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The Bipolarity of a Unipolar World: Why Secondary Powers will Stand By America

Quddus Z. Snyder, Ph.D. Research Scholar, CIDCM, University of Maryland

Abstract: Scholars and policymakers have begun to debate the implications of Americas eroding relative power position. The conventional wisdom suggests that as the US declines and is unwilling or unable to perform hegemonic functions then systemic instability will follow as security competition intensifies. The nature of a post-hegemonic international order depends on how secondary powers will respond to a weakened US. The conventional wisdom suggests that they are likely to turn on a declining US and oppose and weaken her. This perspective ignores the extent to which secondary powers have come to depend on the US. This article makes the case that secondary powers will increasingly turn to a declining US. They will be more willing to accommodate and cooperate. And can be expected to assume a more significant role in managing world order.

Introduction

The world has been bipolar for some time. Not in the structural sense, but the psychological.

During the Cold War the US dominated and managed a hegemonic order whose cohesion rested

on deep forms of cooperation and the Soviet threat. The post-Cold War era has seen the United

States occupy an unrivalled power position not seen since Rome at its zenith. In this world,

secondary powers both love and love to hate America. Responses to US power have been

consistently erratic: accommodation and cooperation here, opposition and resistance there. Just

as secondary powers were acclimating to life in a unipolar world, they now confront the reality

of a weaker US. How will secondary powers respond to Americas eroding power position?

The bipolar structure expired along with the Soviet Union. When approached from the

dominant theoretical lens of the time, it was understood that concentrations of power would

induce balancing behavior that would soon restore equilibrium.1 Many believed that American

1 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1994); Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993)

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primacy could not last long.2 As the 1990s wore on, it increasingly appeared as if unipolarity was

here to staythe unipolar moment became the hegemonic age. A number of important

studies sought to explore the dynamics of this unprecedented distribution of power and account

for the absence of balancing behavior and Great Power security competition.3 While many

variables were emphasized, the literature seemed to coalesce around the view that a unipolar

system is remarkably peaceful and durable.4

Though secondary powers were not hard balancing against the US, a number of observers

believed that non-military tools were being used to soft balance.5 In an era of American primacy,

secondary powers could not hope to challenge the US militarily, but they might use institutional

and economic means to frustrate and constrain unilateral US foreign policy. In large part, these

arguments were developed to explain widespread opposition to the 2003 Iraq war. But after

2 Douglas Lemke, Continuity in History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold War, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 203-236; Charles A. Kupchan, After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79; Michael Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997) 3 G. John Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Post-war Order, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 43-78; William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999); Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Josef Joffe, Uberpower: The Imperial Temptation of America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007); G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences, World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009); 4 For an important challenge to this conventional wisdom see, Nuno P. Monteiro, Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9-40 5 Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006); T.V. Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005); Robert Pape, Soft Balancing against the United States International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005); Kai He, Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power in Southeast Asia, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2008); Judith Kelley, Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq International Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2005); For critiques of this literature see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005); Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander, Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is Not Pushing Back International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005); Quddus Z. Snyder, Diluted to Death: Balancing, Soft Balancing, and Concept Stretch Unpublished manuscript

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Saddam was toppled and the US got bogged down in what increasingly seemed like a quagmire,

relations between the US and secondary powers appeared to be returning to a state of relative

normalcy. Faced with the 2008 financial tsunami that soon swept across the globe, the Iraq rift

became water under the bridge.

Even before the Great Recession hit, the debate was already shifting. American

preeminence was being challenged by the rising powers and the irresistible shift of global power

to the East.6 All eyes were on China whose breathtaking economic rise had catapulted the nation

into the ranks of the Great Powers, now poised to rival the US.7 The economic downturn seemed

to alter geopolitical assessments in a dramatic way. While China appeared to be forging ahead,

the United States seemed to be in decline.8 Foreign policy analysis has by and large mirrored the

prevailing public mood of doom and gloom.9 Scholars have begun to consider what a post-

hegemonic world might look like.10

6 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 2008); Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008) 7 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011) 8 Roger C. Altman, Globalization in Retreat, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Jul/Aug 2009); Charles A. Kupchan, The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance, The Atlantic (March 20, 2012); Leslie H. Gelb, Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 3 (May/Jun 2009); Paul Kennedy, American Power is on the Wane, The Wall Street Journal (January 14, 2009); Christopher Layne, the Waning of U.S. HegemonyMyth or Reality? A Review Essay, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1(Summer 2009), pp. 147-72; Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 2009); Robert A. Pape, Empire Falls, The National Interest (Jan/Feb 2009); Christopher Layne, This Time Its Real: the End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012) 9 For more optimistic views on the future of US power see Michael Beckley, Chinas Century? Why Americas Edge Will Endure, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41-78; Robert Kagan, Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline, The New Republic (January 17, 2012); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012); Josef Joffe, The Default Power, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2009), pp. 21-35 10 Charles A. Kupchan, No Ones World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, After Unipolarity: Chinas Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 41-72

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In large measure, the nature of such a world will depend upon whether China continues

its ascent and how it uses its newfound power capability. But perhaps more importantly, it will

depend on how other secondary powers such as France, Germany, Britain, Japan, Turkey, India,

and Russia respond. At various points, each of these countries has pushed back at Americas

unbound exercise of powereven if this has not risen to the level of hard balancing. Given past

behaviors and policy statements, there is reason to believe that secondary powers will welcome a

leveling of global power and influence. Secondary powers may seize the opportunity to assert

their autonomy vis--vis the US. A competitive struggle for power and status may ensue.

This is the theoretical expectation of unipolar stability theory. In a unipolar system,

stability has been maintained by the preponderance of American power. In effect, the propensity

to balance has been muted. Under US hegemony, secondary powers have been generally

dissatisfied. Other than mild resistance and non-cooperation on the margins, they have been

unable to tame US power. As the US declines and ceases to perform hegemonic functions, the

game changes. Security competition can be expected to follow as secondary powers struggle to

take advantage of a weakened hegemon and improve their relative power position. After a brief

interlude, the world may again be headed back to the future.11

This pessimistic scenario assumes that all or even some secondary powers will be eager

to seize the opportunity and assert their autonomy vis--vis a declining US. But what if

secondary powers do not abhor dependency as much as the conventional wisdom suggests? What

if their dissatisfaction is only superficial? What if unipolarity is not simply a structural

constraint, but Americas role is a valued good that is worth preserving?

11 John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the cold War, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56

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Instead of seizing the opportunity to oppose and weaken, secondary states are likely to

make significant concessions in order to accommodate a declining US. Stability is premised on a

bargain in which a powerful US provides goods in exchange for secondary state consent and

cooperation. Over time, secondary states have come to depend upon the many functions the US

performs. Though all resent unrestrained power, and none is likely to admit it, secondary powers

have grown comfortable as dependents. Where a declining US is unable or unwilling to carry the

load, secondary states will be forced to do more. Secondary powers will increasingly fear US

disengagement. They will try to move closer to the US. From their perspective, having the US in

a lesser capacity is better than not having the US at all. Paradoxically, even as American power

wanes, secondary states may become more inclined to accommodate and cooperate. This is the

bipolarity of a (decreasingly?) unipolar world: secondary states want, but really do not want

autonomy and a leveling of power.

This paper unfolds as follows: the first section reviews earlier theories about hegemonic

stability and more recent contributions to unipolar structural theory. The basic expectation

emerging from this conventional wisdom is that as Americas relative power position erodes and

the US is unable or unwilling to perform hegemonic functions, systemic instability will ensue as

secondary powers turn on the US. The second section offers an alternative theoretical

interpretation, emphasizing the role that secondary power dependency is likely to play. Contrary

to the conventional wisdom, secondary states are likely to accommodate the US and take a

leading role where their vital national interests are at stake. The third section draws out important

empirical implications of the theory and suggests that recent developments confirm the expected

trend. I will conclude by drawing out the arguments implications for international relations

theory.

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The Perils of American Decline

Unipolar stability theory is an extension of earlier theories about hegemonic stability. These

theories sought to explain how liberal trading orders were created and maintained by a powerful

hegemonGreat Britain in the 19th century and the US in the 20th.12 Deeper forms of

cooperation become possible because a hegemon performs a number of important functions.

First, a hegemon induces cooperation by secondary powers by making them offers that

are hard to refuse. After World War II the US provided aid in the form of the Marshall Plan in

order to help rebuild the war torn allies. From 1947 to 1951 the US spent roughly $12.5 billion

on European reconstruction. The US also permitted trade on an asymmetric and discriminatory

basis, encouraging the allies to cooperate in forming a customs union that would disadvantage

America. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of

benefits in the area of international political economy: First, it created and managed an

international monetary system that facilitated trade and payments, provided a large market for

goods, and secured access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.13 Finally, the US provided for

security through the occupation of Germany, the stationing of troops in Europe, and NATOs

nuclear umbrella.

The hegemon does not eliminate anarchy but temporarily creates an environment in

which its effects are subdued. Secondary powers are tempted to take advantage of the goodies

offered by a hegemon. In the case of the war ravaged allies following World War II, they had

little choice. Their economies lay in ruins. They were threatened by an increasingly menacing 12 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade, World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. Chap. 3; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Chap. 3 13 After Hegemony, Chap. 8

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Soviet Union. They were stuck between a rock and soft place. Turning to the US for assistance

and protection was the obvious choice.

A hegemon encourages cooperation by solving collective action and enforcement

problems that plague cooperation under anarchy.14 Hegemony also changes the relative gains

logic. Because the hegemon feels invincible it is less concerned about relative loss; only when

second tier powers appear to be overtaking it does it grow nervous. For their part, secondary

powers go along because they are gaining at the expense of the hegemon, and its game is likely

to be the only one in town. Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually

does things, or provides benefits. It is not simply concentrated power. It is concentrated power

that is put to use.

Sadly, all good things must come to an end. The hegemon faces a dilemma because

second tier powers will eventually catch up.15 Increasingly, the hegemon finds itself in a fiscal

bind:

This three way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequences can be severe internal tensions and class conflictIf the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline.16

Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable.

The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs, losses in relative

14 For useful analysis on the difficulties and solutions to cooperation under anarchy see Kenneth A. Oye, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) 15 Arthur A. Stein, The hegemons dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and international economic order, International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 355-386 16 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 167

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power, and inevitable overextension. Challengers will rise. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in

war, and thereafter begins anew: The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of

another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline.17 Virtually no realist believes that

hegemony can persist indefinitely though disagreement exists over how long it can last.

In the 1970s and 80s it indeed appeared that the US led economic order was crumbling

the symbolic event occurred when Nixon dismantled the gold standard in 1971. It was widely

believed that Japan was overtaking the US economically. The shrinking of the economic gap

between the US and its allies was partly a function of post-war recovery; it was also brought on

by the asymmetric nature of the Bretton Woods system. Of course, an energy crisis and a

stagnating US economy made matters worse. During the 1970s and early 80s protectionist

pressures were mounting at a time when US hegemonic leadership was not forthcoming. Many

thought the world trading system was on the verge of collapse.18 America was believed to be in

decline.19 Liberal scholars began to consider whether cooperation could in fact be sustained after

hegemony.20 Fears of American decline were short lived as the US economy recovered, the

Soviet Union imploded, and Japan stagnated. Americas unipolar moment was at hand.21

17 Ibid., p. 210 18 For a range of views on the debate that took place, much of which centered on the question of US hegemony and the future of economic cooperation, see, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony; Charles Kindleberger, Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy, International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981); Stephen Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade; Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985); Beth Yarborough and Robert Yarborough, Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade: after hegemony, what? International Organization Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987) 19 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 343-352 20 Keohane, After Hegemony; Duncan Snidal, The limits of hegemonic stability theory, International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 579-614 21 Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91), pp. 23-33

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Unipolar stability theory draws on earlier theories of hegemonic stability. The same logic

that causes the bipolar system to be more peaceful than the multipolar system applies with

greater effect in a unipolar system. A bipolar structure simplifies security competition because it

is reduced to a rivalry between two superpowers. In a unipolar structure, secondary power

conflict is further subdued because the unipole is the decisive player in any possible contest. The

unipole intervenes to create order and also maintains extensive alliance networks that further

reduce the likelihood of conflict.22

Unipolarity is also durable because the extreme concentration of power prevents the

system from returning to equilibrium through the mechanism of balancing. Because of

Americas edge, balancing is futile and made more difficult because the US is an offshore power.

Challengers would have to contend with the US but also a robust bandwagoning coalition. And

finally, it is likely that would-be challengers would prompt regional balancing behavior before

they could fully challenge Americas preeminence.23 Thus, the structure features built in

mechanisms that resist power transition.

Systemic stability can be maintained so long as two conditions remain. Power must

remain highly concentrated. And second, the US must continue to perform hegemonic functions.

Ifthe United States fails to translate its potential into the capabilities necessary to provide

order, then great power struggles for power and security will reappear sooner. This may result

in an earlier transition to bi- or multipolarity and a quicker reemergence of conflict over the

leadership of the international system.24 Much like earlier hegemonic stability theorists,

22 Wohlforth, Stability, p. 23-28 23 Ibid., pp. 28-32 24 Ibid., p. 39

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unipolar stability theory predicts that decline or Americas failure to play an active role will

unleash the instability inherent in anarchy.

While there is disagreement over whether the US is in decline, and to what extent the

system has in fact transitioned toward bi- or multipolarity, there is little disagreement over what

the consequence of such a change would be. Realists expect trouble. As Layne predicts,

history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world figures to become a much more

turbulent place geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana.25

Underlying this perspective is the belief that secondary powers are generally dissatisfied

with the unipolar distribution of power. If leaders are taken at their word, one is easily led to

think that. From time to time China and Russia have expressed the view that The world is

moving toward multipolarization and that both deserve to be two important and independent

poles in a multipolar world.26 At a 1999 Munich conference, German Chancellor Schroeder

warned: That there is a danger of unilateralism, not by just anybody but by the United States, is

undeniable. At a NATO meeting that year, resentment was palpable. The United States of

America today predominates said French Foreign Minister Vedrine, moving on to explain

that The entire foreign policy of Franceis aimed at making the world of tomorrow composed

of several poles, not just one.27 During a November 2001 meeting between French President

Chirac and Chinas Vice-President Hu, each shared the view that a more multipolar world was

desirable, one which preserved the diversity of civilizations.28

25 This Time Its Real, p. 212 26 Ralph A. Cossa, A Mild Chinese-Russian Affair, New York Times (January 14, 1997) 27 Craig R. Whitney, NATO at 50: With Nations at Odds, Is it a Misalliance? New York Times (February 15, 1999) 28 Vice-President Hu Jintao Held Talks with French President Chirac, Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Kingdom of Norway (November 6, 2001)

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These views became more pronounced and forceful as the beating of the Iraq war drums

grew louder. In Feburary 2003, for example, President Putin proposed closer cooperation with

other European countries:

We believe here, in Russia, just as French President Jacques Chirac believes, that the future international security architecture must be based on a multipolar world. This is the main thing that unites us. I am absolutely confident that the world will be predictable and stable only if it is multipolar.29

Germanys Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer expressed strong resentment against US power

when he opined that the same rules must apply to the big, the medium-size, and the small

nations. But such an order is not possible so long as the national interest of the strongest

power is the definitive criterion for the use of that countrys military power.30

These official statements very much reflected the public image of the US around the

world. Between 1999/2000 and 2004, the number of people having a favorable view of the US

plummeted 40 percentage points in Germany, 25 percent in France, and starting from a much

lower baseline, a startling 22 percent in Turkey.31 Americas power and unilateral policies have

been the source of both acute resentment and grave concern almost across the board. While

Obama has presented a kinder face to the world, there are lingering suspicions of American

power. Transatlantic relations have improved somewhat, though it is not unreasonable to ask

whether the West is at an end.32

From the perspective of unipolar stability and balance of power theory, none of this is

particularly surprising. Secondary powers want greater autonomy. They fear unbalanced power. 29 Quoted in Pape, Soft balancing, p. 24 30 Der Spiegel, Spiegel Interview: America Had No Verdun, New York Times (March 24, 2003) 31 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted (Washingon, D.C.: Pew Research Center, June 2012) 32 Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008)

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They oppose the trampling of their interests by an unconcerned giant. They are affronted by the

arbitrary and capricious nature of US foreign policy. They resent the lesser prestige that their

lower rank affords them. Tension between the unipole and secondary powers is inevitable

because a hegemons interests expand along with its power.33 Hegemons play an active role. In

exerting its influence and intervening around the world, the US will trample on the interests of

secondary powers, violate their autonomy, and rouse fears.

To summarize: while the hegemon remains invincible, secondary powers are prevented

from asserting their autonomy and interests in any serious way. They mostly grumble. They

refuse to cooperate.34 They use institutions to frustrate the hegemons designs.35 In general, they

make it more difficult for the US to exercise power.36 As the hegemon declines, however, the

game is changed. Unimpeded by the structural constraints of unipolarity, secondary powers are

freer to seize the great power mantle and assert their autonomy. Soon, rivaling the US will be in

the realm of political reality. The Pax Americana will end.

All of this assumes that secondary powers in fact resent the US and abhor unipolarity as

much as statements suggest and the conventional wisdom predicts. It assumes that secondary

powers actually prefer an uncertain future to the known world of unipolarity, imperfect as it is. It

assumes that secondary powers will make a push for autonomy and not try to preserve the

attractive and comfortable features of their dependency. However, there is theoretical reason to

believe that secondary powers will in fact not jump ship. In a counter intuitive way, as the US

declines, they are likely to become more accommodating and more cooperative.

33 Robert Jervis, The Compulsive Empire, Foreign Policy, No. 137 (Jul/Aug 2003), pp. 83-87 34 Kelley, Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing 35 Paul, Soft Balancing 36 Pape, Soft Balancing, p. 40

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The Silver Lining in Americas Decline

States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence argues Waltz,

because considerations of security subordinate economic to political interest.37 Generally

this is true. But sometimes states are forced into dependent relationships as Japan and Germany

were occupied after World War II. Other times they are tempted by the benefits and comforts

that dependency promises, much as France and Britain were drawn into an attractive hegemonic

order. Americas allies are dependent. This relationship of dependency has been over sixty years

in the making. Secondary states have grown comfortable, perhaps even spoiled.

Secondary states such as France, Britain, Germany, and Japan are not worried about

survival. While the US occupied Germany and Japan following World War II, it has shown no

interest in or inclination to violate their territorial sovereignty since returning them to semi-

sovereign status. As a hegemon, the US is unlike the expansionist rising power it was in the 19th

century. The US is a stable democracy. From time to time the US interferes in the internal affairs

of other states, as is befitting of a hegemon. Meanwhile, secondary powers have found it difficult

to bind and restrain the US from behaving in arbitrary and capricious ways.38 Nonetheless, the

US has shown little interest in territorial expansion as such. In this way, the US is a kind of

Liberal Leviathan.39 Today, the notion that Americas allies view the US as a direct security

threat is far removed from reality.

Far from being a threat to their survival, the US has been the guarantor of it. The US has

maintained a vast network of alliances both with its European and Asian allies. This has enabled

37 Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 107 38 Quddus Z. Snyder, Unbound and Unbridled: Western Order and the Increasing Returns to Power 39 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins of Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011)

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these countries to spend a paltry amount of their Gross Domestic Product on national defense. As

the table below shows, compared to the US, the allies spend a small fraction on defense. With

additional defense cuts in the UK and Germany on the way, Europes dependence on American

firepower is a fact that shows no sign of receding. If weakness is a sign of intent, the fact that

Japan only spends 1 percent of GDP on defense speaks volumes. To dispel any remaining doubt,

Article 9 of Japans constitution renounces war as a sovereign right. Americas formidable

firepower has made all of this possible. It is a public good that secondary states enjoy. The US

has led, managed, and financed a kind of security community that has benefitted secondary

powers a great deal.40

Table. Military expenditure (% of GDP) by US allies and non-allies during the years 2007-2011

Country Military expenditure (% of GDP)

United States 4.7 Allies United Kingdom 2.6 France 2.2 Germany 1.3 Japan 1.0 Non-allies China 2.0 Russia 3.9 Source: World Bank available at: http://data.worldbank.org The US has provided a security umbrella and protected many countries through a robust

extended nuclear deterrent for decades. Second, the US has time and again intervened in ways

that have helped American allies. In 1991 the US led an intervention to foil Saddam Husseins

40 Robert Jervis, An Empire, But We Cant Keep It, in I. William Zartman, ed. Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 37-59

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plans to annex Kuwait. The US sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in

March 1996 in order to deter an escalation of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. In 1999 the US

led a NATO operation to end ethnic violence in Kosovo and terminate the rule of strongman

Slobodan Milosevic. In their own backyard, the capabilities gap and the weakness of the

Common Foreign and Security Policy were brought into sharp relief as Europes role in the

Kosovo operation was primarily one of peacekeeping.41 The division of labor seemed fairly

clear: the US was making the dinner while the Europeans were doing the dishes.42

And though France and Britain took the lead in the 2011 intervention in Libya, American

participation was a necessary condition for the campaigns overall success. Europes showing

was unimpressive to put it mildly. Germany and Poland refused to participate. Denmark and

Norway were overburdened. Italy withdrew its aircraft carrier to save resources. France was

forced to bring its only aircraft carrier home for overdue maintenance. A few months into the

conflict, the allies ran out of precision-guided missiles and were forced to purchase more from

the US. American initial airpower, aerial tankers, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities,

and cruise missiles were vital to the operations success.

In the aftermath of the Libya operation, concerns over Europes weakness have been

raised anew. In June, Defense Secretary Robert Gates charged that unless Europeans worked to

enhance their capabilities NATO would confront the very real possibility of collective military

irrelevance. At a Munich security conference, NATOs General Secretary Anders Fogh

Rasmussen gave a blunt assessment, warning that If Europe becomes unable to make an

appropriate contribution to global security, then the United States might look elsewhere for

41 David S. Yost, The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 97-128 42 Quoted in Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, Policy Review, (Jun/Jul 2002); See also, David Calleo, Rethinking Europes Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)

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reliable defense partners.43 The general consensus was that Frances gusto notwithstanding, the

US had led the mission from behind. In the end, while there was a relatively unified operation,

there was only one significant protector. When viewed from a distance, Americas military

power has been a great benefit to secondary powers and they know itmuch as a teenager who

constantly grumbles about his parents but truly values them in the end.

The worlds love hate relationship with the US is manifest in the realm of low politics as

well. Since the International Monetary Funds (IMF) creation in 1944, the US has contributed far

more to the Fund than any other country. Though Americas voting power has declined steadily

over time from an early peak of around 30 percent, it still remains very high. In 2010, the US

quotathe contribution that takes into account the relative size of the economywas over 17

percent. By comparison, Japan and Germany account for over 6 percent each.44 Predictably, the

US has dominated the institution.45 Predictably, secondary powers resent Americas arbitrary and

capricious influence over the IMFs lending choices. While Americas veto power over many

IMF decisions is a source of discontent, it is equally true that the US has shouldered a greater

share of the burden, a fact that secondary powers do not highlight but are likely to appreciate

nonetheless. Consider the financial crisis that swept across Asia in the late 1990s. As the crisis

spread, numerous countries including Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia lined up for multi-

billion dollar IMF bailouts. With funds running low, the IMF turned to the US for replenishment.

43 Steven Erlanger, Libyas Dark Lesson for NATO, New York Times (September 3, 2011); A Troubling Victory: The alliances performance in Libya confounded critics and raised awkward questions, The Economist (September 3, 2011) 44 IMF Members Quotas and Voting Power, available at: www.imf.org 45 Miles Kahler, The United States and the International Monetary Fund, in Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst, eds., The United States and Multilateral Institutions (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Strom Thacker, The High Politics of IMF Lending, World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Oct 1999)

17

After a heated debate, the US approved additional funds in March of 1998 by overwhelming

margins in both houses of Congress.

The United Nations, an institution with which the US has had a troubled relationship

throughout much of its history, relies heavily on Americas leadership and largesse as well.

Though the US has from time to time sidestepped the Security Councils blessingand the veto

wielding secondary powers thereinit remains vital to the functioning of the institution itself. It

is unclear what would happen if the US simply decided to abandon it. Article 26 charges the

Security Council with the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security.

To the extent that the Security Council has performed this function at all, it has depended on

American leadership and might. The UN has 193 member states. In 2011, US contributions

accounted for nearly a fourth of the UNs budget. The combined contribution of Germany,

France and the United Kingdom was less. Russia contributed a paltry 1.6 percent.46 Though

Americas unilateralism has been much decried, it is difficult to underestimate the centrality of

the US to the institutions functioning. Though loath to admit it, secondary powers know this.

The dollar and gold convertibility were the foundation of the post-war Bretton Woods

system. Since the 1971 Nixon Shockwhen the US unilaterally dismantled convertibility

the dollar has remained the most important reserve currency. From time to time secondary

powers including France, Russia, and China have floated various schemes for establishing a new

reserve currency to replace the dollar.47 In 2009 China made a splash when it proposed that a

new reserve currency should be created. In the meantime it was suggested that the IMFs Special

46 Assessment of Member States contributions to the United Nations regular budget for the year 2011. Available at: http://www.un.org/zh/members/contribution_2011.pdf 47 Mathew Saltmarsh, Despite Lots of Talk, Dollar Still Reigns, New York Times (October 11, 2011)

18

Drawing Rightswhich consists of a basket of leading currenciesmight be expanded.48 All of

the talk notwithstanding, the dollar continues to reign supreme. The Euro is weak. The RMB is

still pegged to the dollar and the Chinese banking system is vulnerable to boot, though this is

changing. For the foreseeable future, the dollar is still the safest bet.49 Crude oil transactions are

still settled in dollars. China continues to buy US Treasuries and shows no sign of diversifying

its dollar denominated assets in a significant way. For all of the bellyaching, secondary powers

have been slow to take concrete action, an indication that theyre acting according to a realistic

assessment of the situation.

Whether or not the US is actually in decline, or whether secondary powers are rising

faster, or both, are questions beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, in the coming decades

it is quite likely that Americas relative power position will continue to erode. This is the bad

news. The good news is that secondary powers are in fact not chomping at the bit to assert their

autonomy. They are not eager to oppose and weaken a declining US. When stuck in a dependent

relationship, the weaker party sees everything as unfair. But dependency is also safer. It is easier

and more comfortable. It is also familiar. Much like the character Brooks Hatlen in the

Shawshank Redemptiona lifelong prisoner who finally has an opportunity to taste freedom

secondary states are not eager to exit this asymmetric relationship of dependency. For them,

having the US in a lesser capacity, or in any capacity really, is far better than not having the US

around at all.

How is this hegemonic relationship to be understood from a theoretical point of view? It

is perhaps but a small stretch to suggest that it is similar to Hobbes social contract in which

48 David Barboza, China Urges New Money Reserve to Replace Dollar, New York Times (March 23, 2009) 49 Barry Eichengreen, The Dollar Dilemma: The Worlds Top Currency Faces Competition, Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 2009)

19

individuals who are free, equal, and sovereign over themselves, agree to give up their freedom in

order to escape a life that is nasty, brutish, and short. The price paid is dependence and the

inconvenience of being subjected to the arbitrary and capricious whims of a Leviathan. Security

and order are the benefits reaped. Though the US is not a world state, and secondary powers are

sovereign and act with a great deal of autonomy, in many respects the unwritten post-World War

II contract resembles this in key respects.

This is an agreement between a hegemon and secondary powers. In it, the US agrees to

guarantee order and provide numerous benefits. In return, secondary powers agree to go along

and live within this hegemonic commonwealth. The US trades benefits for consent. Secondary

powers trade consent for benefits. The relationship holds so long as the hegemon is willing and

able to deliver benefits, and secondary powers are willing and able to give their consent. The

contract is renewed through ongoing transactions and relations. As David Lake explains, in such

a hierarchical relationship each side benefits:

The subordinates benefit from order and the greater prosperity it generates, but give up some measure of autonomy and accept commands to act in ways they otherwise would not choose. The ruler must gain sufficiently to offset the costs of providing order. The ruled must find that political order provides greater net benefits than their next best alternative50

So long as the hegemon is satisfied with the arrangement, it persists. So long as secondary states

do not have better options, it persists.

Indeed, this hierarchy has been remarkably stable and enduring. With a few exceptions

such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, secondary powers have not revolted in a serious way. For its

part, the US has by and large kept its end of the bargain. At various times, secondary powers

have tried to assert their autonomy. In the early 1960s, a frustrated President Charles de Gaulle

50 Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 33

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explained to an aide: Western Europe has become, without even being aware of it, a

protectorate of the Americans. It is now necessary to free ourselves of this domination. But the

difficulty in this case is that the colonies are not really trying to emancipate themselves.51 Under

de Gaulle, France did stage a rebellion of sorts. In 1966 France withdrew from NATOs

integrated allied command, though it remained in the overarching alliance, in order to assert

greater autonomy on the world stage. For all intents and purposes though, France has remained

firmly in the US camp.

The stability inherent in the relationship is threatened when one party fails to live up to its

end of the bargain. If the US is in decline, it is likely to scale back its international commitments.

It will be less willing to underwrite the security of the many secondary powers that rely on it. A

declining US may be unable and unwilling to perform hegemonic functions to the extent that it

was before. It is here that secondary powers face a choice: do I stay or do I go?

Because of their flawed theoretical machinery, balance of power realists believe that

secondary powers will turn on a declining US and try to oppose and weaken it. But this logic

fails to account for the extent to which secondary powers do not fear the US, depend on it, and

value the underlying bargain. Unlike the Soviet Union, the US will not suddenly implode. If

there is a relative decline, it is likely to be slow. Though perhaps to a lesser extent, the US will

still remain engaged. It will not suddenly withdraw into pre-World War II style isolation.

Under these circumstances, secondary powers are likely to adopt a strategy of

accommodation. Robert Kelly describes this as a kind of bail in behavior where secondary

powers come to the aid of a struggling hegemon that they see as legitimate.52 The US will remain

51 Quoted in Ibid. p. 36 52 Strategic Self Restraint: A Third Step in the Liberal Hegemony Debate Unpublished manuscript

21

far stronger, at least militarily if not also economically, than most of the secondary powers for a

long time to come. While it might not be able to do as much as it used to, the US will still be able

to accomplish more than most. In effect, secondary powers are likely to reason that a weakened

hegemon is still much better than no hegemon.

The hegemonic bargain will not be abolished. It will be adjusted in two important ways.

Secondary powers will do more in areas where their vital interests are at stake. This can be seen

in the way France and Britain took the lead in the Libyan intervention. Or, in the way Turkey is

taking charge in responding to the Syria crisis. The US will play a very large supporting role. As

every NATO operation in the post-Cold War era has demonstrated, secondary powers must

ultimately increase their own power capability. This is not to balance the US, but to make up the

difference. Compensating for Americas lesser role, firstly, requires that secondary powers spend

more on defense. The necessity of doing so will become increasingly evident as various crises

threaten the interests of secondary powers and the US shows ever less enthusiasm for cleaning

up the mess alone.

Second, the difference can be made up through cooperation. Secondary powers are likely

to move ever closer to a declining US. Deeper forms of policy coordination and the combining of

capability can go a long way toward remedying individual power deficitsthe animating idea

behind NATOs new concept of smart defense. Predicting NATOs demise is a perennial

realist pastime. As before, their predictions will be proven wrong again. Not only will NATO

persist, but as the US declines it will become more important. Interestingly, just as the American

decline debate was heating up, France rejoined NATOs allied command in 2009. President

Sarkozy explained that his countrys strategy cannot remain stuck in the past when the

22

conditions of our security have changed radically.53 Sarkozys critics grumbled that France was

cozying up to the US just as the world was moving out from underneath American domination.

New life will be breathed into Americas alliances in the Asia Pacific region as well, as seen for

example in the way Japan has recently been moving closer to the US.

The US will find that secondary powers are willing to accommodate and compromise in

ways that were perhaps unlikely under unipolarity. The main concern will not be the unilateral

exercise of American power. Rather, secondary powers will worry about Americas level of

commitment to them moving forward. America will no longer be able to stack the deck in some

of the ways it has before. But happily, the US will find that it holds a number of high cards in

negotiating the terms of cooperation with eager secondary powers because this time the US can

credibly threaten to stand by and watch.

All of this suggests that as the global field is leveled, secondary powers will not turn to

balancing, but rather, they will adopt a strategy of bonding. From time to time, weaker states

have bandwagoned with more powerful or threatening states, either to appease or gain from the

spoils of a hegemons aggression.54 In this case, the US will grow less powerful and less

threatening over time, suggesting altogether different motives. Bonding involves both policy

accommodation and efforts to move closer through deeper cooperative ties. The primary

concern of secondary powers will be to keep the US engaged. After World War II, the European

allies were mainly concerned about US abandonment. As Ikenberry explains, The evolution in

American policywas a story of American reluctance and European persistence.55 In an era of

53 Quoted in Edward Cody, After 43 Years, France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member, Washington Post (March 12, 2009) 54 Randall Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) 55 After Victory, p. 206

23

relative decline, American disengagement may again emerge as the principal problem facing

many of the worlds secondary powers. This fear will move them to work ever harder to secure

Americas commitment and support.

Why would secondary powers double down on the US as opposed to developing regional

order to provide security? Above, we noted how individual states are likely to enhance their own

capability. Why wouldnt they also develop deeper supranational security ties with one another?

The potential balance of power implications of European security cooperation have not been lost

on proponents of balancing theory.56 If a declining US is unable or unwilling to provide security

to the extent that it has in the past, is Europe likely to strengthen security ties and the European

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)? Indeed, analysts believe that deeper forms of security

cooperation are a good hedge against possible US disengagement later on.57 But what strategists

and federalists believe Europe should do and what Europe actually does are two very different

things.

To date, collective European security efforts have been a failure. Europe is divided; the

ESDP is weak. There is little reason to believe that Europe will suddenly get its act together as

Americas relative power position slowly erodes. Our confidence should be further reduced

given Europes divided and piecemeal approach to the ongoing debt crisis. Going forward, it will

be far easier for secondary powers to accommodate a declining US than to coordinate collective

action among 27 countries with diverse national interests. Many understand that the ESDP

cannot replace NATO. Geoffrey Van Orden, defense spokesman in the European Parliament,

56 Barry R. Posen, ESDP and the Structure of World Power, International Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (January-March 2004); Robert J. Art, Europe Hedges Its Security Bets, in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Walt, Taming American Power 57 Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002)

24

expressed this view arguing that the ESDP is a diversion, weakening wholehearted commitment

to the North Atlantic Alliance and that it is duplicative and divisive and produces no new

military capabilities.58 NATO will continue to be the primary guarantor of Europes security

and not the ESDP. Many Eurocrats want the ESDP to work. But NATO has something it does

not: the US.

With Chinas rise, things in Asia may play out differently. David Kang has argued that

historically speaking a Sino-centric hierarchy has been the natural order of things in the region.

According to Kang, Southeast and East Asian powers do not fear a Chinese hegemony but

welcome it. Smaller states in the region are likely to move away from the US and bandwagon

with China.59 The problem with this perspective is that it overlooks the political reality on the

ground. In Asia, every state of any consequence shares at least one thing in common: they all

hate each other more than they hate the United States. Regional powers are nervous about

Chinas rise and unsure of its intentions. Chinas assertive behavior in the East and South China

Seas has not helped. In recent years, many countries have been moving closer to the US as a

hedge against possible Chinese aggression.60

While most secondary powers are likely to move closer to a declining America, how will

China respond? Of all the systems secondary powers, China is perhaps least likely to pursue a

bonding strategy. To oppose Soviet power, China did turn decisively toward the US in the late

58 House of Commons Defence Committee, The future of NATO and European defense: Ninth Report of Session 2007-08 (London: House of Commons, The Stationary Office Limited, March 2008), p. 76 59 Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85; For other arguments on the distinctiveness of Asian systems see Erik Ringmar, Performing International Systems: Two-East Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order, International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 1-25; Robert E. Kelly, A Confucian Long Peace in pre-Western East Asia?, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 407-430 60 Evan S. Medeiros, Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 145-167; Renato Cruz de Castro, The US-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge against an Emerging China Challenge, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2009), pp. 399-423

25

1960s and early 1970s. Henry Kissinger described the Sino-US relationship during this period as

a kind of quasi alliance.61 Despite this important episode, Sino-US relations have been

consistently tense though broadly cooperative. China, however, never did come to depend on

Americas security role as much as many other secondary powers have. There is reason to

believe that as the US declines, China is likely to become more assertive and confrontational,

especially in its own backyard.62

If China continues to ascend, its interests will expand and its foreign policy in all

likelihood will grow more assertive. This is in some ways completely natural. But even China

may value American power more than Sino-US political friction and rivalry might lead us to

believe. First and foremost, Chinas rise was made possible by a globalized economic system

that the US, with the cooperation of her allies, built. Chinas grand strategy of integration was

motivated by the belief that the Peoples Republic (PRC) was both backward and falling behind

in the contest for relative power.63 Growth and modernization have been driven by investment

and exports. China is rising because the Communist Party (CCP) learned to play the Wests

capitalist game.64 Today, China is far more integrated economically than most of the worlds

liberal trading states. Between 2001 and 2008, exports and investment in tradable sectors

accounted for 60 percent of Chinas growth, compared to only 30 percent in the Euro zone.65

China holds trillions in dollar denominated assets. The US is Chinas top trading partner and

export destination, followed by Americas close ally Japan. In 2010, the volume of Sino-US 61 On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), Chap. 10 62 Friedberg, A Contest For Supremacy; John J. Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm: Chinas Challenge to US Power in Asia, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 381-96 63 Quddus Z. Snyder, Integrating Rising Powers: Liberal Systemic Theory and the Mechanism of Competition, Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 64 Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why Chinas Rise Doesnt Threaten the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 65 Kai Guo and Papa NDiaye, Is Chinas Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable, International Monetary Fund (August 2009)

26

trade was over $380 billion.66 Economically, the US and China are locked into a relatively stable

relationship of mutually assured destitution. Generally, Americas economic strength is good for

China, and economic decline may end up hurting the PRC.

In a somewhat counterintuitive way, China may also value US military power more than

policy statements suggest. Americas security presence in Asia has been a stabilizing force.

Though often complaining about encirclement, containment, and Americas Taiwan policy,

China is also a beneficiary of this overall stability. Because of this, Japan, Chinas historical

enemy, has not rearmed.67 Until perhaps quite recently, Chinas regional policy was designed to

reassure neighbors.68 Americas presence in the region has helped by discouraging smaller states

from forming a robust counterbalancing coalition against China. This has enabled China to focus

its energies on modernization and internal stability. For these reasons, weakening the US is not

self-evidently in Chinas interest.

Regardless of whether the future of Sino-US relations will be more cooperative or

oppositional, most states in the Asia Pacific will turn to the US and not China or each otheran

East Asian Community is simply not in the cards. Though a veritable alphabet soup of proto-

institutions and talk shops have been created, none of these can hope to stabilize a region

populated by mutually suspicious regimes of diverse typesthat many observers believe is ripe

for rivalry.69 Most regional players will still see a declining US as their best bet.

66 US-China Trade Statistics and Chinas World Trade Statistics, The US-China Business Council, available at: https://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html 67 For more on this see Thomas J. Christensen, China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80 68 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: Chinas Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 69 Aaron L. Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; For more optimistic views on the Asia-Pacific institutional milieu see Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08); G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Between

27

If the above theoretical reasoning is sound, Americas eroding power position may not be

nearly as destabilizing as the conventional wisdom suggests. The argument might even be

pushed a step further. The extent to which this type of secondary power bonding behavior might

succeed in arresting American decline is difficult to assess. One important implication is that the

US will not have to face an aggressive challenger or a balancing coalition. Strangely, as a weaker

and less assertive Great Power, the US may encounter a more friendly and accommodating

cohort of secondary powers. To the extent that the US can scale back some of its international

commitments and reduce its defense spending, this may free up resources that could be used to

pay down the national debt and revitalize the foundations of the domestic economy. Relative

decline may have a silver lining. Though the US may not be as powerful, it will face less

resistance. It might not be able to do was much as before. But then again, it may accomplish

almost as much with less.

Empirical Implications Thus far the discussion has been mostly theoretical. Some suggestive empirical evidence has

been offered to give the theoretical argument some meat and lend it some initial plausibility. If

the above argument is correct, what are the observable implications? There are three basic

expectations: First, Americas image around the world should improve markedly as secondary

powers try to secure continued US engagement. Secondary powers are likely to move closer to

Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 2002); Amitav Acharya, Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the ASEAN way to the Asia-Pacific way? Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319-346; Alastair Iain Johnston, Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory, in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003)

28

the US. And third, secondary powers will be forced to take the lead in areas where their

fundamental interests are at stake.

The first thing to note is that though a global leveling of power has been ongoing for

some time, talk of American decline is a more recent development. Indeed, it is still unclear

whether the US is declining at all.70 For these reasons, the empirical record can only yield very

tentative conclusions. However, things do appear to be trending in a direction supportive of the

theorys main expectations. The conventional wisdom suggests that if the US declines and/or

refuses to perform hegemonic functions, secondary powers will assert their autonomy and

instability will follow. As the underlying distribution of power changes, argues Wohlforth,

the probability increases that some states will conclude that internal or external

counterbalancing is possible.71 My theory predicts the opposite. Secondary powers will

increasingly gravitate toward the US. They will increasingly accommodate the US. They will try

to strengthen their security ties with the US as it is perceived to be declining.

Recently, Americas image in the non-Muslim world has improved markedly. As the

table below suggests, Americas image in Western Europe world is vastly better than it was

during the Iraq war in 2003.

70 Beckley, Chinas Century?; Kagan, Not Fade Away 71 Stability, p. 35

29

Source: Richard Wike, From Hyperpower to Declining Power: Changing Global Perceptions of the U.S. in the Post-Sept. 11 Era (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, September 2011)

America s image in Russia is also much better. In Japan, the percentage of people having a

favorable few of the US rose from 52 to 72 percent between 2008 and 2012.72

This improving image reflects both the more conciliatory Obama presidency but also a

lessening of public resentment and anxiety resulting from Americas eroded power position.

Increasingly, people see China as overtaking the US. Many already believe that the US has been

surpassed by China as the dominant economic power. In 2011, pluralities in Britain, France,

Germany, and Spain believed that China was the worlds number one economy. Back at home, a

whopping 45 percent of people picked China. Only 38 percent chose the US.73 Though the public

mood may not reflect underlying reality, it does help fashion a political reality of its own.

72 Continue Positive Views of U.S. in Obama Era, Pew Research Center (June 13, 2012) 73 Richard Wike, From Hyperpower to Declining Power: Changing Global Perceptions of the U.S. in the Post-Sept. 11 Era (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, September 2011)

30

Source: Wike, From Hyperpower to Declining Power As the above table illustrates, an 18 country survey shows that more people now believe that

China has or will eventually overtake the US. This is a dramatic change from 2009. At the height

of its unilateral posture, Americas image suffered because of concerns about unrestrained power

and its arbitrary use. But now the general worry is very different. In most countries, people

worry about Chinas military capability and do not want to it reach parity with the US.

Increasingly, foreigners are worried about American decline: the rise of China and the

uncertainty surrounding global economic leadership are creating new anxieties about a world

where, many believe, American power is weakening.74 This trend is reflected in Americas

relations with numerous secondary powers.

74 Wike, From Hyperpower to Declining Power

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President Obama took office at a time when US-Japan relations were at a real low point.

Disagreement over the relocation of the Futenma Air Base in Okinawa had soured relations for

years. Seismic shifts in Japans domestic politics were underway. After governing for 53 of the

previous 54 years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was ousted in August 2009 by the

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Yukio Hatoyama. In his election campaign, Hatoyama

had promised to end subservience to the US. The Partys 2007 Manifesto pledged to re-examine

the role of the US military in the security of the Asia-Pacific region and the significance of US

bases in Japan. Independence was needed, Hatoyama believed, arguing that If Japan just

follows what the US says, thenas a sovereign nation that is very pathetic.75

At the center of the Prime Ministers foreign policy was his vision of an East Asian

community. As observers immediately recognized, this represented a tilt away from the US and

toward China.76 According to this vision, a New Japan together with other East Asian

countries would lead the world through deeper forms of cooperation, including the creation of a

new currency. In Washington, these developments were viewed with increasing alarm. A senior

State Department official commented that the US had grown comfortable thinking of Japan as

a reliable ally in the region, adding that the hardest thing right now is not China, its Japan.77

For the pessimists, it increasingly seemed as if the time to say sayonara to the US-Japan

alliance was at hand.

Since this nadir in diplomatic affairs, relations have warmed considerably and Japan has

again placed the alliance at the center of its security strategy. In April 2012, President Obama

and his counterpart Primer Minister Noda of Japan announced a joint vision statement. At a press

75 Quoted in Simon Tisdall, Japan tries to loosen the US leash, The Guardian (August 11, 2009) 76 John de Boer, Hatoyamas Vision for a New Japan, JPRI Critique, Vol. 15, No. 4 (November 2009); 77 Quoted in John Pomfret and Blaine Harden, U.S. pressures Japan on military package, Washington Post (October 22, 2009)

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conference in which the Prime Minister described the alliance as unshakeable, the President

explained that we recognize that the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain the foundation of the

security and prosperity of our two nations but also a cornerstone of regional peace and security.

To accomplish our shared vision for the future, the President explained, we seek to further

enhance our bilateral security and defense cooperation.78 This new vision has yielded tangible

results. In June, an agreement was reached to delay the relocation of the controversial Okinawa

air base beyond the 2014 deadline. The alliance is a central focus of Americas recent pivot to

Asia. In September, the US and Japan agreed to install another missile defense radar in the

latters territory.

Even as Japan is moving closer to the US, it is beginning to rethink its own defense

strategy. Internally, Japan continues to debate the future of the Self-Defense Forces and whether

they should play a larger role in the region and internationally. Japans Coast Guard has already

become more active in the East China Sea. The US has used its Asia realignment to encourage

greater military integration and three-way cooperation between the US, Japan and Korea.

Though its impact was mostly symbolic, the new defense guidelines adopted in 2010 gave

expression to the view that Japan needed to become more proactive in providing for its own

defense.79 In general, Japan is beginning to rethink the absoluteness of the sacrosanct Article 9

and confront the psychological defense spending threshold of 1 percent of GDP. Chinas

increased assertiveness and the flaring of nationalist passions over disputed islands is certainly

helping to change the publics view.

78 Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Noda of Japan at Joint Press Conference, The White House Office of the Press Secretary (April 30, 2012) 79 Richard Rousseau, The New Japanese Defense Strategy: A New Role for Japan? Foreign Policy Journal (April 3, 2011)

33

A similar process of renewal and reexamination of burden sharing is taking place within

the transatlantic alliance. Even before the 2003 Iraq War, the US and Europe seemed to be

drifting apart.80 In the lead up to and during the war, NATO cohesion suffered a huge blow. The

alliance was divided and the US began to talk of an Old Europe and a New Europe. An

academic debate was sparked over the future of the transatlantic alliance.81 Since this low point,

transatlantic relations have improved dramatically. NATO has had a number of important

successes since Obama took office. Even as allies have moved closer to the US, they will be

forced to do more.

NATO is alive and well. In 2009, France rejoined the integrated allied command. At the

Lisbon summit in November 2010, NATO launched a plan to create a missile defense shield that

would cover all of Europe and the US. The missile shield involves the dispatch of four American

warships to Spain, a radar system in Turkey, and the location of missile interceptors in Poland

and Romania. The alliance also unveiled its new strategic concept that emphasized new

ballistic missile and cyber security threats. Worldwide, NATO has been active. In 2011, over

150,000 troops, under NATO command, were involved in six operations in three continents. The

seven month Libyan mission, involving air and naval power, was widely hailed as a success. In

order to play a more effective out of area role, NATO has pursued partnerships with countries in

many regions including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Finland and Sweden. At

the Chicago summit in May 2012, the alliance signed a $1.7 billion contract with Northrop

80 Stephen M. Walt, The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart, The National Interest, No. 54 (Spring 1998/99) 81 See for example, Anderson, et. al. The End of the West?; Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ronald D. Asmus, Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Affairs Vol. 82, No. 5 (Sept/Oct 2003), pp.

34

Grumman for five Global Hawk drones to boost the Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) system.82

At the summit, NATO also announced that its Interim Ballistic Missile Defense Capability was

operational.

Lopsided burden sharing is perhaps the single greatest challenge facing the alliance.

Consumed by fiscal woes, European countries have hacked away at military spending. Between

2011 and 2015, the UK and Germany are set to slash military spending by about 8 percent. Most

of the mid-sized European countries will make military cuts of around 10-15 percent.83 These

reductions come at a time when the US is also facing financial stress and appears ever less

willing to shoulder a disproportionate share of the defense burden. The US is shifting its focus to

Asia. Further troop reductions have brought the number of American forces based in Europe

down to about 30,000 from a Cold War high of over 250,000.

Smart defensedoing more with lesshas been Europe and NATOs proposed

response to austerity. This approach involves deeper forms of cooperation and the pooling of

capabilities. But it is unimaginable that efficiency gains can compensate for the startling decline

in Europes hard power. The predictable outcome of a neglected defense apparatus was put on

full display during the Libyan intervention. In a moment of characteristically blunt candor,

Robert Gates noted how, The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an

operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated countryyet many allies are

beginning to run short munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference.84 In

Libya, the allies were forced to confront the new reality that in the future the US might not make

82 Kate Brannen, NATO Signs $1.7 Global Hawk Contract, Defense News (May 21, 2012) 83 ODonnell, Clara Marina, ed. The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATOs Largest Members (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, July 2012) 84 Greg Jaffe and Michael Birnbaum, Gates rebukes European allies in farewell speech, Washington Post (June 10, 2011)

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up the difference. After flying about 1600 sorties the US decided to stop running airstrikes and

limit itself to a vital supporting role. Reflecting on the significance of the move, former defense

secretary Lord Hutton reflected: The US has been saying for 10 or 15 years that it wants the

Europeans to share more of the security burden and we have to heed that lesson.We cannot go

on expecting the US to take the leading role.85

Libya is likely to be a model for how future NATO operations will be carried out.

Because the US is less willing to lead major operations, it will be incumbent upon secondary

powers to do so wherever their vital national interests are at stake. The US is still likely to play a

very prominent role in many cases. It is less likely to lead. It will allow other secondary states to

take charge. The US will either lead from behind or play a secondary and supportive role. This

is not to say that the US will not take direct and forceful action when its vital interests are at

stake, rather, it suggests that the US will be reluctant where this is not the case. To date, Europe

is in the grips of denial and has not come to terms with this new reality. The rude awakening will

come sooner or later.

Overall, recent developments suggest that secondary powers are seeking to renew their

ties to the US. At the same time, the social contract is being renegotiated as the US is

increasingly forcing its allies to confront the lopsided nature of the security relationship.

Redefining this division of labor will not take place overnight. The process will be slow and

tortuous, moved forward by future crises that are difficult to predict.

85 Quoted in Daniel Dombey and James Blitz, Europe feels strain as US changes tack on Libya, Financial Times (April 6, 2011)

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Conclusion: Negotiating a New Social Contract

The pessimistic strand of international relations theory since the end of the Cold War

increasingly resembles the fabled shepherd boy who repeatedly cries wolf and ultimately loses

credibility among the villagers who no longer believe him.86 At each juncture, pessimists have

predicted a coming anarchy. At each juncture they have encouraged policy makers to respond to

secondary powers as if they were rivals intent on opposing and weakening the United States.

Each time, subsequent events have proven them wrong.

America can no longer afford to draw the wrong lessons from experience. Scarce

resources must be managed in intelligent ways. Going forward, Americas engagement of the

world will be complicated by growing power constraints. Maximizing effectiveness requires that

the US accurately assess the nature of the security environment. Assuming that every secondary

power is anxious to turn on the US is a flawed assumption. Constructing a foreign policy on this

incorrect foundation will lead to unnecessarily adversarial relations and the misallocation of

diplomatic capital and power capability.

American power has been a stabilizing force. But the prescription that doing too little is

a greater danger than doing too much has proven unwise.87 Hubris and perceived invincibility

created the impression that America was exceptional and immune from the pathologies that have

led to the fall of hegemons and empires of the past. Americas unenviable predicament has been

brought about, in part, by doing too much. The US has bitten off more than she could chew (at

least without choking). 86 Witness titles such as This Time Its Real: the End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana

87 Wohlforth, Stability, p. 39

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Grand strategy is an overarching foreign policy plan that takes into account available

resources and constraints. Second, it must also consider the extant security environment and the

direction in which things are trending. The former will be determined by how robustly the US

economy recovers and how effectively the political system can manage a broad array of domestic

challenges, questions beyond the scope of this article and the authors expertise. As for the latter,

the above argument does suggest that the external strategic environment will be far more benign

than the conventional wisdom suggests. Accordingly, the US can get the most bang-for-its-buck

by working with the systems dominant tendency and not against it.

Understanding that most secondary powers both depend on and value Americas leading

role is the first step. By and large, Americas allies have no ambitions to rival the US in a geo-

strategic sense. They harbor no plans to oppose and weaken a struggling hegemon. They will not

suddenly turn on America. Quite the contrary, they will increasingly turn to America.

Anticipating this trend should allow us to strategically prepare a response. As secondary powers

seek closer ties, how should the US respond? In what ways can the US use its bargaining

position to encourage necessary forms of cooperation and a more equal sharing of burdens?

Secondary powers will become more active, not because they want to but because they

have to. The US will scale back its role. Where the vital interests of secondary powers are at

stake, they will be forced to do more. This is to be welcomed overall. The trend does pose novel

challenges however. In what capacity should the US participate? How should the US seek to

influence the foreign policies of more assertive secondary powers? This will require the US to

craft responses that do not involve outright leadership.

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Third, this renegotiation of the social contract between the US and secondary powers will

not occur overnight. After six decades of dependence, secondary powers have not fully come to

terms with the new reality that confronts them. But if we understand that such a bargain indeed

exists and that it will and should be renegotiated will allow the US to influence the process in

favorable ways. The US must find creative ways to signal its intention to play a lesser role while

not jeopardizing the overall stability of the relationship. The US cannot threaten to disengage

though it must insist on a new balance. Partly, this adjustment of paradigms will occur naturally

as ongoing and future crises take place without intervention by the US. Where vital national

interests are not at stake, Americas response is likely to be tepid.

The unipolar status-quo no longer holds. Nor should the unfolding of events be seen as an

inexorable slide back into multipolar anarchy. Instead, America faces a grand strategic

bargaining game in which it must negotiate a new social contract with many of the worlds

secondary powers. Secondary powers will get some of what they wished for, but are perhaps less

enthusiastic to receive: more autonomy and a more central role in managing world order. The US

must partially let go of that which it never hoped to lose, but is perhaps somewhat relieved to

modify: unrivalled supremacy and the burdens that go along with it. The changes will be far

reaching in many respects, but not as dire and dramatic as many observers believe.