taiwan’s sovereignty laim over the

Taiwan’s Sovereignty Claim over the Diaoyutai Island Group (DIG) & the Proposed

East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI)

Yann-huei Song

Research Fellow

Institute of European and American Studies/CAPAS

Academia Sinica, Taipei

Taiwan, R.O.C.

12. 2012

Maritime Disputes in the Asia-Pacific Region

• For countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the cause for concern is the development trend of maritime activities conducted by the countries that border the Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

■

■

■

Diaoyutai Diaoyutai

Island Group

Potential Flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific Region

Paracel Islands

Dokdo/Take-shima

Kuril Islands/ Northern Territories

■

Scarborough Shoal Spratly

Islands

http://xd5.xanga.com/21581a217876846034263/b31055241.jpg

Potential Flashpoints in the

Asia-Pacific Region Existing Disputes over Island Sovereignty and Maritime Rights

• Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories Disputes (Russian Federation/Japan)

• Dokdo/Takeshima (Korea and Japan) • Okinotorishima (Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan） • Socotra/Suyan Rock/Ieodo （Korea and China) • Diaoyutai Island Group/Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands (China,

Japan, and Taiwan) • Paracel Islands (Vietnam, China, and Taiwan) • Scarborough Shoal （The Philippines, China, and Taiwan) • Spratly Islands (China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei,

Malaysia, and Taiwan) • EEZ and Continental Shelf Maritime Delimitation (The SCS and

the ECS Bordering Countries)

(Mainly involving with Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan)

Japan Tokyo Governor visited Okinotorishima

Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara waved

the Japanese national flag near the

plate that declares "Okinotorishima,

Japan" in Japanese after landing on

Higashi Kojima, one of the two

Okinotorishima islets, about 1,730

kilometers (1,070 miles) south of

capital Tokyo, during an inspection

tour in May 2005.

No territorial dispute involved,

But legal status of the land feature.

Kuril Islands/Northern Territories Disputes (Russia and Japan)

Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visited the Kuril Island of Kunashir in July 2012 to reinforce the Russian claim to the islands.

The islands were occupied by Russia at the end of the second World War. Ever since Japan and Russia have been at loggerheads over the issue of ownership.

Iturup (Russian: Итуруп)/Etorofu Island (Japanese: 択捉島, Etorofu-tō?) Kunashir (Russian: Кунашир)/Kunashiri Island (Japanese: 国後島, Kunashiri-tō?) Shikotan (Russian: Шикотан)/Shikotan Island (Japanese: 色丹島, Shikotan-tō?) Habomai rocks (Russian: острова Хабомаи ostrova Habomai)/Habomai Islands (Japanese: 歯舞諸島, Habomai-shotō?)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iturup

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_language

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_language

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Installing_Japanese_character_sets

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunashir




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shikotan




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habomai




Dokdo/Takeshima (Korea and Japan)

• ROK President Lee Myung-

bak flew to Dokdo/ Takeshima in August 2012.

• Japan recalled its ambassador from South Korea.

• Both South Korea and Japan say they have a historical claim to the islands, and the issue has been a long-standing thorn in relations.

Japan Tokyo Governor visited Okinotorishima

Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara waved

the Japanese national flag near the

plate that declares "Okinotorishima,

Japan" in Japanese after landing on

Higashi Kojima, one of the two

Okinotorishima islets, about 1,730

kilometers (1,070 miles) south of

capital Tokyo, during an inspection

tour in May 2005.

No territorial dispute involved,

But legal status of the land feature.

President Ma visited Pengjia Islet in the East China Sea (7.Sept.2012)

Unlikely to visit the Diaoyutai Island Group, but how about Taiping Dao (Itu

Aba) in the South China Sea?

習近平接任中共總書記與中央軍委主席李克強任國務院總理

Xi Jinping visits Woody Island?

The Development Goal of PRC

• In a report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party by Hu Jintao, the PRC government explicitly outlined its policy to “resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power.”

Japan’s Concern about PRC’s Maritime Activities

• Japan is hoping that the development goal of PRC’s maritime policy will be achieved in accordance with international law and in harmony with neighboring nations.

• While Japan is taking the view that the PRC appears to be attempting to make the practice of dispatching government vessels to the ECS and the SCS areas an everyday affair, and therefore change the status quo through coercion, the PRC government considers its assertive moves necessary, mainly in response to the assertive actions taken by other claimants in the ECS and the SCS, which change the status quo or break their political commitments under the agreement, such as Japan and PRC’s understanding reached in 1978; and Vietnam’s and the Philippines’ commitments made in 2002 under the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

Are Certain Territories in the Asia Pacific Disputed or Not Disputed?

• South Korea says that there is no dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima; Japan says YES, it is disputed.

• Russia says that there is no dispute at all over Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories; Japan says, YES, it is disputed.

• Japan says that Okinotorishima is an island, not a rock; PRC and ROK say no, it is not an island, but a rock, and therefore cannot generate a 200 nautical mile EEZ.

• PRC says that there are no disputes over the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal, but Vietnam and the Philippines say YES, they are disputed.

• Japan says that there is no dispute over the DIG; PRC and ROC say YES, it is disputed.

Why did Japan purchase three of the DIG in

September 2012? • The objective was to minimize any adverse impact on the Japan-China

relationship, according to Japanese Foreign Minisiter Koichiro Gemba. • According to Japan, there is no doubt that the DIG are an inherent part

of Japan, as evidenced by both historical facts and international law.

• Japan insists that it cannot make any concessions where sovereignty is concerned.

• Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced his intention in April 2012 to buy and develop facilities on the islands. Purchasing the islands instead was the only viable and best option available to the government of Japan to protect bilateral relations, argued by the Japanese government.

• Is this position acceptable? In fact, Japanese government’s decision to

nationalize the DIG has more profound negative effect than Ishihara’s plan.

• (Koichiro Gemba, Foreign Minister of Japan, “Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads,” The International Herald Tribune, 21 November 2012)

Why does not Japan refer the issue to the International Court of Justice?

• This is a question that is often wrongly directed toward Japan. It is Japan

that has valid control over the DIG under international law, and it is China that is seeking to challenge the status quo. The question should be posed to China.

• Japan has accepted the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. as compulsory. Since China

is undertaking various campaigns to promote their assertions in international forums, it seems to make sense for China to seek a solution based on international law.

• Why don’t they show any signs of accepting the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. as compulsory and taking their arguments to the I.C.J.? (Japan admits that there involves dispute over the DIG first).

(Koichiro Gemba, Foreign Minister of Japan, “Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads,” The International Herald Tribune, 21 November 2012)

The DIG in the ECS: Disputed or Not Disputed?

• It is difficult to accept Japan’s position that the DIG is not disputed.

• If Japan insists that there is no territorial dispute over the DIG, why did the U.S. government return only the administrative rights to Japan, but not ownership (sovereignty), in accordance with the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty?

• Apparently there is a key difference between “Administration” and “Sovereignty”.

Article 2

China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:— (b) The island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa. (Emphasis added)

(Note: The DIG are appertained to Taiwan)

Treaty of Shimonoseki

Signed at Shimonoseki 17 April 1895 Entered into Force 8 May 1895 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification

1945 Potsdam Declaration

• Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, Issued at Potsdam, 26 July 1945

• Article 8:

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty

Articles 2 (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores. (c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. (f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Japan’s Basic View on the Sovereignty over the DIG/Senkaku Islands

• From 1885 on, surveys of the DIG had been thoroughly made by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the DIG had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of Qing China.

• Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to erect a marker on the Islands to formally incorporate the DIG into the territory of Japan.

Japan’s Territorial Claim Based on “Incomplete Surveys” and “WRONG CONFIRMATION”

• Following the first on-site survey, in 1885, the Japanese foreign minister wrote, “Chinese newspapers have been reporting rumors of our intention of occupying islands belonging to China located next to Taiwan.… At this time, if we were to publicly place national markers, this must necessarily invite China’s suspicion.…”

• In November 1885, the Okinawa governor confirmed “since this matter is not unrelated to China, if problems do arise I would be in grave repentance for my responsibility”.

• “Surveys of the islands are incomplete” wrote the new Okinawa governor in January of 1892. He requested that a naval ship Kaimon be sent to survey the islands, but ultimately a combination of miscommunication and bad weather made it impossible for the survey to take place.

Han-Yi Shaw, “The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkalu Islands,” The New York Times, 19.9.2012

How did Japan Steal the DIG?

• 1872 The Kingdom of Ryukyu was changed from “External Barbarian” (外藩) to “Internal Barbarian” (內藩)

• 10. 1874 Mu Dan Village Incident (牡丹社事件) (now, Mudan County of Pingdon in Taiwan) (Japan sent military forces to Taiwan to in revenge of the people from Ryukyu and Japan who were killed by the aboriginal people in Taiwan )

• 3. 1879 Japan annexed Ryukyu, and renamed as Okinawa Prefecture (沖縄県)

• 9. 1885 Japan planned to put sovereign markers on the DIG, but the plan was aborted due to concerns about China’s naming and using the DIG.

How did Japan Steal the DIG?

• 12 May 1894 (Replying Letter No. 153) 《県治処秘第一二号ノ内・復第百五十三号》

• In response to the Home Minister’s instructions, the Okinawa Prefecture Governor wrote that no further investigations had been carried out since the initial fields surveys of 1885.

How did Japan steal the DIG?

• Due to concerns about possible strong reactions from Qing China, what was already reported in the Chinese newspaper (申報), the Japanese government withheld its intention to annex the DIG and gave instruction that it was not necessary to publicize the information about the plan in the government documents or newspapers.


• 1894 Qing China-Japan war

• 15.12.1894 Secret No. 133 (Classified Letter No. 133) (《秘別第一三三号久場島、魚釣島へ所轄標杭建設ノ義上申》) from Director of the Prefecture Administration Bureau

to Minister of Home Affairs,

• “. . . The situation today is greatly different from the situation

back then.” (Implying that Qing China was to be defeated)


• 8.1984- 4. 1895 Qing China-Japan War • 3 months before signing the Shimonosheki Treaty,

a decision was made at Japan’s Cabinet Meeting to approve the petition regarding the construction of jurisdiction markers at the DIG and on 14. 1. 1895 completed the plan to annex the DIG.

• There was no official announcement nor publication on the annexation of the DIG and therefore not known to Qing China and the outside world.

Administration vs. Sovereignty The following are some examples of valid control after the reversion to Japan of the administrative rights over Okinawa including the DIG, which can be found in Japanese Foreign Minsitry’s website (Q&A on DIG/Senkaku Islands at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#qa04

• (1) Patrol and law enforcement. (e.g. law enforcement on illegal

fishing by foreign fishing boats) (Fishery administrative/Management Rights, not EEZ Sovereign Right, nor sovereignty)

• (2) Levying taxes on the owners of the Islands under private

ownership. (in Kuba Island.) (The costs paid by not the “Owners” but “Users” of the islands that does not belong to Japan, but only exercise the administrative rights. If Japan as a country does not own the DIG, how can the “Users” claim private ownerhsip?)

• (3) Management as state-owned land (in Taisho Island, Uotsuri

Island, etc.) (Again, Japanese is exercising only administrative rights, not Sovereignty).

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html




Administration vs. Sovereignty The following are some examples of valid control after the reversion to Japan of the administrative rights over Okinawa including the DIG, which can be found in Japanese Foreign Minsitry’s website (Q&A on DIG/Senkaku Islands at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#qa04 )

• (4) As for Kuba Island and Taisho Island, the Government of Japan

has offered them to the United States since 1972 as facilities/districts in Japan under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. (Again, the right of using, not ownership)

• (5) Researches by the Central Government and the Government of

Okinawa Prefecture (e.g. Utilization and development research by Okinawa Development Agency (construction of temporary heliport, etc.) (1979), Fishery research by the Okinawa Prefecture (1981), Research on albatrosses commissioned by the Environment Agency (1994).) (Again, these are examples of conducting research activities under the administrative right, not sovereign rights, nor sovereignty.)





The East China Sea The ECS is a semi-closed sea east of China. It is a part of the Pacific Ocean and covers an area of 770,000km².

The ECS is bounded on the East by the Kyushu and Ryuku Islands, on the South by Taiwan, and on the West by mainland China. It is connected with the SCS by the Taiwan Strait and with the Sea of Japan by the Korea Strait; it opens in the North to the Yellow Sea. Territories with borders on the sea (clockwise from north) include: South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and mainland China.

There are disputes between China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea over the extent of their respective EEZs and continental shelves.

32

Diaoyutai Island Group (DIG)

Mainland China

Taiwan

Sovereignty Disputes in the ECS

Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea

Japanese name Chinese name coordinates Area(km2) Highest elevation(m

Uotsuri Jima (魚釣島)

Diaoyu Dao (釣魚島)

25°46′N 123°31′E / 25.767°N 123.517°E / 25.767; 123.517

4.32 383

Kuba Jima (久場島)

Huangwei Yu

(黃尾嶼)

25°56′N 123°41′E / 25.933°N 123.683°E / 25.933; 123.683

1.08 117

Taishō Jima (大正島)

Chiwei Yu (赤尾嶼)

25°55′N 124°34′E / 25.917°N 124.567°E / 25.917; 124.567

0.0609 75

Diaoyutai Island Group

http://toolserver.org/~geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Senkaku_Islands&params=25_46_N_123_31_E_type:isle































































Japanese name

Chinese name coordinates Area(km2) Highest elevation(m)

Minami Kojima (南小島)

Nan Xiaodao (南小島)

25°45′N 123°36′E / 25.75°N 123.6°E / 25.75; 123.6

0.4592 149

Kita Kojima (北小島)

Bei Xiaodao (北小島)

25°45′N 123°36′E / 25.75°N 123.6°E / 25.75; 123.6

0.3267 135

Okino Kitaiwa (沖ノ北岩)

Da Bei Xiaodao (大北小島/北岩)

25°49′N 123°36′E / 25.817°N 123.6°E / 25.817; 123.6

0.0183 nominal






























































Japanese name

Chinese name coordinates Area(km2) Highest elevation(m

Okino Minami-iwa (沖ノ南岩)

Da Nan Xiaodao (大南小島/南岩)

25°47′N 123°37′E / 25.783°N 123.617°E / 25.783; 123.617

0.0048 nominal

Tobise (飛瀬)

Fei Jiao Yan (飛礁岩/飛岩)

25°45′N 123°33′E / 25.75°N 123.55°E / 25.75; 123.55

0.0008 nominal











































Historical Background

• The U.S. decision to incorporate the administrative rights of the DIG as part of the return of U.S.-ruled Okinawa islands to Japan triggered a spate of anti-Japanese demonstrations in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Chinese community in the U.S. & Canada in early 1970s, which led to the beginning of the so-called “Bao Diao Yundong” (Protect the Diaoyu Movement).

China-Japan 5 Common understandings (4. 2007)

• (1) Both sides are committed to making the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship; • (2) They agreed to carry out joint development based on the principle of mutual benefit as a temporary arrangement pending the final demarcation and without prejudice to the positions of either side on matters concerning the law of the sea; • (3) They will conduct consultation at higher level when necessary; • (4) They will carry out joint development in larger waters acceptable to them; and • (5) They will speed up consultations and hope to submit a detailed plan on joint development to the leaders of the two countries in autumn of 2007.

China-Japan 4-point New Consensus on the ECS issues (12.2007)

• (1) To continue to adhere to the five-point consensus achieved by leaders of the two countries in April 2007 in a bid to turn the ECS into a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship;

• (2) The two sides have elevated the level of consultation, conducted earnest and substantive consultation on the concrete solution to the issue and made positive progress;

• (3) To conduct vice ministerial-level consultation, if necessary, while maintaining the current consultation framework;

• (4) The solution to the ECS issue conformed with the interests of both China and Japan.

Progress in 2008

• In May 2008, China and Japan issued a joint statement on promoting strategic, mutually beneficial ties. The two sides pledged again to work together and make the ECS a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship.

• In June 2008, after 11 rounds of serious consultation, China and Japan reached the Principled Common Understanding on the East China Sea Issues, in which the Japanese companies are allowed to participate in the development of Chunxiao oil and gas field in accordance with the relevant Chinese laws that govern cooperation with foreign enterprises in the exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources. In addition, the two sides agreed to establish a block for joint development in the ECS.

The 2008 PRC-Japan Principled Consensus Understanding on the ECS Issues

II. Understanding Between China and Japan on Joint Development of the ECS As the first step in the joint development of the ECS between China and Japan, the two sides will work on the following: (a) The block for joint development shall be the area that is bounded by straight lines joining the following points in the order listed: 1. Latitude 29°31' North, longitude 125°53'30" East 2. Latitude 29°49' North, longitude 125°53'30" East 3. Latitude 30°04' North, longitude 126°03'45" East 4. Latitude 30°00' North, longitude 126°10'23" East 5. Latitude 30°00' North, longitude 126°20'00" East 6. Latitude 29°55' North, longitude 126°26'00" East 7. Latitude 29°31' North, longitude 126°26'00" East

Map showing the 2008 PRC-Japan Joint Development Zone

2008 PRC-Japan Joint Development Zone

PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s statement made in March 2011

• China and Japan have reached a principled common understanding on the issue of the ECS.

• It is the result of long-term efforts of both sides.

• It has not come easily and should be cherished.

• Both countries should observe the spirit in the Understanding and work to foster favorable conditions for the effective implementation of the Understanding so as to turn the into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.

On May 21, 2011, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan’s

disaster-hit areas to express China’s sympathy and support for the

Japanese people.

Japan asked to resume talks on the development of gas fields in the

ECS as soon as possible. PRC agreed to consider the Japanese

plan for re-open of the talk. (22/5/2011)

Official Position of the ROC Government

• The DIG was discovered, named, and used by the Chinese hundreds of years before the government of Japan decided to incorporate the islands into its territory on 14.1.1895.

• The Chinese had exercised their rights to conduct a variety of economic activities that included navigation, fishing, collecting medicinal herbs, and building shelters on the islands and in the sea areas surrounding them more than five hundreds before 1895.


• The DIG was not terra nullius, which makes the Japanese incorporation of the islands into its territory illegal and invalid, mainly because under the then existing international law, China had effectively obtained the ownership of the DIG in particular via discovery, and no state can unilaterally proclaim sovereignty over the territory of China.


• The action taken by the Chinese government (during Ming and Qing Dynasties) to incorporate the DIG into the mainland China’s and Taiwan’s coastal defense system for the purpose of guarding against the threat from the so-called Woko (Japanese pirates, wako in Japanese) also support the fact that the DIG belongs to China.


• Japan’s reliance on the legal reasoning of obtaining the sovereignty over the DIG by way of prescription cannot stand at all, since actions have continuously been taken by the PRC and ROC governments, the Chinese no-governmental organizations, and the Chinese communities in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and oversea to oppose against the Japanese position since the early 1970s.


• Geologically speaking, the DIG is situated on the edge of the ECS continental shelf, and is an appendage of Taiwan.

• Both the ROC government considers Taiwan a part of the

Chinese territory in accordance with the ROC Constitution and relevant domestic laws.

• When Taiwan and all of the islands appertaining or belonging to it were ceded to Japan in 1895 under Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki as a result of China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the DIG was undoubtedly included in that part of the Chinese territory so ceded.

The 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation

• In 1945, when Japan surrendered to the allies, it accepted the terms as set forth in the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration regarding the return of the Chinese territories including the DIG.

• “Japan shall be stripped off . . . all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. . .”

Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan signed on April 28, 1952

• Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. . . all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war.

The Official Position of the PRC/ROC Governments

• Due to the fact that both the ROC and PRC were excluded from attending the San Francisco Conference held in 1951, Beijing considers the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty “illegal and null and void”.

• Based on this position, the PRC government holds that the

Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryuku Islands and the Daito Islands signed on June 17, 1971 (known as the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty), that includes the Diaoyutai Islands in the area of reversion, did not alter the sovereignty of the PRC over the territory of Diaoyu Dao and other islands in the group.

The Official Position of the PRC Government

• The Joint Communique issued by the PRC and Japanese governments in 1972 also stated that Japan “firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”

• These provisions were further confirmed by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by the PRC and Japan in August 1978.

Japan’s Position

• Surveys had been undertaken thoroughly by the Japanese government before 1885 through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and by other ways, which confirmed that the DIG had not been under the control of China.

• Accordingly the Japanese government decided to incorporate the islands into its territory on 14.1.1895.

• Since then, the islands have remained as an integral

part of the Nansei Shoto (southwest group) Islands which are the territory of Japan.

Japan’s Position

• The DIG was not included in those islands ceded to Japan form the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article II of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.

• The DIG was not included in the territory which Japan renounced

under Article II of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. • The decision of the U.S. government to return the administrative

rights over the DIG to Japan in accordance with the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty indicates the status of the islands being part of the Japanese territory.

Japan’s Position

• The PRC government failed to express objection to Article III of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which placed the DIG under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands, which implies that China did not consider the DIG as part of Taiwan.

• In Japan’s view, it was not until the latter half of 1970, when the Emery Report was released, indicating the potential petroleum reserves in the areas surrounding the DIG in the ECS that both the ROC and PRC governments began to make claim to the sovereignty over the islands.

• None of the points raised by the ROC and PRC governments as

“historic, geographic or geological” evidence provide valid grounds under the international law in support of the ROC and PRC claims to the ownership of the DIG.

Baselines of Japan • 14.3.2008, Japan adopted the method of straight baselines to draw its limit of territorial seas; 14.5.2008, China sent diplomatic note to the UN Secretary-general to

protest Japan’s claim

Japan’s baselines for measuring territorial sea and the claimed EEZ


EEZ

High Sea

Pacific Ocean

Okinotorihima

Minimi- torishima

Territorial Sea

Contiguous Zone

Yonaguni island

http://img7.itiexue.net/1542/15424495.jpg

PRC Baseline and Baseline Points in the Diaoyutai Island Group

Coordinates of PRC Baselines and Basepoints in the DIG

Overlapping Maritime Zones in the East China Sea

U.S. Position on the DIG Dispute

• U.S. administration of the DIG from 1953 to 1971 as a result of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed Sept. 8, 1951 (3 U.S.T. 3169)

• The application to the DIG of the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, approved by the U.S. Senate in 1971 and entered into force 1972


• The Treaty did not mention the Senkakus Diaoyu/Diaoyutai), but it referred to other islands that had reverted to Chinese control or which China claimed. These included Taiwan, the Pescadores (off the western coast of Taiwan), as well as the Spratlys and the Paracels (both in the South China Sea). Article 3 gave the United States sole powers of administration of “Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu and the Daito Islands)....”

• In 1953, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus issued

U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 (USCAR 27), which defined the boundaries of “Nansei Shoto [the southwesternislands] south of 29 degrees north latitude” to include the Senkakus.


• During the period of U.S. administration, the U.S. Navy established firing ranges on the islands and paid an annual rent of $11,000 to Jinji Koga, the son of the first Japanese settler of the islands.

• Similarly, during the period of Japanese administration (1972-until today), the Japanese paid rent to 栗原家族, which does not mean the ownership of the DIG belongs to Japan, but the right to use and in the case, the adminisitrative right.


• The Okinawa Reversion Treaty,14 which was signed on June 17, 1971, and entered into force on May 15, 1972, provided for the return to Japan of “all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction” over the Ryukyu and Daito islands, which the United States had held under the Japan Peace Treaty. Article I of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty defines the term “the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands” as “all territories with their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan....”


• An Agreed Minute to the Okinawa Reversion Treaty defines the boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito islands “as designated under” USCAR 27. Moreover, the latitude and longitude boundaries set forth in the Agreed Minute appear to include the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai). A letter of October 20, 1971, by Robert Starr, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs—acting on the instructions of Secretary of State William Rogers—states that the Okinawa Reversion Treaty contained “the terms and conditions for the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, including the Senkakus.”


• U.S. takes no position on the DIG territorial disputes. However, it also has been U.S. policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the disputed islands, because Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan” and Japan administers the DIG.

• (Based on the interpretation of Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Pact, the treaty does not cover the DIG, mainly because the U.S. takes no position on the ownership of the DIG, which is therefore NOT “the territories under the Administration of Japan” , at least before the final resolution of the territorial disputes over the DIG. – Dr. YH Song’s Interpretation)


• During Senate deliberations on whether to consent to the ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, the State Department asserted that the United States took a neutral position with regard to the competing claims of Japan, China, and Taiwan, despite the return of the islands to Japanese administration. Department officials asserted that reversion of administrative rights to Japan did not prejudice any claims to the islands.


• When asked by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how the Okinawa Reversion Treaty would affect the determination of sovereignty over the Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai), Secretary of State William Rogers answered that “this treaty does not affect the legal status of those islands at all.”


• In his letter of October 20, 1971, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser Robert Starr stated:

(See Next Slide)

The Governments of the Republic of China and Japan are in disagreement as to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. You should know as well that the People’s Republic of China has also claimed sovereignty over the islands. The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.


• “Administration” rather than “sovereignty” is the key distinction that applies to the disputed DIG.

• Japan’s act to nationalize the disputed DIG in 9.2012 can be interpreted as a violation of the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which only returned administration right to Japan, but not sovereignty.

• Japan has no right to “Nationalize” the DIG.

US position on the DIG

• Although Washington does not take a position on the question of the ultimate sovereignty of these islands, a US official warned recently that “the Senkakus would fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”

US position on the DIG

• President Obama and Chinese primer Wen met before the 7th EAS on 21 Nov. 2012

• President Obama reiterated that the US takes no position on any of the specific claims in the ECS and SCS.

The 7th East Asia Summit (EAS) 20 November 2012, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

U.S. President Barack Obama met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. President Obama reaffirmed U.S. national interests in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and freedom of navigation. President Obama encouraged the parties to make progress on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to provide a framework to prevent conflict, manage incidents when they occur, and help resolve disputes.

US should support ECPSI

• Taiwan’s proposal offers such a solution. Now that the US presidential election is over, it is time for Washington to stop sitting on the sidelines and energetically support the “East China Sea Peace Initiative.” To do otherwise could invite disaster.

• Dennis Hickey is the James F. Morris Endowed

Professor of Political Science and director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies at Missouri State University. 14 Nov. 2012

taiwan’s sovereignty laim over the

Documents