the application of a graph of a process in hazop analysis
TRANSCRIPT
Accepted Manuscript
The application of a graph of a process in HAZOP analysis in accident preventionsystem
Jan Maciej Kościelny, Michał Syfert, Bartłomiej Fajdek, Andrzej Kozak
PII: S0950-4230(16)30479-X
DOI: 10.1016/j.jlp.2017.09.003
Reference: JLPP 3585
To appear in: Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
Received Date: 20 December 2016
Revised Date: 4 August 2017
Accepted Date: 2 September 2017
Please cite this article as: Kościelny, J.M., Syfert, Michał., Fajdek, Bartł., Kozak, A., The application of agraph of a process in HAZOP analysis in accident prevention system, Journal of Loss Prevention in theProcess Industries (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.jlp.2017.09.003.
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPTThe application of a graph of a process in HAZOP analysis in accident prevention
system
Jan Maciej Kościelny*, Michał Syfert**, Bartłomiej Fajdek***, Andrzej Kozak#
Warsaw University of Technology, Faculty of Mechatronics,
Institute of Automatic Control and Robotics *[email protected]
**[email protected] ***[email protected]
The Office of Technical Inspection #[email protected]
Abstract
HAZOP method does not provide the completeness of risk analysis, especially indicating all causes of deviations of the process parameters which are the main risk. Particular difficulties occur when complex objects are concerned, which are decomposed into nodes for the needs of the HAZOP analysis. In the majority of cases, particular nodes are not independent - there are interactions between them, that may be overlooked. The presence of feedbacks between the nodes in the process is particularly dangerous. This paper proves that the completeness of this analysis may be increased by applying the qualitative model of the process in the form of a graph of a process. Definition of the graph of a process is provided, as well as discussion on the methodology of the process modelling with the use of such graph. Intelligent Accident Prevention System is also presented allowing for supporting HAZOP analysis by a model in form of a graph of a process.
Keywords: risk analysis, HAZOP, quantitative modelling, graph of process, safety system.
1. Introduction
For all installations posing a risk to human life or health, as well as the environment and property, the existing legal regulations and technical norms introduce the requirement of providing an appropriate level of safety, i.e. reduction of the risk to the acceptable level. The first element of the sequence of actions aimed at providing an appropriate level of safety is the analysis and assessment of the existing risks. In the process industry, the most common method is HAZOP - hazard and operability study, i.e. the study of risks and operational capabilities. In Europe, process industry covers chemistry, petrochemistry, gas manufacture and conventional energy production. HAZOP methodology came into existence in the sixties of the 20th century in the United States of America, and the author of this method is considered Trevor Kletz (Kletz, 1999).
The gist of this method consists in investigating the causes and results of the deviations of the process parameters by the team of experts. It serves as the determination of the possible hazardous events (threatening human health and life, natural environment and technological installation), as well as technological problems (causing a drop in the effectiveness of the process or in production). The study is performed with the use of keywords.
In the first stage of the analysis, the process is divided into separate subassemblies, the so-called nodal elements (pipelines, pumps etc.). For each node a medium and a set of characteristic physical parameters are determined, such as temperature, flow, pressure etc. Next, using these parameters together with keywords hypothetical situation of deviations of the given element from the normal state is defined. For a defined situation, a team of experts attempts to find possible causes and expected results for the operation of the installation. The team also suggests possible ways to protect the installation. Such an analysis is performed for each of the separated nodes of the analysed installation. Relations between particular nodes are also subject to analysis. As a result, one obtains the list of potential risks together with guidelines on
