indias stand wto doha round

7/29/2019 Indias Stand Wto Doha Round

1/15

Indias stand on Doha round of

talks at WTO

SIBMPune - EPGDBM

2010-11 .Subject : International Trade.Presented By :

Abhijit Malankar ( Roll - AV 102 )Email - [email protected]


2/15

Contents

Brief Intro of WTO Doha rounds

Run-up to the DOHA round

Indias stand in the Doha Round in relation to :

- Agriculture / SSM- NAMA

- Services Sector

- IPRs, TRIPS

- WTO Impact on India

Conclusion


3/15

Brief Introduction about WTO Doha round

The fourth ministerial meeting of the WTO was held in Doha inNovember 2001 in which ministers from 142 member countriesparticipated .

This ministerial had attracted a lot of attention because of theconflict of interests between the developed and developing

countries The developed countries ( USEC ) wanted a new round of

multilateral trade negotiations to be launched soon which included investments,competition policy,trade facilitation,transperency ingovernment procurement, environment, agriculture and TRIPs

Developing countries like India , on the other hand , held that theimplementation issues should be resolved before any new round .India almost singlehandedly fought against the developedcountries .


4/15

Run up to Doha July 2008 Rounds .

Why India participated in the Doha rounds

1- India went along with the then emerging consensus ,because it supported a rule based multilateral tradingsystem.

2 - At that time India had not emerged as an important

player in the realm of regional trade agreements (RTAs) butit had benefitted from the predictability of the GATT/WTOframework.

3 - India engaged constructively and carried a twinresponsibility : protecting its own core negotiating interests

and joining other like minded developing nations informulating a coordinated position of the developing world


5/15


6/15

Earlier GATT and WTO trade roundsName Start Duration Countries Subjects covered Achievements

Geneva April 1947 7 months 23 TariffsSigning of GATT, 45,000 tariff concessions affecting

$10 billion of trade

Annecy April 1949 5 months 13 Tariffs Countries exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions

TorquaySeptember

19508 months 38 Tariffs

Countries exchanged some 8,700 tariff concessions,

cutting the 1948 tariff levels by 25%

Geneva IIJanuary

19565 months 26 Tariffs, admission of Japan $2.5 billion in tariff reductions

DillonSeptember

1960

11 months 26 Tariffs Tariff concessions worth $4.9 billion of world trade

Kennedy May 1964 37 months 62 Tariffs, Anti-dumping Tariff concessions worth $40 billion of world trade

TokyoSeptember

197374 months 102

Tariffs, non-tariff measures, "framework"

agreements

Tariff reductions worth more than $300 billion

dollars achieved

UruguaySeptember

198687 months 123

Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services,

intellectual property, dispute settlement,

textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO, etc

The round led to the creation of WTO, and

extended the range of trade negotiations, leading

to major reductions in tariffs (about 40%) and

agricultural subsidies, an agreement to allow full

access for textiles and clothing from developing

countries, and an extension of intellectual property

rights.

Doha

November

2001 Ongoing 142

Tariffs, non-tariff measures, agriculture,

labor standards, environment, competition,investment, transparency, patents etc

The round is not yet concluded.


7/15

Indias stand on Agriculture/ SSM ( Special

Safeguards Mechanism )

For India it appears that cuts in OTDS (overall trade distortingsupport),tariff rate quota expansion and tariff capping were not dealbreaking issues and with some intelligent negotiations,issues relating tosensitive products and special products of Interest to India could also besecured with the give and take policy with developed countries. The issueof SSM however became a deal breaker.

India argued that since agriculture is associated with poverty andsubsistence in the country, markets opening up here needs to becalibrated in order to protect the livelihoods of the poor farmers and theirfamilies.The proposed SSM would enable developing countries like India totake remedial action through higher tariffs in case of import surges orimport induced price declines

Due to Indias efforts, SSM remained an integral part of the mandate

throughout the Doha negotiations, as reiterated in the Hong KongMinisterial Declaration. Differences between India and the US are aboutthe level of increase in import volume (i.e. the trigger) required to crossthe Uruguay Round (UR) bound levels of tariffs and the extent by whichthe UR bound tariffs can be exceeded. Indias position, like that of mostdeveloping countries, was that there should be no difference in thetriggers leading to increase of tariffs up to and above the UR levels.


8/15

Indias stand on Agriculture/ SSM ( Special

Safeguards Mechanism ) (contd)

For the bound rate trigger, the so-called Lamy Text put a figure of 140

percent, i.e. import volumes to rise by more than 40 percent to enable

increase of tariffs beyond the UR bound levels. India was flexible enough

to consider different options around that number, and suggested a figure

of 115 percent. But the US continued to insist on a trigger of 140 percent.

India expressed its inability to accept this trigger, citing studies

purportedly proving that substantial injury can occur at level above 110

percent.

In the face of differences on this issue, Lamy tried to broker a compromise

through an alternative proposal involving defining substantial injury and

inserting a strict monitoring mechanism. India agreed to negotiate on this

proposal but the US turned it down. With the efforts of the EC, the G-7

senior officials worked out an alternative proposal. India was again ready

to use this as a basis for negotiations but the US again turned it down.

Clearly, the US has shown no flexibility on this issue


9/15

Indias stand on NAMA ( Non Agricultural

Market Access )

In NAMA (industrial goods but including fisheries), discussions focused on threeissuescoefficients for tariff reduction by developed and developing countries,the anti-concentration clause and sectorals. On coefficients,the depth of Indiasautonomous liberalisation provided it with an adequate cushion based on which itappeared to accept the proposals in the NAMA text albeit developing countrieswere being asked to cut tariffs more than those of developed countries.

Under the mandate for NAMA negotiations, developing countries have someflexibility in tariff reduction for a negotiated percentage of tariff lines. On suchtariff lines,they can either take zero cuts for a smaller number or 50 percent of theformula cuts for a higher number

However, developed countries wanted to restrict this flexibility through the so-called anti-concentration clause to ensure that developing countries would not useit to block liberalisation in sectors important to them, for example, automobiles.India did not accept a blanket restriction on this flexibility, but was willing toconsider a via media, which did not effectively restrict its ability to protectimportant sectors. Having failed to secure that India reverted to its originalnegotiating position that infant and vulnerable industries of developing countriesneeded to be protected. It is apparent that India would not have blocked a deal onthese issues.


10/15

Indias stand on Services Sector

Services liberalisation is another important issue for India due to itsinterest in the movement of natural persons in the category of

experts and skilled persons. There was a Signalling Conference onServices during the July 2008 meeting with the idea that Memberswith an important interest in services could provide clear signals toeach other regarding their intentions to open their markets. Indiasignalled a liberal offer in important areas of interest to developedcountries including telecommunications, distribution, financialservices, energy and environment services, and courier services.

In the areas of its interest,India received positive signals from,among others, EU, Canada, Norway and Japan. However, the USresponse did not cover new ground; though it talked of increasing

H-1B visas and that too in consultation with the Congress,but it didnot mention anything on liberal entry norms for contractual servicesuppliers (CSS) and independent professionals which is Indias maindemand.


11/15

Indias stand on IPRs , TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of

Intellectual Property Rights )

On intellectual property rights (IPRs), India seeks changes in the TRIPS

agreement to accommodate concerns relating to bio-piracy, and issupporting the EC demand for a higher level of protection to allproducts.Though it is not clear whether India has undertaken any soundanalysis on commercial interests in these two issues, their politicalvisibility will require a reasonably credible outcome. The US is against boththe issues. This could be another deal-breaker in the end game.

On trade remedies, zeroing in anti-dumping and fisheries subsidies in theSubsidies Agreement are important. On the former, there is a big groupled by Japan and Chinese Taipei opposing the US position, whichincidentally is also the position emerging from WTO jurisprudence. Indias

stand is similar to that of Japan and therefore, it is content to follow suit.

In the case of fisheries subsidies, fate of small and artisanal farmers inIndia depends on India taking a frontal position to insist upon flexibilities,which is possible with the help of intelligent negotiation that would helpavoid collateral benefits flowing down to big and heavily-subsidised

enterprises in some WTO Members.


12/15

WTO Impact on India.


13/15

Conclusion The scenario post-July 2008 Mini-Ministerial meeting, including the failure

of Lamy to secure sufficient support in December to call them to Genevaagain is unclear. While a number of analysts have observed that the DohaRound is frozen, at least till the middle of 2009 (by then Obamaadministration is expected to have it on its table and the Indian electionswill be over), there is plenty of support for continuation of thenegotiations given that considerable progress was made in the run up toand during the Mini-Ministerial meeting.

Lamy certainly did not have any intention of giving up.After his visit to

Delhi for the Conference on Global Partnership for Development organisedby CUTS in August 2008, he travelled to Washington and elsewhere togauge the mood. But with the Obama administrations tongs in manyother fires, negotiators are not calling their trade ministers to Geneva anytime soon.

Given the broad support to calibrated liberalisation accompanied by

regulatory and institutional policies amongst most Indian political parties,so long as its farm sector is protected, the US does not insist on upfrontcommitment of a zero-for-zero in any sector of industrial goods. Moreover,so long as it can take some commercially meaningful achievements homeand some politically useful commitment to accommodate Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD) in TRIPS, India may not be the deal-breaker.


14/15

Acknowledgements

www.cuts-citee.org

www.wtocenter.iift.ac.in

International Business PHI - Francis

Cherunilam
http://www.cuts-citee.org/http://www.wtocenter.iift.ac.in/http://www.wtocenter.iift.ac.in/http://www.cuts-citee.org/http://www.cuts-citee.org/http://www.cuts-citee.org/


15/15

Q / A

indias stand wto doha round

Documents