terrorism and globalization- grifka

Terrorism and Globalization Grifka 1

Terrorism and Globalization: A Cross-National Examination of Transnational Terrorist Attacks

Amanda Grifka

An applied research project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of Master of Arts

Master of Arts Political Science Department

Central Michigan University Mount Pleasant, Michigan

May 2014


Abstract

This research investigates potential associations between globalization and transnational

terrorism. Recent research in the field of terrorism suggests a shift from the old, traditional form

of state-sponsored terrorism, into “new” terrorism motivated primarily by religious and ethnic

grievances. What explains the dramatic spread of terrorism in recent decades? I investigate the

association of economic globalization, political globalization and social globalization on the

lethality of transnational terrorist attacks. Using newly collected cross-national, time-series data,

I employ multivariate regression analysis in an attempt to explain the impact of globalization on

terrorism.

Introduction

The study of terrorism has expanded dramatically since the 1970s. Because of the media

and technological advances, terrorism became an international topic of interests to scholars and

citizens alike (Cronin, 2003). For a phenomena that has resulted in a large amount of

publications (more than 6,000 works have been published about terrorism since the 1970s), much

of methodology is psychological terrorism theories (LaFree and Freilich, 2012). In order to

understand terrorism from an empirical perspective, I employ quantitative methods. The goal of

this paper is to investigate the association between globalization and the rise of new terrorism.1

This paper is organized with a brief introduction and history of transnational terrorism, mainly

how terrorism has changed following the Cold War. I then provide a literature review of research

about terrorism and globalization. The latter part of the paper uses linear regression models to

analyze the relationship between terrorism and globalization using data from the ITERATE

terrorism dataset and the KOF Globalization Index.

1 Terrorism is measured in this research by the number of victims, not the number of attacks. More on this can be found in the Research Design Section.


Brief Distinction of “Old” Versus “New” Terrorism

Before the 1990s, transnational terrorism was primarily motivated by nationalism,

separatism, Marxist ideology, racism, nihilism and economic inequality. Following the end of the

Cold War, transnational terrorism has shifted to motivations of religious-based terrorism

(Wilkinson, 1986 in Enders and Sandler, 2000; Field, 2009). The ideological Islamic

fundamentalist pose the greatest international terrorism threat, perpetuated by the rapid growth of

Muslim communities in western societies and the belief, like other fundamentalists groups, that

those faithful to other religions than their own are deemed to go to hell and must be sent there as

soon as possible (Moghaddam, 2008).

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the language of terrorism

portrayed by the media, political leaders and some scholars shifted from traditional terrorism or

“old terrorism” to what is being called “new terrorism.” Old terrorism is commonly defined as

having a hierarchical organizational structure, territorially oriented within a home region,

politically/nationalistic in motivation, restraining of violence and system-affirming (Gofas,

2012). Former leaders George W. Bush and Tony Blair referred to this new terrorism as being

fundamentally different from the terrorism of the past. New terrorism was described to the public

by policymakers and world leaders as “driven not by a set of negotiable political demands, but

by religious fanaticism” (Blair, 2004 in Field, 2009). Similarly, former President Bush (2002)

warned of “the growing threat of terror attack on a catastrophic scale – terror armed with

biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.” Blair’s successor, Gordan Brown (2006), also asserted

that modern terrorism is new and “multidimensional in its operations” (Field, 2009).

In academics, the concept of new terrorism was conceived well before the attacks of

September 11 and was widely discussed during the 1990s by scholars in the field. By the late


1990s, four trends in terrorism were becoming apparent: an increase in the incidence of

religiously motivated attacks, a decrease in the overall number of attacks, an increase in the

lethality per attack and the growing targeting of Americans.2 Furthermore, scholars argued that

terrorism had dramatically shifted in recent years (Hoffman, 1993; Laqueur, 1999; O’Lesser,

1999 in Field, 2009). According to Gofas (2012), new terrorism is more loosely structured than

traditional terrorism, transnational rather than local, religiously motivated rather than politically,

deliberately targets civilians and is aimed at causing maximum destruction. A similar opinion is

shared by Field (2009), who further elaborates on key differences between traditional and new

terrorism. First, the overall purpose of terrorism has changed from functional violence backed by

political strategy to symbolic violence aimed at destruction and punishment. Whereas traditional

terrorism had a clear objective in its act, new terrorism, such as that of the World Trade Center

bombing, is aimed at having a symbolic statement achieved by the dramatic use of power

(Juergensmeyer, 2000 in Field, 2009). New terrorists are less rational in their approach to

violence than their predecessors and believe it is their duty to eliminate certain social, religious

and cultural groups (Hoffman, 1995 in Field, 2009). Second, new terrorist are less willing to

negotiate and compromise than traditional terrorist. Old terrorism had clear objectives

(political/national ideological changes) that created a basis for negotiations and communication

with governments. However, new terrorists “are not seeking a seat at the negotiating table; they

want to blow up the table altogether and build a new one in its place” (Cilluffo and Tomarchio,

1998 in Field, 2009). Third, the scale of terrorist demands has increased. Old terrorism had

limited objectives restricted to specific geographical areas in close proximity to the terrorist. In

contrast, new terrorism seeks to change the entire international system rather than the political

2 I will only be focusing on two of these four trends—the decrease in overall number of attacks and the increase in the lethality per attack.


situation of a specific region or country. Fourth, new terrorism is different from traditional

terrorism in its organizational structure. Traditional terrorism was organized by tight hierarchical

groups; new terrorism is structured in international networks that are loosely connected. New

terrorism uses a horizontal system of coordination and cooperation, as opposed to the

conventional vertical, hierarchy system. Fifth, new terrorism is more lethal than old terrorism. In

the past, terrorist believed that too many casualties could undermine their legitimacy and turn

away supporters. However, new terrorist are less concerned with appearing legitimate and

instead believe their actions have received divine authorization, which makes them more willing

to kill. This is supported by an overall rise in the number of causalities caused by international

terrorist attacks (Hoffman, 1989 in Field, 2009). Such was the case with the September 11

attacks that “perpetrated a series of mass casualty attacks that went beyond anything previously

undertaken by traditional terrorist groups” (Field, 2009). Lastly, new terrorism is closely linked

with weapons of mass destruction, whereas traditional terrorist had little use for such weapons.

New terrorist are more likely to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to achieve their

goals, which are often extreme in the elimination of religious opponents (Field, 2009).

Moreover, along with the shift in terrorist organizations’ objectives in the 1990s, there

has also been a decrease in state sponsorship of terrorism and an increase in anti-terrorism

efforts. Although the number of transnational terrorism incidents has decreased since the end of

the Cold War, the number of casualties has increased since 1997. The threat of future terrorist

attacks continues to be daunting to its sought-after targets (Sandler, 2013; Enders and Sandler,

2000). Furthermore, it appears new terrorism is not only fundamentally different at its core,

objectives and goals, but is also more dangerous since it has resulted in more causalities with less

actual attacks. What explains new terrorisms’ ability to be more dangerous than old terrorism?


Why is transnational terrorism now more lethal than ever before? The research of Tucker (2001),

concludes that international terrorism became more lethal from the period of 1969-1980 to 1987-

1999. Tucker’s findings are based on the methodology by “dividing the number of causalities

and fatalities in any given period by the total number of incidents in the same period.”

The new terrorism of the 1990s is often discussed by scholars and policymakers in

conjunction with characteristics of globalization, as globalization started having a profound

impact on the international system with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow and the

Warsaw Pact countries were the leading trainers of terrorists and the leaders in weapons to

terrorists. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, weapon access was no longer

controlled, influenced or even known to the Soviets, who had previously restricted the choices of

weapons to such groups. Access to newer, more sophisticated weapons by these non-state actors

was now easier with the unemployed former Soviet weaponry experts being easily seduced by

offers from abroad. Soviet allies in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, Syria and Libya lost the

indirect protection that Soviet friendship and interests in its major weapons clients afforded.

Furthermore, the security agency of the Soviet Union had been able to indirectly and directly

control some of the targeting of the terrorists groups supported by Moscow’s allies, satellites and

friends and deter attacks from Americans since it was not in the interest of the Soviets’ interests

(Radu, 2002). Globalization has not only shaped what terrorism is in and of itself, as discussed

above, but globalization has also affected how terrorism has spread into the international system.

The availability and ease of transporting information, technology, capital and people from the

rapid spread of globalization following the Cold War is advantageous to terrorist organizations

(Radu, 2002). Transnational terrorists organization now cooperate with each other and


international criminals for funds, recruitment and arms, all made easier with advances in

communications, transportation and financial transactions.

Literature Review

Defining Terrorism

The study of terrorism began in the late 1960s with a focus of defining terrorism, the

causes of terrorism, the tactics of terrorists and identifying the primary terrorism groups and

movements (Sandler, 2013). Since the beginning of terrorism studies, a consistent definition has

yet to be established. Definitions not only vary among scholars internationally, but also vary

internally in the United States among the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of

Homeland Security, U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense (Hoffman,

2012). Hoffman takes into account the definitions of terrorism used by the above mentioned

institutions of counter-terrorism and defines terrorism as being characterized by: “ineluctably

political in aims and motives; violent—or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to

have far-reaching psychology repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted

either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure

or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influences, motivated or inspired by

the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and

perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.” A similar, more concise definition of

terrorism to be used here forth is: “Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by

individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social

objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims”

(Enders, Sandler, Gaibulloev, 2011).


A political motive and lack of state-sponsored terrorism is consistent with the definition

of terrorism by Sandler (2013) and Zimmermann (2011). Sandler (2013) further classifies

transnational terrorist attacks as involving victims, perpetrators, targets, supporters or territory

from more than one country, whereas domestic terrorist attacks are originating in the home of the

attackers and home are directed. As such, events that start in one country and end in another are

transnational (Enders and Sander, 2000). Scholars have also discussed the terminology

differences of transnational terrorism and international terrorism. Martin (1986) and Mickolus et

al. (2012) distinguish the international terrorism as terrorists controlled by a sovereign state and

transnational terrorist as autonomous non-state actors.

Defining Globalization

The topic of globalization became prominent in the early 1980s. Globalization research is

traditionally focused on at least one of four foundations: capitalism and economic systems (some

scholars dating globalization in this field back at least a few thousand years), technology,

political dimensions (governments shape private entrepreneurship industry) and socio-cultural

changes. Furthermore, the history of globalization can be viewed with two significant turning

points: communication separated from transportation in the 1830s and the establishment of

global networks in the 1970s (Dreher et al., 2008). The most recent wave of globalization took

place with the invention of the computer and the fall of the Soviet Union (Zimmermann, 2011).

Globalization can be summarized as being “an extension and intensification in the exchange of

goods, persons and ideas” (Held et al., 1999 in Zimmerman, 2011).

Globalization has been defined as including: the increased dissemination of ideas and

technologies (Albrow, 1996; Shin, 2009); the growing integration of markets and nation-states

and the spread of technological advancements (Friedman, 2005; Shin 2009); receding


geographical constraints on social and cultural arrangements (Waters, 1995); or the

transformation of the economic, political and cultural foundations of societies (Shin, 2009;

Mittleman, 2000 in Dreher et al., 2008). Simply, globalization is the free flow of goods, services,

people, capital and information (Sirgy, 2007). Thus, it is apparent that globalization is a multi-

dimensional concept that has economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental dimensions,

among others (Keohane and Nye, 2000; Leidner, 2010; Martens et al., 2010 in Mukherjee and

Krieckhaus; Shin, 2009).

The current wave of terrorism is not only a reaction to globalization, but is facilitated by

it (Cronin, 2003). There is a multitude of literature on the association between terrorism and

globalization. Since globalization has multiple dimensions, below I examine terrorism by each

dimension of globalization—economic globalization, political globalization and social/cultural

globalization.

Economic Globalization and Terrorism

Economic globalization refers to increased flows of capital, goods and services across

international boundaries (Mukherjee and Krieckhaus, 2011). Information technologies, such as

the Internet, mobile phones and instant messaging, have extended the global reach of terrorist

(Tucker, 2001). These information tools have led to more efficiency in terrorist organizations,

including administrative tasks, coordination of operations, communication among members and

recruitment efforts. Before the attacks of September 11, members of Al-Qaeda used Yahoo Mail

as a communication tool and the Internet to research chemical weapons. Information to build

weapons of mass destruction is easily available through the Internet to terrorist organizations.

Furthermore, economic globalization has significantly eased the communication and planning

processes for transnational terrorist organizations. Globalization’s impact on information


technology is often seen as a positive to the international system. However, it has resulted in the

ease of operations for terrorists. It has allowed for goods, including weapons, and people to

travel further distances in shorter periods of time and with less difficulties. As commerce and

business interests are no longer restricted by borders, so too are terrorists seen as borderless

entities. Although economic benefits of globalization are shown to allow for terrorist

organization to operate with more ease and thus more effectively, there is also the opposite

impact of economic globalization. Many terrorist attacks occur in regions not strongly integrated

by globalization. In these areas, international interests only exists for easily exploitable raw

materials. Divisions of labor create minority populations that do not share in the benefits of a

more globalized country and thus support a corrupt culture of terrorism (Zimmerman, 2011).

The financial system is globalized, allowing terrorists to gather financial resources

through the web, international businesses, nonprofits and charities often unknown to the donors

(Cronin, 2003). Zimmerman (2011) acknowledges that globalization increases the mobility of

militant terrorist groups and the capital they can receive as well as their ability to disseminate

information and propaganda. He also finds that globalization can be a background factor for

international terrorism because it provides for more ideological competition and access to new

financial resources and weapons.

Goldman (2010) concludes that terrorism has become more local and less global. One

explanation of Goldman is the low profitability of transnational terrorist attacks in relation to

local attacks. Furthermore, Goldman’s study does not take into account the severity of terrorist

attacks by considering the number of causalities resulting from each attack.


Political Globalization and Terrorism

Political globalization occurs when countries involve themselves in international political

relationships, such as establishing embassies in foreign countries, joining international

organizations, international treaties and participating in UN Security Council Missions

(Mukherjee and Krieckhaus, 2011). According to Cronin (2003), the Arab world has the most

threatening religiously inspired terrorism. This region blames the United States and Western

world for being left behind by the promise of globalization and its assurance of broader freedom,

prosperity and access to knowledge. Additionally, much of the anti-American terrorism is rooted

in the desire to change the United States foreign policy in the Middle East (Cronin, 2003). Thus,

terrorism can be explained partially in terms of political aspects of globalization with the

objectives of terrorists organizations that are anti-American and against the political policies of

the United States.

Additionally, an increase in international organizations from political globalization can

lead to domestic policy changes within a country. Involvement in international political systems

can bring into domestic policy areas interests such as human rights and management of

epidemics (Tsai, 2006), which appear beneficial to all of society, but in fact may result in

hostilities by some individuals and groups. Involvement in international governance causes

heavily led by the West attempts to bring democratic beliefs to the rest of the world. Terrorism

can be facilitated by this contempt for the West and the attempt at bring political changes to

other regions that are not welcoming of such changes.

Social/Cultural Globalization and Terrorism

Social globalization refers to the extent of informal interaction among states and

individuals, such as international tourism, media and other forms of information exchange.


Social globalization leads to greater exposure to the prevailing international conditions, ideas,

norms and cultures of other states (Mukherjee and Krieckhaus (2011). Religiously motivated

terror attacks are thought to be more likely to cause mass casualties because unlike politically

motivated attacks, they are not constrained by fear that excessive violence will offend some

constituency, since they only care about a small circle of elect (Tucker, 2001). Furthermore,

religiously motivated terrorist organizations have increased from zero in 1968, to two (out of 64

known terrorist organizations) in 1980 and 25 (out of 58) by 1995 (Cronin, 2003).

Cultural globalization brings new knowledge, education and opinion to people from other

cultures. International fundamentalist Islamic terrorism is a cultural phenomenon. Every known

associate or alleged associate of Al-Qaeda in Europe, the Middle East and North America is

university educated and of the middle class or higher. Bid Laden himself was a multimillionaire.

Terrorist organizations make no attempt to link their cause with poverty or economic inequality.

Their objective is completely cultural and their aim is to fight Western culture (Radu, 2002).

Globalization has likely facilitated terrorist organizations in bringing their goals and opinions to

all parts of the world.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

Since globalization has progressively increased each year per country, it makes sense

logically to test the effects of globalization on terrorism in order to better understand if

globalization has facilitated terrorism to become more deadly. I argue that because of rises in

globalization, terrorism has also risen. Economic globalization has allowed for the ease of

transferring goods and money and resulted in labor divisions and opportunity for exploitation for

terrorists. Political globalization has allowed for terrorist organizations to extend their political

objectives internationally. Social and cultural globalization has resulted in clashes of culture that


has allowed terrorists to extend their cultural goals. I argue that because of globalization,

terrorism is more lethal and thus more dangerous. It is no longer just a concern of a terrorist

attack; now the lethality of the attack is of greater concern.

Transnational terrorism is encouraged internationally by the social and cultural advances

of globalization and executed by the economic and capital advances brought to all regions of the

world from globalization. Globalization has made it easier for terrorists to carry out attacks in

various regions that can be geographically located anywhere in the world; location is no longer a

constraint. Advancements in technology, communications, financial systems and transportation

has allowed terrorist to plan and plot from one location and execute an attack in a completely

different region. Additionally, economic advances have allowed for more sophistication in

weaponry, which makes terrorism more dangerous. The following hypothesis can be derived

from the foregoing argument:

H1: Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in economic globalization.

I anticipate that as a country becomes more politically globalized, anti-terrorism policies

become more internationally motivated, meaning countries formulate similar policies in order to

appear concise and consistent in battling terrorism. While at first this would seem to deter

terrorist, it can actually have the opposing effect and allow for terrorist to have it easier in

planning an attack. Additionally, political globalization creates foreign policies that may not be

supported all over the world, creating hostilities and an aim to change those policies. Terrorist

organizations dislike participation in international organizations that threaten their organization.

The following hypothesis can be derived from the foregoing argument:

H2: Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in political globalization.


Since modern terrorism is religiously and culturally motivated, I hypothesize that

terrorism is to associated with cultural globalization. Expansion of ideas and cultures can result

in hatred for certain lifestyles (Western/American), resulting in dislike and distaste for nations

that exhibit such behavior. Terrorist organizations that are largely religiously motivated feel

threatened by Western culture. Increasing cultural globalization brings together vastly different

cultures, norms, beliefs and customs, of which some are bound to compete with each other. Thus,

the following hypothesis can be derived:

H3: Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in social globalization.

From the three aforementioned hypotheses, I also establish a fourth hypothesis. Since I

expect each individual dimension of globalization (economic, political and social) to be

associated with a rise in terrorism, I presume a cumulative measure of globalization to have the

same effect.

H4: Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in globalization.

Data and Research Design

This research will be a quantitative, large-N, empirical time series. I am using secondary

data from the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) database to

measure terrorism. The globalization data comes from the KOF Index of Globalization. The

KOF Index is widely used in research because it provides an aggregated measure of economic,

political, cultural and overall globalization for 184 countries from 1970 to 2010. The data is

organized by year and by country, which is necessary for this study since I am investigating

countries over time. This study will cover the period from 1970 to 2010. The number of

observations for my study is 177 (n=177). Appendix A lists all of the 177 cases.


Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for my research is the sum total number of people killed and

wounded in terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2010. I use the measure of victims of terrorist attacks

because I am interested in the lethality of terrorism. Figure 1 shows that the number of terrorist

attacks has remained fairly consistent, with an average of 320 transnational attacks per year,

ranging from as few as 53 recorded attacks in 2001 to 579 in 1991. Victims are individuals who

are directly harmed by the terrorist incident. Individuals wounded who later die are only

categorized as victims killed. The terrorism data is from the ITERATE database compiled by

Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock and Flemming (2012).3

ITERATE gather’s information from newspapers and media outlets from across the

world. The definition of transnational terrorism used by ITERATE is “the use, or threat of use, of

anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group,

3 There are other terrorism databases available, including Global Terrorism Database, RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). I am using ITERATE because it is produced by leading terrorism-studies political scientists and is robust in characteristics recorded for each terror attack.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Terr

oris

t Att

acks

and

Vic

tims

Worldwide Number of Terrorist Victims vs Number of Attack

Number of Terrorist Victims

Number of Terrorist Attacks


whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is

intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate

victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the

nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications

transcend national boundaries”

(Mickolus et al., 2012). ITERATE data

excludes terrorist incidents associated

with declared wars or military

interventions. Terrorist attacks against

combatants are excluded and attacks

toward peacekeepers are included.

Figure 2 is the distribution of the

dependent variable. There is skewness of

4.26 in the positive direction.

Furthermore, terrorism is not normal, per

se, so it logically makes sense that the number of victims will vary across time and cases.

Independent Variables

The main independent variables are the disaggregated measures of globalization from the

Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) Index of Globalization produced by the KOF Swiss

Economic Institute.4 The three measures—economic, political and social—are themselves drawn

from 24 sub-indices in order to provide a holistic, multifaceted representation of globalization

(Dreher, 2006). The KOF Index is an elaborate, widely cited index for measuring globalization

4 The KOF Globalization Index is available at www.globalization.kof.ethz.ch.


because it covers 207 countries from 1970 to 2010 and provides a globalization value, from 0 =

no globalization to 100 = complete globalization, for economic globalization, social

globalization, political globalization and overall globalization. The overall globalization levels

are measured by the three dimensions of globalization being weighted nearly equally as follows:

1) economic globalization weighted at 36%, 2) social globalization weighted at 37% and 3)

political globalization weighted at 26%. Furthermore, economic globalization is equally divided

(50% each) into actual flows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and income

payments to foreign nationals) and restrictions (hidden import barriers, tariff rate, taxes on

international trade and capital account restrictions). Political globalization is measured by the

number of embassies in a country, membership in international organizations, participation in

United Nations Security Council’s Peacekeeping Missions and international treaties. Social

globalization is divided into data on personal contract (34%), data on information flows (35%)

and data on cultural proximity (31%). Person contact includes telephone traffic, transfers,

international tourism, foreign population and international letters. Information flows includes

Internet users, televisions and trade in newspapers. Cultural proximity includes number of

McDonald’s restaurants, number of Ikea stores and trade in books. See Appendix B for complete

list with weight of the globalization variables. Each dimension of globalization is normally

distributed.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Mean Minimum Maximum Number of People Killed and Wounded from Terrorism

279 0 4,690

Economic Globalization 48.08 0 94.90 Political Globalization 50.94 1.60 50.94 Social Globalization 40.56 8.18 83.70 Overall Globalization 46.17 18.47 84.46 Sources: ITERATE; KOF Globalization Index


Control Variables

I use regional dummy variables to control for geographic differences across the world. I

am interested if globalization is impacting terrorism in some parts of the world but not others.

Countries were categories into one of seven regions: Sub-Sahara Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe,

Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia, South and Central America, North America and Oceania.

Oceania is used as the point of reference.

I also control for degree of freedom. I expect a country that is freer to have less terrorism.

Citizens that are freer will not feel constrained by their government. Thus, countries that are less

free will experience more terrorism because the people (terrorist) have less opportunities and less

freedom from their government to do as they please, causing the people (terrorist) to be angry. I

use freedom data from the Freedom House.5 Countries are coded 0 = not free, 1 = partially free

or 2 = completely free.

I control for democracy because democratic regimes are less violent. Democratic regimes

are more representative of the desires of the citizens; thus, countries that are democracies will

have less terrorism because its citizens will adopt policies that are anti-terrorism. I use data from

the Polity IV Project6 to code countries from -10 (autocratic) to 10 (democratic) to test the

impact of democracy on terrorism.

Empirical Methods

The cross-national study uses data from 1970 to 2010 and the unit of analysis is country

year. The number of observations for my study is 177 (n=177). Appendix A lists all of the 177

cases. The KOF database includes values for all countries from 1968 to 2012 with exceptions to

some country-year combination that was not available when the data was collected. I will use the

5 Freedom House data is available at www.freedomhouse.org. 6 Polity IV Project data is available at www.systemicpeace.org.


dependent variable data availability to determine if that case is used (where there is a value

provided, that will be used for the measure). I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression

analysis to test the impact of globalization on terrorism. Four models are used to investigate

economic globalization, political globalization, social globalization and overall globalization.

The results are reported in Table 3 and Table 4 below.

Findings

Before using the OLS model, I created a simple correlation matrix of the four

independent variables. Table 2 summarizes the results. Column one reports the correlation

between terrorism and each measure of globalization. The only correlation that is significant with

respect to terrorism is political globalization, with Pearson’s r value of .227, indicating some

correlation (recall +1 is complete positive correlation, 0 is no correlation and -1 is complete

negative correlation). Interestingly, economic globalization and social globalization are

correlated at a .724, indicating that these measures overlap. However, this is not the case since

both are using very different measures. Moreover, it is expected that as a country increases in

one form of globalization, it also increases in the other types, which explains why the two

dimensions are correlated.

Table 2 Correlations of Terrorism and Globalization Terrorism Economic Political Social Overall Terrorism .061 .227*** .023 .099 Economic .061 .398*** .724*** .835*** Political .227*** .398*** .297*** .671*** Social .023 .724*** .297*** .898*** Overall .099 .835*** .671*** .898*** ***p<.01


Moving to the OLS regression, I begin by examining the association between terrorism

and globalization without any control variables. Models 1-4, reported in Table 3, show the

results. Model 1 tests H1: Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in economic

globalization. The results are not significant, indicating that economic globalization is not

associated with a rise in the number of people killed and wounded in terrorist attacks.

Additionally, regardless of statistical significance, only 4 percent of the variance of terrorism is

explained by economic globalization, meaning almost nothing is explained.

Model 2 reports the results for political globalization and terrorism and test H2:

Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in political globalization. According to Table 3,

Model 2 supports H2, indicating that terrorism is positively associated with political

globalization. Political globalization is statistically significant (p<.01; t>2) and indicates that for

Table 3 OLS Regression of Terrorism and Globalization Model 1: Economic

Globalization Model 2: Political

Globalization Model 3: Social Globalization

Model 4: Overall Globalization

Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t (Constant)

160.55 (124.199)

1.293 -85.03 (126.5)

-672 240.229 (118.593)

2.026 82.242 (3.339)

.505

Economic Globalization

1.79 (2.398)

.747

-- -- -- -- -- --

Political Globalization

-- -- 7.00*** (2.282)

3.07 -- -- -- --

Social Globalization

-- -- -- -- .799 (2.627)

.304 -- --

Overall Globalization

-- -- -- -- -- -- 4.261 (3.339)

1.276

R-Squared .004 .052 .001 .101 Note: N=177. See Appendix A ***p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses The aggregated globalization data was used for calculating overall effect of globalization on terrorism.


Table 4 OLS Regression of Terrorism and Globalization with Geographic Regions Model 5: Economic

Globalization Model 6: Political

Globalization Model 7: Social Globalization

Model 8: Overall Globalization

Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t (Constant)

-77.64 (272.24)

-.29 -354.62 (251.08)

-1.41 -12.3 (277.48)

-.04 -351.67 (295.82)

-1.19

Economic Globalization

-3.38 (2.98)

-1.14

-- -- -- -- -3.17 (3.35)

-.95

Political Globalization

-- -- 5.85** (2.66)

2.20 -- -- 8.00** (2.79)

2.86

Social Globalization

-- -- -- -- -4.724 (3.71)

-1.27 -2.29 (4.10)

-.56

Freedom

2.51 (82.60)

.03 -43.74 (83.52)

-.52 -3.34 (86.75)

-.04 -5.40 (81.19)

-.07

Democracy

47.49*** (11.83)

4.01

32.10** (12.85)

2.50 46.81*** (12.64)

3.70 38.38** (12.30)

3.12

North America

292.42 (349.42)

.84 35.79 (406.47)

.09 340.64 (406.49)

.84 101.56 (358.34)

.28

Central/South America

218.57 (246.87)

.89 163.67 (254.07)

.64 204.45 (257.19)

.80 168.95 (241.94)

.70

Europe Eurasia Asia Pacific Middle East North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa

256 (249.52) 522.93 (317.23) 531.38** (262.60) 980.87*** (282.58) 456.46* (251.53)

1.03 1.65 2.02 3.47 1.82

111.56 (259.36) 420.79 (320.52) 404.06 (265.34) 1089.76*** (290.39) 355.08 (257.93)

.43 1.31 1.52 3.75 1.38

291.74 (263.58) 499.12 (324.58) 442.13 (271.76) 8284.51*** (287.94) 372.96 (264.76)

1.11 1.54 1.63 4.46 1.41

169.56 (252.95) 556.07* (311.93) 454.77* (258.79) 907.23*** (279.84) 389.86 (248.85)

.67 1.78 1.76 3.24 1.57

R-Squared .158 .202 .188 .207 Note: N=177. See Appendix A ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses


every one increase in political globalization (recall globalization is measured on a 0 to 100

scale), the victims of terrorism increases by seven individuals. Although this association is in

support of my hypothesis, it only explains 5.2% of the variance of terrorism, which again is

negligible.

Turning to Model 3, social globalization is found to be not statistically significant,

resulting in an acceptance of the null of H3: Terrorism is positively associated with a rise in

social globalization. Accepting the null hypothesis indicates that the amount of social

globalization does not have an effect on the lethality of terrorism. Had the relationship been

significant, this model produced the lowest R-squared of the three models indicated that only 1

percent of the variance of terrorism is explained by social globalization.

For Model 4, I used the aggregated measure of globalization to test H4: Terrorism is

positively associated with a rise in globalization. Again, the model nor the globalization variable

are significant in this regression. After looking at the impact of globalization on the number of

victims of terrorism, I then created Models 5-8 with the addition of control variables. Models 5-7

were ran the same as models 1-3 (for economic globalization, political globalization and social

globalization, respectively) except with the addition of freedom and democracy variables and

geographic regional dummy variables. Table 4 reports the findings.

Model 5, economic globalization, is not significant as a model, nor is economic

globalization statistically significant. However, democracy is statistically significant, indicating

that as democracy increases, the number of victims of terrorism increases. This is the opposite

effect I had hypothesized for the regime type variable. Model 5 also has regional dummy

variables of significance for the Asia Pacific region, the Middle East and North Africa region and

the Sub-Saharan region. All three regions have a positive coefficient, which means that being in


one of these three regions increases the number of victims of terrorism compared to being in the

Oceania region. Adding the control and region variables increased the R-squared from Model 1

(.004) to .158 in Model 5, indicating that the addition of freedom and democracy as well as

regional controls explains more of the variance of terrorism than globalization alone.

Model 6 has the main independent variable as significant, political globalization, which

indicates that as political globalization increases, the victims of terrorism also increases by

almost 6 victims. Again, democracy is significant and positive, indicating as democracy

increases, terrorism victims also increase. For the geographic regions, only the Middle East and

North Africa region is statistically significant with a coefficient of over 1,000. This means that

for the political globalization model, victims of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa

region increase by 1,089 in reference to the Oceania region. About 20 percent of the variance is

explained by Model 6.

Model 7, the social globalization, is very similar to Model 6, except social globalization

is not significant. Democracy and the Middle East and North Africa region are the only

statistically significant variables in this model. The Middle East and North Africa variable

indicates that being from this region compared to the Oceania region results 8,284 more victims

of terrorism.

For Model 8, I included all three dimensions of globalization instead of the overall

globalization indexed value I used in Model 5. Model 8 has the highest R-squared, meaning that

taking all three dimensions of globalization together produces the strongest variance for

explaining the number of victims of terrorism. The model itself is not significant and only

political globalization is significant, indicating that as political globalization increases by one

point, the number of victims of terrorism increases by 8 people. Democracy is significant, as


expected since it is significant for the three other models. Asia Pacific and the Middle East and

North Africa are also statistically significant. A change in Model 8 from Models 5-7 is the

significance of Eurasia, indicating that the number of victims in Eurasia increases by 556

compared to Oceania when taking all forms of globalization, freedom levels and democracy into

the formula.

Considerations

None of the eight models produced any significance for the freedom score variable. This

implies that it does not matter the degree of freedom of a country in deterring victims of

terrorism. While this does not logically follow from previous literature, the coding (0, 1 or 2)

may be an explanation for why this variable is not significant. Had I used a larger scale, the

results may be different.

As stated in the introduction of this research, much of the terrorism research is

qualitative, not quantitative. Terrorism itself is a difficult phenomena to operationalize. While I

believe my measure is the best measure for this model, I do not ignore that there are pitfalls. The

ITERATE dataset provides exact counts of victims that are wounded and killed. It also provides

an indicator if there were victims, but the exact amount is unknown. In order to numerically code

this, I provided those incidences with a one, indicating that there is one victim. However, the

number of victims could be only one or it could have been a lot more. Moreover, this study is

still relevant, but I do acknowledge that data flaws could be a possibility for the lack of statistical

significance.

Qualitative studies of terrorism are able to elaborate on different aspects of globalization

and aided terrorist, such as the use of the Internet and international banking, possibly better than

quantitative studies. I used the victim country for my counts of globalization. However,


transnational terrorist is transnational, indicating that it is difficult to follow the paths of inter and

intra state activity that may have hindered or aided in an attack. Additionally, this study is over

forty years. There may be a flaw in the research method used. Logistic regression could have

been employed to provide probabilities for there to be victims of terrorism or a terrorist attack

against the amount of globalization. A time-series regression could also have been used to better

understand the changes in globalization and terrorism over time. Nevertheless, I was assuming a

linear relationship between the lethality of terrorism and the level of globalization, which

suggests the use of OLS regression.

Conclusion

Economic globalization, social globalization and overall globalization appear to be poor

indicators of the lethality of terrorism. Geographic region is a strong predictor in the number of

victims of terrorism, with the largest number of victims residing in the Middle East and North

Africa region and Asia Pacific (in comparison to the number of victims of the Oceania region).

Political globalization indicates that as a country becomes more politically globalized, it falls

suspect to more lethality of terrorism, measured by more wounded and killed people from

transnational terrorist attacks.

I conclude with realization that many of my hypotheses were not supported. However, I

am still optimistic that globalization increases the lethality of terrorism (the number of victims of

terrorist attacks). Economic globalization allows for the ease of planning, organizing and

executing terrorist attacks from an international banking system, the Internet, cell phones and

transportation of goods, services and people. Political globalization allows for international

cooperation among nations against terrorism, which creates a clear and consistent message

globally about terrorist. This can aid terrorist because it makes it easier to understand the policy


of one specific country when all countries have similar policies. Also, political globalization

spreads foreign policy from the West to other regions of the world where it may not be as

welcomed, thus fostering motivation for terrorist. Social globalization allows for the sharing of

knowledge and culture, which can in turn be negative for cultures that do not want influence

from other parts of the world. Cultures that are not welcoming of other cultures results in

motivation for cultural shifts from terrorist organizations. This research has exposed the

dimensions of globalization to the lethality of terrorism to conclude that there is still a lot about

transnational terrorism that is not understood nor explained. Regardless of the lethality of

terrorism, future research needs to continue to explore this relationship in efforts to bring more

information and explanation to the internationally phenomena of terrorism.


Appendix A

Study Cases: Number of Victims of Terrorism and Levels of Globalization, 1970-2010

Country Terrorism Economic Political Social Total

*If data was not available for 1970-2010, years data available indicated here

Afghanistan 1611 . 36.24 8.18 19.76 Albania 5 32.67 40.56 29.9 33.71 Algeria 234 41.44 70.25 26.13 43.29 Andorra 0 . 11.78 72.03 . Angola 638 62.54 38.58 11.6 37.23 *1975-2010

Argentina 765 44.87 85.23 38.27 53 Armenia 0 58.95 33.18 37.12 44.04 *1991-2010

Aruba 0 . 3.78 71.79 43.71 Australia 27 61.5 85.66 74.38 72.65 Austria 115 69.13 91.93 76.99 78.06 Azerbaijan 86 42.19 26.68 37.09 36.22 Bahamas 0 43.74 37.07 63.17 49.24 Bahrain 28 78.93 31.87 55.73 57.91 Bangladesh 38 16.49 54.01 12.11 24.7 Barbados 73 53.83 35.23 49.78 47.44 Belarus 0 41.57 34.64 48.58 42.36 *1991-2010

Belgium 204 87.6 93.74 74.86 84.46 Belize 0 48.31 32.89 42.96 42.27 *1981-2010

Benin 0 27.44 44.98 16.06 27.8 Bermuda 0 . 2.52 56.84 34.41 Bhutan 0 . 17.18 25.51 22.07 Bolivia 35 50.06 56.17 28.72 43.7 Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 52.04 52.18 44.43 49.23 *1992-2010

Botswana 9 64.7 31.58 34.73 44.82 Brazil 47 42.58 77.89 30.11 48.65 Bulgaria 49 51.08 68.62 41.03 51.94 Burkina Faso 0 38.67 42.21 19.76 32.54 Burundi 360 18.62 34.15 16.4 21.87 Cambodia 665 46.7 32.27 16.9 31.79 Cameroon 6 29.73 53.73 23.03 33.53 Canada 69 71.92 90.94 83.79 81.34 Cape Verde 0 42.09 27.62 31.43 34.31 *1975-2010

Central African Republic 104 25.07 40.77 13.33 24.81 Chad 98 27.84 39.79 10.13 24.37 Chile 51 62.51 77.03 41.71 58.56 China 347 33.65 57.58 21.84 35.53


Colombia 1229 38.2 61.94 35.39 43.38 Comoros 0 . 24.01 23.05 23.45 *1975-2010

Congo (Dem. Rep.) 54 29.37 44.09 10.66 26.25 Congo (Republic) 117 50.99 43.43 19.73 37.34 Costa Rica 41 54.01 54.65 48.85 52.25 Cote d'Ivoire 17 35.93 58.65 31.4 40.2 Croatia 36 60.5 61.13 61.03 60.86 *1991-2010

Cuba 11 . 56.01 28.65 39.95 Cyprus 85 59.19 50.63 61.36 57.75 Czech Republic 18 77.28 83.42 79.86 79.85 *1993-2010

Denmark 36 78.1 92.25 75.28 80.77 Djibouti 130 . 41.14 34.08 36.99 *1977-2010

Dominica 0 . 22 41.24 33.3 Dominican Republic 4 35.96 51.55 37.01 40.44 Egypt 928 38.15 75.73 31.33 45.47 El Salvador 267 44.11 56.16 40.77 46.03 Ecuador 27 39.35 64.25 31.34 42.9 Equatorial Guinea 0 . 21.97 16.01 18.47 Estonia 0 82 54.09 66.34 68.83 *1991-2010

Ethiopia 240 28.66 52.83 10.39 28.19 Fiji 0 51.5 50.58 37.1 45.88 Finland 0 68.05 87.53 63.27 71.38 France 1445 59.97 95.51 70.35 73.17 Gabon 2 47.09 50.92 41.26 45.92 Georgia 107 54.87 32.9 47.26 46.26 *1991-2010

Germany 1106 64.49 69.13 73.23 68.97 Ghana 1 30.22 76.02 23.09 39.58 Greece 676 63.77 75.21 53.69 63.01 Greenland 0 . 1.6 35.5 . Grenada 1 . 29.21 49.18 40.94 Guam 0 . 2.44 . . Guatemala 145 41.81 61.43 34.01 44.05 Guinea 2 35.01 55.48 14.86 32.86 Guyana 6 60.2 40.29 40.38 47.58 Haiti 36 23.14 41.44 14.94 24.89 Honduras 78 44.33 54.29 33.75 43 Hungary 7 61.58 73.26 60.5 64.24 Iceland 0 58.76 53.89 68.42 61.09 India 2183 25.92 76.48 16.82 35.8 Indonesia 0 43.45 68.49 19.24 40.99 Iran 195 21.45 50.47 25.27 30.49 *1979-2010

Iraq 4690 . 51.4 23.45 35 Ireland 369 88.19 79.95 69.68 79.12


Israel 4303 67.8 56.76 54.1 59.79 Italy 816 63.54 92.67 56.67 68.62 Jamaica 4 60.47 50.85 45.24 52.26 Japan 55 34.88 74.68 46.13 49.53 Jordan 114 53.86 62.18 48.46 54.03 Kenya 583 32.34 65.81 21.59 37.12 Kurdistan 26 . . . . Kuwait 269 62.9 48.54 66.16 60.35 Kyrgyz Republic 1 53.36 47.33 40.88 47.12 *1991-2010

Laos 36 . 27.34 13.6 18.96 Latvia 1 65.91 40.69 63.18 58.27 *1990-2010

Lebanon 3314 . 53.25 59.53 56.93 Lesotho 5 45.66 28.83 28.85 34.97 Liberia 13 . 39.09 21.93 28.96 Libya 24 . 46.02 34.11 39.03 Liechtenstein 0 . 23.06 75.64 . Lithuania 0 64.8 55.29 57.09 59.43 *1990-2010

Luxembourg 0 94.9 61.02 69.04 76.35 Macedonia 7 49.22 26.21 54.33 54.09 *1991-2010

Madagascar 0 24.51 42.18 16.8 26.27 Malawi 0 47.06 37.08 24.21 35.91 Malaysia 130 67.73 60.22 55.65 61.25 Mali 2 32.8 53.36 13.33 30.93 Malta 97 71.36 38.54 63.93 59.97 Mauritania 42 50.29 38.68 21.35 36.44 Mexico 42 50.16 67.19 39.39 50.61 Moldova 0 51.97 23.66 42.16 40.87 Mongolia 0 50.43 38.81 18.88 35.6 Montenegro 0 71.23 61.34 58.75 63.97 Morocco 73 39.37 68.16 33.49 44.74 Mozambique 224 39.48 41.75 22.1 33.59 *1975-2010

Myanmar 117 38.01 24.74 8.49 23.51 Namibia 98 58.32 53.47 41.42 50.74 *1990-2010

Nepal 19 18.89 49.18 15.57 25.6 Netherlands 100 85.87 91.6 76.28 83.79 New Caledonia 41 . 2.89 65.3 39.53 New Zealand 0 65.51 71.87 67.96 68.09 Nicaragua 82 39.46 53.16 33.4 40.8 Niger 10 28 51.36 12.13 28.21 Nigeria 171 47.94 75.97 18.41 44.28 North Korea 1 . 25.12 . . Norway 7 72.4 88.51 71.36 76.24


Oman 0 65.5 33.89 49.76 51.32 Pakistan 2149 30.29 69.42 21.51 37.29 Palau 0 . 11.02 48.26 32.88 Panama 0 70.8 55.6 50.89 59.38 Papua New Guinea 5 56.21 33.54 24.67 38.49 Paraguay 9 38.36 51.88 29.28 38.52 Peru 312 42.87 69.6 26.9 43.93 Philippines 1064 45.94 61.4 30.58 44.26 Poland 5 49.04 82.78 58.55 61.45 Portugal 32 68.28 76.52 59.62 67.21 Puerto Rico 24 . 3.96 60.94 . Qatar 16 71.84 38.21 58.03 57.86 Romania 4 40.33 71.09 37.07 47.19 Russia 2032 44.05 75.61 58.9 57.88 *1990-2010

Rwanda 16 15.98 37.69 18.62 22.67 Samoa 0 . 23.35 51.38 39.81 Saudi Arabia 1378 60.86 52.83 50.31 54.81 Senegal 0 27.34 73.59 27.15 39.41 Serbia 0 45.62 33.01 59.87 47.63 Seychelles 2 . 24.51 53.19 41.35 Sierra Leone 68 28.17 40.86 14.37 26.35 Singapore 10 92.26 51.53 83.21 78.19 Solomon Islands 6 . 21.77 26.63 24.62 *1978-2010

Somalia 600 . 32.7 . . South Africa 196 59.94 48.69 35.3 47.79 South Korea 112 46.48 59.53 32.42 44.66 Spain 535 62.82 82.26 65.78 69.03 Sri Lanka 524 44.55 68.31 39.27 48.82 *1998-2010

Sudan 241 21.74 46.14 16.14 26.05 Suriname 1 . 30.23 48.55 40.99 *1975-2010

Swaziland 20 56.45 28.32 41.07 43.32 Sweden 32 73.39 94.56 77.17 80.36 Switzerland 162 75.95 81.36 82.8 79.93 Syria 509 28.83 50.77 23.5 32.6 Tajikistan 118 . 34.21 19.43 25.54 *1991-2010

Tanzania 109 26.91 43 15.13 26.74 Thailand 659 44.65 58.84 32.8 43.95 Togo 98 43.52 49.85 28.5 39.57 Trinidad and Tobago 21 59.45 42.89 49.02 51.21 Tunisia 107 49.24 73.35 35.94 50.61 Turkey 627 45.68 75.63 38.57 50.89 Uganda 369 26.57 31.97 16.21 28.26 Ukraine 1 49.54 68.96 47.96 54.05 *1991-2010


Ukraine 0 49.54 68.96 47.96 54.04 *1991-2010 United Arab Emirates 140 77.54 42.26 61.83 62.41

United Kingdom 3033 72.08 96.03 73.64 78.95 United States 679 57.85 89.59 66.85 69.54 Uruguay 5 53.45 75.98 40.51 54.54 Uzbekistan 3 . 33.91 21.76 26.77 *1991-2010

Vanuatu 0 47.91 26.16 31.91 36.23 *1980-2010 Venezuela 87 44.16 66.65 38.29 47.88

Vietnam 5 43.49 38.33 15.48 31.68 West Bank and Gaza 1 . 7.6 42.8 28.26 Yemen 242 46.65 33.94 18.56 32.83 Zambia 54 54.43 56.03 26.63 44.47 Zimbabwe 278 40.1 56 30.22 40.59 *1980-2010

Sources: Mickolus, E. F.; Sandler, T., Murdock, J. M., & Flemming, P. (2012) International terrorism: attributes of terrorism events (ITERATE), 1968–2012. Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard Software. Dreher, A. (2006) Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new Index of globalization. Applied Economics, 38(10), 1091-1110.


Appendix B

Source: Dreher, A. (2006) Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new Index of globalization. Applied Economics, 38(10), 1091-1110.

2013 KOF Globalization Index

Indices and Variables Weights

Economic Globalization [36%] Actual Flows (50%) Trade (percent of GDP) (21%) Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (28%) Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (24%) Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (27%) Restrictions (50%) Hidden Import Barriers (24%) Mean Tariff Rate (27%) Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) (26%) Capital Account Restrictions (23%) Social Globalization [37%] Data on Personal Contact (34%) Telephone Traffic (25%) Transfers (percent of GDP) (3%) International Tourism (26%) Foreign Population (percent of total population) (21%) International letters (per capita) (24%) Data on Information Flows (35%) Internet Users (per 1000 people) (33%) Television (per 1000 people) (36%) Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (31%) Data on Cultural Proximity (31%) Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (45%) Number of Ikea (per capita) (45%) Trade in books (percent of GDP) (10%) Political Globalization [26%] Embassies in Country (25%) Membership in International Organizations (28%) Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) International Treaties (26%)


Annotated Bibliography

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