The Contours of Elite Contestation in Iran

Payam Mohseni, Ph.DHarvard University, Nov. 6, 2013.

Democratic Politics in an Islamic Theocracy

The rise of military dictatorship: Post-2009 election period

The success of sanctions: Following the 2013 presidential

victory of Hassan Rouhani

Two Dominant Discourses on Iran

A Military “Praetorian” State?

2005 and especially 2009 considered a coup staged by the Leader and IRGC (the Islamic Revolutionary Guards)

The increasing role of the IRGC (political, economic, social…)

The sidelining of reformists and even pragmatists, such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani. The narrowing of the regime’s base of power

Conclusion: elections do not matter; they do not play a significant role in regime politics there is no competition or uncertainty in the results; there are no meaningfully different candidates; state-society relations have fundamentally changed; the regime is neither a

republic nor Islamic

Crippling Sanctions?

Sanctions have hurt the interests of the elite and the population Economic “collapse” regime threat Popular discontent changing voter preferences

Concerted effort by regime to change course, image and behavior

Conclusion: Continue and/or increase sanctions to win concessions at the negotiation

table or bring the regime to its knees Implicitly, the military-led state path obstructed by the sanctions

Both views are simplistic and cannot capture the reality and complexity of Iranian politics.

A disregard for the inherent fluidity of the Iranian political scene due to an absence of party capacity.

Factionalism

A disregard for the checks-and-balances within the institutional framework of the political system

Iran as a hybrid regime

A hybrid regime is a political system that holds competitive elections for the executive and legislature without meeting the minimum definitional requirements of democracy.

They are not fully authoritarian because they have uncertain and competitive multiparty elections with turnover.

They are also not fully democratic because they violate a configuration of democratic principles, such as a poor civil liberties record and/or the existence of nondemocratic tutelary institutions.

The anomaly of “democratic” politics in an Islamic state

Iranian-Islamic discourse

The Islamic Republic Party (IRP)

The emergence of open factional competition

The dissolution of the IRP in 1987

An unintended consequence of the Islamic Revolution and constructing theocracy:

Under the banner of Islam, meaningful and significant policy differences came to the fore among the elite.

Difference on economic, socio-cultural, domestic, and foreign policies Factions

Classification of Iranian Political Factions

The Islamic Republic Party: 1979 - 1987

The Architecture of the Iranian political system

Multi-layered institutional design with numerous “veto players”

A veto player is an “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 1995)

Checks-and-Balances

Leadership restraints: Power-sharing, cooptation

Prevents the monopolization of power by any one political group or faction

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

Majles (Parliament)

Guardian Council

EPA

Expediency Council

Dolat.ir

Council of Experts

Factional FluidityTactical Political Alliances

The Islamic Republic Party: 1979 - 1987

The Alliance of the Right: 1989 - 1996

The Alliance of the Republicans: 1997 - 2004

The Alliance of the Theocrats: 2005 - 2013

The Alliance of the Right? 2013 -

A complex and multi-faceted regime architecture creates a robust system of institutional checks-and-balances that attracts and coopts—rather than excludes—the input of an eclectic set of political elite over time.

Due to the weakness of institutionalized parties, a single group or faction cannot monopolize the political game. The political scene is fluid and volatile. Alliances constantly shift, and factions are always competing.

An absence of the institutional capacity to create military or closed dictatorship

Overarching Patterns

The Fragmentation of the Alliance of the Theocrats - 2008

Republican Right versus Theocratic Left - 2009

The Power Triangle – 2010 to July 2013 – Khamenei Shifts

The Alliance of the Right? 2013 -

Sanctions may have helped perpetuate the fragmentation of the theocratic alliance, particularly pushing the theocratic right towards the republican right.

However, the impact of sanctions on the Iranian political system should be seen from a dynamic context – meaning change of impact over time.

And the impact of sanctions should be clearly delineated within the Iranian factional scene – a disaggregation from the “regime” level to actual factional politics

Sanctions

The delicate position of Rouhani within this competitive and shifting factional scene

If Rouhani cannot deliver sanctions relief or economic benefits, there will be a new movement for elite reconfiguration

The theocratic right will begin to re-join and form a coalition with the theocratic left, undermining the tacit alliance forged by Rouhani

This may also weaken Rouhani’s political power and bargaining position domestically to incorporate the republican left

The Possible Future Impact of

Sanctions

Themes on Islam and Politics from the Iranian Experience

The root of legitimacy: divine or popular; divine will or popular will

The role of religio-political leaders

The content of “religious thought” – knowledge and science; policy

The contours of elite competition

Appendix

The Iranian Political System

Aliazimi, Wikipedia

2005 IRANIAN ELECTIONS

First Rounds of Elections:

7 Candidates Turnout ~64% (67% in 2001), despite boycott

Rafsanjani 21.13% Republican Right Pragmatist

Ahmadinejad 19.43% Theocratic Left Conservative (radical)

Karroubi 17.24% Republican Left Reformist (traditional)

Ghalibaf 13.93% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)

Moeen 13.89% Republican Left Reformist (modern)

Larijani 5.83% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)

Mehralizadeh 4.38% Republican Left Reformist

3 Republican Left

2 Theocratic Right

1 Republican Right

1 Theocratic Left

2005 IRANIAN ELECTIONS

First Rounds of Elections:

7 Candidates

Rafsanjani 21.13% RR 21.13% Pragmatist 21.13%

Ahmadinejad 19.43 TR 19.76% Conservative 39.19%

Karroubi 17.24 RL 35.51% Reformist35.51%

Ghalibaf 13.93 TL 19.43%

Moeen 13.89

Larijani 5.83 Left 54.94% Theocratic39.19%

Mehralizadeh 4.38 Right 40.89% Republican 56.64%

2009 IRANIAN ELECTIONS

4 Candidates Turnout ~85%

Ahmadinejad 62.63% Theocratic Left Conservative (radical)

Mousavi 33.75% Republican Left Reformist (modern)

Rezaee 1.73% Republican Right Pragmatist

Karroubi 0.85% Republican Left Reformist (traditional)

2013 IRANIAN ELECTIONS

6 Candidates Turnout ~73%

Rouhani 50.88% Republican Right Pragmatist

Ghalibaf 16.46% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)

Jalili 11.31% Theocratic Left Conservative (radical)

Rezaee 10.55% Republican Right Pragmatist

Velayati 6.16% Theocratic Right Conservative (moderate)

Gharazi 1.22%

Republicans/Pragmatists 61.43%

Theocrats /Conservative 33.93%

Left 11.31%

Right 84%

Hybrid Regime Conceptualization

Leah Gilbert and Payam Mohseni. “Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development, Sep. 2011, 46 (3): 270-97.

A Linear Conceptual Map of Political Regime Types

A Configurative Approach to Regime Classification (Juan Linz)

Configurative Regime Dimensions

Competitive Dimension

Tutelary Dimension

Civil Liberty Dimension

Non-Electoral Regimes (in 2006)

Electoral Regimes (in 2006)

A Configurative Model of Regimes in 2006