technology, geography and trade · technology, geography and trade! j. eaton and s. kortum topics...
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Technology, Geography and Trade���J. Eaton and S. Kortum
Topics in international Trade
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Overview
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1. Motivation
2. Framework of the model
3. Technology, Prices and Trade Flows
4. Trade Flows and Price Differences
5. Equilibrium
6. Counterfactuals
1 Motivation
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Theories of International Trade miss some basic facts:
trade diminishes with distance prices vary across locations factor rewards vary across countries relative productivities of countries vary across industries
2 Framework of the Model
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Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson two-country Ricardian model
Ricardian model of international trade based on differences in technology, incorporating geography
comparative advantage promoting trade with geographic barriers (transport costs, tariffs and quotas, delay) preventing it
Continuum of goods Homogeneous goods and perfect competition Probabilistic formulation of technological
heterogeneity
3 Technology, Prices and Trade Flows
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Different access to technology, different efficiency across countries and commodities country i‘s efficincy to produce good j ∈ [0, 1] is zi(j) input cost of producing good j in country i is ci (later broken into
cost of labor and intermediate inputs) cost of producing one unit of good j in country i: ci/zi(j)
Geographic barriers – iceberg assumption delivering a unit from country i to country n requires producing dni
units in i dii = 1 for all i
dni > 1 for n ≠ i
Price of good j produced in country i and delivered to country n pni(j) =
€
€
cizi( j)⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟ dni
3 Technology, Prices and Trade Flows
Utility function to maximize CES objective:
Q(j) – individual goods in amounts Maximization is subject to aggregating budget
constraint across buyers in country n, leading to Xn, country n‘s total spending
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€
U = Q( j)(σ −1)/σ dj0
1
∫⎡
⎣ ⎢
⎤
⎦ ⎥
σ /(σ −1)
3.1 Technology
Country i‘s efficiency in producing good j is realization of random variable Zi (drawn independently for each j)
Two important parameters regarding technology country-specific parameter Ti
bigger Ti, high efficiency draw for any good j is more likely (absolute advantage)
parameter, common for all countries θ regulating heterogeneity across goods in countries‘ relative
efficiencies, bigger θ implies less variability (comparative advantage)
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3.2 Prices
Development of the price parameter
summarizes how states of technology around the world... input costs around the world... geographic barriers... ... govern prices in each country n
Two cases: zero-gravity world and autarky
Price index for CES objective function is then:
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€
Φn = Ti(cidni)−θ
i=1
N
∑ €
Φ
€
Φ
€
Φ
€
pn = γΦn−1θ
3.3 Trade Flows, and Gravity
Fraction of goods that country n buys from country i
already similarities to the standard gravity equation in bilateral trade, as it is related to importers total expenditures and to geographic barriers
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€
Xni
Xn
=Ti(cidni)
−θ
Φn
=Ti(cidni)
−θ
Tk (ckdnk )−θ
k=1
N
∑
3.3 Trade Flows, and Gravity
After some manipulations and substitutions
exporter‘s total sales Qi and importer‘s total purchases Xn enter with unit elasticity
geographic barrier dmi is deflated by importer‘s price level pm: lower pm (due to competition) reduces i‘s access to m in the same way as a geographic barrier does market size of destination m as perceived by country i denominator of right-hand side is total world market from
country i‘s perspective
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€
Xni =
dnipn
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟
−θ
Xn
dmipm
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟
−θ
Xmm=1
N
∑Qi
€
dmi pm( )−θ Xm
4 Trade flows and price differences Putting trade flows and price differences into one
framework Country i‘s share in country n relative to i‘s share at home i‘s normalized import share in country n
If overall prices in n decrease relative to prices in market i (higher pi/pn) or if n becomes more isolated from i (higher dni), i‘s import share in n declines
If force of comparative advantage weakens (higher θ) import shares become more elastic w.r.t. price and geographic barriers
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€
Xni Xn
Xii Xi
=Φi
Φn
dni−θ =
pidnipn
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟
−θ
5.1 Equilibrium: Prices split input costs ci into labor and intermediates
Price indices as functions of the parameters of the model and wages
Trade shares as functions of the parameters of the model and wages
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€
ci = wiβ pi
1−β
€
pn = γ Ti dniwiβ pi
1−β( )−θi=1
N
∑⎡
⎣ ⎢
⎤
⎦ ⎥
−1/θ
€
Xni
Xn
= πni = Tiγdniwi
β pi1−β
pn
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟
−θ
5.2 Equilibrium: Labor-Market Concentration on production and trade in
manufactures Two cases used to close the model
Case 1: Mobile labor (workers can move freely btw. manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing)
wn is given Yn is aggregate final expenditure and exogenous α fraction spent on manufactures determines manufacturing employment Li
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€
wiLi = πnin=1
N
∑ 1− β( )wnLn +αβYn[ ]
5.2 Equilibrium: Labor-Market
Case 2: labor is immobile (number of manufacturing workers in
each country is fixed at Ln)
exogenous nonmanufacturing income determining manufacturing wages wi
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€
wiLi = πnin=1
N
∑ 1− β+αβ( )wnLn +αβYnO[ ]
€
YnO
5.3 Zero-Gravity and Autarky
Impossible to attain analytic solution of interaction among prices in different countries
Again, two extremes are considered
geographic barriers disappear (zero gravity), dni=1 geographic barriers are prohibitive (autarky), dni for
n≠i
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→∞
5.3.1 Zero-Gravity Without geographic barriers, law of one price holds The country with higher state of technology relative
to its wage will specialize more in manufacturing with immobile labor, wages depend on technology in per
worker terms with Ti as given, as Li increases, workers move into
production of goods in which country is less productive, driving down wage
increase in technology Tk anywhere raises home wage relative to abroad how much country i benefits from increase in Tk depends on k‘s
labor force if labor force in source country k is small, wk rises more,
diminishing benefits of others
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5.3.2 Autarky
Regarding autarky there would be gains from trade for everyone
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6.1 Gains from Trade Move to autarky for 19 countries:
costs of moving to autarky range from one quarter of a percent for Japan to ten percent for Belgium effects of shutting down trade only in manufactures
manufacturing labor rises everywhere except Germany, Japan, Sweden, UK (due to comparative advantage in manufactures)
Move to zero-gravity world: Germany and Japan experience large drops in manufacturing
employment Sweden continues to gain little happens in UK world trade would be about five times its current level if geographic barriers fall by 69%, doubling of trade, welfare
rises by 1 to 3 percent
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6.2 Technology vs. Geography With zero gravity, fraction of a country‘s labor force
devoted to manufacturing depends on the state of technology per worker and the wage
When geographic barriers are prohibitive, fraction is simply α, share of manufactures in final demand (technology does not matter)
If geographic barriers fall smaller countries manufacturing shrinks production
to larger countries, cheaper inputs if geographic barriers continue to fall, forces of technology
take over, fraction of labor in manufacturing grows
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6.3 Benefits of foreign Technology
Trade allows a country to benefit from foreign technological advances
Two conditions should be met
country must be near the source of advance
country needs to be able to reallocate its labor to activities outside manufacturing
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6.4 Eliminating Tariffs General Multilateral Tariff Elimination:
almost all countries would gain, welfare rises almost everywhere
U.S. Unilateral Tariff Elimination: everyone benefits except the U.S.
Trade Diversion in the European Community immobile labor:
nonmembers nearby are biggest losers (wages must fall to remain competitive suppliers to EC)
members gain
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