the board of executive directors of the world bank · 2007-10-09 · ufrgs model united nations...
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UFRGS Model United Nations 2007
The Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank
Dear Delegates,
Since the first edition of UFRGSMUN, in 2003, our Model United Nations has
always tried to bring to its delegates new challenges in each new edition. It could not be
different this year as we celebrate the fifth anniversary of UFRGSMUN: we will
simulate for the first time the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank. In order
to make this experience even more enriching, the committee seeks innovation by
focusing on one topic area for discussion – trying to have a more comprehensive look at
the economic sides of an issue mostly seen as political. Let’s meet the World Bank’s
staff from now on.
Gustavo Meira Carneiro is an Economics student currently at his 5th semester.
This is not his first year as a staff member, as he was AssistantDirector of the
UNCTAD at UFRGSMUN 2006 and a member of the Administrative Staff. He has
participated as a delegate in UFRGSMUN 2005, representing South Africa at the
UNCTAD; and he also represented Costa Rica at the WorldMun 2007 and Venezuela at
the Istanbul International MUN last July.
Luíza Galiazzi Schneider is an International Relations student, studying in
France for one semester. Currently at her 7th semester in the IR undergraduate program,
Luíza was an AssistantDirector to the Historical United Nations Security Council in
UFRGSMUN 2006, her first participation as a staff member. As a delegate, she
represented Pakistan at the UN Security Council in UFRGSMUN 2004, Ukraine at the
DISEC in AMUN 2005 and Brazil at the UN Security Council in UFRGSMUN 2005.
Caio Mascarello Teixeira is a Business Administration student, currently at his
4th semester. This is his first participation as an UFRGSMUN staff member. As a
delegate, he represented Mozambique at the UNCTAD of UFRGSMUN 2006 and the
United Kingdom at ECOFIN, in AMUN 2007.
Camila Vogt is an Economics student, currently at her 3rd semester. It is her first
participation as a staff member in UFRGSMUN 2007. She represented Indonesia at
UNCTAD in UFRGSMUN 2006 and soon desired to be part of our staff!
Marcelo Fonseca is an International Relations student, currently at his 8th and
last semester. This year, he is part of UFRGSMUN staff for the first time. As a delegate,
he represented Italy at UNCTAD in UFRGSMUN 2005 and Colombia at UNCTAD in
UFRGSMUN 2006.
INTRODUCTION
World Bank’s General Background
The World Bank was one of the institutions created at the Bretton Woods
Conferences, right after the end of the Second World War, on 27 December 1945. At the
time, the institution’s main goal was the reconstruction of the wardevastated countries,
mainly through its loans. In 9 May 1947, the Bank approved its first loan, to France, in
order to rebuild the country after the war and the German occupation.1 Throughout its
history, however, the Bank has experienced a brightly evolution, although never
abandoning its historical goals. After the end of the Cold War, the World Bank’s
activities focused on the transparency and credibility of the economies throughout the
world, managing loans and policies aimed at a continuous growth of the world economy.
The importance of the institutions and of the freemarket values were always on the
edge of the World Bank’s policies.
From the end of the 1990’s, the Bank once again changed, in a way, the focus of
its policies and programs. The fostering of development and the eradication of poverty
appeared as central objectives to the institution and new policies have been adopted in
this sense from then on. In this context, reconstruction always remained as one of its
capital missions, but different ways of contributing to development issues and to the
eradication of poverty have appeared. An example of this is Conflict Prevention, one of
the most recent matters on which the Bank has already worked and, as it brings new
elements to the institutions, it also brings new challenges.
The Bank is controlled by its Board of Governors, in which are represented all
180 member countries. This Board meets once a year at the World Bank’s Annual
Meetings, and their decisions are the Bank’s final answer to any matter. The Board of
Executive Directors, on the other hand, is responsible for the general operations of the
institution and all its powers are delegated to them by the Board of Governors under the
1 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20653660~menuPK:72312~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html Last Accessed: 05/14/2007
Articles of Agreement.2 The Board is composed of twentyfour Executive Directors,
whose voting power is proportionally linked to its number of World Bank’s shares. The
five members with the largest numbers of shares (United States, Japan, Germany,
France and United Kingdom) point out five Executive Directors to represent them. The
other nineteen are elected in constituencies, mainly composed regionally. There are
countries that own single constituencies, such as the Russian Federation, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of China.
2 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:50004945~menuPK:64020014~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html Last Accessed: 05/15/2007.
TOPIC AREA
Policies for Civil Conflict Prevention
1. Historical Background
1.1 Conflicts after the Second World War
The first fifty years of this century were dominated by several interstate
contentious among the great powers on their struggle to reach a better status in a new
world scenario. These hostilities led to a dispute on a technological and military
progress basis, culminating on a large increase on potential lethal wars. This cycle
unfolded a serious concern in the modern international society, which is related to how
bellicosity can be harmful to the human being’s existence and development.
Although the popular consciousness that engagement in a conflict can be
harmful for countries and their citizens emerged more strongly only after the Second
World War and with the forthcoming of a nuclear era, this fact was first expressed by
the famous strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Concerned about the conflicts’ trend to be
increasingly violent over the years after the Napoleonic Wars, the Austrian general
assumed in his book “On War” that, given his interpretation of the political purpose of
war, a conflict is a way to reach this political purpose and must not be considered aside
of it.3 Thus, citizens and governments only recur to conflicts in order to achieve social,
political and economic benefits that cannot be obtained by political bargain. However, in
the twentieth century conflicts have reached such a great size that it became hard to tell
if a conflict can really bring advantages to those countries engaged in it.
According to PRIO’s4 database, there were 225 armed conflicts in the period
19462001: 163 were considered internal (or intrastate), 23 extra state, 5 and 42 interstate
3CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von. On War., London: Penguin Books, 1982.4 Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) dataset. Available at: http://new.prio.no/CSCWDatasets/DataonArmedConflict/UppsalaPRIOArmedConflictsDataset/ (last accessed on 08/16/07)5“Extrastate armed conflict occurs between a state and a nonstate group outside its own territory.” (GLEDITSCH et al. Armed Conflict 19462001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, no. 5., 2002, p. 6)
conflicts. 6 It is important to emphasize that the proportion between intrastate and
interstate conflicts has never been so high in history. The Cold War nature can offer one
explanation for this phenomenon, since the bipolarity originated a world divided in
influence zones ruled by either the Communist or the Capitalist ideology. Aiming at
fostering and preserving alignment with other countries, the Superpowers encouraged
internal ideological confrontation and, in some cases, even intervened inside the
countries. These countries’ alignment constraints, forged by the Superpowers’ foreign
policy, raised situations of internal instability and offered several reasons for conflict
occurrence around the world.
The twentieth century’s events might enlighten the understanding of the
international scenario movements at this time in history. Right after the Second World
War, conflicts in Europe were generally linked to EastWest dynamics. A relevant crisis
situation involved two Soviet satellites, namely Poland and Hungary, in an episode that
came to light due to a shift in the Soviet foreign policy. The USSR, acknowledging the
growing interdependence between the two blocs, began to allow a greater pluralism of
the communist governments of Eastern Europe7. Although this was an undeniable trend,
given the social discomfort experienced by these countries’ population at that scenario,
the disapproval speech brought by the new Soviet governor Khrushchev about some of
Joseph Stalin’s practices surpassed agents’ expectations and incited instability in the
region.8
Particularly in Hungary, the crisis reached a delicate path. Popular insurrection
contested the communist government demanding liberalizing reforms, which were led
by Imre Nagy when – after his followers’ triumph – he became Prime Minister. He was
successful until the announcement that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw
Pact, which had been signed one year before. This further step could open a dangerous
precedent for the communist world and, thus, impelled a strong reaction by Moscow.
The Russian Army occupied Budapest and soon replaced Nagy by a Kremlin supporter
named János Kádár. The aftermath results were 20,000 Hungarian casualties in the
6GLEDITSCH et al. Armed Conflict 19462001: A New Dataset, 2002, p. 247BÉKÉS, Csaba. Cold War, Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Working Paper #7. The Cold War as a Global Conflict. International Center for Advanced Studies. New York University. September 2002. Available online at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/icas/Bekes.pdf, last accessed at 09/09/2007.8STREICKER, Sarah. Soviet Intervention in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. University of Michigan. Available online at www.umich.edu/~historyj/pages_folder/articles/, last accessed at 09/09/2007.
battlefield and stability only being guaranteed by the continuous presence of Russian
troops.9
On the other side of this bipolar world was Latin America, widely known as a
United States’ allied territory during the Cold War. However, this Superpower faced
severe challenges to oppose the “communist menace” in that continent. Seeking the
preservation of its area of influence, the United States created a regional security system
formalized through the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) within
the Organization of American States (OAS) scope.10 Furthermore, some studies indicate
that the United States were involved in several “coups d’état”, principally when a left
oriented force had begun to gain space in the domestic affairs of any LatinAmerican
country. Brazil, Argentina and Chile are historical examples of this policy.11
Ironically, two of the central holdbacks for NorthAmerican strategy in Latin
America took place in those countries where there was a deep subordination to the
NorthAmerican power before the revolution – Cuba and Nicaragua. In the second case,
the Somoza family had been controlling the country for over thirty years – using this
power for personal purposes – when the Sandinist coalition started a rebellion. This
movement was backed by most of Nicaragua’s population, which had assisted and
supported the overthrowing of Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s repressive dictatorship in
July 1979.12
Even being an economically and strategically limited country, Nicaragua had a
combination of Marxism, nationalism, antiimperialism and liberation theology that
could become a substantial menace for American capitalist prevalence in the region.
Due to this reason, the NorthAmerican government began a counteroffensive based on
support for domestic antiSandinist forces, counterparted by constant Soviet aid given
9KEYLOR, William R. The Twentieth Century World. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 293295.10 BITENCOURT, Luis. Latin American Security: Emerging Challenges. In KUGLER, Richard L.; FROST, Ellen L. The Global Century – Globalization and National Security. Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). National Defence University. NDU Press Books. Washington, USA. Available online at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001/Global%20Century%20%20June%202001/globcencont.html, last accessed at 09/09/2007.11 Brazil, Argentina and Chile suffered from military coups in the second half of twentieth century. In Brazil, the militaries took the government in 1964, when João Goulart was taken out of presidency. In Argentina, there were successive military coups from 1955 to 1981, beginning with the popular President Juán Perón deposition. In Chile, the government of Salvador Allende was removed form power in 1973 and succeeded by the General Augusto Pinochet who headed the chilean government for seventeen years. In all of the three cases there are studies indicating northamerican interference.12 KEYLOR, William R. The Twentieth Century World, 2001, p. 403.
to the new Sandinist government. Violent conflicts followed the entire Sandinist
government period until 1990, when the weakened Sandinists lost the first free universal
elections to the National Opposition Union (UNO), which rose to power represented by
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. After more than a decade of conflict, the country entered
the 1990s suffering from serious structural economic problems. High inflation rates,
unemployment and a fragile private sector were just few of them.13
Another important cause for an increase in internal conflicts was the
decolonization process, as usually a fight for selfdetermination is followed by a civil
war period. Although this process began in the interwar period, it was consolidated at
the end of Second World War, with rebellions in Asia and the liberation of Arab and
Islamic countries after AngloFrench evacuation.14 Due to the fact that internal conflicts
are waged inside the countries’ borders, they have a stronger impact over these
countries’ economic, social and political structures, being, in this way, much more
costly for the country’s population and commonly inserting the country into a “conflict
trap”.15
Conflicts in Asia and Africa after the end of the Second World War were in their
majority based on nationalism matters, but not detached from the world’s bipolarity. The
decolonization process gained space as an irreversible trend brought by modern
capitalism and also by the colonial countries’ weakness, which prevailed after all losses
of the World Wars. There were different conflict developments in those regions. Some
had found a progressive path through a steady overture of political institutions, but
others had faced strong repression by colonizers.
The latter was the case of the Portuguese colonies, as most of them remained
under foreign control until the 1970s. The armed conflict in Angola can be taken as a
significant example. This was a longterm crisis that embraced not only the fight for
independence, but also a posterior internal conflict for government control, the latter
highly influenced by international actors. Angola was divided in three different political
parties – FNLA, UNITA and MPLA,16 the two first connected to the United States and
13KEYLOR, William R. The Twentieth Century World. 2001, p. 54214 PEREIRA, Juan Carlos. Historia de las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas. 2.ed. Barcelona: Ariel, 2003, p. 38915For further information read “Breaking the conflict trap”, World Bank.16FNLA – Frente Nacional para Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola); UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola); MPLA – Movimento Popular para Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement
the latter to the Soviet Union.17 These three forces fought together to achieve
independence, which was obtained only in 1975 – Portugal was internally fragile by
their then recent Carnation Revolution.
However, once Angola reached autonomy, a civil war began. After violent
conflicts against the other two parties, MPLA’s leader Agostinho Neto and his
supporters occupied Luanda and established a Marxistoriented Popular Republic in
November of the same year.18 Given the conflict’s high tension, Cuba sent 20,000
soldiers to ensure MPLA governance and also to combat the “guerrilla” forces. The
conflict stepped into an ideological and ethnic confrontation, but a great number of
natural resources located in the Angolan territory, including oil, was also on dispute.
The ceasefire was twice signed in Angola, in 1994 and in 2002, due to a new spread of
violence in 1998. After almost thirty years of tension, the country shows now its results
– a devastated economy and preoccupying famine among refugees.19
The main difference between conflicts in the first fifty years and the last fifty
years of the twentieth century is related to the agents that participated in those battles
and their postwar effects. The first half of century comprehended wars in which the
most powerful countries were involved and that had devastating effects for them.
However, due to their own strength and some foreign aid mechanisms, such as the
Marshall Plan, they could recover and rebuild an entire new structure. This was the case
of Germany, Italy, France and other Western European countries that recovered their
status within the international community.
On the other hand, the armed conflicts that emerged in the last half of the last
century have generated a major preoccupation to the world system due to three crucial
issues: 1) most of these modern conflicts are being waged in weaker and smaller nations
that do not have enough potential to rebuild themselves after a war period; 2) modern
conflicts are having a much longer duration than those in the first half of the century;
for the Liberation of Angola)17PETITHOMME, Mathieu. The Institutionalization of Violence Beyond the State: The Case of Angola. Panel 325 Private Actors and the Construction of Identity and Violence “Making Sense of a Pluralist World”, Sixth PanEuropean International Relations Conference, Turin, 1215 September 2007, Italy. Available at http://www.sgir.org, last accessed at 09/13/2007.
18FERREIRA, Manuel Ennes. Angola: conflict and development, 19612002. The Economics of Peace and Security Vol. 1. N. 1(2006). p. 26. United Kingdom. Available at http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/pdfs/eps_v1n1_ferreira.pdf. Last acessed at 09/13/2007.19CHAUTARD, Sophie. Guerres et conflits du XXe siècle. Librio. 2004. p. 44.
and 3) the civil population increased its participation in conflicts and is the most
afflicted group afterwards. These characteristics made immeasurably worse the
consequences for countries that hosted conflicts in the 19502000 era, essentially in
terms of subsequent development capacity.
1.2. Civil Conflicts in PostCold War Period
From 1989 on, there was a widely spread perception about the world claiming
the eradication of violence. The end of the Cold War and its subsequent period, as some
predicted, however, proved not to be a peaceful time and armed conflicts were not
eradicated from the international scene. Actually, a total of 115 armed conflicts has been
recorded for the period 1989–2001. Only in 2001, 34 conflicts were active in 28
countries.20 Even though the interests of superpowers in rebellions and civil conflicts
have diminished after the end of the Cold War, these conflicts continue to arise all over
the world. Over a decade since the end of the Cold War, the political actors and also the
warfare literature have been changing and are still trying to comprehend a new different
reality: the spread of internal conflicts and the return of an international security
agenda.
Factors like shared history, culture, religious matters and ethnicity highlighted
internal economic, social and political problems and catalyzed internal struggles for
power in many countries after the end of the Cold War.21 These internal disputes, whose
protagonists are generally national rebel organizations or also the government itself, no
longer obeyed the bipolar power system. Has the logic of internal conflicts changed
then? The answer to this question is not easy at all – the majority of the literature tends
to support the idea that ideological rebellions from the Cold War Era were replaced by
bandit groups in search of personal profit or violent ethnic warfare, but some authors
still argue that the logic of the disputes remains the same, even if this is not evident.22
Stepping out of this discussion, it is clear that at least the apparent logic of civil
conflicts has changed after the Cold War – ethnic disputes and genocides did come up,
as well as rebel groups involved drugs and natural resources trafficking. Indeed, that
20CORDESMAN, A. Lessons of PostCold War Conflict: Middle Eastern Lessons and Perspective. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.21SANDOLE, Dennis;Capturing the Complexity of Conflict Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts in the PostCold War Era ; Routledge, 1999.22KALYVAS, Stathis. Les guerres civiles après le fin de la Guerre froide. In : HASSNER, Pierre. Guerres et sociétés. Ed. Karthala, Paris : 2003
was a major change on the conflicts’ profiles – the forms of financing.23 The use of
natural resources and drugs to finance rebellion is pointed out sometimes as a cause for
conflict and sometimes as a factor for prolonging it, since it becomes a very profitable
business.24 In Sierra Leone, for example, the rebel soldiers of the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) financed their rebellion with diamond sales in the illegal market – the
“blood diamonds”.25
The use of the natural resources revenue by rebels, and even governments, leads
to another extremely relevant issue, a heritage of the Cold War arms race. Not ended by
1989, the development of new military technologies and the increasing arsenals
throughout the world are a decisive matter on the new civil conflicts international
scenario. The fall of the Soviet Union was significantly important on this matter, mainly
due to its huge arsenal. The availability of that arsenal associated with a developed black
market along with weak governance played its role on turning it – consisted essentially
of light weapons – into fuel for intrastate conflicts. 26
Afghanistan is a good example of a conflict in which military technology and
arsenals provided by the superpowers during the Cold War turned to boost violence by
the 1990s. The country was a battlefield during the Cold War, when the United States
financed conservative rebels to fight against the proSoviet government. Since then,
Afghanistan has been devastated by continuous war: after the end of the Soviet
occupation in 1989, a civil conflict erupted in the 1990s and finally the country was
invaded by coalition forces in 2001.27
In Africa, support by external sources and disagreements between the different
internal groups are among the most important causes to the persistence of conflicts. In
Sudan, in spite of the discovery of oil reserves in 1978 in the southern region, the
majority of the Sudanese population remains desperately poor. Sudan’s longest civil war
began in 1983, largely pitting the Muslim north against the Christian and Animist south,
and killing at least 2 million people and displacing a further 4 million.28 While a peace
23 HUMPHREYS, Macartan. Economics and violent conflict. Harvard, 2003.24BANNON, Ian and COLLIER, Paul; Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: options and actions. The World Bank, Washington 2003. And also: CORNELL, Svante; The interaction between narcotics and Conflict; in Journal of Peace Research25 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=9626Estimatives say that around 639 millions of light weapons circulate on the world. UNDP Report of Human Development, 2005.27http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=128http://www.crisisgroup.org/
agreement was signed in January 2005, in Nairobi, another conflict zone was imploding.
In the western region of the country, Darfur, rebel groups became hostile to the
Sudanese Government, mainly arguing social grievances. The Government of Sudan,
using its own armed forces, repelled the rebel attacks, initiating a declared violence
zone. The conflict that would be, at a first glance, characterized as an ethnic cleansing
or even as a tribal war, soon proved to involve external interests in newly discovered oil
reserves in the area.29
Therefore, the conflicts’ profile has changed at the end of the 20th century – the
absolute majority of conflicts became internal and their forms of financing, the means
of fighting and their causes have been modified and adapted to the new order. The
saddest evaluation is that until 1989, only one third of the world’s conflicts happened in
least developed countries, but from then on that ratio has changed to more than half.30
Since 1990, armed conflicts have killed more than 3 million people, almost all of them
in developing countries.31 Consequently, by the end of the 20th and the beginning of the
21st century, civil conflicts became more than a security issue – they are now an issue of
development.
2. Statement of the Issue
2.1. Civil Conflict
According to Wallensteen,32 a conflict can be defined as “a social situation in
which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time
an available set of scarce resources.” Therefore, a conflict surpasses the simple
behavior of the parties involved in it; there is the idea of scarcity of resources at a time
given. However, it is important to notice that “resources” is not applied only in the
economic sense, but in a larger sense of something that is scarce, an object of desire –
maybe power. For Swanström and Weissmann, it is also essential to include the
perception of the actors on this definition, since it is their perception of the conflict that
29PRUNIER, Gérard. The Ambigous Genocide. London: Cornell University Press, 2005. JOHNSON, Douglas. The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.30Heavily Indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative: status of implementation. 2004, Washington.31UNDP Report of Human Development, 2005.32WALLENSTEEN, Peter. Understanding Conflict Resolution war, peace and the global system. Sage, 2002. pg 15.
will determine their actions – even if there is a way of not engaging in a conflict, if the
parts do not perceive it, they will engage. The definition of conflict proposed by these
authors would then be: “perceived differences in issue positions between two or more
parties at the same moment in time.”33
Most of the scholars agree that a conflict should be viewed as a cycle, which
explains why so many conflicts are actually restarts of old conflicts and why we can say
a country in conflict is in a vicious circle – since a country involved in conflict suffers
badly in terms of development and poverty, and therefore becomes even more prone to
face another conflict. Thus, a conflict cannot be viewed as a static situation: it is a
dynamic and a changing one at that, and this is very important to bear in mind when
thinking about prevention. Nevertheless, there are many views on what a conflict cycle
is like; some authors even argue that it has 17 stages of development – from its gestation
to sustainable peace.34 The common approach, though, describes a conflict in form of an
upsidedown U that goes from stability, escalates to war and deescalates into stability –
like we said, it is normal that it escalates again into war. A good graphic illustration for
that concept is the following:35
Figure 1
33SWANSTRÖM, Niklas; WEISSMANN, Mikael; Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration. The Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, 2005. pg 9.34 REYCHLER, Luc ; Les Crises et leurs fondements, la prévention des conflits violents. In : Conflits en Afrique : analyse des crises et pistes pour une prévention. GRIP, Bruxelles, 1997.35 SWANSTRÖM, Niklas; WEISSMANN, Mikael; Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and beyond: a conceptual exploration. The Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, 2005.
We can see on Figure 1 the escalating form of a conflict and its different phases,
including the prevention phases that will be further explained. From a stable phase, the
tensions may rise to the point that it becomes violent and further turns into a war.
According to some authors, like Reychler (1997), violence is always present in conflict
even if it is not physical.36 It is very important to notice, though, that this cycle is not
necessarily always completed, which means peace can be built at any level of the cycle.
Therefore, Reychler distinguishes two kinds of peacebuilding: prewar and postwar
peacebuilding.37
Through these examples we can notice that the concept of conflict is not simple
at all and there is no unanimity among authors around this matter. However, we can
deduct from these concepts that a conflict involves two parties that have incompatible
interests or, at least, perceive their interests as incompatible. Hence, conflict is a very
general concept, and it can be – as it is – used by many areas of knowledge. Simplifying,
hereby we will use the expression “civil conflict” to denote the idea of a conflict
involving parties within a country. A civil conflict may reach the level of a war. A
current definition of civil war is from the Correlates of War (COW) database that says a
civil war is a conflict with organized military action and which has more than 1000
victims per year, and at least 5% of the victims inflicted by the weaker part.38 To
simplify again, we can say a civil war is the highest violence point of a civil conflict.
2.2. Conflict prevention
The idea of preventing conflicts is not new, but it was back in the 1990s that it
gained force and importance. Nevertheless, an actual framework of conflict prevention
is not yet complete and there are still several conceptual points to be determined since
there are many different views around the subject.39 Reychler (1997) distinguishes four
kinds of conflict prevention unilateral, bilateral, trilateral and multilateral – and
36The author distinguishes four kinds of violence: physical, psychological, cultural and structural. 37 REYCHLER, Luc ; Les Crises et leurs fondements, la prévention des conflits violents. In : Conflits en Afrique : analyse des crises et pistes pour une prévention. GRIP, Bruxelles, 1997, pp.61.38COLLIER, Paul; HOEFFLER, Anke. Draft Chapter of the Handbook of Defense Economics. 2006. The COW website is www.correlatesofwar.org 39See: WALLENSTEEN, Peter and MÖLLER, Frida; Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown. Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 7, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden.
mentions the possible effective role of NGOs on prevention. One idea that is widely
accepted is that there are two categories of conflict prevention: one more immediate and
a longterm kind. Basically, one can say that preventing a conflict is to avoid that it
reaches violent levels. In the case of civil conflict, we could say it is to prevent civil
conflict from reaching the civil war level.
According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, there are
two categories of conflict prevention strategies: operational prevention and structural
prevention. Operational prevention may occur in the face of an imminent crisis; the
Commission states also that there are four groups of measures to avoid violence
escalation: early warning and response, preventive diplomacy, economic measures and
the use of force.40 Due to the longterm character of the World Bank’s actions, one may
think the Bank does not have a place on the operative variety of prevention. But the
Bank can also play its role on this kind of prevention through other means, which
obviously belong to the economic measures branch the conditionalities, that will be
explained further on.
During an operational prevention phase, the role of international organizations is
of paramount importance, and another actor is appearing on stage: the Non
Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The action of international organisms and NGOs
in conflict affected countries is a complicated issue, and it surely involves the Bank and
its projects. International actions on conflict affected countries are often criticized due
to the lack of integration between the many actors involved in it, including the Bank.41
This question is of vital relevance to conflict prevention, since this lack of cooperation
may not only lead to ineffective measures, but even to the worsening of the conflict.
Therefore, an improved cooperation between the Bank and other actors – such as UN
organs and NGOs – could lead the institution’s performance in conflict prevention to
other stages.
According to the Carnegie Commission:
“Structural prevention—or peacebuilding—comprises strategies
such as putting in place international legal systems, dispute resolution
40Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington D.C: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997.41REYNTJENS, Filip et PAUWELS, Anne; Des measures preventives, etude de cas: Namibie, Angola, Ruanda, Kenya. In : Conflits en Afrique : analyse des crises et pistes pour une prévention. GRIP, Brussels, 1997, pp.61.
mechanisms, and cooperative arrangements; meeting people’s basic
economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian needs; and rebuilding
societies that have been shattered by war or other major crises.”42
Therefore, one can see that the Bank has a major role to play when it comes to
structural prevention, since by this definition we can say that structural prevention is
almost a synonym for development.
The Commission sets four elements for maintaining a stable regime and
preventing intrastate conflict, which are basically a secure law and institutional
environment within the country. But, as almost every scholar agrees that poorer
countries are the most prone to conflict, it is clear that economic and social
development are vital on structural prevention. In fact, there is not an agreement on
which are the most effective policies on a structural prevention basis, in view of the fact
that agreeing on that means agreeing around which are the underlying causes of
conflict, which is actually difficult. This is complex due to the fact that research on the
causes of civil conflicts is still developing, and that the causes pointed out so far are
innumerous. Hence, to reach an effective framework for structural conflict, it is
necessary to establish priorities among the pointed causes of conflict.
2.3. Civil Conflict’s Main Causes
The onset of an internal civil conflict in one country underlines the failure of its
Social Contract,43 meaning that the government cannot deliver social benefits for its
population anymore.
“Nationstates fail because they are convulsed by internal
violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their
inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of
the particular nationstate itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in
the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.”44
42 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington D.C: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997, pp. xxviii.43MURSHED, Mansoob. Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction. Journal of Peace Research, 39, 387, 2002, p. 390.44ROTBERG, Robert. Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in: Rotberg, Robert (ed.): State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
As it is an internal matter, it is impossible to completely immunize a country from
the start of violence.45 However, understanding the root causes of a conflict and applying
preventive policies on them makes violence much more unlikely to take place.
First of all, we do have to extinguish the perception of civil conflicts being
caused only by ethnic characteristics. Mainly in Africa, political and economic conflicts
have been treated as if they were solely ethnic, an alarming prejudicial analysis. “While
disputes between groups are common, the escalation of these disputes into lethal
violence cannot be explained merely by reference to sectarian, ethnic, or cultural
background.”46 Even if these conflicts have an ethnical, cultural or sectarian mask, they
cannot be understood only by those variables. They can be characterized by ethnic
divisions, although their root causes are linked to economical, political, and social
grievances and disputes.
There are studies which underline that countries with an ample number of ethnic
groups are more peaceful and democratic.47 According to such authors, countries with
more ethnic groups are less prone to witness conflicts mainly because it is more
difficult to raise a rebel army or to mobilize people to fight in an ethnically diversified
nation. Ethnic factors are greatly used as motivation sources and “ethnic hatred”
remains most of times as a central characteristic of civil conflicts. The authors refer,
however, to the risk of ethnic dominance. In such cases, conflicts have a high probability
of happening, mostly because the majority has not only the state’s use of force within its
control, but the minority (in a democratic context) does not have ample chances of
gaining the control. However, it is also possible that a minority controls the use of force
against the majority – as was seen in South Africa, during the apartheid.
Therefore, the predominant causes of a Social Contract’s failure and its
consequent spread of violence are deeply related to the country’s economic situation. A
significant number of researches allude to the fact that poorer countries are much more
prone to witness the onset of a conflict within their territory. “The econometric
evidence (…) suggests (…) that wealth reduces the likelihood of civil war, and that
45Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington D.C: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997.46Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington D.C: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997.47COLLIER, Paul. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for policy. World Bank, 2000.
economic growth also reduces risks while recessions worsen them.”48 Figure 2 shows
that the richer the country is, the lower are the risks of an internal conflict’s occurrence.
Figure 2
Source: HUMPHREYS, Macartan. Economics and violent conflict. Harvard: Harvard University, 2003, p. 2.
Linked to the poverty rate of a country, usually there is an unequal distribution
of wealth throughout its territory. To help in the prevention of a conflict, the economic
growth must be equally distributed throughout the entire country.49 An inequality in the
distribution of goods, wealth and even government services boosts grievances among
the population and increases the possibilities of violent conflict.50 There are, however,
studies pointing out that just one type of inequality does have influence on conflict
incidence.51 The horizontal inequality, which would be unequal distribution of goods
and wealth among regions and groups, would have strong influence on conflict onset.
The overall inequality, the unequal distribution of wealth among individuals of a
country, on the other hand, proved to have no causal linkages with internal conflict
spread.
Hence, in spite of the scholarly divergence, it is likely that groups who feel
injustice towards them do have strong motivations to claim their rights by the use of
force. Such a poor distribution of goods and wealth in a country is highly linked to a
major problem: the governance inside the country, which here means the capabilities of
the government to control its own territory. A corrupt government or an ethnically
48HUMPHREYS, Macartan. Economics and violent conflict. Harvard: Harvard University, 2003, p. 2.49 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington D.C: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997.50HUMPHREYS, Macartan. Economics and violent conflict. Harvard: Harvard University, 2003.51See Paul Collier’s studies
excluding one (a government that belongs to one ethnic group and deliberately excludes
other ethnic groups) can also harm the interests of rival groups or the needs of
minorities.
Since the 1990’s, another important factor has been perceived by the
international community as a current conflict cause: the relationship with natural
resources52. The onset of violence in Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and
others proved to have strong links between natural resources such as oil, diamonds,
timber and gemstones and the conflict among their population. Others such as Peru,
Colombia and Afghanistan did not have natural resources to boost civil conflict, but
narcotics and other illicit activities played an important role on those conflicts. As
indicated above, in countries that are dangerously dependent on natural resource
revenues, the onset of a civil conflict is much more likely to break out. Bearing in mind
the negative consequences of an unequal distribution of wealth previously explained,
“countries with middling levels of dependence on natural resources may be
experiencing transitory inequality as part of the development process.”53 The presence
of oil, diamonds, timber, gemstones and other natural products do have influence in the
onset or on the duration of a conflict, mainly because this kind of product may have two
major consequences: to enrich authoritarian governments that do not distribute wealth,
like the actual conflict in Sudan,54 or to finance rebel groups and allow them to continue
fighting.55
Michael Ross’ research divides natural resources in two categories: the highly
capitalintensive and concentrated activities, such as oil, and the laborintensive, such as
coca plantations and activities alike. Oil exporting countries do have more probability of
facing the onset of a conflict primarily due to the highly competitive market of that
product. In oil exporting countries, external actions are more evident in an international
conjuncture of oil lack, such as the known international interference on the Sudanese
52ROSS, Michael. What do we know about Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of Peace Research, 41, 337, 2004.53HUMPHREYS, Macartan. Economics and violent conflict. Harvard: Harvard University, 2003, p. 5.54PRUNIER, Gérard. The Ambiguous Genocide. London: Cornell University Press, 2005. And JOHNSON, Douglas. The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.55 “In general, [various] studies show how the sale of gems or drugs allowed the weaker party to a conflict – usually but not always the rebel group – to finance itself, and hence continue fightinginstead of being crushed or forced to the negotiating table. In several cases, lootable resources have also made conflict so profitable that one or more combatants lose their incentive to reach a peace settlement.” ROSS, Michael.
actual conflict. Also, as Ross56 highlights, the oil industry is capitalintensive and
therefore contributes less to the local economy and produces more grievance among the
native population. Oil exporting countries are more likely to have a strong participation
of the State in the conflict, mainly because the oil trade is most of the time legalized.
Therefore, its revenues are many times used by the State to eradicate violent rebellions.57
Diamonds, timber, gemstones, narcotics, among others, on the other hand, do not
affect the onset of the violence, but have a major role on its length. Those products are
used to finance the groups that control them and, in several cases, “have also made
conflict so profitable that one or more combatants lose their incentive to reach a peace
settlement.”58 The conflict in Colombia, for example, did not initiate because of the
narcotics problems, but the rebel groups do finance their activities with the narcotics’
illegal trade. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime was highly sustained through the illegal
trade of narcotics and arms. The high profit from these activities encourages the
maintenance of the use of force.
Moreover, there are economists that sustain the perception in which countries
that are dependent on natural resources are more vulnerable to external shocks of the
international market, mainly those affecting the country’s terms of trade.59 In this view,
highly concentrated export bases do make countries more vulnerable and, in the case of
a shock, may worsen the economic situation of a country. The scarcity of resources
makes violence more likely as well as new clashes between rival groups or even
rebellions against the government.
2.4. Preventive Policies
After understanding the root causes of civil conflicts in general, we do need to
build, through their analysis, reasonable policies aiming at the prevention of those
conflicts. As we are aware, the major objective of the World Bank at the present time is
56ROSS, Michael. Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Role of Natural Resources in Civil War IN BALLENTINE, Karen & SHERMAN, Jack (Eds) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (4770), 2003a apud ROSS, What do we know about Natural Resources and Civil War, 2004, p. 344.57PRUNIER, Gérard. The Ambigous Genocide. London: Cornell University Press, 2005. JOHNSON, Douglas. The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.58ROSS, What do we know about Natural Resources and Civil War, 2004, p. 346.59 The country’s terms of trade is defined by the ratio of the price the nation obtains for its export commodity to the price it pays for the import commodity. HUMPHREYS, Macartan. Economics and violent conflict. Harvard: Harvard University, 2003, p. 5.
the reduction of poverty throughout the world. Through the policies aimed at the pursuit
of this goal, the Bank is already helping the eradication of violence. However, as
conflicts are not only consequences of poverty, but also one of its causes, the
elaboration of more direct and specific policies toward conflict prevention becomes also
a need.
2.4.1. Structural Prevention Policies
2.4.1.1. Development policies
As stated before, structural prevention is achieved by policies that address the
root causes of conflict. Poverty reduction and development are, therefore, effective
measures to prevent conflict from happening, but, as we have seen, there are certain
specificities that can make development and poverty reduction policies more effective to
conflict prevention. For instance, it is important to development not be unequal neither
vertically nor horizontally since, as previously mentioned, this could fuel conflict
between groups or regions. Along with that, the provision of microcredit opportunities
for countries in risky situations, as it has been proved by World Bank studies60, allied
with grand loans and other financial aid activities, could present great results. It is
important here to bear in mind the compromises assumed by the countries in those
situations. The results aimed by the Bank at poverty rates are only real if the country
follows the Bank’s recommendations. Stimulating small factories or even familiar
agriculture could also be an effective way of helping the population. In addition, a
population with higher income becomes less susceptible to being recruited by rebel
groups, since these groups usually pay their soldiers, which can become too expensive.61
An aspect often raised by authors as a path for prevention on the matter of
natural resources is the improvement of institutions and governance within the
countries. Initiatives to improve transparency on the business of natural resources are
referred as key means to prevent the misuse of their revenue by governments.62 By the
60ZAMAN, Hassar. Assessing the impact of microcredit on Poverty and Vulnerability in Bangladesh. Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, 1999, available at (last accessed 04/12/07): http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000094946_9908240530397461COLLIER, Paul. Economic causes of civil conflict and its implications for policy. The World Bank, June 2000, pg. 17.62PALLEY, Thomas. Lifting the natural resources curse. Foreign service journal, available at: (last access 19/04) http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/generaldebate/2003/12curse.htm
development of transparency on these matters, governments would be also helping
prevent conflict, since the revenues would be better invested on areas of public interest.
Also, these resources would not be used in ways that could fuel conflict (like in illicit
enrichment of administrators or even to purchase weapons). Palley states that the World
Bank has an extremely important role on that subject mainly through two ways: funding
technical assistance programs in countries affected; and implementing governance and
transparency conditionalities.63 According to Collier, “if governments and the
international community can defuse the risk from its primary commodity exports,
generate rapid growth, and provide credible guarantees to minorities, then the risk of
conflict can be radically reduced”.64
2.4.1.2. Natural Resources: Specialization vs. Diversification
Considering the strong relationship between natural resources and the onset of a
civil conflict, a debate on the possible policies aimed at this problem is necessary. On
one hand, the mainstream economists’ arguments support the theory of the comparative
advantages.65 In sum, this theory argues that a country does not need to have an absolute
advantage in order to benefit from trade; the country should specialize in a product in
which it has a comparative advantage. Therefore, as shown above, the country would be
less vulnerable to violence onset. In this sense, countries presenting a concentrated
exports list would have great relative advantages in international trade.
A classic numeric example is very illustrative and helps better understand the
concept of comparative advantages. Suppose, as shown on table 1 below, that there are
two countries (A and B), which produce Cloth and Wine and have labor as the only
production cost. As it is shown, A has an absolute advantage on both products: it
produces a bolt of cloth in 90 days of labor and a barrel of wine with 80, while B takes
100 and 120, respectively. Even though A has absolute advantages, comparing to B, on
both products, it may benefit from trade. Looking at the exchange ratios (supposing that
the labor costs are the determinant of these ratios) in both countries we see that, in A 1
bolt of cloth is exchanged for 9/8 (90/80) barrels of wine and, in B, 1 bolt of cloth is
63PALLEY, Thomas. Lifting the natural resources curse. Foreign service journal, available at: (last access 19/04) http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/generaldebate/2003/12curse.htm 64 COLLIER, op. cit. 65 Major contributor: RICARDO, David. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Cosimo Classics, 2006.
exchanged for 5/6 (100/120) barrels of wine. Given that, if both countries specialize and
engage on trade, exchanging 1 bolt of B’s cloth for 1 barrel of A’s wine, both will gain:
A will change 1 bolt of cloth for less than 9/8 barrels of wine and B will change 1 barrel
of wine for less than 6/5 bolts of cloth.66 In that way, both countries would have gains
when specializing in the product in which they have a comparative advantage.67
Country Cloth (one bolt) Wine (one barrel)
A 90 days of labor 80 days of labor
B 100 days of labor 120 days of labor
On the other hand, there are studies emphasizing that policies focused on the
diversification of exports, mainly in countries whose exports are concentrated in
products like oil, diamonds, timber, etc, are extremely helpful to conflict prevention. For
the defenders of this opinion, a more diverse export base makes the country less
vulnerable to external shocks and, consequently, to internal economic crises. There are
policies that can help reduce the risk of conflict in a highly dependent country, as
economic diversification away from primary commodities – through better economic
policies; investment of the commodities’ revenues on effective basic services delivery,
in a way that the population could benefit from it; and more difficulties imposed by the
international community for rebel groups to sell their commodities and profit from it.68
2.4.1.3. Conditionalities
Briefly, conditionality means the imposition of conditions for a country to
continue to receive assistance from donors or international organizations or, to the
Bank, it “is the set of conditions that, in line with the World Bank’s Operational Policy
(OP) 8.60, Development Policy Lending, can affect the flow of resources to a
country”.69 Since the reinterpretation of the Articles of Agreement by the Executive
Directors in 1946, the Bank started to extend its loans to economic reconstruction and 66 For B, 6/5 bolts of cloth equal 1 barrel of wine since, as it was stated on the example it is supposed to be a simple equality: 1bolt of cloth = 5/6 barrel of wine. Therefore, 1 barrel of wine = 6/5 bolts of cloth. 67 This example was adapted from: INGRAM, James C. and M. DUNN, Jr. International economics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993.68COLLIER, Paul. Economic causes of civil conflict and its implications for policy. The World Bank, June 2000, pg. 16.69Review of world bank conditionality: modalities of conditionality. Operations policy and country services, World Bank, June 30, 2005.
longterm stabilization. Since then, structural adjustment loans introduced the
imposition of certain conditions to the borrowing countries; these loans, authorized by
the “special circumstances”, are usually called policybased loans.70
The Operational Policy (OP) 8.6071 replaced the Operational Directive (OD) 8.60
in 2004, establishing the development policy loan, which substituted all existent types of
adjustment loans. Development policy lending is intended “to help a borrower achieve
sustainable reductions in poverty through a program of policy and institutional actions
that promote growth and enhance the wellbeing and increase the incomes of poor
people.”72 Furthermore, there are three major areas that condition this sort of loans:
“(a) compliance with the critical program conditions, (b) the adequacy of the
macroeconomic policy framework, and (c) the overall satisfactory implementation of the
program.”73
Therefore, the Bank may impose certain conditions to borrowing countries.
However, these conditions are based only in economic arguments, which happens
because the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, on the Section 10 of the Article IV, state the
prohibition of political activity:
“The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I”.74
This prohibition does not mean that political aspects are not taken into account
when analyzing a loan – they obviously are object of analysis – but they are only on the
impact of the political situation of the borrower on the success of the program.
Therefore, the current interpretation of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement does not give
flexibility to conditionality outside strictly “economic” matters.
70Legal VicePresidency, World Bank; Review Of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects Of Conditionality In PolicyBased Lending. June 29, 2005.71WORLD BANK, OP 8.60 Development Policy Lending. January 2004. Available at (Last accessed on 03/19/07): http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/tocall/AD55139DFE937EE585256EEF00504282?OpenDocument 72 WORLD BANK, OP 8.60 273Review of world bank conditionality (2005).74IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article IV, Section 10. Available at (Last accessed on 03/19/07) :http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049603~pagePK:43912~piPK:36602,00.html#I11
Nevertheless, the conditionalities imposed mostly on the 1980s and 1990s,
having “strictly economic” targets, by both the Bank and the International Monetary
Fund to their borrowers, were accused by many to be unsuccessful and have harmful
impacts both economically and socially.75 Eventually, there came the introduction of
“good governance” and even military expenditures reduction conditionalities, but the
incorporation of a systematic “peace conditionality” has not come to place yet.76 Such
conditionalities could be imposed to conflictprone countries as a way to prevent the
escalation of conflict. The imposition of such conditionalities by the Bank, though,
would need a reinterpretation of or even an amendment to its Articles of Agreement,
which can be suggested by the Executive Directors and would need later approval by the
Board of Governors.77
Hence, the conditionalities are a strong instrument of the World Bank to achieve
its goals. Bearing in mind the problems regarding the distribution of goods, wealth and
even governmental services throughout a country and, in consequence, the national
government capacities, the Bank must impose conditionalities targeting determined
behaviors from the governments. Conditionalities would be successful policies in
countries where the conflicts are financed by drugs or any sort of illegal trade, such as
Colombia and Afghanistan. It is important also to emphasize that “Policy conditionality
requires casebycase analysis. Depending on social and physical conditions, it may not
be appropriate to introduce wideranging conditionalities all at once.”78
2.5. Operational Prevention Policies
2.5.1. Contingent Emergency Loans
75See: BELELI, Özsel ; Aid as a peacemaker: a view from Burundi. Justice and Peace Certificate Senior Thesis, 2001. and BOYCE, James and PASTOR, Manuel; Aid for Peace: Can International Financial Institutions Help Prevent Conflict? PERI – University of Massachusetts Amherst, 1998. and World Bank "Conditionalities" Greg Palast; The Observer, London. October 10, 2001. available at (last accessed 03/20/07): http://www.laleva.cc/economy/worldbank.html 76 BELELI, Özsel ; Aid as a peacemaker: a view from Burundi. Justice and Peace Certificate Senior Thesis, 2001, p. 34.77Interpretations of the IBRD Articles of Agreement arising between members and the Bank are subject to the analysis of the Executive Directors (Article IX – Interpretation); Ammendments to the Articles can be suggested either by members, Governors or the Executive Directors, but have to be further approved by the Board of Governors (Article VIII – Amendments). 78WORLD BANK, The World Bank Experience with PostConflict Reconstruction. The World Bank: Washington DC, 1998, p. 22.
The World Bank, in spite of its major linkage to structural prevention, has also
policies designed for emergency situations. According to Operational Policy 8.00,
January 2007,
“Recognizing the importance of (...) crisis prevention into the development strategies of countries at high risk of (...) rising conflict (...,) the Bank may provide technical assistance and finance investments to build a country’s capacity for emergency preparedness and management through regular investment operations. Such investment operations may also include a contingent emergency support component that would enable the borrower to withdraw loan funds during a defined drawdown period upon occurrence of an emergency.”79
Thus, in cases of an alarming escalation of conflict, the Bank can use emergency
resources to cover costs of “measures such as factfinding and monitoring missions,
negotiation, mediation, the creation of channels for dialogue among contending groups,
preventive deployments, and confidencebuilding”.80 In this sense, cooperation with
different international organizations is extremely important. Moreover, the Bank can
give incentives or impose sanctions on the national government, trying to stop the onset
of violence.
It is worth emphasizing that according to the Bank’s Operational Directive 8.50
“emergency credits or loans to such countries (…) fall under Operational Directive
8.50, ‘Lending by the Bank for Emergencies,’ which discourages the application of
conditionality to emergency operations unless ‘directly linked to the cause of the
emergency.’”81
2.5.2. Cooperation with different international organizations
Furthermore, a significant number of academic researches82 suggest that a more
profound cooperation between international agencies and NGOs would probably aid the
process of conflict prevention. As Ackermann exposes, “it is necessary (...) that a
significant number of international and regional organizations, national governments,
and nongovernmental organizations (…) be convinced to incorporate preventive
79 WORLD BANK, Operational Police 8.00. The World Bank Operational Manual, January 2007. Available at: http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf/281c0896c54307a18525699e005e12b4/404b870c4053068085257292001936cf?OpenDocument . Last accessed: 04/15/200780ACKERMANN, Alice. The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 40, no 3, 2003.81WORLD BANK, The World Bank Experience with PostConflict Reconstruction. The World Bank: Washington DC, 199882 For all, ACKERMANN, The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention, 2003, p. 7.
policies into their agendas and programs (...).”83 As Beleli states, the NGOs, which are
usually much closer to the communities than other organizations, improve dialogue
between parties in societies on the verge of violence and can promote understanding
easily, preserving this community as an “enclave of peace”.84 Furthermore, a stronger
communication with NGOs may improve the Bank’s projects’ effectiveness, by using
these organizations’ closer knowledge of the situation to avoid mistakes that could lead
to fuel conflict instead of preventing it.
A deeper communication with other multilateral agencies is also decisive, once it
could make work much more efficient. The World Bank’s Operational Policy 8.00
recognizes the ultimate importance of this cooperation: “Harmonization,
collaboration, and cooperation with other development partners—including
participating in joint strategy discussions and conducting activities in concert with
them—are key to mobilization of needed resources and to a successful response to an
emergency.”85 Moreover, case studies have proved that the Bank can also play a crucial
role as aid coordinator on conflict affected countries. These nations frequently receive
aid from many donors, which must be effectively managed – a difficult task for
governments usually torn apart. The Bank could, therefore, play a role of “leadership
on macroeconomic and external debt issues, strengthening policy dialog and policy
reform, and mobilizing resources.”86
As we can see, there are several potential policies for preventing conflict. They
may fit as regular Bank actions – like development enhancing – as well as innovative
sorts of actions, or even as a change on the Bank’s policies – as the peace conditionalit
ies. It is important to discuss the possibilities suggested here, and obviously others, in
order to create a solid policy framework for the Bank on the matter of conflict preven
tion, which could improve and contribute to the work that is already being done by other
international organizations and governments.
83ACKERMANN, The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention, 2003, p. 7.84BELELI, Öszel. Aid as peacemaker: a view from Burundi. Justice and Peace Certificate Senior Thesis, 2001.85WORLD BANK, PO 8.00, 2007.86KREIMER, Alcira; ERIKSSON, John; MUSCAT, Robert; ARNOLD , Margaret and SCOTT, Colin. The World Bank’s Experience with PostConflict Reconstruction. The World Bank, Washington, 1998.
3. Previous International Action
3.1. The World Bank
“Since its inception as the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the World Bank has had a long history of involvement in postconflict
reconstruction.”87 The increasing number of civil conflicts in the postCold War period
has made it necessary for the Bank to have in its scope not only reconstruction, but also
conflict prevention. The Bank’s portfolio of conflictrelated projects was over $6 billion
by the late 1990’s. Reflecting the Bank’s proactive role in preventing conflicts, the
PostConflict Unit was renamed in 2002 as the Unit for Conflict Prevention and
Reconstruction.88
The World Bank perceives Conflict Prevention, as well as PostConflict
Reconstruction as critical goals to its mission of poverty reduction. In this perspective,
the Bank recognizes “the vicious circles in many of the world's poorest states, where
poverty causes conflict and conflict causes poverty”.89 Bearing this fact in mind, the
Bank has developed its Poverty Reduction Strategies in several conflictaffected
countries90, also including countries on the edge of conflict, such as Burundi, Chad and
Sri Lanka. PRSPs91 are constituted of policy actions designed to increase sustainable
growth and to reduce poverty. Considering each country’s reality, the program is based
in four key areas of content: “(i) macroeconomic and structural policies to support
sustainable growth, including on that the participation of the poor; (ii) improvements in
governance and public sector financial management; (iii) appropriate sector policies
and programs; and (iv) realistic budgets and appropriate levels of funding for the major
programs.”92
The link between countries classified as LowIncome Countries under Stress
(LICUS) and conflictaffected countries is tangible as countries in this situation are
considerably more susceptible to fall into conflict than any other. In this context,
87 DAVIS, Gloria. A history of the social development Network in the World Bank, 1973 – 2002.Washington DC: World Bank, 2004.88 Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. The role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development. Washington D.C: World Bank, 200489 Toward a ConflictSensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy. Washington D.C: World Bank, 200590 Conflictaffected countries are countries at risk of conflict, counties in a conflict situation and countries in a instable postconflict situation.91 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper;92 Page 44.Toward a ConflictSensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy. Washington D.C: World Bank, 2005
policies and strategies that can decrease the effects and risks of conflict are a greater
priority in LICUS than elsewhere.93 According to that, the LICUS Unit and the Conflict
Prevention and Reconstruction Unit are developing a joint work program to support the
implementation of the LICUS Task Force’s recommendations and to assist and guide the
preparation of LICUS pilot strategies (e.g., Angola, Central African Republic, Haiti,
Somalia and Sudan).94 According to the Bank, as a result of this task, “in a relatively
short time, without creating new instruments or bureaucratic responses, the work of the
Task Force brought a more nuanced approach on good governance, policy reform and
service provision in circumstances of chronic instability or ‘zerogeneration’ reforms”.95
Another important factor always taken into account by the World Bank is the
natural resource dependence. In this issue, the Bank has taken strong actions, such as
requiring countries which need financial aid to report the transparency of the natural
resources’ revenues and expenditures.96 An expressive example of that is the World
Bank’s innovating handling of the Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline’s financial situation.
The Bank’s loans became conditional to Chad’s compliance with strict accounting and
spending management.97
It is very important to stress the Bank’s stance: “while the OP/BP 2.30 sets the
overall context and provides a flexible framework for the Bank’s engagement on
conflictaffected countries, it also makes clear that, in line with the mandate specified in
its Articles of Agreement, the Bank does not engage in peacemaking or peacekeeping
operations, does not provide direct support for disarming combatants, and does not
provide humanitarian relief, all of which are functions assumed by the United Nations
and other agencies or donors.”98 The OP 2.30 sets a general framework for the Bank’s
procedures on conflictaffected countries; it stresses the limits for the Bank’s activities
and engagement before, during and after conflict. However, OP 2.30, from January
93 COLLIER, Paul and DOLLAR, David. Development effectiveness: what have we learnt? The Economic Journal, 200494 The LICUS Pilot Strategies are a group of policies such as improving good governance, poverty reduction, leadership building, supporting programmes to fight HIV/AIDS, for example.95 Page 7. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. The role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development. Washington D.C: World Bank, 200496 PALLEY, Thomas I. Lifting the Natural Resource Course. Foreign Service Journal, 200397 Breaking the Conflict Trap. Washington D.C: World Bank, 200398 Page 9. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. The role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development. Washington D.C: World Bank, 2004
2001, not only does not treat on specific measures for conflict prevention, but it was also
created and released before the crucial changes in international relations after 2001.99
3.2. Other Organizations
The Civil Society, Governments, International Organizations and NGOs have
played an essential role in Civil Conflict Prevention since the 1990s. In this perspective,
some initiatives can be identified, such as those from the UN, in diverse fields of
actions; from the Kimberley Process, in the natural resource dependence; and from the
OSCE, in the avoidance of conflicts in the Balkans’ region.
3.2.1. The United Nations
Regarding prevention of armed conflicts, the 60th Session of the General
Assembly has stated: “The most effective way to prevent crisis is to reduce the impact of
risk factors.”100 In order to answer to this commitment, the UN has developed many
projects in various fields of action: regulations on the trade of resources that fuel
conflict; attempts to prevent illicit flows of small arms and light weapons and the spread
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; efforts to combat narcotics’ cultivation,
trafficking and addiction; actions against HIV/AIDS; and steps to reduce environmental
degradation, with its associated economic and political fallout.
A good example of UN policies on this matter is the Building National Capacity
for Conflict Prevention “a joint programme of the Department of Political Affairs and
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (… ) actively helping Governments,
political parties and members of civil society to acquire the skills they need to resolve
disputes peacefully before they lead to violence.”101 During 2005, the program was
active in Guyana, Ecuador, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and Yemen.102
In the military field, the most important action was the assessment of preventive
deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP103), which was established in March 1995 to
99 OP 2.30, “Development Cooperation and Conflict”, January 2001, World Bank. Available at: http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/80e1478c4b21f85d852570bb00810e95/5870698de018c520852569e5004ec9ad?OpenDocument#7.%20IBRD%20Articles%20of%20Agreement%2C%20Ar Last accessed on 10/09/07.100 A/60/891. Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict. New York City: United Nations, 2006101 Page 14. A/60/1. Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the work of the Organization. New York City: United Nations, 2006102 http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/conflict.html. Last Access in 05/18/2007103 The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
replace the UNPROFOR104. Its mandate came to an end in February 1999 by decision of
the Security Council.105
3.2.2. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
Related to the natural resources dependence, the Kimberley Process is the most
well known example in this area. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is a joint
initiative of governments, the international diamond industry and civil society, which
imposed the certification of diamonds’ origins from conflictfree states.106 The process
was established in 2003 to prevent rebel groups and their rivals from financing their
operations with diamond sales. Nowadays, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
has evolved into an effective mechanism for stopping conflict diamonds’ trade and
covers 99.8 per cent of the global production of rough diamonds.
3.2.3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The OSCE is an international organization for security, which has fixed its
attention into regional cooperation: focus on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis
management and postconflict rehabilitation.107 Its Conflict Prevention Center organizes
and conducts a significant number of programs and activities in conflictaffected areas
in close coordination with other international and regional organizations. These
programs focus in areas such as border security and management, education, regional
seminars on Small Arms and Light Weapons, war crime issues, among others.
Furthermore, the organization also works with early warning mechanisms and field
operations, 108 and has also developed closer cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in matters linked to conflict prevention.109 The Organization has
also an innovative body – the High Commissioner on National Minorities, which should
provide early warning in cases of tensions involving national minorities. The OSCE’s
first large mission in conflict area, the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, took place in
104 The United Nations Protection Forces105 http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm Last Access in 05/18/2007106 http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=14&Itemid=26. Last Access 05/18/2007107 Annual Report on OSCE activities 2006. Vienna, Austria: OSCE, 2006108 http://www.osce.org/about/13510.html Last Access in 05/18/2007109 The European securityand the relationship between the OSCE and NATO. http://membres.lycos.fr/tomdsm/otanosce.pdf
the former Yugoslavia in December 1995. The OSCE has established missions in a
substantial number of countries in the Balkans region.110
4. Bloc Positions
4.1. Developed countries
The United States of America is the World Bank’s largest shareholder and represents the
main source of the institution’s development assistance throughout the world. According
to that, the World Bank “recognizes the United States as both a significant financial
contributor and a steadfast partner in the effort to achieve the organization's
overarching mission of poverty reduction in developing countries”.111 Countries like
Iraq, Congo, Jordan, and Afghanistan, which are witnessing internal conflict, receive a
significant aid from the US government.112 The United States supports the efforts of
World Bank in achieving transparency, good governance and credibility among
developing countries. Therefore, policies aimed at the improvement of national
institutions and establishment of democratic governments are one of the main trends in
American policy nowadays. The United States has also historically supported the Bank’s
preventive efforts, as long as they do not disrespect key principles such as free trade.
As the second largest shareholder of the World Bank, Japan has a long history of
cooperation and participation in multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations
and the Bank. On what relates to conflict, the country is currently delivering a major
assistance program to Reconstruction Operations (Kosovo, TimorLeste, Sri Lanka,
Afghanistan, and Iraq) and also PostConflict Assistance113. In this sense, according to
the shifts in the Bank’s policy, Japan also sees Conflict Prevention as a necessary tool
for development worldwide.
The Japan Policy and Human Resource Development Fund is an extraordinary
instrument for such policies, mainly due to its ability to make resources available to the
public sector in the poorest countries, aiming at the acquisition of technical expertise
110 Georgia (Dec/92 ); in Moldova (Feb/93 – Feb/95); Croatia (Apr/96 ); and Montenegro (Jun/06 ), as well as a Presence in Albania (Mar/97 ).111 WORLD BANK. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EXTUS/0,,menuPK:668561~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:668549,00.html Last Accessed in: 05/19/2007.112 PHERSON, Randolph. Developing a More Effective Conflict Prevention Capacity in anIncreasingly Unstable World. December 18, 2000. 113 www.worldbank.org
and the promotion of capacity building by these countries. Hence, the Japanese
government attempts to help countries formulate their own reforms and investment
programs, in order to achieve poverty reduction and socioeconomic growth. Asia and
Oceania have the largest assistance amount from the country.
Europe has a strong representation among the largest shareholders of the World
Bank owing it to the German, French and English significant voting powers.
Furthermore, other European countries are represented in the Board of Executive
Directors, such as Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Switzerland. The
European Union supports the reconstruction and conflict prevention programs of the
Bank, mainly those aimed at poverty reduction. The United Kingdom has mechanisms
such as the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), which is the UK’s main conflict prevention
strategy.114
The European Commission is the main interlocutor of the World Bank among
other EU institutions. It is responsible for a great part of the European actions in
developing countries, such as aid and trade.115 Another important part of the European
organization for the Bank’s action is the European Investment Bank, which is financed
through loans on the financial markets and also by contributions from European
countries. The European Investment Bank has programs of effective assistance to
African countries, concentrating on poverty reduction and social reconstruction in
conflictaffected countries. These assistance programs are followed by countries like
Canada, which spent $4.1billion in official development assistance in 200405 and is
currently supporting development efforts in more than 150 countries around the
world.116
The European Union is a major international player in preventing conflict and
civil violence. It has a significant number of agreements with developing countries, in
which not only trade benefits and aid issues are included, but also support for economic
reforms and security issues, such as the nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.117 It supports improvements on economic credibility, transparency and
governance, also encouraging developing countries to extinguish trade barriers. The EU
114 AUSTIN and CHALMERS. Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd. 2004.115 www.worldbank.org colocar o link da página específica116 www.worldbank.org colocar o link específico117 EUROPEAN UNION. A world player: the European Union’s external relations. 2004.
does not support efforts in order to implement trade barriers, as they deeply regard such
policies as harmful to international trade.
4.2. Developing countries
The developing countries, mainly the conflictaffected ones, are the most
interested in achieving important results on this subject. In order to eradicate poverty
and hunger from their populations, the developing countries’ governments believe that
measures such as the diversification of exports and of the economy as a whole, and also
a better relationship with organizations such as the World Bank, are extremely important
on this new wave of globalization. Counting on the support of the Bank, these countries
could implement economic policies more emphatically, achieving a better economic
situation more quickly. The World Bank’s loans also are viewed within a positive scope,
as they help countries’ economies have more credibility and attract more foreign
investments. For conflictaffected countries, it is a core interest to stop violence and
conflict, in order to be able to establish a more comfortable environment for their
populations. Despite the great power possessed by the developed countries, the
negotiation possibilities at the Board of Executive Directors remain in a joint effort of
the developing countries.
Nevertheless, there is also a skeptical vision of conflict prevention actions
highlighted by developing countries. This position understands that conflict prevention
measures could be a way for foreign actors to intervene in national policies and create a
gateway for intrusive management from abroad on matters of national interest, such as
natural resources. Considering conflict prevention as an extension of development
cooperation in general, these countries argue that external aid to prevent conflicts
should be focused on longterm partnership as a way to reduce violence risks by
increasing development sustainability, while also aware of the central role played by the
local dynamics. In sum, this approach believes that actions to help “countries (…)
develop and strengthen their own capacities to handle their problems, rather than trying
to do things for them, [offer] the only hope for durable results”.118
The People’s Republic of China sees economic development as an essential
element to any kind of conflict prevention policy. Noninterventionism is one of the 118 WOOD, Bernard. Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (Second Draft). Ottawa, Canada. June 2001
most important principles of Chinese foreign policy since 1989, 119 and the country states
that any kind of more concrete action to prevent conflict must only be taken by demand
of the affected country.120 However, the country sees international and regional
cooperation as a possible instrument for preventing conflict, mainly by promoting
development policies and enforcing institutions against terrorism, extremism and
separatism – the “three evils” of the Shangai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which
groups China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.121
The Russian Federation is one of the members of the “Shangai five”, but, more
importantly, it is the main sponsor of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
which views conflict prevention as a main preoccupation on its charter.122 Russia is
always concerned with the maintenance of stability on its neighboring areas such as
Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, as China, the Russians see with concern any
kind of policy that affects State sovereignty in the name of conflict prevention.123 With
regards to the relevant arms producing sector of the country, the Russian government
claims to be “…undertaking measures at the national level to tighten control over the
export, production and supplies of small arms and light weapons and intensifying the
fight against their illicit proliferation.”124
The OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members support
the World Bank’s efforts to improve the institutions and governance issues on countries
highly dependent on oil exports, as they believe conflict prevention can be a path
towards poverty reduction. Through its Fund for International Development (OFID) they
have already taken strong steps toward the eradication of poverty.125 They believe,
however, that oil is not the real problem, but the use given by governments to its
revenues and expenditures. In this sense, they support the World Bank’s policies which
are targeted on governance and credibility amelioration, bearing in mind that oil exports
revenues can be a beneficial instrument to social and economic development.
119 TAYLOR, Ian. China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36, 3, pp. 443±460. London: Cambridge University Press, 1998.120 http://english.people.com.cn/english/200007/21/eng20000721_46053.html 121 http://www.sectsco.org/html/00035.html122 Charter of the CIS, http://www.therussiasite.org/legal/laws/CIScharter.html#IV 123 http://www.globalpolicy.org/visitctr/lstsrv/2001/ls0625.htm 124 http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2001/kirtonkokotis.pdf125 OFID. Making a difference. 2006.
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER
1. Does the World Bank have a role on the prevention of civil conflict? Should, or could,
this role be increased? To what extent?
2. Which are the main characteristics of countries on the edge of violence? How could
the World Bank identify such countries in order to work on the adoption of preventive
policies?
3. Which policies could be applied in order to reduce conflict probability in countries
rich in natural resources?
4. How can the Bank cooperate with other international agencies? Would this
cooperation help in conflict prevention? How?
5. Could the Bank impose conditionalities on countries that witness ethnic dominance?
How can our institution deal with corruption and governance issues? Does our scope
allow policies on such matters?
6. Should the Board of Executive Directors work on new policies, such as Special
Conditionalities? Could the Bank impose “peace conditionalities” on countries prone to
the onset of violence? How and in which specific cases?
7. Is there a real linkage between trade specialization and conflict? Can specialization be
a good thing or countries should adopt policies to diminish it?
6. REFERENCES
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BOYCE, James and PASTOR, Manuel; Aid for Peace: Can International Financial Institutions Help Prevent Conflict? PERI – University of Massachusetts Amherst, 1998.
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KALYVAS, Stathis. Les guerres civiles après le fin de la Guerre froide. In : HASSNER, Pierre. Guerres et sociétés. Ed. Karthala, Paris: 2003
KEYLOR, William R. The Twentieth Century World. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
KREIMER, Alcira; ERIKSSON, John; MUSCAT, Robert; ARNOLD , Margaret and SCOTT, Colin. The World Bank’s Experience with PostConflict Reconstruction. The World Bank, Washington, 1998.
PENUELA, Edgar Pinto. El surgimiento de las FARC. Universidad de Nueva Granada, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos, 2001
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RICARDO, David. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Cosimo Classics, 2006.
ROUSSEAU, JeanJacques. The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Kessinger Publishing, 2004.
SANDOLE, Dennis. Capturing the Complexity of Conflict Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts in the PostCold War Era ; Routledge, 1999.
WALLENSTEEN, Peter. Understanding Conflict Resolution war, peace and the global system. Sage, 2002.
Articles from Periodicals
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COLLIER, Paul and DOLLAR, David. Development effectiveness: what have we learnt? The Economic Journal, 2004.
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FREDHOLM, Michael, Uzbekistan and the threat of Islamic extremism, Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2003.
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7. ANNEX: CASE STUDIES
Colombia
The civil conflict in Colombia is one of the longest in the world. The violence
between the Colombian government, insurgent movements such as the FARC
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army)
and paramilitary forces, such as the United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (AUC),
initiated about forty years ago and from then on has caused extremely high economic,
human and social costs to the Latin American country126. The appearance of the
guerrilla groups was associated with social and political claims for changes on the
structural basis of the Colombian society, which quickly found in communist principles
its ideological umbrella.
By the 1940’s, Colombia had not accomplished the eradication of the social,
political and economic grievances dated of its colonization process. The high political
instability in the country contributed to the rise of insurgent groups. During the period
of “La Violencia”127 (194858), the insurgent groups passed through three phases of
126 “Over 100,000 people had died as a direct result of fighting in the last two decades, and another two million had lost their jobs, homes, and land. (…) Violence had been estimated to cost some 2 percentage points of GDP each year: the average Colombian income would have been 50 percent higher had the fighting stopped 20 years ago. Internal violence had dampened investment, and led to huge revenue losses—with sabotaged pipelines alone reducing government income by US$500 million per annum.” WORLD BANK. Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report For The Republic Of Colombia For The Period Fy03Fy07. 2005.127 This was a turbulent period in Colombian history as important changes were occurring in the country, as shifts in the labor market, rural uprisings and political violence. See: SÁNCHEZ, Gonzalo. La Violencia in Colombia: New Research, New questions. Hispanic American Review, 65, 789807, 1985.
gestation128, culminating in the foundation of the FARC and the ELN in 1964. In this
sense, despite its claims of communist and MarxistLeninist orientation, the FARC’s
goals had also nationalistic allegations. From its beginning to the present conflict, the
FARC continues to base its claims on two principal documents: the Communist
Manifest and an Agrarian Reform proposal, characterizing such dialectic relationship
between internal and external aspects of the guerrilla’s allegations.
By the 1990’s, the perception of the insurgent movement shifted to a deep
association with the narcotics trade. Not only countries like the United States of
America, but even the Colombian president of the period, Ernesto Samper (19941998),
believed that the FARC had a strong financial linkage with the narcotics traffickers.129
According to this perception, the government of Samper, trying to achieve a better
relationship with the American government, initiated a program of eradication of the
cultivation areas. This program, however, did not accomplished good results, as “such
radicalization meant, in real terms, the progressive increase of the guerrilla’s presence
on the Colombian territory, which arose from 17,5% of the cities in its control in 1985 to
59,8% in 1995”.130
The deterioration of the circumstances culminated in the renouncement of
Ernesto Samper and the beginning of the government of Andrés Pastrana (19982002).
In the same period, the growing participation of paramilitary groups, such as the AUC,
which were also financed by the narcotics traffic, worsened Colombia’s government
situation. The main measure adopted by the new government, as its peace efforts failed,
was the adoption and application of the Plan Colombia, an initiative from the American
government to eradicate the cultivation areas, and, as a consequence, the insurgent
movement.
Plan Colombia was received positively by Colombia and also by other countries
in the region, as all of them perceived the conflict as a transnational problem. The
program was targeted on the strengthening of the Colombian Armed Forces, as well as
128 PENUELA, Edgar Pinto. El surgimiento de las FARC. Universidad de Nueva Granada, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos, 2001 (our translation).129 VILLA, Rafael Duarte; OSTOS, Maria del Pilar. Relations between Colombia, its neighbors and the United States: Views on the Security Agenda. Rev. Bras. Polit. Int. 48 (2) : 86110, 2005, p. 99 (our translation).130 VILLA, Rafael Duarte; OSTOS, Maria del Pilar. Relations between Colombia, its neighbours and the United States: Views on the Security Agenda. Rev. Bras. Polit. Int. 48 (2) : 86110, 2005, p. 90 (our translation).
the eradication of coca production areas. The FARC, on the other hand, claimed that the
Plan was another American initiative in order to control Colombian internal affairs. As
a matter of fact, “the practical arm of the Department of State’s antidrugs strategies
was focused on the interdiction and on the control and, hence, could not be efficient, as
it assumed capabilities that the Andean countries do not have”.131 Within the election of
Álvaro Uribe, the country witnessed a deep program of destruction of coca cultivation
areas,132 diminishing the actions of the insurgent groups. Moreover, the disbanding of
the paramilitary forces of United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and also of
some guerrilla forces were important steps towards peace.133
However, International Crisis Group alerts for the renewing of the conflict, as
new paramilitary actors appear on the country134. According to the organization, it is
still early to tell if “Colombia is witnessing the failure of AUC demobilization and
reinsertion and the resurgence of paramilitaries, or experiencing a reshaping of the
criminal world, including the atomization of actors that had been more or less united
under the AUC umbrella.”135 Moreover, while the insurgent groups continue to attack
government facilities and to fight paramilitary forces, unclear peace efforts part from
the government, which is accused of supporting the paramilitary rightwinged forces.136
The worsening of the situation not only means great economic losses to
Colombia, but also destabilizes the region as a whole, compromising peace efforts. The
Colombian conflict is thus highly linked not only to traditional natural resources, having
oil as the main export products of the country, but also to narcotics, mainly coca and
poppy, meaning it may have developed a very complicated and difficult to solve conflict
trap. As Michael Ross emphasizes, narcotics do not influence the onset of the conflict,
131 VILLA, Rafael Duarte; OSTOS, Maria del Pilar. Relations between Colombia, its neighbours and the United States: Views on the Security Agenda. Rev. Bras. Polit. Int. 48 (2) : 86110, 2005, p. 94 (our translation).132 International crisis group website. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1269. Last accessed in 05/19/2007.133 WORLD BANK. Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report For The Republic Of Colombia For The Period Fy03Fy07. 2005.134 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. Colombia’s new armed groups. Latin America Report N°20 – 10 May 2007.135 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP. Colombia’s new armed groups. Latin America Report N°20 – 10 May 2007.136International crisis group website. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=cw_search&l=1&t=1&cw_country=29&cw_date= Last accessed: 05/20/2007.
but have a strong relationship with its duration, turning the Colombian conflict into a
useful example for Conflict Prevention.
Nigeria
The Federal Republic of Nigeria was officially a British colony until October 1st
1960, when the British Parliament declared it an independent member of the
Commonwealth. But it was only in 1963 that it was proclaimed a Constitutional
Republic, when the country was divided in four regions, having its first parliamentary
elections held one year later.137 However, already on 1966 the country witnessed two
military coups d’état and the first civil war took place, when the Eastern region declared
its independence from the central government, denominating itself as the Republic of
Biafra.138 With a loss of over a million lives, the war ended in 1970 when the region was
occupied by the Nigerian federal forces.139
The Biafra War strengthened the National Army, within the presidency of
General Gowon, who assured he would hold elections and restore democracy in 1976.
However, in the absence of Gowon in 1975, General Mohammed came to power and
promoted a program of moralization throughout the country until he restored
democracy in 1979, when elections lead Shehu Shagari, from the National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) to power.140 The diminishing of the oil boom in 1981 decreased Nigerian
revenues and demanded a severe cut on public expenses. By the elections held in 1983,
the Shagari government was weak and accused of fraud on the elections that officially
gave the NPN power again. The circumstances brought about another coup d’état.141 The
new military period, controlled first by General Ibrahim Babangida from 1985 to 1993
and secondly by General Sani Abacha, lasted until 1999.142 The transition to democracy
was completed only a year after Abacha’s death, with the election of Olusegun
Obasanjo, from the People’s Democratic Party, for the presidency in 1999.
137 The library of the Congress, Country Profiles. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf 138 Religion, History, and Politics in Nigeria Essays in Honor of Ogbu U. Kalu, publié par Chima J. Korieh, G. Ugo Nwokeji. University press of America.139 International Crisis Group ; http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=82 140 Le Nigeria Contemporain, BACH, Daniel. Ed. du CNRS, Paris 1986, pg. 106141 Le Nigeria Contemporain, BACH, Daniel. Ed. du CNRS, Paris 1986, pg 116142 International Crisis Group ; http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=82
Nigeria has, therefore, a very troubled history since it became independent. The
country is the most populous of Africa, and also one of the richest in oil – the main
source of the country’s revenues. Actually, “between 1970 and 1999, the Nigerian
petroleum industry generated about $231 billion in rents, or $1900 for every man,
woman, and child. Yet from 1970 to 1999 Nigeria’s real income per capita fell from $264
to $250 a year.”143 We can thus notice that Nigeria fits the profile of a conflict prone
country, as we established throughout this study guide: 1) it is highly dependent on one
natural resource; 2) it witnessed conflicts on its recent history; 3) it faces ethnic division
over power; 4) it has governance problems144 and 5) presents a significant amount of its
population under poverty conditions.145
The oil region of the Niger Delta, on the South of Nigeria, has already faced
strong conflicts (chiefly on 1997, 1999 and 2003), mainly between two militias – Ijaw
and Itsekiri. These conflicts have taken thousands of lives and destroyed several villages
on the region, with reports of serious human rights violations.146 The rebel groups’ main
source of financing is oil bunkering, which causes losses to the enterprises equivalent to
the production of a small oil country.147 One of the main sources of unrest in the region
is the claim that oil revenues remain centralized as a part of the Petroleum Act148 – the
oil producing regions, such as the Delta one, receive only a minor part of them. As a
result, oil companies suffer almost daily with sabotage and even kidnappings of their
staff.
As we can see, the question of oil dependency is a key factor for civil conflict in
Nigeria: the concentration of the country’s economic activities on the oil sector makes
other sectors – such as agriculture – weaker, since even if oil revenues grow they have a
143 Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor, ROSS, Michael; UCLA Department of Political Science. http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/NigeriaOil.pdf 144 After the end of the military regime, almost 500 million dollars coming from oil revenues were discovered on a Swiss bank account belonging to General Abacha. (The library of the Congress, Country Profiles. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf) 145 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4272&l=1 146Crisis group report: Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis. http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/west_africa/118_fuelling_the_niger_delta_crisis.pdf 147 Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis.pg.8. http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/west_africa/118_fuelling_the_niger_delta_crisis.pdf 148 This act states that the State is the only owner of the country’s oil, therefore the only responsible for issuing permits and licenses of exploitation. http://www.nigerialaw.org/Petroleum%20Act.htm
low multiplication effect on the economy.149150The fighting over land and oil revenues
and the politicization of ethnicity has put ethnic groups against each other, like in the
Delta region conflicts.151 Moreover, another factor of risk is the uncertainty of Nigerian
institutions, still recovering from years of undemocratic rule.152 Recently, the
presidential elections of April 2007 occurred under troubled a context of fraud, raising
violent protests on several states. These circumstances leave the situation of the country
even more complicated and certainly increase the risk of escalation to a civil war.153
Uzbekistan
In 1924, Soviet planners established the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan
as a political entity, being a part of the Soviet Union’s strategy for the Central Asian
region. The country remained attached to the USSR until its end, and in 1991 it became
the Republic of Uzbekistan.154 Uzbekistan’s current President, Islam Karimov, rose to
power for the first time in 1989 as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of
Uzbekistan after violent clashes between ethnic groups took place on the Ferghana
Valley region.155
After the end of the USSR, Karimov was elected president with 86% of the votes
on the highly contested elections of 1991.156 Following this process, a new constitution
was issued in 1992, suppressing all opposition parties.157 During the 1990’s, Uzbekistan
watched continuous centralization of power on the figure of Karimov, who banned
oppositionists and suppressed many civic liberties. In 1995, a referendum allowed
Karimov to cancel the elections set for 1996 and extended his mandate until 2000. After
149 Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor, ROSS, Michael; UCLA Department of Political Science. http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/NigeriaOil.pdf 150 The multiplication effect is the effect that one sector has over other sector of the economy. The oil sector has a low multiplication effect since it produces mainly for exportation and employs few local workers – not distributing wealth locally. 151 World Bank and DFID. Country Partnership Strategy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 152 World Bank and DFID. Country Partnership Strategy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria.153 Crisis Watch report n°45, 1 May 2007. pg. 4. http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2007/cw45.pdf 154 International Crisis Group, Conflict history: Uzbekistan. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=114 155 Library of the Congress, Country profiles. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Uzbekistan.pdf 156 International Crisis Group, Conflict history: Uzbekistan. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=114157 Library of the Congress, Country profiles. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Uzbekistan.pdf
new elections and a new referendum on 2002, Karimov once again has power granted
until 2008.
During the Soviet period, Uzbekistan was a centre of cotton production, and the
primary sector remains the base of the country’s production, although it is rich in
natural resources such as natural gas and oil.158 The Uzbek population remains poor,
with a GNP per capita of US$ 520159, and has very low standards of living. Even though
80% of the Uzbek population is Islamic, the Karimov regime continues to be secular,
and has the religious question as a major concern, claiming that Islamic extremists pose
threat to the government.
In fact, since the mid 1990’s Islamic groups have appeared in the country – the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was created in 1996, with close links to the
Taliban regime on neighbouring Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda. The first terrorist
attacks claimed by the IMU (which declared Jihad against the Uzbek government)
happened in 1999, and were followed by guerrilla actions.160 The raise of the IMU made
the Islamic extremism one of the main concerns of the Karimov’s regime, and a source
for more repression. Although the invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Taliban
regime weakened the IMU, terrorist acts were still reported in 2004.
The Uzbek government faces external pressure for its disregard to human rights
and civil liberties; the peak of this question was the Andijan massacre in 2005 – which
was even followed by sanctions of the European Community.161 In 13 May 2005, protests
on the city of Andijan were followed by killings when the National Security troops
intervened – the official number is 187 deaths, but the real numbers are believed to be of
more than 700.162 The Uzbek government claimed the protest was an act from the IMU,
but it was actually a protest against the arrest of a group of local businessmen accused
of “religious fundamentalism”. There are reports of massive human rights abuse on that
operation, including several summary executions and execution of wounded people.163
158 World Bank, country brief. http://www.worldbank.org.uz/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/UZBEKISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20152186~menuPK:294195~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:294188,00.html 159 Source: World Development indicators, World Bank.160 FREDHOLM, Michael, Uzbekistan and the threat of Islamic extremism, Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2003.161 Human Rights Watch World Report 2006, pg 20.162 Uzbekistan: the Andijon uprising, International Crisis Group report, may 2005.163 Human Rights Watch report, “Bullets were falling like rain”, June 2005.
The Karimov regime thus faces several accusations of human rights abuses, hard
repression and widespread corruption, which can be (as on the Andijan case) a source of
social unrest, and are certainly on the basis of the raising Islamic extremism. The
government policies of continuous repression on religious manifestations are only likely
to worsen the situation. Moreover, the region of the Ferghana Valley (border with
Tadjikistan and Kirgyzstan) is believed to be a potential place for the raise of ethnic
conflicts, as already happened in 1989.164
As we can see, the Republic of Uzbekistan is a country that, even if mostly
stable, has possibilities of facing growing civil unrest and conflict. The main issues on
the country are related to governance: endemic corruption and disregard of individual
rights and public needs in a lowincome country can be a dangerous combination. The
religious and ethnic factors are not by themselves a source of conflict, but are extremely
worsened by poverty and repression by the government. As specialized reports state
“Uzbekistan is well down the path of selfdestruction”165, and this poses a threat not
only to this country, but to the entire region.
164 Fatimakhon Ahmedova and Keith A. Leitich, Ethnic and Religious Conflict in the Ferghana Valley http://fellowships.ssrc.org/gsc/publications/fellows/valley.pdf 165 International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1256&l=1