the 4th australia and japan 1.5 track security dialoguethe 4th australia and japan 1.5 track...

proceedings

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track security dialogue canberra, 10–11 december 2007

Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Australia–Japan Commerce Agreement (1957)

Session 1: Possible future strategic shocks in East Asia

A maritime coalition centred on the Japan–Australia–US trilateral alliance: aiming for a regional maritime coalition in the southwestern Pacific 2 VADM(ret)HideakiKaneda,TheOkazakiInstitute

Possible strategic ‘shocks’ in Asia 14 DrRodLyon,AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute

Session 2: New regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific and the role of Australia and Japan

Emerging Asia–Pacific security architectures: the Australia–Japan factor 22 ProfessorWilliamTTow,AustralianNationalUniversity

The Japanese approach to an East Asian Community and Japan–Australia partnership 39 DrYoshihideSoeya,KeioUniversity

Session 3: The rise of China (PRC) and its implications for the region

China rising: the view from ‘down under’ 47 DrBrendanTaylor,SDSC,AustralianNationalUniversity

The impacts of China’s rise on the Asian international system 55 DrSeiichiroTakagi,AoyamaGakuinUniversity

Session 4: Review and prospects for the Australia–Japan strategic relationship

Review and prospects for the bilateral strategic relationship between Japan and Australia 64 ProfessorTsutomuKikuchi,AoyamaGakuinUniversity

The Japan–Australia strategic relationship: an Australian perspective 78 DrMarkThomson,AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute

� Proceedings

A maritime coalition centred on the Japan–Australia–US trilateral alliance: aiming for a regional maritime coalition in the southwestern PacificVADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda Director, The Okazaki Institute

1 The rising importance of sea lane security

OneoftheconstantandcontinuedanxietiesintheAsia–Pacificregionissealanesecurity.Itisthesourceofconcernsnotonlyintheregion,butalsointheadjacentregionsoftheIndianOcean,OceaniaandtheSouthPacific,andtheEastPacific.Allthesealanesconnectingtheseregionshavefacedandwillfacerisksofattacksbyinternationalterroristgroupsandbypirates(possiblywithconnectionstoterroristgroups).Thisisespeciallyevidentatmajorchokepoints,suchasthenorthwestIndianOcean(includingtheStraitofHormuz),India’ssoutherncoasts,andtheMalacca–SingaporeStrait.

Risks to security in the Asia–Pacific region

ToassessthesecuritysituationintheAsia–Pacificregion,letusfirstconsiderthepotentialforthemanifestationofthreatsintheregion.

OntheKoreanPeninsula,wheremilitaryconfrontationcontinuesinprinciple,therelationshipbetweentheUSandSouthKoreaisbecomingmoredistantduetotheemergenceofmorereceptivefeelingstowardNorthKoreaamongSouthKoreans,basedontheirethnicidentityandthecurrentSouthKoreanGovernment’spolicyofpromotingmoreindependentnationaldefence.

TheSix‑PartyTalks,initiatedbythenucleardevelopmentprogramofNorthKorea,

havemadesomeprogress,suchastheagreementtodisablenuclearfacilitieswithinthisyear.ThishasbeenpossibleduetotheadvancementinUS–NorthKoreabilateraltalks,backedbyamorecompromisingposturetakenbytheBushadministration.However,thefutureprospectsforthetalksareunclear,asNorthKoreastillpracticesbrinkmanshipdiplomacytowinfurtherconcessionsfromtheUS.Withotherissues(suchasballisticmissiledevelopmentandunlawfulactivities,includingtheabductionofforeignnationals)stillunsolved,NorthKorearemainsasourceofconcernatleastintheshortterm.

IntheTaiwanStrait,politicaltensionisstillhigh,providinganothersourceofconcerninthemediumtolongterm.Thetensionisduetopolitical,militaryandpsychologicalpressuresfrommainlandChina,Taiwan’sdemocratisationandpursuitofindependence,theexpectedshiftinthemilitarybalancebetweenChinaandTaiwaninthenearfuture,andchangeinthedelicatebalanceoftheUS–Chinarelationshipinthecurrentsituation.Ifanyemergencyoccursinthisarea,itwillundoubtedlycutoffthevitalsealanespassingnearTaiwan.

Overall,theregionembracesseveralinstabilityfactors,includingChina’saggressiveadvancetowardtheoceansanditsintensivebuild‑upofmaritimeandairpower,developmentsinpoliticallyunstablenationsofSoutheastAsia,andthedelicatebalanceofstrategicrelationshipsamongmajorpowers,includingtheUS,China,JapanandRussia.Thesafetyofsealanesintheregionisnoexception—itisalsosubjecttotheeffectsofregionalinstabilityfactors.

Inthecurrentsecuritysituation,thereareeightnotableinstabilityfactorsthatthreatenregionalsecurity.Theycanbeclassifiedintotwomajorcategories:conventionalandnonconventionalfactors.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue �

Ofthefourconventionalfactors,thefirstisconfrontationalstructuresthatareremnantsoftheColdWarera,suchasthoseintheKoreanPeninsulaandtheTaiwanStrait,whichstillcastshadowsofinstability,uncertainty,andunpredictabilityintheregion.Thesecondfactoristherapidbuild‑upofChinesemilitarypower,mostlyinnavalandairforces,whichhasthepotentialtodisrupttheregionalmilitarypowerbalance.Thethirdfactorinvolvesterritorial,religiousandethnicdisputesfoundedonhistoricalcontroversies(territorialdisputesoverislandshaveaparticularpotentialtodevelopintoarmedclashes).Thefourthfactorisconfrontationsovermaritimeinterests,whicharecloselyrelatedtoterritorialdisputesoverislands.Allthesefactorsarelikelytocreateseriousimpactsonthesafetyandstabilityoftheregionasawhole,astheycanreducethesafetyofsealanes.

Nonconventionalfactors,ontheotherhand,arethosenewfactorsthatbecameapparentaftertheendoftheColdWar.ThefifthfactoristheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionandballisticmissilesfromNortheastAsiatoPakistanandotherregions,mainlythroughregionalsealanes.Thesixthfactoristheincreasedvigourofterroristactivitiessuchasbombattacks,asinternationalterroristgroupsstrengthentieswithotherrelevantgroupsinandoutoftheregion,mainlytargetingnationswithweakergovernance,islandalseasandremoteislands(thisbecameespeciallyapparentafterthe9/11terroristattacks).Theseventhfactoristhetrendtoglobalisationandreorganisationofunlawfulmaritimeactivities,suchaspiracy,drugsmuggling,andhumantraffickingintheregion.TheeighthfactorisChina’slong‑termambitiontosecuremaritimehegemony,demonstratedbyitseffortstobuildstrategicbasesalongthevastmajorsealanesconnectingtheMiddleEastandNortheastAsia,inawaythatconfrontstheexistingmarinepowers,suchastheUS,orJapan.

Ourexaminationoftheseinstabilityfactorsrevealssomecommonkeywords,suchas‘safetyofsealanes’.SealanesecurityisnotonlyimportantforthesecurityoftheAsia–Pacificregion,butformostotherregions.

Significance of sea lanes today

Thesignificanceofsealanestodaycanbeanalysedfromtwoperspectives:‘maritimetransportation’and‘marineusage.’TheeconomiesoftheAsia–Pacificregion,includingJapan’seconomy,arefarmoredependentonoceansthanareeconomiesinanyotherregion.Therefore,theoceanshaveextremestrategicsignificanceinthisregion.Moreover,thedynamismofeconomicgrowthseenintheAsia–Pacificregionrecentlyhasmadesealanesecurityevenmorevitalforthecontinuedgrowthanddevelopmentoftheregionasawhole,assealanesarethecommunicationmediumofregionaleconomies(‘maritimetransportation’),whiletheoceansprovidevastresourcesthatcansecuretheeconomicdevelopmentofcoastalcountriesintheregion(‘marineusage’).Thesetwoaspectsareessentialforregionaleconomicdevelopment.

Intermsof‘maritimetransportation,’theglobaleconomytodayenjoyssmootherdistributionofmaterialsandinformationthaninthepast.Thisisduetotheextensiveandrapiddevelopmentanddeploymentoftransportationinfrastructureswithinformationtechnologies.Also,mutualexchangesbetweennationshaveincreasedastheideologicalconfrontationoftheColdWarerahasdissipatedandthebarriersdistancingnationsfromoneanotherhavedissolved.Inaddition,thetransitionofformerlysocialistnationstomarketeconomiesandtherapideconomicdevelopmentofdevelopingcountrieshaveledtothedevelopmentofvariedformsofeconomiccooperationamongnations,andthefurtherdeepeningofmutual

4 Proceedings

dependenciesintheglobaleconomy.Tomaintainanddevelopsuchrelationships,thetransportsectorhasbecomemoreimportantthanever.Thisisespeciallytrueinthecaseofmaritimetransportation,asitenableseconomicalandmassivetransportofcargo.Thismeansthatsecuringsealanesafetyhasbecomemuchmoreimportant.

Inparticular,Japan’seconomyandlifestylearelargelydependentonmaritimetransportationusingsafesealanes.Itspasteconomicdevelopmentwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutsuchsecurity.OilresourcesfromtheMiddleEastareessentialmaterialstosustaintheJapaneseeconomy,andtheirshipmentisentirelydependentonthebroadsealanefromtheMiddleEast,throughtheIndianOcean,Malacca–SingaporeStraitandSouthChinaSea,totheEastChinaSea.ItisnoexaggerationtocallthesesealanesthelifelineoftheJapaneseeconomy.Moreover,theMalacca–SingaporeStraitisalsopartofthelifelineofotherNortheastAsiancountries,suchasChinaandSouthKorea—makingit,inasense,theAchilles’heeloftheglobaleconomy.About50,000vesselsnavigatethroughthestrait,carryingmorethanaquarteroftheworld’smaritimetransportvolumeandabouthalfofthetradevolumesofJapan,China,andSouthKorea.About50%ofglobaloiltankervolume,andabout85%ofoiltankersfromtheMiddleEasttoNortheastAsia,passthroughthestrait.

AsthemajoruseroftheMalacca–SingaporeStraituntilveryrecently,Japanprovidedmanybeneficialprojectsintheareatodevelopandmaintainsafenavigationroutesthroughthestraitincoordinationwiththecoastalcountries—Singapore,Indonesia,andMalaysia.Theprojects,deliveredmainlybytheprivatesector,suchastheJapanFoundation,andbackedupbytheJapaneseGovernment,werehighlyappreciated.Recently,however,thesituationaroundtheMalacca–SingaporeStraithaschangeddrastically.Inaddition

totherapidandsignificantincreaseinthevolumeofoilimportsbyotherEastAsiancountries,suchasNIE(newlyindustrialisedeconomy)countrieslikeSouthKoreaandTaiwan,andChina(whichisexperiencingremarkableeconomicgrowth),thecoastalcountrieshaveincreasedthenumberofoilrefineriesalongthestrait,resultinginasignificantincreaseinthevolumeofoilproductsshippedintheregion.Growthinregionaleconomieshasalsoledtoincreasesinshipmentsofproductsandrawmaterialsotherthanoilthroughthestrait.

Furthermore,thecoastalcountrieshavechangedthenatureoftheirdependencyonthestraitsignificantly,frombeing‘provider’nationsinthepasttobeing‘user’nations,astheycontinuetodevelopcontainershipmenthubports,suchasSingaporeHarborandtheportofTanjunPelapasinMalaysia,andtoexerteffortforindustrialdevelopmentalongthecoasts.

Asclearlydemonstratedinthe1991GulfWar,duringtheTaiwanStraitcrisisin1996whenChinafiredballisticmissilesintowatersoffTaiwan,duringthe9/11terroristattacksandtheAfghanistanWartocontrolandcontaintheterroristgroupsin2001,andduringtheIraqWarfrom2003,ifthereisanydirectorindirectdisruptiontothesecurityofthesemajorsealanes,itwillseriouslyandadverselyaffecttheinternationaleconomyaswellasthesecurityofthesurroundingregionsandcoastalcountries.Becauseoftheextentofsealanes,however,itisnotpossibleforanycoastalnationonitsowntosecurethesafetyofthesealanes.Thereisagrowingrealisationthatcooperativeandcoordinatedeffortsbythecoastalnationsarerequired.

TypicalexamplesofcooperativeprogramsaroundtheMalacca–SingaporeStraitincludeMalSinDoandEyesintheSky,whicharestructuredtofightinternationalterroristgroupsandpiracyaroundthestraitusingmultilateralcoastalnavalforces,andReCAAP,

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 5

whichisacoalitionamongthestraitusercountriesbackedupbyJapan.AnotherexampleisOEF–MIO(OperationEnduringFreedomMaritimeInterdictionOperation),themaritimeterrorismpreventionactivityinthenorthwestIndianOceanstartedimmediatelyafterthe9/11terroristattacksandcontinuedeversincebymultilateralnavalforces.

Fromtheperspectiveof‘marineusage,’theUNConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)allowscoastalcountriestoholdsovereignrightsoverinternalwaters,territorialseasandconnectingwaterways,andtohavejurisdictionovertheirexclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ)aswellastheuseofmarineresourcesandtherighttoprotecttheenvironmentonthecontinentalshelf.WiththeestablishmentofEEZsbycoastalcountries,almosthalfoftheworld’sseasarenowunderthejurisdictionofonecountryoranother.

IntheoriginaldefinitionofEEZs,basedonthefundamentalphilosophyofUNCLOS,thecoastalcountries’jurisdictionovertheirEEZsgivesthemtherighttomanageandcontrolmarineresourcesandtoexecutetheirresourcecontrolobligations,butdoesnotimplytherighttomonopoliseuseoftheresources.Inreality,however,effortstodeterminenationalbordersbetweencoastalcountriesdonotalwaysleadtoamicablesettlements,becauseofconflictsovermarineinterestsandhistoricaldisputesoverterritories.TypicalofsuchdisputesistheJapan–Chinamid‑lineissueintheEastChinaSea.

Withtheprospectofterrestrialresourcedepletioninthefuture,thereisgrowinginterestinabundantmarineresources,suchasfisheriesandseabedresources.Thishasledtotheriseofextremenationalismamongdevelopingcountries,especiallyinChina,whichisnowactingasanunruly

‘resource‑greedy’and‘marineenvironmentpolluter’nation.

Theriseofnationalisminsuchcountriesinvitesanexplosionofefforttostealthevestedrightsofdevelopedcountries.ProofofthisistheseriousstrifeandstrugglesatinternationalforumsnegotiatingtheprotectionanddevelopmentoffisheryresourcesorintergovernmentaldiscussionsonthejurisdictionofdeepseabedresourcesupontheentryintoforceofUNCLOS.Thisfacthighlightsthegrowingneedforcooperativemeasuresformarineusageamongrelevantcountries.Suchmeasuresshouldtakeintoaccountthemanagementoflimitedresourcesandtheconservationoftheglobalenvironmentunderestablishedinternationalandregionalrules.

Increasing importance of broad sea lanes and the roles of Japan and Australia

SecuringthesafetyofsealanesintheAsia–Pacificregioniscertainlyimportantfortheregionaleconomyandregionalsecurity,butsealanesdonotendinonesingleregion.Themajorsealanes,whicharethelifelineofJapan,extendfarbeyondtheregionalseas,intotheIndianOcean,Oceania–SouthPacific,andEastPacificregions.

Theneedtoensurethesafetyofbroadsealanesisnotlikelytodiminishinthefuture,butwillgrow.Atthesametime,variousfactorsthatobstructsealanesafetyarebecomingmoreevidenteverywhereintheregionandintheworld.Inthissense,itisimportanttoensurethattheworldcanbenefitfrom‘managedmaritimefreedom’underknownrulesbuiltbyconsensusamongrelevantcountries.Thisiseasytounderstand,butdifficulttorealise.Becausesealanesconnectoneregiontoanotherthroughoceans,itisurgentlynecessarytobuildaconsensusamongbroaderregionalbeneficiarycountries

� Proceedings

toseekcommonbenefitsandtocooperatetoensuresealanesafety.

AmongmajorsealanesadjacenttoJapan,thoseintheOceania,SouthPacific,andEastPacificregionsarerelativelystable,withnosignificantthreats.Inthoseregions,theUSmaintainsoverwhelminginfluencefrombasesinHawaii,Guam,andthewestcoastoftheUS.Thepresenceofothermajorseapowerallies,suchasAustraliaandCanada,alsoensuresthestabilityofthesesealanes.Ifthereisanypotentialthreatintheseregions,itmaybeChina’saggressivemilitaryadvancementtowardthePacificOceanasitcontinuesitsriseasamajorworldpower.China’sactivitieswillrequirecontinuedattention.Inthissense,theallianceamongmajorPacificseapowers(Japan,Australia,andCanada),withtheworld’slargestandstrongestseapower,theUS,atthecentrewillbesignificantinsecuringthesafetyofsealanesinthepan‑Pacificregion.

ThealliancewithAustraliawillbeespeciallysignificant,asitmaintainsstrongrelationshipswithAsiannations,includingJapan,notonlyintheareaofsealanesecuritybutalsointheoverallareaofregionalsecurity.Consideringtherecentinternationaleconomicandsecuritysituation,Australiaisoneofthemostimportantalliesinthe‘expandedAsia,’extendingfromsouthtonorth.

Impact of India’s emergence

Inthecontextdescribedinthispaper,Indiaisoneofthemostimportantcountriesinthe‘expandedAsia,’extendingfromeasttowest.

TheIndianOceanregionusedtoreceiverelativelylessattentionfromAsia–Pacificcountriesfromeconomicandsecurityperspectives.Recently,however,thereisgrowingrecognitionintheimportanceofthenorthernIndianOceanregion,andofIndia’spredominantpowerintheregion.

Indiahasthepopulationofmorethanonebillion—theworld’ssecondlargestnexttoChina.Withavarietyofethnicgroupswithdifferentreligions,languagesandcultures,itistheworld’sbiggestdemocraticcountrygovernedbyanadministrationelectedthroughfreemultipartyelections.Moreover,IndiasharesmanycommonbasicvaluesandsystemswithJapanandothermajordevelopedcountries,suchasfreedom,democracy,andamarketeconomy.

Havingpromotedliberalisationandeconomicreformssincethe1990s,IndiamaintainsahigheconomicgrowthratethroughthedevelopmentofinformationtechnologiesandITindustries.Supportedbyitsrobusteconomicgrowth,Indiaisexercisingactiveandmultifaceteddiplomacy,enhancingitspresenceintheinternationalcommunity.

However,thelandrouteconnectingthenorthernIndianOceanregionandtheAsia–Pacificregionisnotyetfullydeveloped,inevitablyincreasingdependenceonthevastsealanespassingthroughtheregion.Moreover,inbothregions,‘marineusage’(theexploitationofmaritimeresources,suchasfisheriesandseabedresources)isakeyfortheirfuturedevelopment.Becauseofthesefactors,anydisturbanceordisruptionofthesafetyofthesesealaneswouldlikelycausesevereadverseeffectsontheeconomyandsecurityofbothregions.

ThenorthernIndianOceanisinastrategicallyandgeopoliticallyimportantlocation,asacorridorconnectingtheAsia–PacificregionwiththeMiddleEastandEurope.Italsoformspartofthe‘arcofinstability’—anexpressionthatfirstappearedintheUS’s2001QuadrennialDefenseReview,releasedimmediatelyafterthe9/11terroristattacks.Theregionprovidespotentialbasesforinternationalterroristgroupactivities,aswellasastageforstate‑to‑stateandwithin‑stateconfrontations.


Consideringthesefactors,thevastsealanesconnectingtheIndianOceanandthePacificOceanshouldberecognisedasthemajoreconomicandstrategicarterytorunthroughthe‘arcofinseparability,’ratherthanthe‘arcofinstability’.Inotherwords,theycreateaninseparableandintegratedregioninwhichcoordinationandcooperationeffortsconnecttheAsia–PacificregionandnorthernIndianOcean.

InAugust2007,Japan’sthenPrimeMinisterAbeandIndia’sPrimeMinisterShinhheldtheIndia–JapanSummit,andagreedontherecognitionthat‘strongIndiaisJapan’sbenefits,andstrongJapanisIndia’sbenefits.’TheJapanesesidewelcomedtheemergenceofIndiaasamajorpower,andemphasiseditsintentiontoprovidesupportforIndia’sfurthereconomicdevelopment,andtopromotemoremutualexchangeeffortsateverylevel.

PrimeMinisterAbestatedthatJapanandIndia,astwomajorseapowersanddemocraticcountriesthatsharebasicvaluesandinterests,shouldaddressmeasurestoensurethesafetyofthesealanes,incooperationwithothercountries.Inhisspeechon‘theexchangebetweentwooceans’deliveredtotheIndianParliament,hereflectedonthelonghistoryoftiesbetweenJapanandIndia,andstatedthatthenewlyemerging‘expandedAsia’wouldintegrateEastAsiaandSouthAsiathroughexchangesbetweenthe‘twogreatoceans’—thePacificandtheIndian.ThoselinkscouldgrowintoanopenandtransparentnetworkthatcoverstheentirePacificOceanregion,includingtheUSandAustralia.

CurrentJapanesePrimeMinisterFukudaistofullyandactivelycontinuethebasicAsiandiplomacypolicylaunchedbyPrimeMinisterAbe.

2 Development of bilateral and trilateral relationships among three countries

Japan,AustraliaandtheUSareallseapowers.TheJapan–USalliancehasbeenandwillcontinuetobe,inprinciple,amaritimeallianceatleastfortheforeseeablefuture.TheUShasalliedrelationshipswithothermajorpowers,includingAustralia,andbecauseofthetwocountries’geopoliticalsituation,theUS–Australiaalliancealsohasthecharacteristicsofamaritimealliance.

AlthoughJapanandAustraliahavenotenteredintoaformalalliance,theagreementmadeinMarch2007enabledthemtobegina‘semi‑alliance’relationship.BecauseofJapan’sandAustralia’sgeopoliticalrelationship,thesemi‑alliancebetweenthemisalsobasicallyamaritimeone.ThedevelopmentofJapan–AustraliabilateralrelationshipsinthesecurityareamayprovideafoundationforitsdevelopmentintoatrilateralmaritimealliancethatincludestheUS.

Japan–US alliance

AfterWorldWarII,theUStookonthevital‘keystone’roleinglobalandregionalsecurity.

SincetheendoftheColdWar,andespeciallyafterthe9/11terroristattacks,theUShasusedmuchofitsenergyrespondingtonewdangers,suchasstate‑to‑stateconfrontationsbasedonreligiousandethnicconflicts,theunrelentingactivitiesofinternationalterroristgroups,andthelinksbetweenIslamicradicalgroupsandtheirexpandinginfluence.EspeciallyimportanthavebeentheUSresponsesinIraqandAfghanistan,wheremassivedeploymentsofarmedforceshavenotmadeanyprogress,andWashington’sresponsestoIranandNorthKorea,whichhalf‑openlypursuethedevelopmentofnuclearweapons.AnothervitalissuefortheUSishowtobuildconstructive

� Proceedings

relationshipswithChinaandIndia,whichhavethepotentialtodevelopintopowerfulrivalsinthefuture.

Insuchasituation,theUSconsidersJapantobethecoreofitsnewmilitarystrategyinAsia,andplanstostrengthenthepositionofUSforcesinJapanas‘BeyondFarEastRegionalForces,’withtheirbasesliterallythe‘coremilitarybases’.Needlesstosay,Japanisasovereignnation,sotheJapanesesidewilldecidewhetherthepositioningofUSbasesandUSforcesinJapanisappropriatetothenationalsituationandinterestsofJapan,althoughthealliancewiththeUSistobemaintained.

Inthemediumtolongterm,however,JapanandtheUSneedtoseekgreatermutualityintheoperationoftheUS–Japanalliancefromtheglobalandregionalperspectives.Eventoday,Japanhasimplementedcooperationinregionalandglobaloperations,includingthedevelopmentofaframeworkforcooperationwiththeUSforcesundertheLawConcerningMeasurestoEnsurePeaceandSecurityofJapaninSituationsinAreasSurroundingJapan;internationalcooperativeactivitiesundertheAnti‑TerrorismSpecialMeasuresLawandtheSpecialsMeasuresLawforHumanitarianandReconstructionAssistanceinIraq.Thesekindsofactivitieswilllikelyincreaseinimportanceinthefuture.

Thefightagainstinternationalterrorism,ontheotherhand,requiresmorecomprehensivemeasuresforamuchlongerperiodoftime.Asinternationalterroristgroupswilllikelydevelopmorecomplexandsophisticatedtactics,therewillbegreateropportunitytouseinternationalcooperationinactivitiestopreventterroristattacks.AnalysesofterroristactivitiesindicategreaterassociationsandlinkagesbetweeninternationalterroristgroupsandexistingterroristorganisationsinSoutheastAsia.Thismeansthattherewillbeagreaterneedtodevelopregionalmaritimesecuritycooperationwithanaimof

defendingthesealanesinordertorespondagainstterroristattacksandotherunlawfulactivitiesintheMalacca–SingaporeStraitandSoutheastAsianislandalseas.

Furthermore,ifthesituationcallsforit,therewillbeincreasedopportunitiestoengageinglobaljointactionsthroughmultilateralforcesandcoalitionsbasedonUNresolutionsorregionalagreements,asintheOEF–MIO,whichJapanandothercountriesareimplementinginthenorthwestIndianOcean.Insuchsituations,theUSNavyandJapan’sMaritimeSelfDefenseForceareexpectedtotakemoreactiverolesininternationalcooperativeactions.Asseenhere,broadsealanedefencewillhavegreaterweightinthefutureoftheJapan–USmaritimealliance.

US–Australia alliance

InSeptember1951,Australia,NewZealandandtheUSsignedtheANZUSTreaty.NewZealandwithdrewfromthetreatyin1985asagesturetoopposetheUS’snuclearpolicies,andtheUScancelledthealliancecommitmenttoNewZealandin1986.Insteadofthethree‑nationalliance,theUSandAustraliastartedtheUS–AustraliaMinisterialMeetingonSecurity(AUSMIN),whichhasbeenheldannuallyeversince.

SincethestartofAUSMIN,AustraliahasbecomeamajorallyoftheUSandactivelyparticipatedintheGulfWarandmilitarysanctionsagainstIraq.Australia’scooperationwiththeUSisnotlimitedtomilitarycooperationinthefieldandinjointdrillsandexercises.TheveryfoundationoftheallianceisjointmilitaryinformationcentresinmanyplacesonAustralianterritory.Theseincludegroundstationstoreceiveearlywarninginformationfromsatellitesthatprovidesthebasisforballisticmissiledefence,andthecommunicationcentretomonitorthenavigationofvesselsintheOceania–SouthPacificregion.ThesharingofmilitaryinformationbetweentheUSandAustralia


isa‘tiethatbinds’,andisconsideredtobeoneofthemostimportantfunctionsoftheUS–Australiaalliance.

Afterthe9/11terroristattacks,AustraliadecidedtoapplyArticle4oftheANZUSTreaty,whichstipulatestheexerciseoftherightofcollectiveself‑defence,anddispatchedvessels,aircraftandSpecialForcestosupporttheanti‑terroristactivitiesoftheUSforces.WhenthemilitaryoperationagainstIraqbeganinMarch2003,Australiaalsosentvessels,airplanesandSpecialForces.ByMay2007,therewereabout1600AustraliantroopsstationedinIraq.

Inaddition,Australiaismakingeffortstostrengthenitsdefencepoliciesandequipment.Althoughtheactualformofparticipationisstilldebateddomestically,AustraliadecidedtoparticipateintheUS‑ledMissileDefensePlaninDecember2003.AdecisiontointroducetheAegissystemasthecombatsystemforAustralia’snewair‑defencedestroyerswasmadeinAugust2004,andtheAustralianDefenceForceismakingeffortstoimproveinteroperabilitywiththeUSthroughthedevelopmentofUS–AustraliajointdrillfacilitiesinAustralia.

AustraliaisalsoimplementingjointdrillswithMalaysia,Singapore,theUnitedKingdomandNewZealandundertheFivePartyDefenceAgreement.

Japan–Australia semi-alliance

AustraliaisavaluableandimportantpartnerintheAsia–PacificregionandsharescommonbasicvalueswithJapan,suchasrespectforhumanrights,freedom,anddemocracy.Inthesecurityaspectaswell,AustraliaandJapanhavecommonstrategicinterestsasalliesoftheUSandsharesimilarinterestsinnationaldefence.Fromsuchaperspective,itisvitalforbothcountriestodevelopabaseofbilateralcooperationthroughthepromotionofdefenceandsecurityexchanges,

andtoseekmoreeffectivecooperationandcoordination.SucheffortswillcertainlybebeneficialforthepeaceandstabilityoftheAsia–Pacificregion.Therecentpromotionandexpansionofdefenceexchangesbetweenthetwocountries,suchascooperationinIraqandhumanitarianaidafternaturaldisasters,havedemonstratedsteadyprogressinthedevelopmentofacooperativerelationshipinthesecurityfield.

Basedonthecurrentsituation,JapanagreedwithAustraliainMarch2007topromotesecuritycooperationbetweenJapanandAustraliaasa‘semi‑alliance’inordertofurtherreinforcebilateralsecuritycooperationunderacomprehensiveframework,andconcludedtheJointDeclarationofJapanandAustraliaonSecurityCooperation.ThiswasthefirsttimeJapanhadenteredsuchanalliance,otherthanitsalliancewiththeUS.InJune2007,theministersofdefenceandforeignaffairsofbothcountriesheldtheirfirstregularsecuritytalks(so‑called‘2+2talks’)inTokyo.TheagendaincludedmissiledefencecooperationandjointdrillsbetweentheJapanSelfDefenseForcesandtheAustralianDefenceForce.

TheMarch2007jointdeclarationsetaframeworkforreinforcingandexpandingbilateralcooperationinthesecurityfield.Thedeclarationselectedforcooperationtheareasofnationalbordersecurity;anti‑terrorism;armsreductionandanti‑proliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionandtheircarriertools;peacekeepingactivities;exchangesofstrategicinformation;maritimesecurityandairsecurity;disasterreliefandotherhumanitariansupportactivities;andothers.

Basedonthejointdeclaration,JapanandAustraliaconductedbilateraljointdrillsofftheeastcoastofJapaninApril2007,afive‑navyjointdrillwiththeUS,IndiaandSingaporeintheBayofBengalinSeptember2007,andatrilateralnavaljointdrillwiththeUSatNaha,Japan,thefollowingmonth.

10 Proceedings

TheJapan–Australiasemi‑alliancewillnotremainatthelevelofpromotingbilateralcooperationinsecurityfields,butmaydevelopintoatrilateralrelationshipwithmoreemphasisonmaritimealliances.Furthermore,itcouldmovetowardthebuildingofaregionalmaritimecoalitionthatembracesothermajordemocraticseapowersin‘extendedAsia.’

3 A Japan–Australia–US regional maritime coalition

Japan,AustraliaandtheUSshouldconstituteamaritimealliancecoveringtheAsia–Pacificregion,OceaniaandtheSouthPacific.Theyneedtocreatea‘SouthwesternPacificMaritimeCoalition’withotherdemocraticseapowersintheregiontoensurethesafetyofsealanes.Atthesametime,JapanandAustralianeedtomakeeffortstorealisebroaderregionalmaritimecoalitionsundertheleadershipoftheUSintheIndianOceanandtheEastPacific,incooperationwithotherdemocraticseapowersinneighbouringwaters,suchasIndiaandCanada,andtoworkonthedevelopmentofmoreorganiccoordinationbetweentheseregionalcoalitionsinordertopromotethesafetyofbroadsealanes.Ultimately,bothcountriesneedtotakeonrolesandresponsibilitiesappropriatefortheirnationalpowersandsituations,asmajoractorsina‘globalmaritimecoalition’thatgathersalltheworld’sdemocraticseapowers.

Japan–Australia–US maritime alliance

ThemaritimeallianceofJapan,AustraliaandtheUSinthesouthwesternPacificshouldplayamajorpartinbuildingtheregionalmaritimecoalitionforbroaderseaareas,takingadvantageofbenefitsarisingfromtheirrelationshipsinalliancesandsemi‑alliances,theircharacteristicsasseapowers,theirdemocraticsystems,andtheirmodernisedmilitaryforces.

Asdemocraticnations,oneoftheirmainaimswouldbetoattemptthedisseminationandsolidificationoftheircommonconceptsandvalues—thatis,democracy.Sincearegionalmaritimecoalitionwouldinevitablyinvolvecountrieswithdifferenttraditionsandgovernancesystems,askingforthecooperationofthosecountriesinmaintainingsecurityandorderwouldbeabigchallengeforthethreeallies.

Inaddition,Japan,AustraliaandtheUSthemselveshavefundamentaldifferencesintheirgeopolitical,environmental,historical,cultural,linguistic,andreligiousbackgrounds,althoughtheysharedemocraticvalues.Theirnationalconceptsarenotentirelythesame,andtherearesomedifferencesintheirpoliticalsystems.However,theyundoubtedlysharebasicconceptsasmature,developed,democraticcountries,andtheirhistoryforthepastsixtyyearssincetheendofWorldWarIIclearlydemonstratesthosesharedconcepts.

Asseapowers,thethreealliesmustmaintain‘properlymanagedmaritimefreedom’inordertosurviveandprosperasnations.Forthis,theyneedtofindlogicalsolutionstoproblemsindeterminingEEZsandtheextentofcontinentalshelves,whichhavebeenthesourceofseriousstate‑to‑statedisputesbetweennationswithcommonnationalborders,evenafterUNCLOSenteredintoeffect.

Asiswellknown,JapanandChinahaveseveraldisputes,includingterritorialdisputesovertheSenkakuIslands,andtheissueoftheJapan–Chinamid‑lineandOki‑no‑TorishimaIslandinrelationtodeterminingtheirEEZs.Althoughthesemattersmightlooklikesimplequestionsofdeterminingterritorialrightsoverremoteislands,ordecidingthescopeofeconomicinterestsovertheoceans,theyare—inrealityandmoreimportantly—aboutChina’smilitarychallengeintheWestPacificanditsmilitaryadvancementtowardthe


‘SecondIslandalDefenseLine’fromthe‘FirstIslandalDefenseLine,’andthatfactshouldbethoroughlyrealised.Inotherwords,theseissuesshouldbeconsiderednotonlyfromtheviewpointofJapan’sterritorialdisputes,butalsoinviewofsecurityissuestheUSandAustraliacannotoverlook.Consideringthesefactors,ensuring‘maritimesecurity’and‘controlofmarineinterests’willbecomeimportantforthethreecountriesasawaytoeffectivelydeteraggressiveandunlawfuladvancesbyChina.

Ontheotherhand,itispossibletofindcommoninterestswithregionalcountries,includingChina,in‘maintainingthemaritimeorder’.Thisisbecauseitisintheinterestsofallthecountriesandpeopleintheregiontomaintainregionalmaritimeorder,forexampletopreventterroristattacks(includingmaritimeterrorism)byinternationalterroristgroupsinassociationwithlocalgroups,andtoaddresstheproblemsofpiracy,drugsmuggling,andpeopletrafficking.Thereisnoreasonforothercountriestorefusetocooperateinsuchresponses.

Finally,thereisthethreeallies’thirdcommonfeature:theyallmanagemodernmilitaryforces.Theregionincludessomecountrieswithmanyislandsandbroadareastopatrol,butquantitativelyandqualitativelyinadequatemaritimemilitaryandpoliceforces.Forexample,themediahasreportedthatNorthKoreawasabletosupplyweapons(smallarmsandmini‑submarines)totheMoroIslamicLiberationFrontinthePhilippines.Therefore,theallieswillberesponsibleforprovidingcapacity‑buildingandothersupportacceptabletolocalpeople.

Thethreecountriescouldaddresssuchproblemsincooperationwithothercountries,notonlyundertheProliferationSecurityInitiativetocontrolweaponsofmassdestruction,butalsothroughaidforthecontrolofotherweapons.Intermsof

humanitarianaid,itisstillvividinourmemorythatJapan,Australia,andtheUSswiftlysenttroopsforthereliefandrecoverysupportactivitiesafterthetsunamidisasterof2004,andtheireffortswerewelcomedbythelocalpeople.

A regional maritime coalition in the southwestern Pacific

ThemaritimeallianceofJapan,AustraliaandtheUSshouldtakeresponsibilitiesappropriatetothethreecountries’nationalpowerasthemajorresponsiblestakeholdersofaregionalmaritimecoalitioninthesouthwesternPacific,whichlinkstheAsia–PacificregionwithOceaniaandtheSouthPacific.

Here,‘maritimecoalition’isdefinedasa‘globalorbroaderregionalnation‑to‑nationcoalitionwiththeobjectivetomaintainandsecuresafeandfreeuseofoceansinpeacetime.’Thiskindofcoalitiondoesnotnecessarilyrequiretheentryintoforceofaninternationalagreementorconvention,butcanbeamultinationalnetworkbasedonmutualconfidencewithcommonconcepts.

Therefore,itispossibletoenterintoacoalitionrelationshipwithanycoastalcountriesaslongastheysharecommonobjectives.Inbuildingsuchamaritimecoalition,eachmembernationisrequiredtotakearesponsibleroleproportionatetothefeaturesofthenationortheregion.Howcountriestakeresponsibilitymaydifferfromacountrytoacountryandeachcountrycandecideonwhatitcancontribute.

Forexample,JapanhasavitalinterestinthemaintenanceofsealanesextendingfromsouthoftheSuezCanal(oreastoftheCapeofGoodHope)toNortheastAsia.Consideringitsnationalsituationandnationalpower,however,theextentoftheareaforwhichJapancanactivelytakearesponsiblerolewillremainfromtheNortheastAsianseastotheMalacca–SingaporeStraitandsurrounding

1� Proceedings

areas.IntheIndianOcean,westofthestrait,theresponsiblerolecanbeassignedtothedemocraticmaritimenationsinEastAsia,ledbythemajorpower,India.Indiawillthusmakeamorepositivecontributiontosecuritycooperationwithothermaritimedemocraticcountries,suchasJapan,AustraliaandtheUS,andtotheglobalandbroaderregionalnation‑to‑nationcoalitiontosecurefreeandsafeuseoftheoceans.

Onepreconditionforaccessiontosucharegionalmaritimecoalitionwillbewhetheranationsharesthreebasicmaritimeinterestswithothercountries:

• existence—tocooperateinmaintainingthesecurityoftheregioninpeacetimeaswellasinemergencyorcrisis

• prosperity—tocooperateandtoprospertogetherincommerceandtrade,aswellasinmarineresourcedevelopment

• value—tosincerelypursuetheconservationanddevelopmentofvariousbenefitstheseascanprovide,intermsofmarineenvironmentprotectionandmarineresourcecontrol.

Inshort,thebasicrequirementtojointhecoalitionisthatthenationhasnoseriousdisputeovermaritimeinterestsorterritories,economicconflicts,orobjectionstoenvironmentalconservationorthedevelopmentofmarineresources.Evenifthereisaseedofdispute,buildingacoalitionthatallowsfairanddemocraticwaysofsolvingdisputesisessentialforthemaintenanceofthecoalition.Moreimportantly,thecoalitionneedstobebuiltontheactionprincipleof‘servicetoothers,’whichisbasedontheconceptofdiplomacy.

Consideringallthesefactors,itwillbethebesttocreateacoalitionamongtheUSallies(inotherwords,amongthedemocraticcountriesthatsharethesamethreeinterestsinthecoalition’sexistence,prosperity,andvalue),thenaddfriendlymaritimenations

thathavethoseinterestsandabidebytheactionprincipleofservicetoothers,andeventuallyexpandthecoalitiontoincludeothernations.Forthemoment,Japan,Australia,andtheUScanbuildthecoreofthecoalitioninthesouthwesternPacific.

Development into a global maritime coalition

TheJapan–Australia–USmaritimeallianceshouldtaketheinitiativetobuildtheSouthwesternPacificMaritimeCoalitionandcooperatewiththecreationofotherregionalmaritimecoalitionsintheIndianOcean(involvingIndia)andintheEastPacific(involvingCanada).ForJapan,Australia,andtheUS,itwillbeespeciallyimportanttoensuretheassociationwithIndia,akeycountryinthe‘arcofinseparability’.

Thinkingmoreglobally,FranceandItalyintheMediterranean,theUnitedKingdomintheNorthAtlantic,andGermanyinEuropecouldbecomemajormembersofUS‑ledregionalmaritimecoalitions,foundedonthefreeanddemocraticconceptandsharingthecommonpursuitofexistence,prosperity,andvalue.

Ultimately,thiscouldleadtothebuildingofaglobalmaritimecoalition.FromJapan’sperspective,theinitiativeforaglobalmaritimecoalitioncoincideswiththe‘arcoffreedomandprosperity’proposedbyformerForeignMinisterAso,andthe‘coalitionofnationsbasedoncommonvalues’referredtobyformerPrimeMinisterAbeandbycurrentPrimeMinisterFukuda,whopromisedtopromoteAbe’sconceptinhisdiplomaticpolicies.

The challenge of security cooperation in the coastal sea lanes

Finally,oneimportantquestionforglobalorregionalmaritimecoalitionsishowtosecurethesafetyofthesealanesattheirpointsofconvergenceonthecoasts,evenif

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 1�

regionalmaritimecoalitionscanbeformedinthoseareas.Suchareashavebeenthestagesforhistoricconfrontationsoverthelandterritoriesandmarineinterestsofcoastalnations,asdemonstratedintherelationshipsbetweenJapan,China,Korea,andRussia.Inthoseareas,thenationalinterestsofmultiplecountriesareintertwined,anditisextremelydifficulttoformacooperativesystem.

ItisnotsoeasytobuildacoalitionsysteminNortheastAsiaorSoutheastAsia,asthecoastalsealanesinthoseregionsinvolvemanyseedsofconfrontation.Forexample,RussiahasrecentlyunilaterallydeclareditsinterestsintheArcticOcean,motivatedbytheabundantseabedresourcesthereandbytheincreasedpossibilityofyear‑roundnavigationduetoglobalwarming.IntheEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSea,Chinahascoercedandaggressivelyadvancedtowardoceans,whichhasledtomoreconfrontationsoverterritoriesandmarineinterestssuchassea‑bottomresources.ForJapan,AustraliaandtheUS,coordinationwiththethreecoastalcountriesofIndonesia,MalaysiaandSingaporealongtheMalacca–SingaporeStraitwillbethemostimportant.

Otherareashavesimilarandevenmorecomplicatedproblems.AroundthecoastsoftheArabianPeninsulatherearereligiousconfrontationscentredonIslam,conflictsoveroilrightsandconcessions,andahotbedofinternationalterrorismandpiracy.SomeorallofthosefactorsarealsoinplayalongEastAfricancoastsandintheeasternMediterranean.However,itispossibletodevelopopportunitiestoresolvesuchproblemsinthefutureifweaimforregionalmaritimecoalitionsamongtherelevantcoastalcountries.

Inthissense,itisessentialtoformregionalmaritimecoalitionsintheoceansfirst.Duringthedevelopmentofsuchcoalitions,therewillbemanyopportunitiestodevelopmutual

confidence—evenbetweencountrieswithdisputes—andtocooperatewitheachothertoattainthecommontarget.

4 Conclusion

WhatJapanandAustralianeedtodois,first,totakeaninitiativewiththeUStodevelopcooperativerelationshipsonthesecurityofoceansealanesinthesouthwestPacific,whilesolidifyingcooperativesystemswithcoastalcountriesofmajorsealanessuchastheMalacca–SingaporeStrait.Moreover,thetwocountriesneedtodevelopstrongertieswithcountriesintheneighbouringIndianOceanandEastPacific,astheycanformtheaxesofregionalmaritimecoalitionstoprotectoceanicsealanes.TheSouthwesternPacificMaritimeCoalitioncanpromotemoreeffortstoconductpolicydialogueandjointdrillsbetweencountries.ItwillbeespeciallyimportantforeconomicprosperityandmaritimesecuritytobuildastrongerrelationshipwithIndia.

Nonetheless,itisalsonecessarytotakeeveryopportunityanduseeverychannelofdiplomacyanddefenceconnectingregionalcountries,suchasdirectintergovernmentaldialogues,torealisealltheseobjectives.Itwillbeimportanttocontinueregionalsecuritytalks(suchastheASEANRegionalForum),thenavaldialogueframework(suchastheInternationalSeaPowerSymposiumandtheWesternPacificNavalSymposium)andforumsfordialoguebetweenprivateandpublicsectors(suchasthoseinvolvingmajormaritimethink‑tanksandinstitutes).Inthemeantime,bothgovernmentsshouldactivelyusetheoutcomeofthoseforumsandmakeeffortsateverypossibleopportunitytodevelopmutualconfidencebetweenthenaviesorothermaritimeforcesofregionalcoastalcountries.

14 Proceedings

Possible strategic ‘shocks’ in AsiaDr Rod Lyon Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Strategic‘shocks’inAsiamightcomeinavarietyofforms,andinthesomewhatgloomypaperthatfollowsIexploreanumberofthem.Ofcourse,muchofhowwethinkaboutthepossiblerangeofshocksdependsuponhowwedefinethekeyterm,‘shock’.Itwouldbetiresomemerelytorevisitthetraditionalregional‘flashpoints’ofTheDemocraticPeople’sRepublicofKorea(DPRK),TaiwanandSouthAsia.Thoseflashpointsstillposedangers;indeed,theyposeseriousdangers.Anyoneofthemmightprecipitateaconflictinwhichthecasualtiesnumberedinthemillions.Butherewehitthedefinitionalproblem:woulditreallybemuchofa‘shock’ifoneofthewell‑knownflashpointsweretoposemoreintenseproblemsfortheregion?Moreover,ifwearehappymerelytorehearsethetraditionalflashpoints,aren’tweindangerofoverlookingthe‘alternativestrategicfutures’ofAsia?Inshort,focusingremorselesslyonthewell‑knownflashpointsmightwellservetodiminishourunderstandingofwhatmightgoseriouslywronginourregion.

What is a ‘shock’?

InthispaperIwillinterprettheterm‘shock’tomeanaradicaldiscontinuity.Bythatdefinition,NorthKorea’scontinuingtobeaproblemwouldn’tbeashocktoanyone.NorthKorea’spenchantforabrupt,bizarreandoftenself‑destructivepolicyinitiativesissowellknownthatawiderangeofbehaviourisnowtoleratedbytheregionundertherubricthatitismerelytypicaloftheregime’seccentricities.True,itmightchoosetobehaveevenmorebizarrely,butthedifferencewouldessentiallybeoneofdegree.Evenamoreerratic,morethreateningNorthKoreawouldn’tbea‘shock’.Rather,

NorthKorea’stransformationtoaliberal,engageddemocracywouldbeashock;apleasantshock,perhaps,butcertainlyashock,a‘radicaldiscontinuity’inthegenuinesenseoftheterm.

Iwouldalsoarguethatafocusondiscontinuitiesactuallycapturesmostofwhatinterestsusaboutwheretheregionmightbegoing.Discontinuitiesoftenhaveanexplanatorypowerininternationalrelationsatleastasprofoundasthatprovidedbyhistoricalcontinuities.Inthedisciplineofinternationalrelations,suchaclaimmightwellbedisputed.Afterall,muchofthedisciplineemphasisestheslow,grindingnatureofchangeintheinternationalsystem.Thenaturalinclinationofanyanalystattemptingtoforecastthefutureistolookfortheexistingtrendsandthentoassumethatthosetrendswillcontinue.

Butoverthepastyears,forexample,thetrendsfromtheworldof1987haveprobablybeenlessinfluentialinshapingwherewearetodaythanhavethemajordiscontinuitiesoftheinterveningyears:theendoftheColdWar,theAsianFinancialCrisis,and9/11perhapsmostprominentamongstthem.Ananalystprojectingforwardfrom1987’strendswouldnowbesadlyastray,foreventheendoftheColdWarby1990waslargelyinvisibletothebulkofstrategicanalystsinthemid‑1980s.

Bycomparison,ananalystwhohadmadebetterallowancein1987forpossiblediscontinuitiesinglobalandregionalpatternsmightbeclosertothemark.Isay‘might’beclosertothemark,becauseherewehittheprimarysnagofforecastingonthebasisofpossiblestrategicshocks:therearemanymorepotentialdiscontinuitiesthanevercometrue.Afterall,justaboutallpatternsofstablebehaviourmightshift.Howdoweknowwhichoneswill?Thebrutalansweristhatwedon’tknow.Eventheusualmetricsoflikelihoodandimportanceseemtooffer


poorguidance.Therewasscarcelyabettercaseduringmostofthe1980sforarguingthattheSovietUnionwaslikelytocollapsethanforclaimingthatWesternallianceswere.Similarly,therewasbarelyabettercaseforbelievingthatamajorcatastrophicterroristattackwouldbethemostimportantpotentialdiscontinuityof2001ratherthanthesouringofUS–Chinarelationsearlierthatsameyear.

Despitethosemethodologicalhurdles,there’sanewboutofinterestinspottingpossiblestrategicdiscontinuitiesinAsia.Pentagonofficial,JamesShinn,deliveredapaperattheIISS’s2007Genevaconferenceinwhichheexploredpossible‘BlackSwan’eventsinAsia.1Theterm‘BlackSwan’comesfromarecentlypublishedbookbyNassimNicholasTaleb,calledTheBlackSwan:TheImpactoftheHighlyImprobable.The‘BlackSwan’categorydescribeseventswiththreekeyfeatures:rarity,extremeimpact,andretrospective(thoughnotprospective)predictability.(Thisessentiallymeansthatinhindsightpeoplebelievethatwhatoccurredwasentirelypredictable!)

Shinn’slistcontainedamixedbagofpossibilities,including:

• anothertsunamiinSoutheastAsia,somewherealongtheBeltofFire

• humantohumanavianflubreaksoutonSumatraorJava

• anotherEP‑3‑typemilitaryaccident,intheair,afloat,orevenunderthesea—perhapsaChinesesubmarinesurfacesunderaUSaircraftcarrier,ratherthanjustastern

• ashootingwarstartsacrosstheTaiwanStraits

• anuclearwarheadismountedonaTaepodongmissileonalaunchpadinNorthKorea

• anucleardeviceappearstobeonboardamerchantshipinthePacificheadedwhoknowswhere

• acoupinThailand,thePhilippines,orPakistan.

Notallofthosepossibilitiesseem—tomymind,atleast—entirelyinlinewiththecategorydefinitionsofaBlackSwanoutlinedearlier.Someeventsonthelist,acoupinthePhilippines,forexample,oranavalincidentatsea,seemunlikelytohaveextremeimpact;others,ashootingwarintheTaiwanStraits,wouldincertainconditionsseementirelypredictable.IntermsofthedefinitionsofBlackSwansoriginallyprovidedbyTaleb,itispossiblethatMrShinn’sexamplesactuallyincludenumerous‘grayswans’.2Grayswansrepresentourattempttothinkourwaydownpathsthatareunlikelyratherthanunpredictable.

Taleb’sthesis,ofcourse,isthattheworld—andnotmerelyAsia—isheadedfortheungentleterrainof‘Extremistan’,aplacewhereeventsareshapeddisturbinglybyaprocessoffractalrandomness.TobeaBlackSwan,aneventdoesnothavetobemerelyrare,orwild,‘ithastobeunexpected,hastolieoutsideourtunnelofpossibilities.’3Inmathematicalterms,manyofTaleb’sBlackSwansoccurmorethantwentystandarddeviationsfromthemean.Inaworldwhereameasureofthreestandarddeviationsisusuallytakentosuggeststatisticalimprobability,itisinthissensethatBlackSwaneventsaregenuinelyunforeseeable.

Unfortunately,thatmeansTaleb’sthesisdoesn’thelpusmuchinidentifyingtheemergingBlackSwans.Ifsucheventsaregenuinelyunforeseeable,whatpointintryingtoforeseethem?Wemayhavenooptionbuttosettleforananalysisofeventsthatarepredictabletosomeextent,andwhichmight‘shock’orreversethecurrentlyratherbenignpatternsofAsia–Pacificsecurity.Thismighthappeninanumberofways.Ifweimaginecertainfuturescenariosiswhichweask‘WhathappenedtomakethegoodAsia–Pacificgo

1� Proceedings

bad?’thenitseemstomethereareseveralpossiblediscontinuitiesthatcouldhaveaprofoundlydestabilisingeffectontheregion.Iproposetolookbrieflyatfivesuchfuturistichistoricalplots:

1. theAsiainwhicha‘stew’ofnon‑traditionalsecurityissues—everythingfromenvironmentalpressures,tohighsex‑ratioimbalances,topandemics,ageingpopulationsandafailureofurbanisation—combinedtodrivetheregionintoprotractedcrisis

2. theAsiainwhichdomesticmodernisationderailedinkeyAsiancountries

3. theAsiainwhicheconomicinterdependencegavewaytoeconomiccompetition

4. theAsiathatslidintonuclearproliferationandaworldofnuclearhazard

5. theAsiathatfollowedthehistoricaltrajectoryofEurope’spastandfellintogreat‑powerconflict.

Ofthosefive‘shocked’Asias,thelasttwoaretheresultoftensionstypicaloftraditionalconflictpaths,butthefirstthreeemergefromfailuresinthebroaderagendaofdomesticdevelopmentpatterns,economicsandnon‑traditionalsecurity.Ithinktherelativebalancebetweenthedifferentsortsoffailures—thenarrow,traditionalandthebroad,non‑traditional—isactuallyaboutright.ThetraditionalsecuritypressuresarerelativelywellmanagedinAsia,largelybecauseofthesecuritystructureputinplaceaftertheSecondWorldWar,thecomparativestrategicweaknessofthemainAsianplayersoverthedecadessince,andthefactthatthetheatrewasa‘secondfront’duringtheColdWar.Ofcourse,thatsecuritystructureisdecaying,sosome‘shocked’Asiascanbeforeseendownthatpath.ButAsiansecurityhasforsomedecadeshadsomethingofabroader‘developmental’patterntoit,anditwouldbeentirelyreasonabletosupposethat

someBlackSwansmightemergewithinthatbroaderarena.

Allfiveshocksareaboutthingsthatgeneratebigwavesintheregionandpossiblybeyondit.Generatingbigwavesisnoteasytodo:Asiaisalargeregion,solargethatwehavetraditionallyseenitasasetofregionalsecuritysub‑complexes.Inthissense,Ihavenotattemptedtoinclude‘single‑state’failuresonthislistofshocks.Undoubtedly,somesingle‑statefailures—China’sfailure,forexample—couldbeprofoundlydisturbing.Butingeneral,Ihavetriedtoconcentratehereonbroaderpatternsofchangethatmightbeshocking.

First shock: the stew of non-traditional security pressures

Asiaistheworld’sgreatregionofsuccessfulmodernisation.Thesuccessofdevelopmentstrategiesacrossbroadswathesoftheregionhasenhancedlevelsofhumansecurityforhundredsofmillionsofpeople.Ithasalsoeasedperceptionsthatsecurityisazero‑sumgame.Modernisationhasdependedprominentlyuponstrategiesofurbanisationandindustrialisation.Urbanisationassiststheaccumulationofbothcapitalandlabourandsoiscentraltothedevelopmentpath.

ButitmightbeworththinkingaboutanAsiawherethosestrategiesweresubjecttosuddenreversal.InthatAsia,higheconomicdynamism‘eats’theenvironment,andenvironmentaloutcomesbecomesuddenlyacute:ascenariothatisnotentirelyfancifulgivenwhatweknowfrompreviousenvironmentalshiftpatterns.Wedoknowthatgreatpowerscanruintheirownenvironment:theUSSRdidso,sothereis,sadly,nothingtosuggestthatAsiangreatpowerswillautomaticallybeblessedwiththewisdomtoavoidsuchoutcomes.Moreover,weneedtoconsiderthispossibleoutcomeinthelightofhumanignorance


abouttheenvironmentoverall:weknowlessabouttheglobalenvironmentthananineteenth‑centuryphysicianknewaboutthehumanbody.Wesimplydon’tunderstanditsworkingswellenoughtoknowwhatactionscausewhateffects.Inthosecircumstances,rapidgrowthstrategiesforalargefractionoftheworld’spopulationmighteasilyinduceenvironmentalcrises.

UrbanisationitselfmaybreakdowninmanypartsofAsia.Asaworld,wearelongpastthetimewhenlargecitieswerethoughttorepresentthepinnacleofnationalgreatness.Manyofthemega‑citiesoftheworldtodayarenolongerliketheLondonandParisofyesteryear.Inmanypartsoftheworld,citiesattesttonationalweakness:Lagosisaprimeexample.WhenRobertKaplanwaswritingof‘thecominganarchy’,hedrewprominentlyupontheWestAfricanurbanconditionasametaphorforthefutureoftheworld:‘becausethedemographicrealityofWestAfricaisacountrysidedrainingintodenseslumsbythecoast,ultimatelytheregion’srulerswillcometoreflectthevaluesoftheseshanty‑towns.’4

Asia’sfuturesuccessstorydependsuponthelinkedstrategiesofurbanisationandmodernisationworking.Asia,simplybecauseofitspopulation,willhavemultiplemega‑cities,butglobalexperienceindesigning,constructingandmanagingmega‑citiesisstillrelativelylimited.

Asiaisalsobesetbyloomingdemographicproblems:ageingpopulations,the‘barebranches’5ofhighsex‑ratiosbecauseofthepreferenceformaleoffspring,andactualpopulationcontractionaredrivingseveralAsiancountriesintounfamiliardemographicterrain.Aregionalorglobalpandemicwhich,likethe1918Spanishflu,naturallytargetedtheyoungermembersofapopulation(thosewithlowerexposuretoavarietyofflustrainsduringtheirlives)mightwellposeserious

problemsfortheemergingdemographicprofilesintheregion.

Infact,thisfirst‘shocked’Asia,anAsiabesetbyastewofnon‑traditionalsecuritypressuresisactuallyarelativelyeasyonetoenvisage.ItisonethatDrAlanDupont,forexample,hasexploredinhisbook,EastAsiaImperilled.6Dupontarguesthatanewclassoftransnational,non‑militarythreatshasthepotentialtoreversedecadesofhard‑wondevelopmentacrosstheregion.Itisascenarioweshouldtakeseriously.

Second shock: domestic failures across Asia

TheimportanceofdomesticpoliticsinAsiansecurityisthethemebehindthelatestNationalBureauofAsianResearch’svolumeinitsStrategicAsiaseries.7Asia’sstrategicstabilityhasbeenlargelybaseduponasetofdomesticsuccessstories:storiesthat—inturn—areessentiallybasedupongeneralpatternsofregionalgoodgovernanceandnationaltransformation.Regionaldynamismisbasedatthemicro‑leveluponaninterlinkedpatternofnationaldynamism.

So,wemustlookatwhatmightconstituteasetofnationaldiscontinuities.AlmostallthemajorAsiancountriesareinsomekindofpoliticaltransitions,evenJapanandAustralia.Forsomeofthosecountries,thetransitionswillbedeeplytransformative.Overall,wearewitnessingamixofleadershipchange,institutionalalterationandimportantsocietalchangeacrosstheregion.Itisunclearwheremostofthosedevelopmentsareheaded.ThomasCarothersinanimportantarticlefortheJournalofDemocracyin2002arguedthatwewerewitnessing‘theendofthetransitionparadigm’.8Mostoftheregimesexperiencingtransitionalmodernisationpressureswould,Carothersargued,failtobecomematuredemocraciesandwouldliveforthelongterminapolitical‘grayzone’.

1� Proceedings

Australia’sformerSecretaryofDefence,MrRicSmith,presentedapaperinSingaporewhichinvestigatedsomepotentialchallengesfortheAsiansecurityenvironment.9Hisrangeofpossiblerisksincludedrisksof‘domesticpoliticalmanagement’,becauseagendasofeconomicreformhaveinmanycountrieseasilyoutpacedthedomesticpoliticalreformsthattypicallyaccompanythem.InChina,Vietnam,PakistanandBurma,forexample,thoserisksaremosteasilyseen;andinthosecountriesitisnotatallapparenthowpoliticalsystemscanevolveinstabilisingways.Beyondthosecases,thereisamuchbroaderswatheofcountrieswherepoliticaltransitionshavenotyetbeenconsolidated:Thailand,thePhilippinesandIndonesia,forexample.

Recentacademicresearchoninternationalsecurityhasledustoplaceanincreasedemphasisonregimetypesasakeydeterminantofconflictpatterns.SohowAsiandomesticpoliticsflexandadjustovercomingyearsisimportanttosecurityinabroadregionalsense,andnotmerelyalocalised,nationalone.InAsia,domesticprioritiesoftenshapeforeignandstrategicpolicies.China,forexample,hasbuiltaforeignpolicytosustainitsdomesticprioritiesofgrowthandstability.Inaregionwhichhasoftenembracedanon‑interventionprincipleinrelationtoissuesofdomesticpolitics,weareallsteadilybecomingmoreengagedinpreciselythosesortsofissues.Regionalsecuritycouldnothelpbutbeaffectedwereseveralregionalcountriestoslidebackwardsintoolder‑styleauthoritarianregimes.

Third shock: economic competition?; a new wave of protectionism?

SofarthepaceofeconomicdevelopmentinAsiahasbeenaclearpositivefactorforAsiansecurity.Puttingitsomewhatcrudely,theregionhasbeenreadytoagreetoforms

ofinterdependencewhereeverybodymakesmoney.Economicrelationshipshaveeasilyoutpacedsecurityrelationships.Tradehasbeenadriverofeconomicgrowth,and,inmanycases,adriverofpoliticalmodernisationaswell.Theregionasawholehasbeen‘drivenbygrowth’,touseJamesMorley’sphrase.10

Themaineffectofthatincreasinginterdependencehasbeen,principally,tosoftenasetofunresolvedhistoricalantagonisms.Butthishasnotbeenthecaseacrosstheboard:justtolookbrieflyatJapan’sowncase,forexample,Japan’seconomicintegrationwithitsneighbourshasincreasedbutJapan’slevelofsecurityseemstohaveworsenedasitsneighbours’economicpowerhasincreased.GeopoliticaloutcomeshavelongbeenaboutmorethaninterdependenceandthisremainstrueinAsiatoday.

Butjustastradeandinterdependencecanhavepositiveoutcomes,theycanalsospurnegativepolicyoutcomes,whichalsorippleintothesecurityarea.Sofartheregionhasside‑steppedafearaboutrelativegains,becauseofitspreferenceforabsolutegains(apolicypreferencetypicalofcountriesatalowlevelonthedevelopmenttrajectory).Butcanthatpreferencelast?Muchwouldseemtodependontheconditionofgreat‑powerrelationships.Underwhatcircumstancescansomeregionalpowersremainindifferenttotherapidescalationofothersintermsofpowerassets?ChristopherLayneoncewrotethateconomicgrowthrateswouldbethebasisforundoingunipolarityatthegloballevel.TheywillalmostcertainlybethebasisforanewregionalsecurityorderinAsia.

Soperceptionsofeconomicoutcomesmustbecomesharperasthosegrowthratesbegintosuggestamorefundamentalrearrangementoftheregionalsecurityorder.Inthatrearrangement,perceptionsof


economicgrowthasa‘win‑win’outcomewillstarttodeclineasperceptionsofashiftingordersuggestamoredefinitesetof‘winners’and‘losers’inAsia.

Thatsuggestthecurrentcondition,whereregionaltensionsaboutdifferentialgrowthratesaremuted,can’tlast.ItisalreadyapparentthatthekeyUS–Chinatradelinkisunderstress.TheUSTreasurySecretary,HenryPaulsonhasdescribedthelinkascharacterisedbythreedynamics:deepeninginterdependence,astrainedpolicyconsensus,andtheriseofeconomicprotectionism.11Henotedthat‘thetectonicplates’oftheUS–Chinaeconomicrelationshipwereshifting,asperceptionsofoutcomesbecamesharper.Thesamedynamicalreadycharacterisesmanyofthebilateraleconomicrelationshipsbetweentheregion’sgreatpowers.

Fourth ‘shock’: nuclear proliferation

TheAsia–Pacificregionhasgrownvigorouslyinanenvironmentwherethepressuresofnucleardynamismhavebeenrelativelycontained:containedbywhatMitchellReisswouldcallthe‘bridledambitions’ofmostregionalstates.12Thosebridledambitionshavebeenaugmentedbytwoparticularlyusefulmechanisms:theNuclearNon‑ProliferationTreaty(NPT)andtheassociatedelementsofthatregime;andtheUSdoctrineofextendednucleardeterrence(END).Butwhatwouldittakefortheambitionstobecomeunbridled?

Abreakdowninthecurrentpatternismostlikelytobedrivenbyafailureinoneorbothofthekeymechanismsoutlinedintheprecedingparagraph:

• Abreakdownoftheextendednucleardeterrencesystem,eitherthroughUSdisengagement(highlyunlikely)oranerosionofthecredibilityoftheUSguarantee(morelikely).

• AbreakdownoftheNPTregime,inparticularbythemoveofstatus‑quopowerstowardsthedevelopmentofindigenousnucleararsenals

– suchproliferationismostlikelytooccurinitiallyoutsidetheregion(e.g.intheMiddleEast),butwouldprobablynotremainisolatedthere.

TheAsiaPacificisalreadyamultipolarnuclearregion(withUS,Russia,China,India,Pakistan,and,perhaps,DPRKallrankedasnuclear‑weaponstates).Indeed,onlyBritainandFranceandIsraelstandasNWSoutsidetheregion.OfthecurrentAsianpowers,onlytheUShasever‘extended’nucleardeterrencetoothers,andthatsystemwasdevisedforadifferentworld.NewstrategicpressuresareflowingthroughAsia,theresultofamuchmorecomplexsecuritylandscape.Nuclearproliferationisaworryanditseffectsuncertain;toechoWilliamWalker’sjudgment,itmightreflectabreakdowninthestrategicorderaswellasinthenuclearone.Itmightalsogenerateanewsecurityordersocomplexastoundoanyprospectsforgreatpowercooperationonregionalpublicordergoods.

Nuclearproliferationmighthavesomestabilisingeffects.It’spossiblethatsomestrategicrivalriesmightbe‘contained’bythesoberingprospectsthatthoserivalriesmightescalateintocostlycontests.ButtherewouldbeanobviousedginesstointernationalpoliticsinAsiaweretheregiontohostperhapsdoublethenumberofnuclear‑weaponstatesthatitcurrentlydoes.Variationsinarsenalsizes,differentlevelsofvulnerabilitytopreemptivestrikes,asymmetriesinconventionalforcecapabilities,anduncertaintiesaboutnationalred‑lines,nuclearthresholdsandtargetingstrategieswouldallmakeforamoredangerousAsiaPacific.ThatAsiawouldbearegionrepletewithnuclearhazard.

�0 Proceedings

Fifth ‘shock’: great power conflict in Asia

Ithinkthis‘shock’haslongbeenaconcernofacademicsandinternationalrelationsscholars.InparticularitcallstomindAaronFriedberg’sscenario,thatAsia’sfuturemightbeEurope’spast.13Suchafuturewouldbeprofoundlyshapedbytheunreconciledgreat‑powertensionsinAsia.Theregionhasnohistoricalexperienceofallthegreatpowersbeingstrongsimultaneously,andnoexperienceofsystematisedsecuritycooperationbetweenthosepowers.

Weareinclinedtothinkofdiscontinuitiesasabruptevents,muchlikethesuddennessoftheterroristattackson9/11.Butinthisscenario,Ithinkthefundamentaldiscontinuitieswouldreflectshiftsinthedeep,slower‑movinglayersofinternationalrelations.Itmightplausiblybearguedthatadiscontinuitycouldstillbefundamentallyimportanteventhoughitassumedamoreprotractedform.Inthissense,forexample,thegradualbreakdownofRobertRoss’sbipolarAsiansecurity‘structure’(astructurecharacterisedbyadominantmaritimepowerandadominantcontinentalpower14)canbethoughtofasaparticularlyimportantdiscontinuity.Themovebythecontinentalpowerintothemaritimedomainiscertainlyaprofoundstrategicdevelopment,raisingasitdoesahostofissuesaboutpossibleconflictandcooperation.

ItiscertainlytruethattheAsiaofgreat‑powerconflictisnotdestinedtoarise.Ontheothersideofthebalancetotheforcesoutlinedabove,weneedtoplacethetwofactorsthatJohnIkenberrywouldtypicallyidentifyasconstraininggreat‑powerconflictacrosstheglobe:

• nuclearweapons

• theexistenceofanOECD‘system’thatismorethantheprominenceofasinglepower.

NuclearweaponsIhavespokenaboutearlier.TheOECD‘system’seemstopresupposethebroadcontinuanceoftheworldorderinitscurrentshape.Worldordersareslowtochange,butnotimmunefromchange.AtatimewhenglobalpowerisinanyeventshiftingtoAsia,itisentirelypossiblethatwearewitnessingthetransitiontoanewglobalorder,onelesscolouredbyWesternpreferences.

Greatpowerconflictisarelativelyrarething,especiallyifwetalkinparticularaboutthosegreatpowerconflictsthatdrawothersin(seeJackLevy’sidentificationofninesuch‘worldwars’intheinternationalsystemsince1475).15Butwhilegreat‑powerconflictisgenericallyrare,itisarelativelycommonthingattimesofmajorpowertransitions.AndsuchtransitionsnowloominAsia.

Implications for Australia and Japan

NoneoftheshockssketchedabovearewithinthecontrolofAustraliaorJapan,althougheachcountry,singlyandtogether,cananddopursuepoliciesintendedtoeasesomeoftheshocks.Wealreadydosomethingstooffsetthenon‑traditionalsecuritychallengesaroundtheregion,andthebilateralsecuritypactconcludedin2007providesaframeworkfordoingmore.Similarly,bothcountriesworktodeflectpressuresfornuclearbreakoutandtoreinforcethecurrentsetofnon‑proliferationnormsacrosstheregion.Webothworktoeasethecoming‘great‑powertransition’thatloomsinthenexttwentyyears,andsoworktoreducetheprospectsforgreat‑powerconflictintheregion.Ontheotherhand,wehavelittlescopetoaffecttheinternalpoliticaldynamicsofkeyplayers,regardlessofwhetherthosedynamicsconcernpoliticaladjustmenttothepressuresofmodernisationoremergingdemographicprofiles.

SomeoftheAsiasdepictedabovearewellbeyondourabilitytoshape.Butitwillremainimportantforourtwocountriestowork

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue �1

togetherinaregionthatpromisestobeamoreturbulentonethanwhatwehavebeenusedto.

Conclusion

TheAsiansecurityenvironmentdoeshaveadownsideaswellasanupside.I’veconcentratedhereon‘thingsthatmightgowrong’,ratherthan‘thingsthatmightgoright’.Thelatterwouldclearlybethesubjectofadifferentpaper.I’veconcentratedhereontwodifferentsortsof‘shocks’:theshocksofmodernisationasitwere,andtheshocksofinterstaterivalry.Theyarenotentirelydisconnected,thoughneitherdotheynecessarilycascadeintoeachother.Asadirectstrategicproblem,managingthecomplexpowertransitionsinAsialooklikelytobeoneofthekeyproblemsofourtime.Butwewillhavetomanagethosetransitionsaspartofanevenmorecomplextapestryofproblemsatboththeregionalandthegloballevels.

Endnotes

1 JamesShinn(2007)‘TrackingAsia’sBlackSwans’,RemarkspreparedfortheIISSGlobalStrategicReview,“ManagingGlobalSecurityandRisk”,Geneva7‑9September.Copyavailableathttp://www.iiss.org/conferences/global‑strategic‑review/plenary‑sessions/plenary‑session‑2

2 NassimNicholasTaleb(2007)TheBlackSwan:TheImpactoftheHighlyImprobable(NewYork:RandomHouse).Foratreatmentofthe‘grayswan’phenomenon,seeChapters14ff.

3 Taleb,p.213.

4 RobertKaplan(2000)TheComingAnarchy:ShatteringtheDreamsofthePostColdWar(NewYork:VintageBooks)p.12

5 ValerieHudsonandAndreadenBoer(2005)BareBranches:TheSecurity

ImplicationsofAsia’sSurplusMalePopulation(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress).

6 AlanDupont(2001)EastAsiaImperilled:TransnationalChallengestoSecurity(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress).

7 AshleyTellisandMichaelWills(2007)(eds.)StrategicAsia2007-08:DomesticPoliticalChangeandGrandStrategy(Seattle:NBR).

8 ThomasCarothers(2002)‘Theendofthetransitionparadigm’,JournalofDemocracy.13,1:5‑21

9 RicSmith(2007)‘AustraliaandAsia:ManagingChange,ManagingRisk’,RSISDistinguishedLecture,Singapore,26November.

10 JamesMorley(1998)(ed.)DrivenbyGrowth:PoliticalChangeintheAsia-PacificRegion(M.E.Sharpe).

11 HenryPaulson(2007)‘RemarksonManagingComplexityandEstablishingNewHabitsofCooperationinUS‑ChinaEconomicRelations’,2007GeorgeBushUS‑ChinaRelationsConference,23October.Availableathttp://treasury.gov/press/releases/hp633.htm

12 MitchellReissBridledAmbition:WhyCountriesConstraintheirNuclearCapabilities(Washington:WoodrowWilsonCenter).

13 AaronFriedberg(2000)‘WillEurope’spastbeAsia’sfuture?’Survival,42,3:147‑160

14 SeeRobertRoss(1999)‘TheGeographyofthePeace:EastAsiaintheTwenty‑firstCentury’,InternationalSecurity,23,4:81‑118

15 JackLevy(1983)WarintheModernGreatPowerSystem,1495-1975(Lexington:UniversityPressofKentucky).

�� Proceedings

Emerging Asia–Pacific security architectures:the Australia–Japan factorProfessor William T Tow Australian National University

Historicalshiftsininternationalsecurityrelationsoftenoccurunexpectedlyandambiguously.LordGrey’sfamouswarningattheoutsetoftheFirstWorldWarthat‘thelightsweregoingoutalloverEurope’hardlyanticipatedmonumentalchangeevokedbythedemiseofthatcontinent’scentury‑oldconcertsystemoforder‑building.NorhastheendoftheColdWar—contrarytotheexpectationsofmanyobservers—spelledtheendoftheAmerican‑ledEurasiannetworkofsecurityalliances.1Instead,NATOhasexpandedeastwardtounderwritetheemergenceofa‘newEurope’forgedfromtheoldSovietempire.TheUSpostwarsystemofbilateralPacificalliances,meanwhile,hasbeenrenovatedtohedgeagainstarisingPeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)andtoconfrontterrorism,nuclearproliferationandother‘asymmetricalthreats’.NearlytwodecadesafterthefalloftheUSSR,theUSalliancesystemremainsthemostcohesiveregionalsecuritymechanismoperatingintheAsiaPacific,withJapanandAustraliaconstitutingitstwokeycomponents.

Pressuresareintensifyingwithintheregion,however,tocomplementandeventuallytosupplantthisalliancesystemwithmoreregionallyindigenousorganisationsor‘architectures’.TheEastAsianSummit(EAS)hasperhapscapturedthemostattentionasalikelyinstrumentforshapingsuchchange.The‘ASEAN+3’(APT)processwasinitiallyaresponsebytheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),China,JapanandSouthKoreatoperceivedeconomicbarriersimposedbytheUnitedStates,theEuropeanCommunityandtheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)thatledtothe1997–98

AsianFinancialCrisis.2SomeAsianstates(i.e.Malaysia,IndonesiaandSouthKorea)resentedtheIMFviewthatthiscrisiswaslargelyprecipitatedbytheinefficienciesandinflexibilityofvariousmarket‑stateprocessesforwealthcreationandmanagementthatcharacterisemuchofEastAsia’seconomicgrowth.

Asaresult,aquestionaroseamongregionalpolicy‑plannersastowhetheritwas‘possibletocreatearegionalpoliticalarchitecturewhichwouldallowregionalelitestopromotetheirpreferredvisionsoftransnationalcooperationwhilesimultaneouslypreservingregionalautonomy?’3Inaddressingthatquestion,theAPTgraduallyevolvedintotheEastAsianSummit,whichinitiallyconvenedinDecember2005,inKualaLumpurandincludedthethirteenAPTstatesplusAustralia,NewZealandandIndia.ChinaandMalaysiaspearheadedan‘EastAsian‑centric’formulaforestablishingtheEASasanexclusivistorganisation,reflectinga‘blocpolitics’approachtoregionalpolitico‑securityidentity.Thisprovedtobeunsuccessful;Japan,SingaporeandIndonesiafoughteffectivelyfortheadoptionofamoreinclusive,‘pan‑Asian’modelforEASdevelopment.4Japan’sPrimeMinisterKoizumihadalreadyproposed(inJanuary2002)hisideaforan‘AsianCommunity’thatwouldemploytheAPTfor‘secur(ing)prosperityandstability’inEastAsiaandapply‘open,transparentandinclusiveprocesses’forinstitutionaldevelopment.5Koizumi’ssuccessor,ShinzoAbe,furtherrefinedKoizumi’svisionofopenregionalismbyaddingadistinctlyideologicalcomponenttoit.HisadvocacyforcreatingaEurasian‘arcoffreedomandprosperity’directlychallengedproponentsof‘Asianvalues’,andproscribedtheconsciousascendancyof‘emergingandmaturedemocracies’.6

TheAbegovernment’szero‑sumoutlookonregionalorganisation,embracingstate‑centricideologicalorientationasapredominant

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue ��

componentforsecurityorganisation,contestsASEAN’s(and,morerecently,China’s)traditionalblueprintforregionalsecurity.StrengtheningsecuritytieswithbothAustraliaandIndia,moreover,weredeemedasintegralbytheAbegovernment,andledtoJapaneseeffortstoforgea‘quadrilateral’securitycoalitioninvolvingAustralia,India,JapanandtheUnitedStates.However,theJapaneseexpectationthattheotherproposedaffiliateswouldembracethisformulaprovedtobeincorrect.OnlytheUnitedStatesseriouslycontemplatedoperationalisingAbe’svision;AustraliaandIndiawerewaryofit.TheAbegovernment’spassinginSeptember2007wasabenchmarkinJapaneseregionalsecuritydiplomacy.BylateNovember,Japan’snewPrimeMinister,YasuoFukukdawasstronglyendorsingaten‑year‘ASEANPlusThreeCooperationWorkPlan’thatwouldunderwritethecreationofanASEANCommunityby2015andpromotesecuritycommunity‑buildingthroughboththeAPTandtheASEANRegionalForum(ARF).7ThevestigesofanyJapanese‘containmentrevisited’strategydirectedtowardChinawereclearlyburiedwhenFukudavisitedChinainlateDecember.Hesupportedwhathetermeda‘strategicallyreciprocalpartnership’betweenChinaandJapan.HealsopositedthattheUS–Japanalliancebestworkedasa‘contributortopeaceandstabilityintheregion,whichmeanscordialandopenrelationswithallnationsintheregion.’8

ThischapterwillinitiallyidentifyandassessthosepolicyinterestsandquestionsthatbothcurrentlyuniteandpotentiallycomplicateAustralian–Japaneseinteractiononregionalsecurityarchitectures.Thetwocountries’respectiveallianceswiththeUnitedStates,theirrelationswithChina,andselected‘transnational’or‘alternativesecurity’issuesareassessed.ItwillthenbrieflyevaluatehowandwhyAustraliaandJapanhavepursuedmultilateralsecurityandeconomic‑security

politicsandtowhatextentthatpursuithasbeensuccessful.Thechapter’sconclusionofferspolicyrecommendationsthatCanberraandTokyocouldponderregardingfuturecollaborationinregionalsecuritycommunitybuildingwithoutunderminingtheirstillhighlyvaluedbilateralalliancetieswiththeUnitedStates.

Architectural dynamics: background and challenges

Disagreementprevailsoverwhatactuallyconstitutes‘securityarchitecture’.WhenproposingaConferenceonSecurityCooperationinAsia(CSCA)inJuly1990,AustralianForeignMinisterGarethEvansenvisioned‘awhollynewinstitutionalprocessthatmightbecapableofevolving,inAsiajustasinEurope,asaframeworkforaddressingandresolvingsecurityproblems.’9However,whatspecificorganisingprinciplesshouldbeappliedtorealisesuchaprocessremainscontested.Evans’visionofincorporatingaEuropeanmodel(theConferenceforSecurityCooperationinEurope,CSCE)toaddressAsiansecurityproblemswasnotreceivedfavourablybymanywithinAsia.ManyAsianelitescontinuedadherencetorealistthought,comfortablewiththeirexistingnotionsofinternationalhierarchyandconvincedthatnewpowerblocsortacitgreatpowerconcertswouldprevailovernorm‑basedregionalinstitutionsinthepost‑ColdWarAsiansecurityenvironment.ASEAN’svisionofAsianinstitutionalism,allegedlypredicatedonregionallyindigenousvalues,neverfullytookholdasSoutheastAsianelitesinsteadhedgedbetweenaccommodatingandbalancingChineseandAmericanpower.10

Whileaprecisedefinitionof‘architectures’hascontinuedtoeluderegionalpolicy‑makersandanalysts,debateoverhowtoshapeandrefinethemhasintensified.By2007,SoutheastAsianpolicyleaderswerereferringtoarchitecture‑buildingasembodying‘…a

�4 Proceedings

loose,overlappingpatternofpartnershipsformedaroundfunctionalareasofinterestwithvaryingmembershipsandvaryingagendas’.11Criticsofthisviewarguethatapreoccupationwithcraftingnewandincreasinglycomplicated‘architectures’merelyobfuscatesthetaskofintegratingthemanyinstrumentalitiesandmechanismsalreadyestablishedinwaysthatwouldbetterensureregionalstability.12Norealconsensushasyetmaterialised,however,onwhatstrategycanbestservethatpurpose.AsintegralparticipantsatboththebilateralandmultilaterallevelsofAsia–Pacificsecuritypolitics,however,JapanandAustraliacanplayakeyroleinreconcilingtheregion’svariousperspectivesofappropriatesecuritypolicyinfrastructure.

Intra-alliance management

AfirststepistoidentifyareasofpotentialcomplementaritybetweenthetraditionalUSbilateral‘hubandspokes’regionalalliancenetworkandtheregion’sburgeoningmultilateralsecurityforums.ThiswillnotbeeasyaschallengesrelatedtoshiftingnationalsecurityinterestsandtraditionalUSresistancetomultilateralsecuritypoliticsintheregionmustbeovercome.BothAustraliaandJapan,moreover,havenewnationalleaderships(theRuddandFukudagovernments,respectively)whiletheUnitedStatesisnowimmersedinanationalelectionprocessthatrenderstheBushadministrationlesseffectiveinformulatinglong‑termUSnationalsecuritypolicyfortheremainderofitsterm.

Althoughinpoweronlyashorttime,thenewAustralianGovernmentledbyKevinRuddhasalreadydemonstrateditszealforenvironmentalpolitics.IthasratifiedtheKyotoaccordand,ofmoresymbolicconsequencetoJapan,ismonitoringadherencetointernationalanti‑whalingaccordsintheAntarctic.13Japaneseofficials

warnedthattheywould‘nottolerateanymovestoobstructourresearchwhalingprogram’beforebackingdowntointernationalpressureandpromisingtosuspenditskillingofhumpbackwhales.14Also,inamoveperceivedasarefutationoftheBushadministration’sMiddleEastpolicy,RuddhasservednoticethatAustraliawillbewithdrawingitscombatforcesfromIraqduring2008.

TheFukudagovernment’ssofterlineonthePRCrelativetotheKoizumi–Abeadministrationshasalreadybeennoted.ThismodifiedJapaneseposturetowardsChina—thecountrythatmostobserversviewtobetheburgeoning‘peercompetitor’toAmericanpowerandinfluenceinAsia—rendersdoubtfulanyprospectfor‘threatoriented’,multilateralsecurityarrangementssuchasthequadrilateralcoalitionofdemocracies,initiallyenvisionedbyAbeandstronglysupportedbykeyBushadministrationofficialssuchasVice‑PresidentDickCheney.JapanesedomesticpoliticalinfightinghasalsospilledovertoimpedeFukuda’sabilitytosustainJapanesenavalrefuellingsupporttoUSmilitaryoperationsinAfghanistan.Althoughlegislationwaseventuallypassedinmid‑January2008torevivethisoperation,theepisodehighlightedJapan’sgrowinginternalpoliticaldivisionsoversupportingUSglobalstrategyrelativetoJapaneseconstitutionalrestraintsondefencepolicy.15

Intra‑alliancepolicymanagementisthusbecomingamoredifficultundertakingforallthreegovernments.Ongoing,‘functional’,alliancecollaborationcontinuesamongthethreealliesinsuchareasasmissiledefenceresearchandtesting,maritimepatrollingofkeysealanesofcommunicationandintelligence‑sharing.Withoutwidespreadconsensusoverwhatconstitutesthe‘generalinterest’ofallianceaffiliation,however,thetaskconfrontingpolicy‑makersinAustralia,JapanandtheUnitedStatesof‘bridging’


existingbilateralandmultilateralframeworksinwaysthatcanproducerobustapproachestoshapingregionalstabilitybecomesmoredifficult.16

TraditionalUSresistancetomultilateralsecuritypoliticsintheregioncompoundssuch‘bridging’difficulties.ThiswasinitiallyillustratedbyGeorgeHWBush’sadministration’sstrongoppositiontoGarethEvans’CSCAproposal.WorriedthatitwouldfocusonarmscontrolmeasuresthatcouldlimitUSnavalpowerinthePacific,anddisillusionedbytheSoutheastAsiaTreatyOrganization’s(SEATO’s)failuretoreplicateNATO’sbrandofAmerican‑dominatedmultilateralisminEurope,USSecretaryofStateJamesBakerrequestedthatAustraliawithdrawitsproposal.Baker’srequestwassupportedbythethenJapanesegovernment,concernedthatanyintensificationofmultilateralsecuritypoliticswouldweakentheUScommitmenttoitsbilateralsecuritytreatywithJapan.17

Littlehassincechanged.GeorgeWBush’sadministrationhasstronglysignalleditspreferenceformaintainingahubandspokesalliancestrategyinAsiaaspartofitsbroadercampaigntobalancepotentialcontendersforhegemonyintheAsiaPacific(e.g.containingChinaorcollaboratingselectivelywithIndia).USDeputySecretaryofStateJohnNegroponteinsistedinMay2007testimonybeforetheUSHouseofRepresentatives’CommitteeonForeignAffairsthattheongoingUSstrategicpresenceanditsbilateralalliancesremainedthe‘bedrock’ofitsAsiapolicy.18

USskepticismof‘cooperativemultilateralism’stemsfromWashington’spastproblemsinaddressingkeyAsia–Pacificregionalsecuritycrisesinthepost‑ColdWarera.The1994NorthKoreannuclearcrisisandthesubsequentfailureoftheKoreaEnergyDevelopmentOrganization(KEDO)regime

toinduceacceptableNorthKoreannuclearpolicybehaviour,forexample,clearlyswayedtheGeorgeWBushadministrationtorejectPresidentClinton’sgrowingrelianceonmultilateralAsiansecuritydialogues.MorerecentAmericanperceptionsthatChinahasemployedmultilateralsecuritydiplomacyviaits‘NewSecurityConcept’tocontestUSstrategicinfluenceintheregion,andChina’sinitiativewithRussiaandvariousCentralAsianstatestoformtheShanghaiCooperationOrganizationasacountertoNATOactivitiesinAfghanistanareillustrativeofUSconcerns.19

BoththeClintonandGeorgeWBushadministrationshavebeenlessreluctanttoexploreavariantofmultilateralsecuritycooperationinAsiaknownas‘minilateralism’.Asdefinedhere,‘minilateral’arrangementsare‘adhoc’policycoalitions,usuallyinvolvingthreeorfourcorestates,whomaybebutarenotalways,alliedformallybutwhoaffiliatetoresolveaspecificissueorissues.Minilateralsmaydifferfromclassicalalliancesbecausetheyarenotalways‘threat‑centric’andindeedoftenunderwriteorperpetuatestrategicreassuranceorconfidence‑buildingarrangements.20Theyarefrequentlyregarded,however,asusefulmechanismsforcoordinatingmutualinterests‘beyondbilateralism’whensuchcoordinationpromisestomaximisetheircollectivestrategicpositionwithinaregionalorglobalbalanceofpower.Minilateralsecuritycooperationismostlikelytooccurwhenpotentialrivalstominilateralistpartnersarenotyetsothreateningastoprecludeconfidence‑buildingandotherformsofcooperativesecuritybehaviour.21

Earlypost‑ColdWar‘minilaterals’inAsiaweremainlydesignedundersuchcircumstances.TheyincludedKEDO,theUS–Japan–SouthKoreaTrilateralandOversightGroup(TCOG)tocoordinatediplomacytowardPyongyangfollowingtheNorthKoreanTaepodong

�� Proceedings

missiletestin1998,theFourPowersTalksonstabilisingtheKoreanPeninsulaand‘JakartaWorkshop’participants(ChinaandASEANclaimants)toaddressterritorialdisputesintheSouthChinaSea.TheTrilateralStrategicDialogue(TSD),createdin2002andupgradedtotheministeriallevelin2005,isanotherexample.RepresentedbyAustralia,JapanandtheUnitedStatesasamechanismforstrengtheningtheexchangeandcoordinationoftheirapproachesto‘non‑traditional’aswellasthreat‑centricregionalandinternationalsecurityproblems,theTSDisnevertheless‘threat‑centric’totheextentthatChinesepowerandtheNorthKoreanthreatareinevitablydiscussedinthisforum.Thequestionoftowhatextentthisdialoguewillmaturebeyondthe‘talkingshop’stageofministersortheirimmediatesubordinatestodevelopaconcretegeneralpurposeandcorrespondingorganisationalattributesisstillanopenone.22

MinilateralismarguablyreplicatestheexclusivistandhierarchicalcharacteristicsoftheUS‑ledbilateralalliancenetworkintheAsiaPacific.The‘senior’ormostpowerfulallyusuallyinitiatesasecuritycoalitioninresponsetoanissueorcrisisthatisofdirectconcerntoitself.Thereisusuallynoindependentsecretariatorotherexecutivecomponentestablishedtorepresentornegotiatepossibledifferencesthatmayariseamongminilateralaffiliates.ThepossibletransformationoftheSixPartyTalksformatintoamorepermanentNortheastAsianRegionalPeaceandSecurityStructuremay,however,constituteatestofhowwellminilateralgroupingsformedtomanageaparticularsecurityissue—inthiscasetheNorthKoreannuclearproblem—canevolveintoabrandofmultilateralsmcapableofaddressingawiderrangeofAsia–Pacificsecurityissues.

Australia, its alliances and the ‘China factor’

ForAustraliannationalsecurityplanners,reconcilingongoingAmericanandJapanesepropensitiestoapplyminilateralismasameansofstrengtheningalliancepoliticswithChina’sobviousapprehensionsoverthistrendisessential.Oneanalysthasrecentlyandaptlyoutlinedthisproblem:bilateralAustralia–JapansecuritylinkscandevelopinparallelwiththesetwocountriesexistingbilateralsecurityallianceswiththeUSonlyifallthreestatesshareperceptionsandinterestsofregionalsecurity,andifWashingtondoesnotpromotea‘miniatureNATO‑typeorganisation’designedtocontainChina.23AustraliadoesnotviewitsAmericanalliance,oritsincreasinglyrobustbilateralsecurityrelationshipwithJapan,ascomponentsofacontainmentposturedirectedtowardChina.Australia’stradingrelationshipwiththePRCisexpandingdramatically.Thus,the‘Chinafactor’isakeydimensionofthenewAustralianLaborgovernment’sefforttoremain‘agoodUSally’buta‘moreindependentone.’KevinRuddsignalledconsistentlyduringhisOctober/November2007electioncampaignthathewillbelesspronetoendorsenearlyeveryUSpositiononinternationalsecuritythanwashisimmediatepredecessor.24

FromtheTrilateralSecurityDialogue’soutsetin2002,Chineseofficialsandanalystshavedirectedlow‑keycriticismtowardsitasapotentialinstrumentofanti‑Chinacontainment.25TheybecameespeciallyconcernedwhenTSDconsultationswerescheduledtoconveneduringtheSeptember2007AsiaPacificEconomicCooperation(APEC)summitandbytheprospectthatthosediscussionswouldendorseaninitiativetoexpandtheTSDintoaquadrilateralallianceinvolvingIndia.ChinesePresidentHuJintaohadalreadyexpressedhispersonaldispleasureover‘exploratory


sidetalks’heldbetweenIndiaandtheTSDstatesduringtheASEANRegionalForum(ARF)securitypolicymeetinginManilaon24–25May2007.26He subsequentlyengineeredadiplomaticcounter‑initiativetoneutralisetheTSDbypersuadingtheHowardgovernmenttoannounceabilateralSino–AustralianstrategicdialogueatAPEC.27Althoughthisinitiativewaslaunchedwithsomefanfare,itshouldbenotedthatJapanandtheUnitedStateshavelongmaintainedseparatebilateraldialogueswiththePRC.Thetimingandeffectoftheannouncementwas,however,assignedgreateremphasisbythePRCthanwhateveractualsubstancesuchSino–Australiandialoguemightyield.

AskeyregionalUSallies,howJapanandAustraliarelatetoAsiancrisisspotsor‘flashpoints’iscarefullyobservedbyand,whenpossible,influencedbyWashington.TaiwanandNorthKorearemainthetwomajorunresolvedregionalsecurityissuesemanatingfromtheColdWar.Accessiblesealanesofcommunicationarealsoamainconcern,asarenuclearproliferationandregionallinkstointernationalterrorism.DuelargelytouncompromisingChineseinsistencethatTaiwanremainsastrictlyinternalaffair;thefateofthatislandpolityhasnotbeenincorporatedintoregionalmultilateralsecurityagendas.Chinahasworkedassiduously,forexample,toprecludeanydiscussionoftheTaiwanStraitatAPEC’sHeads‑of‑Statesummits.

ThequestionofwhatJapanandAustraliawouldactuallydoifthePRCweretoattackTaiwan,however,isverymuchaliveasacentralissueofAmericanalliancepoliticsinthePacific.ThisissuedrawsattentiontotheoverridingrelevanceoftheUSbilateralalliancenetworkovernascentmultilateralsecuritygroupingsintheregion.Thelatterhavenotthusfarbeenabletogeneratesufficientlyrobustmechanismstoensurethatconfidence‑buildingandcrisisresolution

willprevailoverclassicalpowerbalancingscenariossuchasaSino–AmericanwarexplodingintheTaiwanStrait.Thisrealityhasbeenincreasinglyself‑evidentoverthepastfewmonthsandyears.InFebruary2005,JapanincurredBeijing’swrathbyagreeingtoanexplicitreferencetothestabilityoftheTaiwanStraitasa‘common[JapaneseandAmerican]strategicobjective.’28

USbasingoperationsinJapan(andespeciallyatKadenaAirBaseinOkinawa)constitutethenearestconcentrationofUSmilitarypowertotheStrait(approximately350nauticalmiles,31/2sailingdays,fromtheStrait)andaretheprimarystagingpostformovingUScarrierforcesintotheEastChinaSea.DespitetheFukudagovernment’srecenteffortstorepairSino–JapanesetensionswhichintensifiedundertheKoizumi/Abegovernments,itishighlyunlikelythatitwoulddefyUSexpectationsthatJapanprovidetransitfacilitiesandlogisticalsupportinanyfutureSino–AmericanwaroverTaiwan.29

MajorAustralianportsandbases(exceptDarwin)aremorethan4,000milesfromTaiwan.Thisdistance,combinedwiththefactthatAustralia’sgeopoliticalorientationismorewithJapan,theUSandthewiderPacificthanwithChina,wouldinitiallyappeartoprecludeAustralianforcesplayingamajorroleinsupportofanyUSmilitaryoperations.30ThemostfundamentalconcernregardingAustralianinvolvementinaTaiwancontingency,however,ishowintenseUSpressurewouldbeforAustraliatoprovidemilitarysupport.WhilevisitingBeijinginAugust2004,AustralianForeignMinisterAlexanderDownerpubliclysurmisedthattheAustralian–Americanallianceor‘ANZUS’didnotnecessarilycoversituationsapartfromdirectattacksonthesignatories’homelands.Hewasimmediately‘corrected’byAmericanofficialsandbyPrimeMinisterJohnHowardonthisinterpretation.ThisepisodeillustratedtheextenttowhichWashingtoninsiststhat

�� Proceedings

anattackonitsownforcesinthePacifictriggersacommitmentforalliedresponse.31ThelandslidevictoryoftheTaiwanNationalistPartyinTaiwan’sJanuary2008legislativeelectionsandthestrongprospectofasimilarvictoryinthatisland’spresidentialelectioninlateMarchcouldatleasttemporarilydefusetheSino–TaiwanesetensionsprecipitatedbythearguablyseparatistpostureschampionedbyTaiwan’sDemocraticProgressiveParty(DDP)government.USpressureonAustralia’sown‘hedging’strategycouldlikewisebeeduced.

Multilateralism and transnational security

Theascensionofinternationalterrorismandother‘asymmetricalthreats’asaleadingconcernofstrategicpolicy‑plannershasbeenaccompaniedbyaninterestinhowmultilateralframeworkscanbeemployedtoneutralisethem.Asoneobserverhasrecentlynoted,theBushadministrationhasengagedinsuchmultilateralsecurityinitiativesastheProliferationSecurityInitiative(PSI),theSixPartyTalks,andtheARFandhasproposedotherssuchasthe(unsuccessful)RegionalMaritimeSecurityInitiative(RMSI).Washington’smultilateralcommitmentsandinteractions,however,havebeenlargelyandcorrectlyviewedbyotherAsia–Pacificstatesas‘US‑centric.’32AmajorquestionwhichconfrontstheUSanditsregionalalliesiswhethertheyarepreparedtomodifytheUnitedStates’historicalinsistenceonmanagingkeyregionalsecurityissues.33‘Traditional’orstate‑centricsecurityissuesarestillmarkedbyhighdegreesoftensionandmistrust;‘non‑traditional’orasymmetricalproblemscouldprovidethebasisfordevelopingprecedentsforgreatersecuritycooperationinmultilateralforums.

Evidenceisgrowingthatsuchisgraduallybecomingthecase.Withinaweekfollowing

the26December2004SouthAsiantsunami,USmilitaryofficialsspearheadedthecreationofthe‘CoreGroup’,initiallycomprisingtheUS,Australia,Canada,Japan,IndiaandtheNetherlands,toestablishmilitaryandcivilianassistanceprogramstothevictimsofthatnaturaldisaster.34Variousgeopoliticalrationalesaccompaniedthisgenuinelyhumanitarianresponse.AustraliaandtheUnitedStatesweregiventheopportunityto‘makeamajoranti‑terrorismandrelationship‑buildinginvestmentinIndonesia,acountryindispensabletoregionalsecurityandtheglobalwaronterrorism.’35AtruceimposedovertheprotractedinsurgencyconflictinAcehwasashort‑termbyproductoftheIndonesianGovernmentwishingtoappearcommensuratelybenign.JapanandIndiabothentertainedcalculationsthattheirprominenceintsunamidisasterreliefoperationswouldtranslateintogreatersupportforpermanentUNSecurityCouncilmembership.36Thefundamentaloutcomeofthisreliefeffort,however,wasmorenormativethanmaterial.ItpositedacommonidealismsharedbyAustralia,JapanandtheUnitedStatesas‘like‑mindedstates’defined,asThomasWilkinsputit,‘bywhattheystandfor…’.37

NormativepreferencesarealsoreflectedinthetextoftheMarch2007Australia–JapanDeclarationonSecurityCooperation.38Most‘areasofcooperation’intheDeclarationandthe‘ActionPlan’thathasemanatedfromitarerelatedtotransnationalsecurityconcerns:lawenforcementagainsttransnationalcrime,bordersecurity,peaceoperations,humanitarianoperationsandcoordinationagainstpandemics.Counter‑terrorismandcounter‑proliferationagainstweaponsofmassdestructionarearguablytransnationalincontext,involvingdiplomaticaction,institutionalsupportandtechnicalcapabilitiesthatarenotexclusivelystate‑centricincharacterbutrequireexpandedmultilateral


coordination.ThelanguageoftheDeclarationwashardlycoincidentalinthisregard.

RecentpatternsofAustralia–Japansecuritycooperationhaveassumedadistinctlytransnationalflavour,includingpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingoperationsinIraq,AfghanistanandEastTimor;aidtoSouthPacificmicrostates,pollutioncontrol,environmentalassistancetoIndonesia,climatechangeandenergysecurity,jointpre‑deploymenttrainingforpeaceoperationsandmutualparticipationinurbansearchandrescuetrainingexercises.39RecentAustralian–JapanesedifferencesoverJapan’s‘scientific’whalingoperationsintheSouthernOceanconstituteamajorchallengeforbothcountries’leaderships.Thischallengemustbefinessedtoassurerespectiveelectorates’supportforcontinuedorintensifiedsecuritycollaborationintheseareasoftransnationalsecuritypolicy.

Responding to Asia–Pacific multilateral security politics

DespitetheirfundamentalinvolvementintheUSColdWaralliancesystem,cooperationbetweenAustraliaandJapaninmultilateralsecurityarenasclearlyprecededtheendofthatstruggle.Bothcountrieswere,from1965to1975,membersoftheAsianPacificCouncil(ASPAC)formedtopromotedemocraticvaluesandgreatersocio‑economiccohesionintheregion.JapanwasalessenthusiasticparticipantthanAustraliainthisgroupingduetoitsapprehensionsthatitwouldforgeintoamilitaryorganisation(an‘AsianNATO).Bothstatesperceivedlittleutility,however,insustainingASPACfollowingtheenunciationoftheNixonDoctrinein1969,andtheUnitedStatesrapprochementwiththePRCin1971–1972,thatisolatedTaiwan(anASPACmember)anddefusedthetacitcontainmentrationalesthathadpreviouslyshapedmuchofASPAC’sstrategicpurpose.40Australiahasmaintainedlong‑standingdefencecontacts

ontheMalayanPeninsula,initiallythroughtheCommonwealthStrategicReserve,theAnglo–MalayanDefenseAgreementand,since1971,throughtheFivePowerDefenseArrangements.41Asitspostwareconomiccapabilitiesgrew,Japanintermittentlylaunchedmultilateralsecurity‑relateddiplomacyinitiativesthatwerereceivedwithvaryingdegreesofsuccess:PrimeMinisterTakeoFukuda’s‘heart‑to‑heartdiplomacy’initiativetowardASEANstatesin1977designedtostrengthenASEANresilienceintheimmediateaftermathoftheVietnamWar;ForeignMinisterTaroNakayama’sproposaltopromoteregionalmultilateralsecuritydialoguesinJuly1991withintheASEANPost‑Ministerialframework,andcooperativesecuritydiplomacyemanatingfromtheHiguchiReportinAugust1994.42

NeitherAustralianorJapanwaspronetosupplantingtheircorebilateralalliancerelationshipswiththeUnitedStates.However,bothcountrieswereintentnottobeshutoutfromwhateverindigenousregionalsecuritycommunity‑buildingprocessesmightemergeastheColdWardrewtoaclose.NordidtheywishtoseetheirseniorAmericanallymarginalisedfromAsiabecause,asmaritimepowerssituatedontheperipheriesofthatcontinent,anysuchdevelopmentwoulddecreasetheirownstrategicleveragewithinit.43ThisreflectedwhatcouldbeviewedasabrutalpolicydilemmaconfrontingbothAustralianandJapanesepolicy‑makers.BothAustraliaandJapanwereobviousbeneficiariesofthelargelyhierarchical‘hub‑and‑spokes’alliancesystemmaintainedbyWashingtonduringtheColdWar,extractinggreaterregionalinfluencebyvirtueoftheircloseaffiliationwithAmericanpower.Preciselyduetothataffinity,however,bothcontinuedtoberegardedasregionalproxiesforUSinterestsonsuchissuesasEastTimor,theChina–Taiwandispute,ethnicandreligiousgrievancesandAsianinstitution‑building.

�0 Proceedings

ThismadeitharderforthesetwoAmericanalliestobeviewedasgenuineparticipantsinbuildingAsia’sregionalistidentityandshapingitsprocesses.Theirearlypost‑ColdWareffortstoselltheirregionalneighboursonthebenefitsof‘openregionalism’bynominatinganAmerican‑endorsedAPECasthepreferredcommunity‑buildingmechanismfellonlargelydeafears,particularlyintheaftermathofthe1997–98AsianFinancialCrisis.ThesavinggracetodateisthatmoreexclusivistmodelspursuedbyChina,Malaysiaandotherstatesfavouringthe‘EastAsian’modeloverthe‘Pan‑Asian’visionhavearguablybeennomoresuccessfulinfosteringtheirown,oftendisparatevisionsofwhatanAsiansecuritycommunityactuallyshouldbe.44

CompoundingAustralia’sandJapan’sdifficulties‘fittingintotheregion’havebeentheirrecenteffortstoreconstitutetheirpolitico‑securityagendasinwaysthataccommodatetheirgeographywithoutcompromisingtheirrespectiveallianceswiththeUS.AustralianForeignMinisterGarethEvansspearheadedtheHawke/KeatingLaborgovernment’seffortsduringtheearly1990stoapplya‘middlepower’strategytolinkAustraliandiplomaticandsecurityinterestswithregionalmultilateralsecurityinitiatives.HisCSCAproposalforamultilateralsecuritydialoguewasverysimilartotheaforementionedNakayamainitiative.Itwasclearlyintendedasaregionalcoalition‑buildingstrategythatwouldestablishAustraliaasa‘competent’yetindependentmemberofaburgeoningAsia–Pacificsecuritycommunity.Criticsarguedthat‘middlepowerpolicy’limitedAustralia’sinfluencewithinandbeyondtheregion.Instead,theyassertedAustraliashouldplaytheroleofa‘pivotal’powerbetweendevelopedandunderdevelopedcountriesandnotmerelybesatisfiedwithstakingaclaimasalegitimateor‘acceptable’regionalsecurityplayer.45Thiscriticismwastakentoheart

bytheHowardgovernmentinitseffortsto‘reinvigorate’theAmericanalliance.Itarguedduringthe1996electioncampaignthatthealliancehadbeenneglectedbyLabor,andAustraliamustrectifywhatitperceivedtobean‘imbalanced’diplomaticandnationalsecurityposturetooweightedtowardAsia.

IfAustraliahasattemptedtoreconcilealliancepoliticsandmultilateralsecuritydiplomacybypursuingdiverseapproachesforbecomingamorecredibleAsia–Pacificactor,Japanhasassignedgreaterpredominanceto‘hedging’itsalliancewiththeUnitedStatesagainstanincreasinglypowerfulAsia.RichardSamuelshascharacterisedthisasJapan’s‘newgrandstrategy’:buildingupitsdefencecapabilitiesonlytotheextentrequiredtowarrantasustainedUScommitmenttoJapanesesecurity,whilesimultaneously‘buildinganEastAsianCommunitythatresemblesthestable,prosperous,economicallyintegratedWesternEuropeandthatisbuiltonaJapanesecommitmenttothevaluesofdemocracyandfreedom’.46

Tokyo’spreferredvisionofmultilateralsecurityandeconomiccooperationisapan‑AsiancommunitythatwouldenmeshUSpolitico‑economicinterestsintheregionwithinnormsandinstitutionstailoredtosafeguardJapanesetradingintereststhroughoutAsiaandbeyond.Chinese,AmericanandEuropeanmarketingcompetitionwouldberegulatedunderaregionalarchitectureunderwritingwhatcouldbeviewedasJapanesequasi‑mercantiliststrategypromotedundertheguiseof‘regionalcommunity‑building’.AresuscitatedAPECorapan‑AsianversionofanEastAsianCommunitythatcultivates‘openregionalism’byactuallytolerating‘soft’formsoftradeprotectionism(selectedandintermittentbilateralorregionaltradepreferenceagreements)wouldconformtothisJapanesevisioninwaysthatmaybemorepalatabletotheUSandAustralian


policy‑makers.AnAsianRegionalBankunderTokyo’sleadershipwouldbeamoreovertandthereforelessacceptableformofJapaneseneo‑mercantilism,generatingWesternfearsthatitwouldcoordinatetheriseofaneconomicprotectionistblocunderJapaneseorjointJapanese–Chineseleadership.

Thislatterprospectwasembodiedinthe‘MiyazawaPlan’,namedafterJapan’sthenforeignministerwhoproposeddifferentversionsofitduringandfollowingtheAsianFinancialCrisis.ThePlanwasrejectedbecauseWashington(throughtheInternationalMonetaryFundorIMF)developedtangibleapprehensionsaboutanAsianinitiativetodefectfromtheexistingsystemofglobaleconomicmanagementduringthattime.Japan,absorbingthehardlessonsaboutexertingitsinterestsindependentlyofitsseniorsecurityally,preventedasimilarChineseblueprintfortheEASfromemergingatthatgrouping’sinauguralmeetinginKualaLumpurinDecember2005.47Asia–Pacificcommunity‑buildingprocesses,fromJapan’sperspective,muststrikeadelicatebalance.TheyshouldensurethatUScooperationandsupportforJapan’ssecurityandprosperityisnotundermined.Simultaneously,however,theymustalsocounterbalancetheprospectthattheUSwillexploitAsianeconomicweaknesstodevelopcomparativeadvantagesinregionaltradeandexcessivegeopoliticalhubris(atJapan’sexpense).TheymustcurbthepotentialhegemonicthreatnowrepresentedbyChineseeconomicgrowthtolong‑standingJapan’seconomicprosperityanditspoliticalinfluencewithboththeUnitedStatesanditsregionalneighbours.

Ascanbediscernedfromtheabovediscussion,bothAustraliaandJapanhaveoscillatedbetweenembracingmultilateralsecurityanddistancingthemselvesfromthatapproachinpursuitofregionalsecurity.Australiahasattemptedtoreconcileallianceandmultilateralpoliticsbycultivatingan

elusivebalancebetweenbeingaloyalandvaluedAmericanallyandestablishingamorecommitted‘regionalist’posturethroughmiddlepowerdiplomacy.However,PrimeMinisterJohnHoward’sextraordinarypersonalrelationshipwithUSPresidentGeorgeBushthatintensifiedafter9/11underminedanychanceofthatbalancebeingperceivedascrediblebyAsianstatesandleaders.48DespitetheexplosivegrowthofSino–AmericantradetiesandAustralia’saccessiontoASEAN’sTreatyofAmityandCooperation(TAC)asapreconditionforitwinningaseatattheEAStable,theoveralltrendsinAustralianforeignpolicydidnotreflectprioritisationofAsianmultilateralismwithinCanberra’sdecision‑makingcouncils.AustralianmilitarypersonnelwerequicklydispatchedtoAfghanistanafter9/11andtoIraqaspartoftheMarch2003US‑ledinvasionofthatcountryinthecontextofAustraliapursuingamore‘globalist’strategicpostureasarequiredcomponentofalliancepolitics.49

Japan’spolicyundulationsonmultilateralsecuritypoliticshavebeenatleastaspronounced,withitsvisibleenthusiasmforthisapproachintheearly1990sgivingwaytoamorenuanced(atbest)orevenskepticaloutlookfollowingthe1997–98AsianFinancialCrisis.USapprehensionsaboutJapanesemotivesinshiftingtowardmoreregionalistposturesfollowingthatcrisis,andhowsuchashiftcouldaffectJapanesedefenceburden‑sharingwithinanalliancecontextandinternationalpeacekeepingcontributionsaspartofAmerican‑led‘coalitionsofthewilling’wasakeyfactor.SotoowasJapan’sgrowingdisillusionmentwiththeARF’sabilitytoimplementeffectivelyitsannouncedregionalconfidence‑buildingandpreventivedefenceinitiativesinthefaceofperceivedChineseintransigence.AgrowingmoodofconservatisminJapanesedomesticpoliticsreflectedintheelectionofJunichiroKoizumiandShinzoAbeassuccessiveprimeministers,

�� Proceedings

andtheevolutionofnewasymmetricthreatssuchasterrorismandnuclearproliferationinNorthKorea,wereallsignificantfactorsindiscouragingJapan’sexpenditureofpoliticalsupportandnationalresourcestowardmultilateralcooperativesecurityinAsia.WhileJapanhasnotlostallinterestorconfidenceinthepoliticsofmultilateralsecurity,itcannotpursueitapartfromcalibratingitseffectsontheUSbilateralalliance.50

Conclusion: policy recommendations

Iftheabovetrendsaretakenintoaccount,theappealoftheTSDasanalternativetomultilateralismiseasiertounderstand.ForAustralianandJapanesepolicy‑makerstodevelopcooperativemultilateralsecurityventureswithlittlehistoryofregionalsuccessistrulyadauntingtask.ThechallengeismadeevenmoreoverwhelmingasChina’sandIndia’sascentstogreatpowerstatusfurthercomplicatetheAsia–Pacific’sstrategicenvironment.HowmucheasieritmustbeforAustraliaandJapan,aslongstandingUSalliancepartners,tobuildontheirexistingallianceframeworkbyexpandingintra‑alliancetiesindesignatedtraditionalandtransnationalsecuritypolicysectorsandtolabelitmultilateralsecuritybehaviour!Theappealof‘competitivegeometry’intheformofTSDorothervariantsisthatitisrelativelyclear‑cutandincorporatesthebestassetsofallianceaffiliationsuchasstate‑of‑the‑artmilitarytechnologytransfers,forceinteroperabilityandconstantdialogueandplanning.Thatappeal,however,mustbebalancedbytheprospectsthatotherregionalpowersinvariablyregardsucharrangementsasdirectedagainstthemselves,thusintensifyingregionaltensionsandundercuttinganyrealprospectsofbuildingagenuineandmorestableregionalcooperativesecuritynetwork.Insuchacase,moreover,the‘truthisnotsomewhereinbetween.’

Australia’spivotalpowerstrategyandJapan’s‘Goldilocksconsensus’havecompoundedbothAustralianandJapanesepolicyambiguityandregionalmarginalisation.

Whatpolicydirectionsshouldbepursuednow?AtleastthreeapproacheswarrantmutualexplorationbythenewAustralianandJapanesegovernments:(1)renewingmultilateralism’scomplementaritytoexistingbilateralorminilateralarrangementsbyconcentratingonstrengtheningjustonemajormultilateralsecurityarchitectureintheregion;(2)encouragingconfidence‑buildingbetweenJapanandChina;and(3)helpingtheUnitedStatesdefinewhatinevitablywillbeanewAmericansecuritypostureinAsiaasthatregionexperiencesintensifiedregionalmultipolarity.Eachofthesestepsdeservesseparateandextensiveanalyseswhicharefarbeyondthescopeofthispaper.Onlylimiteddiscussionofthebasicrationalesthatjustifytheirpolicyconsiderationcanbeofferedwithinthelimitedspaceavailablehere.

First,AustraliaandJapanshouldmovejointlytodesignatetheirpreferenceforwhichoftheseveralburgeoningmultilateralsecurityarchitectureswillcommandthebulkoftheirattentionandresources.ThecriteriabywhichexistingmultilateralarchitecturescanbeevaluatedhavebeenrecentlyspelledoutbyAllanGyngell:(a)facilitatingregionaltradeandinvestmentinwaysthatenabletheAsia–Pacific’sregionaleconomiestorespondmoreeffectivelytonaturaldisasters,pandemics,climatechange,energysecurityandothertransnationalsecurityissues;(b)guaranteeingthatregionalcommunity‑buildingstrengthenslinkagesbetweentheAsia–Pacific’ssub‑regionalsectors,includingNortheastAsia,SoutheastAsia,SouthAsiaandthe‘widerPacific’;(c)promotingcommonregionalsecurityintereststhroughaddressingcoreregionalsecurityissues(i.e.,theTaiwanStrait,NorthKorea,etc.);and(d)ensuringthatkey


pan‑regionalheadsofgovernmentconveneregularlyandsystematicallytodiscuss‘thefullrangeofregionalsecurityissues’.51AsGyngelladmits,noonesecurityarchitecturewillbeabletofulfillallofthesefunctionsequallywellovertheshort‑term.APEC,however,loomsastheoneexistingarchitecturethatfulfillsmostoftheserequirementsatleasttemporarily.AgradualintegrationofAPECandtheEASintoanewregionalsecurityorganisationspearheadedbyanannualHeadsofGovernment(alongthelinesofNATO’sannualsummit)andincorporatingbothforeignandeconomicministersintoitsframeworkmightbeconsideredonepossiblemodelforfutureAsia–Pacificorder‑building.Anysuchbodyneedstoberegionallyinclusive(pan‑Asian),notexclusive;ecumenicalthroughincorporationofbroadersecurityperspectivesratherthanmerelyfocusingonmilitaryorothertypesof‘materialpower’,andsufficientlyauthoritativetoworkregularlywiththeUnitedNations,theIMFandotherorgansofinternationalgovernancetoaddresscoreproblemsofregionalsecurityanddevelopment.

Second,theintractableSino–JapanesesecuritydilemmamustbemodifiedoverthenextfewyearsifprospectsforastableAsia–Pacificsecurityorderaretoberealised.Implementingviableconfidence‑buildingandpreventivediplomacymechanismsatboththebilateralandmultilaterallevelswillbeintegraltoovercominglingeringhistorical,culturalandstrategicanimositiesbetweenNortheastAsia’stwopowerhouseeconomies.ReiteratingandrespectinginternationalnormsareprobablyappropriatefordefusingtensionsintheEastChinaSea(rightsofmaritimepassage)whileChinaandTaiwanfinesse‘Chinesesolutions’totheirlong‑standingdifferencesoverirredentism.AnyeffortbyaTSDmechanismtoforcetheTaiwanissue,shortofanunprovokedmilitaryinvasionofTaiwanbythePRC,wouldbe

counterproductiveandonlyintensifywhatisalreadytheregion’smostserioussecuritydilemma.Inasimilarvein,regionalsecuritymaybebestservedbyquietlyshelvingthe2005US–JapanConsultativeCommittee’sreferencetotheTaiwanStrait,andbyUSpolicyofficialsexercisinggreaterrestrainttowardconveyingtheir‘expectations’aboutAustralia’salliancebehaviourduringafutureTaiwanStraitcrisis.ChinaiswellawareofregionalconcernsaboutitsownintermittentbellicositydirectedtowardTaiwan.ItislesslikelytoadoptpoliciesofmoderationifitperceivesthattheTSDpowersareeagertouseafuturesuchepisodetoneutralisebyforcewhattheyseeasagrowingmilitaryimbalanceinChina’sfavour.Beijing,however,willneedtostrengthenitstransparencyonthenatureandintentofitsongoingmilitarybuildupasaquidproquoforgreaterTSDconstraint.Japancouldalsoadvanceconfidence‑buildingproposalsforpreventingconflictescalationoverTaiwaninongoingSino–Japanesestrategicdialogues,whileAustraliacouldproposesimilardiscussionsaspartofitsnewbilateralstrategicdialoguewithChina.BothJapanandAustraliacouldalsoconsiderestablishingseparatecrisishotlineswithBeijing,aprecedentthatcouldbeemulatedbythesecretariatofanyoverarchingregionalsecurityorganisationthatmayemergeinAsia.52

Third,bothAustraliaandJapanmustcontinueimprovingtheirowndefencecapabilitiestofaceindependentcontingenciesthattheUSbelievesmaynotjustifydirectmilitaryinterventionontheirbehalf.ThepossibilityoftheRuddgovernmentresurrectingelementsofthe‘DefenceofAustralia’(DOA)posturewhichprevailedduringtheHawke/Keatingyearsisstrong;althoughAustralia’spresentcommitmenttosupportingcoalitioneffortsagainstinsurgentsinAfghanistanappearstobeanenduringone.Increasingly,Australiawillberequiredtodeployitsforcesalong

�4 Proceedings

the‘arcofinstability’thatincludesitsnorthernapproaches,MelanesiaandotherSouthPacificvenueswithoutanticipatingeventhosemoderatelevelsofUSlogisticalsupportthatwereavailableduringthe1999EastTimoroperation.Japan’shistoricallegacyanditsconstitutionstillactasconstraintsagainstprojectingitsSelf‑DefenseForceinindependentmilitaryoperations.Inthissense,theUS–JapanalliancewillremaintheprimarycatalystforconstrainingfutureJapanesemilitaryoperations.Withinthebilateralallianceframework,however,Japanwillgraduallybecompelledtoraiseitsdefenceburden‑sharingtoincreasinglysignificantlevelsasthecostsandpoliticalimpedimentsassociatedwiththeUnitedStatesmaintainingdefenceexpenditureshigherthanmostoftheworld’sothergreatpowerscombinedeventuallytaketheirtoll.TheUnitedStateswillremainasuperpowerforsometimetocome.However,itwillinevitablybecomea‘moreordinary’greatpowerasitprioritisesitscommitmentsintheMiddleEast,tohomelandsecurityandtoitsabilitytoprojectsignificantratherthanoverwhelminglevelsofoffshorepoweralongtheEurasianperipheries.China,India,andRussiawillcontinuetoclosethemilitarycapabilitiesgapbetweentheUSandthemselves.AustraliaandJapancanrenderagreatservicetotheirAmericanpartnerandtoglobalstabilitybybecomingmoreeffectivethanwasthecaseimmediatelyafter9/11,byreasoningwithWashingtonwhichofitscommitmentscallsformilitaryresponses.

AustraliaandJapantogetherfaceahistoricalcrossroadsininternationalrelationsnotunlikethatrecognisedbyLordGrey.UnlikethatvenerableandsomewhattragicfigurewhoconfrontedanexhaustedEuropeanconcertonthevergeofwar,however,theirprospectsforhelpingtokeepthelightsburningbrightintheAsia–Pacificregionareinfinitelybetter.Strikinganeffectivebalance

betweensustainingthebestofbilateralismandapplyingamoresophisticatedbrandofmultilateralismiscrucialforshapingtheAsia–Pacific’sfuturesecurityorder.Asallieslongaccustomedtocultivatingstrategictrustwitheachother,AustraliaandJapanwouldnowbewellservedbyextendingthatlegacytothosesurroundingthem.

Endnotes

1 ArecentexpositionofthisargumentisRajanMenon’sTheEndofAlliances(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2007).

2 BackgroundisprovidedbyC.RandallHenning,EastAsianFinancialCooperation.PolicyAnalysisinInternationalEconomics68(Washington,DC:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,October2002),pp.11‑31.

3 MarkBeeson,‘ASEANPlusThreeandtheRiseofReactionaryRegionalism‘,ContemporarySoutheastAsia25,no.2(August2003),p.261.MoreskepticalassessmentsincludeDavidHund,‘ASEANPlusThree:towardsanewageofpan‑EastAsianRegionalism?Askeptic’sappraisal’ThePacificReview16,no.3(September2003),pp.383‑417andDavidMartinJonesandMartinL.R.Smith,‘MakingProcess,NotProgress:ASEANandtheEvolvingEastAsianRegionalSecurityOrder,’InternationalSecurity30,no.1(Summer2007),pp.148‑184.Forarecentupdate,consultShaunBreslin,‘SupplyingDemandorDemandingSupply?AnAlternativeLookattheForcesDrivingEastAsianCommunityBuilding,’PolicyAnalysisBrief,TheStanleyFoundation,November2007athttp://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/Breslin_07_PAB.pdf.Accessedon6January2008.

4 TheJapanesepositionanddiplomaticroleleadinguptotheEASiscoveredbyMichaelAuslinandMichaelGreen,


‘Japan’sSecurityPolicyinEastAsia,’AsianEconomicPolicyReview2,no.2(December2007),pp.217‑218.AlsoseeEdwinCody,‘EastAsianSummitMarkedbyDiscord,’TheWashingtonPost,December14,2005andMohanMalik,‘TheEastAsiaSummit,’AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs60,no.2(June2006),pp.207‑211.

5 TakashiTerada,‘ForminganEastAsianCommunity:ASiteforJapan–ChinaPowerStruggles,’JapaneseStudies26,no.1(May2006),p.5.

6 AuslinandGreen,pp.217‑218.

7 AtextoftheCooperativeWorkPlanisathttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/asean/conference/asean3/plan0711.pdf.Accessedon5January2008.

8 Ascitedattheblogsite,‘Hecame,theytalked,whatnext?’ObservingJapan,November17,2007.Seealso‘ThebankruptcyoftheChinahawks,’ibid.,January1,2008.Bothathttp://www.observingjapan.com/andbothaccessedon5January2008.

9 AscitedinDavidDewitt,‘Common,ComprehensiveandCooperativeSecurity,’PacificReview7,no.1(1994),p.5.

10 EvelynGoh,‘MeetingtheChinaChallenge:TheUSinSoutheastAsianRegionalSecurityStrategies,’PolicyStudies,no.16(Washington,D.C.:EastWestCenter2005andEvanMedeiros,‘StrategicHedgingandtheFutureofAsia–PacificStability,’TheWashingtonQuarterly29,no.1(Winter2005‑06),pp.145‑167.

11 AddressbyTeoCheeHean,MinisterforDefence,Singaporeon‘SecurityCooperationinAsia:ManagingAlliancesandPartnerships,’attheSixthIISSAsianSecuritySummitShangri‑laDialogue,Singapore,3June2007athttp://www.

iiss.org/conferences/the‑shangri‑la‑dialogue/plenary‑session‑speeches‑2007/fifth‑plenary‑session‑‑teo‑chee‑hean.Accessedon6January2008.

12 RichardSmith,‘RegionalSecurity:Is‘Architecture’AllWeNeed?’PolicyAnalysisBrief,TheStanleyFoundation,December2007athttp://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/SmithPAB07.pdf.Accessedon6January2008.

13 Inmid‑December2007,AustralianForeignMinisterStephenSmithwarnedthat‘AustraliaisdeterminedtoplayaleadingroleininternationaleffortstostopJapan’swhalingpractices,’servingnoticethat‘Australiastronglybelievesthatthereisnocrediblescientificjustificationforthehuntingofwhales,andisopposedtoallcommercialand‘scientific’whaling.’See‘Totalsecrecyonwhalerwatching,’TheAustralian,1January2008.

14 ‘Australianoppositionleaderwarnsofdiplomaticriftoverwhalingcrackdown,’InternationalHeraldTribune,14December2007.

15 TheJapan’sMaritimeSelf‑DefenseForce’srefuelingmissionintheIndianOceanonNov.1wasterminatedwhena‘speciallaw’authorisingthemissionexpiredafterthegovernmentandtheupperhouseoftheDietcontrolledbyoppositionpartiesfailedtoreachanagreementtoextendthelaw.SeeHisaneMisaki,‘Japan’sFukudainfightforhislife,’AsiaTimesOnline,December22,2007athttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IL22Dh01.html.Accessedon8January2008.On11January2008,Fukuda’srulingcoalitiongovernment,understrongpressurefromtheUS,forcedenablinglegislationthroughthelowerhouseofJapanesegovernmentaftertheupperhousehadpreviouslyvetoedpreviouseffortstodoso.

�� Proceedings

16 Theconceptof‘generalinterest’inalliancepoliticswasinitiallydevelopedbyGlennH.Snyder,‘theSecurityDilemmainAlliancePolitics,’WorldPolitics36,no.4(July1984),pp.461‑495.SeeEricTalmadge,‘JapantoResumeItsMissioninIndianOcean,’WashingtonPost,January12,2008,A‑11.

17 AkikoFukushima,‘MultilateralConfidence‑BuildingMeasuresinNortheastAsia:RecedingorEmerging?’inBenjaminL.SelfandYukiTatsumi,ed.,Confidence-BuildingMeasuresandSecurityIssuesinNortheastAsia(Washington,D.C.:HenryL.StimsonCenter2000),p.44andGoh,‘TheASEANRegionalForuminUnitedStatesEastAsianStrategy,’ThePacificReview17,no.1(March2004),p.51.

18 Negroponte,‘TheFutureofPolitical,EconomicandSecurityRelationswithChina’athttp://www.state.gov/s/d/2007/84118.htm.Accessedon8January2008.

19 DavidM.Finkelstein,‘ThePeople’sLiberationArmyandChinainTransition,’inStephenJ.FlanaganandMichaelE.Marti(eds.),ThePeople’sLiberationArmyandChinainTransition(Washington,D.C.:InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies,NationalDefenseUniversity,2002),pp.197‑210.Accessedathttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/pla‑china_transition_14_ch10.htmon8January2008.

20 AnAmericanperspectiveoftheminilateralfactorinAsia–PacificsecuritypoliticsisofferedbyMichaelJ.Green,‘TheUnitedStatesandEastAsiainaunipolarEra,’inQuanshengZhao,ed.,FutureTrendsinEastAsianInternationalRelations(LondonandPortland,Oregon:FrankCass,2002),p.36.

21 ThistheoreticalapproachisdevelopedinthecontextoftrilateralalliancerelationsbyWilliamT.Tow,‘’Contingent

Trilateralism’:ApplicationsfortheTrilateralSecurityDialogue,’inWilliamT.Tow,MarkJ.Thomson,YoshinobuYamamotoandSatuLimaye,eds.,Asia–PacificSecurity:U.S,AustraliaandJapanandtheNewSecurityTriangle(London:Routledge,2007),p.27.

22 ExtensivebackgroundontheTSDisprovidedinvariouschaptersofTow,et.al.,Asia-PacificSecurity…(London:Routledge,2007).

23 PurnendraJain,‘Japan–AustraliasecuritytiesandtheUnitedStates:theevolutionofthetrilateraldialogueprocessanditschallenges,’AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs60,no.4(December2006),pp.521‑535.

24 AndrewSymon,‘Australia’snewPMisoldAsiahand,’AsiaTimesOnline,November27,2007athttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK27Ae01.html.Accessedon13January2008.

25 See,forexample,YanWei,‘ABroaderAsiaWithoutChina?’BeijingReviewNo.38,September20,2007athttp://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2007‑09/25/content_77617_2.htm.Accessedon8January2008.

26 Seeacriticalbutthoroughaccountofthequadrilateralinitiative’sevolutionbyBrig.Gen.ShafaatAhmad(Ret.),‘Jointnavalexercise:SEATOinnewformat?’TheDailyStar,October6,2007athttp://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=6809.Accessedon13January2008.

27 ‘Aust,Chinaagreetoannualsecuritytalks,’AustralianDefenceReport,6September2007athttp://www.australiandefencereport.com.au/9‑07/10‑09‑2007/aust_china_agree_to_annual_secur.htmand‘ForeignMinistrySpokespersonJiangYu’sregularpressconferenceon6September2007athttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cemy/


eng/fyrth/t359857.htm.Accessedon8January2008.

28 AnthonyFaiola,‘JapantoJoinUSPolicyonTaiwan;GrowthofChinaSeenbehindShift,’WashingtonPost,18February2005,p.A‑1

29 Inter‑relatedUSbasingoperationsinthePacificinvolvingJapanandotherUSalliesareweighedinawidelydebatedRANDCorporationreportreleasedinMay2001.SeeZalmayKhalilzad,AbramN.Shulskyandothers,TheUnitedStatesandAsia:TowardaNewUSStrategyandForcePosture (MR‑1315‑AF) SantaMonica:RAND,May2001andsummarisedathttp://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB68/index1.html.Accessedon13January2008.AlsoseeCol.LawrenceM.Martin,Jr.,‘CounteringaStrategicGambit:KeepingUSAirPowerEmployableinaChina–TaiwanConflict,’Air&SpacePowerJournalXIX,no.3(Fall2005)athttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/martin.html.Accessedon13January2008.

30 ThispointisdiscussedbyWilliamT.TowandChen‑ShenYen,‘Australia–TaiwanRelations:TheEvolvingGeopoliticalSetting,’AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs61,no.3(September2007),especiallypp.338‑339.

31 ‘USspellsoutANZUSconditions’,ABCradiotranscript,August20,2004athttp://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1181620.htm.Accessedon14January2008.

32 BrendanTaylor,‘TheBushAdministrationandAsia–PacificMultilateralism–UnrequitedLove?’PaperforFulbrightSymposiumonMaritimeGovernanceandSecurity:AustralianandAmericanPerspectives,UniversityofTasmania,Hobart,28‑29June2006at

http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:QoES2dLg7iIJ:rspas.anu.edu.au/gssd/analysis/Taylor_Fulbright_2006%2520_final.pdf+brendan+taylor+multilateralism+transnational+security+Asia&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=au.Accessedon14January2008.

33 MichaelJ.Green,‘TheUnitedStatesandEastAsiaintheUnipolarEra,’inQuanshengZhao,ed.,FutureTrendsinEastAsianInternationalRelations(London:Routledge2002),pp.36‑38.

34 ‘Bushannouncesint’lcoalitiontocoordinaterelief,’IndiaInfo.ComDecember30,2004athttp://news.indiainfo.com/2004/12/30/3012tsunamibush.html.Accessedon14January2008.

35 SoerenKern,‘TheGeopoliticsofTsunamiRelief,’RealInstitutoElcano,August2005athttp://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/Asia‑Pacific/ARI+8‑2005.Accessedon14January2008.

36 Ibid.andTimHuxley,‘Thetsunamiandsecurity:Asia’s9/11?’Survival47,no.1(March2005),pp.125‑127.

37 ThomasS.Wilkins,‘Towardsa‘TrilateralAlliance?’UnderstandingtheRolesofExpediencyandValuesinAmerican–Japanese–AustralianRelations’,AsianSecurity3,no.3(2007),p.266.

38 AtextofthisdocumentcanbefoundonJapan’sMinistryofForeignAffairswebsiteathttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/australia/joint0703.html.Accessedon16January2008.

39 JapanMinistryofForeignAffairs,‘MajorelementsoftheActionPlantoimplementtheJapan–AustraliaJointDeclarationonSecurityCooperation’,athttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/australia/

�� Proceedings

action0709.htmlandJapanMinistryofForeignAffairs,Japan–AustraliaRelations’,http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/australia/index.html.Bothsourcesaccessedon16January2008.

40 CWBraddick,‘Japan,AustraliaandASPAC,’inBradWilliamsandAndrewNewman,eds.,Japan,AustraliaandAsia–PacificSecurity(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2006),pp.30‑46.NineAsia–PacificcountrieswererepresentedinASPAC:Australia,the‘RepublicofChina’(ROCTaiwan),Japan,theRepublicofKorea(ROK),Malaysia,NewZealand,thePhilippines,ThailandandtheRepublicofVietnam(ROV).DelegatesfromLaosusuallyattendedmeetingswith‘observer’status.

41 TheclassicstudyonthisremainsChinKinWah’sTheDefenceofMalaysiaandSingapore:TheTransformationofaSecuritySystem1957-1971(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).

42 PaulMidford,‘Japan’sleadershiproleinEastAsianSecuritymultilateralism:theNakayamaproposalandthelogicofreassurance,’ThePacificReview13,no.3(September2000),pp.367–97andG.JohnIkenberryandJitsuoTsuchiyama,‘Betweenbalanceofpowerandcommunity:thefutureofmultilateralcooperationintheAsia–Pacific,’InternationalRelationsoftheAsia–PacificVol.2(2002),pp.69‑94.

43 MarkBeesonandHidetakaYoshimatsu,‘Asia’soddmenout:Australia,Japan,andthepoliticsofregionalism,’InternationalRelationsoftheAsia–Pacific7,no.23(2007),pp.227‑250.

44 AscontendedbyDavidMartinJonesandMichaelL.R.Smith,‘MakingProcess,NotProgress...’

45 SeeCarlUngerer,‘The‘MiddlePower’ConceptinAustralianForeignPolicy,’AustralianJournalofPoliticsandHistory53,no.4(2007),especiallypp.546‑550.

46 Samuels,‘Japan’sGoldilocksStrategy,’TheWashingtonQuarterly29,no.4(Autumn2006),p.121.

47 CJohnstone,‘StrainedAlliance:US–JapanDiplomacyintheAsianfinancialcrisis,’Survival41,no.2(Summer1999),pp.121‑138andMohanMalik,‘TheEastAsiaSummit,’AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs60,no.2(June2006),pp.107‑111.

48 WTow,‘Deputysherifforindependentally?EvolvingAustralian–Americantiesinanambiguousworldorder,’ThePacificReview17,no.2(June2004),pp.271‑290.

49 Forin‑depthanalysis,seeWilliamTow,‘ANZUS:RegionalversusGlobalSecurityinAsia,’InternationalRelationsoftheAsia–Pacific5,no.2(2005),pp.197‑216.

50 AdefinitiveanalysisofrecenttrendsisbyTakeshiYuzawa,‘Japan’schangingconceptionoftheASEANRegionalForum:fromanoptimisticliberaltoapessimisticrealistperspective,’PacificReview18,no.4(December2005),pp.463‑497.

51 Gyngell,‘DesignFaults:TheAsiaPacific’sRegionalArchitecture,’PolicyBrief(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,July2007).

52 ReportssurfacedattheendofAugust2007thatChinaandJapanhavediscussedtheestablishmentofcriseshotlines.SeeChisaFujioka,‘ChinamilitaryvexesJapandespiteminister’svisit,’Reuters,August31,2007athttp://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia‑29265520070831.Accessedon18January2008.


The Japanese approach to an East Asian Community and Japan–Australia partnershipYoshihide Soeya Keio University

1 Introduction

JapanandAustraliaarenaturalpartnersintheregionalprocesstowardbuildinganEastAsianCommunity.Theysharebasicvaluesasthefoundationofaregionalarchitecture,andaboveallarewellsituatedtocultivatethemiddleground,sotospeak,inbetweentheUSandChina—thetwomajorpowersconstitutingthebasicstrategicandgeopoliticalparameterforEastAsia.TheroleofJapanandAustraliathereinisintrinsicallypremisedonthealliancewiththeUS,butthisdoesnotexcludethepossibilityofJapanandAustraliajointlyconstructingasoundinfrastructureasacoreelementofanEastAsianorderthattheUSandChinawillhavetotakeintoseriousaccountastheydealwitheachother,aswellaswiththeregionasawhole.

Iwouldliketoconceptualiseacommunityasaprocess—perhapsaneverlastingprocess—towardthecreationofasecuritycommunity.Thereshouldbenodisagreementthatcommunity‑buildingeffortsinEastAsiahavejustbegun.Nomatterhowembryonictheyare,however,theycanandshouldbeseenasthecriticalbeginningofalong‑termprocessofcommunitybuilding,whichwillcertainlyhaverepeatedupsanddowns,butwhichwillalsocontinuetomovetowardthefinalgoalofasecuritycommunity.Evenifweacceptthelikelyprospectthatthegoalwillnotbeachievedforalongtime,continuingtomovetowardthegoalisfeasibleandimportant:hencemyconceptualisationofacommunityasaprocess.

Thegoal,aswellasaconceptualbasis,ofasecuritycommunityistheeliminationofwarortheuseofforceasmeansofsettlinginter‑stateconflict,sustainedbythenormofpeacefulsettlementofpoliticaldifferencesaswellasthecommonvaluesofdemocracy.Assuch,itcanbearguedthatexpectationsrelevantforasecuritycommunityalreadyexistamongdemocraciesinEastAsia.

IntheEastAsiancontext,thisconceptualisationofacommunitywouldnaturallyinvitesomeresistancefromChina,particularlyitscentralgovernmentandthePeople’sLiberationArmy.Andthereareseveralcaseswheretheactualevolutionofsecurityissuesindicatestendenciescontrarytothedevelopmentofasecuritycommunity,evenincludingoverbearingbehavioursbytheUSAdministration.ThesetwomajorpowerswillbecriticalintheirownrightsintheevolutionofanEastAsianCommunityinyearsahead,buttheprocesscouldandshouldbeledprimarilybycountriesthatcancultivatethemiddlegroundintheUS–Chinastrategicrelationship,includingJapanandAustralia(aswellasASEANandSouthKorea).

JapaneseinvolvementinthisprocessshouldalsoprovideanimportantframeworkwithinwhichJapanwouldcontinuetodebateandimplementnecessarychangesinitsregionalandsecuritypoliciesintheyearsahead.AustraliaisanaturalpartnerasJapancontinuestogropeforanewregionalroleanddiplomacy,whichwasamplydemonstratedintheproposalbyPrimeMinisterJunichiroKoizumiinJanuary2002toinviteAustraliaandNewZealandascoremembersofanEastAsianCommunity.

ThispaperwillgiveanoverviewtotheevolutionofJapanesepoliciestowardEastAsiasincetheendoftheColdWar,andwillexaminethecentralJapanesethinkingandapproachleadingtotheKoizumiproposal,andconcerningtheUSandChinafactors.

40 Proceedings

2 Japan’s initial efforts in multilateral security

SoonaftertheendoftheColdWar,therearoseanawarenessamongcentralpolicymakersinJapanthatthepredominanceofthealliancerelationshipwiththeUSinJapan’spost‑ColdWarresponsesisdeeplyrelatedtothelackofeffectivemultilateralforumsforJapanesesecuritypolicy.FacingtheendoftheColdWar,therefore,itwasnaturalfortheJapanesestrategicthinkerstooptformultilateralsecuritycooperation,notnecessarilyasanalternativetotheUS–Japanalliance,butasanewtooltocopewithnewsecuritychallenges.

TheinitialattemptinthisdirectionwastakenbyYukioSato,thenDirector‑GeneraloftheInformationandIntelligenceBureauoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Specifically,Satoplayedacriticalroleintheearly1990sasabridgebetweenJapanandASEANintheinitialexchangeandsharingofideasatthetrackIIlevel,eventuallyleadingtotheestablishmentoftheASEANRegionalForumin1994.

AtaboutthetimetheASEANRegionalForumwascreated,theJapanesedefenceestablishmentwasalsogropingforapathtomultilateralsecuritycooperation.InFebruary1994,PrimeMinisterHosokawacreatedanadvisorypanelonpost‑ColdWarsecurityanddefensepolicy.HosokawaresignedinApril,andtheadvisorypanel’sreportwaspresentedinAugusttotheMurayamagovernment,whichsucceededtheshortlivedHatagovernment.Thereportcharacterisedthepost‑ColdWarsecurityenvironmentasopaqueanduncertain,andplacedthepromotionofmultilateralsecuritycooperationontopoftheprioritylist,followedbytheeffectivemanagementoftheUS–JapansecurityrelationshipandJapanesedefencecapability.

ThereportspecificallyarguedthatthecriticalissuewaswhethertheUSwouldbeableto

playaleadershiproleinmultilateralsecuritycooperation,andthatJapanandtheUSshouldpromotebroadandclosecooperation,basedontheinstitutionalsettingsoftheUS–Japansecuritytreaty,towardeffectivemultilateralsecuritycooperation.1

ThisprocessinvitedinterventionbytheUS,whichfearedthattheemphasisonmultilateralsecuritycooperationwouldweakenthefoundationoftheUS–Japanalliance.Infact,in1994(exactlyatthetimewhentheJapaneseadvisorypanelcalledforgreaterparticipationinmultilateralsecurity),theNorthKoreancrisisvergedonmilitaryconflictbetweentheUSandNorthKorea.ThesituationwassavedbyJimmyCarter’svisitatthelastminute,leadingtotheGenevaagreementwhichestablishedtheKoreaEnergyDevelopmentOrganization(KEDO)inexchangeforNorthKorea’scommitmenttofreezeitsnuclearprograms.2Thiscrisisledtothesubsequentrevisionofthe1978GuidelinesforJapan–USDefenseCooperation,whichoccurredin1997.

Asindicatedbythediscussionatthedefenseadvisorypanel,however,Japan’sprimaryconcerninthisperiodhadtodowiththegeneralfluidityoftheuncertainsecurityenvironment,whichrequiredanewapproachtowardmultilateralsecuritycooperationintandemwiththealliancewiththeUS.

3 From Fukuda Doctrine to Koizumi Proposal

Inretrospect,thelongstandingpolicyofJapantowardSoutheastAsiasincethelate1970swasrepresentedbytheso‑calledFukudaDoctrine.PrimeMinisterTakeoFukudaannouncedathree‑pointpolicytowardSoutheastAsiainManilainAugust1977:

• First,Japaniscommittedtopeaceandisdeterminednottobecomeamilitarypower.


• Second,Japanwillestablisha‘heart‑to‑heart’relationshipofmutualtrustwithSoutheastAsiabeyondeconomicsandpolitics.

• Third,JapanwillcooperatewithASEAN’seffortstostrengthensolidarityandresilience,nurturerelationsofmutualunderstandingwiththeIndochinesestates,andthuscontributetothepeaceandprosperityoftheentireSoutheastAsianregion.

ThepoliticalessenceoftheFukudaDoctrinehadtodowiththemessageinthethirdpoint—toserveasabridgebetweenASEANandIndochinaforthepeaceandprosperityofallSoutheastAsiaasanequalpartner.ThisprincipleremainedtoformthecorethinkingofJapan’sSoutheastAsiapolicyduringthesubsequentyears,whichwasrevitalisedatthetimeoftheCambodianpeaceprocessintheearly1990s,whenJapanactivelysoughttoplayapoliticalrole.3

Arguably,withtherealisationofASEAN–10in1997,theexpressedpoliticalgoaloftheFukudaDoctrinewasabouttobeachievedonASEAN’sowninitiative,withmucheconomicbackingprovidedbyJapaneseofficialdevelopmentassistance,privatetradeandforeigndirectinvestment.Inearly1997,anticipatingthebirthofASEAN–10,JapanesePrimeMinisterRyutaroHashimotoproposedtheJapan–ASEANsummittofurtheracceleratetheintegrationofASEANandtofurtherJapan’srelationswiththeASEANcountries.

TherealisationofASEAN–10,however,coincidedwiththeAsianfinancialcrisis,forcingASEANcountriestogothroughasetofrestructuringeffortsindomesticeconomies,politics,andregionalarrangements.Also,ataboutthesametime,Chinashifteditsmainstrategicfocusfrom‘high’politicsto‘low’politics.ASEAN,followingitsusualinstincttocarefullybalance

relationswithexternalpowers,turnedtheHashimotoproposalintoitsowninitiativeleadingtotheestablishmentofASEAN+3attheendof1997.

Thesedevelopmentshaveusheredinanewmomentumtowarddeepeningregionalintegration.Singaporetookanimportantinitiativetoofficiallyproposeafreetradeagreement(FTA)withJapaninDecember1999whenPrimeMinisterGohChokTongvisitedJapan.Japan,whichhadalreadystartedtostudysucharrangementswithseveralcountries,includingSouthKorea,respondedpositivelyandthenegotiationsgainedmomentum.

Inthemeantime,observingthemomentumofaseriesofbilateralFTAinitiativesandachievingitsgoalofjoiningtheWorldTradeOrganization,ChinaalsocameupwithitsownFTAinitiative,mostsymbolicallyindicatedbytheChineseproposalofanFTAwithASEANattheoccasionoftheASEAN+3summitmeetinginNovember2000.Inthefollowingyear,ChineseandASEANleadersreachedabasicagreementthattheywouldachieveafreetradeareawithinthecomingtenyears.ThiswasquicklyfollowedupinNovember2002,whentheleaderssignedacomprehensiveframeworkagreementtocarryouttheplan.

TheseChina–ASEANinitiativeshavepromptedtheKoizumigovernmenttodevelopitsownregionalstrategybuiltontheongoingprocessofFTAnegotiations.InPrimeMinisterKoizumi’spolicyspeechdeliveredinSingaporeinJanuary2002,4Koizumiproposedan‘InitiativeforJapan–ASEANComprehensiveEconomicPartnership,’builtupontheJapan–SingaporeEconomicAgreementforaNewAgePartnership(theso‑calledJapan–SingaporeFTA),whichKoizumisignedpriortothespeech.

Moreimportantly,theKoizumiproposalincludedanambitiousreferencetoanEast

4� Proceedings

AsianCommunity.KoizumisaidtotheaudienceinSingaporethat‘ourgoalshouldbethecreationofacommunitythatactstogetherandadvancestogether.’Koizumiexpressedhisexpectationthat,startingfromJapan–ASEANcooperation,‘thecountriesofASEAN,Japan,China,theRepublicofKorea,AustraliaandNewZealandwillbecoremembersofsuchacommunity.’

TosubstantiatesuchapartnershipwithASEAN,theKoizumispeechadvancedanewapproachtoJapanesediplomacywithASEAN.WhilestatinghisbasicstancetopromotethepoliciesoftheFukudaDoctrine,KoizumiineffectmadeclearacomprehensivedesignforJapan’sregionalengagement.FollowingthisKoizumiinitiative,theJapaneseGovernmenthostedabilateralASEAN–JapansummitmeetinginTokyoinDecember2003.ThiswastheveryfirstoccasionwhentheASEANcountriesagreedtoholdsuchameetingoutsideSoutheastAsia.

TheproposalforanEastAsianCommunityintheKoizumispeechhasignitedaprocessofconceptualcompetitionbetweenChinaandJapan.Particularly,theinclusionofAustraliaandNewZealandembodiedthelineofdivisionbetweenthetwo.IntheJapanesethinking,therestillremainsaconcernabouttheChina‑centeredprocessofcommunitybuildingpossiblydevelopingintoaclosedregion,particularlyvis‑a‑vistheUS.IntheJapaneseconception,theinclusionofAustraliaandNewZealandhasadoublefunction.First,theyprovideaventingchannelleadingtotheUSasasecurityanchorinEastAsia.Second,themembershipofAustraliaandNewZealandisalsoimportantfromthepointofviewofthevaluesthatwillsustainthefoundationofanEastAsianCommunityandkeepitopentotherestoftheworld.

FromtheJapanesepointofview,behindthecompetitionoverthemembershipcomposition—betweentheASEAN+3formula

andtheASEAN+6formula(involvingAustralia,NewZealandandIndia)fortheEastAsianSummit—liesthisconceptualcompetition,ifnotageopoliticalrivalry,betweenJapanandChina.

4 The US and an East Asian Community

WiththeendoftheColdWar,copingwiththepredominantpoweroftheUSatatimeoftransitionbecameacentralcomponentofmanynations’strategies.TheUSitselfhasbeenfundamentalreadjustingitsglobalstrategy,withaprimaryfocusonhowbesttouseitspredominantpower,andforwhatpurposes.

InthesemajorUSeffortsofstrategicreadjustment,therehasalwaysbeenastrongtemptationtoresorttounilateralism,bothinagendasettingandintheexecutionofitspower.WhilethetendencytounilateralismhasbecomequiteapparentwiththeadventoftheGeorgeWBushadministration,particularlyintheaftermathof9/11,ithasneverceasedtobeanAmericantrait—eveninpreviousyears,includingthetimeoftheClintonadministration.

Simultaneously,however,therehasalwaysexistedaninclinationforUSadministrationstoworkwiththeinternationalcommunitywheneveritispossibleandbeneficialfortheUS.Onecouldarguethattheintentionbehindthewillingnesstoresorttomultilateralismisstillunilateralist,butthisistrueoftheso‑calledgreatpowers,includingChina,almostbydefinition.ThequestionisabouttherelativeweightWashingtongivestounilateralismandtothemultilateralapproachasmeansofitsforeignpolicy.

Arguably,USstrategicobjectiveshavebeenconstantsincetheendoftheColdWar.ThemaintenanceofanewglobalorderaftertheColdWarhasbeenofprimaryconcern,andWashington’sdeterminationnotto


allowanyrisingpowertochallengetheUS,eitherregionallyorglobally,hasbeenstrong.The1991GulfWarrepresentedthefirstmanifestationofsuchUSglobalstrategyinthepost‑ColdWarera.SincetheendoftheColdWar,theUShasalsoregardedterrorismandtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionasmainsourcesofthreattoglobalstabilityaswellastoitsnationalsecurity.Throughoutthe1990s,theUSforward‑deployedmilitarypresencehasoftenbecomeatargetofterroristattacks,manyofwhichhaveallegedlybeenbyal‑Qaeda.Andyet,9/11provedtobeahistoricturningpointbecauseitgavetheBushadministrationacleargoalandamissioninawaragainstterrorismandthosewhoharborterrorists.Thiswarislikelytocontinueforafewdecades,evenwiththechangeofadministrations,butwithasomewhatadjustedapproachgravitatingtowardmultilateralcooperation.

ApreferablescenariofortherestofusinEastAsiaistointegratetheUSpowerintotheprocessofbuildingasecuritycommunity,inonewayoranother.Here,theUSinclinationtouseforceunilaterallystandsagainstthenormofasecuritycommunity.Also,astronglyvalue‑orientedapproachbytheUSadministrationcouldalsoconstituteanobstacleinthetriggeringphaseoftheprocesstobuildasecuritycommunity,ifnottothefinalobjective.TherearestillundemocraticordemocraticallydevelopingcountriesinEastAsia,andastrongmissionaryzealsupportedbyadeepcommitmenttovaluescouldonlydiscouragethosecountriesfromjoiningtheeffortstobuildthecommunity.ThesecuritylandscapeinEastAsia,however,iscomplex,involvingChina,Russia,JapanandtheKoreanPeninsula;thismakesthelikelihoodofUSunilateralismdominatingthesecuritysceneveryslim.

Inalllikelihoodandalmostbydefinition,theUSwillnotbecomeaformalmemberof

anEastAsianCommunity.Intheprocessofcommunitybuilding,however,theUSpowerneedstobeaccommodatedratherthanalienatedorantagonised.EastAsiaalsoneedstobeabletospeakinacommonlanguageaboutthebenefitsanddisturbancestheUSmightbringtocommunity‑buildingefforts.Inanutshell,anEastAsianCommunityshouldbeabletocoexistwiththeUS.JapanandAustraliashouldhaveaspecialroletoplayinthisrespect.

5 The rise of China and an East Asian Community

CopingwiththeriseofChinahasalsobeenanimportantcomponentofthestrategicreadjustmentofmanynationsaftertheendoftheColdWar.Intheprocesstowardbuildingasecuritycommunity,Chinawouldalsohavetobeaccommodated,sothatitwouldcommititselftotheprincipleofpeacefulmanagementofdifferences.Therenowexistafewcircumstantialconditionsinwhicheffortstowardthesegoalsareworthmaking.ThemostfavourablefactorisChina’sunmistakablecommitmenttoanewstrategysustainedbya‘NewSecurityConcept.’

ThestrategicfocusoneconomicmattersbyChinaisnowfullydemonstratedbythecompositionofitscentralleadershipaswellasitspolicysubstance.Accordingly,thisstrategyhasnowshiftedChineseattentionawayfromtraditionalhardsecurityissuesintothemanagementofeconomicandsocialproblemsdomestically,aswellasmultilateraldiplomacywithitsneighbours.PerhapstheexternalenvironmentisnowbetterthanatanytimesincetheendoftheColdWartoreachouttoChinatodevelopacommonsecurityagenda.

SkepticswouldarguethateconomicgrowthwouldsimplyincreasePeople’sLiberationArmy’sportionofthepie.However,theoutcomeoftheracebetweenpossible

44 Proceedings

Chineseparticipationinsecuritycommunitybuilding,ontheonehand,andthelikelihoodofitstraditionalmilitarythinkingregainingcontrol,ontheother,isuncertainatbest.WhatiscertainisthatChina’scurrentemphasisoncoexistencereflectsitslong‑termstrategy,andthattherearemanyfactorscapableofaffectingtheturnofeventsinthiscriticalrace.

ThisshiftinChinesestrategies,ontopofWashington’spreoccupationwiththewaragainstterrorismandnonproliferationintheMiddleEastaswellasEastAsia,isanimportantsourceofstabilityintheUS–Chinarelationshipinrecentyears.ThisindicatesthatthemotivationonthepartofChinaforabetterrelationshipwiththeUSdateswellback,tothepre‑9/11context.

Ineffect,ChinahasstoppedchallengingUSpredominanceintheAsia–Pacificregionandtheworldsincethelate1990s.ThishasbasicallybeenthebottomlineofChineseregionalstrategysinceaftertheTaiwancrisesin1995and1996,whenbothBeijingandWashingtonsoughttorestoretherelationshipwithmutualvisitsbyJiangZeminandBillClintonin1997and1998.ThereisreasonableevidencetobelievethatChinaalsoreadjusteditspolicytowardJapanwiththesamestrategicconsiderationsinthesummerof1999,perhapsuponre‑examiningtheeffectofJiangZemin’striptoJapanin1998.

TheTaiwanquestionisnowanobjectofthestrategiccoexistencebetweentheUSandChina.Inprinciple,theTaiwanquestionstillremainsawildcardforUS–Chinarelationsandcouldupsettheirstrategiccoexistence.Now,however,theChineseeconomy‑centeredstrategyappearstobeworking.Taiwan’seconomicdependenceonChinaisever‑deepening,whichinturngivesconfidencetoBeijinginadvancingits‘unitedfront’policytoward‘comrades’inTaiwan.

Havingnotedallthis,however,oneshouldnotoverlookthefactthatinChineselong‑termthinkingthereremainsaninclinationtothinkoftherelationshipwiththeUSincompetitiveterms.ThesebasicurgesintheChinesepsycheareoftenrevealedintheChineseconceptualisationofEastAsianregionalism.Manypoliticalthinkers,forinstance,seeintheChineseFTAinitiativestowardEastAsiancountriesthevalueofbreakingthepossibleencirclementofChinabytheUS‑centredgroupingsofdemocracies,andeventhemeritofisolatingTaiwan.

ThisindicatesthataChina‑centredEastAsianCommunitywouldgiverisetosomeelementsofconcernregardingitsopenness,particularlyinrelationtoUSpowerandsomeofthevaluedimensions,whichalsoleadultimatelytotheUSfactor.Aswehaveseen,centralintheJapaneseconceptualisationandapproachtoanEastAsianCommunityisthisconcernaboutthepossibleclosednatureofacommunityassociatedwithdeep‑seatedChineseimperatives.

6 Japanese internationalism and nationalism, and the case for a Japan–Australia partnership

IhavearguedelsewherethattheYoshidaLineembracingthepostwarConstitutionandtheUS–JapanalliancehaseloquentlyexpressedJapan’s‘postwarconsensus,’builtonadeterminationtostepdownfromthestageofpoliticsamongmajorpowersandtofollowadefactomiddlepowerstrategy.5Japanwasbornanewandembarkedonafreshstartwiththe1951signingoftheSanFranciscoPeaceTreaty.Japan’s‘postwarregime,’embracingtheYoshidaLine,becameanintegralpartofthepostwar‘SanFranciscoregime’thatcontributedtoJapan’spostwarpeaceandprosperity.

Inessence,Japan’ssecuritypolicyaftertheendoftheColdWarrepresentsanextension


ofthatpost‑WorldWarIIJapaneseconsensus.Firstandforemost,thenewsecurityenvironmentaftertheendoftheColdWarhasspurredthetransformationoftheisolationistpacifismJapanmaintainedduringtheColdWarintoamoreproactiveandinternationalistpacifism.JapannowseeksparticipationinUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperationsor,morebroadly,thedomainofinternationalsecurity.

ItiswithinthiscontextthatthepublicisshowinggreatersupportforarevisionofthepostwarConstitution,particularlythetotalrenunciationofmilitarypotentialinArticle9.Forexample,oneoftherecentopinionpollsconductedbytheYomiuriShinbun6revealsthat,while56%ofrespondentsfavourconstitutionalrevision,70%dosobecausetheybelievethepresentConstitutiondoesnotclearlyjustifytheexistenceoftheSelfDefenseForces,and47%supporttherevisionbecausetheyfeelthatthecurrentConstitutioncannotadequatelydealwithnewissues,suchascontributionstomultilateralsecurity.Thisisinlinewiththeresultsofmanyotheropinionpolls,indicatingthatconstitutionalrevisionisfarfrombeinganissueofnationalismforthemajorityoftheJapanesepublic.Afterall,theemphasisinIchiroOzawa’stheoryofJapanasa‘normalstate’wasalsoplacedmoreonJapan’sparticipationininternationalpeacekeepingeffortsthanonanythingelse.

DespitethesedeeprealitiesinJapanesesociety,sincetheendoftheColdWarJapanhasbeenperceivedbyitsAsianneighboursandmanyothercountriestobeseekingareturntoitsformermajor‑powerstatus.ParticularlyamongitsAsianneighbours,domesticcallsforJapantobecomea‘normalstate’havebeenequatedwithaswingtotherightandadesiretoexertitsmilitarywillonothers.Simplyput,thisisagrossmisunderstandinganddistortionofJapan’sforeignpolicy.

Thatsaid,theremustalsoberecognitionofthefactthatthemisunderstandingsanddistortionsmayhavebeenfueledbyrevisionistpoliticalstatementsbypoliticalleadersamidchangingJapanesediscoursesonsecuritypoliciesandissues.Whatthesestatementsreallyrevealisfrustrationwithvariousaspectsofthepostwarset‑up.Suchfrustrationsareincreasinglybeingventedhaphazardly,outofresentmenttowardattacksfromChinaandKoreaanddissatisfactionoverthe‘postwarconsensus’ofJapan.Paradoxically,suchisolatedexpressionshavegainedadegreeofpublicsupportpreciselybecauseofthelackofastrategyonthepartoftheirproponents.WereadesiretoreviveJapan’sprewaraspirationsactuallyarticulatedclearlyasastrategy,theJapanesepublicwouldbethefirsttorejectit—asamplyimpliedbytheopinionpolls.

UponexaminingJapan’sstrategiccontext,comprisinginstitutionalinertia,thedynamicsofdemocraticcompetition,pragmatism,concernaboutthefutureofUSpower,andtheshiftingregionalbalancesofpower,RichardSamuelsconcludesthatthey‘convergetomakethediscontinuationofJapan’srevisionistcourseseemlikely.’7Indeed,thecurrentrevisionist,nationalisticmoodinJapanesepoliticsandsocietyisinessenceanexcessivereactiontotheratherextremepacifistpremisesofthepostwarJapanesedefenceandsecuritypolicies,andthuswouldturnouttobeatransitionalphenomenon.

True,inthisdynamicprocessoftransition,somewhatnaivenationalismhaspropelledthechanges.Thesechanges,however,havenotgonebeyondthepremisesofJapan’soverallpostwarconsensus.Evenintheevent(althoughunlikelyinthenearfuture)thatJapanrecognisestherightofcollectiveself‑defenceandcollectivesecurity,theoutcomeshouldbeamuchtighteralliancewiththeUSandfullparticipationin

4� Proceedings

multilateralsecuritycooperationratherthananythingelse.

TheJapaneseconceptionandapproachtoanEastAsianCommunity,basedonanequalpartnershipwithAustraliaandNewZealand,andinfactwithKoreaandASEANaswell,shouldberegardedasamanifestationoftheinternationalismofpost‑ColdWarJapanratherthanasanexpressionofnationalism.SomeofthepoliticaldiscourseinJapan,particularlybecauseofitsanti‑Chinatone,mightgivetheimpressionthatnationalismisbeingexpressed.Inreality,however,elementsofcompetitionwithChina,ifany,arecarefullyembracedinJapan’sbroadermultilateralapproachtowardEastAsianregionalism,whichisnothingbutamanifestationofJapan’sdefactomiddle‑powerdiplomacy.

ThisistheconceptualfoundationuponwhichagenuinepartnershipbetweenJapanandAustraliacouldandshouldberealisedinarealworld.ThesigningoftheJapan–AustraliaJointDeclarationonSecurityCooperationonMarch13,2007isthemostrecenttestimonytothis.8Theareasofcooperationandthemethodsofpracticalcooperationsignifytypicalmiddle‑powercooperationbetweenJapanandAustralia,includinghumanitarianreliefoperations,peaceoperations,andregionalcapacitybuilding.9

Thisclearlyindicatesthat,intheoverallcontextdiscussedinthispaper,therelationshipbetweenJapanandAustraliahasthepotentialtoleadcommunity‑buildingeffortsfromthemiddleground,betweentheUSandChina.Inthissense,JapanandAustraliaarenaturalpartnerswhocancooperateonanequalbasis,inthetruesenseoftheterm(thatis,notasapoliticalslogan),forthestabilityandprosperityoftheregionandtheworld.IftheJapan–Australiapartnershipevolvesonthebasisofthisconceptualfoundation,itsrolemayeventuallybecomeacceptabletotheChinese

long‑termstrategyof‘peacefulrise,’withoutcontradictingtheultimatelogicofthealliancewiththeUSanditsroleasasecurityanchorfortheregion.

Endnotes

1 PrimeMinister’sAdvisoryGrouponDefenseIssues,TheModalityoftheSecurityandDefenseCapabilityofJapan,August12,1994.

2 DonOberdorfer,TheTwoKoreas:AContemporaryHistory,BasicBooks,NewYork,1997.

3 YoshihideSoeya,‘VietnaminJapan’sregionalpolicy,’inJamesMorleyandMasashiNishihara(eds),VietnamJoinstheWorld,MESharpe,NewYork,1997.

4 SpeechbyPrimeMinisterofJapanJunichiroKoizumi,‘JapanandASEANinEastAsia:asincereandopenpartnership,’January14,2002.Availableathttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/pmv0201/speech.html

5 YoshihideSoeya,Nihon-noMiddlePowerGaiko[Japan’sMiddlePowerDiplomacy],Chikuma‑shobo,Tokyo,2005).KoreantranslationisalsoavailablefromtheOrumpublishers.

6 DailyYomiuri,April4,2006.

7 RichardJSamuels,‘Japan’sGoldilocksstrategy,’TheWashingtonQuarterly(Autumn2006),p.121.

8 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/australia/joint0703.htmlAccessedon23January2008.

9 Thejointdeclarationspecificallymentionsthefollowingitemsunderthesubheadingof‘areasofcooperation.’

ThescopeofsecuritycooperationbetweenJapanandAustraliawillinclude,butnotbelimitedtothefollowing:


(i) lawenforcementoncombatingtransnationalcrime,includingtraffickinginillegalnarcoticsandprecursors,peoplesmugglingandtrafficking,counterfeitingcurrencyandarmssmuggling

(ii) bordersecurity

(iii)counter‑terrorism

(iv)disarmamentandcounter‑proliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionandtheirmeansofdelivery

(v) peaceoperations

(vi)exchangeofstrategicassessmentsandrelatedinformation

(vii)maritimeandaviationsecurity

(viii)humanitarianreliefoperations,includingdisasterrelief

(ix)contingencyplanning,includingforpandemics.

Aspartoftheabovementionedcooperation,JapanandAustraliawill,asappropriate,strengthenpracticalcooperationbetweentheirrespectivedefenceforcesandothersecurity‑relatedagencies,includingthrough:

(i) exchangeofpersonnel

(ii) jointexercisesandtrainingtofurtherincreaseeffectivenessofcooperation,includingintheareaofhumanitarianreliefoperations

(iii)coordinatedactivitiesincludingthoseintheareasoflawenforcement,peaceoperations,andregionalcapacitybuilding.

China rising: the view from ‘down under’Dr Brendan Taylor Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University

Australiaisaffectionatelyknownasthe‘luckycountry.’Itisalsoknown,however,asthe‘frightenedcountry’—toborrowfromthetitleofaclassictextpublishedin1979byAlanRenouf,aformerHeadoftheAustralianDepartmentofForeignAffairs.1Inthispaper,IarguethatthesetwonotionscapturewelltheapproachthatAustralia,overthepastdecadeundertheHowardgovernment,hastakentowardsthe(re)emergenceofChina.Ontheonehand,Canberra’sperceptionsofChina’srisearemoresanguineandgenerallymoreoptimisticthanthoseespousedinTokyoandWashington.LikemanyofitsSoutheastAsianneighbours,however,AustraliaalsoharbourssomeapprehensionsaboutthepossibleramificationsofChina’sgrowingregionalinfluence.Forthisreason,Iwillargue,CanberraduringtheHowardyearspursuedwhatmightlooselybetermeda‘hedgingstrategy’combiningelementsofengagementwitharisingChinaand‘softbalancing’againstit.ContrarytorecentspeculationofanewtilttowardChina(andawayfromJapan)underthenewRuddgovernment,Iconcludethepaperbypredictingacontinuationofthis‘hedging’approach.

The lucky country?

Canberra’soptimismvis‑à‑visChina’s(re)emergencewasapparentinthestatementsofseniorfiguresthroughouttheHowardyears.PrimeMinisterHowardhimselffamouslystatedduringanaddressattheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicyinMarch2005that‘AustraliadoesnotbelievethatthereisanythinginevitableaboutescalatingstrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.’2

4� Proceedings

Likewise,duringavisittoChinainJune2005,thethenAustralianDefenceMinisterRobertHillindicatedthathesawChina’sexpandingmilitaryexpenditureasaprocessof‘modernisation,notdestabilisation.’3InJuly2005,andinararepublicdisagreementwithPresidentBush,HowardsuggestedwhilestandingontheWhiteHouselawnthattheSino–Australianrelationshipwas‘matureenough’toridethrough‘temporaryarguments’overhumanrightsandthatheremained‘unashamed’indevelopingAustralia’srelationswithChina.4Likewise,inJanuary2006theAustralianAmbassadortotheUnitedStates,DennisRichardson,assertedthat‘thequestionforAustraliaisnotwhetherChina’sgrowthisinnatelygoodorbad;Australiamadeupitsmindlongagothatiswasagoodthing.China’sgrowthisunambiguouslygoodforAsiaandtheUnitedStates.’5

Threefactors,inmyview,havecontributedtowardsAustralia’soptimisticviewofChina’s(re)emergence.Thefirst,andmostobvious,iseconomic.Lastyear,forinstance,ChinaovertookJapantoofficiallybecomeAustralia’sleadingtradingpartner.6Alargeproportionofthistradeconsistsofresourceexports,whicharesettoincreasestillfurtherfollowingtheresumptionofLNGshipmentsfromtheNorthWestShelftoGuangdonginMay2006.ChinaisalsoAustralia’ssecondlargestexportdestinationforagriculturalgoodsanditslargestmarketforinternationalstudentenrolments.AsthedisposableincomesofmanyChinesecontinuetoincrease,atourismboomisalsowellunderway.7Takentogether,thishasledtoasituationwhereChina’sriseisseenasnothingshortofaneconomicblessingforAustraliawhich,incidentally,waslargelyresponsibleforfundingsignificanttaxcutsundertheHowardgovernment.Consistentwiththis,AustraliansrankedChinaastheeconomymostimportanttotheircountry(bothnowandintothefuture)inarecent

foreignpolicypollconductedbytheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy.8

Second,andrelatedly,domesticpoliticalfactorshavealsoprovenconducivetoAustralia’smoreoptimistictakeonrisingChina.Canberraisnotshackledbythesamedeep‑seatednationalistsentimentthattodayweseethroughoutNortheastAsia,fuelledintheJapanesecasebythefactthatithasfoughtseveralmajorwarswithChina.Indeed,recentpollingindicatesthattheAustralianpublichasgenerallypositivefeelingstowardsChina.Inthe2007versionoftheaforementionedLowypoll,forinstance,56%ofAustraliansexpressedpositivefeelingstowardChina.9AnidenticalresultwasrecordedinanotherrecentpollconductedundertheauspicesofSydneyUniversity’sUnitedStatesStudiesCentre.Here56%alsoexpressedafavourableopinionofChinaand,interestingly,awhopping75%saidthesameofJapan.10

Third,Australia’sgeographicdistancefromthegreatpowermachinationsofNortheastAsiacanalsobeseentohavecontributedtowardsthesenseofoptimismattendingChina’srise.Tobesure,withthebulkofAustralia’seconomicinterestsconcentratedintheNortheastAsiansub‑region,ourdesireforcontinuedstrategicstabilityinthispartoftheworldisespeciallyacute.Indeed,forthisreasonalonetheprospect—howeverunlikely—ofSino–JapanesetensionseverspirallingintoopenconflictisonethatwouldkeepmostAustralianpolicy‑makersawakeatnight.

Atthesametime,however,Australia’sfortuitousgeographicalpositioningreducesapprehensionssurroundingChina’smilitarymodernisationinawaythatwouldsimplynotbepossibleforJapan.Canberrarecognises,ofcourse,thatBeijingismovingbeyondanexclusivefocusonTaiwanStraitscenariosandthatChina’scapacitytodeployforces


alongitsmaritimeperipheryisincreasinginafairlyrapidandsignificantway.11YetChina’scapacitytoprojectpowerbeyonditsimmediateneighbourhoodremainslimitedandislikelytoremainsointotheforeseeablefuture.AstherespectedAmericandefenceanalystPhillipSaundershasrecentlyobserved‘China’sambitiousmilitarymodernisationeffortsarelikelytoimprovethePLA’scapabilitytoprojectpowerglobally,butthiswillbeagradual,long‑termprocess.’12This,ofcourse,augurswellforageographicallydistantAustralia.

Addedtothis,ChinapresentlydoesnothaveaccesstomilitarybasesinAustralia’simmediateneighbourhood,whileCanberraisoftheviewthatanyseriousChineseattempttoprojectpowerintothispartoftheworldwould,inthecurrentstrategicenvironment,bestronglyresistedbyothermajorpowers(namelytheUS).13Tobesure,Beijing’slong‑rangeballisticmissilesalreadygiveitthecapacitytostrikeatAustraliaanditiscontinuingtomoderniseitsstrategicnuclearforces.However,thismodernisationprocesscontinuestobearelativelyslowoneandChina’sstrategicnuclearforceremainsverysmall.14Againstthatbackdrop,itremainsdifficulttoconceiveofcircumstancesinwhichChinawouldchosetoexpendthisrelativelylimitedarsenalagainstAustraliantargets.

The frightened country?

HoweverremotetheprospectofamajorChineseattackagainstAustraliamightcurrentlyseem,itisstillonewhichhascertainlynotbeendismissedaltogetherinAustralia’sdefenceplanning.15Hence,whileCanberra’sviewofChina’s(re)emergencehastendedtobemoresanguinethanthatheldinTokyoandWashington,itwouldbeamistaketocharacteriseAustralia’spositiononthisissueasoneofcompletecomfort.AsCoralBellwrotein1964,‘avaguesenseofChinaasadistinctlyalarmingforceiswoven

intotheoriginalfabricofAustraliannationalattitudes.’16Mostrecently,thatsame‘vaguesense’ofalarmwasreflectedbeautifullyinthe2007DefenceUpdate:

China’semergenceasamajormarketanddriver

ofeconomicactivitybothregionallyandglobally

hasbenefitedtheexpansionofeconomicgrowth

intheAsia–Pacificandglobally.Butthepaceand

scopeofitsmilitarymodernisation,particularly

thedevelopmentofnewanddisruptive

capabilitiessuchastheanti‑satellite(ASAT)

missile(testedinJanuary2007)couldcreate

misunderstandingsandinstabilityintheregion.17

Initsmostrecentmanifestation,thislingeringapprehensionvis‑à‑visChinaisdrivenbytwofactors.First,byasenseofuncertaintyaboutwhattheregionwouldlooklikeandhowitwouldoperatewereChinatounambiguouslybecomethedominantpowerinthispartoftheworld.AsHughWhite,aprominentfigureintheAustraliandebateputsit,‘NoneofusknowhowastrongandunrestrainedChinawouldbehave,butitmightseektodominatetheregionpolitically,economicallyandevenmilitarilyinwaysthatwouldimpingeuponourinterests.’18Ontheonehand,Beijing’sleadershipcapacityhasbeencalledintoquestionfollowingtherepeatedcover‑upofdiseaseoutbreaks(suchasSARS),thealmostnon‑existentChineseresponsetothe2004IndianOceantsunami,andduetothecontinuedopacityofdomesticpoliticsinChina.19Atthesametime,theexperienceofNaziGermanyhasembeddeddeepintheWesternpsycheabeliefthatstatesundertakingmilitarymodernisationprogramswhoalsodisplayaflagrantregardforhumanrightsoftheirownsubjectsaremorepronetobehavingaggressivelyintheirforeignrelationsthanthosewhichdonotexhibitthesecharacteristics.

Thesecond,equallydeep‑seatedsourceofAustralia’slatentapprehensioncomesfromourlongstandingsensethatweare

50 Proceedings

essentiallyregardedas‘outsiders’inAsia.RenouftoucheduponthisinsecurityinhischaracterisationofAustraliaasa‘frightenedcountry’;acountrythatliterallylivesinfearofitsownneighbourhood,thatisunabletoseetheopportunitiesintheAsianregionclearlyandthatalsoexhibitsastrongpenchantforseekingoutagreatandpowerfulfriend.However,itwastheAmericanpoliticalscientistSamuelHuntingtonwhoprobablycaptureditbestwhenreferringtoAustraliaasa‘torncountry’—asocietydividedoverwhetherornotitbelongstoAsia.20Interestingly,Beijinghasattimesbeenresponsibleforreinforcingthissenseofvulnerability,suchasinmid‑2005whenitreportedlyopposedAustralianmembershipoftheinauguralEastAsiaSummit.21

DuringtheHowardyears,Australiacompensatedfortheseperceivedvulnerabilitiesbyadoptingwhatmightlooselybetermeda‘hedgingstrategy’.‘Hedging’,ofcourse,isanimprecisetermwhoseusagecansometimesconfuseasmuchasitclarifies.Inallofitsmanifestations,however,theconceptof‘hedging’wouldappeartoinvolveacombinationofengagementandindirect(orsoft)balancingbehaviour.Notunlikean‘insurance’policy,hedgingstrategies,asEvelynGohhasrecentlyobserved,‘cultivateamiddlepositionthatforestallsoravoidshavingtochooseoneside(oronestraightforwardpolicystance)attheobviousexpenseofanother’.22

AustraliaandChinahavecertainlydeepenedtheirengagementinanumberofareassincenormalisingrelations35yearsago.Atthattime,bilateraltradestoodatA$100million,whereasby2006ithadreached$A33billion.23BeijingandCanberraarecurrentlyintheprocessofnegotiatingaFreeTradeAgreement(FTA).Theircooperationonenvironmentalissuesisbecominganincreasinglyimportantfacetoftherelationship.Theissueofclimatechangehas

becomeapriorityareahere,asdemonstratedbytheestablishmentofanAustralia–ChinaJointCoordinationGrouponCleanCoalTechnologyinJanuary2007.24Interestingly,however,Australia’sstrategicengagementwithChinahasthusfarremainedratherlimited.25

Juxtaposedagainstthisdeepeningengagement,however,AustraliaduringtheHowardyearsalsoseemedtoindirectlybalanceagainstChina’sgrowingpowerandinfluence.Thecenterpieceofthis‘softbalancing’approachwas,ofcourse,Australia’salliancewiththeUS.Interestingly,however,Canberrawasalwayscarefultoavoidcreatingtheimpressionthatitssinglemostimportantstrategicrelationshipwaseverbeingusedasaninstrumentwithwhichto‘hardbalance’or‘contain’China.Fromanearlystage,forinstance,CanberrarefusedtojoinWashingtoninlobbyingforacontinuationoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)armsembargoagainstChina.26InAugust2004,ForeignMinisterAlexanderDownerfamouslyandcontroversiallyquestionedwhetherAustralia’sANZUScommitmentswouldapplyinthecaseofaTaiwanStraitscontingency.27Inearly2005,Australiainitiallyrefusedtojointheso‑called‘HalibutGroup’—amultilateralforumledbyUSofficialsanddesignedtofacilitateprivatedialogueamongstselectedAmericanalliesregardingChina.28AgaininMarch2006,priortotheinauguralgatheringoftheTrilateralStrategicDialogue(TSD)tobeheldatMinisterialLevelinSydney,Downerpubliclystatedthat‘apolicyofcontainmentofChinawouldbeaverybigmistake.’HispurposeinsodoingappearstohavebeentopubliclydistancehimselffromearliercommentsmadebyUSSecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRiceduringmediainterviewswheresheindicatedthattheUS,JapanandAustralianeededtobemindfulofthepaceandreachofBeijing’smilitarybuildupandalsoraisedtheprospectofChinabecoming‘anegativeforce’.29


TheTSDitselfcancertainlyberegardedasoneofthekey‘softbalancing’componentsofCanberra’s‘hedging’strategy.TheofficialAustralianrationale,ofcourse,isthatthisthree‑wayinitiativeisinnowaydirectedatChina.Araftofotherjustificationshavebeenadvanced:America,AustraliaandJapan,forinstance,areeachliberaldemocracies,espousingbroadlysimilareconomicandpoliticalvalues;theyareeachregarded—albeittovaryingdegrees—essentiallyas‘outsiders’inAsia;andtheyshareincreasinglycommonsecurityconcerns,suchasterrorismandWMDproliferation.Why,sotheofficiallinegoes,shouldthesethree‘naturalallies’notcooperate?TheobjectivesoffacilitatingJapan’s‘normalisation’orofcheckingAmerica’sunilateralisttendenciesinforeignaffairshavealsobeenpositedatvariousjunctures.30

Anyevidencesuggestinganabsenceofthe‘Chinafactor’fromthestrategyandpoliticssurroundingtheTSD,however,remainsfarfromcompelling.TherepeatedemphasisgiventothedemocraticcredentialsoftheTSDmembersautomaticallyandimplicitlytargetsChina—asenseofostracismthatwasreinforcedbysubsequentsuggestionsthattheTSDmightbeexpandedtoincludeIndia.ThefactthatthestatementresultingfromtheMarch2006meetingoftheTSDalsomadeexplicitmentionofChinadoesmakeitdifficulttosustaintheargumentthatBeijingisnotafocusofdiscussionatthesegatherings.31

IthascertainlynotescapedBeijing’sattentionthattheTSDiscomprisedofmemberswhoeachharbor(albeitdiffering)apprehensionsregardingChina’srise.Notwithstandingassurancesthatitisbeingundertakentocounterthegrowingthreatposedbyterroristandroguestateactors,theintensificationofmissiledefenceresearchcollaborationbetweentheUS,JapanandAustraliaannouncedinJune2007canbe

seeninasimilarway.32Indeed,sotoocantheAustralia–JapansecuritydeclarationwhichwassignedinMarch2007.AsAureliaGeorgeMulganhasobserved:

AustraliaisnowfiguringmuchlargerinJapan’s

strategiccalculationsaswellasinitseconomic

andtradevisionfortheregion.Theseare

pre‑eminentlyChina‑focusedratherthancentring

onthevalueoftheAustralia–Japanrelationship

foritsownsake.33

The Rudd government and Asian security: time for a cool change?

Speculationispresentlyrife,however,thatasignificantrecalibrationofAustralia’s‘hedging’approachissettooccurundertheRuddgovernment.ChinaissaidtobethemajorbeneficiaryofthisanticipatedpolicyshiftandJapanthebiggestloser.TheStraitsTimesofSingapore,forinstance,reportsthat:

MrRuddhasadeeperunderstandingofChina.

HewillrecognisethattokeeptheAustralian

economygoing,tieswithChinawouldhaveto

beveryclose.Hemightseekmorecooperation

anddialoguewithChinaoneconomicaswellas

securityissues.34

Insimilarvein,aneditorialprintedintheJapanTimessuggeststhat:

UnderMrRudd,whohasastrongaffinity

withChina,Australia’sapproachtowardsits

relationswithChinamaychange.Hewas

stationedinBeijingfortwoyearsinthe1980s

andspeaksfluentChinese…IfMrRuddmovesto

accommodateChina’sgrowinginfluence,Japan

shouldseriouslyconsiderhowtouseitasleverage

inlesseningconflictandfrictionwithChinaand

gettingthecountrytoplayaconstructiverole

inAsia.35

TheYomiuriShimbunislessupbeat,however,observingthat:

Thereareviewstherecouldbeasetbackin

Australia–JapanrelationsunderthenewRudd

Administration.36

5� Proceedings

Whilesuchsentimentsareunderstandable,myviewisthattheyarealsomisplaced.Indeed,foratleastthreereasonsIwouldarguethat,whenitcomestoAustralianapproachestoAsiansecurity,thesubtlechangeswhichmayoccurundertheRuddgovernmentshouldnotobscurethefactthatmuchwillremainthesameasitwasduringtheHowardperiod.

First,RuddhasmadenosecretofhiscontinuedcommitmenttotheAmericanalliance.Indeed,Rudd’sfirstwordsonforeignpolicyduringhiselectionnightvictoryspeechindicatedthatthealliancewouldremaincentralunderhiswatch.37This,ofcourse,isentirelyconsistentwiththeLaborParty’slongstandingcommitmenttothealliance,notwithstandingtheaberrationoftheMarkLathamcandidacy.

Tobesure,Rudd’sapproachtothealliancewillcertainlynotbeidenticaltoHoward’s.MichaelFullilove,forinstance,hasrecentlyspeculatedthatCanberrawillnowbelesslikelytoparticipateinanyfutureUSunilateraladventures.Inhisterms‘AustraliawillremainarobustandfamiliarallytoAmerica,butitmaynolongerbethebestredoubtforoutlaws.’HealsosuggeststhataRuddgovernmentwillmoreactivelyseektoinfluenceWashington’sattitudesandbehaviours,insharpcontrasttotheoftenunswervingloyaltyoftheHowardyears.Nevertheless,FullilovealsogoesontopositthatRuddmayactuallymoveAustraliaclosertotheUS.38Whilethis,fromRudd’sperspective,oughtnottoprecludeAustraliafromsimultaneouslydevelopingmoreintimatetieswithBeijing,thereversemaynotnecessarilybetrue.TheChinese,whoremainintentuponfurthersofteningUSalliancerelationshipsthroughouttheregion,continuetoviewtheAmerica–AustraliatieasafundamentalimpedimenttotheirdevelopinganygenuinestrategicrelationshipwithCanberra.

Second,whilethedepthofAustralia’seconomicengagementwithChinacanhardlybecalledintoquestion,itsengagementatotherlevelsremainsrelativelyshallowandunderdeveloped.Engagement,ofcourse,isamulti‑layered,multi‑dimensionalprocessthatalsoencompassesawidespectrumofpeople‑to‑peoplecontactsandpersonallinkages.YetAustraliaandChinaremainverydifferentsocieties:wespeakadifferentlanguage,ourculturesarediametricallyopposedandourvaluesarefundamentallyinconflict.TryingtodevelopthesameleveloftrustandintimacythatcurrentlyexistsintheAustralia–USor,forthatmatter,theAustralia–Japanrelationshipisthereforelikelytobealong‑termprojectandonethatwillalmostcertainlyencounteragooddealmoretrialsandtribulationsthanhasthusfarbeenacknowledgedineitherBeijingorCanberra.

Indeed,twoareasofpotentialdifficultyarealreadyapparent.ThefirstisinrelationtotheproposedFTAbetweenAustraliaandChina.WherenegotiationswerenotoriouslyslowduringtheHowardyears,theyhavevirtuallygroundtoahaltunderRudd’swatch.ThenewPrimeMinisterhasalreadycontroversiallycutresourcesallocatedtotheseFTAnegotiations.Addedtothis,Chinaisincreasinglyfocusedupongrowingitsowndomesticconsumptionandon‘goingglobal’intheareaofinvestment.Tradeisthusbecominglessofapriorityinthisenvironment—afactorwhichdoesnotaugurparticularlywellforthefutureprogressoftheFTA.39Thesecondareaofpotentialdifficultyishumanrights.DespiteRudd’spro‑Chinacredentials,hehaspreviouslycriticisedChinainthisarea.Heisalsolikelytofacepressurefromtheleft‑wingofhisownLaborPartytopressBeijingonthisfront.Hence,wheretheHowardgovernmentwasabletolargelyinsulatetheSino–Australianrelationshipfromdifficultiesoverhumanrightsissuesbyconductingdiscussionsregardingthesemattersinthe


contextofaprivatebilateraldialogue,Ruddmaynothavethisluxury.40

Third,andmostimportantlyinthecontextofthisdiscussion,isthecontinuedimportanceofJapantoAustralia.JapanremainsAustralia’ssecondlargesttradingpartnerandthereisverylittletosuggestthatitseconomiccentralitytothiscountrywillsoondiminish.ThelongevityoftheAustralia–Japansecurityrelationshipshouldnotbeunderestimatedeither.Greaterstrategiccollaborationbetweenourtwocountries,weshouldrecall,beganduringthe1970sandhasbeenexpandedsubstantiallyfromthe1990sonwards.41Tobesure,somerebalancingoftheAustralia–JapanrelationshipislikelytooccurfollowingHoward’snoticeabletilttowardsTokyowhichtookplaceatthebeginningof2007.Inmyview,thattiltwasdrivenprimarilybydomesticpoliticalconsiderationsandwasanattemptonthepartofHowardtodifferentiatehimselffromRuddinanelectionyear.

Againstthatbackdrop,ratherthanexecutinganyfundamentalre‑orderingofAustralia’sapproachtoAsiansecurity,myviewisthatwewillseethenewRuddgovernmentreverttothedelicate‘balancingact’thatwassuchadefiningfeatureofAustralianforeignpolicythroughoutmostoftheHowardyears.AmericaandJapanwillremaincentralhere,inmyview,asCanberracontinuesto‘hedge’againstsomeofthelesssavourypotentialitiesassociatedwithChina’s(re)emergence.InthewordsofmycolleagueRobertAyson,‘thecountriesofAsiawillfindthattheRuddgovernment,andespeciallyitsleader,iscommittedtoregionalengagementandtopositioningAustraliawiselyintheemerginggreatpowerpicture…ButAustralia’s26thprimeministerwillbeundernoillusionthatold‑fashionedrelationsofpowerbetweenstatesarebeingsidelinedintheregionorthatAsiaisdestinedforincreasingpeaceaswellasprosperity.Theregion’srealists,andthere

aremanyofthem,willfindthatKevinRuddissomeonewhocanunderstandandspeaktheirlanguage.Theywillfind,inshort,thatRuddisfluentinmuchmorethanmandarin.’42

Endnotes

1 AlanRenouf,TheFrightenedCountry,(Melbourne:MacMillan,1979).

2 PrimeMinistertheHon.JohnHowardMP,addressattheopeningoftheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,Sydney,31March2005.

3 CitedinPaulDibb,‘Don’tGetTooClosetoBeijing’,TheAustralian,2August2005.

4 TranscriptofthePrimeMinistertheHon.JohnHowardMP,JointPressConferencewiththePresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmericaGeorgeW.Bush,TheWhiteHouse,WashingtonDC,19July2005.

5 GeoffElliott,‘StaycoolonChina,AmbassadortellsUS’,TheAustralian,30January2006.

6 JessicaIrvine,‘Chinanowbiggestpartner’,SydneyMorningHerald,1September2007.

7 SeeAustralianDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade,‘People’sRepublicofChinaCountryBrief–December2007’.Availablefromtheworldwideweb:(www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/cb_index.html).[accessed9December2007].

8 AllanGyngell,AustraliaandtheWorld;publicopinionandforeignpolicy,(Sydney,NSW:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,2007),p.13.

9 Ibid,p.5.

10 SeeAlanDupont,‘BenefitsoffsetcostsofUSalliance’,SydneyMorningHerald,3October2007.

11 ForfurtherreadingseeMichaelD.Swaine,‘China’sRegionalMilitaryPosture’,inDavidShambaugh,ed.,PowerShift:China

54 Proceedings

andAsia’sNewDynamics,(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2005),pp.266‑285.

12 PhillipC.Saunders,‘China’sGlobalActivism:Strategy,Drivers,andTools’,OccasionalPaper4,InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies,NationalDefenseUniversity,WashingtonDC,October2006,p.18.

13 SeeHughWhite,BeyondtheDefenceofAustralia,LowyInstitutePaper16,(Sydney,NSW:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy),pp.34‑35.

14 ForfurtherreadingseeUSDepartmentofDefense,AnnualReportoftheMilitaryPowerofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,(USGovernmentPrintingOffice,WashingtonDC,2007),pp.18‑20.

15 See,forexample,CommonwealthofAustralia,Defence2000:OurFutureDefenceForce,(Canberra:DepartmentofDefence,2000),p.23.

16 CoralBell,‘AustraliaandChina:PowerBalanceandPolicy’,inA.M.Halperin,ed.,PoliciesTowardChina:ViewsfromSixContinents,(NewYork:McGrawHill,1965).

17 AustralianDepartmentofDefence,Australia’sNationalSecurity:ADefenceUpdate2007,(Canberra:CommonwealthofAustralia,2007),p.19.

18 HughWhite,‘Thelimitstooptimism:AustraliaandtheriseofChina’,AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs,vol.59,no.4,December2005,p.476.

19 See,forexample,JoshuaKurlantzickandDevinStewart,‘Hu’sonFirst?’,TheNationalInterest,No.92,November/December2007,pp.63‑67.

20 SamuelP.Huntington,‘TheClashofCivilizations?’,ForeignAffairs,vol.72,no.3,Summer1993,p.42;andSamuelP.Huntington,TheClashofCivilizationsand

theRemakingofWorldOrder,(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1995),pp.151‑154.

21 PatrickWalters,‘BeijingplaysspoileronAsiasummit’,TheAustralian,6April2005.

22 EvelynGoh,‘Understanding‘hedging’inAsia‑Pacificsecurity’,PacNetNewsletterNo.43,PacficForumCSIS,Honolulu,Hawaii,31August2006.

23 SeeMalcolmCook,‘BuildingonStrongFoundations:TheFutureoftheChina‑AustraliaRelationship:OutcomesReport’,Perspectives,LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,Sydney,July2007.

24 SeeAustralianDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade,‘People’sRepublicofChinaCountryBrief–December2007’.

25 SeeAustralianDepartmentofDefence,Australia’sNationalSecurity:ADefenceUpdate2007,p.35.

26 SeeMichaelWesley,‘Australia‑China’inBrendanTaylor,ed.,AustraliaasanAsia-PacificRegionalPower:FriendshipsinFlux?,(London:Routledge,2007),p.72.

27 HamishMcDonaldandTomAllard,‘ANZUSloyaltiesfallunderChina’sshadow’,SydneyMorningHerald,18August2004.

28 SeeWilliamT.Tow,‘Sino‑Americanrelationsandthe‘Australiafactor’:inflatedexpectationsordiscriminateengagement?’,AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs,vol.59,no.4,December2005,p.454.

29 PatrickWalters,‘ContainingChinaaBigMistake:Downer’,TheAustralian,16March2006.

30 ForfurtherreadingontheTSDanditsobjectivesseeWilliamTTow,MarkJThomson,YoshinobuYamamotoandSatuP.Limaye,Asia-PacificSecurity:US,AustraliaandJapanandtheNewSecurityTriangle,(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2007).


31 SeeAureliaGeorgeMulgan,‘Australia–Japanrelations:Newdirections’,StrategicInsights,AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute,July2007,p.2.

32 PatrickWalters,‘Possibilityofabiggerroleinsecurityarchitecture’,TheAustralian,9June2007.

33 Mulgan,‘Australia–Japanrelations:Newdirections’,p.2.

34 WilliamChoongandSimChiYin,‘RuddgovtexpectedtobeclosertoChina’,StraitsTimes,26November2007.

35 ‘Australiawithanewface’,TheJapanTimes,28November2007.

36 CitedinChoongandYin,‘RuddgovtexpectedtobeclosertoChina’.

37 Availablefromtheworldwideweb:(www.alp.org.au/media/1107/spepme240.php).[Accessed9December2007].

38 MichaelFullilove,‘Allywithanewattitude;Australia’sprimeminister,thestaunchestofBushsupporters,isousted’,LosAngelesTimes,29November2007.

39 ForfurtherreadingseeRowanCallick,‘ChinaFreeTradeagreementshapesupasanearlychallengeforRudd’,TheAustralian,3December2007.

40 ForfurtherreadingseeSteveLewisandCathHart,‘LefttocreateChinacrisisforRudd’,TheAustralian,12April,2007.

41 ForfurtherreadingseeBrendanTaylorandDesmondBall,‘Australia–Japan’,inBrendanTaylor,ed.,AustraliaasanAsia–PacificRegionalPower:FriendshipsinFlux?,(London:Routledge,2007),pp.50‑59.

42 RobertAyson,‘KevinRuddandAsia’sSecurity’,PacNetNewsletterNo.49,PacificForumCSIS,Honolulu,Hawaii,29November2007.

The impacts of china’s rise on the Asian international system

seiichiro Takagi Aoyama gakuin University1

Introduction

Attheendof1978,Chinadepartedfromthepathofrevolutionandswitchedtoapolicyofreformandopeningup,witheconomicdevelopmentasthefundamentalgoalofthestate.TheeconomicandsocialdevelopmentwhichChinahasattainedtodatehasbroughtaboutvariouschangesontheinternationalscene.Clearly,themoststrikingisChina’shugenewfoundeconomicpresencewithintheinternationalcommunity.AccordingtostatisticspublishedbytheChineseGovernmentinJanuary2006,China’sgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)hasrisentoUS$2.26trillion,makingitthefourthlargestintheworld.ThereisalsoaviewthatChina’sGDPisalreadyeffectivelythethirdlargestintheworld,giventheundervaluationofitscurrency(theyuan)andChina’slowdomesticprices.

Thisrapideconomicgrowthwasaccomplishedthroughexport‑orientedindustrialisationandtheactiveintroductionofforeigncapital.Asaresult,China’sglobaltradepresencehasalsogrownrapidly—accordingtoWorldTradeOrganizationstatistics,by2004Chinawasalreadythethirdlargesttradingnationintheworld.ChinaisnowJapan’snumberonetradepartner.Intermsofotherindicesaswell,suchasinwarddirectinvestmentandforeignexchangereserves,Chinaisnowaleadingeconomicplayerontheworldstage.

Althoughthisinitselfisasignificantenoughchange,theconsequencesofChina’sdramaticeconomicgrowtharenotlimitedtotheexpansionofitseconomicpresenceintheworld.ThispapertriestoexaminetheconsequencesofChina’srapideconomic

5� Proceedings

growthintermsoftheinternationalpoliticalsystem.

1 The influence of China’s economic growth on its international behaviour

Inviewoftherapidandsustainedgrowthofitseconomy,China’spresenceisinvariouswaysadesirableonefortheinternationalcommunity.Havingbecomethefactorytotheworld,Chinaisnowformanycountriesavitalsourceofsupplyoflowpricedconsumergoods.Also,thesteadyexpansionofthemiddleclassoverthecourseofapproximatelyaquarterofacenturyofeconomicgrowthhascreatedanenormousmarket.TherecoveryoftheJapaneseeconomy—longmiredinstagnationaftertheburstofthebubbleatthestartofthe1990s—hasbeenheavilyreliantonChina,bothasaninvestmentdestinationandasanexportmarket.

Fromabroaderperspective,itshouldbepointedoutthatasChinahasrealiseditseconomicgrowthbyintegratingitselfwithinternationalinstitutionssuchastheWorldTradeOrganization,ithasbecomeanactorthatisnotlikelytobenefitfromdisruptingtheexistinginternationalorder.AsadvocatesofthetheoryofChina’s‘peacefulrise’pointout,irrespectiveofChina’smassivepresenceintermsofmacroeconomicindicators,thenationrankslowerthanonehundredthintheworldinpercapitaGDPand,asitrequirescontinuouslongtermgrowth,thistrendcanbeexpectedtocontinueinthefuture.

Itisundeniable,however,thatthevariouschangesaccompanyingChina’srapideconomicgrowthhavearousedmajorconcernintheinternationalcommunity.Foremostamongthese,asmanycommentatorshaveobserved,isthefactthatChina’srapideconomicgrowthhasenabledittoswiftlymoderniseitsmilitary

capability.AccordingtoofficialChinesestatistics,China’smilitaryexpenditurehasincreasedbyover10%almosteveryyearsince1989.However,anannualreportonChinesemilitarypowerissuedbytheUSDepartmentofDefensestatesthatthoseofficialfiguresaccountfornomorethanathirdtoahalfofChina’sactualmilitaryspending.ChinahasbeenusingthishugemilitaryexpendituretoimportadvancedweaponryfromRussia,improvemilitarytrainingstandards,enhancethecomputerisationofitsmilitary,andrapidlymoderniseitsmilitarycapability,withparticularemphasisonnavalandairforces.ThisrapidmodernisationofChina’smilitarycapability—coupledwiththeseriouslackoftransparencythatsurroundsit—hascometobeamajorsourceofanxietyformanycountries.

Second,ashasbeenevidentsincethelaterhalfofthe1990s,demandbyChinafornaturalresources(especiallyforenergyresources)isrisingrapidlyintandemwithitsrapideconomicgrowth.ThefactthatChinahastoseeksuppliesofthoseresourcesfromabroadisexertingamajorinfluenceonitsconducttowardsothernations.Inparticular,therapidriseinChina’slevelofdependenceonoilfromothernationssinceitbecameanetoilimporterin1993hascontributedtothesoaringoilpricesofrecentyears.ThefactthatChinahasstrengtheneditsrelationswith‘problemstates’suchasIran,Venezuela,andtheSudan,withaviewtoensuringsourcesofsupplyforoil,hasalsobecomeamajorcauseofinternationalconcern.

Furthermore,thereisalsomajorcauseforapprehensionaboutthedomesticsocialconsequencesofChina’srapideconomicgrowth.First,ashasoftenbeenpointedout,growthhasbrokendowntheold‘equalityofpoverty’andbroughtaboutvariousacutedisparities.Accordingtoa2005reportbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,disparityinincomelevelsissuchthatthe


ratioofincomeinurbanareastoincomeinruralareasis6to1,andoverthepasttwentyyearsthenationalGiniindexhasincreasedby50%to0.46.2AlthoughthelatterfigureislowerthaninseveralLatinAmericanandAfricancountries,theurbanincomedisparityisseeminglytheworstintheworld.Againstthisbackgroundtherehasbeenasharpriseinthenumberofcasesofsocialunrest.InJanuary2006thePublicSecurityDepartmentannouncedthatin2005therehadbeenmorethan87,000instancesof‘offensesofdisturbingsocialorder,’suchaspublicdisturbancesandincidentsofgroupviolence—anincreaseof6.6%overthepreviousyear.3Notably,therehavebeenreportsofcasesinwhichconflictoverissuessuchastheforcefulappropriationoflandandirregularchargeshaveledtoviolentdisputesinagriculturalcommunities.AsnotedbyElizabethEconomy,anexpertonChina’senvironmentalproblems,therearealsofrequentprotestmovementssparkedbytheongoingaggravationofenvironmentalproblemssuchasairandwaterpollutionanddesertification—thepursuitofeconomicdevelopmenthavingledtoadisregardfortheburdenplacedontheenvironment.4

Itappearsthatthesekindsofsituation—especiallyincidentsofviolenceonalargerscale—arecurrentlyconfinedtothelevelofregionaldisputes,andthatthereisnonationwidecoordination.TheHuJintao–WenJiabaoregimeseemstobefullyawareofthegravityoftheseproblems,asdemonstratedbysloganssuchas‘puttingpeoplefirst,’‘constructingaharmonioussociety,’and‘thetheoryofscientificdevelopment.’Furthermore,theadvocatesofthe‘peacefulrise’theoryassertthat,becauseChinawillhavetorespondappropriatelytothiskindofdomesticsituationoveralongperiod,Chinawillneedapeacefulinternationalenvironment,andthatitscontinuingdevelopmentwillthusinevitablybepeaceful.5

However,therearelimitstotheabilityofthecurrentregimetocountertheseproblems,anditisconceivablethatsuppressionofdiscontent(coupledwithunremittingcorruptionamongofficialdomandtheinadequaciesofthesocialsecuritysystem)couldjeopardisetheverysurvivaloftheregime.Notably,thetheoryofthe‘revolutionofrisingexpectations’suggeststhat,intheeventofasignificantslowdownineconomicgrowth(evenifnegativegrowthwereavoided),thisdangerwouldrapidlyloom.Undersuchcircumstances,theleadershipmightsuccumbtothetemptationtoinflametensionswithothernationsinordertodisplacedomesticdiscontentandavertacrisis.Evenifitdidnotgotosuchlengths,itislikelythatitwouldnotmakeanyeffectiveeffortstocontaindemonstrationsofmassdiscontentdirectedatforeignnations.

Itispossiblethattheriseofnationalismthataccompaniesrapideconomicdevelopmentwillfurtherintensifythesetrends.AsaChineseresearchertoldmeafewyearsago,intheinitialstagesofreformandopeningup,nationalismwasafriendofreformandopeningupbecauseitwasessentialtoovercomeChina’slowlevelofdevelopment,butnownationalismturnedagainstanyopeninguptotheoutsideworld,duetoariseinselfconfidenceresultingfromeconomicgrowth.6

Thistrendisbeingspurredonbytherecentexceptionallyrapidspreadoftheinternet.AccordingtoasurveybytheChinaInternetInformationCenter,thetotalnumberofinternetusersinChinawas620,000in1997,22.5millionin2000,and111millionin2005.The2005figureisnearlyfivetimesthe2000figure,and179timesthe1997total.7Againstthisbackdrop,theanti‑JapanesedemonstrationsthattookplaceinmanyChinesecitiesinApril2005wereorganisedovertheinternetthroughemailandchatrooms,andrapidlyassumedmajor

5� Proceedings

proportions.EvenaftertheactivitiesonthestreetswerebroughtundercontrolinMay,criticismofJapancontinuedunabatedontheinternet.ItissaidthatonJuly1,activistssentUNSecretary‑GeneralKofiAnnanaletter,with46millionelectronicsignaturesattached,opposingJapan’saccessiontopermanentmembershipoftheUNSecurityCouncil.8

HowshouldwedealwithsuchproblematicbehaviouronthepartofChina,stemmingfromitseconomicandsocialdevelopment?Aswellasdevisingwaystoalleviateandavoidthedamagewhichthatbehaviourentails(thenaturalresponse),weshouldprobablyalsoworktowardsapre‑emptiveresponseandwhereverpossibleassistChinaasmuchaswecaninitseffortstomitigateanddispelthecausesofthebehaviour.

Forexample,therapidriseinChineseenergydemandisnottheresultofChina’srapideconomicgrowthalone—itisalsopartlyduetoChina’sinefficientuseofenergy.Accordingtosomeassessments,China’senergyconsumptionperunitGDP(oilequivalentconversion)isapproximatelytentimesthatofJapanandfourtimesthatoftheUS.AlthoughthoseassessmentsmaybebiasedbytheconversionofGDPintodollarsatthemarketrate,Chinadefinitelyhassignificantroomforimprovementinenergyefficiency—andanimprovementinefficiencywouldcertainlyslowdowntheincreaseindemand.AssistingChinatoimproveitsenergyefficiencywouldnotsimplybeinChina’sinterests—itisataskthatoughttobeperformedintheinterestsoftheentireinternationalcommunity.

China’senvironmentalpollutionisalsonotsolelyadomesticproblem,butisalsoahugeproblemforJapanandSouthKorea,whicharedownwindinthejetstream.AccordingtoaJapanesestudyonsulfurdioxidethatfellonJapaninJanuary1999,inallregionsbutoneover50%ofitoriginatedinChina,withtheproportionreaching75%inoneregion.

Thesameistrue(althoughtoalesserextent)ofthespreadofyellowdustcausedbytheadvanceofdesertification.Infact,someofChina’senvironmentalproblemsnowassumeaglobaldimension.AccordingtoastudybytheInternationalEnergyAgencypublishedinNovember2006,Chinaisnowthesecondlargestemitterofcarbondioxide,accountingfor18%oftheglobaltotal(aftertheUS,with22%),andisexpectedtoovertaketheUSwithinfouryears.9

ElizabethEconomypointsoutregionaldisparitiesinChina’sresponsetoenvironmentalpollution,andcitesthesupportofleadersforprotectingtheenvironment,theexistenceofthenecessaryresourcestodoso,andthestrongbackingoftheinternationalcommunityasthecommonfeaturesinthoseregionsthataresucceedinginthisregard.10Inthiscase,theinternationalcommunityincludesnotonlythegovernmentsofenvironmentallyadvancednationsbutalsonon‑governmentorganisations,whichplayakeyrole.ItisalsopossiblethatChinamightwitnessareplayofthepatternseeninEasternEuropeandtheformerSovietUnion,wheredemonstrationsofdiscontentbylocalresidentsoverenvironmentalproblemsprovedtobeavitalfirststeptowardsgovernmentreformanddemocratisation.Hence,assistancewiththeenvironmentcouldtransformintolowkeybackingfordemocratisation.

ItisreallyuptoChinaalonetomakeeffortstoreducethedisparitiesandeliminatecorruption.Althoughthereislittlescopeforparticipationbytheinternationalcommunity,theremaybetimeswhenitwillneedtoexerciseprudencesoasnottobecomepartoftheproblem.WithregardtoChina’smodernisationofitsmilitarycapability,theinternationalcommunitymusttakemeasurestoavoidrisksanddemandincreasedtransparency,whiletakingcarenottofallintothetrapofthesecuritydilemma.China


formerlyconcealedallinformationregardingitsmilitarycapabilities.ItwasinternationalpersuasionattheASEANRegionalForumandothervenuesthatledChinatopublishatleastanationaldefencewhitepaper.Althoughitwashighlyunsatisfactorybyinternationalstandards,itisawelcomestepforward.Finally,theinternationalcommunitymustcopewithChinesenationalismcalmly,withoutrisingtothebaitofitsanti‑foreigntendencies,andatthesametimeseekcooperationwithcoolerChineseheadsthroughmutualunderstanding.

2 The effects on the international system of China’s immense growth

China’s growth and the East Asian international system

China’seconomicandsocialdevelopmenthasnotonlyeffectedvariouschangesinitsownconducttowardsothercountries—ithasalsohadmajoreffectsonthenatureoftheinternationalsystem.ThesechangeshavebeenduetoChina’sconducttowardsothernations—principallyaresultofitsimmenseeconomicgrowth.Chiefamongthemarethetwochangesconsideredbelow.

ThefirstchangeistheincreaseinChina’sinfluenceinthesurroundingregion.WhenChinastoodisolatedinternationally,facingsanctionsfromWesternnationsovertheTiananmenSquareincidentofJune1989,itsoughtabreakthroughbyfocusingontheimprovementofitsrelationswiththenationsofSoutheastAsia,whichhadnottakensuchacriticalstanceontheincident.Betweenthelatterhalfof1989and1991,ChinanormalisedrelationswithLaos,Indonesia,andVietnam,establisheddiplomaticrelationswithSingaporeandBrunei,activelyparticipatedintheCambodianpeaceprocessin1991,andthencollaboratedwiththesubsequentUNpeacekeepingoperationinCambodia.Itdevelopedrelationswith

regionalorganisations,attendingtheASEANpostministerialmeetinginJuly1991asaguestofthechairnation,andattheendofthatyearbecomingamemberofAPEC,alongwithTaiwanandHongKong.AfewyearsaftertheTiananmenSquareincident,ChinamadeheadwayinitsrelationswithotherAsiancountries,withtheJapaneseEmperor’svisittoChinain1992andtheestablishmentofdiplomaticrelationswiththeRepublicofKoreainthesameyear.ChinareactedcalmlytothecollapseoftheSovietUnionattheendof1991,andswiftlyestablisheddiplomaticrelationswiththesuccessorstateswhichcomprisedtheCommunityofIndependentStates,includingRussia.ChinadeclareditsintentiontojointheASEANRegionalForum,thefoundingofwhichwasagreeduponin1993,andin1994becameaconsultativedialoguepartnerofASEAN.However,itmustalsobepointedoutthatatsametimethetheoryofthe‘Chinesethreat’wasgainingcurrencyinthenationsofSoutheastAsia,againstabackdropofChina’srapideconomicgrowthinthewakeofDengXiaoping’sSouthernTourspeechesof1992anddisputesoversovereigntyintheSouthChinaSea.

Inordertochangethisstateofaffairs,fromthemid‑1990sChinabecameevenmoreactivelyinvolvedinSoutheastAsia.AttheASEANforeignministers’meetingin1996,ChinabecameafulldialoguepartnerofASEANandpresentedanewsecurityconceptincorporatingthenotionofcooperativesecurity.Thefollowingyear,ChinahostedanASEANRegionalForuminter‑sessionalmeetingonconfidencebuilding.AtthetimeoftheAsiancurrency/financialcrisisin1997,ChinarespondedtotheconcernsofSoutheastAsiannationsbyavertingdevaluationofitscurrency,theyuan,andconcurrentlygaveeconomicassistancetoThailandandIndonesia.Attheendofthatyear,ChinalaunchedtheASEAN+1consultationmechanismwiththenationsofASEAN,whilesimultaneouslyjoiningthe

�0 Proceedings

ASEAN+3mechanismencompassingChina,Japan,andSouthKorea.UnderASEAN+1,in2000ChinaproposedtheconclusionofafreetradeagreementwiththenationsofASEAN,withaviewtosharingthefruitsofitsowneconomicgrowthwiththem;in2004aframeworkagreementwasfinallyconcluded.In2000ChinaalsobegandiscussionswithASEANnationsoversovereigntydisputesintheSouthChinaSea,andin2002itsignedtheDeclarationontheConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea.In2003ChinajoinedtheTreatyofAmityandCooperationinSoutheastAsiaandannouncedastrategicpartnershipwiththenationsofASEAN.

Atmoreorlessthesametimethatthesedevelopmentsweretakingplace,ChinawasmakinggreatstridesinitsrelationswiththenationsofCentralAsia,itsneighbourstothenorth.In1996ChinatookadvantageofthesigningofanagreementwithRussia,Kazakhstan,Tajikistan,andKyrgyzstanonconfidence‑buildingmeasuresinborderareastoinauguratetheShanghaiFiveSummitMeeting.Sincethen,theShanghaiFivehaveheldanannualsummitmeeting,expandinganddeepeningtheircooperativerelationship.In2001Uzbekistanwasadmittedtothegroupanditwastransformedintoaformalregionalorganisation,theShanghaiCooperationOrganization.Tothesouthaswell,Chinawasmakingprogress,developingimprovedrelationswithIndiawhilemaintainingamicablerelationswithPakistan.Bysettingasidetheresolutionofterritorialproblemsasapreconditiontoimprovedrelations,IndiaandChinatooktheopportunityofthe1988visittoChinabyPrimeMinisterRajivGandhitostartimprovingtheirrelationship.In1993thetwonationsconcludedanagreementonmaintainingtranquilityintheareasaroundthelineofactualcontrol,andin1996concludedanagreementonconfidence‑buildingmeasuresinthemilitaryfieldrelatingtothesameareas.ImprovementsinChina’srelationswithIndia

weresetbackbyIndia’snucleartestinginMay1998,butthesummerof1999sawarecovery.

Astheabovedevelopmentsillustrate,againstabackdropofrapideconomicgrowthsincethe1990s,Chinahassucceededinimprovingrelationswithitsneighboursthroughvigorousdiplomacy,andhasstrengtheneditspresenceintheregion.However,theseeventsdidnotsignifytheinstantformationofanAsianpowerbalanceinwhichChinapredominated.Thiswasbecausesimultaneouslywiththedevelopmentsdescribedabove,other—sometimescountervailing—developmentsweretakingplaceinAsia.OfparticularimportancewasthestrengtheningoftheJapan–USsecurityalliance.AftertheendoftheColdWar,thesecuritypartnershipbetweenJapanandtheUSlapsedintoatemporarydrift,duetothelossofthepotentialcommonenemyintheshapeoftheSovietUnion.However,startingaround1994,therewereconcreteactivitiesbybothpartiestoimprovethesituation.IntheJointDeclarationonSecurityissuedinApril1996,thetwonationsreaffirmedtheimportanceoftheallianceinthepost‑ColdWarerawithoutidentifyinganynationasapotentialenemy.Theyagreedthat,evenaftertheendoftheColdWar,theUS–JapansecurityallianceplayedavitalroleinthepreservationofpeaceandstabilityintheAsia–Pacificregionasaninstitutioncapableofrespondingeffectivelytoregionalinstabilityanduncertainty.SuchamovewasnotmeanttobedirectedagainsttheexpansionofChina’sinfluence,andthejointdeclarationaffirmedChina’s‘constructiverole’asbeinginthecommoninterestofJapanandtheUS.Rather,manyoftheactionstakenbyChinasince1996havebeencountermeasuresagainstthestrengthenedUS–Japanalliance.

Followingthe1996declaration,theframeworkofcooperationintheJapan–USsecurityalliancewasstrengthenedstepbystepwiththerevisionoftheJapan–US


defencecooperationguidelinesin1997,thestartofjointtechnicalresearchonmissiledefencein1999(whichwaspropelledbythefiringofaTaepodongmissilebyNorthKoreain1998),andJapaneselegislationrelatingtocontingenciesinareassurroundingJapanin1999.Sincethe9/11terroristattacksin2001,thetwonationshavebeendrawingcloserevermorerapidly,withtheaccelerationoftherealignmentofUSforcesinJapan,andagainstabackgroundoftheaffirmationoftheglobalsignificanceoftheUS–Japanalliance.ThiscanbeseenintheidentificationofjointstrategicobjectivesinFebruary2005;theformalisationofeachnation’smissions,roles,andcapabilitiesinOctober2005;andthepublicationinMay2006oftheRoadmapforRealignmentImplementation.Concurrently,therealignmentoftheUS–SouthKoreaalliancealsomadeprogressthroughtheFutureoftheAllianceandSecurityPolicyInitiativemeetings,despiteturbulencecausedbyrisingdomesticanti‑USsentiment,whiletheUS–Australiaalliancealsoremainsonanevenkeel.TheevolutionofthelinkagebetweentheJapan–USandtheAustralia–USsecurityalliances,whichseemstohavegainedsteamsince2008,isnotostensiblydirectedagainstChinabutwillcertainlyfunctionastheantidotetotheformationofaSino‑centricAsianorder.

ThenationsofSoutheastAsiaarenotcompletelyundertheinfluenceofChina,either.AftertheAsiancurrencycrisis,JapanprovidedafargreatersuminassistancethanChinaundertheNewMiyazawaInitiative,whichwasunveiledin1998.InDecember2003JapanhostedtheJapan–ASEANCommemorativeSummitMeetinginTokyo,whichwasintendedtostrengthenitscollaborationwithASEANnations.Similarly,thenumberofcountriesreinforcingcooperativerelationswiththeUSsincetheterroristattacksof9/11hasincreased,andin2003thePhilippinesandThailandbecame‘majornonNATOallies’of

theUS.Intheinternationalreliefeffortsthatfollowedthe2004IndianOceantsunami,theUSconstitutedaformidablepresence,contributingalarge‑scaledispatchofforcesthatincludedanaircraftcarrier,aswellasprovidingenormoussumsinfinancialassistance;likewise,Japandispatcheditsselfdefenceforcesandmadethelargestfinancialcontributionofanynation.TheEastAsiaSummitofDecember2005witnessedatugofwarbetweenJapanandChinaoverwhichnationsshouldparticipate.TheSoutheastAsiannationssidedwithJapan,whichinsistedthatAustraliaandIndiabeinvited.

Formation of a US–China–India strategic triangle?

AnotherchangeininternationalsystemsbroughtaboutbyChina’s(andIndia’s)economicgrowthwhichmeritsexaminationisthepossibleformationofastrategictriangularrelationshipbetweentheUS,China,andIndiawhichencompassestheentireAsianregion.Herethestrategictriangleisdistinguishedfromtrilateralrelationshipsbytheexistenceofthreeconditions:

• anyoneofthethreehandlesitsrelationshipwiththesecondinconsiderationofitsrelationshipwiththethird

• thepoliticalandmilitarycapabilityofanyoneissignificantenoughtoseriouslyaffectthestrategicbalanceifitchangesalignmentfromthesecondtothethird

• noneofthethreehasastableandlastingalignmentwitheitheroneoftheothertwo.11

TheUSplayedthecriticalroleinwhatseemstobetheformationofthistriangularrelationship.TheUS’spost‑ColdWarpolicytowardsChinahasundergonefluctuationofgreatmagnitude,withthetraumaoftheTiananmenSquareincidentandthelossoftheneedforananti‑Sovietcardduetothe

�� Proceedings

collapseoftheColdWarorder.Nevertheless,inadditiontoitsrenewedrecognitionoftheimportanceoftheChinesemarketduetoChina’srapideconomicgrowthsince1992,theUSrecognisedChina’sstrategicimportanceduetofactorssuchasitspermanentmembershipoftheUNSecurityCouncil,itspossessionofnuclearweapons,anditsroleintheproblemoftheKoreanPeninsula.WhenJiangZeminvisitedtheUSin1997,thetwosidesagreedtoworktowardbuildinga‘constructivestrategicpartnership.’However,anxietiesoverChina’smilitarymodernisationandlackoftransparencyaboutit,suppressionofhumanrights,andotherfactorswerenotallayed.Ontheotherside,ChinawasawarethatUSmarkets,technology,andinvestmentwereessentialforeconomicdevelopmentandrecognisedtheneedtomaintainamicablerelationswiththeUS(thesolesuperpowerinthepost‑ColdWarera)inordertoensurethestabilityoftheinternationalenvironment,withoutwhichitwouldnotbeabletoconcentrateoneconomicdevelopment.However,ChinastronglyresentedtheUSinclinationtowardsunilateralismandtheimpositionofitsownvaluesinmatterssuchashumanrightsanddemocratisation.

Giventhisstateofaffairs,theUSbegantoturnitsattentiontoIndia,whichhadswitchedtoapolicyofopeninguptotheoutsideworldandwasachievingrapideconomicgrowth,primarilyasabalancetoChina.Fromthemid‑1990sonwards,asuccessionofUSthink‑tanksreleasedreportsstressingtheimportanceofIndia,andthesewereessentiallyrehashedinaDepartmentofDefensereportentitledAsia2025,publishedin1999.Inthisnewclimateofawareness,in2000PresidentClintonvisitedIndiaandPrimeMinisterVajpayeevisitedtheUS.WhenForeignMinisterJaswantSinghvisitedtheUSinApril2001,theBushadministration,whichhadpreviouslydesignatedChinaastheUS’smainstrategiccompetitor,acknowledged

thatIndiawasalreadyamajorglobalpower.AftervisitingJapanonaroundofstopsinAsiatoexplaintheUSpolicyofpromotingmissiledefenceinMay2001,DeputySecretaryofStateRichardArmitagesubsequentlywentontoIndia,skippingChina.After9/11,cooperationbetweentheUSandIndiagrewevenstrongerandthesanctionsoverthe1998nucleartestingwererescinded.

Ashasalreadybeenmentioned,ChinahadbeensteadilyimprovingitsrelationswithIndiasince1988.However,ittookChinasometimetotreatIndiaasaforcetobereckonedwithintheglobalpowerbalance.Sincetheestablishmentofa‘strategicpartnership’withRussiain1996,Chinahadbeenpursuingastrategytopromoteamultipolarglobalpowerstructure,withthedeliberateintentionofopposingthetrendtowardsunilateraldominationbytheUS,butChinadidnotimmediatelytreatIndiaasatargetofthisstrategy.OnlywhenitrealisedthattheUSandIndiawererapidlygrowingcloser,asnotedabove,ChinachangedthewayinwhichithandledIndia.InJanuary2002,PrimeMinisterZhuRongjivisitedIndia,accompaniedbyhisministersofeconomicaffairs,inanefforttostrengthenrelationsthrougheconomicties.WhenPrimeMinisterVajpayeevisitedChinainJune2003,ChinafinallyexpresseditsintentiontoincludeIndiainitsstrategytopromotemultipolarity.InJanuary2005,ChinaandIndiabegana‘strategicdialogue,’and,whenPrimeMinisterWenJiabaovisitedIndiainAprilofthesameyear,thetwonationsannounceda‘strategicpartnershipforpeaceandstability.’

Itisinterestingthat,whilerelationsbetweenChinaandIndiawerevisiblyprogressing,US–Indianrelationswerealsoprogressingfurther.InJanuary2004,theUSandIndiaagreedonthe‘nextstepsinstrategicpartnership,’andinJune2005theystrengthenedtheircooperationonsecurityintheformofthe‘NewFrameworkfor


theUS–IndiaDefenseRelationship.’WhenPrimeMinisterManmohanSinghvisitedtheUSthefollowingmonth,theUSGovernmentagreedtocooperatewithIndiaforitscivilnuclearenergyprogram,despitethefactthatIndiahadpursuedthedevelopmentofnuclearweaponsoutsidetheframeworkoftheNuclearNonProliferationTreatywithits1998nucleartesting.InMarch2006PresidentBushvisitedIndiaandproclaimeda‘strategicpartnership.’

Meanwhile,inthewakeof9/11,Sino–USrelationshaveimprovedrapidlyonthediplomaticfront.InAugust2005thetwonationsbegan‘seniordialogues’betweentheUSDeputySecretaryofStateandChina’sExecutiveViceForeignMinister,whichcoveredanumberofproblemareas.TheUStookthisopportunitytodesignateChinaasa‘stakeholder’intheexistinginternationalsystem.However,theUSrefusestocategorisethesedialoguesas‘strategic,’astheChinesehadhoped,characterisingitsrelationswithChinaasa‘complexrelationship,’andshowingnointentionofconcludingastrategicpartnershipwithChina.Moreover,byexpresslystipulatingthatChinashouldbea‘responsible’stakeholder,theUSwasclearlysignalingtoChinathatitwishedChina’sactionstomeetwithUSexpectations.TheQuadrennialDefenseReviewReport(QDR)publishedbytheDepartmentofDefenseimmediatelyafter9/11expressedastrongsenseofwarinessregardingChina’smodernisationofitsmilitarycapability,andtheQDRpublishedinFebruary2006explicitlystatesthat‘…ChinahasthegreatestpotentialtocompetemilitarilywiththeUnitedStatesandfielddisruptivemilitarytechnologiesthatcouldovertimeoffsettraditionalUSmilitaryadvantage’.12

Underthesecircumstances,Indiaisnowinpoleposition,beingcourteddiplomaticallybybothChinaandtheUS,asbothnationsprincipallyseektouseIndiatoachievea

favourablebalanceagainstoneanother.However,Sino–IndianandUS–Indianrelationsarecertainlynotcompletelystable.AlthoughtheterritorialdisputesbetweenChinaandIndiahavecurrentlybeeneffectivelydecoupledfromotherproblems,theyhaveinnowaybeenresolved,andIndia’sdistrustofChinasincethe1962borderwarhasnotbeendispelled.Indiaisalsoopposedto,andwaryof,theUS’sinclinationtowardsunilateraldominationandbecomingapawninUSstrategytowardsChina.Inthelongterm,thepossibilitythattheUSmilitaryangstcurrentlydirectedatChinamaybebroughttobearonIndiacannotberuledout,dependingonhowIndia’seconomicandmilitarydevelopmentprogresses.TheUS,China,andIndiaallprizetheirindependence,andthetrilateralrelationshipseemstobeintheprocessofcoalescingintoastrategictriangularrelationshipinwhichthethreesetsofbilateralrelationsevolveinintricatecorrelationwithoneanother.

3 Conclusion

China’sphenomenaleconomicgrowthledtoaverycomplexandconfusingoutcome.InmanywaysChinabecameawelcomeinternationalpresenceandactor,butinmanyotherwaysitalsocausedinternationalconcern.Whicheverisjudgedtobemorecritical,noonecandenythatChinahasachievedagreaterpresencebecauseofitsdramaticeconomicgrowthandtheconsequencesofthatgrowth,especiallyintheAsia–Pacificregion.However,astherewereconcomitant,andsometimescountervailing,developmentsintheregion,China’senhancedpresencedidnotleadtotheformationofaChina‑dominantregionalsystem.AnotherinterestingsystemicimplicationofChina’srise,coincidingwithIndia’srise,isthepossibilitythataUS–China–IndiastrategictrianglemaybeemergingintheAsia–Pacificregion.

�4 Proceedings

Endnotes

1 Anearlierversionofthispaperwaspublishedas‘China’seconomicandsocialdevelopmentandtheinternationalscene,’Asia–PacificReview,vol.13,no.2,2006,pp.27–37.

2 WenranJiang,‘DynamicsofChina’ssocialcrisis,’ChinaBrief,vol.VI,issue2(January20,2006),p.2.

3 ‘2005nianquanguoxinshilianshuhuiluo’[Thenumberofcasesofcriminalprosecutiondroppedin2005],RenminRibao,January20,2006,p.10.

4 ElizabethEconomy,‘China’sEnvironmentalChallenge,’CurrentHistory,vol.104,no.683(September2005),pp.279–280.

5 Forfurtherdetailsoftheevolutionofthetheoryfromthispointofview,seeSeiichiroTakagi,‘Chugoku“Waheikukki”‑ronnoGenndannkai’[ThecurrentphaseofChina’stheoryof‘peacefulrise],KokusaiMondai,no.540(March2005),pp.31–45.

6 InterviewwithJinCanrong,August2004.

7 ChinaInternetNetworkInformationCenter,17thStatisticalSurveyReportontheInternetDevelopmentinChina(January2006),p.26.

8 PeterHaysGries,‘Chinesenationalism:challengingthestate?’CurrentHistory,vol.104,no.683(September2005),pp.251–252.

9 Asahi,November21,2006.

10 ElizabethEconomy,op.cit.,p.282.

11 LowellDittmer,‘Thestrategictriangle:acriticalreview,’inIlpyongJ.Kim(ed.),TheStrategicTriangle,ParagonHouse,NewYork,1987,p.33.

12 TheSecretaryofDefense,QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,February6,2006,p.29.

Review and prospects for the bilateral strategic relationship between Japan and Australia Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi Aoyama Gakuin University

1 Introduction

Historicallyspeaking,JapanandAustralia’srelationswerefulloftensionsandconflicts.Evenifbothcountriesnormaliseddiplomaticrelationsin1952,thelegacyofWorldWarIIwasvividinthemindsoftheAustralianpeople.Australia’sdiscriminatorypoliciesagainstJapaneseinbothimmigrationandtradeignitedJapanesepeople’sanxietiesandconcerns.

Despiteenhancedpostwareconomicrelations,Australia’sperceptionofJapan,especiallyJapan’sincreasingsecurityroleundertheUS–Japanalliance,hadbeenambivalentformanydecades.Ontheonehand,therehadbeenaclearrecognitiononthepartofAustraliathattheenhancedsecurityroleofJapanunderlinedbythealliancewiththeUSwouldcontributegreatlytothesecurityandstabilityoftheAsia–Pacificregion.However,atthesametime,therewasastrongfeelinginAustraliathattheANZUSallianceamongthevictoriouspowersshouldbethekeypillarofregionalsecuritymanagementintheAsia–Pacificregion,ratherthantheUS–Japanalliance.Australiahadadeep‑seatedbeliefthatAustralia,secondonlytotheUSindefeatingJapan,hadtoplayakeyroleinregionalsecurityaffairs,andthatANZUSshouldbethekeyallianceintheregion.

WithheightenedColdWartensionsinAsia,thecentreofgravityofinternationalpoliticsinAsiaandthePacificshiftedtothenorth.Japanemergedasaneconomicpower.NortheastAsiabecameastrategicallyimportantregionintheglobalColdWar


confrontation.Thus,theUSpaidmoreattentiontoJapanand,asaresult,putahigherpriorityontheUS–Japanallianceforregionalsecuritymanagement.TheUS–JapanallianceincreaseditsimportanceasakeycomponentoftheAsia–Pacificregionalorder.

FacedwiththispowershiftintheAsia–Pacificregion,Australia’sattitudewasambivalent.Ontheonehand,asaColdWarwarrior,AustraliawelcomedthedevelopmentofUS–Japanrelations,becauseitfurtherencouragedJapantoadoptmoreWestern‑orientedpoliciesintheColdWar.Ontheotherhand,however,Australiacouldnothelpfeelingleftoutbecauseofitsgradualisolationfromthemajorpowercentreofregionalpoliticsandsecurity.

Thisfeelingofisolation,coupledwithastrongsenseofmissiontoplayanimportantroleinregionalpoliticalandsecuritymanagement,forcedAustraliatosearchforanewroleoridentityinregionaldiplomacyinthe1970s.AustraliabegantodefineitsroleasanhonestbrokerforachievingaccommodationbetweenSoutheastAsiancountriesandJapan,orasabalancertocheckorsomehowabsorbrisingJapanesepowerintheregion.Indeed,AustraliabecameafirstdialoguepartnerofASEANin1974.

TheseAustralianpoliciesandattitudesintroducedvariousirritatingfactorsintoJapan–Australiabilateralrelations.AustraliawasperceivedinJapanesediplomaticcirclesasanuncomfortablepartnerthatgave‘lectures’inatoostraightforwardway,basedupon‘Western’normsandrules.However,theseirritantshavenowbeenremovedtoalargeextentandnewareasofcooperationareemergingwhichneedconstructivejointengagementbybothcountries.

Inthemeantime,the1957Australia–JapanCommerceAgreementpavedthewayfordeepeningeconomicinterdependencebetweenthetwocountries.That

interdependence,alongwithconfidencebuilding,overcamethelegacyofthepast.JapanandAustraliagraduallyexpandedtheircooperativerelationshipoverthefollowingdecades.BothcountriestookthejointleadershiproleinpromotingthecauseofAsia–Pacificcooperationfromthelate1970s.TheirjointendeavourtolaunchtheAsia‑PacificEconomicCooperation(APEC)forumsymbolisedthedeepeningunderstandingandcollaborationbetweenthetwocountries.Cooperativeactivitieshaverecentlyexpandedtoincludesecurityareas.1

However,despitetherecentwillingnessbybothgovernmentstoexpandtheirbilateralrelationshipstoaddresspressingregionalandglobalissues,thereareavarietyofissuesthatrequireskillfulmanagementofthebilateralrelationship.Thoseissuesarisemainlyfromstructuralchangesintheregionalandglobalpolitical,securityandeconomicenvironments.

Inthispaper,Itouchuponafewissueandareasinwhichbothgovernmentsshouldrespondmorecarefullyinthedecadestocome:

• first,thechangingpowerrelationshipsamongthecountriesintheregion,especiallytransformationsofNortheastAsianinternationalrelations,andtheimplicationsforregionalsecurityarchitecture

• second,theprojecttobuildanEastAsianCommunity

• third,bilateralrelationsbetweenJapanandAustralia.

ItakethreedimensionsintoconsiderationwhenIexaminethechallengesfacingJapanandAustraliainAsia:competitionandrivalry;regionalproductionnetworks;andthenormativestructuresofinternationalrelationsinEastAsia.2

�� Proceedings

State-to-state competition and rivalry

Statesarestillthekeyplayersofinternationalrelations.Thisisawellknownandoldfashionedstandardapproachtotheanalysisofstrategicandinternationalrelations.Usually,weidentifychangesin‘nationalpower,’suchaseconomicpower(reflectedinGDP),militarypower,technologicalcapacity,sizeofpopulation,etc.askeyfactorsaffectingstrategicrelations.

Asia’spoliticalandstrategicenvironmentshavebeenbecomingmorefluid,uncertainandcomplicated.TheriseofChina;amoreassertiveJapanpursuinganenhancedregionalandglobalsecurityrole;thepredominantUSmilitarypower,thequagmireinIraqandAsians’ambivalencetowardtheUS;India’srise;NorthKorea’snucleardevelopment—allthesearemakingthestrategiclandscapeofAsiamorefluidandcomplicated.

Becauseofthis,therearedeep‑seatedsensesofuncertainty,insecurityandvulnerabilityinmostoftheAsiancountries.Respondingtothoseinsecuritiesanduncertainties,EastAsiancountrieshavebeentakingavarietyofstrategiestoprotecttheirowninterests,rangingfrom‘engagement’to‘riskhedging’and‘softbalancing’.JapanandAustraliaarenoexceptions.

Bilateralismisanothercharacteristicofstatestrategiesadoptedbymostofthecountriesoftheregioninrespondingtouncertainties.Almostallthecountriesoftheregionhavebeenenhancingsecurityandeconomicrelationswithothersonabilateralbasis.Indeed,manycountriesinAsiahavebeenconcludingfreetradeandsecuritycooperationagreements.

Regional production networks

However,afocusonlyonstateto‑staterelations(competitionandrivalry)isnot

enoughtounderstandcontemporaryEastAsianinternationalrelations.Ipointoutasecondperspective:therapidexpansionofthecross‑borderandmultinationalproductionnetwork,mainlyconductedbymultinationalcompanies,anditsimplicationsforsecurityandstateto‑staterelationsinAsia(notjustincreasedtradeandinvestmentvolume).

Multinationalcompaniesareconstructingregion‑wideproductionnetworks.Manycompaniesareconnectingwitheachotheracrossnationalboundariesthroughthoseproductionnetworks.ThisphenomenonismorepronouncedinAsiathaninanyotherregionoftheworld.Ourprosperitydependsonourdevelopmentofevenmoreeffectiveregionalproductionnetworks.

Normative structures underlining East Asia’s international relations

ThethirdchallengearisesfromthenormativestructureorvaluestructureofcontemporaryEastAsianinternationalrelations.By‘normstructure’and‘valuestructure,’Imeanthedifferentapproachestoorganisingtheinternationalaffairsoftheregion.WearewitnessingaseriouscompetitionamongEastAsiancountriesinthisarea.Competitionoverthenormsandruleswillgreatlyaffectthefutureshapeofinternationalrelationsintheregion,includingthecauseofEastAsiaCommunitybuilding.

2 Alliances + a(subregional security multilateralism in Northeast Asia)

Asia’sinternationalpoliticaleconomyandsecuritylandscapeischangingrapidly,particularlyinNortheastAsia.HowtoformulatemechanismstodealwiththosechangesisamajorpolicychallengeforbothJapanandAustralia,giventheirrespectivepoliticalandeconomicstakesinNortheastAsia.


KnowinghowtorespondtochanginginternationalrelationsinNortheastAsiaisbecomingmorepressing,givennewdevelopmentssuchasrisingChinesemilitarypower,Japan’sdesiretobeamoreactiveplayerinregionalandglobalsecurity,NorthKorea’snucleardevelopmentprograms,SouthKorea’squestformore‘autonomous’positionsinthedevelopingnewregionalpowerstructure(reflectingthis,thestructureoftheUS–SouthKoreaalliancehasbeenchanging),andTaiwan’spursuitofabroaderspaceforsurvivalininternationalaffairs.

NortheastAsiaisbecomingamoreimportantregionforAustralia,too.Australia’smajortradingpartnersareinNortheastAsia,andtheirweightinAustralia’stradehasbeenconstantlyincreasing.MaintainingstablerelationshipsamongthecountriesinNortheastAsiaiscriticallyimportantforAustralia’seconomicprosperity.

AlliancescentredonWashingtonhavebeenandwillcontinuetobecrucialforpeaceandstabilityinAsia,providingastableframeworkofmanagingtransition,especiallyinNortheastAsia.Almostallstatesintheregionacknowledgethatthealliancesprovide‘publicgoods’ofstabilityfortheregion,althoughsomemaketheacknowledgmentbegrudgingly.

However,thefunctionofthealliancesismainlytosustainthestatusquointheshortterm.ItremainstobeseenwhetherthecurrentmodeofUScentredsecuritymanagementwillbeadequateforthemanagementofthelongertermpowertransformationoftheregion.Wemayhavetothinkaboutanew,longerterm,regionalsecurityarchitecturefortheregion,basedupontheexistingalliancearrangements.Ireferthisasan‘alliances+ a’systemforsecuritymanagement.

Inthisregard,weshouldpaymorecarefulattentiontotheongoingSixPartyTalks.The

SixPartyprocesspromisestoestablishamorestableregionalsecuritymultilateralisminNortheastAsiathataddressesavarietyofsecurityissuesintheregion.

HowshouldweconceivesecuritymultilateralisminNortheastAsia?Weusuallyassumetheestablishmentofasinglemultilateralsecurityinstitutionthatregulatessecurityissuescollectively.Indeed,therehavebeenmanyproposalstoconstructmultilateralsecurityinstitutionsinNortheastAsia,forexampleinthestyleoftheAsianversionoftheConferenceofSecurityCooperationinEurope(CSCE).Andthesocalled‘2+4formula’onKoreanaffairshasbeenproposedsincethe1970s.Itisassumedintheseideasthatasinglemultilateralsecurityinstitutioncouldaddressavarietyofsecurity‑relatedissues.

Myargumentsarebasedonadifferentconceptionofsecuritymultilateralism.Iarguethatlinkinginstitutions(whetherbilateral,multilateral,regionalorglobal),ratherthanestablishingasinglemultilateralinstitution,iscriticalfordevelopingsecuritymultilateralism.Mutuallycoordinatedorinterlinkedinstitutionscreatedefactosecuritymultilateralism.3

Thereareseveralbasesforthisargument.OurinitialfocusofdiscussionsistheKoreanPeninsula.First,thereareavarietyofsecurityissuestobeaddressedinthepeninsula—issuesthatarecloselyconnectedwitheachother.Apiecemealapproachisnoteffective.Forexample,theNorthKorea’snuclearissuecannotbedealtwithinisolationfromthelargersecurityissueofthepeninsula.ItiscloselylinkedwithUS–DPRKrelations,North–Southrelations,Japan–DPRKrelations,China–DPRKrelations,relationswithglobalinstitutionssuchastheUnitedNations,theNuclearNonProliferationTreaty(NPT)andtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),thearmisticeregime,peace‑regimebuilding,

�� Proceedings

economiccooperationandsoforth.Thoseissuesmustbeaddressedsimultaneouslytoresolvethenuclearcrisis.Acomprehensiveapproachiscriticaltoresolveconflicts,whichmustbedealtwithasawhole.

Second,althoughwemustaddressavarietyofsecurityissuessimultaneously,eachissueneedsadifferentcompositionofparticipatingcountriesanddifferentcommitmentsfromeach.Someissueswouldbehandledmoreappropriatelyonabilateralbasis,whileotherissuesmaybebestaddressedbyagroupofthreeorfourcountries.Someissuesneedtobeaddressedbysixcountries.Forexample,thetransitionfromthearmisticeregimetoapeaceregimeneedsagroupofcountriesdifferentfromthegroupofcountriesthatwouldaddressthemissileandnuclearissue.Asinglemultilateralinstitutioncannotaddressalloftheseissues,sosomedivisionoflabouramongdifferentinstitutionsisnecessary.

Third,becauseofthesemultipleaspectsofNortheastAsiansecurity,wewillneedavarietyofinstitutionstoaddressrespectivesecurityissues,whetherbilateral,trilateral,quadrilateralorotherwise.Wewillhavebilateralinstitutionsbetween,forexample,theUSandtheDPRK,NorthKoreaandSouthKorea,JapanandtheDPRK,ChinaandtheDPRK,andsoforth,reflectingdifferentagendasandcommitments.Wemayhaveatrilateralinstitutionaddressingmilitaryconfidence‑buildingacrosstheDMZ(theUS,SouthKoreaandNorthKorea).WemayhaveaquadrilateralinstitutionamongNorthKorea,SouthKorea,theUSandChinathatdealswiththetransitionfromthearmisticeregimetoapeaceregime.

Fourth,becauseoftheneedforacomprehensiveapproach,anissueofcriticalimportanceishowtocoordinatethesedifferentinstitutions,therebystrengtheninganoverallsecuritystructure.Putdifferently,howoneinstitutionlinkswithothersand

whatinstitutionalrelationsaredevelopedbetweentheinstitutionsarecriticalfortheoverallregionalsecuritystructure.Theestablishmentofmutuallyreinforcinginstitutionalrelationsisimportantinthisregard;wemustproducesynergisticeffectsbylinkinginstitutionseffectively.

Fifth,notasinglemultilateralinstitutionbutinsteadwell‑coordinatedandmutuallyconnectedinstitutionalrelationshipswillformdefactosecuritymultilateralismintheKoreanPeninsula.Defactosecuritymultilateralismwillemergeasaresultofthecoordinationofdifferentinstitutionsthroughinstitutionallinkages.

Sixth,therefore,institutionallinkages(howoneinstitutionislinkedwithothers)arekeywhenwetalkaboutsecuritymultilateralism.Asfarasinstitutionallinkagesareconcerned,acertaintypeofinstitutionallinkageisconducivetosecurityandorder.Ontheotherhand,institutionsmayconflictwitheachother,therebyweakeningoverallsecurity.Institutionsmaybelinkedinvariousways,andthelinkagescanstrengthenregionalstructuresforstabilityorweakenthem.Individualinstitutionscanoperateindependentlyonlyaslongastheydonotaffecteachother.Buttheywillamalgamateintolargerbodiestocopewithproblemsthatarebeyondthescopeofanysingleinstitution.Dependingonthetypeofinstitutionallinkage,wecanexpectbothpositiveandnegativeeffectsontheoperationoftherespectiveinstitutions.Iarguethatastableregionalsecurityordercouldbeestablishedthroughinstitutionallinkagesandcoordination,eveninconflict‑riddenNortheastAsia.Defactomultilateralcoordinationcouldbepossiblebyadequatelylinkingavarietyofinstitutions.

Seventh,althoughmostsecurity‑relatedissuesintheregionwillbeaddressedbydifferentgroupsofcountries,weneedsome


comprehensivemultilateralforumorumbrellaframeworkwhereinstitutionalrelationscanbecoordinatedtoenhanceanoverallsecuritystructure.Anumbrellaframeworkisquiteimportant,giventhatresolvingpressingsecurityconcernssuchastheNorthKoreannuclearissuewilltakealongtime(probablymorethanadecade)andvariousinstitutionswillhavetobecoordinatedduringthislongtransitionperiod.Withoutinstitutionalcoordinationunderacommonumbrellainstitution,thefinalgoal(apeaceful,prosperousandnuclear‑freeKoreanPeninsula)willnotbeachieved.

Ifwelookbackatthepastfromthisperspective,wecanfindsomequiteinterestingdevelopments.TherearealreadyavarietyofinstitutionsontheKoreanPeninsulathataddresssecurityissues.AseriousconcernforNortheastAsianregionalsecurityisnotalackofmultilateralsecurityinstitutions,butalackofcoordinationandlinkagesbetweenexistinginstitutions.TherealreadyexistmanyusefulinstitutionscoveringNortheastAsia—bilateral,subregional,regionalandglobalones—thatcouldcontributetoregionalpeaceandstabilityiftheywereinterlinkedandintegratedinanappropriateway.Forexample,wehavemanyinstitutionsthatlinkSouthKoreaandNorthKorea,suchasthe1992BasicAgreementandtheAgreementonNonNuclearization.Thereisalsothe1994AgreedFrameworkbetweentheUSandtheDPRK,andabilateralinstitutionbetweenJapanandtheDPRKunderlinedbythe2002PyongyangDeclaration.

However,thoseinstitutionshavenotfunctionedwell.Theyhavebeenweak,andhavenotboundtherelevantpartiesstrongly.Evenwhenagreementswereconcluded,seriousdifficultiesinimplementingthemquicklyarose.Onereasonisthatthevariousinstitutionsoperatedindependentlyandwerenotlinkedwithotherinstitutions.Mutuallycoordinatedinstitutionallinkagesthatwould

generateasynergisticeffectonregionalstabilityhavebeenblockedbyoneormoreofthepartiesconcerned.

So,themostseriousproblemisthelackofinstitutionallinkageandcoordination.Institutionallinkageshavebeenpreventedand/orlimitedand,asaresult,nosynergisticeffecthasbeengenerated.Forexample,the1992North–SouthBasicAgreementhasnotbeenwelllinkedwithotherinstitutions,suchastheSouthKorea–US,SouthKorea–China,SouthKorea–Japan,DPRK–USorDPRK–Japanbilateralinstitutions.Becauseofthelackofinstitutionallinkagesandcoordination,onepartycouldeasilysabotagetheimplementationofanagreement.

HowcanweassesstheSixPartyTalksunderwaytoaddresstheNorthKoreannuclearcrisisfromtheviewpointoftheseargumentsaboutinstitutionallinkages?TheSixPartyTalksprovideanexcellentlaboratorywhenwediscussthepossibilityofcreatingamultilateralsecurityframeworkintheregion.Inmyview,thesuccessofthetalksdependstoalargeextentonwhetherwecansuccessfullylinkandcoordinatevariousinstitutionswitheachother,andthenamalgamatethemintodefactomultilateralism.ThismeansthattheSixPartyTalksarenotavenuewherewecanaddresssecurityissuesdirectly,buttheyareimportantincoordinatingavarietyofinstitutionsthatwillbedevelopedtoaddressdifferentsecurity‑relatedissuesamongdifferentgroupsofcountries.4

ThejointstatementofthefourthroundoftheSixPartyTalks,inSeptember2005,suggestshowinstitutionalrelationsarecrucial.ThetalkswereestablishedtoresolvetheNorthKoreannuclearissue.However,thejointstatementclearlydemonstratesthatacomprehensiveapproachiscriticaltoresolvethenuclearimpasse;itrefersnotonlytoNorthKorea’spledgetodismantleitsnuclearweaponsandexistingnuclearprograms,but

�0 Proceedings

alsotoavarietyofotherissues,includingsecurityassurance,US–DPRKnormalisation,Japan–DPRKnormalisation,energyandfoodassistance,economiccooperation,peace‑regimebuildingonthepeninsula,andsoforth.Thestatementalsorefersthe1992North–SouthBasicAccord,the2002Japan–PyongyangDeclaration,multilateralsecurityreassurance,thetransformationofthearmisticeregimetoapeaceregime,provisionofenergy,economiccooperation,theNuclearNonProliferationTreaty,theInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyandsoforth.AlmostallsecurityissuesontheKoreanPeninsulawillhavetobeaddressedtoresolvethenuclearcrisis.

ItisalmostcertainthatresolvingtheNorthKoreannuclearissuewillbealongprocess.Aswasseeninthe1994US–DPRKAgreedFramework,itmaytakemorethanadecadetofinallydismantletheDPRK’snucleardevelopmentprogramandestablishapermanentstructureofpeace,evenifthesixcountriesagreeonsomeformulatodismantlethenuclearprogramssoon.

Ifthejointstatementisimplemented,variousinstitutionswillbecreatedinthislongprocess,andexistinginstitutionswillneedtoberevitalised.AsIhavementioned,differentissueswillinvolvedifferentspecificcommitmentsandobligationsbythepartiesconcerned;therefore,varioustypesofinstitutionalarrangementswithdifferentmembershipswillbecreatedintheprocess.Forexample,theFourPartyTalksthatwereabortedinthelate1990smayberevitalisedtotacklethetransformationofthearmisticeregimetoapeaceregime.Othersubregional,trilateralorbilateralinstitutionsfocusingonsuchissuesasconventionalarmsreduction,missiles,biochemicalweapons,andbilateralrelations(US–DPRK,SouthKorea–NorthKorea,China–DPRK,Japan–DPRK,US–China,Japan–China,etc.),aswellasregional

institutionstoaddressdifferentissues,willbeestablished.

ThethirdsessionofthefifthroundoftheSixPartyTalksheldinFebruary2007agreedtosetupworkinggroupstocarryouttheinitialactionsandfullimplementationoftheSeptember2005jointstatement.Thevariousworkinggroupsarerequestedtodiscussandformulatespecificactionplansfortheimplementationofthejointstatement.TheyarealsorequestedtoreporttotheSixPartyHeadsofDelegationMeetingontheprogressoftheirwork.Thesearrangementsindicatethat,basedontheworkinggroups,avarietyofinstitutionswithdifferentmembershipcompositionwillbeestablishedundertheumbrellaoftheSixPartyTalks.Thetalkswillserveasaninstitutioncoordinatingvariousotherinstitutions,whetherbilateral,trilateralorquadrilateralones.

Ratherthandirectlyaddressingspecificsecurityissues,theSixPartyTalkswillbealooselyorganisedmultilateralumbrellaforumunderwhichexistingandnewlyestablishedinstitutionsaremutuallycoordinated.Underthatumbrella,decoupledinstitutionsmustbeamalgamatedintoanintegratedinstitutionalpackage,therebyenhancingtheregionalsecuritystructure.

InstitutionallinkagesandcoordinationundertheSixPartyTalksarequiteimportant,giventhatindividualinstitutionsinNortheastAsiaaregenerallyweakandthereforevulnerabletochangesinthepoliciesandattitudesofevenoneofthepartiesconcerned.Therefore,institutionswillneedsomesupportingmechanismsfortheimplementationoftheagreements.Bylinkinginstitutions,wecanstrengthentheinstitutionsand,therefore,theimplementationoftheagreements.

Thus,IarguethatthereisapossibilityforNortheastAsiatodevelopmultilayered,interlinked,institutionalmechanisms


basedonexistingandnewlyestablishedinstitutions.Mutuallyreinforcingrelationsbetweenvariousinstitutionscouldbeestablishedthroughinstitutionallinkages,evenifindividualinstitutionsarestillweakandlimitedintheirscope.

Finally,mutuallycoordinatedinstitutionalrelations(whichwemaycalla‘concertofpowers’systemforsecuritymanagement)willsupportregionalpeaceandstability,evenifNorthKorea’snuclearprogramsarenottotallydismantled.Indeed,NorthKoreawillcontinuetoresistthetotaldismantlingofitsnucleardevelopmentprogramsandweapons.OurconcernoverNorthKorea’snuclearthreatmightnotdisappearforever.

Evenso,wecaneffectivelycontainthethreatthroughinstitutionalcoordinationbasedonsomeformofaconcertofpowersinNortheastAsia.Inaddition,thepossibleinstitutionalcoordinatingmechanismscentredontheSixPartyTalkswillalsoservenotjustasaregionalcollectiveconstraintonNorthKorea’snuclearambition,butalsoasaregionalinstrumenttorespondtosuch‘emergencies’asKoreanunification,acollapseoftheNorthKoreanregime,domesticdisturbancesinChina,ansoon.ThecoordinatingmechanismbasedontheSixPartyTalkswouldserveasaregionalmechanismtosmoothpowertransitionandadjustment.Thus,thesignificanceoftheSixPartyTalksfargoesbeyondresolvingtheNorthKorea’snuclearcrisis.5

3 Economic relations and their security implications: the emergence of regional production networks connecting Japan with the rest of Asia

Whenwetalkaboutanewsecurityarchitecture(basedonthealliances)inNortheastAsia,wemustunderstandcurrenteconomicrelationsintheregion.The

respectiveeconomicengagementsofJapanandAustraliaaredifferentinthisregard.

Australia’seconomicrelationswiththerestofAsiashowaquitetraditionaltradingpattern:exportingmineralandothernaturalresourcesandimportingmanufacturedgoods.Japan’seconomicrelationswiththerestofAsiaarefundamentallydifferentfromthoseofAustralia.JapanismoreandmorecloselyconnectedwiththerestofAsiathroughregionalindustrialproductionnetworks.

Multinationalcompanieshavebeenexpandingtheirproductionnetworksacrossnationalboundaries.Japan‑basedmultinationalshaveplayedcrucialrolesinestablishingregionalproductionnetworks.EastAsiahasgrownintoagiant,EastAsia‑wide,factorywitheconomiesinterlinkedthroughextensive,region‑wideproductionanddistributionnetworksrunbymultinationalcompanies.Wedonotseethisphenomenoninotherregionsoftheworld.

EastAsianproductionnetworksledbymultilateralcompanieshavegivenrisetoa‘triangular’tradepattern:JapanandNIEs(newlyindustrialisedeconomies)exportcapitalgoodsandsophisticatedintermediategoods(partsandcomponents)totheless‑developedcountries(someASEANcountriesandChina),whichprocessthemforexporttoNorthAmericaandEurope.

China’spositionreflectsthistriangulartraderelationship.China’ssurplusvis‑à‑vistheUSisoffsetbyitshugetradedeficitwithotherAsianeconomies.SowecansaythatthemassiveUStradedeficitisheldagainstEastAsiaasawhole.

China’sexportofhigh‑technologyproductshasexpandedinrecentyears.ThisgrowthisalsoattributabletoChina’sintegrationintotheEastAsia‑wideregionalproductionanddistributionnetworksformedthroughextensiveforeigndirectinvestmentbyforeign

�� Proceedings

(notChinese)firms.Inthemeantime,China’scontributionintermsofaddedvaluehasbeenlimitedtoitsfunctionintheassemblysector,whichisheavilydependentonthesupplyofabundantcheaplabor.

TherecentincreaseofexportsfromSoutheastAsiatoChinacouldbeexplainedbytheexpansionofcross‑borderproductionnetworksledbymultinationalcompanies.ThemostrapidlyincreasingitemsoftradefromSoutheastAsiatoChinaarenotfinishedgoodsoragriculturalproducts,butcomponentsandpartstobeassembledbyforeignmultinationalcompaniesinChinaforexport.

Thesedays,goodsmarked‘MadeinChina’aremostlymadeelsewherebymultinationalcompanies,andthelabelshouldread‘AssembledinChina.’6MultinationalcompaniesareusingChinaasthefinalassemblysiteintheircross‑borderproductionnetworks.Japan‑basedmultinationalcompaniesarelargely‘invisible’behindthe‘Chinese’factoriesproducingalargeamountoftradablegoods.Andabout60%ofChina’sexportsarecontrolledbyforeigncompanies.Thismeansthatmultinationalcompaniesarenowplayingthekeyrolesinproducing,supplyingandassemblingvariouspartsforthefinalproductsintheregion.Weareobtainingincomethroughthesenetworks.

Japan’seconomicrelationswiththerestofAsia,includingitsrelationswithChina,mustbeunderstoodinthisbroaderpicture,whichgivesusanewunderstandingofEastAsianeconomicrelationsandtheirimplicationsforsecurityinAsia.

First,JapanviewsChinaasanopportunity,andachallenge.However,theargumentthatJapanisconcernedaboutChina’seconomicdevelopment(thatJapanfearslosingitsworldno.2positiontoChina)isfundamentallyflawed,andignoresthefundamentalchangesintheeconomicstructuresinEastAsiaover

thepastdecades.ChinagivesJapanplentyofeconomicopportunities.

Second,JapanisnotcompetingwithChina.Therealeconomiccompetitionistakingplacenotbetweenstateandstate,butbetweenprivatefirmsoperatingglobally.

Third,ChinesefirmsarenotcompetitorsforJapanesefirmsintheforeseeablefuture.RealcompetitionistakingplacebetweenJapanesefirmsacrossnationalboundaries.SONY–Japan’srivalisnotChinesefirmsbutSONY–China.Toyota–JapanwillsoonbecompetingwithToyota–Chinainaglobalmarket.

Fourth,theseaggressiveventuresbymultinationalcompanieshavebeenchangingdomesticpolitics.Thepoliticalinfluenceofcompaniesthatareaggressivelypursuingaregion‑wideproductionstrategyisgrowing.LookatthecaseofJapan.ThepresidentsoftheJapanEconomicFederation,themostpowerfulbusinessassociation,usedtobemostlyCEOsofthebigcompaniesheavilyprotectedbythegovernment,suchasbigbanks.Butthishaschanged.ThepreviouspresidentwastheCEOofTOYOTAandthecurrentoneisfromCANON—bothglobalcompaniesaggressivelypursuingregionalandglobalstrategies.

Fifth,Japan’sprosperityismoreandmoredependentonthesuccessofmultinationalcompanies.Japan‑basedmultinationalcompaniesaregettingthebulkoftheirprofitsfromtheiroverseasbusinessinEastAsia,includingChina.Actually,Japan’sprofitsfromoverseasinvestmentarenowroughlyequaltoJapan’sannualtradesurplus.Japanisgettinghugeamountsofprofitfromoverseasinvestmentstoday.Thecountryisbecomingmoreandmoredependentonoverseasbusinessforitseconomicwelfare.

Sixth,withthecomingofanageingsociety,Japanmustgenerateprofitoverseasbyeffectivelyusingthehugeassetsithas


accumulatedoverpastdecades.Japandesperatelyneedsgoodoverseasmarketsforinvestmenttosustainitsprosperity.China’sgrowthprovidesJapanwithexcellentopportunitiesforinvestmentandcontributingtotheupgradingofJapaneseeconomicstructures.ItisgoodforJapantohearthathundredsofmillionsofexcellentChinesepeoplearereadytoworkforJapan‑basedfirmsandsustainJapan’sprosperity.TherearenoreasonswhyJapanshouldbeworriedaboutit.

Seventh,whatJapanisconcernedaboutisdomesticinstabilityandeconomicdisturbanceinChina,whichmightbecausedbyinternalcontradictionsandthelackofChineseeconomicgovernance.JapanshouldbeconcernedthattheChineseleadershipmayfaceseriouscriticismsthatithasbeen‘selling’Chinatoforeignmultinationals,onceeconomicgrowthslowsdown.7

Eighth,allthesefactorsaffectoursecuritycalculations.Itisbecomingmoredifficultforcountriestoresorttomilitaryforce,althoughweneedtoprepareforsuchemergencies(seePeterBrook’sexcellentbookonthesecurityimplicationsoftheemergingregionalproductionnetworks).Wecanreasonablyexpectthetensionsandconflictstobecontainedwithinamanageablescopeifwehaveaclearunderstandingofthisneweconomicreality.8

4 East Asian Community building

Normative premises of regional cooperation

ThefuturesofJapanandAustraliaarecloselyconnectedwiththatofEastAsia.Therefore,EastAsianCommunitybuildingisimportantforbothcountries.

However,thecurrentleveloffunctionalcooperationisnotenough.EastAsiatodayneedsmuchstrongerandmoreintrusive

regionalinstitutionsthattouchupondomesticaffairstoaddresspressingpolitical,security,economic,andsocialissues.

StrengtheningdomesticgovernanceinstitutionsandharmonisingdomesticinstitutionsamongEastAsiancountriesarecritical.Morebindingmeasuresformilitaryconfidence‑buildingarealsocriticallyimportant.Forthis,EastAsianeedssomedegreeof‘likemindedness’amongthestatesonsocialorganisationsandinternalvalues.

Japan’sprimarygoalistomakeEastAsiaamoreintegratedeconomicarea.Aswehaveseen,Japanesefirmshavealreadyestablishedtworegion‑wideproductionanddistributionnetworksinEastAsiasincethemiddleofthe1980s(onewithSoutheastAsiaandtheotherwithChina).ThepressingtaskofJapanistoconnectthetwonetworksmoreclosely,therebyconstructing‘seamless’networksofproductionanddistributionthatwillgreatlyenhancetheinternationalcompetitivenessofJapanesefirmsinaglobalmarket.9Usingthisadvantageousposition,Japancouldbecomea21stcenturyeconomicphoenix.

Inthisregard,contrarytothegeneralview,thegovernmentandbusinesscommunityofJapanwelcometheventurebyChinaandASEANtoconcludeafreetradeagreement(FTA)betweenthem,becauseJapanesefirmswillbethelargestbeneficiarysuchanagreement.WhatJapanisconcernedaboutisthatChinaandASEANmightfailtoconcludeadeeperFTA,withasubstantialopeningoftheirrespectiveeconomiesandtheirinstitutionalandregulatoryharmonisation.Indeed,thecurrentFTAbetweenChinaandASEANistooshallowtotackledeeperintegrationissues.

TheissueofwhichcountriesshouldbeinvitedtothefirstEastAsiaSummitwashotlydebatedformanyyears.Ofcriticalimportanceisnotjust‘WhoarestakeholdersinEastAsia?’,butthefundamentalnormsand

�4 Proceedings

principlesoforganisinginternationalrelationsintheregion.China’sreluctancetoinviteAustralia,IndiaandNewZealandtothefirstEastAsiaSummitdemonstratesthatChina’snormsandprinciplesarenotnecessarilyinharmonywiththoseofothersintheregion.Therearethusseveraldistinctapproachesonhowtoorganisetheinternationalrelationsoftheregion(seeFigure1andTable1).

Ontheonehand,wehaveaChineseway.The‘NewSecurityConcept’andtheconceptof‘PeacefulDevelopment’wererecentlyaddedtothedecades‑oldFivePrinciplesofPeacefulCo‑existence.Althoughtheseconceptsemphasisevariousnewformsofinter‑staterelations(suchasmutualtrust,mutualbenefit,dialogueandconsultation,confidencebuilding,cooperation,andsoforth),theyarebasicallytheWestphaliatypeofnormsofinternationalrelations.

Chinesenormsandprinciplesmostlyrelateto‘external’dimensionsthatcouldbeappliedonlyininter‑staterelations.Asfor‘internal’matters,Chinasticksfirmlytothetraditionalconceptsofnationalsovereigntyandnon‑intervention.Chinaissellingthesocalled‘BeijingConsensus’insteadofa‘WashingtonConsensus.’

Ontheotherhand,wehaveanAmericanwaythatemphasises‘internal’aspectsandharmonisation.Democracy,freedom,humanrightsandgoodgovernancearethekeyprinciplesthatshouldunderlineinternationalrelationsintheregion.Theharmonisationofdomesticinstitutionsunderlinedbyliberalnormsisvitalinthisregard.Australia’spositionisclosetothatoftheUS.

Inbetween,wehaveanASEANwayandahybridtypeofJapaneseway.JapanhasbeenmovingtowardacceptinganAmericanwaymorepositively.StrengtheningdomesticgovernanceinstitutionsandharmonisationofdomesticinstitutionsamongEastAsiancountriesarecritical.

WhatJapanandAustraliamustbemostconcernedaboutisthatinternationalrelationsinEastAsiaareorganisedundermixedprinciplesandnormsfromChina’swayandanold‑fashionedASEANway,mostlydealingwithonlytheexternaldimensionofstateto‑staterelationsandtakinginternalmattersoutoftheregionalagenda.

Inthisregard,itiscriticallyimportantforASEANcountriestosuccessfullydevelopnewnormsandprinciplesforcooperationintheASEANCharter,overcomingold‑fashioned

China

ASEAN+3

ASEAN

EAS(?)

ARF

NewASEAN

APEC

Japan Australia US

Note:Lefthandside:‘External’normoriented,Righthandside:‘Internal’normoriented

Figure 1: Organising norms/principles of international relations


Table 1: External and internal norms/principles

‘External’ norms and principles ‘Internal’ norms and principles

Sovereignty Democracy,humanrights

Non‑interventionininternalaffairs Harmonisationofdomesticinstitutions

Differentnation‑buildingprocesses Goodgovernance

Statesecurity Humansecurity

Bordermeasures(tariffs,etc.) Democratisationofinternalpoliticalsystem

Democratisationofinternationalaffairs

ASEANpremisesofcooperation.JapanandAustraliashouldencourageASEAN’sshiftofnormativepremisesofcooperation.

Enhancing trans-Pacific linkages and responding to a US unipolar world

NorthAmerica,includingboththeUSandCanada,willcontinuetoplaythecriticalroleforpeaceandprosperityinEastAsia.WemustmakethebesteffortstoreconcileEastAsianinstitutionswithAsia–Pacificinstitutions.

DespiteEastAsia’srecenteconomicgrowth,thebasiceconomicrelationshipbetweenEastAsiaandNorthAmericahasnotchangedfordecades.Economically,theUSmarketisstillcriticalforAsia’sgrowth,andAsiaisquitevulnerabletopolicychangesbytheUS.AsianeedsabroaderregionalframeworkforeconomiccoordinationbetweenAsiaandNorthAmerica.

Militarily,theUSforwardmilitarypresence—underlinedbyawebofalliancenetworks—continuestoprovideabasicfoundationofregionalpeaceandstability,containingmilitarytensionsandrivalries.Therefore,itiscriticallyimportantforAsiatodeveloptrans‑Pacificinstitutions,intandemwithEastAsianones.

Inthisregard,JapanandAustraliamustbemoresensitivetotheambivalenceamongAsianstowardtheUS.BothourcountriesneedtohandlerelationswiththeUScarefully.Overall,wearebothcomfortableinaUS‑led

unipolarworld.Inasense,wehavebothbeenseekingtojointlymanageUSpowerinEastAsia.

OtherAsiannationsaremoreambivalent.Ontheonehand,theyunderstandthatthecontinuedengagementoftheUSinAsiaisessential;ontheother,theyareconcernedaboutUSinterventioninthenameofprotectinghumanrights,promotingdemocracyandgoodgovernance,andfightingagainstterrorism.USglobalpowercreatesalotoflocalresistance;itisnotautomaticallytransformedintoUSinfluenceandprestigeinAsia.

JapanandAustraliashouldbeawareofthesesensitivities.Neitherwe,northeUS,shouldtakeitforgrantedthatASEANcountriesandSouthKoreafullysupporttheUS–JapanandUS–Australiaalliances.

RespondingtochangesintheEastAsianstrategiclandscape,JapanhasbeenenhancingitsalliancerelationswiththeUS.Theallianceiscriticallyimportant,andwillcontinuetoprovideabasicfoundationofregionalpeaceandstability.

ButJapanandAustraliamustgobeyondthesealliances.Wehavemanyissuesthatmustbeaddressedmultilaterally.OurcountriesshouldnottrytorunawaytothecomfortableshelteroftheUSalliance.Wemustfaceandrespondtothechallenges,evenifthatdemandsapainfulrethinkingofourownpastandfuturerolesinEastAsia.Especially,asI

�� Proceedings

pointedout,thereisapromisingpotentialforNortheastAsiatodevelopamultilateralframeworkforsecuritymanagementbasedupontheongoingSixPartyTalksprocessesthatwouldgreatlycontributetodevelopingstablerelationsamongthemajorpowersinNortheastAsia.JapanandAustraliashouldnotmissthisgoldenopportunity.

5 Conclusion: Japan–Australia bilateral relationships

Australia’sstrategicstakeinNortheastAsiahasincreasedwithclosereconomicrelationswiththeregion’seconomies.JapanwilloccupyamuchlargerpartofAustralia’sstrategicthinkingonAsiainthedecadestocomebecauseJapan’sfutureforeignanddefensepolicydirectionwillincreasinglyaffectAustralia’spoliticalandeconomicinterests.HowJapandevelopsitsrelationshipswiththerestofAsia—especiallywithChina—willbecrucialtoAustralia’sstrategicandeconomicinterests.

Contrarytopopularbelief,the1990swasnotthe‘lostdecade’forJapan.Japanadapteditselftochanginginternalandexternalenvironmentsduringthe1990s,althoughtheprocesswaspainfulanddifficult.Japanesegovernmentalandpoliticalinstitutionshavebecomemoretransparentandaccountable,andthereforeresilient.Japaneseprivatecompanieshavebecomemorecompetitive,takingmoreaggressivebusinesspracticesabroad.AnewgenerationofpoliticalleadersismorewillingtoassertJapan’sinterestsininternationalaffairs.Japanischangingandrising.10

KennethPyleoftheUniversityofWashington,adistinguishedscholarofmodernJapanesepoliticalhistory,arguesthat‘Japanismakingarevolutionarychangeofcourse.’Formorethan150yearsofitsmodernhistory,Japanhasadaptedbothitsforeignpolicyanditsdomesticinstitutionstofitchangesinthe

internationalsystem.AccordingtoPyle,‘Abe’selectionisanunmistakableindicationofJapan’smaturingresponsetothefarreachingchangesinitspostColdWarenvironment.’11

AustraliahasbeenwelcomingandhasencouragedJapantotakeamoreproactivepolicylineinregionalandinternationalsecurityformanyyears.However,atthesametime,itisagainstAustralia’sinterestsifproactiveJapanesesecuritypoliciescausenegativereactionsamongJapan’sneighbours.ItisinthebestinterestsofAustraliathatJapan’sasyetundefinedglobalandregionalsecurityrolesarewelcomedandwellacceptedintheregion.Theworst‑casescenarioforAustraliawouldariseifJapan’sexpandedsecurityrole,togetherwithitsmoreassertiveforeignpolicy,causesserioustroublewithitsAsianneighbours.

Thus,itiscrucialforAustraliathatJapan’sexpandednewsecurityroles(whichAustraliastronglysupports,especiallyundertheformerHowardgovernment)aredevelopedwithregionalblessings.Forthattohappen,itwouldbehighlydesirableforAustraliatohavechannelsavailabletomakeAustralia’svoiceheardinJapan’sdecision‑makingprocesses.Throughthosechannels,AustraliacouldhelpJapanexpanditssecurityroles,withblessingsfromtheothercountriesintheregion.

ItseemstomethatthisconsiderationpushedtheAustralianGovernmenttoproposeandconcludetheMarch2007jointsecuritydeclarationwithJapan.ThedeclarationclearlydemonstratesthatJapan’sfuturedirectionhasbeenoccupyingmoreofAustralia’sstrategicthinking.Contrarytogeneralperceptionsonthesecuritydeclaration,whichmostpeopleunderstoodandassessedinthecontextofalliancecoordinationtodealwiththeriseofChina,Ihaveastrongfeelingthatthe‘Japanfactor’droveAustralia’sproposaltoconcludethedeclaration,not


the‘Chinafactor’(althoughtheChinafactorwasinvolved).

Ontheotherhand,Japanhas‘discovered’AustraliaasoneofitsmostimportantpartnersindealingwithgreattransformationsinEastAsia.JapanappreciatesAustralia’sstrategicthoughtsandinsightsinitsforeignandsecuritypolicyconsiderations.

JapanandAustraliasharebasicpolicyorientationstothechangingregionalenvironmentsintheAsia–Pacificregion.However,thenewLaborgovernmentunderKevinRudd’sleadershipmayposepolicychallengesforJapaninitsrelationswithAustralia,whichwerefirmlyestablishedunderJohnHoward.Intensivestrategicdialogueandconsultationshouldbefurtherenhanced,giventhetremendousimplicationsforbothcountriesofdecisionsabouthowtorespondtothegreattransformationsofAsianinternationalrelations.

ThechallengestoJapan–Australiacooperationaresohugethatbothcountriesneedtoaddressthemcarefullyandcreatively.

Endnotes

1 TsutomuKikuchi,‘Towardmultilateralinitiatives:canJapanandAustraliacopewithanemergingAsiaPacific?,’inPeterKingandYoichiKibata(eds),PeaceBuildingintheAsiaPacificRegion,Allen&Unwin,NSW,1996,pp.1–15.

2 TsutomuKikuchi,‘Beyond“StrategicStudies”:strategicrelationsinEastAsia,’paperpresentedatthePlenary3,TheGlobalStrategicBalanceandCompetitionamongtheMajorPowersinEastAsia:ImplicationsandResponses,The21stAsia–PacificRoundTable,June5–7,2007,KualaLumpur,Malaysia.

3 TsutomuKikuchi,‘Institutionallinkagesandsecuritygovernance:securitymultilateralismintheKoreanPeninsula’(achapterofaforthcomingbooktobepublishedbytheUnitedNationsUniversity,Tokyo).

4 Oninstitutionalinterplay,seeVinodKAggarwal(ed.),InstitutionalDesignsforaComplexWorld,CornellUniversityPress,Ithaca,1998;OranYoung,GovernanceinWorldAffairs,CornellUniversityPress,Ithaca,1999.

5 Thismaytakeaformofaloose‘concertofpowers’amongthemajorpowers.

6 DavidBarboza,‘Someassemblyneeded:ChinaasAsianfactory,’NewYorkTimes,9February2006.

7 YashengHuang,SellingChina:ForeignDirectInvestmentduringtheReformEra,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2003.

8 Onthesecurityimplicationsofcross‑borderproductionnetworks,seeStephenGBrooks,ProducingSecurity:MultinationalCorporations,Globalization,andtheChangingCalculusofConflict,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,2005.

9 SeeaseriesoftheannualreportsbytheJapaneseMinistryofEconomics,TradeandIndustry(METI).

10 KennethBPyle,JapanRising:TheResurgenceofJapanesePowerandPurpose,PublicAffairs,NewYork,2007.

11 KennethBPyle,‘AbeShinzoandJapan’schangeofcourse,’NBRAnalysis(NationalBureauofAsianResearch),vol.17,no.4,October2006,pp.5–31.

�� Proceedings

The Japan–Australia strategic relationship; an Australian perspectiveDr Mark Thomson Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Onthe6thofJuly1957inHakoneJapanthePrimeMinisterofJapanNobusukeKishiandAustralia’sTradeMinister‘BlackJack’McEwensignedtheAgreementofCommercebetweenAustraliaandJapan.Designedtoimproveanddevelopcommercialrelationsbetweenthetwocountries,theAgreementheraldedwhatwastobeamutuallybeneficialeconomicpartnershipbetweenAustraliaandJapan;apartnershipthathasnowenduredformorethanhalfacenturyandremainsasvibrantandstrongasithaseverbeen.

Overthesameperiod,relationsbetweenJapanandAustraliahavegrowninotherwayswithculture,tourismandeducationnowfirmlyestablishedasimportantpartsofthebilateralrelationship.WhilesuchdevelopmentsmayhavebeenforeseenbythosepresentatthesigningoftheAgreementbackin1957,itisunlikelythattheyanticipatedJapanandAustraliadrawingtogethertocooperateinthesecuritydomainashasoccurredoverthepastseveralyears.

ThispaperreviewsthedevelopmentofrelationsbetweenAustraliaandJapanandexaminesprospectsforthefuture.Itbeginsbylookingbroadlyattheimpactofthe1957AgreementonCommercebeforenarrowingitsfocustoexploreindetailtherecentdevelopmentsonthesecurityandstrategicfronts.

‘Beingdesirousofimprovinganddevelopingcommercialrelations…’

Inessence,the1957Agreementconferredmost‑favoured‑nationstatustoeachoftheparties.Putsimply,AustraliaandJapanagreed

thattradebetweenthetwocountrieswouldfacenogreatertariffs,taxbarriersorotherhindrancesthanimposedonanythirdparty,andthatquotasorotherrestrictionsonimportswouldnotdifferfromthoseimposedonallthirdparties.

Comparedwiththeaspirationsoftoday’sfreetradeadvocates,itwasamodestagreement.Itevenincludedaclauseallowingeithernationto‘takesuchmeasuresasarenecessarytosafeguarditsexternalfinancialpositionandbalanceofpayments’.Nonetheless,itunleashedtradebetweenAustraliaandJapanwhichhasgrownsubstantiallyovertheyears.In1957,forexample,Australiaexportedonly$67,000ofcoaltoJapan1.TodayannualexportsofcoalfromAustraliatoJapanstandinexcessof$9billion2.

Thevolumeoftradebetweenthetwocountriesisimpressive.AccordingtodatapreparedbyAustralia’sDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade;

• JapanwasthenumberonedestinationforAustralianmerchandiseexportsin2006withavalueofA$32.6billionrepresenting19.4%ofthetotal

• JapanwasthenumberthreesourceofmerchandiseimportstoAustraliain2006withavalueofA$17.4billionrepresenting14.3%ofthetotal.

FromtheJapaneseside,thesemerchandiseexportsandimportsputAustraliaatnumbertwelveintherankingofJapaneseexportdestinations(1.9%)andnumberfiveintermsofimportsources(4.8%).

TheimportanceofJapanasanexportdestinationforAustraliaisnotarecentdevelopment.Infact,ittookonlytenyearsafterthesigningofthe1957AgreementforJapantobecomeAustralia’snumberoneexportdestination,apositionithasheldforfourdecades.


ThesuccessoftradebetweenAustraliaandJapanisbuiltuponthecomplementarystructureofthetwocountry’seconomies.AustraliahasresourcesthatJapanneeds,andJapanisanefficientmanufacturerofgoodsthatAustraliadesires.Inaddition,AustraliaisanattractivedestinationforJapanesetouristsandstudents.Around700,000JapanesepeoplevisitAustraliaeachyear.Interestineachother’sculturesisalsostrongwithmorethan300,000AustralianstudentsstudyingJapaneseinsecondaryschoolsandtertiaryinstitutions.

Withsomuchvestedintherelationship,itisnotsurprisingthatthelastfortyyearshaveseenagrowingpoliticalrelationshipbetweenthetwonations.In1957,thethenAustralianPrimeMinisterSirRobertMenziesvisitedJapan—thefirstAustralianleadertodoso.Subsequently,AustralianPrimeMinistersvisitedJapanfourtimesinthe1970s,fivetimesinthe1980s,sixtimesinthe1990sandfivetimesalreadythisdecade.

ItisworthrememberingthatthedepthandbreadthofbilateralrelationsbetweenJapanandAustraliaowesalottotheforesightandcontinuedeffortsofgovernmentsonbothsides.The1976BasicTreatyofFriendshipandCo-operationbetweenJapanandAustraliawasanimportantstepincementingthegainsfromthe1957treaty3.ItremainstheonlybilateralumbrellatreatytowhichAustraliaisapartyto.

Whatmakesthe1957Agreement,andeventhe1976Treaty,soimpressiveisthattheywereachievedagainstabackgroundoflessthancompleteamitybetweenAustraliaandJapan.The1957AgreementwassignedonlyfiveyearsaftertheSanFranciscopeacetreatywasconcluded.Atthattime,WWIIstillcastaheavyshadowoverAustralianperceptionsofJapan.Conversely,Australiacarriedtheburdenofaracistimmigrationpolicy(onlyeffectivelyrevokedin1973)thathardlyendearedittoitsAsianneighbours,Japanincluded.

Butsuchmattersarenowlargelytheconcernofhistorians.SomuchsothatinthepastseveralyearsAustraliaandJapanhavebeguntobroadentheirrelationshipbeyondsharedeconomicbenefittoembrace—albeittentatively—sharedstrategicinterests.

‘AffirmingthatthestrategicpartnershipbetweenAustraliaandJapan…’

ManyhavebeensurprisedatthepaceAustraliaandJapanhavemovedtodeepentheirdefenceandsecurityrelationshipoverthepastcoupleofyears.

InJune2007thetwonationsheldinauguraltwo‑plus‑twodefenceandforeignministertalksinTokyo4.ThismeetingfollowedthesigningofaJointDeclarationonSecurityCooperation5inMarchthatcommittedbothsidestoworktogether‘torespondtonewsecuritychallengesandthreats’.BothinitiativescomplementtheinauguralAustralia–Japan–UnitedStatesstrategictrilateraldialogue6thatbroughtthethreenation’sforeignministerstogethertodiscusssecurityinMarch2006.

PerceptionsinAustraliaofwhatisbehindthenewfoundstrategicpartnershipbetweenAustraliaandJapanvary.7

Ononesidearethosewhoseerecenteventsinentirelypositiveterms.Japanisfinallyshakingoffthestricturesofanoutdatedpost‑WWIIconstitutiontoplayarolebefittingtheworld’ssecondlargesteconomy.Inthis‘comingofage’tale,deepeningsecuritycooperationwithAustraliaandtheUnitedStateswillhelpJapanemergeasaneffectivesecurityactorforthegoodofall.Totheextentthatthisversionofthestoryhasvillains,theyarethevillainsoftheso‑callednon‑traditionalsecurityagenda;violentnon‑stateactors,transnationalcriminals,pandemiccausingmicrobes,weakstatesinneedofrebuildingandroguestatesinneedofrestraint.

�0 Proceedings

Othersseealesspromisingnarrativedeveloping.Thelong‑establishedpowerbalanceinEastAsiaisbeingtornbytheriseofChinacausingrolesandrelationshipstoberedefined.Inthisversionofthestory,thenewfoundclosenessbetweenAustraliaandJapan,andtheUnitedStatesinturn,representthefirststepsincounter‑balancingtheriseofChinaasagreatpower.Takecare,wearetoldinthisversionofthestory,orouractionsmightcreateaChinamoreinlinewithourfearsthanourhopes.

Sowheredoesthetruthlie?

Themoreupbeatofthetwoassessmentscancertainlylayclaimtoreflectingtheofficiallineofthethreecountries.Forexample,thejointcommuniquéfollowingtheMarch2006Australia–Japan–UnitedStatesTrilateralStrategicDialoguereadslikeachecklistofuncontroversialsecurityconcernscentredmainly,butnotexclusively,ontheAsiaPacific.TopicscanvassedincludedNorthKoreanandIranianproliferation,counter‑terrorismcooperation,democraticreforminBurma,thestabilityofPacificIslandstatesandpreparingtodealwiththeconsequencesofmajorpandemics.

TheonlymentionofChinawasasinglesentencethat‘welcomedChina’sconstructiveengagementintheregionandconcurredonthevalueofenhancedcooperationwithotherparties…’Theonlyhinttochangingpowerbalanceswasatangentialreferenceto‘theimportanceofreinforcingourglobalpartnershipwithIndia’(inwhichthereaderislefttospeculateonthemeaningoftheterm‘globalpartnershipwithIndia’).Andtheonlyconcreteactionsagreedtoweretoenhancethe‘exchangeofinformationandstrategicassessments’and,naturally,toholdanotherdialogue.Inthefinalanalysis,theTrilateralStrategicDialoguesawthethreenationsagreetoagreeonthingsthattheyhadalreadyagreedupon.

AlthoughtheAustralia–JapanJointDeclarationonSecurityCooperationisamuchmoresubstantivedocumentthantheanodynetrilateralcommuniqué,itstillaccordscloselywithanupbeatperspectiveoftheemergingsecurityrelationship.Atitsheartisalistofnineareasforcooperation;eightfocuseddirectlyonnon‑traditionalsecurityissuesandonefortheexchangeofinformation.Thereisabsolutelynoreferencetobalance‑of‑powergeopolitics,letaloneanythingthatcouldbeconstruedasasuggestionofcollectivedefence.Thejointdeclarationismostdefinitelynotamutualdefencetreatyorpact.

Nonetheless,thejointdeclarationdoesestablishaprogramofstrengtheneddefenceandsecuritycooperationthroughexchangesofpersonnel,coordinatedactivitiesandjointexercises.Importantly,however,thelattertwoinitiativesarecastinthecontextofnon‑traditionalsecurityconcerns,specifically;humanitarianrelief,lawenforcement,peaceoperationsandregionalcapacitybuilding.ThejointdeclarationwasfollowedbyanActionPlaninSeptember20078thatprovidedmoredetailwithoutexpandingthescopeofplannedcooperation.

Thejointstatement9followingthetwo‑plus‑twotalksinJune2007wasblandintheextreme,onceagaincanvassingarangeofnon‑traditionalsecurityproblemswhileavoidinganymentionofChina.TheonlypointofvaguelystrategicimportwasadiplomaticstatementofconcernregardingNorthKoreanproliferation.

Thus,onthebasisofwhathasbeensaidofficially,andintermsofactualcooperationinIraqandelsewhere,theemergingtrilateralAustralia–Japan–UnitedStatesandbilateralAustralia–JapansecurityrelationshipsareexplicitlydirectedatsecurityconcernsotherthanthechangingpowerbalanceinEastAsia.


SowheredoesthisleavetheinterpretationofrecenteventscentredoncounterbalancingChina’srise?Certainly,noneofthethreecountrieshaveeversuggestedthattheirclosersecurityrelationshiphasanythingtodowithChina,ifanythingtheyhavearguedthecontrary.ExplicitlysointhecaseofAustralia,whosethenPrimeMinisterJohnHowardsaidthatthetrilateraldialogue(andbyimplicationthebilateralAustralia–Japanstrategicrelationship)‘isnotdirectedagainstChinaorthepeopleofChina’10.Nonetheless,therearetwostrongreasonstogivecredencetoaperspectivethatputsChinaatthecentreofrecentdevelopments.

First,themerefacttheUnitedStatesandtwoofitsAsia–Pacificalliesaredrawingtogetheronsecurityissuesisimportantinandofitself.Inthisregard,contextiscritical.WhiletheUS–Chinarelationshiphaswarmedconsiderablyintheyearsfollowing9/11,tensionsremainbetweenthetwocountries.Inpart,thisreflectsmemoriesofthethreerecentSino–Americancrises;the2001EP‑3aircraftdowningincident,the1996TaiwanStraitcrisisandthe1999USbombingoftheChineseembassyinBelgrade.

Whiletheseeventsarenowinthepast,thefactremainsthatboththeUnitedStatesandChinaarestrategicallywaryofeachother—totheextentthattheybothappeartobedevelopingmilitarycapabilitywitheachotherinmind.TheUnitedStatesdoessoexplicitlythroughitsstatedpolicyofmaintainingdecisivemilitarysuperiorityinorderto‘influencecountriesatthestrategiccrossroads’ofwhichChinastandspreeminentinUSthinking.11Foritspart,Chinaisdevelopingarangeofadvancedweapons,includinganti‑satellitecapabilities,presumablywiththeaimofhavingfreedomofaction(againstUScounters)acrossitsairandmaritimeapproachesparticularlyaroundTaiwan12.WiththemilitarybalancebetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesattheforefrontofbothnation’s

minds,anymovebytheUStoconsolidateitsalliancesintheAsiaPacificinevitably,evenifinadvertently,factorsintothatbalance.

Second,andevenmoreimportant,therecentbilateralandtrilateralinitiativesusedlanguagethatputChinaontheopposingsideofanideologicalrift.ThepreambletotheAustralia–Japanjointdeclarationrefersto‘democraticvalues,acommitmenttohumanrights,freedomandtheruleoflaw’andthetrilateralcommuniquémentions‘supportingtheemergenceofdemocracies’.Bythemselves,thesestatementsarenothingmorethandiplomaticrecitalsoflongestablishedpositions.But,onceagain,contextiseverything.

TheideologicalrhetoricneedstobeseeninlightoftheUSposition,reaffirmedasrecentlyas2006,callingfor‘politicalliberalization’inChina13—theinevitableconclusionofwhichwouldbeanendtothecommunistregime.CouplethiswiththeproposalfromtheUnitedStates14tocreateapartnershipofdemocraciesincludingAustralia,India,JapanandtheUnitedStates—centredgeographicallyaround,butnecessarilyexcluding,China—andadifferentpictureemerges:DespitetherecentwarmingofrelationsbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates/Japan,anideologicalriftremainsthat,amongotherthings,definesasphereofsecuritycooperationcentredontheUnitedStatestotheexclusionofChina.

Similarly,thoughsomewhatlesspointedly,underforeignministerAso,Japanembarkedonaprogramof‘valuesbaseddiplomacy’withanemphasis‘on‘universalvalues’suchasfreedom,democracy,humanrights,theruleoflawandthemarketeconomy’whichsoughtto‘[f]urtherstrengthentieswiththeUS,Australia,IndiaandthememberstatesoftheEUandNATOamongothers’andcreatean‘arcoffreedomandprosperity’thatformeda‘prosperousandstableregionbasedonuniversalvaluesaroundtheouterrimoftheEurasiancontinent’15.

�� Proceedings

Atleastoneneoconservativecommentator16intheUnitedStateshasgonesofarastoproposeestablishingaLeagueofDemocraticStates‘tobestowlegitimacyonactionsthatliberalnationsdeemnecessarybutautocraticnations[specificallyChinaandRussia]refusetocountenance’andspecificallymentions‘Japan,AustraliaandIndia’aspotentialmembers.

Tothesurpriseofsomedomesticcommentators,Australia’snormallypragmaticPrimeMinisteratthetime,JohnHoward,wasquicktoacceptthisideologicallybasedconceptionofstrategicaffairs.HisresponsewhenchallengedonChina’spossiblereactiontothedevelopmentofacloserbilateralsecurityrelationshipbetweenAustraliaandJapanwasinformative.Ontwosuchoccasionsheargued,notunreasonably,thattherewasnoconflictinAustraliahavingconstructiverelationswithbothnations,beforethenpointingoutthatAustralia’srelationshipwithJapanfellintoaqualitativelydifferentcategorybecausebothnationsaredemocracies.17OnotheroccasionshehasstressedtheideologicalbasisofthetrilateralrelationshipbetweentheUnitedStates,JapanandAustralia18goingsofarastocallit‘anaturalcomingtogetherofthreePacificdemocracies’.

China’sresponsetotheAustralia–Japan–UnitedStatestrilateralhasbeendiplomatic.WhenaskedforChina’sperspectiveonthetrilateralstrategicdialogue,PresidentHusaidthatChina‘believedthatcountriesinthisregionshouldincreasetheirdialogueandcooperationonthebasisofmutualtrust,mutualbenefit,equalityandcooperationtoattaincommonsecurityandcommondevelopment’19.Thenotionof‘mutualtrust,mutualbenefit,equalityandcooperation’hasforseveralyearsnowbeenthebasisforwhatChinacallsits‘newsecurityconcept’.Thequestionis;canamodelofsecuritycooperationthatdifferentiatesbetween

democraciesandnon‑democraciesbereconciledwithonebasedonequality?

Apparentlynot—fromChina’sperspectiveatleast—ifIndiaisaddedtocreateaquadrilateralgrouping.AccordingtomediareportsthatweresubsequentlyconfirmedbyofficialAustraliansources20,Chinasentademarche(a‘pleaseexplain’diplomaticnote)toCanberra,NewDelhi,TokyoandWashingtonontheeveofseniorofficialsfromthosecapitalsmeetingtodiscusssecurityonthesidelinesoftheMay2007ASEANRegionalForum(ARF)inManila.21Subsequently,bothNewDelhiandCanberradownplayedanysuggestionofafour‑waysecuritypartnership22,notwithstandingjointmaritimeexercisesinvolvingthefournationsandSingaporeinSeptember200723.

Sowheredoesthisleaveus?WhichofthetwodisparateinterpretationsofthegrowingsecuritypartnershipsbetweenAustralia,JapanandtheUnitedStatesiscorrect?Tosomeextent,itdependsonthepreconceptionsthatonebringstothequestion.Thosewhoseetheworldchangedirrevocablybytheeventsof9/11tendtoplacegreateremphasisonthegainsfromengagingaresponsibleandprosperousnationlikeJapantoassistwiththenewnon‑traditionalsecurityagenda.ThosewhoseetheemergenceofChinathroughthebitterlessonsofEuropeanhistoryfeararepeatofthenonsensicalsituationthatsawtheworldgotowarin1914.

TheHowardgovernmentwasconfidentthatitcouldreapthebenefitspromisedbytheformerperspectivewhileavoidingtherisksinherentinthelatter.Othersarenotsosure.Australia’snewPrimeMinisterKevinRuddhas,sofar,adoptedadecidedlymorecautiousapproach.WhilecommittingtocontinuesecuritycooperationwithJapanacrosstheeffectivelyfullgamutofareassetoutinthe2006jointdeclaration,he’stakenafirmlineagainstaformaldefencepactwithJapan


arguingthatitwould‘unnecessarilytieoursecurityintereststothevicissitudesofanunknownsecuritypolicyfutureinNorthEastAsia’.Incontrast,hispredecessorJohnHowardsaidthatthejointdeclarationmighteventuallyleadtoatreaty24,aviewconsistentwiththatexpressedbythenJapaneseForeignMinisterAsowholeftopenthepossibilityofafutureAustralia–Japan–UnitedStatesalliance25.

Inmanyways,however,AustraliahasadifferentviewofChinatoboththeUnitedStatesandJapan.Wehavenoargumentsoverhistoryortradeand,unliketheUnitedStates,wedonotlecturetheChineseregimeabouthowtobea‘responsiblestakeholder’.Infact,followingthe2007two‑plus‑twotalksinJune2007,theAustralianForeignMinisterAlexanderDownerwasatpainstoexplaintothemediathatChina’sgrowingmilitarybudgetwasbothreasonableandbenign26.Australia’sperspectiveofChinaisbestdescribedasrelaxedandcomfortable.

Onpastexperience,Australia’slargelysanguineviewofChinawilllimitthepotentialofeitherthebilateralortrilateralinitiativestogobeyondtheirpresentcarefullycircumscribedlimits.RecentjointAustralia–Japandiplomaticpronouncementsreinforcethisjudgment.AndeventhoughtheHowardgovernmenttookAustraliaonesmallstepclosertoapartnershipofdemocraciesonChina’speriphery,thisiswillnotsurvivethenewRuddLaborgovernment.Iftherewaseveranydoubtofthis,StephenSmith,thenewAustralianforeignminister,putthemattertobedduringhisinauguralvisittoJapanandChinawhenheinformedbothnationsthatAustraliawouldnolongerparticipateinfour‑waysecuritytalkswithJapan,IndiaandtheUnitedStates27.

Thismorecautiousapproachmakessense.FromAustralia’sperspective,prudencedictatesthatthepotentialbenefitsof

engagingJapanonnon‑conventionalsecuritymattersmustbeconservativelybalancedagainstthedangerofprovokingapotentiallydiredeteriorationininternationalrelationsinEastAsia.AkeypartofdoingsoisforAustralia,JapanandtheUnitedStatestoremainconstructivelyengagedwithChina.ForAustralia,thetaskhasbeenmadeeasierbytherecentlyannouncedAustralia–Chinastrategicdialogue.

ItremainstobeseenwhethertheAustralia–ChinadialogueleadstosecuritycooperationbetweenAustraliaandChinaonparwiththatbeingdevelopedbetweenAustraliaandJapan.EvenmoreinterestingwouldbeanAustralia–Chinajointdeclarationonsecurity.

ThefactthattheAustralia–Chinadialoguecommencedattheministeriallevelissignificant.Whilebilateralsecuritydialoguesarenotextraordinary—ChinaandJapanhaveheldsevenandChinaandtheUnitedStatesfour—thesehaveallbeenattheviceministeriallevel.Whateverhappens,atleasttheAustralia–ChinastrategicdialoguebringsadegreeofsymmetrytoAustralia’srelationswiththepowersofNorthAsiaandsoftenstheperceptionthatearlierAustralia/Japan/USinitiativesweredirectedatChina.

Moving forward

Assumingthattheforegoingargumentiscorrect,thenewdimensionsoftheAustralia–Japanrelationshipwillbemorefocusedonsecurityissuesthanstrategicaffairs(inthesenseofcompetitionbetweengreatpowers).Thatstillleavesampleroomforworthwhilecooperationgiventhetwocountries’sharedinterests.

Tobeginwith,AustraliaandJapanaremercantilestateswhicharehighlydependentonthefreeflowofgoods,materialsandenergytoandfromourshores.Asaconsequence,theirprosperityisvulnerabletoevenrelativelysmalldisruptionsintheglobal

�4 Proceedings

securitylandscape.Moreover,inrecentyearsbothhaveexperiencedrapidgrowthintradewithChina;aphenomenathathaseveryprospectofcontinuingintothefuture.

ThenthereisthefactthatbothcountriesareclosealliesoftheUnitedStates.Andwhiletheirrespectivealliancesgreatlyenhanceourlocalsecurity,botharesubjecttogrowingexpectationsfromtheUStosupportitsbroadersecurityglobalagendainplaceslikeAfghanistanandIraq.RecentcooperationbetweentheAustralianDefenceForceandtheJapaneseSelfDefenseForceinIraqshowsthepotentialforsynergiesfrombringingtogethercomplementarycapabilities.

Finally,bothcountrieshaveopendemocraticpoliticalsystemsandfreemarketeconomies.Thus,whiletheirtwoculturesreflectdistinctlydifferentEasternandWesternheritages,theyneverthelesssharearangeofimportantunderlyingvalues.Specifically,theyagreeonthefundamentalrelationshipbetweentheindividualandthestate,andonthebestwaytobuildprosperityathomeandabroad.

Takentogether,thesethreefactorsgiveAustraliaandJapanagooddealofcommonground,andindeedcommoncause,toworktogether.It’snotsurprisingthenthatcooperationisalreadyunderwayinseveralareas.

Ofallthesecurityissuesthathaveariseninrecentyears,nonehasattractedasmuchattentionasthatofIslamistterrorism.BothAustraliaandJapanlostcitizensinthe9/11attacksof2001andtheBalibombingof2002,makingterrorismanimportantissueforbothourcountries.It’sunderstandablethen,thattheyhavebeencooperatingonanumberoflevelstocombatinternationalterrorism.ThiswasformalisedintheStatementandActionPlanissuedjointlybytheAustralianandJapanesePrimeMinistersinJuly2003andreinforcedintheJointDeclarationof2007.Cooperationembracesimmigration

controls,transportsecurity,lawenforcement,internationalfinanceandthedevelopmentofresponsecapabilitiesforchemical,biologicalandradiologicalincidents.

ArguablythemosttangiblecommitmentthatAustraliaandJapanhavemadeincounteringterrorismwasthedispatchofforces(albeitinquitedifferentroles)toAfghanistanintheaftermathof9/11.Ofcourse,itwouldbenaïvetopretendthatAustraliaandJapan’seffortsinAfghanistanwerenotatleastequallymotivatedbyadesiretonurturetheUSallianceforitsownsake.

TheriseofIslamistterrorismhas,inturn,givennewurgencytocontainingthespreadofWeaponsofMassDestruction(WMD).Accordingly,bothAustraliaandJapanaremembersofthe‘coregroup’offifteencountriesparticipatingintheProliferationSecurityInitiative(PSI).

WhilethePSIandotherongoingnon‑proliferationinitiativesareimportant,itisthediplomaticeffortsunderwaytocurbNorthKorea’snuclearambitionsthatwillbecriticalintheimmediatefuture.Here,theopportunityforAustraliaandJapantocooperatehasbeenlimited.AlthoughthereismuchatstakeinNorthKorea,therealityisthatAustraliaisbutaconcernedobserverwhileJapanisadirectpartytotheSixPartytalks.

OnthequestionofIranianproliferation,AustraliaandJapanaresodistantastobeirrelevantinthefirstinstance.Thatsaid;followingthe2003attemptto‘disarm’Iraq,JapanandAustraliaendedupworkingtogethertorebuildinfrastructureinthatcountry.

DespitetherelativelycircumscribedlevelofcooperationbetweenAustraliaandJapanoncounter‑terrorismandcounter‑proliferation,aworthwhilecontributiontotheoverallinternationalefforthasresultedinbothareas.


ThesameisequallytrueforcooperationbetweenAustraliaandJapaninothernon‑conventionalsecurityareas.Nodoubtthiswillcontinueasopportunitiesariseandnewchallengesemerge.

Finally,althoughfuturecooperationbetweenAustraliaandJapanwilllikelyavoidtryingtoinfluencetheactualorperceivedbalanceofpowerinEastAsia,itisstillperhapspossibleforthetwocountriestoenhancestrategicstabilityinthatregion.Specifically,JapanandAustraliacouldworktowardscreatingasecurityarchitectureforEastAsiabasedoncooperationratherthanconfrontation.

IthasbecomeclichétosaythatthestabilityofEastAsiadependsonfindingawaytosimultaneouslyaccommodatetheriseofChinaasagreatpower,managethenormalisationofJapanasastrategicentityandkeeptheUnitedStatesengagedasastabilisingfactorintheregion.Usuallyitisassumed,implicitlyorotherwise,thatthiswouldbeeaseriftherewasaregionalforum,usuallytermedasecurityarchitecture,tofacilitateconsultationanddisputeresolution.Noneoftheexistingalphabetsoupofregionalforumsissuitableforthispurpose;mostaretwolargetobepracticalandallareprincipallyfocusedonnon‑securityaffairs.

ThemostcredibleproposalatpresentistoevolvethesixpartytalksintosomesortofstandingentitytodealwithquestionsofNorthAsiansecurity.SuchanentitywouldhavetheadvantageofengagingChina,JapanandtheUnitedStatesonanequalbasis.Ofcourse,thedifficultyofinstitutionalisingsuchaforumwouldbetheexclusionofthemyriadofsmallernationsinthebroaderregionincludingthoseofSoutheastAsia.Butthismightbeunavoidableifaworkablesolutionissought;theproblemsofwhatisessentiallyNorthAsiansecurityarenotgoingtobesolvedbyconveninga‘generalassembly’oftheAsiaPacific.

Evenifamanageablysmallandproperlyfocused‘securityarchitecture’emerges,itwillbeatbestameanstoanend.What’sultimatelyneededisacombinationofimplicitnormsandexplicitrulesbywhichregionalcountries—andespeciallyChina,Japan,UnitedStates—delineatepower,resolvedisputesandaccommodateeachother’sinterests.Althoughaforumfordiscussionisalmostcertainlynecessary,itwillnotbesufficient.

Australiahasastrongstakeinseeingaforumemergewiththenecessaryaccompanyingrulesandnorms.Thecountry’sthreekeytradingpartners(Japan,ChinaandtheUnitedStates)aretheprinciplestrategicplayersinEastAsia,andtheUnitedStatesisitsclosestally.Australia’ssecurityandprosperitydependscriticallyonthestrategicstabilityofEastAsia.Thesame,ofcourse,isevenmoreacutelytrueforJapan.

Ofitself,therecentlyestablishedsecurity/strategicpartnershipbetweenAustraliaandJapanisbutaminordevelopmentinthebroaderlandscapeofEastAsiansecurity.Nonetheless,itpresentstheopportunityforbothnationstoworktogetheronthetrulystrategictaskofhelpingestablishaneffectivesecurityarchitectureforEastAsia.Arguably,theprospectsfordoingsoareimprovedbythedistinctlydifferentrelationshipstheyeachhavewiththekeyplayers—theUnitedStatesandChinainparticular.Itmaybethat,aswithcommerce,AustraliaandJapanfindthattheircomplementarycharacteristicsdelivermutualbenefit.

Endnotes

1 PhilIngram,Australia-JapanCommerceAgreement1957-50thAnniversary,Commentary,athttp://www.australia.or.jp/english/seifu/50/20070627.html

2 AustralianDFAT,JapanFactSheet,athttp://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/jap.pdf

�� Proceedings

3 GaryWoodard,MoreenDeeandMaxSuich,NegotiatingtheAustralia-JapanBasicTreatyofFriendshipandCooperation:ReflectionsandAfterthoughts,ANU,AsiaPacificEconomicPapers#362,2007,atwww.eaber.org/intranet/documents/26/901/AJRC_Woodard_07.pdf

4 Japan,AustraliaeyemeetinginJune,SydneyMorningHerald,23May2007,athttp://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Japan‑Australia‑eye‑meeting‑in‑June/2007/05/23/1179601489149.html

5 Australia-JapanJointDeclarationonSecurityCooperation,13March2007,athttp://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/aus_jap_security_dec.html

6 JointStatementAustralia-Japan-UnitedStates;TrilateralStrategicDialogue,18March2006,athttp://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/joint_statement‑aus‑japan_usa_180306.html

7 RecentAustraliancommentaryincludes:GerardHenderson,Friendsinpeaceandprosperity.TheSydneyMorningHerald,March13,2007athttp://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/friends‑in‑peace‑and‑prosperity/2007/03/12/1173548110222.html

PaulKelly,SecurityaccordflagsnewJapan,TheAustralian,March13,2007,athttp://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/paulkelly/index.php/theaustralian/comments/security_accord_flags_new_japan

RodLyon,EvolvingsecuirystructureswilldisplaceUShegemony.TheAustralian,March22,2007,athttp://theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21423631‑7583,00.html

GregSheridan,HowardcanmakehistorywithIndianalliance,TheAustralian,April19,2007,athttp://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21580534‑25377,00.html

GregSheridan,Madnesstomisspoliticalinvestment,TheAustralian,March14,2007,athttp://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/madness_to_miss_political_investment

HughWhite,Japan’swelcometoarms,TheDiplomat,April/May2007,athttp://www.the‑diplomat.com/article.aspx?aeid=2687

8 SecuritycooperationwithJapan,MediaRelease,PrimeMinisterJohnHoward,9September2007,athttp://www.pm.gov.au/media/Release/2007/Media_Release24545.cfm

MajorElementsoftheActionPlantoimplementtheJapan-AustraliaJointDeclarationonSecurityCooperation,JapaneseMinistryofForeignAffairs,athttp://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‑paci/australia/action0709.html

9 Japan-AustraliaJointForeignandDefenceMinisterialConsultation–JointStatement2007,athttp://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2007/fa064_07.html

10 JointstatementandpressconferencebythePrimeMinistersofJapanandAustralia,Sydney,9September2007,athttp://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24544.cfm

JointPressConferencewiththePresidentofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,HisExcellencyHuJintao,6September2007,athttp://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24538.cfm

11 QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,2006,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr‑2006‑report.pdf

12 MilitaryPowerofthePeopleRepublicofChina,2007,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,ReporttoCongress,athttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523‑China‑Military‑Power‑final.pdf


13 Reference11aboveandTheNationalSecurityStrategyfortheUnitedStatesofAmerica,2006,athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/

14 DennisShanohan,PacificalliestoenlistIndia,TheAustralian,March152007,athttp://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21384779‑601,00.html

15 Japan’sExpandingDiplomaticHorizon–NewPillarforJapan’sForeignPolicy,athttp://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/horizons.pdf

16 RobertKagan,TheIllusionofManagingChina,WashingtonPost,15May2005,athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‑dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/AR2005051301405.html

RobertKagan,LeagueofDictators?,WashingtonPost,30April2006,athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‑dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/AR2006042801987.html

RobertKagan,Theworlddivides...anddemocracyisatbay,Timesonline,2September2007,athttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article2367065.ece

17 JohnHoward,PressConference,Sydney,9March2007,athttp://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24193.cfmandJohnHoward,DoorstopInterview,Sydney,11March2007,http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24194.cfm.

18 Reference10above.

19 JointPressConferencewithPrimeMinisterJohnHowardandPresidentHuJintao,Sydney,6September2007,athttp://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24538.cfm

20 BrendanNicholson,JapanjitteryoverclosertiesbetweenAustraliaandChina,TheAge,6February2008,athttp://www.theage.com.au/news/national/japan‑jittery‑over‑our‑ties‑with‑china/2008/02/05/1202090421830.html

21 BrahmaChellaney,‘QuadInitiative’:aninharmoniousconcertofdemocracies’,TheJapanTimes,19July2007,athttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi‑bin/eo20070719bc.html

SiddharthVaradarajan,‘Chinademarchesto4nations’,TheHindu,14June2006,athttp://www.thehindu.com/2007/06/14/stories/2007061404451200.htm

22 StephenMcDonell,NelsonreassuresChinaoverregionaldefencepact,ABCOnline,athttp://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/07/09/1973982.htm

23 NaviesjoinforcesforExerciseMALABAR,RANwebsite,athttp://www.navy.gov.au/news/navies‑join‑forces‑for‑exercise‑malabar

24 JohnHoward,DoorstopinterviewImperialHotel,Tokyo,11March2007,athttp://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24195.cfm

25 MinistersAso,Downer,KyumaandNelson–2+2JointMinisterialDoorstop,6June2007,athttp://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2007/070607_min_doorstop.html

26 AlexanderDowner,MediaConference,Tokyo,6June2007,athttp://www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2007/070608_media_conference.html

27 Reference20above.

�� Proceedings

About the OrganisationsThe Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA)isJapan’sforemostcentreforproducinganddisseminatingideasoninternationalrelations.AsanacademicallyindependentinstitutionaffiliatedwiththeJapaneseMinistryofForeignAffairs,JIIAisasourceofauthoritativeinterpretationsofJapaneseforeignpolicy.Buildingonitsworkofpublication,internationalscholarlycollaborationandpolicyrecommendation,JIIAisaforumforinformedpublicdebate.

Tel:(03)3503‑7261+81‑3‑3503‑7261(fromoutsideJapan)Fax:(03)3503‑7292+81‑3‑3503‑7292(fromoutsideJapan)Webwww.jiia.or.jp/en

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s(ASPI)aimistopromoteAustralia’ssecuritybycontributingfreshideastostrategicdecision‑making,andbyhelpingtoinformpublicdiscussionofstrategicanddefenceissues.ASPIwasestablished,andispartiallyfunded,bytheAustralianGovernmentasanindependent,non‑partisanpolicyinstitute.Itisincorporatedasacompany,andisgovernedbyaCouncilwithbroadmembership.ASPI’spublications—includingthispaper—arenotintendedinanywaytoexpressorreflecttheviewsoftheAustralianGovernment.

Tel+61262705100Fax+61262739566Emailenquiries@aspi.org.auWebwww.aspi.org.au

About the DialogueThisDialogueisaninitiativeofthetwoleadinginstitutions:AustralianStrategicPolicyInstituteandtheJapanInstituteofInternationalAffairs.Itaimstoassistthetwogovernmentstoaddressandexplore,throughfrankandsustainedexchanges,theirrespectivepolicyapproachesandoptionsonglobal,regionalandlocalsecurityissues.

ParticipantsatthisDialogue,hostedbyASPIwiththeassistanceoftheAustralianDepartmentofDefenceandtheJapaneseMinistryofForeignAffairs,engagedindiscussionswithaviewtostrengtheningbilateralsecurityanddefencerelationsinsupportoftheircommoninterests.

Important disclaimerThispublicationisdesignedtoprovideaccurateandauthoritativeinformationinrelationtothesubjectmattercovered.Itisprovidedwiththeunderstandingthatthepublisherisnotengagedinrenderinganyformofprofessionalorotheradviceorservices.Nopersonshouldrelyonthecontentsofthispublicationwithoutfirstobtainingadvicefromaqualifiedprofessionalperson.

©TheAustralianStrategicPolicyInstituteLimited2008

Thispublicationissubjecttocopyright.ExceptaspermittedundertheCopyrightAct1968,nopartofitmayinanyformorbyanymeans(electronic,mechanical,microcopying,photocopying,recordingorotherwise)bereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystemortransmittedwithoutpriorwrittenpermission.Enquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothepublishers.

the 4th australia and japan 1.5 track security dialoguethe 4th australia and japan 1.5 track...

Documents