Learn from what others are doing right.. Issue 4/96

That Others May Live

On July 7, 1996, three members of Canada’s CivilAir Search and Rescue Association (CASARA) diedwhen their PA-28 crashed and burned on SnowcrestMountain near Nelson, British Columbia. The pilot,Richard Dendys, and spotters William Bing andRichard Ayotte were searching for another PA-28that had gone missing the previous day.

Nelson is in a narrow valley surrounded bymountains. The CASARA aircraft did a

low flying aircraft in a very narrow valley known asGrohman Creek. That pilot and one of his twopassengers were rescued with serious injuries. Theother passenger died in the crash.

CASARA was formed in 1986 from a number ofindependent provincial volunteer groups. Its goal isto provide a nation-wide organization that will foster

aviation safety and augment the CanadianForces search and rescue (SAR) forces.

shuttle climb to gain altitude before CASARA is jointly sponsored byproceeding on course to theirassigned search area. The

Transport Canada and DND.CASARA now has over

crew did not make the first 3700 volunteers — pilots,mandatory half-hour com- navigators, spotters —munications check-in and has over 500with search head- aircraft available atquarters. Nor did they 105 locations acrossrespond to subsequent Canada. They flycalls from other 500-1000 hours persearch aircraft. year on SAR mis-Smoke from the post- sions and contributecrash fire led the crew an additional 200-of a 442 SquadronBuffalo to the scene.

300 hours per yearto assist provincial

The aircraft had hit the and territorial author-mountainside with little ities. In addition,or no forward speed. CASARA spotters have

Strong wind currentswere reported by anotherpilot in the area. It is suspected

logged many thousands ofhours in military SAR aircraft.In 1991, CASARA won the

that the PA-28 was caught in a prestigious Mynarski trophy forstrong downdraft that it could not out- their significant contribution toclimb, and it mushed into the mountainside Canada’s SAR program.in a near stalled condition. This CASARA crew joins the ranks of 29 other

The original missing PA-28 was found that same searchers who, over the years, have given their livesday by a helicopter pilot investigating a report of a so That Others May Live.

Decision to Continue

In December 1993, an SD3-30crew was transporting 11 com-pany employees from Kuujjuara-pik to Umiujaq on the easternshore of Hudson Bay.

The crew had received a com-plete weather briefing from theircompany dispatcher prior totheir flight. He told them a waveover Hudson Bay with a warmfront extending southwardwould move eastward throughtheir route during the afternoon.

There was no terminalforecast for their destination,but the area forecast was for abroken ceiling at 3000 feet withvisibilities intermittently threeto six miles in light snow show-ers with local ceilings of 600 to1200 feet and visibilities of onehalf to three miles in snow andblowing snow. Winds wereforecast to be 250 degreesTrue at 35 gusting to 45 knots.

Terminal forecasts for aero-

degrees magnetic at 20 knots.Five minutes later, the FSSupdated the crew with a seven-minute old special — indefiniteceiling 100 obscured, visibilitythree quarters of a mile in lightfreezing drizzle, light snow andfog. The FSS updated the crewagain five minutes later withanother special taken only three

But they all survived.

approach (the CFS includes thefollowing warning: Severe turbu-lence may be encountered whenwinds exceed 20 knots).

During their 26-minute flight,the crew received a total of fourseparate weather reports fromUmiujaq. All indicated anobscured ceiling at 100 feet, seri-ous icing in freezing drizzle and

dromes 126-210 milesnorth oftheir desti-nation werefor “occa-sional par-tiallyobscuredceiling 800 feet overcast, visibil-ity one mile in light freezingdrizzle and light snow.”

Immediately after takeoff, thecrew contacted the KuujjuarapikFSS to air-file a flight note witha cruise altitude of 5000 feet.They requested the latestweather information. The FSSgave them the 45-minute-oldhourly observation: partiallyobscured, a balloon-measuredceiling of 100 feet overcast withvisibility at one mile in lightfreezing drizzle, temperatureand dew point both minus twodegrees Celsius, wind at 230

minutes before — again, it indi-cated partially obscured condi-tions with a balloon-measureceiling of 100 overcast, visibilityone mile in light freezing drizzle,very light snow and fog, includ-ing light blowing snow.

Seven minutes later, as thecrew was commencing theirdescent, the Community AirRadio Station (CARS) operatorinformed the crew of currentweather — it was unchangedfrom earlier reports except thatthe winds were now 260 degreesM at 23 knots and there wasmechanical turbulence on the

probablesevere tur-bulence onapproach(there is nopublishedinstrumentapproachat Umiu-

jaq, nor are there any de-icingfacilities). Yet the crew decidedto continue with the approach.

(As an aside, the airport hadNOTAMed the only runway atUmiujaq closed due to snowseven days prior to this occur-rence, and it had remainedclosed continuously. Neither thecompany dispatcher nor the FSSpassed the NOTAM to the crew.Nor did the CARS operatoradvise the crew of the NOTAMalthough he gave the crew adetailed description of the run-way conditions. The fact that therunway was NOTAMed “closed”

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did not get to play a part in thestory because the crew nevermade it to the threshold.)

The TSB accident report(A93Q0245) records the finalminutes of flight as follows:30 miles from the aerodrome,the crew began the descent fromtheir 5000-foot cruise altitude.At seven miles, now at 700 feet,the crew said they could see theground. After passing a GPSwaypoint (before reaching thedownwind position), the crewcontinued their step-down proce-dure to about 200 feet AGL. Atthat altitude, the visibility wasreported by the crew to be overone and one half miles, and thecrew stated they could recognizereferences on the ground andposition the aircraft for landing.When turning onto final, the cap-tain initiated a turn with at least35 degrees of bank, and theaircraft stalled. The captain initi-ated a stall recovery and calledfor full power. The aircraft didnot gain sufficient altitude tooverfly the high terrain, and itcrashed.

The co-pilot indicated that hehad observed a 1/8 to 1/4-inchthick layer of ice on the unheatedportion of the windshield. Thecrew did not check the wings.Nor did they use the de-icingboots. Post-accident examinationof the wreckage found a l/4-inchthick layer of ice almost com-pletely covering the de-icingboots, and another layer of icealong the wing chord.

Forced by strong tail winds ondownwind and base legs, thepilot had to manoeuvre at lowaltitude in a high bank-angle,constant-altitude turn to remainin visual contact with the runwayand to remain clear of higher ter-rain. The high bank-angle andthe accumulation of ice caused asignificant increase in the air-craft’s stalling speed. The aircraftstalled at an altitude where thepilot could not lower the nose togain speed and, behind the power

curve, could not climb over thehigher terrain.

Unbelievably, the two pilotsand two of the eleven passengersreceived only minor injuries. Therest of the passengers were unin-jured. Most of the occupantsevacuated the wreckage throughthe main cabin door. A fewpassengers kicked out windowsand evacuated through them.Shortly after evacuating thewreckage, the intrepid survivorsdecided to walk to the airport.Forty-five minutes later theyfinally saw the lights from theirdestination.

Call for Nominations

for the TC Aviation

Safety Award

Do you know someone whodeserves to be recognized?

The Transport Canada Avia-tion Safety Award is presentedannually to stimulate awarenessof aviation safety in Canada byrecognizing persons, groups, com-panies, organizations, agencies,or departments that have contrib-uted in an exceptional manner tothis objective.

You can obtain an informationbrochure explaining awarddetails from your RegionalAviation Safety Officers. Theaddresses are on this page. Theclosing date for nominations forthe 1997 award is December 31,1996.

The award will be presentedduring the ninth annualCanadian Aviation SafetySeminar to be held in Calgaryin April 1997.

ASL 4/96 3

SARTORIAL SPLENDOUR ... and the Canadian North

The development of heated, long-rangeaircraft has been a mixed blessing forcrews who fly from, say, Florida, to calori-cally-challenged regions of Canada. Acostume comfortable in Florida will speedup serious frostbite upon deplaning inthe “quelques arpents de neige” that soinspired the Group of Seven, who presum-ably huddled together for warmth duringtheir painting sessions.

Similarly, a costume (ahem) suited tothe tundra will make unacceptabledemands on 24-hour deodorants in theclose confines of a modern bizjet. Becausemost flights go as planned, many aircrewgo about their business in attire best‘suited’ for heated, hermetically sealedoffice towers. Most of the time, that works.

Occasionally, there are exceptions. Lastwinter, a medevac aircraft flew an ailingCanadian resident from Fort Lauderdale,FL to Barrie, ON. The trip went withoutincident. On takeoff for the return flight,an engine problem threw the aircraft outof control and into a snow bank at the sideof the runway. The snow, thrown aroundby the aircraft’s sudden, high-speedarrival extinguished an ensuing flash fire.

The two pilots and two paramedicswere shaken but uninjured. One of theparamedics set out to get help, wearing,as the Toronto Star described it, “only alight jacket, track pants and running shoes, and ran potential for serious injury. Inadequate clothing cantwo kilometres in the frigid cold to summon help.” shorten survival time. How often do you dress theAt least he wasn’t impeded by heavy clothes. same way these people did?

This crew was lucky. This incident had the

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Exempt from the ELT Order? Maybe You Shouldn’t Cancel IFR!

It’s a simple phrase.uttered many times daily.“Whizbang Air 372 is can-celling IFR, going tower (orsome other frequency).”

Most of you know thismeans filing a VFR flightplan, unless you’re landingimmediately. But you maynot realize that if you areoperating under the exemp-tion to the ELT Order, can-celling IFR means that younow must have an ELTinstalled. Granted, the ELTexemption does not apply toowidely. It applies to multi-engine,turbo-jet aircraft of more than12,500 pounds (5700 kilograms)MCTOW that are being operatedin IFR flight (i) over land withincontrolled airspace, and (ii) southof latitude 66.30 N.

As all you keen students of theANOs and CARS recall, theexemption is now set out inANO 2, No. 17, the ELT Order,and will appear in CARS laterthis year. Aircraft which meet allthose conditions don’t have tocarry an ELT. Aircraft whichdon’t, do.

Most often, it’s an Air Mega-Chair pilot who cancels IFR, fivemiles back from Megalopolis air-port. If the aircraft lands a trifleshort — or a trifle long — manypeople will instantly know aboutit. The search part of SAR won’tbe a problem.

But suppose you have a smalleraircraft and an unpeopled or super-visorily challenged airport. Let’ssay you are cleared out of con-trolled airspace at 18,000 feetsome 80 miles from your destina-tion; you cancel IFR and proceedthence VFR.

“Far-fetched”, you say? Notreally. A recent TSB report toldus of an MU-300 which used4750 feet of the 4500-foot runwayat the Jasper-Hinton airport lastyear, and came to rest in theboonies. Although the aircraft

was somewhat re-arranged, allcrew members and passengerswere uninjured.

For some time, the aircrafthad operated VFR. It no longermet the terms of the ELT exemp-tion. Consequently, it was requiredto carry an ELT. It didn’t. Thisoperator is not unique. Othersare — equally inadvertently —doing the same thing.

Look at it from a riskassessment perspective. ELTsare intended to summon help tocrash sites. Some aircraft areexempt from carrying thembecause their operations keepthem close to the jungle we callcivilization. Should they crash,everyone will know about itinstantly and dispatch help.

Not so the MU-300, nor manycorporate or air taxi aircraftwhich help keep the wheels ofcommerce turning by flying toplaces not normally served by aircarriers, large or small. TheMU-300 cancelled IFR, left con-trolled airspace, did not refileVFR, but flew under VFR condi-tions for some time beforelanding. During that time, thepassengers and crew were notprotected by Flight Following oran ELT. The crew may haveknown about the risk, andaccepted it. But what about thepassengers? Would they haveaccepted the risk?

The Safety Board did not thinkit acceptable. They said, “...hadthe aircraft crashed at any timeduring the approach or at anytime after cancelling IFR, therewould have been no ELT signalto indicate a downed aircraft.The fact that there was no flightmonitoring exacerbates the situa-tion. If no one is advised or awareof an occurrence (because of thelack of an ELT or lack of flightmonitoring) immediate medicalattention for the injured wouldnot be available.”

Exemptions are granted if allconditions pertaining to them aremet. Operating outside those con-ditions increases the risk. Noharm came of this occurrence.However, the potential for seri-ous harm was there.

Because most corporate air-craft hop-scotch all over the coun-try, most of them probably carryELTs. Others, like the MU-300,are exempted. And those payingthe bills may not think an ELT isworth the additional cost, giventhe limited time their aircraftoperates under VFR.

After the fact, their passengers— and their lawyers — maythink otherwise. When doingyour ELT risk assessment,remember that ELTs cost lessper hour to operate thanlawyers.

ASL 4/96 5

The Courier Attitude

Courier contracts are typicallyawarded to the lowest contractbidder who can provide the on-time reliability specified in thecontract. So couriers keep exactrecords of departure and arrivaltimes. Because route segmenttimes in the contract assumemaximum aircraft speed, courierpilots feel that they must pushthe operation to keep these timesat a minimum. Contract timesdo not consider delays due toweather, traffic, or mechanicalbreakdowns. In a poor economicclimate, all individuals involvedfeel the pressure to meet the con-tract specs and preserve theirjobs. Without passenger comfortto consider, pilots feel that theyare able to go to the maximumsafe aircraft limits on a routinebasis.

The “courier attitude”exists and leads to modified stan-dards for courier flights by thepilots who fly these aircraft andby the controllers who directthem.

The SA 226-AT Merlin crewwas expecting radar vectors tothe straight-in final approach forthe ILS approach. At 45 milesfrom the airport, ATC clearedthem from their cruise altitude of13,000 feet down to 6000, and at18 miles, cleared them to theminimum radar-vector altitude of2000 feet. Initial rate of descentwas 1800 feet-per-minute,groundspeed was 290 knots.

As ATC advised the crew thatthey were 10 miles from theFinal Approach Fix, radar tapesshowed the aircraft descendingthrough 7400 feet with a ground-speed of 290 knots. Six milesfrom the fix, ATC again advisedthe crew of their position (radarshowed the aircraft descendingthrough 5900 feet still at 290 knotsgroundspeed). Three miles fromthe localizer ATC advised the

crew again of theirposition and askedif they were ableto get down, ifthey would be ableto continue fromtheir present posi-tion. The crewreplied in theaffirmative andstated that itwould not be aproblem (radarshowed the air-craft at 4500 feet,groundspeedunchanged at290).

As the aircraftapproached thelocalizer, theintercept vectorwas 98 degrees tothe inbound track,groundspeed was300 knots, andrate of descenthad increased to4200 fpm. Justprior to the air-craft interceptingthe localizer, thecontroller issued a70-degree rightturn providing a 28-degree inter-cept angle. The aircraft shotthrough the localizer 2000 feetabove the glideslope with thegroundspeed showing 300 knots.

Rather than overshoot andattempt another approach, thecrew decided to attempt to re-intercept the final approachcourse and to descend to theminimum descent altitude fora non-precision approach.Twelve seconds after issuing the‘IO-degree turn, the controllerissued a further 60-degree rightturn and then another 20 degreesright to re-intercept the localizer(radar now showed the aircraftdescending through 2100 feet,still at 290 knots).

Descent limits for the approachwere: 395 feet ASL for the ILS

approach, 500 feet ASL for thenon-precision LOC, LOC/NDBapproach. Witnesses 1.3 mileseast of the localizer, watched theaircraft miss a large generatingplant by a mere 50 feet at an alti-tude of 140 feet ASL. The gearand flaps were still UP. The crewfinally executed the missedapproach.

The second approach wasuneventful.

The “Courier Attitude” —The approach was not stabilizedat any time on the final approachcourse, and the crew was modify-ing their approach inside thefinal fix at a critical time whentheir total attention was required.To continue the unstabilizedapproach seems to have been anacceptable risk. Without the

6 ASL 4/96

worry about passengers, theyflew the aircraft very aggressively.

Pressure to stay on schedule,and pilots’ natural desire to makea successful landing on the firsttry create situations where pilotsfly their aircraft to the maximumsafe limits. Courier pilots haveaccepted tight approaches similarto the one described, and havemanaged to successfully carrythem out. These two pilotsreported that had it been apassenger flight they would nothave continued the approachafter they went through the local-izer. But as courier pilots — veryhigh, very fast, scooting throughthe centreline two miles from theFAF with the gear and flaps stillup — not a problem!

The “Courier Attitude” —The controller knew that it was

a courier flight andhe was surprisedwhen they wereunable to interceptthe final approachcourse on the firstattempt. He also feltthat the vectors givenwere well within thecapabilities of theflight crew and theaircraft.

The TSB report(A94A0078 — worthreading in full) notesother contributingfactors in this near-CFIT.

Complacency:Both pilots had

flown into this airportmany times. Theapproach briefingwas routine and inef-fective. They antici-pated that the con-troller would vectorthem onto final witha minimum of ma-noeuvring. They wereconfident that theycould manage speed,altitude, and angle of

descent to position the aircraftfor the ILS final.

Crew Coordination:Failure to follow proper

altimeter setting proceduresresulted in the 220-foot differ-ence in altimeter readings.Neither adequately performedhis function as PF or PNF. Thefact that both had considerableexperience as captains may havecontributed to an attitude whereeach may have thought that theother had the situation well inhand. Airspeed control to put theaircraft at its gear-extensionspeed (normal for beaconcrossing) would have made itpossible for them to turn the air-craft quicker to successfullyintercept the final approachcourse.

Training:Although both pilots had

received CRM training in thepast, they had no recent train-ing. Because no jump seat isavailable, Transport Canadaconducts PPC rides while theinspector functions as PNF —two-pilot check rides would haveprovided the opportunity to bet-ter emphasize, evaluate andencourage good CRMprocedures.

Controller Procedures:The controller vectored the

aircraft to a close-in high-angleintercept. He should have seenthat the aircraft would not beable to negotiate the 70-degreeturn to roll out established onthe localizer. Despite his queryto the crew if they were able tomake the approach and theiraffirmative reply, he did notfully monitor the approach. Herelied on past experience in vec-toring courier aircraft to decidethat they would be able tosuccessfully complete theapproach.

Having seen the aircraft flythrough the localizer, given theaircraft’s high speed, knowingthat the weather was at approachlimits, and having found it nec-essary to give the aircraft areintercept vector of 50 degreesfrom the back side, it could beargued that the controllershould have given a safety alertto the crew to highlight thedanger of the rapidly developingsituation.

ASL 4/96 7

Flying the Alaska Highway . . . VFR?

The following is based, inpart, on a CTAISB accidentreport, but also on my experienceas a long-time mountain flier.The transition from flat-land fly-ing to mountain flying is a diffi-cult one for many pilots. In flatcountry or over the water, if youare uncertain, you can climb to asafe, familiar altitude and go formiles until you get your headtogether or get help. In the moun-tains, if you are not in clear VFRconditions, you had better be oninstruments, at an altitude wellabove MOCA.

Food for sober second thoughtin this tale has been inserted initalics for emphasis. — Ed.

The TSB accident synopsisreads:

“The Piper PA 32-301TSaratoga departed Fort Nelson,British Columbia, on a visualflight rules flight to BeaverCreek, Yukon. When the aircraftfailed to arrive at the destina-tion, a search was initiated. Themissing aircraft was found sixdays later by a Canadian ForcesSearch and Rescue aircraft. Ithad struck a steep, rocky slope inmountainous terrain at 6000 feetabove sea level. The aircraft wasdestroyed and both occupantssustained fatal injuries.

The Board determined thatthe pilot attempted to continuevisual flight in adverse weatherconditions.”

PreflightThe pilot, a retired US Navy

pilot with about 5000 hours mili-tary 350 hours civil experience,and his son were on a long-rangepleasure flight from California toFairbanks, Alaska, via theAlaska Highway route.

They had arrived at FortNelson after two days of flyingfrom California. The next morn-ing, the pilot received a detailedtelephone briefing from theFlight Service Specialist at FortNelson, covering the enrouteweather along the AlaskaHighway route from Fort Nelsonwest to Watson Lake, Teslin,Whitehorse, and Burwash.

The area forecast indicatedthat a series of trowals weremoving across northern B.C. andsouthern Yukon, producing lowceilings, rain and fog. The FortNelson to Watson Lake leg wasforecast to be good with ceilings3000-5000 feet above ground.Very marginal VFR was forecastfrom Watson Lake to Teslin withovercast ceilings at 4000 feetASL and layers to 20,000 feet ina very moist airmass (airport

elevations rise from 1250 feetASL at Fort Nelson to 2262 feetASL at Watson Lake, 2313 atTeslin, 2305 at Whitehorse andup to 2647 feet ASL at Burwash).Visibilities were forecast at twoto five miles in rain and fog.Occasional rime and mixed icingwere forecast in cloud above the6000-foot freezing level (theWatson Lake-Teslin run is about120 NM, and the terrain betweenthe two aerodromes rises wellabove the 6000-foot level).Conditions were forecast toremain poor throughout the day.

The pilot also received the lat-est actuals from along the route:

Watson Lake: 200 feet over-cast, 4000 overcast, visibility sixmiles in light rain, temperature/dew point spread zero — boththree degrees, winds three knots(AWOS report explains the twoovercast layers). Question theforecast accuracy or at leastthink about the local effects ofterrain.

Teslin: 1800 thin broken, esti-mated 4500 broken, 5500 over-cast, visibility 15 in light rain,temperature/dew point bothseven.

Whitehorse: special at09:30 a.m.: partially obscured,measured 700 overcast, visibilitytwo in light rain/fog, temperature/dew point both seven degrees(again questions about forecastaccuracy and terrain effects).

Burwash (85 miles from desti-nation): 1500 scattered, estimat-ed 3500 broken, 9000 overcast,visibility 20 in rain showers,temperature four, dew pointthree.

(A VFR planner shouldespecially note the temperature/dew point spread at all theselocations, particularly inSeptember, in the mountains.)

At the end of the weatherbriefing, the pilot remarked tothe FSS Specialist that it wouldbe a day to “hunt and peck”. Heindicated that he would eitherreturn to Fort Nelson or “stay at

8 ASL 4/96

Birds and Bedlam

Cont. from page 12

AWACS wreckage.

strikes since 1950. Are the birdswinning the war in the sky?

Large birds are the greatestthreat to aircraft. The force ofimpact depends on the the bird’sweight and the aircraft’s speed.A large number of heavy birdsstriking an aircraft travelling athigh speed can exceed the designlimits of its airframe andengines.

Most of today’s engines aredesigned to absorb a 1.5 lb. birdvolley, although early designsand smaller engines were notbuilt to this standard. The latestgeneration of high bypass ratioturbofan engines are required towithstand a 2.5 lb. bird volley,but their larger intake areas andreduced noise means they arestruck more frequently.

Reporting is critical to man-aging this hazard. The FAAestimates that only 15% of birdstrike incidents are reported inthe U.S. Despite our much lowerlevel of aircraft activity, Canada

had 28.5% as manyreported strikes asthe U.S. in 1994.In 1993, Canadaaccounted for21.3% of theworld’s bird strikesreported to ICAO.We estimate thatonly 30% of Cana-dian bird strikesare reported.

Approximately85% of reportedbird strikes occurwithin the airportenvironment, 50%occuring duringtakeoff or landing.In 1995,Canadiansreported 58precautionarylandings, 18aborted takeoffs,15 forced landings,22 engine inges-tions, 3 engineshutdowns, and8 penetratedairframes as a

result of bird strikes. Pilotreports increased from 132 in1994 to 319 in 1995 — a 141%jump! That’s good news, if theincrease reflects better reportingand not a growing problem.

Bird strike reports helpengine and airframe manufac-turers improve designs, and air-port operators make environ-ment management decisions.The bird hazard is serious. As apilot, you have a vital role toplay by reporting birds and birdstrikes, and if you see birds nearthe runway, you may want topostpone your takeoff decisionuntil the birds are dispersed.

For bird strike report formsand more information on thehazard contact:

Bruce MacKinnonTransport Canada (AKPP)18C, Place de VilleOttawa, Ontario, K1A 0N8Phone: (613) 990-0515Fax: (613) 957-4260

Just Briefly

Good Night Pre-flight Check?The Cessna 150 pilot was

planning local night circuits.Immediately after takeoff, heexperienced attitude controlproblems. Only with the controlcolumn fully forward could hemaintain level flight. Hedeclared an emergency and man-aged to complete one circuitlanding with the emergencyresponse crew standing by.

The emergency crew removedthe 85-pound cement tie-downweight that was still attached tothe tail.How Thorough is Your TestFlight Pre-flight?

Maintenance had just com-pleted a check that required awing removal on the DC-3. Asthe test-flight crew levelled theaircraft after takeoff, they usedaileron trim to correct a left-wing-heavy condition, but trim-ming only made the problemworse. They immediatelyreversed the trim selection andturned for home, landing safely.

Post-flight investigationrevealed that the trim was oper-ating in reverse — not the first,nor probably the last time for“Murphy” to strike.Little patience on a Not-so-good Day!

On final approach to the run-way, the Piper Malibu struck asnow bank 125 feet short of thethreshold. The impact and thefollowing hard landing causedsubstantial damage to the wingsand the landing gear. The pilottaxiied to the hangar where heinspected the damage.

No doubt angry with himself,frustrated and impatient, hedecided to taxi the aircraft intothe hangar, but did not appreci-ate that the damaged aircraftnow sat on the ground in a tail-high, nose-low attitude. As heentered the hanger, the aircraft’svertical fin hit the top of the doorand the propeller slammed into asteel tow bar.

ASL 4/96 11

Birds and Bedlam

Birds are beating up aircraft— badly — and recent historysuggests that they may be win-ning the world-wide air war.March 30, 1996: A B767 lostone engine on takeoff fromVancouver Int’l Airport afterstriking a flock of ducks (ASL3/96). The aircraft returned tothe airport for a precautionarylanding after dumping fuel overthe ocean. Damage — $2M plus.May 18, 1996: A B747 lost oneengine to a bird strike on takeofffrom Lester B. Pearson Int’lAirport and dumped thousandsof pounds of fuel over LakeOntario before returning for aprecautionary landing.January 20, 1994: A Falcon20 departing Le Bourget struckLapwings causing an uncon-tained engine failure and a fierycrash killing 10 people.January 1, 1996: A Boeing 747-

struck Canada Geese. Engine The dramatic increase in birdand airframe damage totalled’ numbers, particularly large$2 million. Loss of service added birds, has raised the stakes.another $500,000. Ring-billed Gull populations inSeptember 22, 1995: A Boeing the Lower Great Lakes region707 E3 AWACS aircraft crashed have increased approximatelyafter takeoff from Elmendorf Air 12% per year since the mid-Force Base, Alaska (ASL 3/96) 1970s. In the Ottawa area alone,killing all 24 crew members. the population has grown from

Takeoff aborted by bird strike.

200 on takeoff 5 nestingfrom Cairns,Australiastruck severallarge birdsdestroying twoof its fourengines.

Approxi-

pairs in,1974 toover 6000pairs in1995.

We estimate that bird strikescost the North Americanaviation industry more than$500 million per year. Rapidgrowth in air travel and birdpopulations are leading to agrowing awareness of thisserious threat to aircraft andpassengers. As well, high profileaccidents in the United States in1995 have attracted significantattention.June 3, 1995: A Concorde, onfinal approach to JFK Int’lAirport, struck a large numberof geese. After the emergencylanding, all passengers evacu-ated safely, but the geese haddestroyed engines #3 and #4.Damage: $6 million.September 18, 1995: An A320,landing at LaGuardia Airport,

31 dead geese were found on therunway. Added to the tragic lossof life, dollar costs reached$189 million.September 25, 1995: A CessnaCitation carrying Newt Gingrich,Speaker of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, struck geese ontakeoff from Mackinac Island.The pilot aborted the takeoff butcouldn’t keep the aircraft on therunway. Luckily, nobody washurt.December 10, 1995: On a nightapproach to JFK Int’l, a B747struck geese at 7500 ft. AGL.The crew saw a flash of whitebefore being struck by what feltlike sandbags. The impact de-stroyed two engines and exten-sively damaged the airframe.Repairs cost approximately$6 million.

mately 30% of Canadian birdstrikes involve gulls.

The number of Canada Geesemigrating through NorthAmerica has doubled in the past25 years, with a noticeable influxof non-migratory, resident geese.Canada Goose populations inother parts of the world areincreasing by 8% per year.

Some results of this popula-tion explosion have been a 400%increase in goose strikes to air-craft at JFK Int’l Airport since1984, and over 237 strikesinvolving gulls in Canada during1995. The increasing populationis not good news for air traffic.

The Israeli Air Force has lostmore aircraft to birds than inwar. In Europe and Israel, morethan 168 military aircraft havebeen confirmed lost to bird

Cont. on page 11

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