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OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations

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OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS The Art and Science of Sustaining

Military Operations

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS The Art and Science of Sustaining

Military Operations

by

Moshe Kress Center for Military Ana/yses,Israel

SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, LLC

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS The Art and Science of Sustaining

Military Operations

by

Moshe Kress Center for Military Ana/yses,Israel

SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, LLC

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kress, Moshe. Operationallogistics : the art and science of sustaining military operations /

by Moshe Kress p. cm.

lncludes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4613-5387-4 ISBN 978-1-4615-1085-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-1085-7 1. Logistics. I. Title.

Ul68 .K74 2002 355.4'II--dc21 2002069403

Copyright © 2002 by Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2002 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2002 All rights reserved. No part ofthis work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilm ing, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose ofbeing entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Permission for books published in Europe: [email protected] Permissions for books published in the United States of America: [email protected]

Printed an acid-free pa per.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kress, Moshe. Operationallogistics : the art and science of sustaining military operations /

by Moshe Kress p. cm.

lncludes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4613-5387-4 ISBN 978-1-4615-1085-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-1085-7 1. Logistics. I. Title.

Ul68 .K74 2002 355.4'II--dc21 2002069403

Copyright © 2002 by Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2002 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2002 All rights reserved. No part ofthis work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilm ing, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose ofbeing entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Permission for books published in Europe: [email protected] Permissions for books published in the United States of America: [email protected]

Printed an acid-free pa per.

Contents

Preface

1. Introduction 1 1.1 The Essence of Logistics 2 1.2 What is Logistics? 3 1.3 War as a Production System 4 1.4 Logistics - A Definition 7 1.5 Art or Science? 8 1.6 The Three Logistics Options 10 1.7 Summary 15

2. Structure, Terminology and Analytic Tools 17 2.1 The Three Levels of Logistics 17 2.2 Strategic Logistics 19 2.3 Tactical Logistics 26 2.4 Basic Operational Logistics Terms 28 2.5 Models and Analytic Tools 31 2.6 Summary 35

3. The Foundation of Operational Logistics 37 3.1 The Operational Level 37 3.2 Defining Operational Logistics 39 3.3 Characterization and General Features 41 3.4 Operational Logistics and Operational Art 43 3.5 The Content of OpLog 47 3.6 The Principles of OpLog 57 3.7 Summary 70

4. The Planning Process 73 4.1 The Nature of OpLog Planning 74 4.2 Planning at the Strategic and Tactical Levels 76 4.3 Logistic Responsiveness in Operations 83 4.4 Planning Logistics in an Operation 89 4.5 Summary 99

VI Contents

5. Logistic Information 101 5.1 The Information Needed by the Operational Logistician 102 5.2 The Structure of the Logistic Information Network 105 5 J The Flow in the Logistic Information Network 111 5.4 Standard vs. Ad-Hoc Information 117 5.5 Total vs. Efficient Information 119 5.6 Data, Information and Decision-Making 122 5.7 Summary 123

6. Forecasting Logistic Demands 125 6.1 Forecasting Demand at the Three Levels of Logistics 126 6.2 Forecasts as Input to Logistics Planning 127 6J The Factors that Affect Uncertainty 137 6.4 A Framework for Logistics Forecasting System 139 6.5 Summary 147

7. The Visual Network Model 149 7.1 Network Models 150 7.2 The Logistics Network Model 153 7J The Visual Network (VN) Model 158 7.4 Structural and Operational Properties 162 7.5 Summary 165

8. Flexibility in Operational Logistics 167 8.1 The Facets of Flexibility 168 8.2 Flexibility in Military Operations 169 8.3 The Need for Flexibility in Logistics 170 8.4 Defining Logistics Flexibility 171 8.5 Summary 187

9. Two Critical Processes in Operational Logistics 189 9.1 Force Accumulation 190 9.2 Medical Treatment and Evacuation 206 9J Summary 214

10. Optimizing the Logistics Network 217 10.1 The Decision Problems 218 10.2 Logistics Inter-Temporal Network Optimization Model 219 10J The Optimization Problem 226 10.4 The Linear Programming Model 230 10.5 Summary 242

Index 245

Preface

The term management is seldom used in the context of military operations, yet several aspects of modem warfare lend themselves to common management disciplines. Information management is needed to control, filter, process and route the flow of data and information in the battlefield. The role of manpower management becomes more important as more specialized personal qualifications and training are needed to operate and maintain advanced weapon systems. Movement management is applied throughout a campaign to accumulate the force in the theatre of operations and to deploy it in the various zones of the theater. The term management is used occasionally even in combat operations with regard tofire control. As more advanced, effective and expensive weapon systems enter the battlefield, efficiency must be considered, along with the more traditional effectiveness objective. Attaining efficiency depends on good management.

However, the broadest, the most complex and probably the oldest of all the managerial aspects of warfare is logistics - the management of combat resources and combat means. This book is about the management of warfare logistics - planning, implementing and controlling processes that sustain military operations.

Before we proceed to describe the scope of the book and define its thrust, let us first review some quotes concerning logistics.

Few Quotes on Logistics ...

About two hundred and fifty years ago Benjamin Franklin composed the following lines, which have become since a motto for logisticians:

viii Preface

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost-

For want of a shoe, the horse was lost -

For want of a horse, the rider was lost-

For want of a rider, the battle was lost.

This well known, albeit naive, maxim expresses allegorically a chain of events that is so common in combat situations. A seemingly marginal and local "maintenance" fault initiates a series of events that leads to the ultimate military failure - defeat.

As a response to the plans and instructions of General George Marshall, the US Chief of staff during WWII, Admiral Ernest J. King - Chief of Naval Operations at that time - was quoted to say:

I don't know what the hell this "logistics" is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.

Even the light "virtual wink" that may have probably accompanied this statement does not blunt the lack of logistic understanding that is embedded in it. The message that is implied from this statement, which is so prevalent to commanders throughout history, is: "Don't bother me with this thing that is called logistics, simply make sure that we have all we need ... "

In November 1984 the Washington Post published an article about the US National War College. In that article there was also a reference to the Industrial College ofthe US Armed Forces. The following is an excerpt from that article.

The [National War] College is supposed to teach strategy to The thinkers ' ... and the Industrial College is supposed to teach logistics to the nuts-and-bolts types.

This citation implies two superficial and misguided beliefs: (a) strategy and logistics are two separate disciplines, and (b) logistics has nothing to do with thinking - it is just a collection oftechnical and dull skills.

Preface IX

Finally, it seems appropriate to cite General Julian Thompson who concluded, at the end of the preface to his book The Lifeblood ofWa/, that:

1 have no reason to believe that logistics will ever have much military sex-appeal, except to serious soldiers, but this book is written in the hope that 1 am wrong.

This book is written with the same kind of hope.

The Perception

The historical experience in warfare since the military expeditions of Alexander The Great to the Gulf War teaches us that logistics is an important and inseparable part of warfare. Logistics facilitates movement, fire and sustaining of the impetus and vitality of combat forces along time and space. In-spite this evident "truth", some of the quotations above indicate that logistics has been treated as a second rate subject compared to "pure" tactics and strategy. It is probably the lack of glamour and, as Thompson describes it, the lack of sex-appeal that is associated with slow moving convoys of trucks - as compared to charging tank columns - that led to this perception.

Also the misled notion that logistics is low-risk (close to 500 supply personnel and close to 700 maintenance personnel were killed during Israel wars) affected this perception. Commanders tended to concentrate on maneuvers and fire, while the logisticians were supposed to worry about moving supplies, maintaining the equipment, and evacuating the injured. The logisticians were expected not to bother their chiefs with mundane problems such as stalled convoys, overflowing maintenance areas, blown-up ammunition dumps and the like.

However, from talking to commanders and military scholars in Israel and the US, it seems that this perception is changing. The claims and statements regarding the central role of logistics in the making of war do not need any more proof or justification. Exploring the causes for this perceptual leap is beyond the scope of this book; it may deserve an analysis of its own. We only point out here that technological changes in the battlefield and lessons learned from wars in the past fifty years - lessons that only relatively recently have been studied and analyzed in depth3,4,5,6,7,8 - are probably the main reasons for that change.

This change of perception, and the enhanced interest in logistics that this change may generate, are the main motivation for this book

x Preface

The Literature

There are essentially three categories of books and monographs on Military Logistics. The first category comprises historical accounts of wars and military operations, as viewed from the logistics angle. One of the first books in this category, and probably the most cited one, is that by Van Creveld9• These class of history monographs provide detailed descriptions of logistics processes and events in past wars, along with some analyses of these phenomena.

The second category of logistics literature includes doctrinal publications and manuals - published mostly by military organizations. The US Field Manuals are typical examples of this category. These publications include doctrinal principles, rules and instructions that are designated mainly for commanders and logistics practitioners.

The third category of logistics publications includes theoretical essays that attempt to probe into the intricate structure and essence of logistics. These monographs attempt to reveal intrinsic properties, processes and general rules that govern logistics. Such essays have appeared in few books and in journals such as Military Review, Parameters and Army Logistician. An important monograph on the theoretical foundation of logistics is that of Admiral Eccles,1O which first appeared in 1959. The link between strategy and logistics is discussed by Brownll in an essay from 1987. A more recent book is that by Foxton12 (1993). This book is an excellent review of the components, structure and general doctrinal aspects of contemporary logistics. Another recent book of this type is by Sarin13 (2000).

The Objectives

As implied from its title, this book belongs to the third category of logistics texts and its goal is to explore the theoretical foundations of operational logistics. This effort has two dimensions. The first dimension applies to the "artistic" or qualitative aspects of contemporary logistic issues within the context of the operational level of war. These aspects include principles, imperatives and tenets, which are stated and analyzed. The second dimension - the "scientific" one - comprises a formal representation, by a network model, of operational logistics.

To the best of my knowledge, this book is a first attempt to bridge the gap between the artistic and scientific aspects of military operational logistics. Specifically, the main thrust of the book is to study - both qualitatively and quantitatively - the interactions between the logistics system in the theater of operations and the principles of operational level of war.

Preface Xl

The book is intended for logisticians, commanders and military scholars. Operations-research analysts, who are interested in large-scale logistics systems, may also find interest in the models that are presented in the last four chapters. Except for Chapter 10, and parts of chapters 8 and 9, no quantitative background is needed.

Book Overview

The book has ten chapters.

Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to Logistics. The term logistics is discussed in its military context and a new general definition is proposed by drawing an analogy between warfare and general production systems. The chapter concludes with a short historical review of the three options for implementing logistics - Obtain in the battlefield, Carry with the troops, Ship from the rear - and a discussion regarding their impact on modern warfare.

Chapter 2 discusses the general structure and characteristics of logistics and describes its three levels - strategic, operational and tactical. Basic terminology, which is used extensively in subsequent chapters, is defined. Quantitative tools and models that are utilized for analyzing and planning logistics are reviewed.

While Chapters I and 2 give a general introduction to logistics Chapter 3 focuses on the main theme of this book - Operational Logistics (OpLog). A brief introduction to the operational level of war is followed by a discussion on the cognitive, functional and practical aspects of OpLog. Next, the main functional areas of OpLog are discussed. A large section ofthis chapter is devoted to describe the principles of OpLog. It is shown that the set of principles can be viewed as a union of two sets of properties - cognitive properties and operational and structural properties.

Chapter 4 deals with the logistics planning process. Following a brief discussion on planning at the strategic and tactical level, the main body of the chapter is concentrated on the logistics planning process at the operational level. First, the term responsiveness is defined and described by two visual models. Then, the two cycles of the logistics planning process at that level - the macro-logistics cycle and the micro-logistics cycle - are described and demonstrated.

xu Preface

Chapter 5 addresses the issue of logistic information. First, the information needed by the operational logistician during an operation is described. Second, the logistic information network is defined and the special structure and features of the information flow are described. Third, the various types of logistic information are identified and analyzed.

Chapter 6 deals with forecasting logistics needs. Battlefield uncertainties, and their impact on estimating attrition and consumption are discussed. An outline of a framework for a logistics forecast system is presented.

Chapter 7 introduces the first version of the logistics network model. The second version is presented in Chapter 10. This model is a descriptive­visual tool that represents the logistics deployment in the theater of operations. In particular, it displays the operational-structural properties that were defined in Chapter 3. This model- called Visual Network (VN) model - may be a useful planning aid in the macro-logistics planning phase of the logistics planning process.

Chapter 8 addresses one of the most important operational-structural properties of an OpLog system - Flexibility. In this chapter the basic definition and brief qualitative discussion that were given in Chapter 3 are elaborated further. Quantitative metrics for measuring the two types of flexibility - intrinsic and structural- are described.

Chapter 9 discusses two major (and dual) issues in OpLog practice: Force accumulation (also called sometimes mobilization) and medical evacuation. Both processes are complex and rely on efficient management of time. Some optimization issues that relate to these processes are discussed.

Chapter 10 presents an inter-temporal optimization model that is based on the logistics network model that was introduced in Chapter 7. The network optimization model is designated to optimize the deployment of the OpLog system in the theater of operations, and the employment of the corresponding logistics support chain.

Preface Xlll

I us GAO, Welcome to the Logistics and Communication Division, Washington DC, GPO, 1974

2 Thompson, J., The Lifeblood of War - Logistics in Armed Conflict, Brassey's (UK), 1991.

3 Ohl, J. K., Supplying the Troops - General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII, Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb Ill, 1994.

4 Lynn, 1. A., Feeding Mars - Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, Westview Press, 1993.

5 Pagonis, W. G., Moving Mountains - Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, Harvard Business School Press, Boston Mass. 1992.

6 Stucker, J. P., and I. M. Kameny, Army Experiences with Deployment Planning in Operation Desert Shield, RAND, Arroyo Center, 1993.

7 Shrader, C. R., Communist Logistics in the Korean War, Greenwood Press, Westport CN, 1995.

8 Wandall, R. S., US Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944, Greenwood Publication Group, 1994.

9 Van Creveld, M., Supplying War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1977.

10 Eccles, H. E., Logistics in the National Defense, Greenwood Press, Westport CN, 1981.

II Brown, K. N., Strategies, The Logistics-Strategy Link, A National Security Essay, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1987.

12 Foxton, P. D., Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics, Brassey's (UK), 1993.

\3 Sarin, P., Military Logistics - The Third Dimension, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2000.

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge all those who helped me with this book.

The idea to write this book was conceived, and initial drafts of some chapters where written, during my sabbatical at the University of Rhode Island in 1997. I would like to thank Winston Knight and Manbir Sodhi, at the Industrial Engineering Department of URI, for their kind support. Several reviewers reviewed parts of the book and provided me with valuable comments. I am indebted to David Schrady (Naval Postgraduate School), Stephen Baker (Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australia), Boaz Golany and Yale Herer (Technion, Israel Institute of Technology) and to my friends and colleagues at CEMA: Noami Abigadol, Ruvi Kaplan, Amos Kovacs, Uri Naot, Uri Reychav, Shimrit Stem and Irit Talmor. Special thanks to my dearest friend and partner, my wife Nurit, for her critical eye in checking the sense (and the English) in some of the early chapters. Thanks also to my editors at Kluwer Academic Publishers, Gary Folven and Carolyn Ford, for facilitating the publication of this book.

Finally, it should be pointed out that unless specifically identified as a source, all the models, statements and opinions are my own and therefore my sale responsibility.