1

Temporary Employment Contracts, Workers’ Well-

Being and Behaviour: Evidence from the UK.1

By

David Guest

Michael Clinton

Department of ManagementKing’s College, London

150 Stamford StreetLondon SE1 9NH

david.guest@kcl.ac.uk: tel 0207 848 3723michael.clinton@kcl.ac.uk: tel 0207 848 3472

January 2006

Department of Management Working Paper No. 38

1 This study was supported by the European Union under the Fifth Framework Programme (HPSE-CT-2002-00121)

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Temporary Employment Contracts, Workers’ Well-Being andBehaviour: Evidence from the UK

Summary

1. There has been pressure from Europe to protect and enhance the rights ofworkers on temporary or fixed-term employment contracts on the grounds thatsuch workers represent a disadvantaged group whose well-being suffers fromtheir precarious employment status.

2. This conflicts with the desire of the UK government for a flexible economy,facilitated by a flexible workforce.

3. Academics have suggested that temporary workers should not be viewed as ahomogeneous group. They are likely to vary, in particular, according to theirskill level in a world where knowledge workers in high demand may prefer tomaintain contract flexibility. We can therefore distinguish temporary workersaccording to skill level and the extent to which they are employed on theircontract of choice. It is therefore likely to be those in low skill jobs and whowould prefer permanent employment whose well-being is likely to suffer.

4. These propositions were tested on a sample of 642 UK workers from 19organizations. 25 per cent had temporary contracts of various sorts. Data werecollected on a large number of background variables and indicators of well-being, health, work attitudes and behaviour.

5. Measure of well-being covered depression, anxiety, irritation, general health,life satisfaction and the influence of work at home. Attitudes included jobsatisfaction, organizational commitment and intention to quit. Behavioursincluded absence, sickness presence, accidents and harassment and violence aswell as self-rated performance.

6. Contrary to expectation, workers on temporary contracts reported better well-being, better general health, more positive attitudes towards work and betterwork behaviour than their permanent counterparts. This was found forvirtually all the measures. The differences remain after controlling for a rangeof individual and organizational background variables.

7. High skill temporary workers who wanted temporary contracts had the mostpositive attitudes. However even low skill temporary workers who preferredpermanent employment reported more positive attitudes than workers withpermanent contracts. They also reported the highest levels of well-being.

8. Temporary workers reported higher levels of job insecurity than permanentworkers. However their insecurity did not have a major impact on their well-being or work attitudes and behaviour.

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9. A majority of temporary workers would have preferred permanent jobs butthis too did not have a major impact on their well-being, work attitudes andbehaviour.

10. Temporary workers reported clearer job roles and less work overload. Thishas a modest positive impact on their outcomes.

11. Temporary workers reported a much more positive state of their psychologicalcontract –the perception of the employment relationship and the obligationsimplied in that relationship. In particular, they reported less violation by theorganization of the promises and commitments made to them and also fairertreatment and more trusting relations with the organization than theirpermanent counterparts. This provides some of the explanation for the morepositive outcomes reported by temporary workers.

12. Even after taking account of all the possible explanations including insecurity,job content and the state of the psychological contract, temporary workers arestill generally more positive about their experience in their current work thanpermanent workers.

13. A possible explanation lies in the deterioration of permanent jobs. Manypermanent workers report high levels of work overload, relatively high levelsof irritation, anxiety and depression and a strong interference of work with lifeat home. Temporary work may have drawbacks; but for many people inpermanent contracts, the experience of work is markedly more negative.

14. This research was undertaken as part of a European-wide project. The resultsin the other countries, including Germany, Spain, Belgium, The Netherlandsand Sweden, some of which have different levels of unemployment anddifferent experiences with temporary employment, were very similar.

15. The findings suggest that it would be better to focus legislation and policy onimproving the quality of the experience of work for all workers rather thanseeking to legislate on flexible employment.

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Temporary Employment Contracts, Workers’ Well-Being and

Behaviour: Evidence from the UK.

Introduction

British Governments have for some time proclaimed the advantages of a flexible

economy and a flexible workforce. There are a number of dimensions to the concept

of a flexible workforce and Beatson (1995) among others has distinguished numerical,

functional and reward flexibility. Much attention has recently focussed on numerical

flexibility and it is a form of this, temporary employment contracts, that provides the

subject of this paper.

Some other European countries have been more sceptical than the UK about the

benefits to society of a flexible workforce. European Union reflects a desire in a

pluralist society to accommodate the competing concerns of the social partners and

therefore to protect workers against the potential excesses of flexible employment.

This is already reflected in restrictions on working hours and the current issues for

discussion and legislation concern the employment rights of workers on non-

permanent contracts. It is this group with which the present study is concerned. The

proportion of workers on non-permanent employment contracts varies quite widely

across Europe and reflects different traditions of employment. The UK has a

relatively low proportion of workers falling into these categories. Indeed, the

proportion reached a peak of about 8 per cent in 1997 and has fallen back to about 6

per cent since 2003 (OECD, 2002; Office of National Statistics, 2005).

The reason why workers on non-permanent employment contracts have been the

focus of European legislation is that they are viewed as a disadvantaged minority on

the margins of employment. Without permanent jobs, their position is precarious and

insecure and this is likely to be damaging to their financial and emotional well-being.

In these circumstances, they need protection. This is a view that has the strong

support of trade unions across Europe and in the UK the TUC has been campaigning

in favour of legislation by highlighting cases of the abuse of temporary workers2.

This analysis leads to the straightforward proposition that workers on non-permanent

2 TUC web pages

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contracts are disadvantaged compared with permanent workers and this will be

reflected in lower work satisfaction and general well-being.

Not everyone accepts that the picture is so straightforward. For a start, there are a

number of different types of non-permanent employment, including fixed-term

contracts, work with employment agencies, seasonal work and consultancy-style

assignments for people classified as self-employed, to name a few. There are also

some groups in employment, including students, those in training, those who are

exploring the labour market to improve their employability and those who have heavy

domestic responsibilities who may prefer the more limited commitments that are

sometimes associated with non-permanent work. This leads to the proposition that

those who are on their employment contract of choice and who prefer to be in non-

permanent employment will not feel disadvantaged. Lower levels of satisfaction and

well-being will only be found among those who would prefer to be in permanent

employment.

A further element of complexity can be added by taking into account the type of work

in which non-permanent workers are engaged. For example, some UK researchers

have found evidence that the roles of temporary workers are more circumscribed and

non-participative than those with permanent contracts (Millward and Brewerton,

1999; Parker et al., 2002). However, UK commentators such as Handy (1989),

writing about portfolio workers and Knell (2000), describing the growth of “free”

workers have argued that a growing body of knowledge workers who are in high

demand in industry may prefer to manage their own employment contracts. Further

support for this comes from American writes such as Barley and Kunda (2004) who

have looked at the careers of engineers. In the UK, the Recruitment and Employment

Confederation, a pressure group made up of a mix of corporate and individual

members, have used their own large surveys to argue that the profile of temporary

workers has changed to reflect the growing numbers of knowledge workers in their

ranks, to extol the benefits of temporary employment and to argue against any need

for legislation to protect or promote their rights3. These arguments lead to the

3 Ref to their report

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proposition that an increasing proportion of the workforce may actually gain higher

levels of satisfaction and well-being from being in temporary contracts.

Marler, Barringer and Milkovich (2002) have suggested that the picture is more

complex and that in seeking to understand the consequences for workers of temporary

employment contracts, we need to distinguish between high and low skill workers and

between those who are and are not on their contract of choice. This leads to the

proposition that those who have most to gain are high skill knowledge and

professional workers who opt for temporary employment as their contract of choice

while those most disadvantaged will be low skill workers who have not sought

temporary employment. It is concern about the well-being of this second group that

has provided the case for protective legislation in Europe.

A further line of analysis, presented by writers such as Capelli (2000) and Smith

(2001) is that the changing nature of employment is rendering even permanent jobs at

risk. This possibility has been explored in the literature on job insecurity (Heery and

Salmon, 2000; Burchell, Lapido and Wilkinson, 2002; De Witte, 2005). Unsuccessful

but also visibly successful firms can be subject to takeover and to sudden change in

employment fortunes. Some have suggested that the psychological contract has

changed as a result of this constant uncertainty. In a world where we are all

vulnerable, it is no great advantage to have a permanent job. This leads to the final

proposition, namely that there will be no difference in the satisfaction and well-being

of workers in permanent and temporary contracts.

This paper reports a study that investigates these issues by comparing the experiences,

attitudes and work behaviour of workers on temporary and permanent contracts in

jobs requiring a range of knowledge and skill. The next section outlines the analytic

framework for the study.

The Analytic Framework of the Study

The core aim of the study was to explore the impact of temporary and permanent

employment contracts employment contracts on employee experiences, attitudes and

behaviour and in particular on comparing employee well-being. Building on the

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analysis of Marler, Barringer and Milkovich (2002) we need to take into account the

skills and knowledge and the extent to which workers are on their employment

contract of choice. We also need to explore whether various types of temporary

contract, ranging from agency-linked to fixed-term and seasonal contracts are

associated in different ways with employee well-being. These three factors –skill

level, contract of choice and type of temporary contract - can therefore be considered

as broader independent variables providing potentially greater diversity across

employment contracts. These variables in turn are likely to be shaped in part by a

range of individual and organizational background factors that can serve as control

variables.

Based on the existing literature (see Connelly and Gallagher, 2004 and Guest, 2004

for reviews) we expect that the link between employment contract and outcomes to be

mediated by at least three sets of factors. The first will be the allocation of tasks and

in particular the extent to which temporary workers are given the same levels of

responsibility, autonomy and workload as permanent workers in similar roles; the

second will be the extent to which the current experience of work lives up to

expectations. This is captured by the concept of the psychological contract which can

be defined as “the perceptions of both parties to the employment relationship,

organization and individual, of the obligations implied in the relationship” (Herriot

and Pemberton, 1995). There are two arguments in the literature. One is that

temporary workers will have psychological contracts that are more limited and more

explicit or transactional in scope; and secondly, that managers will feel less compelled

to keep their promises to temporary as opposed to permanent workers. There may

therefore be differences in perceptions of fairness of treatment and levels of trust in

management which could affect outcomes. The third mediating variable concerns

perceptions of the external labour market and in particular views on the ease of

finding alternative employment and feelings of insecurity. The assumption in the

literature is that those who believe that there are attractive employment alternatives

and report low levels of job insecurity will report higher levels of satisfaction and

well-being, and further that high employability and low insecurity are more likely to

be found among permanent workers. Put another way, if we find more negative

outcomes among workers on temporary contracts, possible explanations for this could

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be that temporary workers have greater job insecurity, poorer psychological contracts

and/or lower levels of responsibility and autonomy within their job roles.

The primary research question addresses the impact of temporary contracts on well-

being, work attitudes and behaviour and these therefore formed the main dependent

variables. Well-being was assessed through self-report measures of anxiety,

depression, irritation, physical health, work-life overlap, self-efficacy, job satisfaction

and life satisfaction. Because there are arguments about the extent to which

temporary workers will be as committed to the organization as permanent workers,

we included attitudinal questions about commitment and about aspects of behaviour

including absence, performance, accidents and intention to quit. The core model,

including the expanded independent variables and hypothesised mediational variables,

is set out in Figure 1.

Methodology

Design & Procedure.

A cross-sectional, self-report questionnaire design was adopted for the study, which

was underpinned by extensive pilot work. During 2004, organisations in the

manufacturing, retail/service and education sectors were approached to participate in

a study examining the use of non-permanent contracts. These three sectors were

5. PsychologicalContract

Well-being,Work Attitudes

& Behaviour

IndependentVariables

3. Contractof Choice

2. Skill Level

1. Type ofContract

Figure 1. The conceptual model

Mediators

6. EmploymentProspects

4. Job ContentEmployment

Contract

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chosen on the assumption that they were likely to employ predominantly low,

medium and high skill workers respectively, although there will inevitably be a range

of skill levels within most organisations. Questionnaires were either distributed

amongst employees by participating organisations or the research team visited

organisations and supervised questionnaire completion.

Participants.

642 usable questionnaires were collected from 19 organisations. 25% were from non-

permanent employees. Data were also collected from employers but will not be

reported here. Information on the sample is presented in Table 1. The three main

non-permanent contract types were fixed-term contracts (53%), temporary agency

contracts (21%) and seasonal contracts (16%). Other non-permanent contracts

include probationary and training contracts and contractors/consultants. Compared to

the permanent staff, non-permanent workers included a greater proportion of women

and were younger; they were more likely to have higher educational attainments, be

white-collar and union members, and to have shorter tenure and work fewer weekly

hours. In addition to the information presented in Table 1, 21% of non-permanent

reported that they supervised others at work compared with 40% of permanent

workers, and both groups report the same mid-level of work involvement (4-items

from the scale by Kanungo, 1982). Both permanent and non-permanent workers

reported experiencing an average of four out of eight HR practices (items from Guest

& Conway, 1998), such as help with issues outside of work, opportunities to express

views and concerns at work and training and development.

Table 1. Main characteristics of the sample

Non-permanent Permanent Total n

Food Manufacturing 16% 84% 388Retail/Service 22% 78% 140Education 55% 45% 114Total n 158 484 642

Percentage female 67% 60%Average age 34 yrs 39 yrsPercentage A-levels or higher 54% 34%Percentange blue-collar 23% 46%Weekly hours 35 hrs 38 hrsAverage tenure 1.4 yrs 7.7 yrsUnion membership 17% 22%

Sec

tor

Cha

ract

eris

tics

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The average duration of a temporary contract in our sample was just over 15 months

(although there was a large level of variation in contract length: SD=18 months). The

average time left remaining on contracts at the time of the survey was just over eight

months. On average, the non-permanent workers in the sample had worked on

temporary contracts for around 18 months including their time on the current contract.

Just over 38% of the non-permanent workers in the sample indicated that they had

some expectation of a continuation of their current contract, though less than half of

these were confident about this. Only around four per cent were expecting to receive a

permanent contract with their current employers. The most common reasons for

working on a temporary contract were that the job they wanted came with a non-

permanent contract (54% agree), to get experience and expertise with different tasks

and jobs (53%), because it suits present needs or situation regarding family, study or

leisure (49%) and to gain a permanent contract (45%). Less than 10% of the non-

permanent sample agreed that they had a temporary contract because they had found

it difficult to find a permanent job.

Outcomes Variables: Measuring Well-Being, Work Attitudes and Behaviour

Participants were asked to complete a range of questions that measured aspects of

well-being, several work attitudes and a related features of work behaviour. Well-

being was measured using items from established scales covering occupational self-

efficacy (3-items from Schyns & von Collani, 2002); work-related anxiety and

depression (6-items each from Warr, 1990); work-related irritation (8-items from

Mohr, 1986); general physical health (5-items from Ware, 1999); the (positive)

influence of work at home (4-items from Wagena & Geurts, 2000); and life

satisfaction (6-items from Guest & Conway, 1998). Attitudes were covered by scales

measuring job satisfaction (4-items adapted from Brayfield and Rothe, 1952) and

organisational commitment (4-items from Cook & Wall, 1980). Behaviour was

measured partly through four single-item questions measuring sickness absence,

sickness presence, incidence of accidents and experience of harassment/violence at

work; and two scales measuring intention to quit (4-items modified from Price et al.,

1992) and self-rated performance (6-items from Abramis, 1994). All scales in the

present study were found to have adequate structural validity and reliability. The

reliabilities are shown in the table of correlations in the Appendix.

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Measuring the Independent and Mediator Variables

Participants were asked to indicate their employment contract from a list of ten

possible contract types that were observed during the pilot stage. From this measure it

was possible to distinguish between permanent and non-permanent workers and also

identify types of non-permanent contract. Skill level was identified using

classifications developed from Goldthorpe’s Class Scheme (unskilled blue-collar

worker, skilled blue-collar worker, lower-level white-collar worker, intermediate

white-collar worker, upper white-collar worker and management/director; example

positions were given for each classification) (Goldthorpe, 1980). Contract of choice

was measured using a four-item scale developed for this study asking whether

respondents had the type of contract that they wanted. This was developed after the

pilot study indicated that existing scales did not display sufficiently high validity. In

addition, single items, developed by Aronsson & Göransson (1999) measuring

whether respondents had their job and profession of choice were also used.

Job content was measured using several dimensions commonly found in job design

research: autonomy (5-item; Rosenthal, Guest & Peccei, 1996), role clarity (3-item;

Price, 1997), skill utilization (4-item; Van der Doef & Maes, 1999) and workload (4-

item; Semmer, Zapf & Dunckel, 1999). Employment prospects were assessed using

scales measuring job insecurity (4-items from de Witte et al, 2002) and employability

(4-items from de Witte, 2000).

The psychological contract was measured through four measures: content, fulfilment,

violation and trust/fairness. Content of psychological contract was measured using an

approach similar to that adopted by Rousseau and others (Robinson and Rousseau,

1994) and adapted in the light of the pilot study, asking participants to indicate

promises or commitments that had been made by their organisation from a list of 15

items commonly used in psychological contract research (e.g. regarding career

opportunities, workload and development opportunities). The number of items on

which promises were made was then summed to provide a score for the content or

breadth of psychological contract. Fulfilment of psychological contract was measured

by asking, for those items on which promises or commitments had been made, the

extent to which their organisation had kept them on a 5-point scale from ‘not at all’ to

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‘totally’, from which a mean was calculated. Respondents were also asked about their

own obligations towards their employer, in terms of what they had promised (content)

and what they had delivered (fulfilment). Thus we have information on both sides of

the psychological contract. Violation of the psychological contract, which is

considered to include an emotional dimension to the experience of contract breach

(Morrison and Robinson, 1997) was measured by asking respondents how they felt

about the extent to which their organisations had fulfilled their part of the deal using

six adjectives: happy, angry, pleased, violated, disappointed and grateful. After

reversing ‘positively-worded’ items, a mean score was produced. The measures of

trust and fairness (3 items and 4 items respectively from Guest & Conway, 1998)

were found to be very highly correlated (>.07) and both loaded onto the same factor;

therefore a combined measure was used in the analyses.

Analyses and Results

The analyses presented in this report involved three main steps. First the scales were

analysed and inter-correlations were computed. These are shown in the appendix. A

single-item measure of role clarity was used as the scale showed low reliability.

Otherwise, only scales measuring self-efficacy and organisational commitment had

reliabilities below 0.70 (0.68 and 0.69 respectively). Secondly, simple comparisons

using t-tests were made between reports of permanent and non-permanent workers on

each of the main variables measured in the study. Means and standard deviations are

presented. Subsequently, regressions were computed and tests for mediation

conducted. We start with the simple bivariate comparisons.

Similarities and Differences in the Reports of Well-being and Other Study Variables

The implicit hypothesis we are testing is that non-permanent employees report will

report lower levels well-being and less positive work attitudes. However, quite the

reverse is found when the comparative responses, presented in Table 2, are examined.

While there are no significant differences between permanent and temporary workers

in levels of occupational self-efficacy, life satisfaction, organisational commitment

and self-reported performance, on all the other measures there are differences that are

statistically significant (p< 0.05) or very close to significance (p< 0.10). On all these

measures, the responses of the temporary workers are more positive than those of the

permanent workers. In other words, temporary workers report higher levels of work-

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related well-being, higher job satisfaction and a better sickness, accident and

harassment record.

Table 2. Comparison of reports on well-being and work attitudes across contract type

Contrary to expectation, it is the permanent workers who report the poorer outcomes.

However this might still be explained in terms of a less fulfilled psychological

contracts, worse employment prospects, problems with the content of their jobs or

having neither the contract or job that they would wish for. The relevant results are

shown in Table 3. These confirm that although there are no differences in the scope

of the psychological contract, permanent workers report significantly lower levels of

fulfilment of psychological contract, higher levels of violation of their psychological

contracts and lower levels of trust and fairness at work. Permanent workers also

report lower levels of role clarity and higher levels of workload. Temporary workers

report far higher levels of job insecurity and are far less likely to indicate that they

have their employment contract of choice, both of which one may expect to be related

to poorer well-being (see correlations).

Mean SD Mean SD t p-value 1

Work-related healthOccupational self-efficacy 4.03 0.63 4.10 0.62 -1.16 0.247

Influence of work at home 2.98 0.89 2.73 0.90 3.00 0.003

Work-related irritation 2.48 0.71 2.69 0.79 -3.08 0.002

Work-related anxiety 2.08 0.78 2.37 0.85 -3.76 0.000

Work-related depression 2.73 1.18 2.94 1.31 -1.81 0.071

Reported behaviours/incidentsSick leave 1.99 1.02 2.20 1.09 -2.13 0.033

Sick presence 2.31 1.15 2.77 1.22 -4.09 0.000

Accidents 1.14 0.54 1.24 0.61 -1.92 0.056

Harassment 1.14 0.52 1.41 0.88 -4.66 0.000

General health reportsGeneral health 3.99 0.75 3.85 0.80 1.95 0.052

Life satisfaction 5.11 1.24 5.05 1.15 0.56 0.574

Work-related attitudesJob satisfaction 3.80 0.97 3.56 1.02 2.68 0.007

Organisational commitment 3.94 0.72 3.91 0.72 0.50 0.620

Intention to quit 2.07 0.98 2.32 1.07 -2.65 0.008

Self-reported performance 4.01 0.55 4.03 0.56 -0.49 0.622

All scales range between 1-5, therefore a mean score of 3.00 represents the mid-point on each scale.The exception to this is life satisfaction, which was measured on a 7-point scale.

Type of Employment Contract

Non-permanent Permanent

1A mean difference is significant if the p -value is less than 0.05

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Table 3. Comparison of reports on possible explanatory measures across contract type

While these comparisons are compelling, but it is possible that the differences may be

a result of a number of related background variables rather than due to contract type

alone. The next step is therefore to undertake more sophisticated analyses that take

into account a number of individual and organizational background factors.

Regression Analysis and Background Variables

To examine whether there is still a relationship between employment contract and the

outcome variables after controlling for a range of background variables a series of

regression analyses were conducted and the findings are presented in Tables 4 and 5.

A large number of background variables were included that have been found in the

past to be related to employee health or have been found to distinguish permanent and

non-permanent workers; these were age, gender, educational and occupational level,

level of work involvement, working hours, tenure, union membership, whether the

worker had supervisory responsibilities, the provision of HR practices, organisation

size and industrial sector.

Mean SD Mean SD t p-value 1

Psychological contractEmployer's obligationsContent 10.08 4.15 10.20 4.21 -0.30 0.768

Fulfilment 3.93 0.76 3.58 0.88 4.61 0.000

Violation 2.11 0.80 2.54 0.92 -5.54 0.000

Trust/Fairness 3.46 0.94 2.88 1.00 6.36 0.000

Employee prospectsJob insecurity 2.70 1.05 2.27 0.92 4.53 0.000

Employability 3.55 0.86 3.56 0.95 -0.10 0.917

Job CharacteristicsRole Clarity 4.08 0.96 4.33 0.84 -3.14 0.002

Autonomy 3.29 0.94 3.34 0.94 -0.54 0.588

Skill Utilisation 3.29 1.08 3.20 1.03 0.95 0.344

Workload 2.84 0.98 3.17 0.97 -3.74 0.000

VolitionContract of choice 2.84 1.06 3.64 0.94 -8.99 0.000

Job of choice 3.49 1.24 3.58 1.20 -0.84 0.404

Profession of choice 3.49 1.36 3.51 1.29 -0.10 0.923

All scales range between 1-5, therefore a mean score of 3.00 represents the mid-point on each scale.The exception to this is Content of PC, which is a summated score with a range of 0-15.

Type of Employment Contract

Non-permanent Permanent

1A mean difference is significant if the p -value is less than 0.05

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In all the regressions presented in Tables 4 and 5, the background control variables

were entered first, followed by the specific variable of interest. Before exploring the

key independent variables, it is worth noting in Tables 4 and 5 that among the control

variables, a few show consistent significant associations with a range of outcomes.

Much the most consistent in this respect is the experience of human resource

practices; those reporting that they experience more of them in their current work also

consistently report much more positive outcomes. Longer working hours are

associated with poorer well-being but not with poorer attitudes and behaviour. Older

workers report more positive responses across a range of outcomes and in particular,

higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

Type of employment contract

The first independent variable we explored was the broad measure of type of

employment contract, comparing workers on permanent and temporary contracts.

(Independent Variable 1 [IV 1 in Table 4 & 5]). Findings from these first regressions

replicate the differences found through comparisons of the mean scores shown in

Table 2. This is indicated by the significant beta weights indicating a relationship

between permanent contracts and poorer reports of well-being, work attitudes and

behaviour. Importantly this suggests that the differences between contract types

cannot be explained by any of the background measures.

Type of temporary employment contract

So what are the explanations for these unexpected results? Firstly, it may be that a

simple distinction between permanent and non-permanent employees hides a greater

diversity in experiences across types of temporary contract. To examine how different

types of non-permanent contract workers compare with permanent workers the same

regressions were carried out again but instead of using the dichotomous measure of

contract type, a number of dummy variables were used to represent the different

groups of non-permanent contract workers (IV 2 in Tables 4 & 5). The non-permanent

contract workers were grouped either into fixed-term contract workers (n=82), agency

workers (33) or direct-hire employees (34). Direct-hire workers were mostly seasonal

workers (25) but included a small number of contractors (2), daily/on-call workers (1)

and those with probationary (5) or training (1) contracts.

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The beta for each dummy variable indicates the strength of the relationship between

the dummy variable and outcome measure relative to permanent contracts. Findings

of the regressions indicate that all types of non-permanent contract workers report at

least as positive well-being, work attitudes and behaviour as permanent workers.

Fixed-term contract workers report a greater positive influence of work at home and

better physical health and lower levels of work-related depression, incidence of

harassment/violence at work and intention to quit than permanent workers. Agency

workers also report a greater positive influence of work at home and lower levels of

work-related anxiety, depression and irritation and a lower incidence of sickness

presence and harassment/violence at work compared with permanent workers. Non-

permanent workers hired directly by organisations report a lower incidence of

sickness absence compared with permanent employees. Examining the valence of the

betas for each of the contract types it seems that they are mostly in the same direction

relative to permanent workers and invariably indicating a more positive outcome. This

consistency in direction suggests that irrespective of the type of temporary contract on

which they are employed, temporary workers give reasonably consistent and more

positive responses than permanent workers. Differentiating the types of temporary

contract does not therefore help to explain the results.

Skill levels: the response of the ‘free workers’

One of the dimensions identified by Marler, Barringer and Milkovich (2002) in their

attempt to explain differences in the reactions of temporary workers was skill level.

Specifically, the expectation was that high skill ‘free’ knowledge workers would be

positive about temporary work and display positive attitudes as a result but low skill,

more ‘precarious’ workers would not. To examine this, further regressions were

carried out in which dummy variables representing ‘free-workers’ and ‘precarious

workers’ were compared against permanent workers (IV 3 in Tables 4 & 5). People

were allocated to one of the two categories on the basis of their skills. Blue-collar and

low-level white-collar workers were combined to represent ‘low-skill’ workers with

the other groups representing ‘high-skill’ workers. Numbers within each of the four

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groups are as follows; low-skill permanent (n=280), high-skill permanent (n=203),

low-skill temporary (n=90), high-skill temporary (n=68).4

The beta scores indicate the strength of the relationship between the dummy variable

and outcome measures compared to those on permanent contracts. These reveal that

both high and low skill temporary workers generally report more positive attitudes

and behaviour than workers on permanent contracts. High-skill non-permanent

workers report a greater positive influence of work at home, better physical health,

lower work-related depression, lower incidence of harassment/violence at work, lower

intention to quit and higher performance compared with permanent workers. Low-

skill temporary workers also report a greater positive influence of work at home and

greater job satisfaction and lower levels of work-related anxiety, depression and

irritation, a lower incidence of sickness presence and absence and lower incidence of

harassment and violence. While there are some differences in the responses of the

low and high skill temporary workers, both are more positive then the permanent

workers and, contrary to expectation, it is the low skill who more consistently report

higher work-related well-being. We therefore cannot explain the differences in

outcomes in terms of differences in skill levels among temporary workers and related

arguments about free or precarious workers.

The role of contract of choice

The second dimension identified by Marler, Barringer and Milkovich (2002) in

seeking to explain whether temporary workers will be more or less positive than

permanent workers is contract of choice. The assumption is that those who can

choose and are on their contract of choice will display more positive attitudes. As the

results in Table 3 indicate, one of the largest differences found between permanent

and temporary workers is on contract of choice. Temporary workers are less likely to

be in their employment contract of choice. In the correlational analysis in the

Appendix, contract of choice is positively related to all of the outcome measures with

4 Another way of testing the Marler and colleagues (2002) proposition more directly would be tocompare high and low skill temporary and permanent workers. We undertook a series of Anovas toexplore this. More often than not, it was the low-skill permanent workers who reported the leastpositive reports. Further details are available from the authors on request.

18

the correlation ranging between 0.08 and 0.33. Therefore the relationship between

employment contract, contract of choice and outcomes is rather complex. To examine

it further, temporary workers were divided according to whether they were above or

below the mid-point on the scale measuring contract of choice and on this basis being

classified as high or low with respect to contract of choice reflecting, in effect, their

agreement as to whether they were on their contract of choice. Dummy variables,

labelled as high and low contract of choice, were then constructed and entered into the

regression model (IV 4 in Tables 4 & 5). The number of temporary workers falling

into each of these categories was 75 and 81 respectively.

Findings indicate that temporary workers who were employed on their contract of

choice had significantly higher scores on six of the seven well-being measures and on

five of the eight attitude and behaviour measures compared with permanent workers.

Temporary workers with lower scores on the measure of contract of choice, and

therefore not likely to be on their contract of choice, reported higher scores on six out

of the seven well-being measures than the permanent workers but the difference was

only statistically significant on the positive influence of work on home. They

displayed marginally lower life satisfaction. They were more positive than permanent

workers on six of the attitude and behaviour measures and more negative on

organizational commitment. They reported significantly lower levels of harassment

and violence at work. It therefore appears that temporary workers on their contract of

choice report the most positive outcomes, followed by temporary workers not on their

contract of choice who are generally more positive, even if not always significantly

so, than permanent workers. The results indicate that being on employment contract

of choice is important but it cannot explain the more positive outcomes of temporary

workers, since they are less likely to be on their contract of choice. It should be noted

that we have compared temporary workers divided according to contract of choice

against all the permanent workers. The picture might alter a little if we compared

permanent workers who were or were not on their contract of choice.

19

Table 4. Associations of employment contract with Work-related and General Health

Occupationalself-efficacy

Influence ofWork at Home

Work-relatedAnxiety

Work-RelatedDepression

Irritation Physical Health Life Satisfaction

Manufacturing dummy -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.17Education dummy -0.14 -0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 -0.04 -0.02Organisation size 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04Core HR-Practices 0.07 0.22*** -0.32*** -0.40*** -0.21*** 0.10 0.15***Blue Collar dummy -0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.20* -0.03 -0.09 -0.05Low-level White Collar dummy -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 -0.08 -0.08Mid/Upper White Collar dummy -0.16* 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.13 -0.06 -0.07Age 0.12* 0.12** -0.07 -0.16*** -0.08 0.09 0.03Gender (male+) -0.01 -0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10*Education level 0.08 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.02Work hours 0.03 -0.05 0.14** 0.06 0.15** -0.04 -0.13**Tenure 0.06 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.04Supervisory role 0.05 0.03 0.10* 0.01 0.13** 0.03 0.00Union membership 0.01 -0.03 0.08* 0.10* 0.10* -0.08 -0.03Work Involvement 0.08 0.29*** 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00

IV 1: Permanent contract -0.04 -0.16** 0.14** 0.17*** 0.11* -0.13** -0.08

Adjusted R-square 0.04 0.17 0.13 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.04

IV 2: Contract DummiesFixed-term 0.06 0.10* -0.08 -0.10* -0.05 0.11* 0.07Agency/Subcontractors 0.03 0.12** -0.14*** -0.11** -0.09* 0.03 0.06Direct hire -0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.02

IV 3: Skill Level Dummies 1

Low Skill Temps 0.01 0.10* -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14** 0.09 0.07High Skill Temps 0.06 0.10* -0.03 -0.10* 0.01 0.11* 0.05

IV 4: Contract Choice DummiesLow Contract Choice Temps 0.02 0.11* -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 -0.02HIgh Contract Choice Temps 0.03 0.09* -0.12** -0.15*** -0.12** 0.15*** 0.12**

1Skill dummy variables not included as control variables in these analysesR2 indicates percentage of variation explained by independent variables within outcome variable (e.g. 0.10 = 10%)

Work-related Health General Health

*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001

20

Table 5. Associations of types of employment contract with Sickness Behaviours, Incidents at Work and Work Attitudes

SicknessAbsence

SicknessPresence

AccidentsHarrassment and

ViolenceJob Satisfaction

OrganisationalCommitment

Intention to QuitSelf-rated

Performance

Manufacturing dummy -0.11 -0.03 -0.08 0.05 -0.15* -0.08 0.04 0.08Education dummy 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.14* -0.07 -0.21*** 0.05 -0.02Organisation size 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00Core HR-Practices -0.06 -0.16*** -0.04 -0.18*** 0.35*** 0.36*** -0.43*** 0.12**Blue Collar dummy 0.13 -0.03 0.26** 0.30*** -0.21** -0.20** 0.13 -0.14Low-level White Collar dummy -0.08 -0.08 0.10 0.19** -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.07Mid/Upper White Collar dummy -0.06 0.00 0.09 0.12 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.12Age -0.18*** -0.09 -0.13** -0.05 0.18*** 0.22*** -0.12** 0.02Gender (male+) -0.13** -0.13** 0.10* -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08Education level -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.02Work hours -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.11* -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.09Tenure -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.08Supervisory role -0.12* -0.01 0.13** 0.16*** 0.10* 0.05 0.03 0.10*Union membership 0.08 0.10* -0.02 0.09* -0.06 -0.11** 0.07 -0.09*Work Involvement -0.01 0.09* -0.01 0.11** 0.13*** 0.17*** -0.08* 0.10*

IV 1: Permanent contract 0.14** 0.14** 0.01 0.17*** -0.12* -0.04 0.11* -0.06

Adjusted R-square 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.33 0.31 0.21 0.05

IV 2: Contract DummiesFixed-term -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.15** 0.08 0.02 -0.11* 0.07Agency/Subcontractors -0.07 -0.09* -0.01 -0.10* 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.06Direct hire -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08

IV 3: Skill Level Dummies 1

Low Skill Temps -0.14** -0.18*** 0.01 -0.12** 0.10* 0.03 -0.08 0.00High Skill Temps -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11* 0.08 0.04 -0.09* 0.11*

IV 4: Contract Choice DummiesLow Contract Choice Temps -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.15** 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.05HIgh Contract Choice Temps -0.13** -0.14** 0.00 -0.09* 0.13*** 0.06 -0.10** 0.04

1Skill dummy variables not included as control variables in these analysesR2 indicates percentage of variation explained by independent variables within outcome variable (e.g. 0.10 = 10%)

Sickness Behaviours and Incidents at Work Work Attitudes

*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001

21

The role of the mediating variables; employability, job content and the psychological

contract

Having failed to explain the different outcomes of permanent and temporary workers

using the two core variables identified by Marler, Barringer and Milkovich (2002),

namely skill level and contract of choice, we turn to three other potential explanatory

factors that were identified at the outset as possible mediating variables. These are

aspects of employability, job content and the psychological contract; all were

measured with more than one variable. As a first step, we need to establish whether

temporary and permanent workers respond differently on any of the relevant

variables. The information is provided in Table 3. This reveals that we can discount

employability (employability and job insecurity) as a mediating variable. Since there

are no differences in reports of employability between temporary and permanent

workers, this variable cannot explain the differences in outcomes. Secondly, although

a large significant difference was found between contract types on job insecurity, it

was temporary workers who reported the higher level of job insecurity. Therefore,

although job insecurity was found to be correlated with more negative outcomes on

all measures except ‘accidents’, it cannot explain why non-permanent workers report

more positive outcomes.

Job content was the second potential explanatory variable identified from the

literature. The suggestion was that temporary workers are given more circumscribed

job roles in comparison with their permanent counterparts and that this affects their

outcomes. However, as indicated in Table 3, no difference was found in the level of

autonomy or skill utilisation reported by permanent and non-permanent employees.

Differences were found indicting that non-permanent employees report greater role

clarity and lower workload, both of which may indicate more simplified job roles and

both were found to be positively related to reports of well-being (see correlation table

in Appendix). In order to evaluate whether these aspects of job content explain the

differences in outcomes, a series of regressions were carried out and presented in

Table 6. These regressions were essentially the same as those carried out in Tables 4

and 5 however the variables representing the role clarity and workload were entered

into the regressions as a second step. In order for these role variables to act as

mediators the beta weights indicating the strength of relationship between

employment contract and outcome variable must be either fully removed (full

22

mediation) or substantially reduced (partial mediation) when entering the regression at

Step 2. Only those outcomes on which there were differences between permanent and

temporary workers were examined in this way. Findings indicate that job content has

a modest mediating role in the relationship between employment contract and well-

being. It partially mediates the relationship with work-related anxiety and sickness

presence and fully mediates the relationship with irritation. However, there is no

consistent pattern of influence of these measures of job content across the range of

outcomes.

This leaves the psychological contract as a potential explanatory variable. Table 3

shows that there is no difference between permanent and temporary employees

regarding content of the psychological contract (i.e. the number of promises reported

being offered by organisations), so this can be ruled out. However differences were

found on the variables of fulfilment and violation of the psychological contract and on

reports of trust and fairness, all indicating that temporary workers have a better state

of psychological contract. In order to evaluate whether the state of the psychological

contract explains the differences in outcomes, a similar series of regressions were

carried out and presented in Table 7. The findings indicate that the state of the

psychological contract acts as either a partial or full mediator in the relationships

between employment contract and outcomes. Table 7 shows that the psychological

contract measures fully mediate the relationship between type of employment contract

and the well-being variables of anxiety, depression and irritation as well as job

satisfaction, sickness absence, sickness presence and intention to quit. They partially

mediate the relationship between type of contract and influence of work at home,

physical health and experience of harassment and violence. Partial mediation

indicates that even after the measures of the state of the psychological contact have

been taken into account, and acknowledging that they explain part of the variation in

outcomes, the type of employment contract still has a significant effect on the

outcomes; and in each of these cases, it is the workers on temporary contract who are

more positive. However in broad terms we can reach the tentative conclusion that

temporary workers report more positive outcomes than permanent workers partly

because they have a better state of psychological contract.

24

Table 6. Evaluation of the Job Content as an explanatory variable

Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2

Step 1 Permanent contract -0.14** -0.14** 0.14** 0.10* 0.16*** 0.16*** -0.14** -0.14**

Step 2 Role Clarity 0.07 -0.20*** -0.21*** 0.08

Workload -0.07 0.32*** 0.05 -0.04

Adjusted R-square 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.02 0.03

Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2

Step 1 Permanent contract 0.15** 0.16** 0.15** 0.13** 0.16*** 0.14** 0.11* 0.11**

Step 2 Role Clarity 0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.20***Workload -0.12* 0.17** 0.20*** 0.03

Adjusted R-square 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.25

-0.10*

-0.12**

Step 1 Step 2

*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001

R2 indicates percentage of variation explained by independent variables within outcome variable (e.g. 0.10 = 10%)

N.B. Background variables are controlled for but not presented

N.B. Beta weights and R2-values may be slightly different in regressions due to variations in sample sizes due to missing values

0.33

Job Satisfaction

-0.13***

Step 2

0.080.22***

0.37

0.11*

0.11

Step 1

0.08

0.30***

0.17

Work Attitudes

General Health

Influence of Work atHome

Work-related AnxietyWork-RelatedDepression

Physical Health

Work-related Health

Irritation

Intention to Quit

Sickness Behaviours and Incidents at Work

Sickness Absence Sickness PresenceHarrassment and

Violence

25

Table 7. Evaluation of the State of the Psychological Contract as an explanatory variable

Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2

Step 1 Permanent contract -0.16** -0.09* 0.14** 0.00 0.17*** 0.04 -0.13** -0.11*

Step 2 Psychological ContractFulfilment of PC -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 0.01Violation of PC -0.30*** 0.41*** 0.41*** -0.21***Trust/Fairness 0.08 -0.21*** -0.20*** 0.05

Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.28 0.13 0.39 0.27 0.51 0.02 0.07

Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2

Step 1 Permanent contract 0.14** 0.09 0.14** 0.06 0.17*** 0.12* 0.11* -0.03

Step 2 Psychological Contract

Fulfilment of PC 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.02

Violation of PC 0.09 0.09 0.13* 0.44***

Trust/Fairness -0.13* -0.23*** -0.09 -0.25***

Adjusted R-square 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.50

Step 1 Step 2

*p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001

R2 indicates percentage of variation explained by independent variables within outcome variable (e.g. 0.10 = 10%)

N.B. Background variables are controlled for but not presented

N.B. Beta weights and R2-values may be slightly different in regressions due to variations in sample sizes due to missing values

0.13**

-0.28***

0.24***

0.33 0.55

Intention to Quit

Step 1 Step 2

-0.12* 0.01

Sickness Absence Sickness PresenceHarrassment and

ViolenceJob Satisfaction

-0.16**

0.11 0.23

Sickness Behaviours and Incidents at Work Work Attitudes

0.11* 0.01

0.000.31***

Work-related Health General Health

Influence of Work atHome

Work-related AnxietyWork-RelatedDepression

Irritation Physical Health

26

Discussion

Contrary to expectations, temporary workers as a whole report more positive

outcomes than permanent workers on the majority of our measures. In particular,

they report better well-being, health and sickness records. While these are self-report

measures, any biases that this introduces can apply equally well to both temporary and

permanent workers. Being on employment contract of choice was also found to be

positively related to well-being, work attitudes and behaviour, although even

temporary workers who were not on their contract of choice were at least as positive

as permanent workers. However, again contrary to expectations, temporary workers

with higher skill levels, those who might be more likely to be classified as knowledge

and potentially ‘free’ workers, did not report consistently more positive outcomes

than those with lower skills, although both were more positive than the permanent

staff.

Our exploration of three sets of mediating variables that might explain the outcomes

revealed that employability had no role to play, job content had a modest role and the

psychological contract had a major role. It fully or partially mediated the relationship

between type of employment contract and outcomes for all the variables where an

initial association had been identified. Looking more closely at the psychological

contract variables, the measure of violation, which seeks to explore the emotional

reaction to the level of contract fulfilment, has the major effect. It is significantly

associated in the regressions with eight of the ten outcomes. It is closely followed by

the combined measure of trust/fairness, which is associated with seven of the ten

outcomes. The measure of fulfilment or breach emerges from the analysis as being

less important. However, since it is highly correlated with the outcome measures and

with the measures of violation and trust/fairness, it is possible that either mediation or

multicollinearity might explain this finding. In terms of explaining why temporary

workers of all types and levels report greater well-being and more positive work

attitudes and behaviour than permanent workers, it seems that an important part of the

explanation lies in the better state of their psychological contract.

Why do temporary workers report a better state of the psychological contract? One

possible explanation that has been offered by Van Dyne and Ang (1998) based on

27

their study of temporary workers in Singapore, is that temporary workers have lower

expectations about what the employer is obliged to provide for them. In other words,

they expect to be treated differently, have a more limited and perhaps more easily

monitored psychological contract and as a result, they are more easily satisfied.

However our evidence does not support this explanation for these UK workers. As

Table 2 reveals, there is no significant difference in the judgements of temporary and

permanent workers about the number of promises made by their current organization.

A second possible explanation is that temporary workers have fewer inputs and

therefore, in equity theory terms (Mowday and Colwell, 2003), have a more positive

exchange. We examined this by exploring the promises made by workers. No

difference was found in the number of promises that both permanent and temporary

workers reported offering their employer or in the extent to which they said they

subsequently fulfilled each obligation, even after controlling for background

variables. Thirdly, there is a possibility that permanent workers, being more fully

embedded within the cultural norms and organisational environment, are more

sensitive to subtle breaches or violations of psychological contracts. There is some

support for this in the data which show an association between tenure and lower

fulfilment, higher violation and poorer perceptions of fairness and trust.

However, after allowing for the influence of the psychological contract, there is still

evidence that temporary workers report better physical health, a more positive

influence of work on home life and a lower experience of harassment and violence at

work. How are we to explain this unexpected finding that even after taking account

of a wide range of possible factors, temporary workers, irrespective of type of

temporary contract, irrespective of skill level and irrespective of whether they want to

be employed in temporary contracts, report generally more positive outcomes and

sometimes significantly more positive outcomes than workers with permanent

employment contracts? A possible explanation for the results is that permanent jobs

have become more demanding and less attractive for many workers in recent years.

We have evidence about labour intensification, reductions in autonomy and a steady

lowering of job satisfaction across the UK working population as a whole (Green,

2006). Our evidence on indicators such as the impact of work on home, suggests that

many permanent workers find that work interferes unhelpfully with life outside work.

Allied to this, the Health and Safety Executive has begun to give a much higher

28

priority to the increase in stress-related absences from work (Mackay et al., 2004). In

other words, it is not so much that temporary work is attractive but that permanent

work is increasingly unattractive for many of those who experience it. Furthermore, it

is younger workers who find it particularly unattractive. Age is associated with

several of the outcomes, with older workers invariably more positive; and this holds,

even though temporary workers are younger than those in permanent jobs. It is

younger workers in permanent jobs who are particularly negative about the

experience of contemporary work.5

These findings have potentially important policy implications. First, they raise

questions about the basis for the policy initiatives proposed by the European Union to

impose conditions on temporary employment and to make it more like permanent

employment. Our evidence suggests that it is permanent workers who appear to be

more in need of protection. This implies that the European Union is right to give

greater emphasis to the quality of jobs; furthermore, there is some support in our

findings for the view that constraints on working hours should be a feature of high

quality jobs. We found that those working longer hours reported higher levels of

anxiety and irritation and lower life satisfaction. Since it is those in permanent

employment who report a poorer experience of work and lower levels of well-being,

the emphasis should be on improving the quality of work for all workers. Our focus

on temporary employment has served both to challenge assumptions about temporary

working and to highlight the growing problems faced by those in permanent jobs.

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32

Appendix 1. Table of correlations and reliabilities

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

1 Manufacturing dummy

2 Education dummy -0.57

3 Organisation size -0.49 -0.19

4 Core HR-Practices -0.29 0.14 0.15

5 Blue Collar 0.64 -0.38 -0.34 -0.30

6 Low-level White Collar -0.13 0.02 0.18 0.03 -0.37

7 Mid/Upper White Collar -0.45 0.35 0.15 0.22 -0.58 -0.30

8 Age -0.09 0.14 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.02

9 Gender (male+) 0.20 -0.13 -0.08 -0.13 0.15 -0.19 -0.06 -0.06

10 Education level -0.52 0.44 0.10 0.21 -0.56 -0.08 0.48 -0.09 0.03

11 Work hours 0.20 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 0.07 -0.32 0.03 0.05 0.29 0.08

12 Tenure 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.10 0.05 0.40 0.01 -0.20 0.10

13 Supervisory role -0.18 0.11 0.10 0.16 -0.33 -0.22 0.32 0.17 0.05 0.28 0.27 0.27

14 Union membership -0.13 0.24 0.00 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.07 0.18 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.14

15 Work Involvement 0.08 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.08 0.12 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.73

16 Permanent Contract 0.23 -0.33 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 -0.17 -0.06 0.17 0.07 -0.22 0.13 0.39 0.17 0.06 -0.04

17 Content PC -0.18 0.04 0.15 0.48 -0.21 0.03 0.15 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.01

18 Fulfilment PC -0.22 0.08 0.09 0.42 -0.22 0.06 0.12 0.05 -0.08 0.15 -0.07 -0.10 0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.17 0.18

19 Violation PC 0.18 -0.05 -0.08 -0.45 0.16 -0.06 -0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.13 0.08 0.18 0.03 0.12 -0.12 0.20 -0.40 -0.59 0.85

20 Trust/Fairness -0.20 0.05 0.10 0.49 -0.20 0.09 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 0.16 -0.09 -0.20 -0.02 -0.13 0.17 -0.25 0.46 0.62 -0.72

21 Job insecurity 0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.27 0.12 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.06 -0.04 -0.19 -0.25 -0.28 0.34

22 Employability -0.11 -0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.14 -0.03 0.08 -0.06 0.00 0.20 0.05 -0.08 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00

23 Role Clarity 0.18 -0.19 -0.10 0.16 0.17 0.00 -0.16 0.10 -0.11 -0.21 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.03 0.25 -0.25

24 Autonomy -0.28 0.18 0.09 0.34 -0.44 -0.06 0.35 0.01 0.07 0.34 0.10 0.09 0.39 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.29 0.23 -0.24

25 Skill Utilization -0.36 0.24 0.15 0.41 -0.48 -0.08 0.40 0.06 0.04 0.37 0.14 0.07 0.38 0.08 0.15 -0.04 0.39 0.28 -0.29

26 Workload -0.23 0.21 0.08 0.05 -0.39 -0.15 0.35 0.25 -0.01 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.47 0.20 -0.08 0.15 0.04 -0.05 0.11

27 Contract of choice 0.03 -0.15 0.00 0.21 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.15 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.08 0.34 0.19 0.23 -0.32

28 Job of choice -0.12 0.05 0.04 0.24 -0.20 0.01 0.09 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.16 -0.01 0.14 0.03 0.25 0.31 -0.38

29 Profession of choice -0.23 0.14 0.10 0.28 -0.31 -0.01 0.17 0.22 -0.01 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.32 0.28 -0.37

30 Self-efficacy -0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.25 -0.15

31 Influence of work at home -0.13 0.04 0.09 0.27 -0.12 -0.04 0.11 0.09 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.31 -0.12 0.37 0.25 -0.42

32 Work-related anxiety 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.27 0.01 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.08 -0.03 0.12 -0.24 -0.40 0.58

33 Work-related depression 0.23 -0.09 -0.13 -0.44 0.25 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14 0.08 -0.16 0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.15 -0.34 -0.50 0.67

34 Irritation -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 0.14 -0.04 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.25 0.39

35 Sick leave 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.07 0.19 -0.03 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.08 -0.18 0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 -0.15 0.16

36 Sick presence 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.16 -0.13 -0.26 0.30

37 Accidents 0.15 -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 0.20 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 0.13 -0.16 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.14 0.18

38 Incidents 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.18 0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.14 -0.10 -0.22 0.27

39 Job Satisfaction -0.31 0.15 0.16 0.44 -0.34 0.02 0.22 0.20 -0.07 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.15 -0.11 0.45 0.50 -0.60

40 Organizational Commitment -0.21 0.01 0.17 0.44 -0.30 0.04 0.17 0.19 -0.05 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.19 -0.09 0.22 -0.02 0.38 0.45 -0.51

41 Intention to quit 0.13 -0.04 -0.06 -0.42 0.15 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.14 0.10 -0.40 -0.46 0.66

42 Perceived Performance 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.10 0.14 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.19 -0.18

43 Physical health 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.17 -0.23

44 Life satisfaction 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 -0.06 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.16 0.24 -0.32

Correlations >0.09 are significant at 5% level

33

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

0.91

-0.32 0.88

-0.01 -0.19 0.84

0.22 -0.15 0.01 n/a

0.21 -0.20 0.18 0.08 0.80

0.27 -0.23 0.15 0.04 0.72 0.86

-0.15 -0.07 0.20 -0.07 0.36 0.41 0.79

0.26 -0.31 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.81

0.36 -0.22 0.01 0.21 0.34 0.41 0.15 0.36 n/a

0.32 -0.24 0.09 0.16 0.39 0.47 0.21 0.32 0.72 n/a

0.17 -0.17 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.68

0.37 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.28 -0.02 0.14 0.27 0.28 0.13 0.86

-0.51 0.31 -0.04 -0.24 -0.11 -0.13 0.27 -0.19 -0.31 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 0.84

-0.61 0.37 -0.07 -0.24 -0.30 -0.38 -0.03 -0.26 -0.43 -0.43 -0.30 -0.45 0.71 0.87

-0.34 0.21 0.04 -0.18 0.06 0.08 0.32 -0.13 -0.16 -0.11 -0.20 -0.15 0.64 0.51 0.88

-0.18 0.16 -0.05 0.04 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.08 -0.17 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 0.14 0.28 0.14 n/a

-0.33 0.15 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.13 -0.10 -0.15 -0.12 0.00 -0.13 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 n/a

-0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 0.01 -0.16 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.14 n/a

-0.25 0.08 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.16 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.19 0.19 n/a

0.59 -0.30 0.04 0.20 0.42 0.53 0.20 0.30 0.55 0.55 0.28 0.46 -0.44 -0.71 -0.27 -0.28 -0.25 -0.17 -0.12 0.83

0.56 -0.31 0.10 0.15 0.33 0.41 0.15 0.33 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.45 -0.36 -0.59 -0.21 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 0.64 0.69

-0.62 0.37 0.05 -0.25 -0.26 -0.34 0.03 -0.32 -0.49 -0.49 -0.20 -0.41 0.52 0.69 0.38 0.22 0.27 0.13 0.21 -0.71 -0.54 0.82

0.13 -0.15 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.51 0.12 -0.20 -0.33 -0.09 -0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.32 0.35 -0.23 0.82

0.18 -0.20 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.20 -0.32 -0.37 -0.40 -0.36 -0.25 -0.13 -0.12 0.30 0.23 -0.26 0.17 0.80

0.31 -0.19 0.02 0.22 0.05 0.07 -0.13 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.26 -0.43 -0.49 -0.51 -0.21 -0.26 -0.18 -0.16 0.34 0.31 -0.39 0.20 0.43 0.86

34