the doha development round - agenda

8/9/2019 The Doha Development Round - Agenda

1/17

The Doha Development Round Agenda

CONTENTS


2/17

1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 3

2. WHAT BEGAN AT DOHA ?.................................................................................4

2.1. The Cancun Ministeia!.............................................................................."

2.2. The H#n$ %#n$ Ministeia!.........................................................................&

3. THE DOHA AGENDA..........................................................................................'

3.1. A$icu!tue.................................................................................................(

3.2. )e*ices................................................................................................... 13

3.3. N#n+A$icu!tua! Ma,et Access -NAMA..................................................1/

4. RE0ERENCE.................................................................................................... 1&

1. INTRODUCTION

2


3/17


4/17

su!!ort from develo!ed and develo!ing countries. 6 third issue deals )ith a revie) of

!rovisions giving s!ecial and differential treatment to develo!ing countries along )ith

!roblems that develo!ing countries are having in im!lementing current trade obligations.

2. WHAT E!AN AT DOHA "

9rom November : to November 1;, 2001, trade ministers from member countries met in

Doha,


5/17

number of regional trade arrangements, trade ministers met in Doha. 6t that meeting, they

ado!ted three documents that !rovided guidance for future actions. The Ministerial

Declaration includes a !reamble and a )or !rogram for the ne) round and for other future

action. This Declaration folded the ongoing negotiations in agriculture and services into a

broader agenda. That agenda includes industrial tariffs, to!ics of interest to develo!ing

countries, changes to WTO rules, and other !rovisions. The Declaration on the TRIPS

Agreement and Public Health !resents a !olitical inter!retation of the WTO 6greement on

Trade&Related ntellectual 'ro!erty Rights (TR'#-.16 document on Implementation-Related

Issues and Concerns includes numerous decisions of interest to develo!ing countries.

$s!ecially )orth noting is ho) the role of develo!ing countries changed at the Doha

3inisterial. #ince the beginning of the 6TT, the ma%or decision&maers )ere almost

e4clusively develo!ed countries. 6t the !receding 3inisterial *onference (#eattle, 1:::-,

develo!ing countries became more forceful in demanding that their interests be addressed.

#ome develo!ing countries insisted that they )ould not su!!ort another round of multilateral

negotiations unless they realied some concessions u!&front and the agenda included their

interests. +ecause of the greater influence of develo!ing countries in setting the !lan of action

at Doha, the ne) round became no)n as the Doha Develo!ment 6genda.

6t the Doha meeting, trade ministers agreed that the Cth 3inisterial, to be held in 200, )ould

Atae stoc of !rogress, !rovide any necessary !olitical guidance, and tae decisions as

necessary,B and that negotiations )ould be concluded not later than @anuary 1, 200C. With the

e4ce!tion of actions on the Dis!ute #ettlement "nderstanding, trade ministers agreed that the

outcome of the negotiations )ould be a single undertaing, )hich means that nothing is

finally agreed until everything is agreed. Thus, countries agreed they )ould reach a single,

com!rehensive agreement containing a balance of concessions at the end of the negotiations.

2.1. The Can#un $%n%&te'%al

6n im!ortant mile!ost in the Doha Develo!ment 6genda round )as the Cth 3inisterial

*onference, )hich )as held in *ancEn, 3e4ico, on #e!tember 10&1;, 200. The *ancEn

1*R# Re!ort R5C0, The WTO, ntellectual 'ro!erty Rights, and the 6ccess to 3edicines*ontroversy, by an 9. 9ergusson

/


6/17

3inisterial ended )ithout agreement on a frame)or to guide future negotiations, and this

failure to advance the round resulted in a serious loss of momentum and brought into 8uestion

)hether the @anuary 1, 200C, deadline )ould be met. The *ancun 3inisterial colla!sed for

several reasons. 9irst, differences over the #inga!ore issues seemed irresolvable. The $" had

retreated on some of its demands, but several develo!ing countries refused any consideration

of these issues at all. #econd, it )as 8uestioned )hether some countries had come to *ancun

)ith a serious intention to negotiate. n the vie) of some observers, a fe) countries sho)ed

no fle4ibility in their !ositions and only re!eated their demands rather than tal about trade&

offs. Third, the )ide difference bet)een develo!ing and develo!ed countries across virtually

all to!ics )as a ma%or obstacle. The ".#.&$" agricultural !ro!osal and that of the rou! of

20,10 for e4am!le, sho) striingly different a!!roaches to s!ecial and differential treatment.

9ourth, there )as some criticism of !rocedure. #ome claimed the agenda )as too

com!licated. 6lso, the *ancun 3inisterial chairman, 3e4ico/s 9oreign 3inister uis $rnesto

Derbe, )as faulted for ending the meeting )hen he did, instead of trying to move the tals

into areas )here some !rogress could have been made. 6t the end of their meeting in *ancun,

trade ministers issued a declaration instructing their officials to continue )oring on

outstanding issues. They ased the eneral *ouncil chair, )oring )ith the Director&eneral,

to convene a meeting of the eneral *ouncil at senior official level no later than December

1C, 200, Ato tae the action necessary at that stage to enable us to move to)ards a successful

and timely conclusion of the negotiations.B The *ancun 3inisterial did result in the creation

of the so&called Derbe te4t.

3inisterial chairman Derbe invited trade ministers to act as facilitators in *ancun and hel!

)ith negotiations in five grou!s F

agriculture,

non&agricultural maret access,

develo!ment issues,

#inga!ore issues,

and other issues.

The WTO Director&eneral served as a facilitator for a si4th grou! on cotton. The facilitators

consulted )ith trade ministers and !roduced draft te4ts from their grou! consultations. The

3inisterial chairman com!iled the te4ts into a draft 3inisterial Declaration and circulated the

revised draft among !artici!ants for comment. The Derbe te4t )as )idely criticied at

*ancun and it )as not ado!ted, but in the months follo)ing that meeting, members looed

increasingly at this te4t as a !ossible negotiating frame)or.

"


7/17

On agriculture, the Derbe te4t dre) largely on both the ".#.&$" and rou! of 20 !ro!osals.

t included a larger cut from domestic su!!ort !rograms than the ".#.&$" !ro!osal made,

contained the blended tariff a!!roach of the ".#.&$" !ro!osal but offered better terms for

develo!ing countries, and !rovided for the elimination of e4!ort subsidies for !roducts of

!articular interest to develo!ing countries. On the #inga!ore issues, it included a decision to

start ne) negotiations on government !rocurement and trade facilitation, but not investment

or com!etition.

2.2. The Hong (ong $%n%&te'%al

The stalemate in 200C increased the !erceived im!ortance of the >th 3inisterial in ?ong

Gong as !otentially the last o!!ortunity to settle ey negotiating issues that could !roduce an

agreement by 2005, the then&de facto deadline resulting from the looming e4!iration of ".#.

trade !romotion authority. 6lthough a flurry of negotiations too !lace in the fall of 200C,

WTO Director&eneral 'ascal amy announced in November 200C that a com!rehensive

agreement on modalities )ouldnot be forthcoming in ?ong Gong, and that the tals )ould

Atae stocB of the negotiations and )ould try to reach agreements in negotiating sectors

)here convergence )as re!orted. The final 3inisterial Declaration of December 1=, 200C,

reflected areas of agreement in agriculture, industrial tariffs, and duty&free and tariff&free

access for least develo!ed countries (see sectoral negotiations section belo) for details-.

enerally, these convergences reflected a ste! beyond the @uly 9rame)or 6greement, but

fell short of full negotiating modalities. Ne) deadlines )ere established at ?ong Gong for

concluding negotiations by the end of 200>. These deadlines included an 6!ril 0, 200>, date

to establish modalities for the agriculture and N636 negotiations.

9urther deadlines set for @uly 1, 200>, included the submission of tariff schedules for

agriculture and N636, the submission of revised services offers, the submission of a

consolidated te4ts on rules and trade facilitation, and for recommendations to im!lement the

Aaid for tradeB language in the ?ong Gong declaration. On 6!ril 21, 200>, WTO Director&

eneral 'ascal amy announced there )as no consensus for agreement on modalities by the6!ril 0 deadline. Trade negotiators lie)ise failed to reach agreement at a high&level

&


8/17

meeting in eneva on @une 0&@uly 1, 200>. t )as agreed at those meetings, ho)ever, that

Director&eneral 'ascal amy )ould undertae a more !roactive role as a catalyst Ato

conduct intensive and )ide&ranging consultationsB to achieve agricultural and industrial

modalities. 'rior to the summit, amy for the first time in his tenure suggested the outline of a

!ossible com!romise. Gno)n as the A20&20&20 !ro!osal,B the offer (1- called on the "nited

#tates to acce!t a ceiling on domestic farm subsidies under H20 billion, (2- !ro!osed the

negotiations use the rou! of 20 !ro!osal of C;I as the minimum average cut to develo!ed

country agricultural tariffs, and (- set a tariff ceiling of 20I for develo!ing country industrial

tariffs. This suggestion )as roundly criticied by all sides and )as not ado!ted at the eneva

meetings. 6t the &= summit of leading industrialied nations in #t. 'etersburg, the leaders

!ledged a Aconcerted effortB to reach an agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture

and industrial maret access )ith a month of the @uly 1> summit.

). THE DOHA A!ENDA

Doha Round tals are overseen by the Trade Negotiations *ommittee (TN*-, )hose chair is

Director&eneral 'ascal amy. The negotiations are being held in five )oring grou!s and in

other, e4isting bodies in the WTO.

#elected to!ics under negotiation are discussed belo) in five grou!s F

maret access,

develo!ment issues,

WTO rules,

trade facilitation,

and other issues.

).1. Ag'%#ultu'e

The "ruguay Round 6greement on 6griculture called for continued negotiations to)ard Athe

long&term ob%ective of substantial !rogressive reductions in su!!ort and !rotection.B +y early

2001, WTO members had achieved some !reliminary )or in those sectoral negotiations, and

later that year, agriculture )as )ra!!ed into the broader Doha agenda. 6griculture has

become the linch!in in the Doha Develo!ment 6genda. ".#. goals in the ne) round )ere

'


9/17

elimination of agricultural e4!ort subsidies, easing of tariffs and 8uotas, and reductions in

trade&distorting domestic su!!ort. The Doha 3inisterial Declaration included language on all

of these three !illars of agricultural su!!ort. t stated that the members committed to

Acom!rehensive negotiations aimed at substantial im!rovements in maret access7 reductions

of, )ith a vie) to !hasing out, all forms of e4!ort subsidies7 and substantial reductions in

trade distorting su!!ort.B

The course of the negotiations in the lead u! to *ancun )ere influenced by the reform of the

$"/s *ommon 6gricultural 'olicy (*6'-. 6 ma%or issue for the $" )as )hether or not to

a!!rovese!aration (Adecou!lingB- of !ayments to farmers based on !roduction. Those ty!es

of !ayments are among the most trade&distorting (Aamber bo4B-. On @une 2>, 200, $"

agriculture ministers a!!roved a reform !acage that included !artial decou!ling for certain

!roducts. The action )as seen by many as a !ositive ste! for advancing the trade negotiations.

The $" reform largely addressed one of the three !illars of agricultural reformJdomestic

su!!ortJbut did little in a second !illarJmaret access. n the WTO negotiations on maret

access, the "nited #tates and the *airns rou! have su!!orted a leveling, or harmoniing, of

tariff !eas, or high rates. n com!arison, the $" and @a!an )ant fle4ibility to cut some items

less than others to arrive at an average total rate cut. 6nother difficulty is Ageogra!hical

indications,B or the !rotection of !roduct names that reflect the original location of the

!roduct. 6n e4am!le is the use of A+ordeau4 )ineB for )ines from the +ordeau4 region only.

$uro!eans, %oined by ndia and some other countries, )ant a mandatory registry of

geogra!hical indications that )ould !revent other countries from using the names. The "nited

#tates and other countries refuse to negotiate a mandatory list, but )ill acce!t a voluntary list

)ith no enforcement !o)er.

While the $" has said that it )ill not acce!t an agriculture agreement )ithout a geogra!hical

registry, it re!ortedly has lo)ered e4!ectations to achieving a registry for )ines and s!irits.

Develo!ing countries vie) reform in agricultural trade as one of their most im!ortant goals.

They argue that their o)n !roducers cannot com!ete against the sur!lus agricultural goods

that the develo!ed countries, !rinci!ally the $" and the "nited #tates, are selling on the

)orld maret at lo), subsidied !rices. #ome 6frican countries also are calling for an end tocotton subsidies, claiming that such subsidies are destroying marets for the smaller 6frican

(


10/17

!roducers. The @uly 200; 9rame)or 6greement !rovided a basis for )hich to continue the

agriculture tals. On domestic su!!ort, subsidies are to be reduced by means of a AtieredB or

AbandedB a!!roach a!!lied to achieve AharmoniationB in the levels of su!!ort. #ubsidiing

countries )ill mae a do)n&!ayment of a 20I reduction in levels of su!!ort in the first year

of the agreement. Tariff reduction )ill utilie a tiered formula )ith a harmoniation

com!onent, but )ith some e4ce!tions for Aim!ort sensitive !roducts.B The $uro!ean "nion

finally agreed to the elimination of e4!ort subsidies, considered a ma%or negotiating goal of

the "nited #tates. While there )as no breathrough at the December 200C ?ong Gong

3inisterial, members agreed to eliminate e4!ort subsidies, and Ae4!ort measures )ith

e8uivalent effectB by 201, a date favored by the $uro!ean "nion ($"-.

3embers agreed to cut domestic su!!ort !rograms )ith a three band methodology. 6s the

largest user of domestic agricultural subsidies, the $" )as !laced in the highest band. The

"nited #tates and @a!an )ere !laced in the second band and lesser subsidiing countries )ere

!laced in the third band. ?o)ever, the actual !ercentage cuts that these bands re!resent

remained sub%ect to negotiation. 3embers also rene)ed a commitment to achieve a tariff

cutting formula by 6!ril 0, 200>. This deadline )as not met. n the !arallel negotiations on

cotton, members agreed to eliminate e4!ort subsidies for cotton and to !rovide duty&free and

8uota&free access for D* cotton !roducers by year&end 200>. 3embers also agreed to reduce

domestic su!!ort for cotton in a more ambitious manner than for other agricultural

commodities as an Aob%ectiveB in the ongoing agricultural negotiations. Tals to reach

modalities !roved unsuccessful at the @uly 2, 200>, meeting of the &> countries in eneva

and the negotiations )ere sus!ended thereafter. #ources of the stalemate in the eneva tals

included ".#. concerns about the magnitude of deviations from maret access commitments

stemming from the so&called A fle4ibilitiesBF sensitive !roducts, s!ecial !roducts, and the

s!ecial safeguard mechanism.

While each of these fle4ibilities )as incor!orated into the 200; @uly 9rame)or 6greement

as negotiating modalities that )ould allo) countries to e4em!t certain !roducts from the

banded tariff formula, the "nited #tates contends that the sco!e envisioned by some countries

for these modalities )ould unacce!tably diminish the overall maret access gains from the

1


11/17

agreement.2*onversely, the "nited #tates )as under !ressure at the meeting from the $" and

the &20 grou! re!resented by +rail and ndia to im!rove its subsidy reduction offer, but the

"nited #tates !ut no ne) offer on the table. The "nited #tates insisted that it )ill not im!rove

its offer on domestic subsidy reduction unless the $" im!roves considerably its maret access

offer and the &20 countries sho) a )illingness to o!en their marets not only to agricultural

!roducts but to industrial !roducts and services as )ell. These dynamics continued in 2005

discussions. n @uly 2005, WTO 6griculture committee chairman *ra)ford 9alconer

submitted a draft modality !a!er to address the divergent negotiating !ositions of the !arties.

6s a result of committee&based negotiations in eneva, revisions to this draft )ere made in

9ebruary, 3ay and @uly 200=, the latter of )hich became the basis for negotiations at the

WTO summit in @uly 21&2:, 200=. #ubse8uent technical level negotiations and refinements

resulted in a December 200= draft from )hich the follo)ing headline figures are derived.

These include a reduction of ".# overall trade&distorting domestic su!!ort (OTD#- of 50I

for a total of H1;.; billion and a reduction in $uro!ean domestic su!!ort of =0I to H22.1

billion. n this draft, @a!an )ould cut 5CI due to its high level of base OTD# (greater than

;0I- in terms of the value of its total agricultural out!ut. Other develo!ed countries that

s!end less than H10 billion in OTD# )ould have to cut their su!!ort by CCI. The "nited

#tates !ublicly offered to ca! OTD# at H1;.C billion on @uly 2C, 200=, during the negotiating

summit, conditional on acce!ting the amy com!romise !acage then on the table. n !ast

negotiations, the $" has set a 50I reduction as its u!!er bound. The &20 grou! of

develo!ing countries, though, has demanded a reduction yielding an H11 billion ca! in ".#.

OTD#. Develo!ed country tariffs )ould be cut in a tiered formula in e8ual increments over

five yearsF a 50I reduction for tariffs currently above 5CI, a >;I cut for tariffs currently

bet)een C0I and 5CI, a C5I cut for tariffs currently bet)een 20I and C0I and a C0I cut

for tariffs bet)een 0 and 20I. n addition, the draft sti!ulates a minimum tariff cuts of C;I

for develo!ed countries, after a!!lication of the formula and other e4ce!tions.

Develo!ing countries )ould be able to cut t)o&thirds of the amount of cuts agreed by

develo!ed countries from bands )ith higher thresholds in e8ual installments over 10 years.

While develo!ed countries )ould have to cut 50I from tariffs currently above 5CI (their

highest tariff band-, develo!ing countries )ould have to cut ;>.5I on all tariffs above 10I,

2*R# Re!ort R#22:25, WTO Doha RoundF m!lications for ".#. 6griculture, by Randy#chne!f and *harles $. ?anrahan.

11


12/17

;2.5I on tariffs bet)een =0I and 10I, =I for tariffs bet)een 0I and =0I7 and .I

on tariffs bet)een 0I and 0I. Develo!ing countries )ould only be re8uired to mae a

ma4imum average tariff cut of >I. f the average falls above that !ercentage, then the cut

made by the formula can be reduced. The modalities draft also !ro!oses that countries may

designate ;I of their agricultural tariff lines as sensitive, and thus sub%ect to lo)er cuts.

Develo!ing countries )ould be allo)ed to claim C.I more tariffs lines as sensitive. The

draft reaffirmed the ?ong Gong 3inisterial commitment to eliminate e4!ort subsidies by

201 )ith half the reductions im!lemented by 2010.

The document also sees disci!lines on e4!ort credits, guarantees, insurance !rograms, and

state trading enter!rises. The s!ecial safeguard mechanism (##3- has been revised in the

December 200= draft. Disagreements over the !articulars of the ##3, a !ro!osal to allo)

develo!ing countries to raise duties beyond bound levels in instances of im!ort surges or !rice

de!ressions, contributed to the failure of the @uly 200= summit.;2 The conce!t of an ##3 for

develo!ing countries had been a !art of the Doha Round modalities since the @uly 9rame)or

6greement of 200;. The controversy revolved around the trigger level and the resulting level

of tariff increase. The ne) !ro!osal !osits a t)o tiered ##3 that could be triggered at a 20I

or ;0I surge above the level of base im!orts. 6 20I surge on im!orts could trigger a

safeguard of the higher of one&third of the current bound tariff or = !ercentage !oints7 a ;0I

surge could result in the im!osition of a safeguard of the higher of one&half of the bound tariff

or 12 !ercentage !oints. This iteration re!resents a com!romise bet)een the higher surge

trigger sought by the "nited #tates and a greater increase in the amount of the safeguard

sought by ndia and *hina. The "nited #tates has also sought to ca! the safeguard duties so

that their im!osition )ould not breach the e4isting (!re&Doha- bound rates, ho)ever the latest

draft !rovides that the bound rate could be breached for u! to 2.CI of bound tariff lines in a

12 month !eriod.

).2. Se'v%#e&

6long )ith agriculture, services )ere a !art of the Abuilt&in agendaB of the "ruguay Round. ;

The eneral 6greement on Trade n #ervices (6T#-, )hich )as concluded in that Round,

39or all the various !ermutations and !ro!osals relating to the ##3, see the WTO 9actsheetA6n "nofficial uide to 6gricultural #afeguards,B 6ugust C, 200=

12


13/17

directs 3embers to Aenter into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five

years from the date of entry into force of the WTO 6greement K@anuary 1, 1::CL ... Kto

achieveL a !rogressively higher level of liberaliation.B Those negotiations began in early

2000. Negotiating guidelines and !rocedures )ere established by 3arch 2001. "nder the

re8uest&offer a!!roach being used, countries first re8uest changes in other countries/

!ractices, other countries then res!ond by maing offers of changes, and finally the countries

negotiate bilaterally on a final agreement. The Doha 3inisterial Declaration recognied the

)or already undertaen and reaffirmed the 3arch 2001 guidelines as the basis for continuing

the negotiations. t directed !artici!ants to submit initial re8uests for s!ecific commitments by

@une 0, 2002, and initial offers by 3arch 1, 200. The services tals are going slo)ly. +y

@uly 200C the WTO had received >= initial commitment offers re!resenting :2 countries (the

$" re!resents 2C members- and 2; offers remained outstanding from non&D* members (CC

if D*s are included-. Only 2= revised offers )ere tendered by November 200C, although the

@uly 9rame)or sti!ulated a 3arch 1, 200C, deadline.

6ll members )ere to have submitted their initial offers by 3arch 1, 200. 3any have

decried the !oor 8uality of offers, many of )hich only bind e4isting !ractices, rather than

offer ne) concessions and e4cluded some sectors entirely. 6t ?ong Gong, members

committed to submit a second round of revised offers by @uly 1, 200>, and to submit a final

schedule of commitments by October 1, 200>. n order to e4!edite the negotiating !rocess,

members also agreed to em!loy !lurilateral re8uests to other members covering s!ecific

sectors and modes of su!!ly to be com!leted by 9ebruary 2=, 200>. n res!onse to this

deadline, 21 !lurilateral re8uests concerning 15 sectors and ; modes of su!!ly )ere

submitted, and ; rounds of discussions have been held concerning them. n addition, > rounds

of bilateral re8uest&offer meetings have been held among the !artici!ants since the end of

200C. To some members, including the "nited #tates, the tals have not yielded ade8uate

offers of im!roved maret access.

*onse8uently, various methods have been advocated to brea the stalemate in negotiations,

from calls to !re!are a services modalities te4t to the convening of a signaling conference. 6

draft services negotiating te4t, released !rior to the @uly 200= miniministerial, called for

countries Ato the ma4imum e4tent !ossibleB res!ond to re8uests )ith Adee!er andMor )ider

4*R# Re!ort R0=C, Trade in #ervicesF The Doha Develo!ment 6genda Negotiations and".#. oals, by William ?. *oo!er.

13


14/17

commitments ... commensurate )ith levels of develo!ment, regulatory ca!acity, and national

!olicy ob%ectives.B;C While much of the activity during the @uly 21&2:, 200=, eneva tals

continued to concern agriculture and industrial maret access, !artici!ants did hold a

signaling conference on @uly 2> on the ty!es of additional offers of services liberaliation

countries )ould be )illing to mae !rovided an agreement )as reached in the agriculture and

N636 tals. et little emerged from these conference. n 3arch 2010, the chair of the

negotiating committee summaried the state of the negotiations, it is clear that there has been

little or no significant !rogress in the maret access negotiations since @uly 200=. a!s in

sectoral coverage and levels of commitment need to be filled in order for 3embers to be

satisfied )ith the outcome of the services negotiations. n filling these ga!s, rule&maing in

the services negotiations )ill need to move in tandem )ith maret access. 3embers can mae

!rogress in maret access in services once the !olitical )ill has been summoned to resolve

!roblems in other areas of the Round. One area of controversy is so&called A3ode B

services. 3ode relates to the tem!orary movement of business !ersons to another country

in order to !erform a service on&site. Develo!ing countries )ant easier movement of their

nationals under 3ode . They claim that the services negotiations have centered on the

establishment of businesses in other countries, )hich has been a focus of develo!ed countries,

)hile there has been no negotiation on 3ode , )hich )ould hel! them. Develo!ed

countries, es!ecially the "nited #tates, have o!!osed discussions on 3ode services trade.

*ongress might o!!ose easier entry for business !ersons, based on #enate a!!roval of a

resolution (#.Res. 211- in the 10=th *ongress e4!ressing the sense of the #enate that future

".#. trade agreements and im!lementing legislation should not contain immigration&related

!rovisions. 3ode services )ill be a difficult issue to resolve. 9ifteen countries have %oined

a !lurilateral re8uest for 3ode services liberaliation to the "nited #tates and other

develo!ed countries. 6t the abovementioned signaling conference, the "nited #tates and the

$" re!ortedly signaled increased fle4ibility on allo)ing more services !rofessionals access to

their marets.C

).). Non*Ag'%#ultu'al $a'+et A##e&& ,NA$A-

n the Doha Declaration, trade ministers agreed to negotiations to reduce or eliminate tariffs

on industrial or !rimary !roducts, )ith a focus on Atariff !eas, high tariffs, and tariff

/A".#., $" *ite 3oves in #ignaling/ Tals On #ervices7 ndia ies 3ode ;/ O!enings,Bnternational Trade Re!orter, @uly 1, 200=.

14


15/17

escalation.B Tariff !eas are considered to be tariff rates of above 1CI and often !rotect

sensitive !roducts from com!etition. Tariff escalation is the !ractice of increasing tariffs as

value is added to a commodity. The tals are also seeing to reduce the incidence of non&tariff

barriers, )hich include im!ort licensing, 8uotas and other 8uantitative im!ort restrictions,

conformity assessment !rocedures, and technical barriers to trade. The sectoral elimination of

tariffs for s!ecific grou!s has also be for)arded as an area of negotiation. Negotiators

acce!ted the conce!t of less than full reci!rocity in reductions for develo!ing and least&

develo!ed countries. Doha negotiators agreed to reach modalities for the reduction or

elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers by the end of 3ay 200. This deadline )as, as

)ere subse8uent ones, not met.

N636 issues )ere not discussed at *ancun, and there )as no agreement on the draft te4ts

!ro!osed for consideration at that 3inisterial. The @uly 200; 9rame)or 6greement ado!ted

the use of a non&linear tariff reduction formula a!!lied on a line&by&line basis, (i.e., one that it

can )or to)ards evening out or harmoniing tariff levels-, and the ?ong Gong 3inisterial

did agreed to use a #)iss formula. The 3inisterial did not agree on coefficients, ho)ever, and

these have become the sub%ect of continuing negotiations. The @uly 200; 9rame)or

6greement also agreed that tariff reductions )ould be calculated from bound, rather than the

a!!lied, tariff rates. Negotiators are also gra!!ling )ith the conce!t of Afle4ibility,B or the

nature and e4tent of develo!ing country&s!ecial and differential treatment, as it relates to

formula cuts. n addition to longer im!lementation times, the @uly 9rame)or 6greement

allo)ed for less than formula cuts for a certain (undetermined- amount tariff lines, ee!ing a

!ercentage of tariff lines unbound, or not a!!lying formula cuts for an (undetermined-

!ercentage of tariff lines (the so&called 'aragra!h = fle4ibilities-. 6t ?ong Gong, negotiators

did agree to !rovide tariff&free and 8uota&free access for *Ds by 200=. ?o)ever, this

agreement !rovides the caveat that I of tariff lines can be e4em!ted as sensitive !roducts

such as te4tiles, a!!arel, and foot)ear.

The 6!ril 0, 200>, deadline, lie so many before, )as breached )ithout agreement on the

N636 formula or on other issues. The end of @une eneva summit also failed to reach

agreement on N636 modalities. The "nited #tates, *anada, and #)iterland !ro!osed a C!ercentage !oint differential bet)een the #)iss formula coefficients of develo!ed and

1/


16/17

develo!ing countries, )hich is consistent )ith the $" !ro!osal of a 10 coefficient for

develo!ed countries and a 1C coefficient for develo!ing countries. 6 grou! of develo!ing

countries no)n as the N636&11 !ro!osed that the differential should be at least 2C

!ercentage !oints. The N636 tals have been increasingly lined to the agricultural tals,

)ith some movement on one becoming increasingly lined to !rogress in the other.

Develo!ing countries have been un)illing to commit on N636 )ithout agreement on

agriculture, but no) some develo!ed countries are tying further agriculture !rogress to

N636. This linage has come be no)n as the Ae4change rateB bet)een the t)o

negotiations. 6 @une 2005 &; meeting in 'otsdam, ermany, faltered in !art over the

re%ection by +rail of a ".#. !ro!osal of a 10&2C !ercentage !oint s!read for develo!ed and

develo!ing country coefficients, a !ro!osal that )as a clear brea from either country/s stated

!ositions. 9ollo)ing on the 'otsdam summit, a draft modality !a!er )as released on @uly 15,

2005, authored by the N636 negotiating chairman. This document, and subse8uent revisions

released in 9ebruary, 3ay, @uly, 6ugust, and December 200=, have formed the basis of the

eneva level negotiations. This !a!er sought to reconcile the !ositions of the !arties to move

the negotiations for)ard7 as such, it faced mostly criticism from the diverse negotiating

grou!s. These various te4ts have reflected some narro)ing of !ositions over time, but they

should not be considered to reflect the !resent state of agreement in the negotiations. >

9ollo)ing the @uly 200= 3inisterial, the chairman revised his te4t again to reflect areas of

AconvergenceB in the negotiations, )hile admitting that not all members acce!ted this

convergence.C1 The "nited #tates, for e4am!le, did not acce!t the 6ugust 200= language on

sectoral tariff !artici!ation, )hich )as )idely criticied by ".#. industry.C2 The follo)ing

figures reflect the latest te4t released in December 200=.C*oncerning the #)iss tariff

reduction formula, the December 200= draft called for a coefficient of = for develo!ed

countries and a range of coefficients of either K4P20LKyP22LKP2CL for develo!ing countries

de!ending on )hich so&called A'aragra!h 5B fle4ibility each country avails themselves.

. RE/ERENCE

"A&; 3inisterial Tals *olla!se7 ".#., $" +lames +rail and ndia over N636,B nside".#. Trade, @une 22, 2005.

1"


17/17

*R# Re!ort R#22:25, WTO Doha RoundF m!lications for ".#. 6griculture, by

Randy #chne!f and *harles $. ?anrahan.

+uc, Tobias, uy de @on8uieres and 9rances Williams. A9ischler/s Ne) $ra for

$uro!e/s 9ramersF No) the 6rgument Over 6griculture 3oves to the WTO.B

9inancial Times. @une 25, 200.

A$uro!ean *ommission o)ers $4!ectations on eogra!hic ndications,B nside ".#.

Trade, October C, 2005.

*R# Re!ort R0=C, Trade in #ervicesF The Doha Develo!ment 6genda

Negotiations and ".#. oals, by William ?. *oo!er.

A$lements Re8uired for the *om!letion of the #ervices NegotiationsF Note by the

*hairman,B (@ob0=M5:-, @uly 15, 200=.

A".#., $" *ite 3oves in #ignaling/ Tals On #ervices7 ndia ies 3ode ;/

O!enings,B nternational Trade Re!orter, @uly 1, 200=.

*R# Re!ort R>;, The World Trade OrganiationF The Non&6gricultural 3aret

6ccess (N636- Negotiations, by an 9. 9ergusson.

A&; 3inisterial Tals *olla!se7 ".#., $" +lames +rail and ndia over N636,B

nside ".#. Trade, @une 22, 2005.

1&

the doha development round - agenda

Documents