TheArabSpringinNorthAfrica

§ This brief will inform the UK Department of International Development about the sources of revolution in developing countries. It will examine three socio-economic independent variables, unemployment among youths, increased food prices and social media usage to allow the department to better understand why developing countries revolt. This brief will conclude with short policy recommendations to help DfID ease these sources of revolution in the hope to reduce instability and the number of violent revolutions.

§ A developing country is one in which the

majority lives on far less money—with far fewer

basic public services—than the population in

highly industrialised countries.1

§ A revolution is the successful overthrow of a

government.

§ Libya, Egypt and Tunisia were chosen because

they are all:

o Developing countries with similar

economic and development statistics

residing in North Africa

o States in which the government was

overthrown and the the leader toppled

o Fairly recent cases of revolution.

1http://web.worldbank.org

PresidentHosniMubarakstepsdown11February,2011

PresidentBenAliresigns14January,2011 PrimeMinisterMuammarGaddafikilled20October,2011

§ The graph shows low overall employment in North African

countries from 2000-2009.

§ Youth unemployment was even higher in 2010:

o Libyan youth unemployment was 22.1% (up 50%

since 1990).

o Egyptian youth unemployment was 26.35% (up 65%

since 1990).

o Tunisian youth unemployment was 29.4% (up 50%

since 1990).

§ Unemployed youths were left idle and frustrated with the current

regime. They wished for greater employment opportunities and

saw the government as ineffective at handling economic affairs.

§ The source of revolution in North Africa came, in part, from the desire for better employment

opportunities and economic prospects. It was a political manifestation of unemployment frustrations.2

2Goldstone(2011)

§ Adverse climate conditions and worldwide production shortfalls created record-high food price increases.

§ Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are particularly vulnerable to food price hikes: o They were experiencing 5 year high inflation rates (20% in North Africa in 2010). o They import most of their food.

§ Egypt was the largest food importer in the world in 2010.

§ The graph above shows that in 2010/2011, food prices skyrocketed.

o Grain in Egypt went from $190/T in July 2010 to $340/T in February 2011.3 § Citizens in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia rely on their governments to provide basic food security. A

sudden perceived failure to provide food at a financially accessible price, seen from 2010/2011, undermines a key purpose of the ruling regime. In turn, hungry populations question the effectiveness of the regime and take to the streets to protest. 3https://www.oxfam.org

Red dashed lines correspond to beginning dates of food riots and protests associated with major recent unrest in North African and the Middle Eastern countries. Overall death toll is reported in parentheses. Blue line indicates date, December 13, 2010, on which researchers submitted a report to the U.S. government, warning of the link between food prices, social unrest and political instability.

Time dependence of FAO Food Price Index from January 2004 to May 2011

§ Use of social media helps create organisation among protestors.

o Facilitates the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge.

o Connects multiple political groups and diverse organisational entities.

o Subverts traditional state repression measures.

§ Social media is effective because it:

o Lowers costs of collective action.

o Increases inclination for similarly minded people to collectivise.

o Decreases likelihood of people in authoritarian regimes to hide distaste for current social

and economic situation.

§ Graphs for Egypt and Tunisia show that spikes in social media activity coincide with major

revolutionary events on the ground.

§ However, high social media usage only amplifies already pre-existing sources of revolution. It is

not a source of revolution on its own.

Percent of Tunisian Blogs with Posts on Politics in 2010/2011, by Keyword

Figure represents percentage of all blog posts containing at least one of six keywords based on data captured through eCairn from 20 Novermber 2010.

Logged Number of Tweets on #egypt, by Location

Outside Region refers to Twitter profiles which had locations outside both the country and the region. No Location refers to profiles which had either no location data or had been deleted or suspended since research began. The blue bar indicates the period when journalists began reporting that protests reached the level of ‘thousands’ of participants.

§ High youth unemployment creates frustration against governments and generates a desire for

better employment opportunities and economic prospects.

§ Dramatic food price increases compel populations to question the effectiveness of their

governments to meet the basic needs of the people.

§ High social media usage lowers costs to social action, collectivises populations, eases

pressures in criticising regimes and amplifies pre-existing issues in society.

§ In conjunction with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, DfID

should tie aid and development assistance to government accountability in developing

countries.

§ To combat the effects of high food prices on populations, DfID should deepen cooperation

with international and regional partners in efforts to relieve economic burdens on populations

through programmes which increase the supply of food to developing countries.

Abdelrahman, M. (2011). ‘The Transnational and the Local: Egyptian Activists and the Transnational Protest Networks’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 38, no 3, pp. 407-424.

Brym, R., Godbout, M., Hoffbauer, A., Menard, G., Zhang, T. (2014). ‘Social media in the 2011 Egyptian uprising’, The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 65, no 2, pp. 266-292.

Goldstone, J. (2011). ‘Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no 3, pp. 8-16.

Howard, P., Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W., Mazaid, M. (2011) Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring? [case study] Seattle: Project on Information Technology & Political Islam.

Lagi, M., Bertrand, K., Bar-Yam, Y. (2011) The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East. [case study] Cambridge: New England Complex Systems Institute.

OECD (2012) Youth Employment: Five Challenges for North Africa. [online] Tunis: OECD. Available from http://www.oecd.org/dev/emea/Background%20Paper.pdf.

Office of the Chief Economist for the World Bank. (2014) ‘Predictions, Perceptions and Economic Reality: Challenges of seven Middle East and North Africa countries described in 14 charts. MENA Quarterly Economic Brief, 3 1-13.

UK Department of International Development (2015) 2010 to 2015 government policy: peace and stability in the Middle East and North Africa. [online] London: DFID. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-peace-and-stability-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/2010-to-2015-government-policy-peace-and-stability-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa#appendix-4-civil-societygovernment-workshops-and-the-forum-for-the-future.

USAid. (2011) Executive Brief: Food Price Trends in Middle East and North Africa. Famine Early Warning Systems Network.

Welton, G. (2011) The Impact of Russia’s 2010 Grain Export Ban. [online] Oxford: Oxfam. Available from https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-impact-russias-grain-export-ban-280611-en.pdf.