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The Demarcation Problem
a brief introduction 01
Tomá² Ondrá£ek
Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy,
BRAK
Pozna«2016
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
the demise and the needs
Laudan (1983): The Demise of the Demarcation Problem
�[. . . ] we ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science' and 'unscienti�c' from ourvocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us.�
�The 'scienti�c' status of those claims is altogether irrelevant.�
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
the demise and the needs
The Needs for Demarcation (cf. Hansson (2015); Pigliucci and Boudry (2013). . . )
I practicalI policy
ex.: funding of institutions, procedures,. . .I education
ex.: creationism / intelligent design & evolution theoryI health care
ex.: stem cellsI justice (expert testimonies)
ex.: pyramid razor sharpenerI . . .
I theoreticalI material starting pointsI epistemological warrantI . . .
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
preliminary questions
What do we want to demarcate?
I scienceI branches of science
I natural sciences, formal sciences, social sciences,. . .I good science
I fruitful, responsible. . .I bad science
I something involving problematic practises. . .I pseudo-science
I something involving mismeasurements and miscalculation. . .I unscience
I something in contradiction or in con�ict with scienceI parascience
I something next to scienceI various types of systems of beliefs
I metaphysics, religion, art . . .
I non-science
I . . .
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
preliminary questions
What do we want to achieve?
I description
I prescription
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
preliminary questions
What should we take under consideration?
I theories
I systems of propositions
I people
I practices
I . . .
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
preliminary questions
Is demarcation universal?
I time/history
I domains/�elds/branches
I universal
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
preliminary questions
Is demarcation fixed?
I once a science/non-science, always a sciences/non-science
I a science/non-science can turn out to be a non-science/science
I a science can turn out to be a non-science
I a non-science can turn out to be a science
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
preliminary questions
How can this be done?
I examination of theories
I empirical examination
I . . .
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
introduction
Domains of Interest
I Marx's theory of history
I Freud's psychoanalysis
I Adler's individual psychology
I Einstein's theory of relativity
�It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact theirweakness.�
(Popper, 2014:34)
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
introduction
Popper (2005): Two Problems of Induction
I psychologicalI Why do We Believe . . .
I logicalI logical formI justi�cation of induction
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
forms of theories
Popper (2005): Forms of Statements
I singular statementsI individual concept
I universal statementsI numerically universal statementsI strictly universal statements
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
forms of theories
Popper (2005): Forms of Statements
I exitential statements
I non-existence statements
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
forms of theories
Popper (2005): Forms of Theories
rigorous axiomatized systemI consistency
I epistemological usefulness
I prohibitonI possibility of falsi�cation
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
forms of theories
Popper (2005): Fries's Trilemma
I psychologism
I in�nite regress
I dogmatism
I version of dogmatismI no �rm base
I observability
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
falsi�ability
Components
I theory
I initial conditions
I basic statements
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
problems & critique
Problems & Critique
I immunizations
I determination of theories
I missing empirical baseI not corresponding to scienti�c practise
I Thick Skin Problem
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
problems & critique
Thick Skin of Scientists
�Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory merely becausefacts contradict it. They normally either invent some rescue hypothesis toexplain what they then call a mere anomaly or, if they cannot explain the
anomaly, they ignore it, and direct their attention to other problems. Note thatscientists talk about anomalies, recalcitrant instances, not refutations.�
(Lakatos, 1978:5�4)
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
revolutions 1st edition
Kuhn (1962): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1st edition)
I pre-paradigm periodI period of normal science
I cumulative procesI dogmas
I period of non-normal scienceI period of extraordinary scienceI period of scienti�c revolution
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
critique of a paradigm
Masterman (1970): The Nature of a paradigm
I metaparadigms
I sociological paradigms
I artefact/construct paradigms
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
critique of a paradigm
Shapere (1964): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
I �paradigms cannot, in general, be formulated adequately�
I �cannot be described adequately in words�
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
revolutions 2nd edition
Kuhn (2012): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (other editions)
I symbolic generalizations
I models
I values
I exemplars
I . . .
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
critique of a disciplinary matrix
Shapere (1971): Critique of the Paradigm Concept
I We are unusre what is content of disciplinary matrix.
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
types of falsi�cation
I NaïveI dogmatic
I �rm empirical base
I metodologicalI conventional empirical baseI passivists vs. activist
I SophisticatedI rules of falsi�cation or eliminationI rules of acceptance
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
research programmes
Structure of Research Programmes
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
research programmes
Lakatos and Musgrave (1970:116):Sophisticated Falsification
�For the sophisticated falsi�cationist a scienti�c theory T is falsi�ed if and onlyif another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: (I) T'has excess empirical content over T: that is, it predicts novel facts, that is,facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden, by T;3 (2) T' explains theprevious success of T, that is, all the unrefuted content of T is included (within
the limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of theexcess content of T' is corroborated.�
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
I The Needs for DemarcationI practicalI teoretical
I Classical SolutionsI Popper: potential falsi�abilityI Kuhn: puzzle-solvingI Lakatos: progressive research programme
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
bibliography I
Combe, G. (1835). Engraving of craniometer from elements of phrenology.
Retrieved from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/
7/70/Craniometer.Elements.of.phrenology.George.Combe.1.png
(picture; online; accessed 2016-11-13)Hansson, S. O. (2015). Science and pseudo-science. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The
stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2015 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/pseudo-science/.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scienti�c revolutions (1st ed.). Universityof Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (2012). The structure of scienti�c revolutions (4th ed.). Universityof Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. (1978). The methodology of scienti�c research programmes (Vol. 1;J. Worrall & G. Currie, Eds.). Cambridge university press.
Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (Eds.). (1970). Criticism and the growth of
knowledge.
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem
Introduction Popper Kuhn Lakatos Summary References
bibliography II
Laudan, L. (1983). The demise of the demarcation problem. In R. S. Cohen &R. Laudan (Eds.), Physics, philosophy and psychoanalysis (p. 111�127).Springer.
Masterman, M. (1970). The nature of a paradigm. In I. Lakatos &A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge:
Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science,
London, 1965. Cambridge University Press.Pigliucci, M. & Boudry, M. (2013). The dangers of pseudoscience. New York
Times, 10.Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scienti�c discovery. Routledge.Popper, K. (2014). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scienti�c
knowledge. Routledge.Shapere, D. (1964). The structure of scienti�c revolutions. The Philosophical
Review, 73(3), 383�394.Shapere, D. (1971). The paradigm concept. Science, 172(3), 706�709.
Tomá² Ondrá£ek Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, BRAK
The Demarcation Problem