thayer china: corruption and military professionalism

7/27/2019 Thayer China: Corruption and Military Professionalism

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Background Brief

China: Corruption and MilitaryProfessionalism

Carlyle A. Thayer

October 2, 2013

[client name deleted]

We request your assessment of corruption in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Two of our staff have learned that the case of General Gu Junshan is moving towards

trial and that the case is likely to have greater transparency than previous trials. The

bribery amounts are likely to be huge. Whether or not they go after Gu's patrons,

our assessment is that Xi's anti-corruption campaign is shifting from rhetoric towards

serious action for the first time in decades. Our view also has been that corruption

has been is seriously debilitating.

We request your assessment of our tentative conclusions. And we request your

assessment of whether or not Xi Jinping is serious about fighting corruption in the

PLA and what might it mean for Chinese military capabilities.

ANSWER: China’s leaders all recognize that entrenched large-scale corruption and

the patronage networks they breed are a threat to the legitimacy of one-party rule.

For example, General Liu Yuan was quoted as stating in late 2011, “no country can

defeat China. Only our corruption can destroy us and cause our armed forces to be

defeated without fighting.”

General Liu is a confidant of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi

Jinping who is also chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Since his elevation as party General Secretary and CMC head Xi has set priority on

dealing with “flies and tigers” – low and high ranking officials involved in corruption.Xi Jinping is motivated to tackle corruption for two main reasons – to stamp his

authority on the Chinese political system, including its myriad domestic civilian and

military security and intelligence agencies and the PLA itself, and to address a serious

issue affecting the rule of the CCP. But a balance must be sought between punishing

those guilty of excessive corruption and not upsetting the carefully balanced

patronage networks and destabilizing the party.

In June this year, Xi convened a four-day meeting of the Politburo at Zhongnanhai to

discuss anti-corruption measures. Xi was reported as stating, “efforts to maintain

strict discipline must start at the Politburo.”

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On PLA day this year, 1st

August, Xi promoted six military officers to the rank of full

general and shortly after promoted eighteen major generals to the rank of lieutenant

general. Of the twenty-four new generals and lieutenant generals, eleven come from

political commands. This is an indication that Xi intends to deal with corruption

within the PLA with a particular focus on promotion based on merit and

professionalism rather than seniority.

In August, General Fan Changlong, deputy chairman of the CMC ordered that senior

military officers disclose information on their personal and family assets, who they

dealt with in their officials capacities and the jobs held by family and relatives. The

following month Xi, as chairman of the CMC, signed off on new regulations

governing the use of official vehicles by army and security officials at garrison

command level.

When corruption becomes excessive and begins to impact on the normal operations

of the party-state, senior party leaders must act. This year Xi Jinping had to confront

this issue in the Bo Xilai case which had ramifications for internal party stability.

Other indications that Xi is serious about tacking corruption may be seen in three

current cases. The first involves the investigation of the role of former head of the

Legal and Political Affairs Committee, Zhou Yongkang. Zhou’s Committee had

oversight of China’s domestic security and police agencies. The current investigation

into Zhou and his patronage network appears to be part of the fall out of the Bo Xilai

affair.

The second corruption case involves Lt. General Gu Junshan, former deputy director

of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistic Department. General Liu

reportedly brought information on Gu’s bribery and corruption to the attention of XiJinping. Gu reportedly amassed wealth by selling PLA land and posts.

The third corruption case involves General Xu Caihou who reportedly accepted

bribes from General Gu and promoted his rapid rise in PLA ranks. Xu was a powerful

figure indeed, he was one of three vice chairman of the Central Military Commission

appointed in 2004 and he served as secretary of the Central Commission for

Discipline and Inspection.

What does Xi’s current anti-corruption efforts mean for the PLA? Recall that in

December last year Xi visited a guided missile destroyer that formed part of a naval

detachment that patrolled in the contested waters of the South China Sea. In an

address to naval personnel he linked his China Dream to a strong nation and a strong

military.

During his first three months in office as party leader and chair of the Central

Military Commission he visited several army, navy, air force, space and missile

facilities. In his addresses to naval personnel he urged them to “fight and win wars.”

The PLA’s involvement in commercial affairs, and the development of political

patronage networks funded by corruption, both serve to weaken the PLA as a

modern and professional fighting force. One of the central arguments of academic

literature on civil-military relations is that a military is most professional when it is

tasked with meeting external threats to the state. Military professionalism embracesboth appointment and promotion based on merit and competence in organizing for



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armed conflict. Military involvement in commercial enterprises and patron-client

networks based on corruption detracts from these missions. In the case of General

Gu Junshan, for example, he reportedly advanced his career by providing bribes to

senior generals (and secured his rapid promotion) and he profited by the sale of

army land.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China: Corruption and Military

Professionalism,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief , October 2, 2013. All

background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself

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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and

other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officiallyregistered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

thayer china: corruption and military professionalism

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