Telling the story of drugs in West Africa: The newest front in a losing war?

Joanne Csete∗  with Constanza Sánchez∞

Policy Brief 1 | November 2013

Key Points

• TheemergenceofsignificantdrugtraffickingroutesinWestAfrica,particularlyofcocaine

fromLatinAmericatoEuropeanmarkets,hasdrawnagreatdealofattentionfromglobal

drugauthorities,includingtheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC),andthegovernment

of the United States, which sees West Africa as a setting for replicating drug-control

interventionsusedinLatinAmerica.

• UNODC andUS reports have used limited data on drug seizures, drug consumption and

drug-relatedterrorisminWestAfricatoweaveanarrativeofaregion‘underattack’by

unscrupulousdrugdealersandseizedbyrapidlyincreasingproblematicdruguse.

• Theseauthoritiessometimesadmitthatthesedataaresketchy,buttheynonethelessuse

thisinformationtomakebroadgeneralisationsabouttheurgentneedformorepolicingand

other‘drugwar’measures.

• Though the link between drug trafficking and terrorism inWestAfrica is not verywell

established,theUSalsoenergisesitsargumentsforrepressivedruginterventionsinWest

Africabyhighlightingthisconnection.

• West Africa undoubtedly has significant drug-related problems that merit an energetic

response.

• It is, however, legitimate to question whether the hyped-up narrative that has been

constructed of a lethal problem ismeant to justify placement ofmilitary, surveillance

andanti-terrorismhardwareandsoftware intheregionatatimewhentheUS-led‘war

ondrugs’islosingsupportwithinmanyLatinAmericancountries.Ratherthanthesimple

replicationofoftenharmfulandineffectivepolicyinterventionsappliedinLatinAmerica,

theresponsetoillicitdrugsinWestAfricashouldbenefitfromacarefulreflectionabout

whathasandhasnotworkedinotherpartsoftheworld.

∗  SeniorprogramofficerfortheGlobalDrugPolicyProgram,OpenSocietyFoundations

∞ResearchAssociateoftheGlobalDrugPolicyObservatory,SwanseaUniversity

ISSN2054-1910

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We see Africa as the new frontier in terms of counterterrorism and counternarcotics issues. It’s a place that we need to get ahead of — we’re already behind the curve in some ways, and we need to catch up.

Jeffrey Breeden, Chief of Europe, Asia and Africa Section, US Drug Enforcement Administration (2012)1

Drug planes don’t have to fly below the radar, because in most cases there is no radar (or electricity). Soldiers sometimes help smugglers by closing airports and unloading the cargo. Police cars run out of gas when giving chase or are left in the dust by smugglers’ all-terrain vehicles….Traffickers are seldom brought to trial; in some cases, there are no prisons to put them in. Antonio Maria Costa, former Executive Director of UNODC, in the Washington Post (2008)2

[…] Numbers are used to help frame a particular narrative about the nature, size and growth of the illicit global economy. The story gives the numbers meaning and brings them to life, while the numbers give the story apparent credibility. The same is true in the presentation of the numbers in official policy debates and in media reporting. Peter Andreas, ‘The Politics of Measuring Illicit Flows and Policy Effectiveness’, (2010)3

oftheworld. ThispolicybriefconsidersthewayinwhichthestoryofdrugsinWestAfricais being constructedby leadingactors in theglobalresponsetoillicitdrugsandthepossibleimpact of that narrative. It suggests thatWestAfrica’sdrugexperiencemayintheendbe a cautionary tale about the repetition ofineffective and harmful policies unless othervoicescanbeheard.

THE RECEIVED WISDOM ON DRUGS IN WEST AFRICA

What is known about the extent of the drugtrafficking and consumption in West Africais generally captured in data on interdictionor seizure of trafficked drugs and on drugconsumption.ThemostwidelycitedfiguresarethosegatheredeveryyearbytheUnitedNationsOffice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for itsannualpublication,theWorld Drug Report,andthose featured in UNODC special publications.Data fromvariousbodies intheUnitedStatesare also relied upon, including the annualInternational Narcotics Control Strategy Report oftheUSBureauofInternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairs(INL).

INTRODUCTION

The responseofnational governments to illicitdrugs isachallengingareaofpublicpolicy formanyreasons.Inmostcountriesitisanextremelypoliticised domain in which repressive policymeasures may be adopted despite evidencesuggestingthattheyareineffective,oftenratherbecausepoliticalleaderswanttoshowthattheyare ‘tough on drugs’. In addition, sometimestheevidenceonwhicheventhebest-intendedpolicies could be built is patchy or unreliable.Inmanyparts of theworld, for example, it isdifficult toknowtheextentofconsumptionofillicit drugs in the general population becausedruguseishighlycriminalised,andthosewhousedrugswillbedifficulttofindusingconventionalsurveymethods.Drugtrafficking,whichalsohasmanysurreptitiouselements,mayalsobehardtoquantify.

West Africa is the subject of considerableglobal attention in mass media and inacademicresearchasasignificantlocusofdrugtraffickingand,tosomedegree,consumptionofillicitdrugs.4Itwouldbeusefultobasedrugpolicy inWestAfrica on lessons learnt aboutwhatconstitutesgood,thatistosayevidence-basedand rights-based,policy inotherparts

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Seizure data

The World Drug Report of 2005 signalled,withoutquantification,the‘newtrend’ofthe‘rising importance of cocaine shipments fromthe Andean region through Western Africato Europe,’ noting that this ‘trade is oftenorganisedbyWestAfricancrimegroups’.5Foritspart,INL’sannualreportof2005wasalreadyciting the West African countries of Benin,Ghana,Nigeria andTogo as facing significanttraffickingofSouthAmericancocainethroughtheir borders and noted that West AfricannetworksdominatedthecocainetradeintheRepublicofSouthAfrica.6

In 2007, UNODC produced a special report oncocainetraffickinginWestAfrica,whichbeganwiththesentence‘WestAfricaisunderattack,’noted that ‘drug money is perverting fragileeconomiesandrottingsocieties,’andconcludedthat several states in the region were as aresult ‘at risk of being captured by foreign orlocal criminal networks…or even collapsing.’7 Beginning to bring data to these dramaticassertions, the report noted that in the three-yearperiod2005–2007,some33tonsofcocainebound for Europe was seized in West Africa,whereas previously reported seizures werenomore than 1 ton annually.8 UNODC furtherassertedthatthese33tonswerelikelythetipoftheiceberggiventhepoorinterdictioncapacityintheregion.In2008,INL’scountryprofilesinits annual report added Guinea (Conakry) andthe following year both Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, noting significant cocaine trafficking intheformerandthepervasiveinfluenceofdrugmoneyongovernmentinthelatterthatjustifieditsbeingcalleda‘narco-state’.9Althoughseldomdefined,‘narco-state’isgenerallyunderstoodtobeastatethatisbotheconomicallydependentontheillicitdrugeconomyandwheregovernmentelites are complicit in the illicit drug trade.10 ConcurringwithUNODConthe‘tipoftheiceberg’assertion,USauthoritiesand Interpolcameupwiththecalculationthatasmuchas300metrictonsofcocainemayhavepassedthroughWestAfricain2007.11

UNODCandUSreportshavelargelyconcurredon the reasons for this apparently dramaticincrease: the decline of cocaine demand intheUS relative to Europe (WestAfrica beinggeographically advantageous as a route toEurope); relative success in interdiction ofcocaineintheCaribbeanandothertraditionalroutes; and, especially, factors inherent toWest Africa — weak and politically unstablestates, widespread corruption, porousborders,poor lawenforcementpracticesandcapacity, existing networks for traffickingof a variety of illicit products, and a readyand inexpensiveworkforce for smugglingandtrafficking activities.12 Indeed, the ‘weakstate’argumentisveryprominent—asinthesomewhathyperbolicsuggestionbytheformerhead of UNODC in the opening quotationsabove that electricity at the airports andcorrections systems may even be absent —andusedconsistentlytoreinforcethecallforinternationalcooperationandassistance.

More recent reports by the US governmentandUNODCcontinuetoraisethealarmaboutthe volume of drugs moving through WestAfrica. INL reports list numerous instancesof seizeddrugs in theiranalysesofcountriesin West Africa. In 2013, UNODC produced areporton illicitmarkets inWestAfrica13 thatprovides much more detailed explanationof drug seizure data than is normally foundin the World Drug Report. With respect toa reported post-2007 decline in cocaineseizures inWestAfrica (Fig. 1), for example,UNODCreiterates,first,thatinanyyeartheseseizuresprobablydramaticallyunderstatetheactualquantitiestrafficked,andsecondlythatit is likely that after 2007 traffickers turnedfrommaritimeshipmentstouseofprivatejetsand large numbers of individual couriers oncommercialairlines, includingalongnewandlessmonitoredroutes.14Inspeakingaboutthisreporttothepressin2013,theUNODCregionalrepresentative for West and Central Africastated that while data are limited, ‘officials

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believe’ that annual cocaine trafficking hadrebounded to the level of 30–35 tons.15 He called for greater support for interdiction ofdrugstraffickedbyallmeansoftransportationthroughmultipleroutes.

Figure 1: Tons of pure cocaine transiting West Africa for European destinations (UNODC, 2013)16

Inthesame2013report,UNODCgivesdetailedinformation about West Africa’s involvementin heroin and methamphetamine trafficking.Reported heroin seizures are shown to haveincreased dramatically in the region (seeFig. 2), especially in 2011. UNODC explainsthat most heroin destined for Europe viaWest Africa is transported by individualcouriers on commercial flights, but the 2011figure is boosted by several large seizuresin shipping (maritime) containers.17 Withrespect to methamphetamine, following thediscovery of two production sites in Nigeria(and numerous sites in SouthAfrica), UNODChas highlighted significant new trafficking ofmethamphetamine from West Africa to EastAsia.ThegraphinFigure3depictsadramaticincrease in this phenomenon along oneprominent trafficking route. UNODC hastenstonotethatsomehowthemethamphetamineoriginating inWestAfrica is largelyproducedwith ingredients that come from East Asia,

and the cumbersome and costly business ofshipping precursors toWestAfrica from EastAsiaandthenthefinishedproductbackintheotherdirectionwillprobablylimitthegrowthof this enterprise inWestAfricaunlessothermarkets are found.18 Nonetheless, UNODCnotes,theprofitabilityofthisactivitymeansthat even relatively small quantities have ahigh value relative to other contributors toGDPinWestAfrica—thatis,itdoesnottakea high profitmargin in this business to yieldenough of a return to exert influence overgovernmentofficials.

Figure 2: Heroin seizures in West Africa (UNODC, 2013)19

Drug consumption data

Withrespecttodrugconsumption,thereisnocountry in West Africa that has population-based data ― i.e. sample-survey data thatwould enable direct prevalence calculations—fromasurveydesignedspecificallytoassessdruguselevels,letalonedataattwopointsintimethatwouldenableestimationoftrends.Nonetheless, the US State Department INL’sasserts that consumption of all illicit drugsis increasing in Ghana and that ‘cocaineandheroinuse increased in2012’ inNigeria,thoughnonumbersarecited.20UNODC’sWorldDrugReportsestimatelevelsofconsumptionof illicit drugs. Drawing on data from2012 and 2013, Table 1 below shows point

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estimatesforprevalenceofannualuse—thatis,thepercentageofpersonsaged15–64whoused the given drug in the last year — andfor the absolute number of persons impliedbytheprevalence,aswellastheconfidenceintervals around those estimates. It alsoshows the number of West Africa countriesthatprovideddataforeachdrugorforwhichdata were estimated by UNODC. (So, forexample,in2012–2013,therewereestimatesofcocaineconsumptionforonlytwocountries—tinyCapeVerdeandNigeria.)

Figure 3: Nigerian couriers arrested

for methamphetamine trafficking in

Malaysia,2008–2011 (UNODC, 2013)21

Prevalence estimates essentially did notchange in these two years, but the absolutenumberofpersonsgrewasaresultofgeneralpopulationincrease.

COCAINE OPIOIDS CANNABIS

Prevalence (%) and number of users (millions)

Number of West African countriesreporting

Prevalence (%)and number of users (millions)

Number of West African countriesreporting

Prevalence (%)and number of users (millions)

Number of West African countriesreporting

2012 0.7%(0.3–1.1)1.5mil(0.5–2.3)

2 0.4%(0.2–0.5)0.97mil(0.43–1.1)

7 12.4%(5.2–13.5)27mil(11.4–29.7)

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2013 0.7% (0.3–1.1)1.6 mil (0.57–2.4)

2 0.44% (0.19–0.5)1 mil (0.44 –1.13)

7 12.4% (5.2–13.5)28 mil (11.7–30.5)

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The World Drug Report 2013 adds thiscomment:

The availability of cocaine in WestAfrica…may also have fuelled anincrease in cocaine use in West andNorth Africa; over the period 2009–2011, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côted’Ivoire and Morocco each reportedincreases in cocaine use based onexpert perceptions, and the latestchanges reported byGhana andTogo(relativeto2008)alsoindicatedrisingcocaineuse.23

This reference is apparently to qualitativeassessments since these countries, with theexceptionofMorocco,didnotreportnumericalestimatesofcocaineusetoUNODC.

WestAfrica’sdataarenaturallydominatedbydata fromNigeria,which hasmore than halfthepopulationoftheregionandwhich,unlikemost countries in the region, has provideddatatoUNODCregularly,thoughnotupdatedeach year. Point estimates of prevalence ofdrug use in Nigeria for selected years since2007 are shown in Table 2, representing theassessmentsofdrugusethatNigeriamadein1999 and 2008.24 (Confidence intervals werenot reported before 2011.) While the pointestimates of consumption are higher in thelatter assessment, the confidence intervalsshowthattheyarenotsignificantlyhigherinastatisticalsense.

Table 1: Estimated drug use in West and Central Africa, by drug, in the adult population (aged 15–64), with confidence intervals, 2012–2013 (UNODC)22

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survey questions about mental health mayhave led to under-reporting of this figure.The same survey estimated that 2.7 % ofNigerianadultshadusedcannabisand0.1%had used cocaine in their lifetimes,29 bothfigureswellbelowUNODC’s(andtheNigeriangovernment’s)estimatesnotedabove.

A2008studyoftheextentofdruginjectionglobally, commissioned by a UNAIDS

referencegroup,reviewedover11,000reportsof small surveys in the published and greyliterature.30 That study made estimates foronlyafewsub-Saharancountries,noneinWestAfrica,becausedataoninjectiondrugusewereso scarce. A series of WHO-supported rapidassessmentsineightNigeriancitiesfrom2000to2005identified1147peoplewhousedrugs,ofwhich8%saidtheycurrentlyinjectedand13%saidtheyformerlyinjecteddrugs.31PeoplewhoinjecteddrugswerefoundinallpartsNigeria,andinallplacesfacedalackofHIVinformationandHIVpreventionservices.

RELIABILITY OF DRUG DATA FOR POLICY DECISION-MAKINGItisveryinadvisableifnotimpossibletojudgedrugtraffickingtrendsonthebasisofseizuredataalone.Drugseizuresareareflectionofthelevelofactivityof lawenforcementofficials.Judging year-to-year trafficking trends fromseizuredataassumesthatinterdictionactivityof the police is constant or at least similarfromyeartoyear.32 It isdifficulttoseehowthat assumption can be justified in WestAfrica, given the many influences on levelsof interdiction activity, including varyingdegreesofresourceavailabilityandchanginglevels of corruption. UNODC includes manycautions about weak data in its reports andhas recognised that seizure data reflect theaggressivenessofpolicing,andthatthequalityof seizure figures can also be underminedwhen there are multiple police forces in ajurisdiction (possibility of double counting)and, for example, when there are lags in

Table 2: Estimated prevalence (%) of drug use in Nigeria in the adult population (aged 15–64 years), 2007–2013, with confidence intervals where available, (UNODC)25

Cocaine Opioids Cannabis

2007 0.5 0.6 13.8

2009 0.5 0.6 13.8

2011 0.5 0.7(0.3–1.0) 14.3(11.8–16.8)2012 0.7(0.3–1.1) 0.7(0.3–1.0) 14.3(11.8–16.8)2013 0.7(0.3–1.1) 0.7(0.3–1.0) 14.3(11.8–16.8)

The confidence intervals after 2008 givethe impression that these figures comefrom a sample survey, but we could not finddocumentation of the methods of the 2008assessment. When the World Drug Report 2011waslaunchedandNigeriahadamongthehighestestimatedprevalenceofuseofalldrugsinAfrica,thedirectoroftheNigerianNationalDrug Law EnforcementAgency remarked thattheestimatesdidnotcomethrougha‘scientistsurvey’andthusshouldbetakenwithagrainofsalt.26HealsonotedthatNigeria’sfigureswerehigherbecauseithasabiggerpopulationthanthatofotherAfricancountries,butpopulationsizeisnotanissueinprevalencefigures.

Nigeria participated in the World HealthOrganisation’s 17-country World Mental HealthSurvey Initiativewithanationalmentalhealthsurvey conducted in 2002–03.27 This surveyestimated lifetime prevalence in the adultpopulationofsubstanceuse(includingcannabis,other illicit drugs and alcohol) and estimatedcocaineconsumptionseparatelybutnotopiateuse.Onegenerallyexpectslifetimeprevalenceto be higher than annual prevalence, theindicatorfollowedbyUNODC,andtheinclusionof alcohol in the WHO survey also skews theresults.Accordingtothissurvey,3.7%ofNigerianadultswereestimatedtohavehadasubstanceuse disorder (including alcohol, cannabisand narcotic and psychotropic drugs) in theirlifetime.28Onlytwoofthe17countries,ItalyandLebanon,reportedalowerrate.TheauthorsofthestudythoughtthatinNigeriastigmaandthepopulation’snotbeingaccustomedtoanswering

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dismantling trafficking networks such that amajor seizure may not make an immediatedent in quantities trafficked. Nonetheless, itassertsthatoveralongperiodandespeciallyat a regional level — where the importanceof national-level changes in policingmay besomewhat diluted — seizure data remain animportantindicatoroftrafficking.33

Isidore Obot’s analysis of official data on anumberofdruglawenforcementoutcomesinNigeria in the 1990s illustrates theweaknessof seizure data in the West African context.OfficialseizuredatainNigeriaduringthisperiodwere influencedbychanges in the leadershipofthenationaldrugcontrolagency,pressuresarisingfromtheUSdenunciationofthelaxityofNigerian drug control efforts, and possiblyeven an attempt to deflect internationalattentionawayfromnon-drug-relatedabusivepractices of the military regime.34 In spiteof such factors, seizure data are central tothe story that UNODC and the INL tell aboutgrowingdrugtraffickingintheregion.

For advocates of prohibition-oriented drugpolicy, one of the advantages of seizure datais partly that they allow for loose ‘tip of theiceberg’ kinds of improvisations. Thus, whileUNODCmayreleasereport that showsacleardropincocaineseizuresinWestAfricainthe2008–2012 period relative to 2007, its WestAfricanrepresentative,asnotedabove,cansaythat seizuresmay be up again to 2007 levelsor above, but for various plausible reasonsthose increases are not in the official figures.Or,whilecocaine seizures in the regionhoverbelow25tonsyearly,USofficialsandINTERPOLcansaythattheymightreallybemorelike300tonsannually,35anditishardtoarguethepoint.

UNODC and US officials also do not hesitateto use seizure data to calculate the marketvalueoftraffickeddrugs.Thevalueofcocainetrafficked annually through West Africa wasestimated by US officials in 2012 as between$3 billion and $14 billion.36 UNODC’s special

2013reportonorganisedcrimeinWestAfricasaidthatifindeedonly18tonsofcocainewastransitingtheregionatthattime,itwouldbeworth $1.25 billion, and hastens to note thateventhisfigurerepresents‘immenseresourcesto traffickers to sow corruption and supportviolentgroups’.37AsPeterReuterandVictoriaGreenfieldnote,cautionshouldalwaysbetakentodistinguishsalesbasedonrevenuefromfinalconsumption—which the high end of the USestimate is likely to be — from estimates oftradeflows,giventhatthevalueofdrugsvariessogreatlydependingonplaceandtimeinthetrafficking trajectory.38 Billions of dollars, inanycase,helptobolsterthecalamitousqualityofthestory.

With respect todrugconsumption, it isclearthat the available data are not sufficient todrawsubstantialconclusionsaboutthesizeortendenciesofuseofillicitdrugsintheregion.The World Drug Reportrepeatedlynotesthatdrug demand-related data are weaker thansupplydata.ThemosttellingfiguresinTable1arethesmallnumbersofcountries inWestAfrica evenmaking estimates of drug use intheirpopulations.

In its carefulmethods chapters in theWorldDrugReports,UNODCnotesthatmanycountries,not justWestAfrican countries, do not havepopulation-baseddataonprevalenceofdruguse,notleastbecausedruguseandpossessionare criminalised inmost countries, and drugusers may be a relatively hidden population,difficult to include innormal sample surveys.In these cases, there are severalmethods ofindirect assessment of prevalence that canbe brought to bear. One suchmethod is tofind the number of people being treated fordrug dependence, a sub-group easier to findthanthegeneralpopulationofdrugusers,andthencalculatea factorbywhich thenumberofpeopleintreatmentshouldbemultipliedtoapproximatethelikelynumberofdrugusers.39 In a region as bereft of treatment facilitiesasWestAfrica, letaloneregular reportingof

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data from such facilities, this method is oflittle use. Another indirectmethod is basedon extrapolation from school-based surveysofdruguse.40Again,inWestAfrica,therearefewsuch surveys,and there is relatively lowsecondary school attendance in the generalpopulation in some countries.The secondaryschool population is likely to over-representyoung people from wealthier families.Interpreting data from such a survey wouldlikelyrequiresomebackgroundknowledgeontherelationshipbetweenincomeanddruguseinyoungpeoplethatisunlikelytobeavailableintheregion.

Assessing the prevalence of drug use anddrug injection should be a public healthpriority in West Africa, particularly in viewof the presence in most countries of theregion of generalised HIV epidemics (thatis, >1 percent HIV prevalence in the adultpopulation).41 Even if it can be determinedthat drug injection is rare, countries shouldbe assisted in helping it to remain rare andensuring HIV prevention services where itdoesexist.ItisdifficulttofindexamplesofdonorassistancetoWestAfricancountriesintheareaofaddressingthelinkbetweendruguseandHIVinspiteofconsiderablenumbersof donor-supported HIV programs.Where tofind injection drug users and how to deliverHIV prevention services to them are crucialassessmentchallengesintheregion,perhapsmore important than trying to get an exactheadcountofpeoplewhousedrugs,whichislikelytobeextremelydifficult.

UNODC, again, at least in the World DrugReports, is frankabouttheweaknessofdataon the West African situation. For instance,theWorld Drug Report 2013states:

WhileitisclearthattheAfricancontinentisbecomingincreasinglyimportantandvulnerableintermsoftheproliferationof trafficking routes, the availabilityof data is very limited. In order toeffectivelymonitorthisworryingtrend,thereisanurgentneedtoimprovethedatacollectionandanalysiscapacityofcountriesintheregion.42

As UNODC notes, problemswith the data donotmeanthat there isnota significantdrugproblem in the region. The question is howbest to depict it to inform a sensible andeffectivepolicyresponse.

THE WEST AFRICA DRUG NARRATIVE

In view of the great caution with which oneshould treat data on the drug supply anddemand inWestAfrica,whyare thesedata somuch a part of the statements of prominentdrugofficials?Whatdrivestheneedforarobust,data-supportednarrativeofaWestAfrica‘underattack’ by drug traffickers and developing a‘growing’ population of addicted persons? (SeeBox 1). We would like to suggest that WestAfrica may find itself in a situation in whichthe depiction of its drug situation is greatlyinfluencedbyshiftsintheglobal‘drugwar’thatarebeyondthecontrolofWestAfricanstates.

Box 1. View from the ground: Illicit drugs in West Africa: Data vs. Narratives Axel Klein, Social Anthropologist at the University of Kent.*

Theproliferationofdrugtrafficking routes inWestAfricahas receivedconsiderableattentionfromtheinternationaldrugcontrolagencies(e.g.theUNODC)andgovernmentsintheUSandEuropesincethemid-2000s.ConceptionsaboutWestAfricabeing‘underattack’frompowerfuldrugtraffickingorganisationsandtheconsequentincreaseindruguseintheregionhavealsobeenpresentinthediscourseoftheseleadingactorsintheglobalarenaduringthisperiod.AxelKleinbelievesthisnarrative,basedonverylimitedandoftenpoorqualitydata,seemstoreflect

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theapproachandprioritiesofthesepowerfulactors,whoareworriedaboutheroinandcocainetransitingtheregiontotheirowncountries.Furthermore,ithasledtotheimplementationofdrugcontrolmeasuresthathavenotalwaystakenintoconsiderationAfrica-specificconcerns.

AccordingtoKleinthereisadrugsceneinWestAfrica‘and so has been for a long time’ howeverthereis‘no evidence that this West African route is as widely used as it has been claimed. Most of the literature on this is self referential.’Thefirstreportsthatcameoutin2007(mainlyfromtheUNODC)werebasedonlimitedevidenceandthe‘methodology used to wave the seizures was very quickly coming into dispute.’ Inthisrespect,Kleinwonderswhattherealscaleofdrugstransitingtheregionis,andwherethisnarrativecomesfrom:‘Is it really that close to the actual volume of trade or does it fulfil another function? Maybe a function that is determined by the needs of the various agencies that are behind it. This needs a closer investigation’.

Anotherproblemlinkedtothisnarrativeandtheinternationalisationofthedrugcontroleffortisthedisconnectbetweentheanalysisofthesituationmadebyinternationalagenciesandthosemadebylocalpartners:‘International partners become involved in West Africa because they are concerned with cocaine trafficking ending up in their own countries i.e. North America, Europe. Local partners interpret the drug control efforts in a literal way. They will be waging very vigorous campaigns against drugs, but not against the drugs that concern their partners — that is cocaine because quite simply there isn’t very much — but to cannabis which seems to be enjoying some popularity particularly in Nigeria and Ghana but I presume right across the region’.

Notwithstanding this there isconsiderablealarmabout thespreadof illicitdrugswithinWestAfrica: ‘There is concern at the state level about the security implications and then at the population level about health and crime issues’. Health and treatment facilitieswithinWestAfricancountries,Kleinnotes,areverypoorand‘when you have competing needs on your health services, drug treatment does not get priority status because in the eyes of many there are greater priorities — let’s say the health of women in childbirth, underfed. So there isn’t much left in health budget that could be allocated for drug treatment. Much of the work that is being done is therefore carried out by private charities often affiliated to religious groups’.

*WithabackgroundinAfricanStudies,DrAxelKleinhasbeenworkinginthedrugsfieldforover20years.Thishasincludedworkwithnon-governmentorganisations,theEuropeanCommissionandtheUNODC.HehasconductedextensivefieldworkinWestAfricaandpublishedonvariousaspectsofthedrugissueintheregion.DrKleinistheeditorofDrugs and Alcohol Today,authorofDrugs and the World(London:Reaktion,2008),co-authorofThe Khat Nexus. Stimulating the Debate on Drugs(Oxford:Berg,2007)andeditorof

Caribbean Drugs: From Criminalisation to Harm Reduction (London:Zed,2004).

A new drug debate in Latin AmericaLatinAmericahasarguablybeenthemostactivefrontinthe‘warondrugs’inrecentyears.Aspartof‘PlanColombia’,from2000to2008theUSgovernmentgaveaboutUS$500millionperyearinmilitaryassistancetothearmedforcesof Colombia for anti-drug efforts, and theColombiangovernmentspentover$700million

peryearondrugcontrol inthesameperiod.43 This programme was followed by the MéridaInitiative,inwhichtheUSsentabout$2billionin military and surveillance assistance mostlyto Mexico from 2008 to 2012, complementedbyabout$47millionperyearinmilitary-basedanti-drug efforts paid for by Mexico.44 Méridafundshelpedtounderwritewhatmostobservers

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considerthedisastrousmiscalculationofformerMexicanPresidentCalderón’sall-outassaultondrugtraffickingorganisationsworkinginMexicowhereby the targeted groups splintered andthrivedinnewandviolentforms.45

Extraordinary levels of violence in Mexicoand elsewhere in LatinAmerica, linked to aprohibitionist law enforcement-dominatedandmilitarisedapproachtoillicitdrugmarketsas well as a growing appreciation of thefutility and side effects of coca eradicationprogrammes, have led to unprecedentedpublic challenges by sitting Latin AmericanpresidentsoftheU.S.-supportedprohibition.46 AmajordrugpolicyreviewbytheOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS),whichresultedfromcalls by Latin American governments for anew drug control paradigm, recognised thatalternativestohyper-criminalisationofdrugs,including possibly state-regulated cannabismarkets,atleastneedtobediscussed.47

AnextraordinarysessionoftheOAStodeepenthe discussion about alternative drug controlregimesisplannedforearly2014.USstatementson these developments have reiterated thatthe US does not believe in legalisation andstateregulationofillicitdrugmarkets.TheUS,nonetheless,has tobereadingthewritingonthewall,especiallyaslegalisationofcannabisfor recreational use is nowwithin its bordersfollowingthemarijuanareferendainthestatesofWashingtonandColoradoinNovember2012.

ItistellingthatpublicstatementsofUSofficialsdrawsomanylinksbetweenwhattheyregardassuccessesinLatinAmericaandthenewchallengesinWestAfrica.USofficialsareatpainstosuggestthatmanyofthesamedrugtraffickersthatbigUSmoneyhaspursuedinLatinAmericaarealsooperatinginWestAfrica.AUSDrugEnforcementAdministration (DEA) official told a US Senatehearingin2012thattheDEAknowsof‘atleastninetop-tierSouthAmericanandMexican’drugtrafficking organisations that operate in WestAfrica.48 He noted that while much of the

cocaine transiting throughWestAfricamay bebound for Europe, these traffickers with linksto Latin America are also responsible for themovement of methamphetamine precursorsfromWestAfricatoMexicofortheproductionofmethamphetaminesdestinedfortheUS.49 This connection isan importantone for theDEAtodocument in that the US criminal code (Title1U.S.C. §959)gives theDEA ‘extraterritorialjurisdiction’overdrugoffenseswithsomelinktotheUS,evenifthereisnoactualentryintoUSbordersbythedrugsatissue.50

Thus,whileLatinAmericainthecomingyearsmaybelessfriendlytotheUSdrugcontrolapparatus’heavypresence,USauthoritiescantransferthesamerationaleandthesameexpensivemilitaryand surveillance hardware to Africa. The UShas already announced an initiative for WestAfrica that has some of the same elements asits recent drug-control programmes in LatinAmerica. The WestAfrica Cooperative SecurityInitiative (WACSI)will ‘buildcapacity todetect,disruptanddismantledrugtraffickingnetworks,’reinforce justicesystems,and ‘harmonize legalframeworks’ in the regionwith an initial pricetagof$60million.51NottobeleftbehindafteritsheavyinvolvementindrugactivitiesinLatinAmerica, the Pentagon is involved in WACSI inexecutingsecurityoperationsandtrainingmilitaryand police personnel on airport interdiction,detecting methamphetamine labs, and moneylaunderingcontrol,amongotherthings.52

Terrorism thickens the plot

There is nothing like terrorism for drawing theattention ofmedia andpoliticians to a subject,andsoitiswithdrugtrafficking’sostensiblelinktoterrorisminWestAfrica.SincethedestabilisationofMalilinkedtoAlQaedaintheMaghreb(AQIM)thatledtotheFrenchmilitaryincursioninMaliinJanuary2013,massmediahavebeenfilledwithstories about the proceeds of drug traffickingfundingterrorisminWestAfrica.53Butattentionto ‘narco-terrorism’, like ‘narco-state’anoftenused but rarely defined term, by the U.S. andUNODCinWestAfricapredatestheeventsinMali.

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Officials from the DEA, the US Department ofStateBureauofAfricanAffairs,theUSDepartmentofDefenseandtheINLhaveallpubliclydepicted‘narco-terrorism’asacentralthreatofthedrugsituationinWestAfricaandnotedthatcombatingthe phenomenon is central to the US foreignpolicymandateintheregion.54AsthePentagonspokespersonata2012CongressionalhearingondrugsinWestAfrica,noted:

Where once DOD’s [the Department ofDefense’s]counter-narcoticseffortswerefocusedintheWesternHemisphere,todaywe are supporting counter-narcoticsactivitiesworldwide….Fortheforeseeablefuturedrugtraffickingwillcontinuetobethe most lucrative criminal enterpriseand therefore theonewith thegreatestability to fund terrorist, insurgents andotherthreatstoournationalsecurity.55

Onceagain,US lawgives thedrugwar’s front-lineperpetratorsgoodmotivationtomakealinkbetween drug control and anti-terrorism. Thecriminalcode(Title1U.S.C.§960a)authorisesUS agencies to pursue and prosecute drugoffensesoutsidetheUSifalinktoterrorismisestablished.56Unlikesection959discussedabove,inthecaseofterrorism,theredoesnotneedtobeanylinktoUSdrugmarketsorconsumptionforUSanti-drugeffortstobeauthorised.

It isbeyond the scopeof thispaper toassesstheAQIM-druglink,butitisworthnotingthatsomeexpertsbelievethatthedrugconnectiontoAQIM inWestAfrica has been exaggerated

ornotaccuratelydepicted(seeBox2).Someof the attention to ‘narco-terrorism’ in WestAfrica seems tohavebeen inspiredbya2009caseheard inUSfederalcourt inwhichthreemenwereaccusedofdrugtraffickinginsupportofAlQaeda.57Inthiscase,thejudgeconcludedthat themen acted not out of any terrorism-drivenmotivebutoutofpoverty.ThemenhadbeencaughtbyUSagentsposingasoperativesoftheRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC), an organisation involved to varyingdegrees with some aspects of the drug tradewithinthecountry.Itwaslatershown,however,that the defendants did not knowwhat FARCwas,andat leastoneof themhadnevermetanyone affiliated with AQIM.58 The ‘narco-terrorism’chargesweredropped.

WolframLacher,whoconductedfieldresearchonAQIMinLibya,MaliandMauritania,assertsthatAQIM’sdruginvolvementandthatofotherorganisationslabeled‘terrorist’intheregionhasbeenoverblowninthat(1)AQIM’smainsourceofrevenueisclearlyransompaymentslinkedtoitskidnappings;and(2)thefocusonAQIManddrugshasunhelpfullydistractedattentionfromhigh-levelcorruptionandstatecomplicitywithorganised crime, leaving governments off thehook in themind ofWesternpowers. In thisregard,heconcludesthattheAQIM-drugstoryisalsosomethingofasmoke-screenforthehardrealitythatWesterndonorssawMaliasamodelofdemocracyformanyyearsastheyfailedtosee the close and collusive relationship thatwasbeingdevelopedbetweenorganisedcrimeentitiesandthehighestlevelsofgovernment.59

Box 2. View from the ground: The drug-terror nexus in the Sahel-Sahara region: Myths, evidence and implications

Virginia Comolli, Research Associate for Transnational Threats at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)ThereisevidencethatIslamicextremistgroups―suchasal-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM)ortheMovementforMonotheismandJihadinWestAfrica(MUJAO)―havebeenusingcriminalactivitiessuchaskidnappingandcigarettesmugglingtoraisefundsforsometime.Howeveritnowseems,thoughtheevidenceispatchy,thattheyarestartingtoplayaroleinregionaldrug

12

smugglingnetworkswithinWestAfrica.Whilst it isnotyetclearwhatthecharacter,sizeandscopeofthiscooperationis, inrecentyearsnarrativesemphasisingstronglinksbetweendrugtrafficking and terrorism in the region have spread throughout the discourse of drug controlofficialsandthemedia.

When asked why this narrative has become so widespread, Comolli highlights three mainreasons.First,thesearchforsensationalistheadlinesbythemedia,‘may have contributed to this conflation of terrorism and drug trafficking’. Second, local governments are aware that‘by emphasising or inflating any connections to terrorist organisations, especially al-Qaeda, it becomes easier to attract donors’ attention and also additional funds’. Finally, she believesthat‘shifting the focus on to extremist groups and placing a disproportionate blame for drug trafficking on [groupslikeMUJAO]serves the purpose of hiding the involvement, which is often considerable, of local political elites in criminal activities, including the narcotics business’.Inthisway,thestrengtheningofthedrug-terrornexusisfunctionaltokeyplayersinvolvedinthepoliticaleconomyofnarcotics inWestAfrica(including localelites, internationalcounter-terrorismactorsanddrugcontrolagencies)andthisseemstoexplaintheemphasisonthislink,eveniftheconnectionsbetweencriminalsandterroristshaveexistedforsometime.

Sowhatistheactuallevelofknowledgeaboutextremistgroupsinvolvementondrugtrafficking?ComolliexplainsthatbecauseUSandAlgeriancounter-terrorismoperationssucceededinlimitingAQIM’sabilitiestocarryoutattacks,theyhavebeenforcedintocriminalactivitiesinordertosurvive.Shenotesthatitisusuallyelementswithintheextremistgroups,ratherthantheentiregroupitselfthatareinvolvedindrugtrafficking,‘as they [criminalactivities]are really against al-Qaeda ideology and therefore it has also resulted in some fractures within the group’.TheinvolvementofAQIMincriminaldrugtraffickingactivitieshaschangedoverthetime:‘originally they simply charged traffickers for passing through the territory it controlled but then, according to some Western and also Malian officials, AQIM has increased its involvement. And both AQIM and MUJAO they now offer armed escorts to drug convoys and they charge between 10 to 15 per cent of the value of the cocaine, which is a currency they can use to sponsor their recruitment programmes and also to buy weapons’.

However,Comolli points out,while drugs are likely tomake a significant contribution to thefinancesof thesegroups, ‘kidnapping remains by far their most lucrative source of revenue’.TheFrenchmilitaryinterventioninMalithatstartedinJanuary2013‘has partly disrupted the narcotics flow but the Islamic ties to the drug traffickers are likely to have remained largely intact’. Itshouldbenotedthatit isnotjustAQIMoral-Qaedasympathiserswhoareinvolvedinthenarcoticstrade:‘There have been a number of investigations by the US government that have explored very tight links between South American drug traffickers and Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist organisation [...] The cocaine trade through West Africa is a very important source of income for Hezbollah, and this was also confirmed by the UN and the Interpol already back in 2009’.

*WorkingwithintheTransnationalThreatsandPoliticalRiskProgrammeatIISS,London,VirginiaComollihasresponsibilityforresearchontransnationalorganizedcrime,extremismandsecuritythreatsinWestAfricaandtheSahel.She is theco-authorofDrugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of Prohibition, (London:Routledge,2012)andauthorofaforthcomingbookonBokoHaram’sinsurgencyinNigeria(Hurst

Publishers/OxfordUniversityPress,2014).

13

Weak state argument

Complementing both terrorism and theWestAfrica situation as a continuation of thedrug war in Latin America, the ‘weak state’depictionofWestAfricancountriesvulnerableto drug traffickers also nourishes the idea oftheneedforlarge-scaleanti-drug‘assistance’fromoutsidetocometotherescue.NeilCarrierandGernotKlantschnigassertthatthe‘weakstate’ argument clouds what may be moreuseful characterisations of states that arereliablycomplicitwithdrugtraffickersinwaysthatmaynotbelinkedtooverallweaknessofthestate,orthosethatarewillfullyneglectfulof drug trafficking because other problemsare more pressing.60 They argue, in fact,that stateswhoseweakness is in the formofpolitical instability and frequent turnover ofpoliticalleadersmaybemorechallengingfordrug traffickers than states with stable andcorruptible leaders. Distinguishing types ofstate‘weakness’isimportantforknowinghowtoaddressdrugtraffickinginagivenplace.

CONCLUSION: A NARRATIVE TO GUIDE POLICY?

There is compelling evidence that drugtraffickinginWestAfricaiscausingconsiderableharm,includingcorruptionandinvolvementofvulnerable people in drugmarkets, and thatimportanttraffickingroutesintheregionmustbe a priority for law enforcement officialsnationally,regionallyandinternationally.Itisundoubtedlythecasethatdruguse,includingproblematic drug use, is also a significantconcern, as it virtually always iswhen illicitdrugsbecomemoreavailable.

Our concern is that questionable data andselective narrative are being used to bolstersupport for a new campaign in the ‘war ondrugs’, which is likely to be as harmful andineffectiveaspreviousoneshavebeen. TheemergenceofWestAfricaasanimportantdrughub in worldmarkets should be an occasionfor rigorous reflection on the approaches

that have dominated drug control elsewhereandtheirrealrecordofsuccessorfailure.Itwould be a gross disservice to West Africato replicate the experience of militarisedrepression in Central and SouthAmerica, forexample, without a nuanced assessment ofwhich measures have exacerbated violenceandcorruptionandwhetheranymadeadentin trafficking without simply pushing it to anew location. The need to learn from pasterrors is crucial for any region of the worldinwhichnewtraffickingroutesmightemerge,butitisespeciallyimportantforaregionthatdepends heavily on external aid, includingfrom the very parties that have perpetuatedill-conceivedandineffectivedrugpolicies.

Withrespecttodrugconsumption,ratherthaninsisting on estimates that are meant to bebasedonsurveysthataregenerallynotbeingdoneinthisregion,UNODCandtheUSwoulddo well to encourage and support provenmeasures to limit the harms of whateverlevel of drug use exists, and ensure accessto scientifically sound treatment for drugdependenceforallwhoneedit. ParticularlyinlightofthesignificantunderlyingprevalenceofHIVinthegeneralpopulationofmostWestAfricancountries,itisdismayingthatthereissomuchattentiontorepressingtraffickingbyanymeansnecessaryandsolittletoassistingthese countries in averting a drug-relatedHIV epidemic and developing humane andaffordable modes of treatment. It wouldalso be very useful for UNODC and othersconcernedaboutdrugusetohelpWestAfricancountries develop appropriatemethods shortof conventional national surveys to identifypocketsofhighestriskofdrug-relatedharmssoastotargetinterventionsmosteffectively.

In a 2012 assessment of the US’ ‘significantexpansion of the war on drugs’ into WestAfrica, the New York Times noted that this‘aggressive response by the United Statesis also a sign of how greater attention andresourceshaveturnedtoeffortstofightdrugs

14

asthewarsinIraqandAfghanistanhavewounddown.’61 Could it be thatWestAfrica simplyhasthemisfortunetohaveemergedasanewdrug trafficking hub at a timewhenmilitaryhardware and technical security assistanceare in search of newworkplaces? If itwereanother part of the world, would the ‘weakstate’ and ‘narco-terror’ narratives simplyhavebeenadjustedtofitanothercontext?

The politicisation of drug policy makes itdifficult under the best of circumstances forrational, evidence-based thinking to prevailandforcountrieswithnewdrugchallengestolearnfromthebestpracticesofothers.Thedinof the chest-beating around narco-traffickingandstatefailureinWestAfricaisrenderingverydifficultausefuldebateaboutaffordableandeffectivemeasures thatmight avert the welldocumentedworstconsequencesofthe‘warondrugs’. The US and UNODC have beaten thedrumtocalltheworldtofollowthisapproachforalongtime.PeopleseekingtounderstanddrugsinWestAfricashouldalsounderstandthisrecordofnarrativeandpractice.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ThanksgotoDaveBewley-Taylorforfeedbackon various drafts of this brief. We are alsogratefultoDanielCarril,EmilyCrick,VirginiaComolli, Christopher Hallam, Axel Klein andGilesPattisonwhoallhelped invariouswayswithitsproduction.ThebriefalsobenefitedfromdiscussionsattheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies(IISS)—GDPOroundtable‘The “Securitisation” of Drug Policy in WestAfrica: Markets, organized crime, terrorismandinternationalresponses’heldattheIISSinLondon,October10th2013.Anyerrorsoffactor interpretation remain the responsibilityoftheauthors.

15

ENDNOTES

1 QuotedinCharlieSavage&ThomShanker, ‘US

drugwarexpandstoAfrica,anewerhubfor

cartels’,The New York Times,21stJuly2012—

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/world/

africa/us-expands-drug-fight-in-africa.html

2 AntonioMariaCosta,‘CocaineFindsAfrica’,

The Washington Post,29thJuly2008—http://

articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-07-29/

opinions/36831531_1_guinea-bissau-cartels-

traffickers

3 PeterAndreas,‘ThePoliticsofMeasuringIllicit

FlowsandPolicyEffectiveness’inPeterAndreas

andKellyM.Greenhill(Eds.),Sex, Drugs and

Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global

Crime and Conflict,IthacaandLondon:Cornell

UniversityPress,2010,p.34

4 Forpurposesofthispaper,weusetheUN

PopulationDivision’sdefinitionofWestAfrica

asincluding:Benin,BurkinaFaso,CapeVerde,

Côted’Ivoire,Gambia,Ghana,Guinea,Guinea-

Bissau,Liberia,Mali,Mauritania,Niger,Nigeria,

Senegal,SierraLeoneandTogo

5 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime

(UNODC),World Drug Report 2005,Vienna:

UNODC,2006,p.26

6 U.S.DepartmentofState,Bureauof

InternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcement

Affairs(INL),2005 International Narcotics

Control Strategy Report,Washington,DC

7 UNODC,Cocaine trafficking in West Africa:

The threat to stability and development (with

special reference to Guinea-Bissau), Vienna:

UNODC,2007,p.1

8 Ibid.,p5

9 U.S.DepartmentofState,INL,2008

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

and2009 International Narcotics Control

Strategy Report, WashingtonDC.Theterm

‘narco-state’appearsinthe2009INCS Report,p.

292andp.295

10 LetiziaPaoli,VictoriaA.GreenfieldandPeter

Reuter,The World Heroin Market. Can Supply

be Cut?,OxfordUniversityPress,2009.p.142.

11 LianaSunWyler&NicolasCook,Illegal

drug trade in Africa: trends and U.S. policy,

Washington,DC:CongressionalResearch

Service,2009

12 Seee.g.UNODC,Cocaine trafficking in West

Africa,2007,op.cit.;INL,2009 International

Narcotics Control Strategy Report, sections

onGhana,Guinea,Guinea-BissauandNigeria;

andDavidE.Brown,The challenge of drug

trafficking to democratic governance and human

security in West Africa,Carlisle,PA:Strategic

StudiesInstituteandU.S.ArmyWarCollege

Press,2013

13 UNODC,Transnational organized crime in West

Africa: a threat assessment, Vienna:UNODC,2013

14 Ibid.,pp.10–1115 RobbieCorey-Boulet,Methamphetamine

‘growing concern’ for West Africa,Voiceof

America,25thFebruary2013—http://www.

voanews.com/content/methamphetamine-

becomes-west-Africa-growing-problem/1610342.

html

16 UNODC, Transnational organized crime in West

Africa,2013,op.cit.,p.4

17 Ibid.,p.21

18 Ibid.,p.23

19 Ibid.,p.21

20 U.S.DepartmentofState,INL,2013

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,

Washington,DC: pp.171,252

21 UNODC, Transnational organized crime in West

Africa,2013,p.22

22 UNODC,World Drug Report 2012 and 2013,

Vienna:UNODC

23 UNODC,World Drug Report 2013,Vienna:

UNODC,p.46

24 Thesearetheyearsoftheassessmentsnotedin

UNODC’sdataannexestotheWorldDrugReports

25 FiguresfromUNODC’sdataannexestotheWorld

DrugReports

26 DeleAnofi,‘Nigeriatopsharddrugsusein

Africa’,The Nation(Nigeria),28thJune2011—

http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.

php/news/10694-%E2%80%98nigeria-tops-hard-

drugs-use-in-africa%E2%80%99.html

27 RonaldC.Kessleretal,‘Lifetimeprevalenceand

age-of-onsetdistributionsofmentaldisorders

intheWorldHealthOrganization’sWorldMental

HealthSurveyInitiative’,World Psychiatry

(2007),6(3):168–17628 Ibid.,p.172

16

29 LouisaDegenhardt,Wai-TatChiu,Nancy

Sampsonetal.,‘Towardaglobalviewof

alcohol,tobacco,cannabisandcocaineuse:

findingsfromtheWHOWorldMentalHealth

Surveys’,PLoS Medicine,2008,Vol.5,Issue7:

e141,pp.1053–106730 BradleyM.Mathers,LouisaDegenhardt,

BenjaminPhillipsetal.,‘Globalepidemiology

ofinjectingdruguseandHIVamongpeople

whoinjectdrugs:asystematicreview,Lancet,

2008,372,pp.1733–174531 M.L.Adelekan&R.A.Lawal,‘Druguseand

HIVinfectioninNigeria:reviewoftherecent

findings’,African Journal of Drug and Alcohol

Studies,2006,5(2),pp.117–12832 See,e.g.,AustralianFederalPolice,

Benchmarkingdrugseizures,AFP Research

Notes Series,ResearchNote4,July2003—

http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/r/

research-notes4.ashx

33 UNODC,World Drug Report 2005,op.cit.,p.30.

34 IsidoreS.Obot,‘AssessingNigeria’sdrugcontrol

policy,1994–2000’,International Journal of

Drug Policy,2003,vol.15,pp.17–2635 LianaSunWyler&NicolasCook,Illegal drug

trade in Africa: trends and U.S. policy,op.

Cit.,p.10

36 U.S.Senate,CaucusonInternationalNarcotics

Control,Hearing:Counteringnarcoticsthreats

inWestAfrica,OpeningStatementofSenator

CharlesE.Grassley,16thMay2012

37 UNODC, Transnational organized crime in West

Africa,2013,op.cit.,pp.17–18.38 PeterReuter&VictoriaGreenfield,‘Measuring

globaldrugmarkets:Howgoodarethenumbers

andwhyshouldwecareaboutthem?’,World

Economics,2001,vol.2,num.4,pp.159–17339 UNODC,World Drug Report 2013 Methodology

section,p.6

40 Ibid.,p.5

41 JointUnitedNationsProgrammeonHIV/AIDS

(UNAIDS),Global report: UNAIDS report on the

global AIDS epidemic 2012,pp.14–15.ForHIVprevalencedataonWestAfricancountries,see

http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/

countries/#d.en.52724

42 UNODC,World Drug Report 2013, op. cit.,p.ix.

43 DanielMejía,‘ThewarondrugsunderPlan

Colombia’,Yale University Center for the Study

of Globalization,OccasionalPaper,2012—

http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/plan-

colombia19-32.pdf

44 ClareRibandoSeelke&KristinM.Finklea,

U.S.-Mexican security cooperation: the

Mérida Initiative and beyond,Washington,DC:

CongressionalResearchService,2013

45 Ibid

46 See,e.g.,AlmaGuillermoprieto,‘Anendto

thewarondrugs?’,The New York Review of

Books,12April2012—http://www.nybooks.

com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/12/latin-

america-end-drug-war/

47 OrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS),The

Report of The Drug Problem in the Americas,

Washington,DC,2013—http://www.cicad.oas.

org/Main/Template.asp?File=/main/policy/

default_eng.asp

48 U.S.Senate,CaucusonInternationalNarcotics

Control,Hearing:Counteringnarcoticsthreats

inWestAfrica,StatementofThomasHarrigan,

DeputyAdministrator,DrugEnforcement

Administration,16thMay2012

49 Ibid

50 Ibid

51 U.S.DepartmentofState,West Africa Security

Cooperation Initiative: A Shared Partnership,

2012—http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/166329.pdf

52 U.S.Senate,CaucusonInternational

NarcoticsControl,Hearing:Countering

narcoticsthreatsinWestAfrica,Statementof

WilliamWechsler,DeputyAssistantSecretary

ofDefense,CounternarcoticsandGlobal

Threats,16thMay2012

53 See,e.g.,BBC,‘Malicrisis:keyplayers’,12th

March2013—http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-17582909;SkyNews,‘Mali:French

interventionhitsdrugrunning’,11thMarch2013

— http://news.sky.com/story/1063100/mali-

french-intervention-hits-drug-running;Ellen

Knickmeyer&DrewHinshaw,‘UpheavalinMali

curbsdrugtraffic’,The Wall Street Journal,

30thMarch2013—http://online.wsj.com/

article/SB10001424127887323639604578366161

944327742.html#articleTabs%3Darticle

17

54 UnitedStatesSenate,CaucusonInternational

NarcoticsControl,Hearing:Countering

narcoticsthreatsinWestAfrica,16thMay

2012.StatementsofThomasHarrigan,

DeputyAdministrator,DrugEnforcement

Administration;SenatorDianneFeinstein

(D-California);SenatorCharlesGrassley

(R-Iowa);JohnnieCarson,AssistantSecretary

ofState,BureauofAfricanAffairs;William

Wechsler,DeputyAssistantSecretaryof

Defense,CounternarcoticsandGlobalThreats;

andWilliamBrownfield,AssistantSecretary

ofStateforInternationalNarcoticsand

LawEnforcementAffairs,StateDepartment.

Availableathttp://www.drugcaucus.senate.

gov/hearings.html

55 Ibid.,WilliamWechslerstatement

56 Ibid.,ThomasHarriganstatement

57 BenjaminWeiser,‘CitingTerrorDefendants’

Motivation,JudgeShowsSentencingLeniency’,

The New York Times,22ndNovember2012—

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/nyregion/

judges-ruling-in-qaeda-terror-case-open-

ideology-debate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

58 Ibid

59 WolframLacher,‘Organizedcrimeandconflict

intheSahel-Sahararegion’,The Carnegie

Papers,September2012,WashingtonDC:

CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.

Availableathttp://carnegieendowment.org/

files/sahel_sahara.pdf

60 NeilCarrier&GernotKlantschnig,Africa and

the war on drugs,London:ZedBooks,2012

61 CharlieSavage&ThomShanker,op.cit

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