cities collect property taxes annually, and the results on Table 4 are for permanent increases in property values.Assuming a 30 year useful life of each facility, a discount rate of 5%, and an average property tax of 1.38%, the presentdiscounted value of the future property tax increases for the median total property value increase of $11.2 million is $10million.12 At the median for the four mile radius impact area, the present discounted value of the increased property taxesis $254 million. Again, it appears that the increase in residential property values generated by a new sports facility is lessthan the cost of building such a facility in all but the largest, most densely populated metropolitan areas.


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Pro- Economy- Public Subsidies Decreasing

The percentage of construction costs contributed by the public is decreasingCrompton, Prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Table 1 shows that there has been a substantial shift over time in responsibility for funding these facilities, fromthe earlier eras during which the norm was for governments to pay the full cost, to the more recent eras in whichthere has been increased financial participation by the franchises. Prior to 1985, the government had been theexclusive provider of funds for arenas. In the current Fully-Loaded Era, only 39.4% of the $4.70 billion spenton arenas has come from the government. For stadiums, the government has contributed 62% of the $7.12billion invested thus far in the current Fully-Loaded Era.


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Pro- Economy- Quality of Life

Improvements in quality of life can be economically calculated.Diedrich, Deputy Finance Director U.S. Senate Campaign & Univ Minnesota Law School; 2007(Christopher; PolicyMatters; 4:2; “Homefield economics: The public financing of stadiums”; Pp. 2-27)

In early 2000, Bruce Johnson, Peter Groothuis, and John Whitehead asked the citizens of Pittsburgh how much theywould be willing to pay in higher taxes to keep the NHL’s Penguins from leaving town. The average response was $5.57per household per year. As there are approximately 960,000 households in the Pittsburgh area, that translates to an aggre-gate “quality of life” benefit of around $5.2 million per year. Spread across thirty years, the average lifespan of a stadium,that annual benefit translates into a present-day value of $66 million, approaching the average public contribution of $84million for a NHL/NBA arena.21In 2003, Jerry Carlino and Ed Coulson used another method to measure the dollar value of the happiness that a team givesits city: how much people will pay to live there. Comparing 53 cities’ average rents in 1993 to those in 1999 andcontrolling for other variables, Carlino and Coulson found that the presence of an NFL team raised annual rents 8 per-cent.22 Their cities included had an average monthly rent of $500, making that 8 percent premium worth about $480 peryear in cities hosting NFL teams. Given that there are approximately 290,000 households in a typical city center, $480translates to an “aggregate amenity value” of approximately $139 million per year. To put that into perspective, localitiestypically provide annual stadium subsidies in the range of $22-29 million, far less than the enjoyment it creates.23 Bycomparison, the annual value of one additional sunny day per person per year is estimated between $7 and $12.24 In theTwin Cities, with about 3 million people, the benefit of a new NFL stadium might well equal approximately 4-7 days ofsunshine a year.


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Pro- Economy- Relocation Bad

The alternative of not paying public subsidies leads to relocation. Leagues will leave any city. Ask LAand Seattle.Ziller, writer for SBNation; 11/21/13 (Tom; SBNation; “Pay to play: Why we gladly give franchises our money for newsporting venues, and how citizens for and against those projects can find common ground”;http://www.sbnation.com/2013/11/21/5129434/stadium-arena-public-funding-kings-sonics-braves)

Teams and leagues will continue to ask for help as long as help is given. But being the city that says "no!' gets you twothings: angry voters and a vacant stadium. The nation's most lucrative league has left the nation's second biggestmarket abandoned for 18 years now. The leagues will leave any city that doesn't play ball. If you annoy the commissionerjust enough, they'll even seek to make an example out of you. Ask Seattle.

Relocation of the Cleveland Browns had a huge economic impact on the city with tens of millions inlosses.Bertsch, Brodnik, Burgett, & Arnold; 2008 (Abby, Daniel, Russell, & Tiffany; IBEC 352; April 27; “Economic effect:The relocation of professional sports teams”; http://www.maxmatsuda.com/ONU/IBEC352/Student%20Works/Projects/2007-2008%20Spring/TEAM%20AWSOME%20BIG%20MONEY%20BA/TEAM%20AWSOME%20BIG%20MONEY%20BA.pdf)

Prior to the move and the new franchise being awarded to Cleveland there was uproar from the departure of the Browns.The fans were heated over the move, so businesses sided with the fans. Advertisements and promotions were cancelledbecause there was a negative connotation with being associated with the Browns during the rest of the 1995 season. Oneexample of the businesses retaliating against the leave was Papa John’s Pizza pulling radio advertisements and promotionsthat would have provided $50,000 to the Browns (Kapner, 1995). The fans were upset to see their hometown teamleaving, but businesses were also upset at the loss of economic activity. “The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce estimatedthat the Browns generate $47 million in economic activity from local and visiting fans” (Kapner, 1995). It was estimatedby the Chamber that a a nonlocal fan spends an average of $43.59 in restaurants. The Chamber also stated that the Brownsgames brought in 4,700 visiting fans and 65,000 local fans in 1994 (Kapner, 1995). The economic impact of the Brownsleaving Cleveland was quite large. With such a large amount of money no longer flowing into the local economy,businesses would be hurt. As the city of Cleveland and the many fans were looking at how the move would negativelyimpact the city, Baltimore was examining how much revenue the team would generate for their city. “The MarylandStadium Authority predicted that the Browns would generate $54 million in direct economic impact. And it estimated off-site direct spending, including retail and restaurant sales, would reach $21 million” (Kapner, 1995).


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Pro- Economy- Tax Benefits

Tax benefits range from $1.1 million to $2.9 million.Diedrich, Deputy Finance Director U.S. Senate Campaign & Univ Minn Law School; 2007 (Christopher;PolicyMatters; 4:2; “Homefield economics: The public financing of stadiums”; Pp. 2-27)

Similarly, the tax argument is not fully realized; increased sales tax revenue primarily benefits a local economy when it ispaid by non-local residents visiting a city exclusively to attend the game. Taking into account sports-related expenses byvisiting fans and using a very high purely local sales tax rate of 5 percent,10 economists estimate the annual sales taxbenefit of a major league team ranging from $696,000 (NHL) to approximately $1.5 million (MLB).11 If the municipalitywhere the team plays has an income tax, then another $1-2 million might flow into the city’s coffers each year from theincome taxes of players, coaches, and others only living or working in the area because of the team’s presence.12 Addingit all up, the total annual economic benefit of a new stadium is somewhere from $1.1 million for a NBA/NHL arena withno local income tax to $2.9 million for a MLB stadium in an area with a local income tax.13


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Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy

Sports events generate long-term legacies that endure through the generationsLi and McCabe, School of Events--Leeds Metropolitan Univ. and Christel DeHaan Tourism and TravelResearch Institute at Nottingham University Business School, 2013 (ShiNa and Scott, International Journal ofTourism Research, “Measuring the Socio-Economic Legacies of Mega-events: Concepts, Propositions, and Indicators,”July 1, vol. 15 no. 4)

Preuss (2007a, 2007b) proposed that legacies can be defined as: ‘Irrespective of the time of production, legacyis all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible und tangible structures created for and by a sportevent that remains for a longer time than the event itself’ (p. 86). Barget and Gouguet (2007) identified thelong-term nature of legacy value as ‘the satisfaction felt as a result of handing down a sporting event to futuregenerations’ (p. 170). One way of differentiating between impacts and legacy is in terms of the economiceffects between short-term ‘shocks’ in contrast to the economic legacy. Li and Blake (2009) argued that tourismimpacts tend to consider those brought about during the short term event holding period, whereas legacies needto consider tourists who arrive at a host country before and after the event as well as the holding period to assesstotal tourism impacts. Although some impact studies do mention one or two legacy issues, they often fail toidentify the difference between the two concepts. The main reason could be that the concept of ‘legacy’ isrelatively new compared with the more established concept of ‘impact’, and the importance of legacies inholding large-scale events have been foregrounded only in recent years. Therefore, the following definition oflegacy of mega-events can be proposed:Tangible and intangible elements of large scale events left to future generations of a host country where theseelements influence the economic, physical and psychological well-being at both community and individuallevels in the long-term.


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Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy

Mega-events boost the legacy of the host city and increase tourism and long-term prosperityLi and McCabe, School of Events--Leeds Metropolitan Univ. and Christel DeHaan Tourism and TravelResearch Institute at Nottingham University Business School, 2013 (ShiNa and Scott, International Journal ofTourism Research, “Measuring the Socio-Economic Legacies of Mega-events: Concepts, Propositions, and Indicators,”July 1, vol. 15 no. 4)

Key indicators for evaluating social legacies include awareness levels of the host nation/city, destination imagelevel changes, social benefits and social costs. Resident attitudes, strength of community cohesion and feelingstowards their own society and others are key indicators for assessing how communities might react to tourists,indirectly affecting tourism demand in the long term. Economic and social legacies do not exist independently,but are often interrelated. For example, media exposure during holding a mega-event can enhance destinationimage of the host country, which can generate social legacies that in turn affect tourism demand. At themeantime, the improvement of image can attract more tourists and bring more tourism expenditure in the post-event period, which is seen as economic legacies. In addition to economic and social legacies, there are otherlegacies: environmental, cultural and political legacies, for example, which also play an important part in thetotal legacy structures of mega-events, and which could potentially adversely or positively affect tourism in thelong term, but these are felt to be weaker determinants of tourism impact.

Studies overlook legacy impacts like social sustainabilityLi and McCabe, School of Events, Leeds Metropolitan Univ. and Christel DeHaan Tourism and TravelResearch Institute at Nottingham University Business School, 2013 (ShiNa and Scott, International Journal ofTourism Research, “Measuring the Socio-Economic Legacies of Mega-events: Concepts, Propositions, and Indicators,”July 1, vol. 15 no. 4)

Since ‘hard legacies’ such as urban regeneration, infrastructure improvement and tourism legacies are easier tobe observed and captured than ‘soft legacies’ such as social sustainability, the latter have received less attention.Minnaert (2012) pointed out the importance of enhancing social legacies, especially for excluded groups (orlow-income groups) through skills/volunteering, employment and sports participation. Tourism legacy impactslast from pre-event to post-event (Kasimati, 2003) and can generate larger tourism receipts than normal tourismimpacts. The tourism industry in the host nation can benefit from sporting facilities and general infrastructurebuilt to accommodate a large event. Tourists attending events and conferences have been found to spend moreon high-value added goods and services such as accommodation and shopping than other types of tourists (Zengand Luo, 2008).


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Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy: Economy

Mega-events generate positive self-image which boosts productivityCornelissen, Bob, and Swart; dept. of political science at Stellenbosch Univ., dept. of geography andenvironmental studies at Univ. of KwaZulu-Natal, Center for Tourism Research at Cape Peninsula Univ.of Technology, 2011 (Scarlett, Urmilla, and Kamilla, Development Southern Aftica, “Towards Redefining the Conceptof Legacy in Relation to Sport Mega-Events: Insights from the 2010 FIFA World Cup,” vol. 28 no. 3)

Allmers and Maennig (2008) suggest that consideration should also be given to the ‘non-use’ or ‘feel-good’effect of events, that is, the benefit for the host country’s population of the event taking place in theirneighbourhood even if they themselves do not visit the stadiums. Economists’ survey-based assessments of theintangible effects of mega-events (using contingent valuation studies and the measurement of hypothesizedwillingness-to-pay values) suggest that feel-good impacts can have significant economic ramifications for thehosts (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 2008)


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Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy: Environment

Mega-events can induce environmental reforms that increase tourism long-term through perceptionLi and McCabe, School of Events, Leeds Metropolitan Univ. and Christel DeHaan Tourism and TravelResearch Institute at Nottingham University Business School, 2013 (ShiNa and Scott, International Journal ofTourism Research, “Measuring the Socio-Economic Legacies of Mega-events: Concepts, Propositions, and Indicators,”July 1, vol. 15 no. 4)

A theoretical framework for measuring the legacies of mega-events is proposed (Figure 1). This frameworkconsists of three main parts. The first part is the definition and dimensions of legacy, which have been discussedin the previous section. The second part consists of the measurement factors, which are developed from the firstpart. The two parts play different roles in the framework – the first is the conceptual foundation and the secondis the conceptual extension. Legacies are divided into three categories: economic, social and compoundinglegacies. Considering the purpose of this research, this framework is set in the context of tourism, and thuslegacies relevant to tourism are foregrounded. It is identified that economic and social legacies are mostrelevant to tourism. Compounding legacies refer to the legacies that do not have a close relationship to tourismbut can add compounding effects either economic or social legacies. For example, to reach the environmentalstandard of requirements by the international Olympic Committee, a host country needs to put efforts toimprove air quality. If the good practice continues after the Olympics, the environmental legacy can addadditional value to social legacies in terms of enhancing a good image of the host country as a tourismdestination.

Empirically, hosting a mega-event will spur a greater environmental awarenessLi and McCabe, School of Events, Leeds Metropolitan Univ. and Christel DeHaan Tourism and TravelResearch Institute at Nottingham University Business School, 2013 (ShiNa and Scott, International Journal ofTourism Research, “Measuring the Socio-Economic Legacies of Mega-events: Concepts, Propositions, and Indicators,”July 1, vol. 15 no. 4)

The International Olympic Committee has recognized the significance of environmental aspects and includedthese in the three important dimensions of impacts/legacies of the Olympics together with economic and socialaspects. Sustainability and environmental legacies of mega-events are positively/negatively correlated. Mega-events can bring both positive and negative environmental externalities to host countries, which can affecttourists’ experiences. Positive components include, for example, increased environmental awareness andenvironmental protection policies, whereas negative components mainly coalesce around issues such as carbonemissions. Measures of environmental legacies may include these positive and negative externalities. Collins etal., (2009) discussed two quantitative techniques, Ecological Footprint Analysis and Environmental Input–output Analysis, which can be applied to assessing the environmental impacts of mega-events. Host countriesneed to formulate plans regarding developing a long-lasting environmental legacy for both tourists andresidents. The Green Goal Progress Report revealed that the 2010 South Africa Football World Cup designed aGreen Goal Action Plan, which is made up of nine target areas such as energy and climate change, waterconservation, landscaping and biodiversity and responsible tourism (City of Cape Town, 2009). In this report,responsible tourism involves three projects: developing a code of responsible conduct of tourists, presentingresponsible tourism awareness and designing environmental accreditation system for accommodation sector.


Page 18

Pro- Economy- Tourism Legacy: Infrastructure

New infrastructure improves a city’s aesthetics and improves image through architectural legacyCornelissen, Bob, and Swart; dept. of political science at Stellenbosch Univ., dept. of geography andenvironmental studies at Univ. of KwaZulu-Natal, Center for Tourism Research at Cape Peninsula Univ.of Technology, 2011 (Scarlett, Urmilla, and Kamilla, Development Southern Aftica, “Towards Redefining the Conceptof Legacy in Relation to Sport Mega-Events: Insights from the 2010 FIFA World Cup,” vol. 28 no. 3)

Despite these potential negative effects, Allmers and Maennig (2008) contend that new stadium constructionassociated with mega-events consistently has a novelty effect. An increase in comfort, improved view and betteratmosphere in new or upgraded stadiums regularly leads to significantly higher spectator figures for the clubs,at least for a period after these improvements. Moreover, the potential exists to exploit the opportunity offeredby large sport events to create an architectural legacy. A newly constructed ‘iconic’ building can become alandmark and be a part of a city’s character, enhancing that city’s image. It can also be an aesthetic focal pointfor the city and serve as a catalyst for further urban development and recreational facilities, for local and otheruse. However, if sustainable regeneration is to be achieved, it is critical to plan for the effective post-event useof facilities (Smith & Fox, 2007).


Page 19

Pro- Economy- Urban Revitalization

Subsidies for new stadiums can catalyze urban redevelopment. Multiple examples.Chapin, Prof Urban & Regional Planning @ FSU; Spring 04 (Timothy; Journal of the American PlanningAssociation; 70:2; “Sports facilities as urban redevelopment catalysts”)

In contrast, Cleveland's experience indicates that sports facilities can play a role in urban revitalization efforts, catalyzingdistrict redevelopment in the form of hotels, residences, and retail businesses as theorized by Robertson (I995). Clevelandis not alone in this experience. In San Diego, the public sector and the city's MLB team entered into a uniquepublic/private partnership to create a downtown "Ballpark District," and early evidence indicates that the area surroundingthe ballpark will be remade into a hotel, entertainment, and residential district (Chapin, 2002). In Columbus, Ohio, adistrict redevelopment initiative centered on a new sports arena is underway, funded primarily by the city's flagshipdowntown corporation (Wright, 200I).

Stadia may hold the key to urban renewal projectsWeiner, Ph.D and assistant prof. of economics at CCNY, 2004 (Ross D., Journal of Urban Technology,“Financing Techniques and Stadium Subsidies in the United States,” August, vol. 11 no. 2)

The introduction of sports stadiums to downtowns can be seen as serving much the same purpose. By creatingan idealized urban environment, seemingly removed from the uncertainties of the typical urban experience,municipalities can use professional sports as a way to retain people and jobs. By making the downtown area“livable,” sports stadiums can help to hold together a coalition of private businesses, charities, and public sectorentities committed to the downtown area by providing a common factor for all to rally around.

Sports complexes are economic programs that enhance multiple measuresBruns, managing editor, 2008 (Adam, Site Selection, “Taking One for the Team,” Nov/Dec, vol. 53 no. 6)

Deals to develop them are indicators that a community has incentives and is willing to wield them, andcoliseums through the ages have helped build community spirit through sports as an entertainment amenity. Onthe other hand, they’re for sports, which some might say is not a productive niche deserving of public money.Wouldn’t corporate leaders and their consultants prefer to see those communities spending that money oninfrastructure, education or other corporate projects?Not necessarily.“The development of sports complexes of any type with various types of tax subsidies and incentives are trueeconomic development programs that enhance the job growth, economic values, and overall qualities oflocations,” says Mike Mullis, founder of esteemed site selection firm J.M. Mullis, Inc., based in Memphis,Tenn., where the downtown centerpiece is the gleaming home of Triple-A St. Louis Cardinal affiliate theMemphis Redbirds.


Page 20

Pro- Economy- AT: Leakages

Leakage threat from a ballpark no different than a factoryChema, academic administrator and lawyer, 1996 (Thomas V., Journal of Urban Affairs, “When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy,” vol. 18 no. 1)

Moreover, the economic model proposed by Dr. Baade intuitively raises several questions. First, emphasis isplaced on the assumption that most of the money generated by a stadium is “quickly disbursed beyond thestadium’s environs.” That may well be, but is that not equally true of a steel mill or auto plant? What is thepoint here, surely not that a business enterprise to be a growth generator must reinvest the income in theimmediate surroundings?


Page 21

Pro- Economy- AT: Spending Tradeoff

Public subsidies are paid for through personal seat licenses, taxes on hotels and rental cars, and salestaxes.Baade, Prof Economics & Business @ Lake Forest College, & Matheson, Prof Economics @ College ofHoly Cross; January 2011 (Robert & Victor; International Association of Sports Economics; Working Paper Series No. 11-02;“Financing professional sports facilities”; http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/MathesonBaade_FinancingSports.pdf)

Numerous funding mechanisms have been used by local authorities for funding stadium construction. Table 8 shows thefunding mechanisms for NFL stadiums built between 1992 and 2006. While a variety of revenue sources are used forfootball stadium construction, three types are most common: personal seat licenses (PSLs), excise taxes on hotels or rentalcars, and general funds including sales taxes.


Page 22

Pro- Quality of Life

Subsidies for professional athletic organizations improve social capital and quality of life.Baade, Prof Economics & Business @ Lake Forest College, & Matheson, Prof Economics @ College ofHoly Cross; January 2011 (Robert & Victor; International Association of Sports Economics; Working Paper Series No. 11-02;“Financing professional sports facilities”; http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/MathesonBaade_FinancingSports.pdf)

If sports teams and events bring little in the way of direct economic benefits, do potential indirect benefits exist? Here theevidence is much more favorable to athletic supporters. Clearly sports are an entertainment option favored by many.Although the professional sports industry in the United States is only roughly the same size as the cardboard box industry,cardboard boxes don’t warrant multiple channels on cable television, have a dedicated section in most newspapers, andare not the focus of frequent discussions around the office water cooler. Sports serve as a municipal amenity that cancreate social capital and improve the quality of life.

Regardless of the economic benefit of public subsidies, professional athletic organizations increase civilpride, quality of life, and happiness.Diedrich, Deputy Finance Director U.S. Senate Campaign & Univ Minn Law School; 2007 (Christopher;PolicyMatters; 4:2; “Homefield economics: The public financing of stadiums”; Pp. 2-27)

The civic pride, quality of life, and simple happiness this public good generates may be the salient considerations inour willingness to pay for stadiums. We want teams in our cities not because they make our city more prestigious oreconomically important, but rather because they help make us proud to live where we do, and because they give ussomething to talk about with our neighbors and coworkers. We want sports teams because we love sports – ourfandom helps us define ourselves as individuals and, taken collectively, our support of a team helps develop acommunal identity.

Sports franchises boost routine pleasure, or ‘psychic income’ felt by everyone in the cityCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

In each of the previous four external benefits that have been discussed—economic impact, communityvisibility, community image, and stimulation of other development—the focus has been on using sports to reachexternal audience, with the intent of encouraging their investment of resources in the community. In contrast,psychic income focuses internally on a community’s existing residents. Psychic income is the emotional andpsychological benefit residents perceive they receive, even though they do not physically attend sports events,and are not involved in organizing them.People may avidly follow “their” team through the media and engage in animated conversations with othersabout the team, but never attend a game. A commentary on the Baltimore Orioles observed:The identification of a sports team like the Orioles with a city surely generates some pleasure for its citizensbeyond that reflected in ticket sales. In this respect the economics of sports is much different from theeconomics of, say, apples. A fan can derive substantial pleasure from the Orioles and identify with them as“his” team without ever attending a game, but he gets no such pleasure from knowing that somebody is eatingapples in Baltimore (Hamilton & Kahn, 1997, p. 269).


Page 23

Pro- Quality of Life

Sports franchises inspire citizens unlike any other developmentCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)If a new IBM plant opens in a city, elected officials and business leaders may get excited, but ordinary residentsdo not because the economic benefits appear intangible and impersonal to them. When a sports team comes to acity, a much broader segment of the population becomes excited and identifies with it. A sports team is aninvestment in the emotional infrastructure of a community. Sports has been eloquently described as “the magicelixir that feeds personal identity while it nourishes the bonds of communal solidarity” (Lipsky, 1981, p. 5)

New Stadiums increase the overall quality of life of the local residents – amenities, additional and betterpark spaces, care and upkeep, beautificationHernandez 2014 (Natalie; “Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports Arena Improve a Neighborhood’s Economy & Quality ofLife?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University, http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)

In regard to the quality of life, there is reason to believe that neighborhoods that have Stadiums/Arenas have moreadditions and amenities because of the stadium, such as stadium events, and more to take advantage of such as additionaland better park space. In addition, the neighborhood is better taken care of in the beautification which in return givesresidents a better quality of life within their communities. Even though only 33.33% of participants felt the quality of lifehas improved in the area due to the new stadium, which was still the majority of the survey. Of those same participantssurveyed, 69.70% of them do agree that the neighborhood is taken care of better and that it is cleaner and nicer from priorto the new stadium, only 24.24% of the surveyed participants felt it has stayed the same with no change. According to thesurveyed populations even the Stadium Events got better, 66.67% of those surveyed feel the events got better, so it can beconcluded that these are things (Beautification of the neighborhood & better stadium events) that improve the quality oflife in the community.


Page 24

Pro- Quality of Life- Community Visibility

Stadiums bring increased media exposure and positive coverage for a cityCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

A professional sports franchise guarantees a significant amount of media coverage for the city in which it islocated. If a city has a major league franchise, then each day across the nation when fans read their sportspages, the city’s name will be there. The city will likely hold an all-star game once every 15 years or so, andenjoy all of the national attention associated with it. Exposure will be further enhanced when a city’s teammakes the play-offs and especially when it appears in a championship final. In the case of these latter events,the exposure is accompanied by the luster of success (Rosentraub, 1997). One baseball owner noted, “Tonight,on every single television and radio station in the USA, Seattle will be mentioned because of the Mariners’game, and tomorrow night and the next night and so one. You’d pay millions in public relations fees for that”(Danielson 1997, p. 103). Further, sports teams can generate positive publicity by plugging otherwise-troubledcities into “the good news network...We’re o.k., say the sports pages” (Danielson, 1997, p. 103)The linkage between community exposure and team visibility is widely recognized. Proponents of publicsubsidies for sports facilities imply in their articulation of the relationship that it will aid recruitment ofrelocating businesses and, thus, lead to enhancement of a city’s economic base. Thus, when Jacksonville wasawarded an NFL franchise, one city leader commented, “T.V. sets in division rivals Cleveland, Pittsburgh, andCincinnati will be showing Jacksonville’s sunshine in the dead of winter, luring future tourists” (Thurow, 1995,p.138). However, there is no empirical evidence that media visibility per se results in this desired sequence ofevents. Opponents would argue that such arguments are false premises. Nevertheless, they would probably haveto accept that the media visibility has some value.


Page 25

Pro- Quality of Life- Culture

The public approves subsidies for professional athletic organizations because sports are culture. TheSacramento Kings draw twice as many customers as the local Art Museum despite only being open 33days a year.Ziller, writer for SBNation; 11/21/13 (Tom; SBNation; “Pay to play: Why we gladly give franchises our money for newsporting venues, and how citizens for and against those projects can find common ground”;http://www.sbnation.com/2013/11/21/5129434/stadium-arena-public-funding-kings-sonics-braves)

Why is the public comfortable spending its collective money on sports facilities? Because the public has becomecomfortable spending its individual money -- and lots of it -- on sports. American sports leagues have become some of themost important cultural pillars of our society, for better or worse. I bet you know more neighbors' NFL allegiances thanreligious denominations. The Crocker Art Museum in Sacramento is a really fantastic institution with a good annualprogram and strong permanent collection. It's dirt cheap, too, and open about 310 days a year. It drew 250,000 attendeesin 2011-12, according its most recent annual report. The Sacramento Kings, a horrid basketball team then suffering underextreme mismanagement, featuring relatively high prices and a fraction of the convenience of a typical museum visit,welcome almost 500,000 paying customers in 2011-12 on 33 nights of action. A bad team in an unstable situation broughtin twice the number of customers than the local excellent museum in about 11 percent of the available dates. This saysnothing about the Crocker or the Kings: this says everything about sports.

Professional sports are critical cultural institutions in our countryWeiner, Ph.D and assistant prof. of economics at CCNY, 2004 (Ross D., Journal of Urban Technology,“Financing Techniques and Stadium Subsidies in the United States,” August, vol. 11 no. 2)

Sports (especially professional sports) play a major role in the everyday life of millions of Americans. Indeed,many people pay more attention to the sports section of the newspaper than to any other section. The sportsportions of the nightly news take up significant amounts of broadcast time, and many local stations produce orcarry shows devoted exclusively to the coverage and discussion of professional (and collegiate) sports. Sportsmetaphors are frequent within the language of many Americans. For example, people are often granted threechances at doing something correctly based on the expression “three strikes and you’re out.” Discussion of tradewith other nations, relations between men and women, and relations between whites and people of color oftenrevolve around the idea of a “level playing field.” Sports (especially professional sports) are an important partof American culture and have come to occupy nearly every nook and cranny of life in the United States. Tharpstates:The love of athletics has now become deeply rooted in national life...The idiom of sports is the way that mostAmericans feel most engaged–and comfortable–talking about racial issues, standards of excellence,comparative worth, even right and wrong. And the passion over sports issues can rival the intensity of politicaldebates (30).Part of an explanation for the large role that sports play in American life is found in the importance granted tosports in American education. From kindergarten onwards through high school, students participate, and areoften required to participate in, athletic activities. Many of the major events occurring in high school andcollege revolve around sports.


Page 26

Pro- Quality of Life- Culture

Professional sports contribute to a sense of collective identityWeiner, Ph.D and assistant prof. of economics at CCNY, 2004 (Ross D., Journal of Urban Technology,“Financing Techniques and Stadium Subsidies in the United States,” August, vol. 11 no. 2)

The sense of collective identity provided by professional sports teams helps to shape the large role played byprofessional sports in the United States. A team provides a community with something common around whichto rally, regardless of gender, color, or other descriptive characteristics. Euchner states:Whether on the playing field or as the object of competition with a city that hopes to lure them away, the“home” team is a symbol for the whole community.... This identity can overwhelm all the other ways that acity’s residents think about themselves; it can therefore obscure other possible emblems of civic identity, largeand small. A city’s identification with a sports team creates vivid symbolism of a common interest, but it alsowashes away other less dramatic concerns that might be more important for a community, like schools, parks,housing, and libraries (12).


Page 27

Pro- Quality of Life- Image

Sports teams and stadiums help a community build its imageCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Many cities consciously engage in what has become known as place marketing, which involves striving to sellthe image of a place so as to make it more attractive to businesses, tourists and inhabitants (Kotler, Haidler &Rein, 1993). The pervasive popularity of sport in the media has persuaded many cities that sport may be auseful vehicle through which to enhance their image. Thus, some believe that major sports events and teams arethe new “Image Builders” for communities (Burns & Mules 1986). In the construction years after World War II,this role was performed by tall building tower skylines, large span bridges, or manufacturing industries (forexample, Motor City or Steel City). Today, as the economy has switched to a service orientation, major sportsevents and teams capture the imagination and help establish a city’s image in people’s minds .

Judgments regarding leadership and quality of life are derived from symbols like franchisesCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

People frequently make judgments about the competence of a city’s administration and its quality of life byextrapolating from snippets of information or from symbols. A sports team is a highly visible symbol. Thus,another dimension of the image issue relates to perceptions of the level of competency of a community’sgovernance. A sports franchise may be considered by some as a symbolic embodiment of the city as a whole(Euchner, 1993). Thus a successful franchise, or the acquisition of a new franchise after competition with othercommunities, may be portrayed as being symptomatic of a community’s economic and social health. Forexample, a leader in the campaign to attract the NFL Colts to Indianapolis from Baltimore stated, “IfIndianapolis lands the Colts or any NFL team, it’s going to do some amazing things for the city in terms ofprestige, economic development, and in terms of enticing companies to locate to Indianapolis” (Schimmel,1995, p. 144). If a city successfully negotiates and implements a major sports event or franchise agreement, thenthe inherent complexity of the task and the extensive publicity these actions generate, are likely to convey anaura of high competency upon the city’s leadership.


Page 28

Pro- Quality of Life- Image/Symbols

Losing a team is worse than never having had one in terms of a city’s image capitalCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Conversely, if a city loses a sports franchise, it may create the impression that local businessman and politiciansare incompetent; that the community is declining or a “loser,” and that its residents lack civic pride. Indeed, itmay be worse for a city’s image to lose a major event or major league team than to never have had one at all.When the Colts left Baltimore, city officials stated it “inflicted a painful blow to the city’s renaissance imagethat would slow economic development” (Schimmel, 1995, p. 144). A case could be made that Indianapolisabsconded with Baltimore’s “major league city” status along with its football team. There was concern at thetime that the city may also the Orioles, who played in the same aging stadium that was a main reason for theColts leaving. With that prospect, many suggested that Baltimore “was rapidly moving back to beingrecognized only as the toilet stop on the drive between Washington, DC and Philadelphia” (Shropshire, 1995, p.50). This concern provided the urgent impetus to build two new stadiums, one for the Orioles and another toentice the new Baltimore Ravens NFL franchise to the city.

Images from sports teams are more important to people than any economic gainCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

The proverbial impact of franchise movements on image in some communities was described by an urbaneconomist reporting on his experience at a radio call-in talk show. The caller wanted him to discuss the declineof St. Louis that took place after the Cardinals left for Arizona. The economist had analyzed the St. Louiseconomy and found it had not suffered, indeed it had improved, after the Cardinals left, but the caller had thedistinct impression that the city was in decline. The economist went on to report:It was not only the caller who believed St. Louis’s image had declined. When we interviewed civic officials inSt. Louis regarding the investments they made to attract the Rams from Los Angeles to the new domed stadium,each told us they supported the concept because most people in America believed that “St. Louis’s best dayswere behind her.” So, image matters to people even if those of us who study the economic effects of stadia andteams conclude there is no real benefit from the presence of a team (Rosentraub, 1997, p. 205).


Page 29

Pro- Quality of Life- Outweigh Museums

Professional sports organizations are more important to citizens than museums.Diedrich, Deputy Finance Director U.S. Senate Campaign & Univ Minn Law School; 2007 (Christopher;PolicyMatters; 4:2; “Homefield economics: The public financing of stadiums”; Pp. 2-27)

At least three studies have attempted to place a value on these benefits. In 1996, Mark Rosentraub and David Swindellsurveyed Indianapolis residents, asking them to rank the importance of a range of cultural attractions to their city. Whenasked about civic pride, respondents answered that the NBA’s Indiana Pacers were as important as museums. Rightbehind them were the NFL’s Indianapolis Colts, well ahead of the area’s music and shopping.18 When asked whatdefined the area’s reputation, respondents answered auto racing first, followed by the Pacers and Colts, with museumsfalling to fourth.19 Finally, when asked whether the loss of a particular community asset would hurt the reputation of thecommunity, sports won again. Eighty-five percent of respondents believed that losing the Indianapolis 500 would hurttheir reputation, followed by the Pacers at 81% and the Colts at 75%, with only 68% of respondents believing that the lossof their museums would harm the city’s reputation.20


Page 30

Pro- Quality of Life- Social Bonds

Sports teams build social bonds that cut across race, gender, or economic boundariesCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Sports teams provide a tangible focus for building community consciousness and social bonding. They are animportant part of the collective experience of urban dwellers since they tie them together regardless of race,gender or economic standing. They are one of the few vehicles available for developing a sense of community.“Fans who chant ‘we’re number one’ are trumpeting the superiority of both their team and their town. Inrallying around the home team, people identify more closely with a broader civic framework in the spatially,socially and politically fragmented metropolis” (Danielson, 1997, p. 9).

Only professional sports teams have the potential to break social divisionsCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Sports are not like other businesses. They are about, “triumphs of the human spirit, community bonding, andfamily memories. They’re about taking a break from the pettiness that divides us. They’re about celebratingsome of the things that make society whole: competition, victory, redemption” Society has an emotionalattachment to sports and receives a psychic income from them. The emotional involvement transposes somepeople from the dreary routines of their lives to a mode of escapism that enables them to identify with a team,personalize its success, and feel better about themselves. Life is about experiences and sports teams help createthem—albeit vicariously in most cases.

Sports teams unite communities over common experiencesCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Sports is a theater where Kipling’s twin imposters of triumph and disaster run side-by-side and impact largenumbers of people. It provides a spectrum of emotions to fantasize about and to casually share (Weiner, 1999).When a team or event is successful, benefits often accrue to the collective morale of all residents. A substantialproportion of a community emotionally identifies with “their” team or event, and feels elation, anxiety,despondency, optimism, and an array of other emotions according to how the team performs. Some of thesepeople may not understand the nature of the even or how the activity is performed. Nevertheless, the teamconstitutes “a common identification symbol, something that brings the citizens of the city together , especiallyduring those exhilarating times when the city has a World Series champion, or a Super Bowl winner” (Quirk &Fort, 1992, p. 176).


Page 31

Pro- Quality of Life- Social Bonds

Stadia and events build social bonds which are key to forming prosperous citiesChema, academic administrator and lawyer, 1996 (Thomas V., Journal of Urban Affairs, “When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy,” vol. 18 no. 1)

Cities of the future will be important and successful if they can create a critical mass of opportunities for people tosocialize within their borders. Several millennia ago, Plato and Aristotle characterized human beings as social creatures.We want to come together, to interact.For the past 500 years much of that interaction has taken place in cities as people did business and engaged in commerce.Today, with the information superhighway and advanced communications, we tend to be much more isolated in businesstransactions. Thus, we continually look for other ways to generate human contact and interaction. Cities which understandthat cultural activities, recreation, sports, and plain old socializing not only bring people together, but form a solid base foreconomic growth, which will be the cities which prosper. Cleveland, Baltimore, Indianapolis, and Minneapolis are citieswhich recognize that sports venues and events can fit into an overall vision for strategic growth. They have integrated thefacilities into the urban fabric and they are successful.

Teams provide a sense of pride and community cohesiveness that would not be there without a team –Cleveland proves that if a team relocates it leaves a void in the communityAbrams 2013 (Roger I., Prof of Law, Northeastern, B.A. Cornell University. J,D. Harvard, PACE I.P., SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM Vol. 3,“HARDBALL IN CITY HALL: PUBLIC FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS”, Chapter 9 in “PLAYING TOUGH: THE WORLD OF SPORTS ANDPOLITICS”)

Much has been written lately about what might be termed the politics of public happiness. A new stadium may not make a city richer,but it might make its inhabitants happier by improving their quality of life and civic pride, much like clean air, good weather andscenic views. Community self-esteem, status and prestige as a public good may be harder to measure than gross local domesticreceipts, but it is just as real. As Art Modell, the owner of the Baltimore Ravens which he relocated from Cleveland, explained: “Thepride and the presence of a professional football team is far more important than thirty libraries.” The opposite effect , of course,follows from the loss of a sports franchise. Cleveland, for example, has suffered from a community-wide malaise for decades. The lossof its beloved football franchise impacted on the psyche of inhabitants across the Western Reserve. Much the same happened decadesearlier when Brooklynites lost their treasured Dodgers.While long-term public happiness may ultimately depend upon the success of the franchise in league competition, there is a genuinepublic benefit in civic pride from national recognition as a major league city even if the local club is an also-ran. The opportunity forcity residents to root for their “home team” provides them a common interest, a cohesive force for any city. One person's consumptionof this public good does not deplete the psychic nourishment available to others, and no citizen can be excluded from its enjoyment,although not all can afford the price of a ticket to attend a game in person. While large metropolises may have franchises in all fourteam sports, smaller cities, such as Green Bay, Oklahoma City, Sacramento, and Salt Lake City, have a single franchise in one sport,but even that single entry places them among the premier cities of the country. There is some evidence that other businesses -- thosethat actually create real, long-term, well-paying jobs -- seek to locate in a city that can boast that it has a major league franchise.Proponents of public subsidies have posited that new construction provides social benefits to members of the community, enhancingself-esteem and social cohesiveness. Not only do people feel better about their city, outsiders do as well. Cities make investments inthe “good will” of their communities all the time. Museums, libraries, schools and clean streets enhance the public’s perception andattract outsiders to come and visit or even relocate. Although it may be difficult to monetize these intangible social benefits, no onedoubts that they are real. While Art Modell may have been engaged in exaggeration by suggesting that a football team is moreimportant to a community than thirty libraries, it seems that having a home club is more significant to the public than reconstructingits schools or repaving its roads.


Page 32

Pro- Generic- Baade Indict

Baade’s study, which is the basis for later scholarship, does not take into other critical factors thatdetermine the economic development success of a stadiumChema, academic administrator and lawyer, 1996 (Thomas V., Journal of Urban Affairs, “When ProfessionalSports Justify the Subsidy,” vol. 18 no. 1)

Such success dramatizes the flaw in Professor Baade’s past and current analyses and conclusions. Baade hasresearched essentially nonurban facilities which were not intended to be economic development tools. Themultiuse stadiums that proliferated in the late 60s and early 70s were specifically designed to be apart from thecity. The design characteristics give the impression more of a fort than a marketplace. Moreover, during theperiod surveyed most new venues were located in suburban or rural locations. The relatively few urban venuesmight as well have been in suburbs because they were separated from their host city by a moat of surfaceparking. These facilities became and continue to be isolated attractions. People drive to them, park on surfacelots, enjoy the events in the building, and then go home. This is not bad, but it does not generate economicdevelopment spin-off. Contrary to Professor Baade’s conclusions, however, it is not the sport activity, but thecontext which is key.


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Pro- Generic- Context Key

New study demonstrated that certain stadia generate developmentCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Similarly, Santo (2005) examined the economic impact of professional sports on the local economy. He positedthat:Theoretically, a retro-style ballpark in a downtown or retail setting is likely to attract visitors from a wider areathan its more utilitarian suburban counterpart, and is likely to induce longer stays and greater ancillaryspending. If so, it is plausible that the new generation of sports facilities would have more favorable economicimpacts than their predecessors. (Santo 2005, 180)Santo utilized methods identical to Baade and Dye (1988) but extended the data through 2004 and dropped alldata prior to 1984. His regressions explained variation in income, or the city’s income as a share of regionalincome, using population, a time trend, and variables that indicated years following the construction of either afootball only or baseball only stadium. Positive and significant coefficients on the stadium variables wereinterpreted as evidence of the importance of context.

Stadia should be viewed in a redistributionist context rather than general welfareCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

While both Nelson and Santo conclude that downtown stadiums have beneficial impacts on their cities, feweconomists are convinced by their results. In both instances, demonstrating that a downtown stadium raises theshare of state or region income that accrues downtown may be evidence that a sports facility redistributesincome away from the rest of a state or region and concentrates it in the downtown area of a major city. Thosewho find no economic impact of franchises and stadiums in the local economy argue that one explanation forthose results is the redistribution of spending and income. Both Santo (2005) and Austrian and Rosentraub10(2002) indicate that pure redistribution effects from stadiums and arenas are, or should be, acceptable from apublic policy perspective if the stadium or arena induces or enhances redevelopment of an area that needsredevelopment. They suggest, in fact, that the emphasis on improvements in general economic well-being fromstadiums and arenas should be replaced by this redistributive focus despite the unclear welfare implications.


Page 34

Con- Coercion- Wash D.C.

MLB helped to strong-arm local leaders into 100% public funding for Nationals ParkFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

As Mayor Williams pursued MLB, similar anti-democratic power dynamics were evident as MLB used itsnegotiating leverage to secure highly favorable conditions from the city. Williams thus framed the issue tomaximize support from the business community and minimize popular opposition. From the start of the processin 2002, Washington seemed at a disadvantage. Between 1901 and 1971, the city hosted the Senators, but afterthey left, MLB granted the city neither an expansion team nor allowed another team to move to the city(Frommer, 2006). As MLB sought a new home for the Montreal Expos in 2002, the Washington market areawas considered the front-runner among the eight cities considered for the franchise, but MLB preferred to movethe team to Northern Virginia, where it would be closer to its anticipated fan base, and further away from theMLB team in Baltimore (Jaffe, 2005). However, Virginia officials could not secure funding for a site.Meanwhile, Washington officials were eager to negotiate as, in January 2003, Williams offered public subsidiesthat would pay for two-thirds of an anticipated $300 million project. However, relocation committeechairperson Jerry Reinsdorf responded to city officials, ‘we were thinking of a different split. We were thinkingthree-thirds and no-thirds (Jaffe, 2005: n.p.).


Page 35

Con- Democracy

Monopolistic nature of leagues inflates demand and increasingly teams avoid public discussionCallaghan, staff writer, 2014 (Peter, The News Tribune, June 3,http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/06/03/3224986/theres-enough-money-in-pro-sports.html )

Oddly, at least for pro sports, the owners of the Atlanta Braves baseball team didn’t let the city of Atlanta bid tokeep the team in its apparently ancient 17-year-old Turner Field. Instead it cut a secret deal with neighboringCobb County.Last week, Braves owner John Schuerholz revealed why. Had the team’s desire to move to ’burbs been knownbefore it was sealed, public opposition might have killed the plan.“If it had gotten out, more people would have started taking the position of, ‘We don’t want that to happen,’”Schuerholz said in a speech to the Atlanta Press Club. He needn’t have worried, though. At the meeting toapprove the deal last week, the Cobb County commissioners limited public comment to 12 slots. Stadiumproponents got to the meeting room five hours early and captured all 12. When opponents stood and demandedto be heard, they were removed by police officers.Although on the far edge of a lack of public process, Atlanta’s isn’t that different from what happenseverywhere. Opponents are marginalized and the establishment — from the chamber of commerce to theeditorial pages — lines up in support.In the abstract, most people likely agree that having taxpayers pick up the largest share of a stadium or arena isludicrous. This is true not just because of the market value and profitability of franchises, but because of thesalaries paid. Surely if the Seattle Mariners can pay Robinson Cano $24 million a year, the team could havefound the $33 million a year in taxes that were used to pay off stadium bonds until they were retired in 2011.But they don’t, not because they can’t afford it but because they don’t have to. They don’t have to because thesedeals aren’t debated in the abstract, they are debated one city at a time with the threat of losing a team as aconstant threat.Then, each new deal negotiated at gunpoint creates the new high-water mark that the next city in line will haveto meet in order to keep its team in town or at least keep it “competitive.”When emotions are involved, economics don’t matter.


Page 36

Con- Democracy- Wash D.C.

Nationals Park approval process continued a legacy of disenfranchisement for D.C. residentsFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

As stated earlier, there is a significant difference between the democratic image of Washington and the abilityof city residents to participate within its purportedly civic democracy. While French architect Charles PierreL’Enfant and subsequent designers conceived Washington to be the symbolic and functional heart of thenation’s democratic life the framers of the Constitution made no provision for democratic participation by thecity’s residents. Instead, Congress was given exclusive authority over the Federal District. As a result, for muchof the city’s history, Congress has appointed people with little or no accountability to residents to govern thecity, and, since 1974, has provided the city with highly circumscribed Home Rule, in which Congress retainsultimate authority over the city’s laws and budget (Gillette Jr, 2006; Gutheim and Lee, 2006; LCCR EducationFund and DC Vote, n.d.; Smith, 1974).In many ways, the process surrounding the city’s pursuit of baseball demonstrated a similar separation betweenthe image and practice of democracy in Washington. As described by Fort (1997), the process approving publicsubsidies for professional sports facilities negotiations with professional sports teams is not very democratic(see also Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Shropshire, 1995; Zimbalist, 2003). MLB operates as a legal monopolyand possesses significant leverage in relation to cities, while team owners tend to be among the city’s elitebusiness interests (Eitzen, 2000; Kalich, 1998; Rosentraub, 1997). Generally, stadium construction projects areactively supported by members of the business community, politicians, sports fans and media, for whom teamsprovide substantial direct economic, political and cultural benefits (DeMause and Cagan, 2008; Sage, 1993).Conversely, opposition to stadium projects tends to be more difficult to mobilize as direct burdens are generallylimited to politically weak communities and economic costs are diffused broadly (Eitzen, 1996; Pelissero et al.,1991; Spirou and Bennett, 2003).


Page 37

Con- Democracy- Wash D.C.

Elites use public funding against the wishes of local residents, D.C. provesFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

Although the residents of Washington recognized that they were being bypassed by much of the growth thatMayor Williams encouraged through his entrepreneurial strategies, Nationals Park and other high profiledevelopments served as spectacles that helped the city project an image of urban renaissance to externalaudiences (tourists, businesspeople, suburbanites) that masked Washington’s growing inequalities. With adesign inspired by, according to lead architect Joseph Spear, ‘the transparency of democracy’ (Nakamura,2005a: B1), Nationals Park captures the essence of the separation between the image and practice of democracyin Washington by ignoring the needs, interests and wishes of residents while it deepens the city’s deep social,economic, cultural, spatial, racial and political divisions. As such, according to Harvey (2001a), ‘the circussucceeds even if the bread is lacking’ (p. 365) as the spectacle offered by the stadium perpetuates the city’sdemocratic mythology, the continual privileging of DC’s urban elites, and the concomitant prolongedsubordination of the city’s historically underserved populations.


Page 38

Con- Economy- Consensus

The majority of economists disagree with stadium subsidiesCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)Survey evidence indicates that on some policy issues economists in general hold views different from those whospecialize in the issue.4 When it comes to sports subsidies, however, both sets of economists appear to agree. Ina 2005 survey of a random sample of American Economic Association members, Robert Whaples (2006) askedof agreement with the following: Local and state governments in the U.S. should eliminate subsidies toprofessional sports franchises. Possible responses were “Strongly Disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neutral,” “Agree,”and “Strongly Agree.” Figure 1 shows that 58 percent strongly agreed, and 28 percent agreed. About 10 percentwere “neutral.” Only 5 percent disagreed. Sports subsidies was but one of about 20 policy issues included in thesurvey, but Whaples highlights this issue as one of exceptional consensus—the other standouts being free trade,outsourcing, and the elimination of agricultural subsidies. The sports question, in fact, received the largest“strongly agree” response in the entire survey.

There is zero academic support for public sports subsidiesCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)There now exists almost twenty years of research on the economic impact of professional sports franchises andfacilities on the local economy. The results in this literature are strikingly consistent. No matter what cities orgeographical areas are examined, no matter what estimators are used, no matter what model specifications areused, and no matter what variables are used, articles published in peer reviewed economics journals containalmost no evidence that professional sports franchises and facilities have a measurable economic impact on theeconomy.


Page 39

Con- Economy- Consensus

There is no economic benefit for new stadium construction – Promoters are just paid advocates of theteam owners – Cities are left with debt they can’t pay back

GAROFALO AND WALDRON 9/07/12 (Pat and Travis, “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics ofSports Stadiums”, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/2/)

Time after time, politicians wary of letting a local franchise relocate -- as theNBA's Seattle Supersonics did, to OklahomaCity before the 2008-2009 season -- approve public funds, selling the stadiums as public works projects that will boost thelocal economy and provide a windfall of growth.However, according to leading sports economists, stadiums and arenas rarely bring about the promised prosperity, andinstead leave cities and states mired in debt that they can't pay back before the franchise comes calling for more."The basic idea is that sports stadiums typically aren't a good tool for economic development," said Victor Matheson, aneconomist at Holy Cross who has studied the economic impact of stadium construction for decades. When cities citestudies (often produced by parties with an interest in building the stadium) touting the impact of such projects, there is asimple rule for determining the actual return on investment, Matheson said: "Take whatever number the sports promotersays, take it and move the decimal one place to the left. Divide it by ten, and that's a pretty good estimate of the actualeconomic impact."Others agree. While "it is inarguable that within a few blocks you'll have an effect," the results are questionable for metroareas as a whole, Stefan Szymanski, a sports economist at the University of Michigan, said.


Page 40

Con- Economy- Local Economies

Stadia can drain money from a communityCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Much of the consumer spending associated with professional sports comes out of the entertainment budgets oflocal residents. When a new sports franchise appears in a city, local entertainment spending on sports increasesand local entertainment spending on other activities like movies, bowling, etc. decreases. The effective “localspending multiplier” on activities like bowling and attending plays or concerts is higher than the multiplier onprofessional sporting events because the owners of bowling alleys, theatres, and restaurants, as well as theemployees of these establishments, live in the community while the owners and highly paid players (whoreceive a majority of team’s expenditures) on professional sports teams generally do not. Since spending onprofessional sports teams substitutes for other local consumer entertainment spending and has a lower localspending multiplier, professional sports can reduce local income rather than increase it.

Stadium jobs do not generate local economic activityCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Coates and Humphreys (2003) used the same approach as in their earlier work, but used the analysis to explainwages and employment in two sectors of the economy that are closely linked to activities in stadiums andarenas: the services and retail sectors. The services sector includes both hotels and amusements and recreationas sub-sectors, while the retail sector includes eating and drinking establishments. By looking at employmentand earnings in these sectors rather than in the metropolitan area, their analysis is focused where sports-leddevelopment advocates contend much of the impact will be. Coates and Humphreys’ (2003) evidence suggeststhat positive effects in earnings per employee in one sector, Amusements and Recreation, are counterbalancedby negative effects on both earnings and employment in other sectors. Their evidence also suggests thatprofessional sports reduce real per capita income in cities both because of substitution effects, where privateexpenditures are switched between sectors of the economy but are not increased, and in the creation ofrelatively low paying jobs.


Page 41


Even new teams hurt the local economy in the short and long runsCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Lertwachara and Cochran (2007) used an event study methodology to assess the impact of a new franchise,enticed into a city via subsidies, on the local economy. They look for a difference in the city or regionaleconomy before and after expansion or relocation of a new franchise into the city. Their evidence includes newteams from each of the four major US professional sports leagues, MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL. Their resultsare consistent with those in the literature and specifically with the findings of Coates and Humphreys (1999)that new teams “have an adverse impact on local per capita income for U.S. markets in both the short and longrun” (244).

Subsides for stadiums don’t provide economic benefits – Stadiums sit empty for the majority of the yearand have to compete with other venues to make money. Additionally, the structure of stadium deals areover a 30 year period – leaving the local community locked in a 30 year cycle of debtGAROFALO AND WALDRON 9/07/12 (Pat and Travis, “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics ofSports Stadiums”, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/2/)

There are numerous reasons for the muted economic effects. The biggest is that arenas often sit empty for asignificant portion of the year. Jobing.com Arena is guaranteed 41 hockey games annually. The other 324nights, it must find concerts, conventions or other events to fill the schedule, and in Glendale, where the arenacompetes with facilities in nearby Phoenix, that can be tough to do."We've looked at tons of these things, and the one that we found that seemed to make sense is the StaplesCenter in Los Angeles," Matheson said. "But they use it 250 dates a year. They don't make sense when you'reusing it 41 times a year and competing with another venue down the street."Another reason the projects rarely make sense is because of the way they are structured. Stadiums and arenasare financed with long-term bonds, meaning cities and states will be stuck with the debt for long periods of time(often 30 years). And while cities make 30-year commitments to finance stadiums, their commitments togovernment workers and other local investments are often made on a year-to-year basis, meaning that, just as inGlendale, it becomes easier to eliminate public sector jobs and programs than to default on debt incurred fromarenas.


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Claims of economic gains for the local communities at all levels of professional sports has been disproven– disposable income, misleading economic multiplier effects, hidden costsRoelofs 4/02/14 (Ted, worked for the Grand Rapids Press for 30 years-covered everything from politics to social services tomilitary affairs, earned numerous awards, including for work in Albania during the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis, “In the era of publicmoney subsidizing pro sports stadiums, two Michigan teams found a way to do without”, Bridge Magazine,http://www.mlive.com/business/index.ssf/2014/04/moneyball_sports_stadiums_that.html)

But Zimbalist and other experts say claims of economic benefit from sports franchises don't hold up underscrutiny. Zimbalist co-authored a seminal 1997 book entitled, "Sports, Jobs and Taxes" that examined thespinoff effect of several major league sports facilities, minor league stadiums and baseball spring trainingfacilities.Its conclusion: "A new sports facility has an extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overalleconomic activity and employment....Regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a local neighborhood, a city,or an entire metropolitan area, the economic benefits of sports facilities are de minimus."Zimbalist, like other analysts, said claims of economic benefits from sports stadiums are based on misleading"multiplier effects" used to gauge economic impact from gross spending. He cited studies that show that moststadium and arena spending comes from local residents. Since most households typically spend a fixed amounton entertainment, analysts say, sports spending simply shifts leisure spending from one venue to another,creating little to no added economic benefit for the community.A 1994 study by Lake Forest College economist Robert Baade examined economic growth over a 30-yearperiod in 32 metropolitan areas with new professional sports teams. Only two of 32 showed a significantrelationship between the arrival of the sports team and per capita income growth, one of which was negative.But findings like that have hardly slowed the pace of publicly funded professional sports stadiums.An academic study by Judith Grant Long, an associate professor of urban planning at Harvard University, foundthat, from 2000 to 2005, 20 major league sports facilities were built at an average cost of $314 million, with thepublic picking up two-thirds of the cost.In her 2012 book, "Public-Private Partnerships for Major League Sports Facilities," Long concludes thattaxpayers shell out about $10 million more than is commonly reported on the typical major league sportsfacility once hidden costs are calculated. When those costs are considered, the public’s share for constructingand operating a sports facility exceeds 75 percent. She argues that governments can make better deals if theyhad "access to better information" on the true cost of construction, land and infrastructure.A similar pattern holds at the minor league level. Research conducted for the North Carolina city of Wilmingtonfound that 22 of 28 Single A minor league ballparks opened between 1995 and 2010 were built with someportion of public funds.


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New Stadiums attract people who don’t live locally and increase the costs of goods around the stadium –Yankee Stadium ProvesHernandez 2014 (Natalie, MA Pace Univ, NY State Dept of Labor,“Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports Arena Improve aNeighborhood’s Economy & Quality of Life?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University,http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)

But with these above-mentioned positives come some negatives to the placement of an arena/stadium in aresidential neighborhood. Most residents feel that since the new stadium and the type of population that istargeted to attend the games, prices have become more expensive at their local businesses. The targetedaudience that comes to the “New Yankee Stadium” are generally people with deeper pockets and higherincomes and many residents that were surveyed feel like this is a reason for the rising prices in the places ofbusinesses within the community--37.50% of those surveyed feel that prices have become more expensive inthe local businesses while only 3.13% feel that they have become less expensive.


Page 44

Con- Economy- Lose Money

Recent analysis proves that citizens have lost $4 billion from publicly subsidizing stadiaSirota, senior writer, 14 (David, International Business Times online, July 22, http://www.ibtimes.com/detroit-other-cash-strapped-us-cities-states-slashing-pension-benefits-while-subsidizing-163566)

The officials promoting these twin policies argue that boosting stadium development effectively promotesbroad economic growth. But many calculations rely on controversial and dubious assumptions that have beenwidely challenged.A landmark 1997 Brookings Institution study by sports economist Andrew Zimbalist concluded that "a newsports facility has an extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overall economic activity andemployment" and that few facilities "have earned anything approaching a reasonable return on investment" fortaxpayers.That finding was confirmed by University of Maryland and University of Alberta researchers, whose 2008review of major academic research found that "sports subsidies cannot be justified on the grounds of localeconomic development." In addition, a 2012 Bloomberg News analysis found that taxpayers have lost $4 billionon such subsidies since the mid-1980s.

Pro-growth studies are biased; public spending versus revenue is 10:1Demause, contributing editor to City Limits and freelance journalist, 2011 (Neil, NPR online, The Nation:“Stop the Subsidy-Sucking Sports Stadiums,” August 5, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/05/139018592/the-nation-stop-the-subsidy-sucking-sports-stadiums)

For politicians eager to embrace sports deals, it's easy to find consulting firms willing to produce glowing"economic impact studies" — even though sports economists nearly unanimously dismiss them as hogwash. Forexample: Economic Research Associates told the city of Arlington, Texas, that spending $325 million on a newstadium for billionaire oil baron Jerry Jones's Dallas Cowboys would generate $238 million a year in economicactivity. Critics immediately pointed out that this merely totaled up all spending that would take place in andaround the stadium. Hidden deep in the report was the more meaningful estimate that Arlington would see just$1.8 million a year in new tax revenues while spending $20 million a year on stadium subsidies.


Page 45

Con- Economy- Pension Trade-offs

Sports subsidies trade-off with local social services and pensions for retired city workersSirota, senior writer, 14 (David, International Business Times online, July 22, http://www.ibtimes.com/detroit-other-cash-strapped-us-cities-states-slashing-pension-benefits-while-subsidizing-163566)

As U.S. states and cities grapple with budget and pension shortfalls, many are betting big on an unprovenformula: Slash public employee pension benefits and public services while diverting the savings into lucrativesubsidies for professional sports teams.Detroit on Monday made itself the most prominent example of this trend. Officials in the financially devastatedcity announced that current and future municipal retirees had blessed a plan that will slash their pensionbenefits. On the same day, the billionaire owners of the Detroit Red Wings, the Ilitch family, unveiled details ofan already approved taxpayer-financed stadium for the professional hockey team.Many retirees now face a 4.5 percent cut in their previously negotiated cost-of-living adjustments, which is partof a larger plan to cut $7 billion of the city’s debt. At the same time, the public is on the hook for $283 milliontoward the new stadium after giving the Ilitches key parcels of land for $1.The budget maneuvers in Michigan are part of a larger trend across the country. As Pacific Standard reports,"Over the past 20 years, 101 new sports facilities have opened in the United States — a 90-percent replacementrate — and almost all of them have received direct public funding." Now, many of those subsidies are beingeffectively financed by the savings accrued from pension cuts.

Pension cuts cost the economy over $1 trillion and over 6 million jobsSirota, senior writer, 14 (David, International Business Times online, July 22, http://www.ibtimes.com/detroit-other-cash-strapped-us-cities-states-slashing-pension-benefits-while-subsidizing-163566)

At the same time, cuts to pension contributions are rarely described by public officials as negative forlocal economic growth, though economic data suggests otherwise. An analysis by the Washington, D.C.-based National Institute on Retirement Security notes that spending resulting from pension payments had "atotal economic impact of more than $941.2 billion" and "supported more than 6.1 million American jobs" in2012.Since Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection, city and state officials have been demanding pension cuts toreduce the estimated $3.5 billion in outstanding pension obligations while at the same time reassuring theIlitches that the subsidies will be preserved.


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Increase in subsidies trades off with Pension FundsGAROFALO AND WALDRON 9/07/12 (Pat and Travis, “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics ofSports Stadiums”, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/2/)

As U.S. states and cities grapple with budget and pension shortfalls, many are betting big on an unproven formula: Slashpublic employee pension benefits and public services while diverting the savings into lucrative subsidies for professionalsports teams.Detroit on Monday made itself the most prominent example of this trend. Officials in the financially devastated cityannounced that current and future municipal retirees had blessed a plan that will slash their pension benefits. On the sameday, the billionaire owners of the Detroit Red Wings, the Ilitch family, unveiled details of an already approved taxpayer-financed stadium for the professional hockey team.Many retirees now face a 4.5 percent cut in their previously negotiated cost-of-living adjustments, which is part of a largerplan to cut $7 billion of the city’s debt. At the same time, the public is on the hook for $283 million toward the newstadium after giving the Ilitches key parcels of land for $1.The budget maneuvers in Michigan are part of a larger trend across the country. As Pacific Standard reports, "Over thepast 20 years, 101 new sports facilities have opened in the United States — a 90-percent replacement rate — and almostall of them have received direct public funding." Now, many of those subsidies are being effectively financed by thesavings accrued from pension cuts.


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Examples abound of cities diverting pension funds to fund stadium projectsSirota, senior writer, 14 (David, International Business Times online, July 22, http://www.ibtimes.com/detroit-other-cash-strapped-us-cities-states-slashing-pension-benefits-while-subsidizing-163566)

Other cities and states that have coupled sports subsidies with pension cuts include: In Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel recently passed a $55 million cut to municipal workers' pensions. At the

same time, he has promoted a plan to spend $55 million of taxpayer money on a hotel project that is part of alarger stadium redevelopment plan for Depaul University.

In Miami, Bloomberg News reports that the city "approved a $19 million subsidy for the professional basketballarena" and then six weeks later "began considering a plan to cut as many as 700 (librarian) positions, includinga fifth of the library staff and more than 300 police."

In Arizona, the Phoenix Business Journal reports that regional governments in that state have spent $1.5 billion"on sports stadiums, arenas and pro teams" since the mid-1990s. At the same time, legislators are consideringproposals to cut public pension benefits, while voters in Phoenix may face a pension-cutting ballot initiative inNovember.

In Jacksonville, Florida, officials have not fully funded the pension system leading to a recent credit downgradeby Moody's. At the same time, city officials just approved a $63 million plan to upgrade EverBank Field.

In New Jersey, Gov. Chris Christie is trying to block a planned $2.4 billion payment to the pension system, atthe same time his administration has spent a record $4 billion on economic development subsidies and taxbreaks to corporations. That includes an $82 million subsidy for the construction of a practice facility for thePhiladelphia 76ers.

In Louisville, Kentucky, up to $265 million in state and local tax revenues were used to finance the constructionof the KFC Yum! Center, which opened in 2010. Only a few years later, Kentucky legislators enacted majorcuts to the state's pension system."Sports stadiums typically aren't a good tool for economic development," said Holy Cross economist VictorMatheson in an interview with The Atlantic. "Take whatever number the sports promoter says, take it and movethe decimal one place to the left. Divide it by ten, and that's a pretty good estimate of the actual economicimpact."


Page 48

Con- Economy- Spending Trade-offs

Public expenditure on professional sports is not positive sum; it necessarily trades of with education androadsMatheson, economics professor at the College of the Holy Cross, 2014 (Victor, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “The Economics of New Stadiums”, May 23, p. 14A)

One place I clearly disagree with Bruce is this concept of hotel/motel taxes. It's very common for politicians tosay, hey, let's finance our stadium through rental-car taxes, because other people are paying that. Let's financethis on hotel taxes --- that's a professor coming in from Boston to be in a debate. Let's figure out things thatother people are paying for to pay for a stadium, and then it's like we get a stadium for free. The real problemwith that is, you could always use hotel taxes to pay your teachers, your firefighters and police officers. Youcould build your local roads with hotel taxes. This idea that you must put hotel taxes toward a stadium, I think,is a wrong one. I'm comfortable taking a no-sports-subsidy stand because the number of examples of bad thingshappening so widely exceeds the number of things where we have some good outcomes.Remember, sports teams are not in the business of local economic development. They're in the business ofgenerating as much revenue as possible.The way you generate revenue is not by creating a neighborhood of bars and restaurants where people can gobefore and after the game. The way you make money is to make sure that anyone who (comes toyour) stadium is spending all their money inside.


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Con- Economy- Spiral

Giveaways to owners are often hidden and exceed reported construction costsDemause, contributing editor to City Limits and freelance journalist, 2011 (Neil, NPR online, The Nation:“Stop the Subsidy-Sucking Sports Stadiums, August 5, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/05/139018592/the-nation-stop-the-subsidy-sucking-sports-stadiums)

Even where elected officials have gotten smarter about rejecting subsidies, the sports industry is increasinglyoutmaneuvering them. Twenty years ago, most sports subsidies came in the form of straight cash giveaways forconstruction costs. Today, they are more likely to arrive via tax breaks, free land, government-subsidized tax-free loans, or discounts to offset operating and maintenance costs. When Long looked at these hidden subsidies,she found that they added an average of 40 percent to sports facilities' public sticker price. The most notableexamples are the new stadiums for the Yankees and Mets, which opened in New York City in 2009. The teamowners promised to pay all $1.7 billion in construction costs — but it was later revealed that they werecollecting a combined $1.8 billion in lease and tax breaks against the outlays.

Pro-stadium studies under-state stadium costsLong, Harvard Univ. urban planning professor, 2005 (Judith Grant, Journal of Sports Economics, “Full Count:The Real Cost of Public Funding for Major League Funding for Major League Sports Facilities,” May, vol. 6 no. 2)

For these reason, most existing estimates of public subsidies for sports facilities are significantlyunderestimated. Moreover, in studies that present comparative statistics among facility types, among leagues, orfor time, these inaccuracies are compounded by inconsistencies in measurement techniques among locations.The purpose of this study is to fill this data gap by providing accurate and consistent estimates of publicsubsidies for all 99 major league sports facilities in use for the “big four” major league sports in 2001, as well asa set of complementary comparative statistics. I present a cost model that estimates the present value of allpublic subsidies for each facility, including construction, land, and infrastructure, as well as ongoing costs foroperations, capital improvements, municipal services, and foregone property taxes, in 2001, based on leases ineffect in 2001, and assuming 30-year lease terms.The analysis reveals that public cost is underreported by an average of $50 million per facility, or $5 billion forall 99 facilities in use in 2001. Across leagues, the average public subsidy for a Major League Baseball (MLB)ballpark is underreported by $53 million, calculated by subtracting the average subsidy as reported by industrysources of $165 million from the adjusted subsidy of $218 million including land, infrastructure and ongoingpublic costs. Comparatively, the average public subsidy for a National Football League (NFL) stadium isunderreported by $41 million, versus $53 million for a National Basketball Association (NBA) arena and $46million for a National Hockey League (NHL) arena. Among facility types, the average subsidy for a stadium isunderreported by $54 million, compared to $44 million for arenas and $66 million for joint NBA-NHL arenas.


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Con- Economy- Studies

Studies advocating stadia use sloppy methodology versus objective academic studiesDelaney and Eckstein, dept. of sociology at Temple Univ. and dept. of sociology at Villanova, 2003 (Kevin Jand Rick, Critical Sociology, “The Devil is in the Details: Neutralizing Critical Studies of Publicly Subsidized Stadiums,”vol. 29 no. 2)

These documents, which we call “advocacy studies,” are quite unlike academic studies. First, the endpoints areusually much different. The academic studies usually look at macro, objective economic factors in an SMSAsuch as overall economic growth, tax revenue growth or employment growth. The advocacy studies rely onmore subjective data usually gathered through surveys and questionnaires where people will speculate on futureeconomic behavior. Such subjective data are not inherently inferior to more objective macro data, but they areespecially susceptible to sloppy methodology.

Advocates fabricate spin-off projects to justify subsidies, Denver provesDelaney and Eckstein, dept. of sociology at Temple Univ. and dept. of sociology at Villanova, 2003 (Kevin Jand Rick, Critical Sociology, “The Devil is in the Details: Neutralizing Critical Studies of Publicly Subsidized Stadiums,”vol. 29 no. 2)

Two studies done in Denver are typical of prospective studies in which advocates make all sorts of promises fora proposed stadium (see Denver study 1992; Silverstein, n.d.). 4 These fantasy documents are typical of thosedone before the actual construction of a stadium. Their main purpose is to make the case for using public dollarsfor a new stadium. Because they are written before final stadium plans are executed, they often promise anincredible amount of economic spin-off activity for the contemplated stadium – promises that rarely come true.For example the Denver studies spoke of a new pedestrian overpass from Union Station to the ballpark plaza,new housing immediately adjacent to the stadium and an international shopping district as well as a new 23rdSt. viaduct. Now that the stadium is built, it is clear that these promises were not fulfilled. Only the viaduct,which allows easy entrance and exit to the stadium area for cars, was fulfilled. Most of the housing has notappeared and pawnshops and warehouses still largely populate the area contemplated for an “international”shopping district. The Downtown Ballpark Redevelopment Committee Report (see Denver report, 1992) alsocalled for tastefully landscaping the main parking lot, and to have this lot used for other activities. Seven yearsafter this report, when we visited Denver, the lot was utterly barren; and even on a busy December Saturdaynight, with LoDo restaurants and parking lots crammed, the main stadium lot was totally empty. Finally, thisdocument contained an artist’s rendition of the 21st St. “streetscape improvements” which were guaranteed toaccompany the new stadium. The new 21st St. would have shops and wide sidewalks, which would lead fromnear downtown directly to the ballpark’s main entrance. In 1999, it looked much the same as it did in 1992.


Page 51

Con- Economy- Studies

Subsides are just a tool for the political elite to maintain powerAbrams 2013 (Roger I., Prof of Law, Northeastern, B.A. Cornell University. J,D. Harvard, PACE I.P., SPORTS &ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM Vol. 3, “HARDBALL IN CITY HALL: PUBLIC FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS”,Chapter 9 in “PLAYING TOUGH: THE WORLD OF SPORTS AND POLITICS”)

Losing a major league team because of the municipal failure to offer a competitive subsidy cannot be measuredsimply in dollars-and-cents. Economics are almost beside the point. In actuality, as we have seen, a sportsfranchise is a very small business with the economic impact of a large supermarket. The “jobs” factor isrebutted by the evidence, although it continues to be adopted by politicians as their rationale for acting. Theyneed some reason to expend limited resources other than as a means of retaining political power, which is likelytheir motivating force.Public subsidies can be measured and evaluated based on their political impact on the decision makers.Elections are normally won or lost based on votes at the margin. Those votes can be affected by decisions thatresult in gaining or losing a professional sports franchise. Presumably, it can also be affected in the long-termby failing schools or potholes left unfilled, but the impact of a sports decision is more direct and immediate.


Page 52

Con- Economy- AT: Economic Development

Studies conclude that stadium projects can crowd-out existing economic activity and decrease jobsMiller, assistant prof. of economics at Minnesota St. Univ., 2007 (Phillip, Journal of Sports Economics, “PrivateFinancing and Franchise Values,” January, vol. 8 no. 5)

Independent analysts, on the other hand, are skeptical about such claims. For example, studies by Baade andDye (1990); Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, and Mullins (1994); and Baade (1996) find that sports teams andtheir stadiums, on average, do not provide significant impacts on local or regional economies, although theyfind some small impacts in some cities. Baade and Dye (1990) find a significant negative effect on the hostcities’ regional share of income and their regional share of retail sales in cities that had baseball stadiums builtor renovated between 1965 and 1983. Furthermore, Coates and Humphreys (1999), examining the 37 cities inthe United States with National Basketball Association (NBA), NFL, or MLB teams, find that the existence ofthese teams is negatively correlated with the level of real per capita income in a city. Coates and Humphreys(2000) examine specific industries within the same set of 37 cities as their 1999 paper and find that the presenceof a sports team is associated with increased levels of employment and earnings in the amusement andrecreation sector. The presence of a sports team, however, is associated with decreased employment andearnings in all other sectors by an amount that offsets the increase in the amusement and recreation sector. Thissuggests that spending on sports teams in a metropolitan area mostly represents spending that is merelyredistributed within the area’s economy. This explains the overall findings in their 1999 article.

The independent evidence suggests two items. First, it suggests that, at best, the economic impactstatements examine the benefit side of the issue and, thus, are measuring gross impacts on output andemployment. A complete economic impact statement would measure bot the marginal benefits and themarginal costs of sports teams and sports stadiums.

Second, the existence of sports teams and stadiums in a metropolitan area causes consumers toredistribute their spending within a metropolitan area. At worst, it can actually decrease earnings andemployment in their metropolitan areas. Hence, neither the existence of sports teams nor the construction ofsports stadiums provide a catalyst for economic development in terms of employment and output growth.


Page 53


New Business attracted to stadium development just trade-off with existing businessesHernandez 2014 (Natalie, MA Pace Univ, NY State Dept of Labor,“Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports Arena Improve aNeighborhood’s Economy & Quality of Life?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University,http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)

Just like the residents, how long a business has been in the area was very important. A business that has been in the areafor a long time way before the new stadium, can give a better opinion as to how it has affected not just their business butthe community because they have seen the entire transformation. It was a pleasant surprise to see the majority of theparticipants had businesses that were in the area for more than ten years (65%). Although many can argue that a newstadium will attract new business owners, it did not seem to be the case to a great extent in this community, at least notbecause of a direct reflection of the stadium. Fifteen percent of the businesses that participated in the survey opened theirbusiness directly because of new stadium while 40% opened their business within the last five years but not directlybecause of the new stadium. The research showed that businesses that have been there for 15 years plus suffered morefrom the addition of the new stadium than the newer businesses. Through interviews many stated that when they openedtheir businesses back in the 80s and early 90s, they were the only “ones of their kind” but many state that when the newstadium was opened to the public, others took advantage to open their own business to compete, which in turn has takenbusiness from the older businesses.

Any Benefits to owning businesses around stadiums are only on game days and when the teams are doingwell – other events don’t bring revenue because of licensing agreementsHernandez 2014 (Natalie, MA Pace Univ, NY State Dept of Labor,“Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports ArenaImprove a Neighborhood’s Economy & Quality of Life?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University,http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)One business owner stated, in a semi-structured interview, which even though the baseball season is 6 months long, onlythree months are here in the Bronx, which wasn’t even considered prior to the research. He stated, “People say it will bebetter for us because of the increase of people, and yes, on game days we see so many sometimes but that is only 82 timesa year; on non-game days, it can be somewhat of ghost town. You’ve been here 20 minutes and I haven’t had onecustomer come in.” Many business owners said that on non-baseball game days they do other events such as concerts andfootball games at the new stadium that should help the businesses, but as one retail store owner stated: “the stadium pre-orders the items they are going to sell, sometimes from a distributor we don’t even have access to, and they sell thesethings within the stadium for these particular events and do you think we capitalize? No, we can’t get those items to sell intheir stores because we are not allowed to. If I sold food and beer, I would benefit year long, but I sell clothing.” There arethe businesses that been in the area long enough that say even going back to the old stadium, if the Yankees are winningthey are as well, during all the interviews all the owners said 2009 was financially one of the best; that just so happens tobe when the Yankees had their last successful season and last won the World Series.


Page 54


Local Businesses around stadiums are forced to lower prices in order to stay competitive – Even afterlowering prices there is no guarantee increased revenue as people would rather buy direct at the stadiumHernandez 2014 (Natalie, MA Pace Univ, NY State Dept of Labor,“Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports Arena Improve aNeighborhood’s Economy & Quality of Life?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University,http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)

During the research, businesses were asked if they had to change prices to lure or keep consumers coming to competewith the new stadium. Forty-five percent of the businesses surveyed stated that to compete with the stadium and keep thecustomers coming, they indeed had to lower their prices; the majority of that 45% were retail and restaurants. Businessesthat did not change their prices suffered the consequences because they saw a decrease in customers (15%). During theresearch, many business admitted to lowering prices and their businesses suffering to survive in addition to still not beingable to attract customers even though their prices are lower than the stadium. This might be because, just like manyresidents, they agree that the fans that are coming to the stadium are a targeted group that have deeper pockets and higherincomes so paying a little more inside the stadium for the same things they can get outside of the stadium for cheaper isnot much of a priority or necessity.

Local businesses can’t hire more staff – even if they do those jobs are only short termHernandez 2014 (Natalie, MA Pace Univ, NY State Dept of Labor,“Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports Arena Improve aNeighborhood’s Economy & Quality of Life?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University,http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)

In reference to the businesses staff, the research wanted to see if due to the influx of people if these businesses have hiredmore staff. If this research could be done again, the research would add another choice to the multiple choices. Many ofthe businesses (65%) chose the response “No there is no need for additional employees within this business” because itwas the “best answer” but many stated even though they chose that answer, the real answer was that sometimes theywould like to hire additional employees during baseball season in particular, but can’t really afford it. The businesses thatcan handle the additional employees usually either laid them off (20%) or shortened their hours (5%) at the end ofbaseball season. You can argue that because of lowering the prices and maybe the fewer customers these businesses see,financially it’s probably impossible to stay up and running if they try to hire more staff to deal with the influx ofcustomers.


Page 55


Any gains are only short term – at most stadiums will bring in 50 new full-time jobs – the remainders areseasonal part-time work – most players and coaches spend their money in other areasAbrams 2013 (Roger I., Prof of Law, Northeastern, B.A. Cornell University. J,D. Harvard, PACE I.P., SPORTS &ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM Vol. 3, “HARDBALL IN CITY HALL: PUBLIC FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS”,Chapter 9 in “PLAYING TOUGH: THE WORLD OF SPORTS AND POLITICS”)

The principal argument in support of public subsidies for private enterprise, including sports stadiums and arenas, is thatsuch expenditures create local jobs and spur economic redevelopment. However, virtually all economists who havestudied the issue in the sports context have concluded to the contrary. The construction jobs are temporary. Fewpermanent, year-round stadium jobs are created, and the seasonal, underpaid jobs that result do little to address issues ofunemployment. If the new stadium replaces an older facility, it may create no new jobs at all since, most likely, theemployees will be transferred to the new stadium. Even if the stadium is used to attract another city’s franchise, theimpact on jobs is no big thing. On average, excluding a club's management team, a new stadium employs fifty full-timeworkers. By comparison, a new Wal-Mart employs on average 360 full-time employees.The broader construct claims that building a new sports facility will boost the local economy. Repeated studies havefound, however, that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports facility construction andeconomic redevelopment. Bringing a new sports team to town does mean there will be some additional spending by theclub, by players and by other employees on local goods and services, but most players and management live (and spend)elsewhere. Simply building a new stadium to keep an existing franchise, of course, may not add an additional penny tolocal expenditures.


Page 56


Subsides are paid through regressive taxes that stunt economic growth of the local communityOng 2013 (Ryan Scott, California State University-Sacramento “THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO ASSESSING ASPORTS COMPLEX PROPOSAL”,http://books.google.com.tw/books/about/The_Public_Official_s_Guide_to_Assessing.html?id=D5EtngEACAAJ&redir_esc=y)

From a taxpayer standpoint, there is an additional opportunity cost because sports complexes are typically funded througha regressive tax such as increasing the sales tax, creating a sin tax, or issuing municipal bonds. A regressive tax slowsdown economic growth because individuals are left with less disposable income. Furthermore, associated costs withensuring the locality is tax compliant such as collecting the tax and enforcing the tax code should also be considered (Nolland Zimbalist, 1997, p. 60).Regressive Tax ImplicationsRegressive tax certainly creates a transfer of income: local households have less disposable income while the players andmanagement incomes increase. A household’s income decreases because government redirects a portion of their incometoward subsidizing a sports complex. Thus, this transfer of income results in a societal deadweight loss for households(Bast, 1998; Mills, 1996). It has been estimated that the “social cost of taxation exceeds tax collections by 25%” if aneconomy is “operating at full employment” (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997, p. 61). This societal loss counteracts the positiveeconomic effects of a sports complex and degrades the community.


Page 57

Con– Economy- AT: Employment

Statistical evidence points to actual decreases in employment in and around stadiums – Yankee StadiumprovesHernandez 2014 (Natalie, MA Pace Univ, NY State Dept of Labor,“Does Having a Major and Lucrative Sports Arena Improve aNeighborhood’s Economy & Quality of Life?”, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences@Pace University,http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/dyson_mpa/13)

An argument that is always brought up in the process of negotiating the building of an arena/stadium in a residentialneighborhood is that it will bring more jobs not just to the immediate area (in this case Bronx County) but to the entirecity as a whole. This doesn’t seem to be the case with New Yankee Stadium, at least not for extended periods of times,although 36.36% of surveyed residents did gain or knew someone who gained employment due to the new stadium andstill have that same employment 5 years later, 48.48% of the residents surveyed stated that neither they themselves noranyone they know gained employment directly as a result from the new stadium. In fact according to NYS Local AreaUnemployment Statistics for NYC, there was actually an overall increase in unemployment. In 2008 the year before theStadium opened in April 2009, the average unemployment rate for the city of New York was at 5.5%, and rising a fewpoints every year thereafter. Below is a table that shows the New York City Annual Unemployment rate for each yearsince 2008, as well as the unemployment rate for each April (when baseball season starts) for each year after 2008.


Page 58

Con- Economy- AT: Income

Local incomes are not affected during professional sports work stoppagesCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Coates and Humphreys (2001) used sports strikes as a natural experiment to test for an economic impact ofprofessional sports on the level of income per capita in urban areas.5 The paper used the vector of “sportsenvironment variables” from Coates and Humphreys (1999) and augmented this with indicator variables for fivework stoppages in the NFL and MLB during the sample period. Work stoppages in professional sports leaguesare useful for analyzing the economic impact of professional sports franchises because they represent periodswhen there are no sporting events to draw outside visitors to a city, the primary driver of economic impact inpromotional economic impact studies, and they are unexpected, infrequent events. Coates and Humphreysfound that real income per capita in metropolitan areas did not fall during work stoppages in professional sportsleagues, supporting the emerging consensus in the literature that professional sports has no tangible economicimpact on local economies.

Even the Super Bowl does not generate any extra income for residents in the host cityCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Coates and Humphreys (2002) used a second natural experiment, playoff appearances by franchises, to measurethe economic impact of professional sports on real per capita income in metropolitan areas. The sports variablesused were the vector of “sports environment” variables used in their earlier studies (Coates and Humphreys1999, 2001), augmented with indicator variables for various post season appearances in Major League Baseball,the National Football League, and the National Basketball Association. The results indicate that real per capitaincome in metropolitan areas that are host to postseason games is identical to real per capita income inmetropolitan areas that are not host to postseason games, disputing the idea in promotional economic studiesthat postseason games are an important source of economic impact. The results did suggest that themetropolitan area that is home to the Super Bowl winner had higher real per capita income in the following yearthan in other metropolitan areas, but this cannot be attributable to direct economic impact because the SuperBowl is played at a neutral site.6 Hosting the Super Bowl also had no effect on real per capita income in thehost metropolitan area.


Page 59

Con- Economy- AT: Multiplier Effect

Multiplier Effect doesn’t take into account the substitution effect and there is no empirical evidence toprove the multiplier effectAbrams 2013 (Roger I., Prof of Law, Northeastern, B.A. Cornell University. J,D. Harvard, PACE I.P., SPORTS &ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM Vol. 3, “HARDBALL IN CITY HALL: PUBLIC FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS”,Chapter 9 in “PLAYING TOUGH: THE WORLD OF SPORTS AND POLITICS”)

Proponents of public subsidies claim quite correctly that calculating the economic effect of increased local expendituresthat result from acquiring a new sports franchise must consider a “multiplier.” A dollar spent locally on goods andservices is then re-spent by local businesses in the community. The size of the multiplier, of course, determines themagnitude of the positive economic projection. While the multiplier is certainly greater than one, critics question thecommonly used two-and-one-half construct as without empirical basis. These calculations also typically ignore thesubstitution effects of exchanging one sports stadium for another or simply moving private resources from anotherentertainment option to the publicly-financed sports venue. The only viable hypothesis to support the economic benefits ofpublic subsidies would be to count only those expenditures that would not otherwise have been made while deducting anyeconomic losses incurred in the neighborhood around the old stadium if the new construction simply substitutes for theold.


Page 60

Con- Economy- AT: Operations/Advertising Revenue

Empirically, local representatives are out-maneuvered and negotiate poorly; teams keep the vastmajority of profits from operations and advertisingDemause, contributing editor to City Limits and freelance journalist, 2011 (Neil, NPR online, The Nation:“Stop the Subsidy-Sucking Sports Stadiums, August 5, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/05/139018592/the-nation-stop-the-subsidy-sucking-sports-stadiums)

Jim Nagourney, who spent three decades negotiating stadium deals on behalf of government agencies and teamowners, describes how he helped snooker city officials as a consultant to the Los Angeles Rams, who were thennegotiating a move to a new stadium in St. Louis. "We had a whiteboard, and we're putting stuff down" todemand in a stadium lease, he recalls. "I said, 'Guys, some of this is crazy.' And John Shaw, who was presidentof the Rams at the time — brilliant, brilliant guy — said, 'They can always say no. Let's ask for it.'" The result,which Nagourney calls "probably the most scandalous deal in the country," included a clause requiring the newstadium to remain "state-of-the-art," or else the team could break its lease and leave. "The city was poorlyrepresented — the city is always poorly represented.... We put in all of these ridiculous things, and the citydidn't have the sense to say no to any of them."The reason this dynamic recurs is simple, Nagourney says: cities rely on in-house legal teams to negotiatestadium deals. "A city attorney is not going to know where the money really is. They're not going to understandadvertising, they're not going to understand concessions — just a whole range of issues that the team officialsintimately understand. They know where the dollars are, and the municipal attorneys do not."


Page 61

Con- Economy- AT: Publicity

No Empirical Evidence to suggest increased publicity will help the local communityOng 2013 (Ryan Scott, California State University-Sacramento “THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO ASSESSING A SPORTS

COMPLEX PROPOSAL”,http://books.google.com.tw/books/about/The_Public_Official_s_Guide_to_Assessing.html?id=D5EtngEACAAJ&redir_esc=y)

Advocates further justify subsidizing a sports complex to the public by claiming that a community gains publicity throughlocal, national, and international media outlets such as the newspaper, radio, television, and the Internet. The community’sexposure increases when a local team makes the playoffs and increases further if they make it to the league championship.Supporters believe that this creates prestige for a locality and induces people and corporations to spend or invest in thelocal economy (Crompton, 2004).Unfortunately, this assertion lacks empirical evidence and is inconclusive (Compton,2004; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). Crompton (2004) and Bast (1998) conclude that sports and media exposure are, atmost, a small fraction of what is required to attract people and businesses to a region. Florida (2003), believes that the“creative class”—highly skilled and innovative workers such as working professionals, leaders, writers, poets, artists,etc.—are attracted to urban areas based on the numerous amounts of attractions— restaurants, hotels, specialty retailers,theaters, museums, parks, trails, and other forms of entertainment—that a city can offer. Florida, however, finds thatsports complexes are “irrelevant” and “unattractive” to the creative class.Instead of solely relying on sports complexes to revitalize an area, the team and its complex is just a part of the mix.Rosentraub (2010, p. 41) finds that a combination of factors, such as a skilled or less expensive workforce, attractions, andincentives are more important to increasing population or businesses than the exposure a team brings to a community.


Page 62

Con- Economy- AT: Relocation Bad

Voters don’t generally care: threats to relocate rarely materialize; owners leverage local politicians withbad deals and drain public funds for specious development projectsDemause, contributing editor to City Limits and freelance journalist, 2011 (Neil, NPR online, The Nation:“Stop the Subsidy-Sucking Sports Stadiums,” August 5, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/05/139018592/the-nation-stop-the-subsidy-sucking-sports-stadiums)

Yet the amount of public money being spent on sports facilities continues to rise. According to Harvard urbanplanner Judith Grant Long, cities, states and counties spent a record $6.5 billion on stadiums and arenas in the1990s, then shattered that mark the following decade with an additional $10.1 billion — a 31 percent increaseafter accounting for inflation. And that's not counting hidden subsidies like lease breaks, property taxexemptions and the use of tax-exempt government bonds, which Long estimates have added at least another 10percent to the public's tab.Why do new sports facilities have such a hold on local elected officials? The simplest explanation is fear:because team owners can choose new cities but cities can't choose new teams — thanks to the leagues'government-sanctioned monopolies over franchise placement — mayors feel they must offer owners anythingthey want. "Politicians continue to believe that it would be political disaster to lose a team on their watch,"Baade says.Actually losing a team, though, is extremely rare. Most team owners prefer to keep plugging for new stadiumsin their hometowns even after their bluff has been called. Florida Marlins president David Samson first declaredin 2004 that a new stadium bill "has to happen in the next week. And if not, we'll move on." He repeated similarthreats for four years, until the city of Miami and Miami-Dade County finally agreed to kick in more than $478million for a new stadium with a retractable roof.Similarly, after successfully using relocation threats to get the city of Pittsburgh to help fund a new hockeyarena, Penguins owner and NHL legend Mario Lemieux admitted, "Our goal was to remain here in Pittsburghall the way. Those trips to Kansas City and Vegas and other cities was just to go, and have a nice dinner andcome back.... That was just a way for us to put more pressure, and we knew it would work at the end of theday." (It's also worth noting that even in those few cities where teams have moved, no local elected official hasyet been voted out of office as a result. A Wisconsin state senator who cast the deciding vote for a new Brewersstadium in 1995 did, however, become his state's first legislator to be recalled by voters.)


Page 63

Con- Economy- AT: Tax Revenue

Leakages prove that professional sports do not increase local growth; at best they recirculate moneySiegfried and Zimbalist, prof. of economics at Vanderbilt and Robert A. Woods professor of Economicsat Smith College, 2002 (John and Andrew, Journal of Sports Economics, “A Note on the Local Economic Impact ofSports Expenditures,” November, vol. 3 no. 4)

Besides overstating the extent of new local spending generated by a sports team, estimates of the impact ofsports teams on local economies often are exaggerated because they use standard local expansion multipliersextracted from regional input-output models. Not only are such multipliers often based on outdated technicalcoefficients which are treated as invariant to shifts in supply and demand, but they also represent an averageover a wide variety of consumption expenditures.Sports teams, however, are not average. They “import” an unusually high proportion of their inputs.Approximately 53% to 60% of total revenues in the National Hockey League, Major League Baseball, NationalFootball League, and National Basketball Association (NBA) go to the players as salaries and benefits. A largeshare of the balance goes to high-paid executives and owners. These are all high-income individuals with highmarginal tax and savings rates. Taxes leak out of the local economy to the federal government, and savings leakinto the world’s financial markets. Neither gets recirculated in the local economy. Because a large share of theconsumption expenditures of these individuals is on goods produced or sold outside the local economy, thestandard economic expansion multiplier overstates the first-round effects of payroll and team profits on thelocal economy.


Page 64

Con- Economy- AT: Tax Revenue

Public stadium funding is a race to the bottom; foregone property tax revenue overwhelms any publicbenefit accrued from public stadium fundingLong, Harvard Univ. urban planning professor, 2005 (Judith Grant, Journal of Sports Economics, “Full Count:The Real Cost of Public Funding for Major League Funding for Major League Sports Facilities,” May, vol. 6 no. 2)

Sports facilities rarely yield property taxes for their municipal hosts, and these foregone revenues represent asignificant and uncounted public cost. Their omission accounts for $43 million toward the total $50 million inuncounted public costs (Table 2). A facility need not be publicly owned to avoid paying property taxes: Eighty-five cases receive property tax exemptions, whereas only 67 are publicly owned. Many cities offer exemptionto privately owned facilities on the grounds that regardless of ownership, sports facilities are used for a publicpurpose. This premise is currently being challenged in Florida, where efforts are underway to restrict citiesfrom offering exemptions to sports facilities. Some cities are responding with threats to transfer facilities tocounty ownership to bypass the impact of the proposed legislation. In a few cases public owners do requiretheir tenants to pay property taxes, as is the case at most facilities located in Canada. In others, teams arerequired to make payments in lieu of property taxes (PILOT) through ticket surcharges and admissions taxes oralternate forms or revenue sharing. The preceding adjustment for net annual costs shows, however, the publicsector is barely making a profit from operations before making the adjustment for property tax exemptions.Consequently, PILOTs would have to increase dramatically to offset the substantial opportunity cost offoregone property taxes.


Page 65

Con- Economy- AT: Tax Revenue – Trade Off

Arenas mostly attract the local populations to attend the games thus any added revenue is money thatwould have been spent elsewhere regardless of the stadium and doesn’t guarantee increases in the taxrevenueGAROFALO AND WALDRON 9/07/12 (Pat and Travis, “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics ofSports Stadiums”, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/2/)

The counterargument -- made by council member Joyce Clark, who voted for the subsidies, and Glendale First, anorganization in favor of the package -- is that the Coyotes and their arena provide support to the local economy thatotherwise wouldn't be there."It's a huge economic engine for Glendale," Bea Wyatt, a spokesperson for Glendale First said. According to Wyatt, whodoesn't live in Glendale but frequents the city for Coyotes games, sales tax revenue made up 41 percent of Glendale'sbudget last year, and a significant portion was derived from sales around the arena. Supporters also claim the deal withJamison is a good one for the city, since he will eventually pay for the arena's management and employ local workers.But again, economists don't seem to buy the argument. While Glendale First claims that more than 600,000 visitors --three times Glendale's population -- came to the city for hockey last year, the Coyotes finished last in the NHL inattendance. And it is unclear how many of those visitors were, like Wyatt, residents of nearby communities who maypatronize restaurants but don't spend money shopping or staying in hotels.Matheson estimates that 20 percent of fans for a Major League Baseball game come from outside the local area, and thatthe figure for hockey games is likely much smaller. That's hardly enough to fill the local hotels or to add outside spendingto the local economy in other ways, he said."It's not generating new revenue. This is local spending on a local event," Matheson said, adding that most of the moneyspent in and around arenas and stadiums would likely be spent elsewhere in the local economy if there were no sportingevents to attend.


Page 66

Con- Economy- AT: Teams would not exist without subsidies

College Sports Prove that without Subsides Sports teams can continue to surviveOng 2013 (Ryan Scott, California State University-Sacramento “THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO ASSESSING A SPORTSCOMPLEX PROPOSAL”,http://books.google.com.tw/books/about/The_Public_Official_s_Guide_to_Assessing.html?id=D5EtngEACAAJ&redir_esc=y)

If public subsidies were eliminated, the teams would still survive in an existing complex. Over 40% of major footballcollegiate teams play in stadiums built before Chicago’s Soldier Field opened in 1924—the oldest NFL stadium in theleague (Haddock, Jacobi, and Sag, 2011). The players and owners income and revenues would probably decrease, but theteams would remain in business (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). The subsidization of a sports complex is not required fora team to remain competitive in an established league, as was the case with MLB before the 1950s. The franticcompetition between regions has led to a financial inequality between the public and owners where government is leftwith the cost and financial liability and owners and players are left to split the revenue.


Page 67

Con- Economy- AT: Travel/Tourism

Net growth is negligible due to trade-offs and substitutionsSiegfried and Zimbalist, prof. of economics at Vanderbilt and Robert A. Woods professor of Economicsat Smith College, 2002 (John and Andrew, Journal of Sports Economics, “A Note on the Local Economic Impact ofSports Expenditures,” November, vol. 3 no. 4)

Promotional impact studies ignore or understate the effects of consumer substitution and leakages from the localeconomy connected to sports facilities (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). These studies rely largely on theassumptions that all (or much of the) spending on sports teams is new to the local economy and that thisspending has a similar effect on the local economy as spending on other consumption goods and services. Bothof these propositions are false.Most consumers have a relatively inflexible leisure budget. The more time and money that is spent on a sportsteam, the less is available for golf, bowling, amusement parks, restaurants, theater, or concert halls. Andalthough some expenditures on local sports teams substitute for imports (e.g. replace out-of-town travel), a lotalso replace alternative leisure expenditures in the community where the team is locate. The net effect of a newteam or stadium on consumption in the team’s local community is likely to be close to zero, although sportsteams cause a substantial rearrangement of leisure spending within the local area (Coates & Humphreys, 2000).If sports teams attract new money into an area, the net effect of spending can be substantial. If that happened,of course, it would be largely at the expense of consumption expenditures in other areas. Thus, the economicimpact rationale for sports team subsidies would constitute a “beggar-my-neighbor” policy. That may satisfylocal politicians, but it is an uncomfortable justification for those economists who do not wish to distinguishlocal residents as favored people.

Minimum elasticity of the sports dollar ensures that any increase in sports tourism is just a trade-off withother sports teamsAbrams 2013 (Roger I., Prof of Law, Northeastern, B.A. Cornell University. J,D. Harvard, PACE I.P., SPORTS &

ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM Vol. 3, “HARDBALL IN CITY HALL: PUBLIC FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS”,Chapter 9 in “PLAYING TOUGH: THE WORLD OF SPORTS AND POLITICS”)

Some cities have based their public expenditures on the hope that a new stadium (and a winning team) will attract moreout-of-state visitors. There is some evidence of increased sports tourism based on new facilities, at least in the short term.Most of the spectators, however, would have come to town in any case and are simply moving their expenditures fromone city venue to another. The private expenditures simply flow to the owner of the franchise with the new facilityinstead of the owner of some other entertainment offering. The addition of a sports team to a city does provide householdswith a new entertainment option. Consumers choosing to attend sporting events will spend less on other entertainmentoptions, such as movies and dining out, thereby shifting, but not increasing, existing tax revenue and spending. Theentertainment and sports dollar has minimum elasticity.


Page 68

Con- Economy- AT: Trickle Down

Washington D.C./Baltimore prove that consumption-based development like ballparks divert from morebeneficial public projects and create budget deficitsFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

In committing more than $611 million to the stadium project, the Williams’s administration and the DCgovernment demonstrated the way in which they were conceiving the city. At the time, civic leaders had manyurgent capital projects demanding their attention: sewer upgrades; school improvements; a new central library;and a new public hospital. Yet, the city’s bonding authority, taxing capacity, and the mayor’s political capitalwere all expended on a project that primarily benefited non-residents, including MLB, team owners, andsuburban fans. This prioritization is often justified through the belief (rooted in the neoliberal logic of ‘trickledown’ economics) that building amenities to attract spending by non-residents is a necessary investmenttowards creating a higher tax base that is then able to provide for other needs. However, the experience ofconsumption-based economic redevelopment strategies has shown that substantial public resources are requiredto maintain and upgrade visitor-oriented areas (Gottdiener, 2001; Hannigan, 1998; Harvey, 1989). For example,Hamilton and Kahn (1997) found that Baltimore, which is considered one of the most successful cities in usingconsumption-based strategies, was spending $17 million more per year to support the Inner Harbor than the areaproduced in tax revenues. Nonetheless, these experiences and the expressed opposition from many of DCresidents were ignored as Williams and the DC Council approved the stadium.


Page 69

Con- Economy- AT: Urban Revitalization

Owners are not in the urban renewal business, stadia are rarely part of greater development projectsCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

Many new stadiums do not foster surrounding development because they are not physically interwoven withother components of the urban fabric. Rather, these stadiums are designed for quick entry and exit of suburbanfans with automobiles. Even though they are technically inner-city parks, often their urban integration is limitedto supplying parking facilities close to the downtown business district. Examples include facilities such asPittsburgh’s Three Rivers Stadium and New York’s Shea Stadium. A commentator on a proposed new stadiumin Chicago observed: “Never have city and stadium been so detached from each other. The garages will attachto the park by elevated walkways, and thus fans who arrive by car will have the privilege of never actuallysetting foot on the South Side of Chicago” (Euchner, 1993, p. 70). The antithetical goals of team owners, andpublic officials who are seeking to use a new stadium to stimulate redevelopment of downtown areas werenoted in the following observation:From the team’s perspective the ideal location will be a site that is easily accessible, has visibility from majorhighways, and is compatible with the direction of existing and future population growth. It should not besurprising that the community goals of local officials often do not match the location criteria and businessinterests of team owners. As one interviewer commented, team owners are not in the urban redevelopmentbusiness (Johnson, 1991, p. 319).

Stadia are designed to capture all recreational spending not to foster surrounding developmentCrompton, prof. of Recreation, Park and Tourism Sciences at Texas A&M, 2004 (John, Journal of SportManagement, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League SportsFacilities,” January, vol. 18 no. 1)

The potential number and range of ancillary businesses that can flourish in a parasitic relationship with facilitieshosting major league sports franchises, however, is relatively small and is decreasing. The new generation offully-loaded facilities is likely to capture much of the spending that used to occur in nearby restaurants, bars andsports merchandise stores. It has been suggested that these new facilities are analogous to European walledcities, seeking to enclose all commercial activity and revenue flows within their confines (Siegfried &Zimbalist, 2000).


Page 70

Con- Eminent Domain- Wash D.C.

Elites use claims of ‘blight’ to seize land from marginalized groups through eminent domainFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

Historically the description of an area as ‘blighted’ has been used to justify the seizure of land from anddisplacement of socially marginal users and less socially accepted uses in order to favor of redevelopmentprojects that primarily benefit dominant groups (Eisinger, 2003; McCann, 1999). In many ways, this seems tobe the case in Washington as users were displaced and landowners were dispossessed through the city’s use ofeminent domain to seize their property. Although the United States Constitution requires that ‘justcompensation’ be made when property is seized through eminent domain, many of the landowners believed thecity was making offers well below market value in order to conform with the DC Council’s $165 million cap onland costs. According to the property owners, the city made very low offers based on outdated and non-comparable data on their properties and then refused to share the appraisals on which those offers were madewith property owners (Jamieson, 2006; Knott, 2005). As a result, many landowners felt compelled to engage inexpensive litigation in order to secure the ‘just compensation’ to which they were entitled (Jamieson, 2006).According to the Washington Sculpture Center’s Reinaldo Lopez, ‘This is like reverse Robin Hood to me. Theyare taking from the poor and giving it to the rich’ (Knott, 2004: C1).


Page 71

Con- Eminent Domain- Wash D.C.

Eminent domain forced the relocation of residents of public housing and LGBT communityFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

While the city may have sought to under compensate the owners of property within the stadium site, littleattempt at restitution was made for the people who used the site or otherwise lived within the Near Southeastand, through gentrification, were displaced from the lives they had created. According to Achenbach, thestadium site was:An eccentric area in a city that’s not sure it wants any such thing. This town has been, from the very start,meticulously plotted, built on a grandiose scheme, every street and public square serving to call attention to thegreatness of a nation. Plans rule this city. And if you’re not part of the plan, you’re out of luck. (Achenbach,2004: D1)In the emerging moral economy of the Near Southeast, its long-time residents and users have tended not be partof the plan and have been mostly out of luck. The residents of the 707 units of public housing in the ArthurCapper/Carrollsburg projects were all forced move with, as described by former resident Debra Frazier, ‘callousdisregard for us as humans, as people being displaced’ (Cherkis, 2005). Although the city has committed tomaking sure that all public housing units will be replaced, a community has been irretrievably destroyed and itsresidents have to create new lives in other parts of the city without guarantees that they will ever have anopportunity to return (Cherkis, 2005).


Page 72

Con- Inequality- Wash D.C.

Monumentalist symbology in Washington D.C. (and the greater U.S.) creates a myth of democracy andrepresentation while diverting attention from poverty and inequalityFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

There exists a Washington, DC, that is readily recognizable within the minds – if not readily accepted within the hearts –of the global populace. At its most concrete, this Washington (and indeed this United States) is expressed through anarchitectural monumentalism constituted within and through a number of emotive architectural forms: the White House,home to the President of the United States, the overseer of the world’s largest economy and Commander in Chief of itsmost powerful military; the Capitol building housing 535 representatives and senators, as legislators in the world’s oldestcontinuing representative democracy; the Lincoln Memorial, honoring the President who emancipated America’s slavesand where Reverend Martin Luther King Jr addressed more than 200,000 civil rights marchers in 1963, is a symbol ofhope and freedom; the National Archives’ displays of the Declaration of Independence, United States Constitution and theBill of Rights – documents upon which many nations have based their own constitutions; and the Smithsonian Institutionof 20 museums and galleries, home to millions of historical artifacts and works of art, significant not only to the UnitedStates but for many countries. Through such architectural monumentalism, the capital of the United States embodies itselfas the bastion of democratic freedom, boundless opportunity, and reasoned progress. Thus, if in John Winthrop’s oftmisquoted words, America has come to think of itself as a ‘shining city upon a hill’, then this monumentalist Washingtonis surely both its political core and ideological essence.Yet, skulking in the shadows of this built American mythology is a second and far less visible Washington. Within thisother Washington, 581,000 people lack representation in a Congress that: has veto power over its laws and budget;appoints its judges and prosecutors; and routinely interferes in purely local matters (LCCR Education Fund and DC Vote,n.d.). It is a fiscally constrained city with a structural deficit nearing $1 billion per year and more than $5 billion indeferred capital projects, but Congress prevents it from taxing the incomes of thousands of suburbanites who use the city’sinfrastructure and services each day (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2003; Lazere and Garrison, 2005; NationalCapital Planning Commission [NCPC], 2006). It is a city in which almost 20 percent of all residents live in poverty, andincome inequality is among the largest in the United States (Lazere, 2007). Yet perversely, and despite such financialshortfalls and inequities, Washington is also a city that has provided the greatest public subsidy (by almost 50% comparedto the next biggest) for any stadium for a major league sports team in North America (Sports Facilities Reports, 2008).Such are the complexities and contradictions of city governance within the context of the post-industrial, entrepreneurialcity, ever increasingly reliant upon the symbolic, as much as the economic, value of major league professional sportfranchises and events (Danielson, 1997; Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999; Silk, 2002). However, in addition toaddressing this extensively researched phenomenon, this article does so within the uniquely politicized context ofWashington: a city explicitly designed and presented to symbolize democracy and progress, but whose governancestructure and practices simultaneously perpetuates the political disenfranchisement and economic inequalities experiencedby its residents.


Page 73

Con- Inequality- Wash D.C.

Sports subsidies mask and entrench structural inequalities and divert funds from health, environment,and education; Nationals Park is evocative of the rest of the U.S.Friedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

In 2004, city leaders in Washington approved the construction of a new stadium: a stratagem used as a part ofthe city’s successful wooing of Major League Baseball’s (MLB) Montreal Expos to Washington. NationalsPark, which opened in March 2008, cost the city $611 million dollars, despite its many other pressing needs forcapital projects within public health and safety, the environment, and education (Mayor’s Task Force, 2005;Miller, 2004; Montgomery and Woodlee, 2004b). Civic leaders have justified spending on the stadium as aninvestment that will help increase economic activity in the city, which, through the fabled power of trickle-down economics, would provide new tax revenues that would enable the city to be better able to meet the needsof its residents.The actions of Washington’s civic leaders and the case of Nationals Park are not unique, as civic leaders aroundthe world frequently include subsidized sports facilities and hallmark sporting events in economicredevelopment programs (Cochrane et al., 1996; Lee, 2002; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Wilson, 1996). Indeed,Nationals Park represents another example of the fallacy of trickle-down stadium economics, premised on thetendency of entrepreneurial urban governments to divert scarce public resources to projects that primarilybenefit private capital interests, in the hope that they prove to be the ‘motor’ for more general capitaldissemination. However, this diversion of public resources for private profit is only one of the impacts resultingfrom stadium decisions. In this article, we examine the social relations and hierarchies that were produced andreproduced within Washington, as civic leaders prioritized attracting MLB to return to the city. In particular,we analyze Nationals Park as a highly politicized, spectacular edifice, which instead of improving the lives ofcity residents, actually perpetuates the disenfranchisement and inequities of the Washington status quo, throughits architectural and ideological masking of the political and economic ‘rot beneath’ the city’s ‘glitter’ (Harvey,2001b: 140).


Page 74

Con- Quality of Life- Bad Science

No Statistical evidence for increase in Quality of Life Arguments – Just Junk ScienceAbrams 2013 (Roger I., Prof of Law, Northeastern, B.A. Cornell University. J,D. Harvard, PACE I.P., SPORTS &

ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM Vol. 3, “HARDBALL IN CITY HALL: PUBLIC FINANCING OF SPORTS STADIUMS”,Chapter 9 in “PLAYING TOUGH: THE WORLD OF SPORTS AND POLITICS”)

Studies of the non-economic impact of public expenditures on sports facilities have not reached convincingconclusions. It is not as easy as counting jobs, gross receipts or taxes. Professor Andrew Zimbalist of SmithCollege, one of the nation’s leading sports economists, in his review of the work on the “public good” thatflows from public subsidies, concluded that the methodologies currently employed have not reached conclusiveresults. Some studies have attempted to measure how much respondents would be willing to spend to “buy” thepublic good in question. In the aggregate the purchase price falls far short of the amounts actually allocated bypublic authorities for the purchase in question. These studies, however, may underestimate the true value to thepublic of the public subsidies in question.Each year, national publications announce their list of “the best cities” in which to live. These rankings basetheir assessments on counting things. For example, Business Week ranks the 100 largest cities based on 16criteria:[T]he number of restaurants, bars, and museums per capita; the number of colleges, libraries, and professionalsports teams; the income, poverty, unemployment, crime, and foreclosure rates; percent of population withbachelor’s degrees, public school performance, park acres per 1,000 residents, and air quality. Greaterweighting was placed on recreational amenities such as parks, bars, restaurants, and museums, and oneducational attainment, school performance, poverty, and air quality.These factors seem plausible, but, at best, they are indirect measures of public happiness. While professionalsports make the list, why are “semi-professional” teams -- big-time college football, for example – omitted? TheOklahoma Sooners and the Alabama Crimson Tide certainly make those states better places to live. U.S. NEWSAND WORLD REPORT, a publication that has ranked everything but the best religions, examines “strongeconomies, low living costs, and plenty of fun things to do.” This is not quite junk science, but it is close.


Page 75

Con- Quality of Life- AT: Intangible Benefits

Even studies that take into account “psychic income” conclude that, on balance, professional sports donot benefit their local communitiesBuist and Mason, faculty members of Physical Education and Recreation at the University of Alberta,2010 (Ernest A. and Daniel S., American Behavioral Scientist, “Newspaper Framing and Stadium Subsidization.” June,vol. 53 no. 10)

Can the benefits that cities and fans receive really justify the subsidies provided to teams? There are twoarguments put forth as to why subsidies are justified, which can be divided into two overarching categories:intangible and tangible benefits. Tangible benefits are the economic effects that a team has on a community,such as the jobs and tax revenues generated by the presence of the team and facility. Intangible benefits includethe major league status and “psychic income” associated with the presence of a team (Crompton, 2004). Both ofthese claims have been subject to academic scrutiny in recent years. Most independent empirical research hasfound the tangible economic benefits derived from stadium construction to be suspect (Baade, 2003; Baim,1994; Coates & Humphreys, 1999, 2003). Other scholars have attempted to place a monetary value on theintangible benefits of sports teams and facilities using Contingent Valuation Method (Johnson, Groothuis, &Whitehead, 2001; Johnson & Whitehead, 2000; Santo, 2007). The latter studies generally concluded that,although teams and facilities certainly confer public goods to cities, they do not do so at a level that justifies theamount of the public subsidies that cities usually provide.


Page 76

Con- Quality of Life- AT: Community/Social Bonds

Residents don’t buy the ‘stadium as a symbol’ rhetoric that elites employFriedman and Andrews, assistant research prof. of physical cultural studies at Univ. of Maryland andprof. of kinesiology at Univ. of Maryland, 2011 (Michael T. and David L., International Review for the Sociologyof Sport, “The Built Sport Spectacle and the Opacity of Democracy,” June, vol. 46 no. 2)

As Williams adroitly obscured the costs of the stadium, other proponents promised several other benefits for thecity. First, the stadium would revitalize the Near Southeast, just as the Verizon Center arena transformed itsneighborhood from ‘a collection of dilapidated row houses, carry-out eateries, trash-strewn parking lots andvagrants looking for spare change’ into an area with upscale retail and condominiums that ‘is splashed in inneon and pedestrians and diners and barhoppers’ (Knott, 2007: B2; see also Hedgpeth, 2005; Wilbon, 2004).Second, anticipating the impact a potential stadium could have upon the AWI, DC Planning Director AndrewAltman stated, ‘the great thing about a stadium is the kind of activity it can generate . . . It can really be a vitalpart of how the city works toward our revitalization goals’ (Kovaleski and Timberg, 2002: C1). Beyond thesedevelopment impacts that seemed to primarily benefit developers, Mayor Williams suggested the stadiumwould symbolize the city’s economic and political resurgence, and expected ‘baseball to be a unifying factor ina city long “polarized by race and class and, on a federal level, ideology”’ (Brady, 2005: 1A).However, many DC residents were skeptical of rhetoric promoting the stadium’s benefits and conceptions ofurban planners. Instead of becoming the unifying factor that Williams described, debate ‘divided the city alonglines of race and class’ (Montgomery and Heath, 2006: A1). Polling conducted in October 2004 by the No DCTaxes for Baseball Coalition found opposition to the proposal from 66 percent of residents (Gross, 2004).Moreover, residents were angry as they perceived ‘the ballpark as an extravagant gift to MLB’s millionaireteam owners at the expense of city schoolchildren, the poor and other groups in need of city funding’(Montgomery and Heath, 2006: A1). To other residents, the stadium was indicative of the city’s ‘Wash Vegasmentality’ (Kovaleski and Timberg, 2002: C1) that favored development benefiting visitors rather than residents(Montgomery, 2004b; Nakamura, 2004a). Opposition to the stadium spurred action with protests in front of theWilson Building, Washington’s city hall, and with members of the DC Council being deluged by calls andemails urging them to reject the deal (Jaffe, 2005; O’Bryan, 2004).


Page 77

Con- Quality of Life- AT: Community/Social Bond

Not everyone likes sports, public subsidies breed resentmentCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland, dept. of Economics at Univ. of Alberta,2008 (Dennis and Brad R., Econ Journal Watch, “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,Stadiums, and Mega-Events?” September, vol. 5 no. 3)

Sports are one of many cultural activities within the city. For every individual who derives enjoyment from thepresence of the sports franchises in the community, there are likely to be other individuals who are uninterestedin sports or even resent being taxed to subsidize an activity they have no use for. Others argue that sportsculture diverts people from more socially beneficial interests and pursuits. Before accepting that sports teamsgenerate external benefits, a careful and thorough look at “external costs,” and the alternative uses of resourcesdevoted to subsidies—uses that might also have “external benefits”—is clearly warranted. Unfortunately, suchdebate quickly leads public discourse and policymakers into a briar patch of unpriced values that are easilymisrepresented. Thus, economists generally urge that society steer away from government sponsorship ofcultural activities not related to education.

Proponents spend many times more than opponents to get stadium bills passed, even in Green BayCoates and Humphreys, dept. of economics at Univ. of Maryland and dept. of recreation, sport, andtourism at Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006 (Dennis and Brad R., Journal of Urban Economics,“Proximity Benefits and Voting on Stadium and Arena Subsidies,” March, vol. 59 no. 2)

Manipulation of the process of the sort that Fort describes undoubtedly occurs. Stadium subsidy proponentsoften expend vast sums of money campaigning for their proposals. For example, the campaign finance arm ofthe Green Bay Packers reportedly spent $858,000 to win voter approval for the redevelopment of LambeauField. Added to $568,000 in lobbying expenses at thestate level spent to get the referendum before the voters,the Packers spent more than $1.42 million on the referendum. Of this amount, $435,000 was spent onadvertising on TV and radio, and on market research to help the Packers focus their campaign message.Opponents of the plan spent $34,996. In Houston, opponents of subsidies for the Rockets spent nearly $700,000on their campaign in the 1999 referendum, but then had far less resources to devote to the fight in 2000.Proponents reportedly spent over $2.5 million, much of it coming from Rockets owner Les Alexander, insupport of the 2000 referendum. Fort argues that this type of spending is also evidence in favor of the agendasetter model. The vast sums spent by one side are evidence that one small group stands to gain handsomely ifthe subsidy is passed. The tiny sum spent by the other side indicates that a large group will see little effect and,therefore, has no incentive to devote many resources to stopping the subsidy. Indeed, the opponents may haveso little at stake that they don’t even bother to vote in the election.


Page 78

Alternatives to Subsidies – Remove Government Sponsored Monopolies

Removing the Government Sponsored Monopolies of Sports Teams would allow for a more balancedapproach to stadiumsOng 2013 (Ryan Scott, California State University-Sacramento “THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO ASSESSING A SPORTSCOMPLEX PROPOSAL”,http://books.google.com.tw/books/about/The_Public_Official_s_Guide_to_Assessing.html?id=D5EtngEACAAJ&redir_esc=y)

Reversing the 1986 Tax Reform Act would allow—or even require—owners to contribute more than 10% for anyfinancing borrowed from the Federal government. Reversing or modifying the 1961 Sports Broadcasting Rights Act, the1914 Clayton Act, and the 1890 Sherman Act of 1890, would give startup leagues the chance to enter into the professionalsports market. Moreover, the Federal government could pass legislation that would divide established leagues intomultiple smaller leagues, the same way collegiate athletics now exist. This would allow new professional teams to enterthe market, thereby reducing the bidding wars between cities. However, given past rulings, the strength of sportslobbying, the power of broadcast media, and local advocate coalitions, it is highly unlikely that such legislation will bepassed.


Page 79

Alternatives to Subsidies - Remove Non-Profit Status & Change Broadcasts

Removing Non-Profit Status and Changing Television Copyrights would allow for revenue to go back tothe public and cover all expenditures from construction of stadiumsEASTERBROOK 2013 (GREGG, contributing editor at The Atlantic, writes the Tuesday Morning Quarterback column forESPN.com and has been an on-air football commentator for ESPN and for the NFL Network, OCTOBER 2013,“How the NFLFleeces Taxpayers.” http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/3/)

IN TOO M ANY AREAS of contemporary life, public subsidies are converted to private profit. Sometimes, such as withthe bailout of General Motors, once the subsidies end, society is better off; sometimes, as with the bailout of AIG,subsidies are repaid. Public handouts for modern professional football never end and are never repaid. In return, the NFLcreates nothing of social value—while setting bad examples, despite its protests to the contrary, regarding concussions,painkiller misuse, weight gain, and cheating, among other issues. The No. 1 sport in a nation with a childhood-obesityepidemic celebrates weight gain; that’s bad enough. Worse, the sport setting the bad example is subsidized up one sideand down the other.The NFL’s nonprofit status should be revoked. And lawmakers—ideally in Congress, to level the national playing field,as it were—should require that television images created in publicly funded sports facilities cannot be privatized. Thedevil would be in the details of any such action. But Congress regulates health care, airspace, and other far-more-complexaspects of contemporary life; it can crack the whip on the NFL.If football images created in places funded by taxpayers became public domain, the league would respond by paying thetrue cost of future stadiums—while negotiating to repay construction subsidies already received. To do otherwise wouldmean the loss of billions in television-rights fees. Pro football would remain just as exciting and popular, but would nolonger take advantage of average people.IN 2010, THE National Football League moved its annual Pro Bowl away from Honolulu for the first time in 30 years.At the very time Hawaii was cutting its budget for public schools, state lawmakers voted to pay the NFL $4 million pergame to bring the event back to their capital. The lawmakers’ gift-giving was bad enough. What was disgraceful was thatthe rich, subsidized owners of the NFL accepted.Until public attitudes change, those at the top of the pro-football pyramid will keep getting away with whatever they can.This is troubling not just because ordinary people are taxed so a small number of NFL owners and officers can live asmodern feudal lords and ladies. It is troubling because athletics are supposed to set an example—and the example beingset by the NFL is one of selfishness.


Page 80

Alternatives to Subsidies – Change Broadcast Rights

Privatization of Television Rights in Publicly Paid for stadiums is the real reason that the locals don’tbenefitEASTERBROOK 2013 (GREGG, contributing editor at The Atlantic, writes the Tuesday Morning Quarterback column forESPN.com and has been an on-air football commentator for ESPN and for the NFL Network, OCTOBER 2013,“How the NFLFleeces Taxpayers.” http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/3/)

Too often, NFL owners can, in fact, get away with anything. In financial terms, the most important way they do so is bycreating game images in publicly funded stadiums, broadcasting the images over public airwaves, and then keeping all themoney they receive as a result. Football fans know the warning intoned during each NFL contest: that use of the game’simages “without the NFL’s consent” is prohibited. Under copyright law, entertainment created in publicly fundedstadiums is private property.When, for example, Fox broadcasts a Tampa Bay Buccaneers game from Raymond James Stadium, built entirely at thepublic’s expense, it has purchased the right to do so from the NFL. In a typical arrangement, taxpayers provide most or allof the funds to build an NFL stadium. The team pays the local stadium authority a modest rent, retaining the exclusiveright to license images on game days. The team then sells the right to air the games. Finally, the NFL asserts a copyrightover what is broadcast. No federal or state law prevents images generated in facilities built at public expense from beingprivatized in this manner.Baseball, basketball, ice hockey, and other sports also benefit from this same process. But the fact that others takeadvantage of the public too is no justification. The NFL’s sweetheart deal is by far the most valuable: This year, CBS,DirecTV, ESPN, Fox, NBC, and Verizon will pay the NFL about $4 billion for the rights to broadcast its games. Nextyear, that figure will rise to more than $6 billion. Because football is so popular, its broadcast fees would be high nomatter how the financial details were structured. The fact that game images created in places built and operated at publicexpense can be privatized by the NFL inflates the amounts kept by NFL owners, executives, coaches, and players, whiledriving up the cable fees paid by people who may not even care to watch the games.

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