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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ASSESSING NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL EMERGENCIES IN VIEW OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE –

AN OUTLOOK

B.I. VAMANU1,2, V. ACASANDREI1 1 Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering – IFIN-HH,

Str. Reactorului no.30, P.O.BOX MG-6, Bucharest - Magurele, Romania, E-mail: [email protected]; E-mail: [email protected]

2 Currently with the European Commission Joint Research Center (EC-JRC), Institute for Energy and Transport (IET), Via Enrico Fermi 2749, I - 21027 Ispra (VA), Italia,

E-mail: [email protected]

Received July 31, 2014

The paper points at several aspects on the current agendas of the emergency management, in particular of preparedness and response following a nuclear and chemical event. Addressed are especially issues relating to the role of models and software tools in the emergency management process, as well as to the particularities and similarities in assessing the risk and potential disruptive events in both the nuclear and chemical industries.

Key words: emergency management, preparedness and response, models, software tools, nuclear and chemical abnormal events.

1. INTRODUCTION

FEMA1 defines Emergency Management (EM) as the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters [1]. Despite its holistic nature, the definition helps however in unambiguously revealing the main goal of EM: reduce the negative impact of disruptive events on humans, property and environment. Above all, it starts with the crucial observation that, regardless their origin, nature and scale disruptive events can never be completely prevented. Facing this unforgiving reality, the only reasonable attitude is to learn coexist with chances of mishaps by acknowledging these, comprehending and preparing ourselves and our communities in such a way that, when – as opposed to if – the dreaded worst happens, be able to withstand the effects and act in a coherent, coordinated and 1 FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.)

Rom. Journ. Phys., Vol. 59, Nos. 9–10, P. 952–975, Bucharest, 2014

2 Terms of reference for nuclear and chemical emergencies 953

efficient way to minimize the extent of harm and maximize chances of recovery. In these authors’ opinion, this resilience-oriented posture makes the core of what EM is about.

There are, perhaps, two observations that would justify the recurrent preoccupation for an ever clearer definition of the EM. The first is that, while the World today is evidently a better place to live in for a few, it is equally a more dangerous place to live for many. The statistically-demonstrated increment in the frequency of severe disasters – whether by Acts of God or of humans – is shifting the perception of the EM scope and targets from the text-book “design basis events” to “black swans” – the low-probability-highly-consequential disruptions, a fact symbolically grasped in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 – An evolving Emergency Preparedness paradigm.

The second – if consistent with the first – observation is that nowadays Emergency management should embrace an “all-hazards approach” principle. Everything from natural disasters to technological accidents and deliberate aggression (sabotage or terrorism), and from IT&C attacks to financial crashes to social unrest should be addressed in a coherent manner; and the ways and means of dealing with the adverse effects of such disruptions must be identified, properly instrumented and put into practice. While the diagram in Figure 2 may look maximalist at a first glance, it is also reflective to the inherent and essential interdependence of the risk aspects confronting the evolving World order. This is a

B.I. Vamanu, V. Acasandrei 3 954

never-ending, never-perfect joint effort that brings together the governance, regulators, academia, practitioners and the society itself.

Despite the progress on record in the recent years at various levels and scales - organizations, countries, regions and continents featuring a variety of cultures and civilizations, in the direction of harmonizing concepts, definitions, the meanings of notions2, principles, methodology and practices (e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6]) there still is a long way ahead towards a working consensus and many lessons to be learned until coming up with a coherent framework for Emergency Management that would be willingly applicable as a solid base for a safe, secure and sustainable society. It is way beyond the scope of this paper to address the whys and wherefores of this reality – at this, the interested reader would be well-advised to consult e.g. the ample, if eclectic, literature available online.

Fig. 2 – The EM scope – a maximal view. Emphasized is the environment-related tier.

Source: Global Risks 2011 [2].

Within our self-imposed bounds, we will proceed with a short overview of the principles of EM, focusing on the place and role of the software tools. The findings will provide a sufficient base for sketching-up a minimum set of requirements that software for incident management support should meet. From this standpoint we will then address the chemical and nuclear accidents assessment 2 In 2008 there were 26 and 33 definitions of Emergency Management and Emergency Preparedness, respectively, in the U.S. only [7] (counted by these authors)


workflow in view of emergency response, calling attention on several features of the models and methods employed that – in these authors’ opinion – would do the job right.

2. THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Modern Emergency Management principles originate in the U.S. where, in 1979 the NGA3 came up with the Comprehensive Emergency Management document [8] as a first systematic attempt to formalize the concepts, components and processes of EM. The NGA document describes the EM as a four (overlapping) phase process. Despite various adaptations and even alternative approaches taken ever since, there seems to be4, over the last 30 years, a consensus within the EM community regarding this aspect5, the four-phases becoming somehow standard (see Fig. 3), [9, 10].

In short, the four phases of EM are: • Phase 1: Mitigation – comprises the effort to reduce loss of life and

property by lessening the impact of disasters. This phase implies (yet is not limited to) actions like identifying hazards and threats, analyzing risks, eliminating and/or reducing risk, identifying the residual risk; Mitigation-oriented activities should be considered long before an emergency occurs.

• Phase 2: Preparedness – following mitigation, preparedness basically implies getting ready to handle the residual risks. The practical expression consists of a variety of activities to minimize the consequences of a disrupting event on humans, property and environment. Emergency preparedness (EP) is one of the core components of the overall process of emergency management. In a nutshell, emergency preparedness is a continuous cycle of planning, managing, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, creating, monitoring, evaluating and improving activities (Figure 4) so as to guarantee effective coordination and enhanced capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of any kind of disasters [16]. As with the mitigation, preparedness-oriented activities should be performed long before the event occurrence.

3 National Governor’s Association (NGA) 4 Ever since 1979 report 5 A fifth phase has been added in some recent (post 9/11) documents: Prevention. ‘(prevention)

happens when property and lives are protected by those that identify, deter or stop an incident from occurring. Activities that may include these types of countermeasures can include: Heightened Inspections; Improved surveillance and security operations; Investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; Public health surveillance and testing processes; Immunizations; Isolation or quarantine; Law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity’ https://yorkcountypa.gov/images/pdf/emergency-management/Handbook.pdf


Fig. 3 – The Emergency Management cycle. The

‘standard’ approach. Source: NCHRP RRD 333 [11].

• Phase 3: Response – also called the ‘golden 72 hours’; this component

consists in putting into practice and applying all the expertise and knowledge prepared in the two phases before. Response phase includes the mobilization and coordination of the necessary emergency services and first responders and the actual intervention. In view of assessing the EM efficiency, response is the crucial indicator. Acting coherently, promptly, responsible, safely, and professionally in front of an actual emergency is the paramount objective of the entire EM process. In close relationship with the event timing, response occurs during or immediately following an event.

Fig. 4 – Typical Emergency Preparedness activities cycle.

• Phase 4: Recovery – is a systematic attempt to restore the affected area to its previous, or otherwise better, state. Recovery activities can be short-term or long-term. Actions selection and prioritization is also a result of preparedness.


Recovery is a process that starts after the event is consummated (all the danger is gone and the situation is totally under control).

One aspect worth emphasis on this subject is that one should not see the four phases of the EM as separated activities. Not only are the activities overlapping, but in most cases the entire EM is depicted as a cyclic, continuous process of interlacing activities.

Emergency Management principles must be applied at national, regional and local levels. Naturally the tasks, challenges and responsibility of the EM practitioners on each level differ. The policy- / management-oriented activities at the national level must result in providing the functional procedural and legal framework for an effective EM, together with the financial means for being enforced at national and regional level. In turn, EM practitioners at regional level should direct their effort in implementing within their jurisdiction a functional scheme based on the general framework, and also to supervise its implementation at local level. Implementing an effective EM at local level includes (yet is not limited to) identifying the needs, depending on the local specifics; creating, equipping and training the intervention teams; and last but definitely not least, create the ways and means to engage the general public as active part of the EM.

The need of involving the public in the EM process is one of the key findings from the lessons learned from catastrophic events that hit the World over the last 20 years (such as hurricane Katrina in 2005 in the U.S. and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011). While handling isolate, sector-specific emergencies can and is being done efficiently in countries with high capabilities, resources and a sound safety culture, reality has indicated the lack of emergency preparedness, action readiness and pro-activeness of the agents involved, when facing a large-scale, unthinkable, beyond design-basis accident, yet painfully real event.

In this context, more effort should be driven towards raising the public risk-awareness and emergency preparedness level, thus teaching people to help and protect themselves first and, as a consequence, to ease the burden on the emergency teams alone [13, 14, 15].

Above all, effective emergency preparedness requires a fundamental cultural change in society and organizations, including an acceptance of uncertainty and imperfection. People and organizations need to appreciate that risk is inherent in every decision and activity, and that part of this risk has the potential to create disruption. As a result, they need to consider how they will manage any resulting disruptions to their activities.

3. THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE MODELS AND SOFTWARE TOOLS IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

The 9/11 event in the U.S. sent out a significant shockwave in the EM community. The enhanced focus on intentional actions (malicious acts) revealed the insufficiencies of traditional approaches in risk assessment, management and


mitigation (mainly technological process-oriented) when applied to the new issues and problems with minimum (or the complete lack) of predictability, internal and external occurrence mechanisms, location and timing.

Responsibility and problems the EM community had to face grew tremendously and can be summarized as ‘from protecting against something that might go wrong to (also) protect against something that wants to go wrong’.

This is also reflected in the shift in the EM deontological posture evoked in Section 1, in which the preparedness and response gain more and more momentum.

To the EM practitioners’ (both the emergency managers and intervention teams) the new approach came with new challenges and responsibilities. They must be ready to effectively intervene everywhere, anywhere, anytime and in the worst circumstantial situations.

In all this context support from computer applications plays a key role in all the phases of EM. Emergency management software (EMS) is the term that encompasses the entire variety of computer applications that are supportive in coordinating, assessing and mitigating the emergency situations. By now, EMS is increasingly used by local, state and regional emergency management personnel to deal with a wide range of emergencies [17].

While the variety of solutions is indeed overwhelming, an underlying spirit stems however from the very nature of the problem (Fig. 5), which may come out as being: grasp the vulnerabilities induced by tangible and intangible risk vectors around; and appropriately address these with the EM motto at heart: minimize damage and maximize recovery chances.

Fig. 5 – The problem – an operational formulation.


Three generic practical aspects would immediately follow from structuring the problem from an operational perspective: (i) a work-type pattern (Fig. 6); (ii) an architecture (Fig. 7); and (iii) a workflow (Fig. 8).

Fig. 6. – EMS (SO6) – a generic work-type pattern.

A very basic classification of the EMS in terms of purpose would identify two main types of software:

– Command, Control and Coordination oriented (CCC): also known as Information Management Systems (IMS), the role of this type of applications is mainly to support the command, control, and coordination of the response in case of emergency. Focus is driven towards the strategic and managerial aspects of intervention (resource allocation, real-time situation maps, intervention team(s) deployment status and coordination, etc.).

Fig. 7 – EMS (SO) – a generic architecture.

– Simulation oriented (SO), with the following sub-types: o (Intervention) management-oriented; o Health and environmental impact oriented: computer programs

modelling the physical phenomena that pose risk to public and environment. In the preparedness tier, SO programs prove to be a

6 SO – Simulation-Oriented


fundamental support in training; from the response perspective, SOs are essential to get an initial estimation of the type of the accident, size of the impact and possible countermeasures that must be put in place. Software packages in this class are often within the Modeling, Simulation and Visualization (MS&V) domain.

Fig. 8 – EMS (SO) – a generic workflow.

Fig. 9 – Example of functional block diagram and dataflow of a CCC platform. The architecture has been proposed by these authors as possible maximum configuration of the DIEX7 platform – part of

the project EMERSYS. 7 DIEX – Data and Information Exchange Platform.


Health and environmental impact models and software play a key role in all of the EM processes. For instance, the mitigation phase includes using screening models for hazard identification. Initial screening is followed by more complex assessments for developing accident scenarios, estimating various risks and mitigation options, or developing response plans. However, to be consistent with the purpose of this paper, we shall focus more on the importance of software simulation in the emergency preparedness and response phases.

The role in preparedness

With respect to preparedness the following stands out: modelling and simulation software helps throughout all of the phases of the emergency preparedness cycle. However, its highest support comes in training.

‘Training is a traditional and vital component of preparation within the incident-response community ’[18]. In light of the statements in previous section, training should not only address EM practitioners, but also the members of the communities at risk.

When addressing public, computer simulation provides a powerful tool in the hands of emergency managers for raising awareness. It is these authors’ belief that periodic meetings between EM practitioners and members of the communities (administration and general public alike), where the latter are presented in an interactive and participative way the risks they are exposed to, how risk-turning-real can be avoided and which are the procedures that should be followed, would eventually be conducive in effect into an enhanced safety-culture at the level of general public. After all, in order to make their life easier, the emergency managers must learn to sell security and safety principles.

But modelling and simulation also helps training the EM practitioners and the front-line workers. The need to have a minimum insight of a phenomenon in order to effectively be able to cope with it is more and more emphasized in the EM literature. From this perspective, computer simulation helps practitioners in acquiring a sufficient level of theoretical knowledge that, in conjunction with the fundamental practical experience would lead to higher intervention efficiency.

Another aspect is worth mentioning here. There is a mixed feeling within the emergency intervention community about the role and the extent of using models and simulation in real cases. After all, it is understandable since, in the end, it is their life at stake. Increasing trust can only be achieved from understanding both the limitations and advantages of the models, and the simulation platforms. For this, actively involving intervention teams in using, testing and assessing the simulation programs is a must.


Last but not least, SO software helps with the fundamental activity for enhancing preparedness: the exercises. Regardless the type8 simulation helps in conferring the vital characteristic of an exercise: to be as realistic as possible.

The role in response

The role of assessment software during or in the immediate phase after an accident is to provide fast and reliable predictions about the possible effects and developments of the situation, in order to support an effective intervention in terms of resource allocation, intervention management and last, but not least, to identify the countermeasures to be taken in order to minimize the impact on public.

When considering emergency response, several remarks are worth mentioning. The first to consider is the nature of the accident. When facing technological accidents things are a little bit clearer when it comes to emergency management (on both nuclear and chemical fields), for industrial activities involving a risk to society are strictly regulated in terms of security.

To consolidate the last statement let us consider the case of hazardous materials industry in Europe. Any (on-shore) industrial installation / establishment that present chances for a major accident involving hazardous materials (other than nuclear) must comply with SEVESO II Directive [19]. One of the requirements for authorization of construction / operation is that the operator must provide – to Member State’s Competent Authority (CA) – a detailed Safety Report (SR) for the purpose of (among others) demonstrating a sound major-accident prevention policy and safety management system, and also that “major-accident hazards have been identified and necessary measures have been taken to prevent […] and to limit their consequences for man and the environment” [19]. In other words, thorough qualitative (including HAZID, HAZOP studies) and quantitative risk assessment (including the impact assessment) processes are already performed; hence residual risks are already known. Moreover, internal and external emergency plans are set-up and in place. Emergency intervention teams (both internal and external) are well equipped, trained, and with sufficient (demonstrable) experience to deal with the possible (foreseeable) disruptive events. The uncertainty level in respect to what can go wrong how can go wrong and what to do when something goes wrong is low. Regardless the level of preparedness, unforeseen events (or chain of events) can and will occur. However, due to an understanding of the physical and/or mechanical and/or chemical processes in the facility, entailing the knowledge of the possible effects; and due to the high level of training and expertise to fight specific threats and mitigate specific risks, the capability level of the emergency teams to cope with unexpected developments is high. The key requirement for an 8 table top/sandbox exercises – used for identifying roles/responsibilities in different scenarios; drills – perfect an individual emergency procedure; functional exercises – usually roundtable simulation of emergency situation with realistic timeline; full-scale exercises –on-site simulation of an emergency situation.


effective intervention in case of technological accidents is to ensure the functional and operational means and procedures for collaboration and information exchange between the internal and external emergency units.

In case of events occurring in un-controlled, not regulated area (such as during HAZMAT transportation) things are different. Intervention managers and front-line workers must display an enhanced capability to adapt themselves to the randomness and fuzziness of the initial conditions and eventual developments. In spite of the availability of established practices and procedures, of an outstanding importance is now the ability to identify essential factors of influence, to analyze novel situations, to select and adapt procedures to the effective circumstances at hand. Adapting oneself on the run is a quality that comes with the accumulated experience, yet also from constant, thorough training.

The emergency workers would use the results of computer simulations as guidance towards what to expect, where, when and at what scale. This does not imply that the field actions should be taken solely based on model estimations. On the contrary, intervention and countermeasures must be backed-up (whenever possible) by in-situ (field) measurements.

One may find this complementarity between prognostics and field measurements in the norms, recommendations and regulations enforced in the nuclear emergency management field. Hence, countermeasures are taken either if the value of projected dose9,10 exceeds a given threshold or if an operational intervention level11 is reached. In Germany for instance, the (projected) intervention level for evacuation is 100 mSv of the effective dose from external exposure and inhalation over 7 days, while the operational intervention level is 1 mSv/h [20].

However, since intervention time is crucial on the one hand, and details about the disruptive event are scarce, or even contradictory, on the other hand, the EM managers should be provided with the means of promptly assessing and/or adapting alternative scenarios.

9 Projected dose – The (acute or effective) dose that would be expected to be incurred if (…) no countermeasure or set of countermeasures were to be taken [21]. 10 The definition for projected dose as provided is adapted from the reference source. The original definition states that the averted dose (effective dose that would be reduced if one or a set of countermeasures would take place) may be also included in the projected dose computation. However, due to the uncertainties and the issues added by the use of averted doses (see literature) these authors have adopted the most conservative posture that implies the computation of the projected dose taking into account NO countermeasures taken. 11 Operational Intervention Levels – A calculated level, measured by instruments or determined by laboratory analysis that corresponds to an intervention level or action level. OILs are typically expressed in terms of dose rates or of activity concentrations of radionuclides in environmental, food or water samples. (acc.to http://www.iaea.org/ns/tutorials/regcontrol/intro/glossaryj_l.htm)


Moreover, there are situations when actual measurements are not available. Or better said, there are cases when the intervention managers cannot afford to wait until the event occurs so that in-situ measurements are available. In these particular circumstances, countermeasures must be taken solely based on (computer assisted) predictions.

Summing up, when properly designed and implemented EMS is a potentially valuable tool that helps in all the event phases:

• pre-event – includes vulnerability and risk assessment of sites; sensors network architecture; contingency planning; training;

• during the event – includes process sensors/surveillance/emergency alerts; fast estimation (screening) of possible consequences; alert and inform the appropriate management and operative factors; post-event – provide information about event reconstruction; estimate projection in terms of possible outcomes of higher order (cascade effects);

• remediation – includes remediation plan in terms of funds and effort allocation; support remediation efforts by monitoring & evaluating; lessons learned.

4. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR SOFTWARE TOOLS FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE

From the above we can proceed now to sketching-out what is in our opinion the terms of reference of the software tools to be used in emergency preparedness and (especially) response.

In terms of requisites: – Fast assessment; time is of outmost importance in effective intervention,

especially in the (most frequent chemicals) transportation accidents; – Reliable assessment; the results must be trusted by the emergency

management and intervention teams; – Relevant results; a variety of information related to effective emergency

management, presented in an intervention-oriented prioritized fashion; for instance, pool fire risk assessment must have as primary result the individual risk-radius (distance down to which lethality percentage is higher than 1%), yet relevant for managing the event is also the time until the fire burns or flame height;

– Capability of temporal and spatial characterization of the event; – Database holding all the ‘static data’12 required for assessment; in both

nuclear and chemical emergencies; however, the software should also provide;

12 ‘Static data’ is considered in this context as all the data that do not depend on time or location of an event; examples here include pollutant-related data such as nuclides dose conversion factors of chemicals characteristics (flash point, specific heat, etc.).


– Flexibility in terms of modifying the input data – in the all-hazards approach the software should allow the user to modify / provide input values that would allow running the code even though static data is unavailable. Considering again the pool fire example, assume that the chemicals database does not contain a record for ACETALDEHYDE, subject of a lorry overturning accident. The EM workers should then find the information from any other sources and the software should allow running simulation based on user-input data;

– Availability, as far as capability of performing the assessment and providing support under any circumstance (online vs offline).

From the workflow perspective: – Guide the user in an intuitive, step-by-step manner; – Transparency – provide (on request) detailed explanation of each step,

inputs, data, and alternative options; explaining ‘on request’ is important in the training periods, when trust and competencies should be built; when dealing with a real event, and also once the users’ proficiency is high, too many details may clutter the interface and also slow down the time required for performing the assessment;

– The next requirement is especially relevant for software intended to be used in intervention. It is a known fact that human stress reaction implies a variety of aspects, including slow responses and loose of focus. In order to overcome this, the software must not allow the user (as much as possible) to make mistakes.

From the user experience perspective, the software must be developed in

such a way as: – to confer the user a feeling of ‘familiarity’, thus providing; – a lesson curve as short as possible, both in terms of using the software and

reading and interpreting the results; – ideally, the user interface (UI) must contain controls the user knows, placed

where the user expects them to be placed and functioning as the user intimates how these should function;

– Moreover, with the advent of mapping and GIS technologies (from desktop to hand-held devices) providing the software with the capability of exporting the results to standard geographical formats (e.g. Google XML, ESRI Shapefile) is a must.

The remark was rightfully made in the line that today’s emergency-related software mostly suffers from the user-experience perspective. The reason is that most of the software originates from academic environments and most of the time a


Linux / Windows terminal sufficed for model implementation validity testing, and sensibility analysis. Developers were thus interested more in developing the models than in ‘(highlighting) the experiential, affective, meaningful and valuable aspects of human-computer interaction and product ownership’ [22] (and including) ‘…a person’s perceptions of the practical aspects such as utility, ease of use and efficiency of the system’ [22].

In terms of models employed: – As simple as possible, yet complex enough to grasp to an acceptable level

of accuracy the physical phenomenology involved in the accident [23]. – Moreover, models must be selected in such a way as to cope with the

uncertainties related to the temporal and spatial characteristics of the accident.

In terms of input required for assessment: – As few as possible.

In terms of costs: the software package must be affordable, given the size of

a jurisdiction’s budget [24].

And, not the least, In terms of 'likes' (social nets parlance): be... attractive (Fig. 10) – which

more often than not proved a difficult challenge!

5. SUPPORTING EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS

The general objective of implementing short-term countermeasures is to reduce health consequences; in particular to avoid deterministic effects and to keep stochastic effects as low as possible. Consequently, emergency managers’ objectives are to protect the public and the front-line intervention workers.

The answers the software tools should deliver in emergency response are the same, regardless the nuclear or chemical fields: given a disruptive event, localized both in time and space – which are the possible outcomes and the risk areas, when also knowing the initial characteristics of the event and its environment.

The assessment procedure focused on intervention should always have as the end-point the impact on humans. For this to happen, the tools must accommodate the models that basically link the physical phenomena that occur / may occur in case of a disruptive event to short-term individual risk indicators. Medium to long-term effects should be addressed only after the immediate effects are mitigated.


Fig. 10 – On EMS attractiveness – a storyboard: “If you find it of interest, just click a 'like'”. Storyboard compilation from 'SAT-A Situation Assessment Toolkit'13

A generic description of the process would go like this: a hazard agent (either

in the form of release of energy or release of hazardous material14) is released and transmitted through the environment to an impact area within a community. Humans and property alike in the impact area are exposed to the hazard agent. In turn, exposure produces the health consequences. The task for emergency workers is to eliminate or reduce to the maximum the health consequences.

13 ‘SAT-A Situation Assessment Toolkit' – a software platform in standing development with the Department of Life and Environmental Physics, Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering, IFIN-HH Bucharest. 14 Chemical or radioactive.


One pertinent remark would be that, at a first glimpse, there is a contradiction between the assertions in the last two paragraphs. On the one hand, the authors state that focus should be driven towards humans; on the other hand exposure to humans and property is referred to in the second paragraph. In fact, there is no contradiction. The reason resides in the fact that the consequences on property should also be seen as mechanisms that would inflict health consequences on humans. To be clearer, in case of a potential explosion, the decision of evacuating an office building should not be made based on the insurance value of the facility but on the fact that the event occurs during working hours and the collapse would increase the number of fatalities.

Just for convenience we would use the terms first and second levels of impact when referring to effects directly inflicted by the exposure to the hazard agent and effects on humans resulting from indirect exposure (e.g. deaths due to broken glass fragments).

Figures 11 and 12 depict a high level overview of the impact assessment in case of nuclear and chemical emergencies. Without being exhaustive, the schemas focus on the principal tasks encountered, the methodology adopted and the pathways that lead from event to inferring the risk / impact indicators, basis of any countermeasures decision making. The authors’ intention was to produce the two workflows in such a way as to help the reader identifying the similarities and also the differences that occur when dealing with the two types of events.

A synopsis of differences and commonalities between the two types of accidents is given Table 1.

In both cases (nuclear and chemical) the assessment process goes by the same main steps:

Starting from:

A. A source term, mainly consisting of: a. Inventory of sensitive quantity (activity [Bq]; chemical [kg]) b. Release mechanisms c. Release fraction d. Release physical form (gas, vapor, aerosols, liquid, etc.)

and

B. Environmental conditions a. Weather data b. Spatial characteristics of event location.

Model the physical phenomena following the release of the threat agent in order to:

C. Compute the values of the exposure vectors15;

15 Physical quantities that characterize the hazard.


Fig. 11 – A possible workflow in assessing nuclear emergencies.


Fig. 12 – A possible workflow in assessing chemical emergencies.


Table 1

Synopsis of differences and commonalities between chemical and radiological accident impact assessment

NUCLEAR CHEMICAL

External – cloud immersion - External – ground-shine - Internal – inhalation Internal – inhalation (toxicity)

EXPOSURE PATHWAYS

External (fire and explosion) Acute doses (TABD, TALD, TTHD)

-

Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE)

-

- Lethality percentage

IMPACT INDICATORS

- Levels of Concern (IDLH, TLV, STEL, ERPGs, AEGLs)

INVENTORY Activity [Bq] Mass [kg] Atmospheric release of radioactive materials – radioactive cloud formation

Atmospheric release of hazardous material – toxic cloud formation; – explosive cloud formation.

- Spill

RELEASE PHENOMENA

- Fire Aerosols (vapor, gas, particles) Aerosols (vapor, gas, particles) RELEASE FORM - Energy Concentration in air [Bq/m3] Concentration in air [mg/m3], [ppm] Deposition rate [Bq/(m2*s)] - Heat radiation load [W/m2] - Overpressure [Pa]

EXPOSURE VECTORS

- Kinetic energy IMPACT INDICATOR INFERENCE

Use of Dose Conversion Factors (DCF)

Use of Probit functions

From there, either go to E; or

D. Proceed with the computation of the impact indicators

To be able to

E. Map the risk areas.

So that effective countermeasures be selected and enforced to minimize the impact on humans.

We shall not plunge further into the depths of methodological or analytical models employed. We would direct the interested reader to consult specific reference literature, such as Till and Grogan Radiological Risk Assessment and


Environmental Analysis [25], TNO Yellow and Green books [26, 27], or Gheorghe and Vamanu Disaster Risk and Vulnerability Management. From Awareness to Practice [28].

In line with the context of this paper we will conclude upon a review of the impact indicators any intervention-oriented software addressing nuclear and chemical accidents should produce for an effective support in emergency response (Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2

Relevant impact indicators in short-to-intermediate phase of nuclear emergencies

Dose Type Symbol Air immersion External Ha Ground deposition External Hd Committed Effective Dose Equivalent, 50y Internal and External CEDE50

Acute bone, 30d Internal Ab Acute lung, 30d Internal Al Compound Total Acute Bone Dose TABD = Ha+Hd+Ab Total Acute Lung Dose TALD = Ha+Hd+Al Total Effective Dose Equivalent TEDE = Ha+Hd+CEDE50

Table 3

Relevant impact indicators in chemical emergency

Burns 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree

Fire

Overpressure Lung injuries Head injuries Whole body injuries Projectiles Body Glass shattered Head

Explosion

Lethality percentage / Individual risk Due to

Acute intoxication Atmospheric release Levels of concern correlation e.g. IDLH, TLV, STEL, ERPGs, AEGLs Effects on structures Building collapse Explosion / shockwave

6. FINAL REMARKS

Solid and generally accepted methods and models for assessing the risk and potential effects of disruptions of virtually any origin and nature are available and


indeed in use. Since these are inherently complex, there is a need for an operationally-valid selection of solutions to provide a worthy support, especially in severe, beyond design-basis emergencies.

This can be achieved, first, by identifying, from the plethora of alternatives in the safety assessment, of models that provide an optimal trade-off between complexity and accuracy. And, second, by developing new models to deal with new challenges, for never before the UN term 'appropriate technology' was more in order than nowadays, in the EM realm.

The paper made an attempt to articulate – in a defendable manner – a set of requirements for the IT solutions to be adopted in supporting the analytic assessment and decision making in Emergency Preparedness and Management. These include, especially:

• an anticipative posture betting on prognostic capabilities, properly seconded by diagnostic instruments observant of regulatory constraints;

• minimum requirements in terms of input, thus offering the capability of usage anywhere and coping with any event;

• a ‘decent’ level of mathematical complexity – thus being more easily adopted and trusted by the non-academic stakeholders;

• the need for effective operational IT tools to address the critical phases of disruptive events and their immediate follow-up;

• an intelligent manner to take advantage of the similarities of different classes of events, e.g. occurring in the nuclear and chemical industries, while taking good account of the respective specifics;

• a IT system analysis and development responsive to non-academic stakeholders needs and 'likes'.

Coming in the early phase of a number of engagements that the authors and their institution are committed to, this paper is an expression of a clarification effort and an attempt to propose a shared deontological and methodological attitude to the actors and stakeholders of many profiles, educational background and missions involved. Acknowledgements. This work was supported by the European Regional Development Funds and co-financed by the Government of Romania - Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration, in the framework of project ‘EMERSYS Toward an integrated, joint cross-border detection system and harmonized rapid responses procedures to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergencies’, MIS-ETC code 774. Selective parts were supported by the Romanian National Research Council (CNCS), The National Program, Project number PN-09 37 03 01.

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