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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE EARLY CA REER OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL

DONATIEN ROCHAMBEAU

AND THE FRENCH CAMPAIGNS IN THE CARIBBEAN,

1792-1794

VOLUME I

CHAPTERS 1-10

By

JAMES LAFAYETTE HAYNSWO RTHIV

A D issertation submitted to the

Department o f History

in partial fulfillment o f the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:

Summer Semester, 2003

Copyright © 2003

James Lafayette Haynsworth IV

All Rights Reserved

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UMI Number: 3098376

Copyright 2003 by

Haynsworth, James Lafayette, IV

All rights reserved.

®

UMIUMI Microform 3098376

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The members o f the Committee approve the dissertation of James L. Haynsworth IVdefended on 28 April 2003.

)onald D. Horward

Professor Directing Dissertation

dSx+li I V l O NPatrick O ’Sullivan

Outside Committee Member

Paul G. Halpem

Committee Member

■**y S _ | __________________________

JoeVM. Richardson

Committee Member

w <P- __

William O. Oldson

Committee Member

ii




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Obviously a great number o f people are involved in the research, writing, and

eventual publication o f a dissertation. I am fortunate to have been aided by a host of

individuals that have included university professors, family members, close friends,

archivists, librarians, history buffs, collectors, and hotel staff. On occasion, and

especially during my travels in Martinique, it even seemed that the ghosts of those

individuals about whom I was writing intervened to ensure that I told their story as

accurately as possible. My list of those to whom I remain indebted is long, and while I

remain grateful to many, I wish to thank publicly certain individuals whose guidance and

input have been absolutely indispensable in transforming what was a multi-voluminous

collection of notes and photocopies into what is now the first volume of the biography of

Lieutenant General Donatien Rochambeau.

Special thanks to Faith Coslett at the U.S.M.A. Library, and to the staff of Strozier

Library’s Interlibrary Loan Department: Dr. Maria Chavez-Hemandez, Ann Spangler,

Jane Feehan, Georgia Henry, Anna Campbell, and Bryan Johnson. Their work in locating

and obtaining rare materials has been both remarkable and indispensable. Thank you also

to the staf f of the library’s Special Collections Department: Gay Dixon, Catherine

Sheffield, Garnett Avant, and B urt Altman, and to the staff of the Documents

iii




Department: M arcia Gorin, Sandra Genetin, and Richard Smith. The archival staff at

both the Service His torique de l’Armee de Terre (espec ially Mme. Son) and the Archives

Nationales were extremely helpful, and I offer my deepest gratitude to them for their

patience.

To my colleagues, I offer my most sincere gratitude to Jennifer Pierce, who never

allowed me to mistake an important date in colonial slave emancipation, to Karen

Greene, whose attention to detail in Special Collections made possible an entire chapter

of this dissertation, to Lieutenant Colonel M att Dawson, without whose help my

transition from warrior to student to teacher would have been extraordinarily difficult,

and to Dr. Everett Dague, my roommate in Paris and my inspiration in the French

archives during working hours and in the city cafes afterward.

I also wish to express my deepest gratitude to the late Proctor Jones, whose

generous contribution to the Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution made

possible the bulk o f the research for this work and its sequel. Thank you to Colonels

Robert Doughty, Casey Brower, and Lee Wyatt at the History Department of the United

States Military Academy, who accepted me into the apprenticeship o f Professor of the

History of the Military Art. Had they not had acted upon their confidence in my potential,

this work would never exist.

Colonels Jim Johnson and Cole Kingseed, who, during my tour at West Point

served as Chief o f the Military Art Division o f the Department o f History at USMA,

deserve special recognition. Their constant admonition to me “do not write the book -

write the dissertation” was always on my mind, though in the long run, I think that I

iv




succeeded in disobeying them. O f course, I was constantly encouraged by my West Point

contemporaries, nearly all of whom were, at the time, in a self-imposed dissertation race,

and who now are fighting Americas’ battles from Afghanistan, Iraq, Asia, Europe, or the

Pentagon. From among my friends at West Point, I offer my most sincere and long-term

thanks to our good friends Drs. Fred and Kim Kagan. I am remarkably fortunate that the

Kagans remain willing not only to review and discuss my current material, but also that

our respective future research will find us working together for years to come.

To my committee, I cannot thank you enough. With minimum notice, Doctors

Paul Halpem, Joe Richardson, William Oldson, and Richard O’Sullivan joined w ith Don

Horward and stepped up to the plate to support a G.I. who sought to complete his degree

while the country was at war. God bless you for your patience and your understanding.

I would also like to thank Mary and Dick Frillici, the two most wonderful parents-

in-law a son could hope for. While Mary kindly spent our first Christmas together editing

drafts of my early chapters before I sent them to Dr. Horward, D ick ensured that we all

remained well-fed and entertained. A scholar could not ask for more loving support.

Thank you also to my immediate family, Liz, Jim and Kay, whose love and

encouragement constantly sustained my efforts.

The Captain of this ship has always been Doctor Donald David Horward,

Chevalier de la Legion d ’Honneur, and Commandeur de VOrdre des Palmes

Academiques. At the behest of the Department o f History at the United States Military

Academy, Dr. Horward kindly accepted me into his program o f study, and within the first

week o f my arrival at Florida State University, developed with me the idea o f a biography

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of the younger Rochambeau. As so little published material existed on this particular

general,

neither of us was clear on what this line of research would involve, or exactly where the

research would take us. Nevertheless, while he educated me in the histories of the French

Revolution and the First Empire, he constantly drove me to produce useful narratives

relating the largely unknown histories o f these periods of French history in the Caribbean.

Fie has read and edited drafts of my dissertation for six years, drafts sent to him from such

varied Army postings as West Point, Heidelberg, Kosovo and Bosnia. When time to

complete this work became a major factor, Dr. Horward went above and beyond the call

of duty by constantly faxing and then re-faxing me edited drafts o f the last chapters. His

effort in co-producing this work has been monumental. This dissertation and subsequent

publications of this material are the direct result o f Dr. Horward’s vision - 1, and future

historians, remain eternally grateful for his foresight.

I am equally grateful to Gina Frillici. Soon after we met in 1999, Gina assumed

the task o f reading and critiquing every page o f my initial manuscript drafts before I sent

them to Dr. Horward for editing. Fortunately for me, Gina Haynsworth continued to

preview every page o f this dissertation, graciously devoting precious time to me while she

raised our two infant boys, James Lafayette V, and Hudson Rochambeau Haynsworth.

My words on paper can never reflect the brightness that their stars shine upon my life.

Indeed, it is to them that this work is dedicated.

vi

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Furthe r reproduction prohibited without permission.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

List o f Figures ............................................................................................................................. ix

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... xii

PREFACE ....................................................................................................................................... 1

1. EDUCATING AN OFFICER: 1 75 5-1 78 0 ...................................................................... 4

2. L ’EX PEDITION PARTICULIERE: 1779 - 1780 ............................................................ 12

3. NEWPO RT TO NEW YORK: JULY 1780 - AUGUST 1781 ..................................... 35

4. TO THE “MIRACLE” : NEW Y ORK TO YORKTOWN JULY - OCTOBER, 1781

........................................................................................................................................................ 70

5. FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION: 1783 - 1792 ......................................... 100

6. THE COLONIES IGNITED: 17 89 -1 79 2 .................................................................... 126

7. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL: SEPTEMBER 1792 - JANUARY 1793 ............... 163

8. SUBJUGATING MARTINIQUE: JANUARY -AP R IL 1793 .................................. 207

9. THE ROYALS ATTACK: APRIL - JUNE 1793 ........................................................ 245

10. LA D ICTATURE REPUBLICAINE : JULY 1793 - FEBRUARY 1794 .................. 282

VOLUME II

11. THE NEW ORDER: SEPTEMBER 1793 - JANUARY 1794 ................................ 309

12. LE S ISLE S DU VENT: AUGUST 1789 - JANUARY 1794 .................................... 347

13. INVASION! 6 - 7 FEBRUARY 1794 ......................................................................... 384

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14. “A PHALANX THAT NOTHING CAN WITHSTAND”: 8 - 1 2 FEBRUARY 1794

...................................................................................................................................................... 422

15. STRANGLING MARTINIQUE: 1 3 - 2 0 FEBRUARY 1794 .................................. 463

16. THE SIEGE OF REPUBLIQUE-VILLE: 21 FEBRUARY - 17 MARCH 1794 ...493

17. “WE CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THEY TREAT US FAVORABLY....” 18 MARCH

-JULY 1794 ............................................................................................................................ 525

18. POWER, PATRIOTISM AND ELUSIVE GLORY ................................................... 554

APPENDIX A-A PPE ND ICE S TO CHAPTERS ............................................................ 574

B - COPYRIGHT PERMISSION ................................................................ 582

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 584

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ................................................................................................ 596

viii




LIST OF FIGURES

1. Captain Donatien Rochambeau - Four Versions of the Same Portrait .........................10

2. The comte de Vergennes ..................................................................................................... 23

3. Lieutenant General Rochambeau ....................................................................................... 23

4. Chateau Rochambeau, Thore-la-Rochette, Vendome ..................................................... 23

5. Rochambeau’s Apartements in Paris ................................................................................. 23

6. The due de Lauzun ............................................................................................................... 23

7. Axel von Fersen ............................................................. 23

8. The Rochambeaus Arrive in America ............................................................................... 39

9. Rochambeau Meets Washington at Hartford, Connecticut ............................................ 49

10. The Sailors o f the Expedition Particuliere ........................................................... 68

11. The Campaign against Cornwallis .................................................................................. 69

12. The Battle at Stony Point, New York .............................................................................. 74

13. The Plan ............................................................................................................................... 83

14. Donatien Rochambeau’s Opening Move ....................................................................... 85

15. The Battle o f Yorktown as Seen by the Participating Nations .................................... 87

16. Various Interpretations of the Surrender at Yorktown ................................................ 90

17. Rocham beau the Conqueror ............................................................................................. 98

18. The Easte rn Caribbean 1792 (MAP) ............................................................................. 125

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19. Leger Felicite Sonthonax 1763-1813 ......................................................................... 180

20. Vue de le Cap Fran?ais ca. 1790 .................................................................................. 180

21. The Dictator’s Right Hand .................................................. 215

22. Old Saint-Pierre .............................................................................................................. 216

23. Fort-de-la-Republique, and Fort-de-la-Convention .................................................. 218

24. The Early Enemy ............................................................................................................ 230

25. Camp Decide ................................................................................................................... 235

26. De Percin’s Attack - Rochambeau’s Riposte (MAP) ............................................... 237

27. Mom e Vert-Pre .............................................................................................................. 266

28. The Eastern Caribbean 1793 (MAP) ........................................................................... 346

29. “The Capture of Tobago by Major General Cuyler, and Vice Admiral S ir John

Laforey” ..................................................................................................................................... 353

30. The King’s Men ............................................................................................................. 385

31. The British Master Plan (MAP) ................................................................................... 389

32. Admiral Jervis’ Gun Boats ............................................................................................ 391

33. The British Invasion in the South 5-7 February 1794 (MAP) .................................. 394

34. Attack at le Marin and Landing at Trois Rivieres ...................................................... 396

35. General Dundas’ Landing .............................................................................................. 400

36. Dundas’ Landing and Attack at Mome Vert-Pre (MAP) .......................................... 402

37. LaTrinite.........................................................................................................................

404

38. Dundas’ Attack at la Trinite (MAP) ................................ 406

39. Generals Whyte and Prescott Attack Across the Grande Anse (MAP) ...................409

40. Gordon’s Landing ........................................................................................................... 425

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41. Gordon Attacks at Case-Navire (MAP) ...................................................................... 426

42. British Maneuvers Against Ilet a Ramiers (MAP) .................................................... 432

43. Ilet a Ramiers ................................................................................................................... 433

44. Bellegarde’s March on Republique-ville (MAP) .......................................................435

45. Rochambeau and Doucassou Ambush Colonel Gordon (MAP) ............................. 440

46. The Land/Sea Skirmish at Case-Navire (MAP) ......................................................... 443

47. Bellegarde’s Failed Attack at Mom e le Brun (MAP) ............................................... 446

48. Royal Marines Attack Ilet a Ramiers (MAP) ............................................................. 449

49. Jervis Infiltrates the Baie du Republique-ville (MAP) .............................................. 451

50. Closing In On Republique-ville by Land and Sea (MAP) .........................................456

51. The British Gain Control of the Baie du Republique-ville ...................................... 457

52. British Land and Sea Movements Against Saint-Pierre (MAP) ............................... 475

53. The Battle for Saint-Pierre (MAP) ............................................................................... 480

54. Destmction of the 1st Chasseur Battalion at Mome le Brun (MAP) ....................... 487

55. The Naval Blockade of Republique-ville (MAP) ....................................................... 510

56. View o f Fort-de-la-Republique from Positions at Pointe des Carrieres ..................519

57. Captain Robert Faulknor’s Attack on Fort-de-la-Republique .................................. 532

58. Images o f Republique-ville ........................................................................................... 536

59. Lieutenant General Donatien Rochambeau in Saint-Domingue ca. 1803..............

564

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ABSTRACT

THE EARLY CAREER OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONATIEN ROCHAMBEAU

AND THE FRENCH CAMPAIGNS IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1792 - 1794

Bom on 7 April 1755, Jean Marie Joseph Donatien de Vimeur, vicomte de

Rochambeau pursued a military career that lasted until his death at the Battle of Leipzig

in October 1813. Though he made important contributions to France’s war efforts during

the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the First Empire, the

overshadowing reputation o f his famous father, Marshal of France Jean-Baptiste

Rochambeau ensured that Donatien Rochambeau’s own history remained on the

periphery o f French history.

Few references are made to Donatien Rochambeau during his earlier career. In

fact, those references that exist are generally confined to regional histories. This work

represents the first biography of the general, and offers a concise history of the French

and English campaigns in the Caribbean between 1792 and 1794. Current textbooks on

Caribbean history continue to confuse the son with his forebear and scarce, i f any,

reference is made to him in the more prominent chronicles of the French Revolutionary

and Napoleonic periods. However, the life and early career of Donatien Rochambeau

offers important insight into some o f the more dramatic events of his times. A

xii




loyal officer of the old regime; combatant in the W ar of American Independence; a leader

in the Estates General who became a staunch Jacobin; defender and Governor General in

the French Caribbean colonies; and finally a divisional commander under the Emperor

Napoleon, the younger Rochambeau’s story serves as an open window into one o f the

world’s greatest sagas. This volume explores his emergence from lieutenant to senior

general officer, and pays special attention to his signal defense of the French Windward

Islands between 1792 and 1794.

xm




PREFACE

Overshadowed his entire life by his famous father, Donatien Rochambeau’s own

story has remained on the periphery o f French history. Current textbooks and

encyclopedic references on the C aribbean continue to confuse the son with his forebear

and scarce, if any, reference is made to him in the more prominent chronicles o f the

French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. Nevertheless, a study of Rochambeau’s

early career, especially his defense o f France’s Windward Island colonies offers important

insight into some of the more dramatic, yet less-known, events of his times. A loyal

officer of the old regime; com batant in the War o f American Independence; leader in the

Estates General; dedicated Jacobin; defender and Governor General o f the French

Caribbean colonies; and finally a divisional commander under the Emperor Napoleon, the

younger Rochambeau’s contributions to the civil and military history of France between

1780 and 1813 deserve exploration and recognition.

To this point, historians have generally chosen to remember Rochambeau for the

two years between 1802 and 1803 that he spent in Saint-Domingue suppressing Toussaint

l’Ouverture and his army o f former slaves in their bid for independence and a national

identity. Through his sharp criticism of the French general, Haitian-born historian C.L.R.

James, in his famous work The Black Jacobins, helped immortalize for Rochambeau a




legend of infamy.1 Other historians, including Thomas Ott and Caroline Fick have taken

a more objective approach, describing the general’s activities in Saint-Domingue more in

the context o f contemporary sentiments and practices.2 Though this work traces his

career until 17 94 ,1 intend to explore for future publication the 1802-1803 Saint-

Domingue Campaign, a campaign during which Rochambeau’s problems proved so

insoluble as to destroy his reputation and his army.

In sum, few references are made to Donatien Rochambeau’s early career and are

generally confined to regional histories. The senior Rochambeau provides useful, but

limited, details of his son’s activities in his autobiography, while J.E. Weelen’s reprint of

Donatien Rochambeau’s diary from America is the only lengthy reference to his service

in our country that we have in English.3 In addition to Kieran Kleczewski’s 1988

dissertation on the British occupation o f Martinique, Sidney Daney de Marcillac, a

Martiniquais historian who wrote his His toire de la Martinique while many of the actual

participants were still living, provides the best historical account o f Rochambeau’s

activities on the island from 1792 to 1794.4 Excluding these two authors, the well of

1 See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins; Toussaint L ’Ouverture an d the San

Domingo Revolution (London, 1980).

2 See Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 1789-1804 (Knoxville, TN, 1973) and

Carolyn Fick, The M aking of Haiti; the Saint-Domingue Revolution from Below

(Knoxville, TN, 1990).

3 J.E. Wheelen, Rochambeau Father an d Son; A Life o f the Marechal de

Rochambeau and the Journal o f the Vicomte de Rochambeau [hitherto unpublished]

(New York, 1926).

4 Kieran R. Kleczewski, Martinique And The British Occupation, 1794-1802

(Washington, D.C., 1988); Sidney Daney de Marcillac, Histoire De La Martinique

(Fort-de-France, Martinique, 1978).

2

roduce d with permission of the copyright owner. Furthe r reproduction prohibited without permission.



available analysis nearly runs dry. Fortunately, volumes of previously unexplored letters,

diaries and reports available at various archives in Paris supply the preponderance of

missing details. Based upon this information, a picture of Rochambeau emerges that is

radically different than the one described by modem chroniclers of Haitian history. At

least until 1794, Rochambeau displayed no tendencies toward the barbarism attributed to

him in Saint-Domingue. Instead, he proved himself an exceptionally competent officer

who employed, to the best o f his abilities, the classic and time-honored military

techniques of his time. The government of France, however, regularly failed to capitalize

on Donatien Rocham beau’s military talents. In Martinique, and later in Saint-Domingue,

he was left with a minimum of resources to fend for him self against overwhelmingly

superior enemies. Nevertheless, regardless of the usually unfavorable conditions in

which he found himself, Rochambeau continued to demonstrate an unswerving loyalty to

his country and his profession, and especially to his vision of the triumph o f the

fundamental tenets o f the French Revolution, Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternite.

3




Chapter I

Educating an Officer:

1755 - 1780

Throughout much o f the ancien regime the Rochambeau family represented an

archetype of the French nobility of the sword. One ancestor, Jean, was killed at the Battle

of Mansourah during the Seventh Crusade and another commanded a company of archers

under Henry III at Coutras. This officer’s grandson served in the company o f musketeers

commanded by Francois Colbert, the brother o f the well-known minister. An invalid at

birth, Donatien Rochambeau’s grandfather, Joseph Charles de Vimeur, marquis de

Rochambeau, always regretted not having been able to follow his family’s military

tradition. Louis XV, nevertheless, held the marquis in high esteem, naming him

Chevalier de Saint-Sepulchre and conferring upon him the governorship o f the city of

Vendome in 1728. Living until 1779, Joseph Charles was instrumental in instilling in

both his son and grandson an unshakable sense of honor and loyalty to the king and to the

church. Joseph Charles’ son, Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, better known in

America as the Comte de Rochambeau, served the crown well, gaining military honors in

the War o f Austrian Succession; the Seven Years War; serving as commander of French

forces in the American War for Independence; and finally, in the first battles of the

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French Revolution. On 28 December 1791, Jean-Baptiste finally received the baton o f a

Marshal o f France from Louis XVI, making him and General Nicolas von Luckner the

last two officers to join the m arshalship under the ancien regime}

Jean Marie Joseph Donatien de Vimeur, vicomte de Rochambeau, was bo m in

Paris on 7 April 1755.2 The young vicomte remained in the capital city only long enough

to “prepare m yself to enter the service” receiving his early formal military education at

Brienne, where he won every prize for textbook proficiency in military studies.3 Leaving

1 La Commission d’Histoire de la Societe des Cincinnati de France, Rochambeau (1725-1807) [hereafter Societe des Cincinnati, Branche Fran9aise, Rochambeau (1725-

1807)], (Annonay, France, 1992), 1-28. Von Luckner, a battle-tried hussar of the Saxon

aristocracy, fought against France during the Seven Year’s War, but eventually offered

his regiment of mercenaries to the service o f the French king. A century later, his

thirteen-year-old descendant, Felix, w ould run away from the family estate near Dresden

to escape his predestined career as a cavalry officer. After signing on in Hamburg as a

ship’s hand under the assumed name “Phelax,” this youngest von Luckner later gained

international fame during the First World W ar as the “Sea Devil,” captain o f the German

Imperial Navy’s sailing ship (turned raider) the S.M.S. Seeadler.

2 Some discrepancy exists concerning Donatien Rocham beau’s actual date of birth. In Jean-Edmond Weelen’s translation o f the younger Rochambeau’s memoir of the

American Revolution, W eelen mistakenly describes the birth dates as both 7 August and

7 April 1755. Still others (to include the Paris Mint, which struck a rather curious

medallion in the late 1970s to commemorate the vicomte’s landing at le Cap, Saint-

Domingue in 1802 - he actually landed elsewhere) set the date in 1750. According to the

actual birth certificate from Paris’ Jean en Greve parish, and official French military

records, the correct date is 7 April 1755. It is likely that like his father in 1725, Donatien

Rochambeau received his baptism at the family’s traditional place o f worship, the Sainte-

Madeleine church in Venddme, where his great-uncle Louis Begon presided as cure.

3 Donatien Rochambeau, Journa l (The War in America) [hereafter Rochambeau, Journal], First Published in J.E. Weelen, Rochambeau Father and Son; A Life o f the

Marechal de Rochambeau an d the Journa l o f the Vicomte de Rochambeau [hitherto

unpublished] (New York, 1926), 193; Randolph Keim, Rochambeau, A Commemoration

by the Congress o f the United States o f Am erica o f the Services o f the French Auxiliary

Forces in the War o f Independence (Washington, D.C. 1907), 375.

5




his studies in Paris, he traveled through Verberie to join the French army camp at

Compiegne, where his father, then a Marechal de Camp (equivalent to a Major General),

commanded the Auvergne regiment. Hence, apparently sometime in his thirteenth year,

Donatien Rocham beau began the career for which his family had intended him since

birth, commencing his pre-commissioning training as a comm on soldier in his father’s

unit.

The vicomte de Rochambeau was a member of a cadre o f officers whose families

had received court honors and whose rapid advancement through the ranks followed a de

facto promotion scheme that normally began at the age of fifteen years, six months. On

or close to this birthday, the French war minister could commission a young nobleman

into the officer ranks, with a latitude ranging between twelve and eighteen years o f age.

Following the established progression, the lieutenant could expect promotion to capitaine

at or near the age o f eighteen, and colonel around age twenty. Further, the officer could,

as vacancies and personal finances permitted, skip the intermediate ranks o f major and

lieutenant colonel, instead purchasing comm and o f units as large as a regiment.4

Army officers at Versailles generally respected the family’s positions in the

existing military hierarchy. Officers whose fathers held high rank in the services could

4 Gilbert Bodinier, Les Officiers de I Arm ee Royale; Combattants de la Guerre

d ’Independance des Etats-Unis de Yorktown a I An II [hereafter Bodinier, Officiers de

VArmee Royale], France, Archives de la guerre, Service historique de 1’Armee de Terre

[hereafter Service historique]: Chateau de Vincennes, (Paris, 1983), 54, 115. This particular arrangement lasted until 1776, when the minister o f war, Saint-Germain,

ordered that colonels have fourteen years o f service, o f which six would be spent in the

newly-created grade of colonel-en-second and five in the grade of capta ia This was quite

a departure from the previous requirement for the grade o f colonel which mandated that

an officer have only seven years o f service, o f which five were served as a captain.

6




look forward to even more accelerated promotion due to the policy of patronage which

existed in the military services of pre-Revolutionary France. Accordingly, the sons of

marshals, lieutenant generals, or marechaux de camp generally rose in rank much faster

than those officers who had no intimate connection with the court. In the Rochambeau’s

case, the son profited directly and immediately from his father’s success until the latter’s

death in 1807.5

Donatien Rochambeau remained with his father at Compiegne until, three months

after his fourteenth birthday, he obtained his commission as lieutenant-en-second in the

artillery on 5 August 1769.6 Concurrently, the new lieutenant received orders assigning

him to the B esan?on Artillery regiment, then in garrison at Strasbourg, where his father

expected him to “profit from the corp’s lessons and instruction.”7 In addition to his

military pursuits, the younger Rochambeau continued his civil education, taking courses

in common law at the university at Strasbourg, and studying German under a Doctor

5 Bodinier, Officiers de I Armee Royale, 54, 61, 115; Service historique, Carton

Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299. While the patronage of higher ranking

officers to their sons was certainly the expectation, such arrangements still had to be dealt

with delicately. Apparently sensitive to impressions and military etiquette, the elder

Rochambeau, when praising his son’s performance at the Battle o f Yorktown in his report

to the Minister o f War, took care to write that he always spoke of his son throughout the

latter’s career as a stranger.

6 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 193; Service historique, Carton Yb 381; doss ier

lieutenant-general no. 1299, items 12, 14, 15.

7 Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossie r lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 19.

Contrary to most noble o fficers who considered artillery service an unglamourous,

technical field, General Rochambeau experimented with artillery throughout his career

and remained a strong advocate o f massed artillery fires to support infantry maneuvers.

7




Schopftin and his secretary M. Koch.8

By early spring 1772, the younger Rochambeau had finished his political studies

at Strasbourg and was approaching his seventeenth birthday. Accordingly, Marechal de

Camp Rochambeau began to seek for his son a promotion to captain and a company

command. Naturally the vicomte’s best chances to secure a company lay in the unit that

his father commanded. As the result, the general requested to the Minister of War that

while his son waited for a company o f dragoons to come available, he be b reveted to the

rank of Aide-M ajor Surnumeraire (an aide in the grade o f major, but supernumerary and

without appointment) and returned to the Auvergne regiment to replace any other aides

who had become absent due to illness, dismissal or furlough. Obviously the transfer

would position the vicomte favorably for the next vacancy but his intent, the comte

asserted, was to further his so n’s professional military education in a variety o f

assignments in the regiment. General Rochambeau further promised that his son would

complete his course o f basic military instruction by March 1772, and would, by that time,

be seventeen years old. The minister approved the brevet on 24 March, and with his

political studies finished, Donatien Rochambeau soon lef t Strasbourg to return to serve

with his father at Verberie.9

By 8 March 1773, nearly a year after his father’s initial request, Donatien

8 Donatien Rochambeau , Journal, 193.

9 Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 19;

Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 193; Georges Six, Dictionnaire Biographique des

Generaux et Amiraux Franqais de la Revolution et de I ’Empire [hereafter Six,

Dictionnaire Biographique] (Paris, 1934), II, 378. At the time, General Rochambeau, as

well as commanding the Auvergne regiment, was Inspector-General of the Infantry.

8

produced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.



Rochambeau remained an aide. General Rochambeau was obviously disturbed by his

son’s delayed promotion and in a memorandum to the Minister of War, the marquis de

Monteynard, he asked once again that the latter support his son’s commission as captain

and his assignment to command a company o f dragoons. A month later the general was

even more adamant, noting to Monteynard that his son had turned eighteen on his last

birthday and had served the preceding year with great “courage and honesty.”10 Further,

he reminded the minister that several other artillery cadets of his son’s former class had

already received companies and that he did not consider it in any way jus t that his son,

who had served as an artillery officer for four years, should have his promotion delayed

any longer. The vicomte de Rochambeau received the rank of captain on 28 July 1773,

yet he never commanded a company in his father’s regiment.11

By the spring of the following year, General Rochambeau requested o f Mestre de

Camp Joseph Francois Louis Charles, comte de Damas-d’Antigny that he accept

Donatien into his regiment o f the Artois Dragoons. Captain Rochambeau, the general

asked, would serve once again as a supernumerary aide in the grade o f major, performing

the same duties that he had in the Auvergne Infantry. Whether or not the general was

once again seeking a potential command for his son is uncertain. More important,

10 General Rochambeau to M. Chariot, marquis de Monteynard, 8 March 1773,

Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 21;

Rochambeau to Chariot, 3 May 1773, Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossierlieutenant-general no. 1299, item 20.

11 It is after this promotion that a youthful Donatien Rochambeau sat for the artist

M. Vestier for his earliest known portrait, proudly wearing the uniform of a captain in his

father’s Auvergne Infantry.

9




Captain Donatien Rochambeau -

Four Versions of the Same Portrait

Figure 1. Captain Donatien Rochambeau - Four Versions of the Same Portrait




however, service in the dragoons would complete what would appear to be the general’s

design of thoroughly educating his son in the business o f all three primary branches o f the

army. With Damas-d’Antigny’s assent, the Minister of War approved the transfer on 24

March 1774.12 The young captain remained in this assignment until, after serving just

under seven years, he received his discharge from active service on 13 June 1776.

Events, however, would not allow the vicomte de Rochambeau to escape the k ing’s

service for long; early in 1779 the young officer joined his father once again, this time to

go to war.

12 Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 25.

Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 193; Six, Dic tionnaire Biographique, II, 378.

11




Chapter II

L ’Expedition Particuliere:

1779 - 1780

Following the American victory over their British enemy at Saratoga in October

1777, France officially recognized the independence of the American colonies, and on 6

February 1778, signed a treaty of alliance and commerce with the new thirteen United

States of North America. In response, Great Britain declared war on the French. Not

being entirely sure how to execute either an indirect commercial war or a w ar o f direct

naval combat, King Louis XVI’s foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes,

secretly dispatched a naval squadron under Vice A dmiral Charles Henri, comte d ’Estaing,

to North America in April 1778. Though d’Estaing’s reputation offered promise for

success, his fleet’s failure to locate and defeat any British naval forces had, by 1779,

weakened Vergennes’ resolve to support fully the American cause. Instead, Vergennes

became more interested in France’s European w ar with Great Britain. After much

deliberation, he devised a plan to attack England itself, engineering the creation o f a joint

Spanish/French invasion force that would seize the Isle of Wight and then capture the

dockyards and arsenals o f Britain’s most important naval facility at Portsmouth.

Vergennes designated Marechal de France Noel de Jourda, comte de Vaux, to

12




oversee the perilous operation, and by the minister’s plan, two fleets would protect and

assist in the transport of Vaux’ force. The French fleet was under Admiral Louis

Guillouet, comte d’Orvilliers, while the second was Spanish and would arrive by June

1779 from Cordova, Spain. With the naval piece o f the operation apparently in place,

Vergennes gave command o f the advanced guard o f the French army contingent to the

recently-promoted Major General Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau. Unusually qualified,

conscientious, and the consummate professional military officer, Rochambeau had hoped

to command the entire expedition himself. He had seen considerably more combat than

Vaux, but General Rochambeau had shrunk from what he considered the distasteful role

of a courtier at Versailles preferring instead to remain with his army in the field or

retreating to the more healthful climes of Vendom e.1 As the result of his remaining

distant politically from the king and his ministers, the general had not gained sufficient

rank to warrant overall command of such an ambitious undertaking. Though

disappointed, the general remained content with the knowledge that his five infantry

battal ions at least would spearhead Marshal de V aux’ attack.

As participation in the upcoming operation would certainly further what he must

have considered his son’s “interrupted” military career, the general brought Donatien

Rochambeau back from his inactive status to active service. The vicomte, now twenty-

three years old, returned to duty to serve as his father’s aide-de-camp at the headquarters

in Vaussieux and in the other cantonments in Normandy and Brittany, and on 22 January

1 A variety of ailments had haunted Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau since his birth and

the area around his father’s estate provided what he considered a restful, curative

environment.

13




1779, received (with his father’s money and influence) the rank of colonel. Further, the

newly-promoted colonel received as his father’s gift the prestigious position of second in

command o f the Bourbonnois regiment under Colonel Anne Alexandre, marquis de

Montmorency-Laval.2 While preparations for the assault against England progressed, the

younger Rochambeau could not have gotten a better practical military re-schooling after

his two and one-ha lf year absence. He regularly observed his father, the master tactician,

as the latter relentlessly drilled his soldiers, preparing them for any potentiality that they

might encounter once they reached enemy shores. In speaking o f General Rochambeau at

this time, Colonel Armand-Louis de Gontaut, due de Lauzun, observed that contrary to

the other commanders o f the proposed expedition “M. de Rochambeau, Brigadier-

General commanding the vanguard, spoke o f nothing but deeds o f martial prowess,

maneuvered and took up military positions in the open, indoors, on the table, on your

2 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 193-194; Service historique, Carton Yb 381;

dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, items 12, 14, 15; Arnold Whitridge, Rochambeau (New York, 1965), 57-58. Both his own and his father’s journals refer to Donatien

Rochambeau as his father’s aide. This official status was short-lived but requires

clarification. While the general’s command was preparing to sail against England in

1779, Donatien Rochambeau served as one of his father’s personal aides-de-camp, and

simultaneously, on 22 January 1779, received his command in the Bourbonnois. The

vicomte continued in this status until the spring of 1780 when his father gave him the

additional duty of assistant to the army’s quartermaster-general. Colonel Rochambeau

continued, however, as an “unofficial” aide to his father in America, accompanying the

general to important meetings with dignitaries (such as the Hartford, Connecticut

conference with General George Washington), representing his father’s army at

Versailles, and certainly receiving preferential consideration from his father in theassignment of most combat missions in America. At first glance, these points may seem

rather arbitrary. However, given Colonel Rocham beau’s position as second-in-command

of the senior regiment in the French expedition (the Bourbonnois) and the contemporary

modus operandi of the French army’s officer corps, such treatment was not extraordinary.

14




snuffbox, i f you took it out o f your pocket; entirely absorbed in his profession, he has a

marvelous knowledge o f it.”3

The French invasion force, however, never set foot on British soil. A crucial

aspect of the operation had been for the combined Spanish/French fleet to secure, by June

1779, the English Channel before landing French troops on the Isle o f Wight and

Portsmouth. The Spanish flotilla arrived six weeks late to meet the French fleet which

waited of f the coast o f Corunna, Spain, yet the combined armada nevertheless sailed

northward for the Channel. Running critically short of water and almost wholly

overcome by smallpox, members of the d’Orvilliers’ fleet struggled to fulfill their

mission, but by mid-August the French foreign ministry aborted the operation, making the

decision official at a council of war held in September at Brest. General Rochambeau

was thoroughly disgusted. Completely consumed with training his soldiers, he had driven

them mercilessly and both he and his troops were exhausted. After determining to end

3 Armand Louis de Gontaut, due de Lauzun, Memoirs o f the Due de Lauzun

(London, 1928), 187. In a letter to his father, Axel Fersen would later describe the

commanding general in less glowing terms. “My stay in this country with M. de

Rochambeau has not been very pleasant, and I share this sentiment with all those who

serve under his orders. He is an excellent officer, but he is one o f the most disagreeable

people I know, brusque, of bad temper, excessively detail-oriented, distrustful, little o f the

grace of which he speaks, but does not show, discouraging to everyone. Finally, everyone

is unhappy, a fact which the general officers hide from him.” Comte Axel de Fersen,

Lettres D ’Axe l De Fersen A Son Pere Pendant La Guerre De L ’Independance

D ’Amerique (Paris, 1929), 122. Twenty years later in Saint-Domingue, General Charles

Emmanuel Leclerc would make many o f the same observations about Donatien

Rochambeau. Much of the criticism against the general, however, is undoubtedlycharacteristic of the jealousy that the higher-placed courtiers felt toward their

commanding general (and by extension, his son) especially during the expedition’s early

months. In Newport, Rhode Island during the tedious, inactive winter months o f 1780-

1781, travel restrictions upon and harsh disciplinary measures taken by the general

against a number of his officers only served to increase their ire.

15




his thirty-seven-year career in the army, the elder Rochambeau handed over his command

at the port o f Brest and left for his Paris apartments in late September to settle his military

affairs.

Within three months, a second, more devastating blow struck the Rochambeau

family, for on 19 December 1779, Joseph Charles, the general’s father, died at the

family’s ancestral estate. With longevity surely in mind, the comte left his son to the task

of settling both the family’s personal and political affairs at the chateau while he returned

to conclude his own business in Paris. The vicomte’s new responsibilities were

extensive. Joseph Charles’ death left not only a sizeable estate, but also created a

vacancy in the governorship o f the family’s representative district, or bailliage.

Consequently, the young colonel took the title of Governor of Vendome and its

concurrent position o f Grand Bai lli d ’Epee du Venddmois.4 While his son continued to

manage the family interests, in January 1780 the general (now tormented by inflammatory

rheumatism and still grieving the recent death o f his father), was granted permission to

take leave to plan for his retirement. Within minutes Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau would

have stepped into his carriage bound for a comfortable dotage in the quiet solace o f the

Chateau Rochambeau, bu t there arrived at his Paris apartments on the Rue du Cherche-

Midi a messenger from Louis XVI summoning him to an immediate audience with the

king. Though he may have privately bemoaned the intrusion, it was hardly in keeping

4 R. de Saint-Venant, Dictionnaire Topographie, Historique, Biographique,

Genealogique et Heraldique de Vendome (Blois, France, 1969), 190. While in 1779 such

a position was primarily titular, it would put Colonel Rochambeau in charge o f the area’s

representative body at the convocation o f the Estates General ten years later.

16

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.



with his professional nature for General Rochambeau to refuse His Majesty’s command.

Ordering his driver at once toward the royal residence at Versailles, the general received,

some hours later, precise orders placing him in command o f an expeditionary force of

four thousand men that would sail for America by April 1780.5

The Americans had made no formal request to their French allies for troops, only

for supplies and money. Marie-Joseph Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette, however,

had recently come back to France from the war in America. Upon his return, Lafayette

wrote a lengthy, detailed memorandum to Vergennes in which he strongly advocated

France’s sending an army corps of 4,000 to America with Newport, Rhode Island, as its

first objective. Not surprisingly, Lafayette sought to command the expeditionary force

himself. Though only a captain in the French army, George Washington had

commissioned the spirited young officer a major general in the American forces. The

marquis’ unprecedented rise to fame and position, however, incensed many other less

opportunistic military men and Louis XVI’s new m inister of war, Alexandre-Eleonore-

Marie de Saint-Mauris, prince de Montbarey, urged the king to name Rochambeau

instead. Though the older general, unlike Lafayette, spoke no English, he had served the

crown loyally and possessed considerable battlefield experience. Montbarey admired

Rochambeau’s solid reputation as a stem disciplinarian who scorned intrigue, but more

important, the minister knew that he could count on the general to perform successfully in

5 Societe des Cincinnati, Branche Franfaise, Rochambeau (1725-1807), 14-15;

Whitridge, Rochambeau, 60-64; Weelen, Rochambeau, 75.

17




the absence o f orders.6 After a brie f incarceration for having left his post in the French

Army to fight for the independence of Great Britain’s colonies, the king released

Lafayette to aid Rocham beau as the latter planned for his army’s voyage to America.7

General Rochambeau did not distance himse lf from Lafayette. On the contrary,

aware that the young marquis had a firm grasp o f the situation in the American colonies,

Rochambeau encouraged Lafayette to counsel him on every pertinent detail. Especially

noteworthy was Lafayette’s strong recommendation to the senior commander that his

force attempt to remain as self-sufficient as possible. The war had outrageously inflated

prices for even the most basic necessities and Am erican merchants tended to accept

neither Continental paper currency nor French livres without the greatest apprehension.8

To make matters worse, both enemy and friendly military operations had crippled much

of New England’s food production capability.

Armed with Lafayette’s reports, his instructions from Montbarey, and his own

judgement, Rochambeau and his hand-picked staff began intensive preparations for what

6 Joachim Merlant, Soldiers and Sailors o f France in the American War fo r

Independence (1776-1783). Translated from the French by Mary Bushnell Coleman

(New York, 1920), 111; Whitridge, Rochambeau , 68-75.

7 Louis XVI promoted General Rochambeau to the rank o f Lieutenant General on

1 March 1780. This rank did not exist at the time in the American Army and placed

Rochambeau higher than Lafayette and Rocham beau’s own French generals, but one step

lower than General W ashington who, possessing the status (without the title) o f a Marshal

of France, would command the entire a llied army.

8 Though the livre (France’s primary currency denomination until the early years

of the French Revolution) regularly fluctuated in value on the international exchange, its

contemporary worth may be best approximated against the English Pound Sterling (avoir

dupois or du-poids) at 1 livre = £1. By 1789, the value of the livre on international

markets would drop by nearly eighty per-cent.

18




the war ministry code-named the Expedition Particuliere. Colonel Rochambeau now

received an even more responsible role. Apparently at his father’s behest, the ministry

assigned Donatien Rochambeau to the position o f the expedition’s Aide-M ajor General

de Logis, the principle staff officer to the Quartermaster General o f the French invasion

force. The vicomte initially balked at the appointment, understandably preferring to serve

solely in his more prestigious position in the Bourbonnois regiment, but was persuaded

by his father to take the logistics assignment “ so that he m ight be with h im always.”9

In the midst o f the preparations for the American campaign, yet another major

event occupied the Rochambeaus’ attention. On 18 March 1780, the vicomte de

Rochambeau married the youthful Franfoise d ’Harville, in a wedding which marked a

change in the family’s traditional marriage criteria. Donatien Rochambeau’s grandfather

had wed Marie-Claire Therese Begon, who came from a family of sailors, but whose

father had served as the tattle collector for Vendome.10 Donatien’s mother was Jeanne

9 Armand-Charles Augustin de la Croix de Castries, A Midd le Passage, The Journal o f Armand-Charles Augustin de la Croix de Castries, Due de Castries, Comte de

Charlus and Baron Castries; 6 April 1780 to 29 September 1780 (Boston, 1970), 18;

Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoirs o f the Marshal Count De Rochambeau, Relative To

The War O f Independence O f The United States [hereafter Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau,

Memoirs o f the Count de Rochambeau] (New York, 1971), 22. Until the army’s march to

New York in 1781, Colonel Donatien Rochambeau acted predominantly in his role of

Aide to the Quartermaster General (1 March 1780 until 21 July 1781). Brigadier Charles

de Beville served as the corps’ Quartermaster General and Chief of Staff, while Captain

Georges-Henri-Victor de Collot, the only o f General Rochambeau’s former aides, served

under Donatien Rochambeau as Second Assistant Quartermaster. In 1792 the Convention

would name General Collot Governor General of Guadeloupe, where he took orders fromthen Lieutenant-General Donatien Rochambeau, Governor General of the W indward

Isles.

10 Under the ancien regime, the tattle (or “cut”) was a much-despised royal

capitation tax, the payment o f which was borne almost entirely by France’s rural peasant

19




Therese Telles da Costa, whose father, a lifelong entrepreneur, afforded a dowry of

336,000 livres to the Rochambeau estate. While these two earlier marriages brought a

greater measure of wealth into the family, they did little to further the Rocham beaus’

influence at court. Whether Donatien’s marriage was a political machination or done out

of true affection remains difficult to ascertain.11 For the time being though, the vicomte’s

wedding had gone a long way toward correcting the family’s social shortcoming.

Mademoiselle Fransoise Eleonore de Jouvenal des Ursines d’Harville was the

daughter of Lieutenant General Claude Constant Jouvenal d’Harville des Ursines,

Governor of Huningue, and a courtier with close contacts to the king.12 As the bride-to-

be was still a minor, her father first emancipated her to the care of her prospective

husband prior to official procedure o f the wedding.13 At the end o f many pages o f

genealogical and legal script, all of the parties, to include parents and surviving

grandparents, signed the official documents on 18 March 1780 at the d’Harville home in

Paris’ Saint-Sulpice parish. The couple held their church ceremony six days later.14 The

population. Because tattle collectors could legally collect amounts far in excess of that

demanded by the crown, the collector’s occupation was a lucrative one that remained

highly coveted.

11 Bodinier, Officiers de I ’Armee Royale, 218.

12 D’Harville would later serve with Marshal Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau in the

Army o f the North during the French Revolution.

13 Wedding Documents of Donatien Rochambeau and Fran^oise d ’Harville.

France, Archives Nationales [hereafter AN], Minutier Central, Depot du Mariage, CartonET/XCII/821. 18 March 1780.

14 Ibid. By 25 March, the day immediately following the wedding in Paris,

General Rochambeau had returned to Brest. His son may well have been with him.

Curiously, Donatien Rochambeau makes no mention in his journal o f his marriage.

20

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction proh ibited withou t permission.



vicomte had precious little time for post-nuptials, for within two weeks the newlywed

colonel would be aboard the Due de Bourgogne (74) en route to America.

When the two Rochambeau men reached the port of Brest in late March, near

chaos reigned. Believing that four thousand soldiers were insufficient for so distant an

operation, the comte had earlier appealed to officials in Versailles to double the number.

He had lobbied for more horses, more artillery, larger stores o f water and rations, and

enough currency to reimburse the A mericans for any possible inconvenience.15 Included

in the general’s demands for this increasingly self-sufficient army were eight druggists,

twenty doctors, butchers, bakers, smiths, etc .16 With Donatien Rochambeau often acting

as his father’s intermediary to Versailles, Montbarey and the king eventually acquiesced

to most o f the commander’s requests. Cataloguing his father’s army, the vicomte de

Rochambeau noted that:

The land army was to be composed o f the Bourbonnois, Royal

Deux-Ponts, Soissonnois, Saintonge, Neustrie, and Anholt infantry

regiments, o f nine hundred men of the Lauzun legion - as much

infantry as cavalry - a battalion o f artillery, a company of bombers

and a detachment o f sappers, some miners and workers with siege

equipment, campaign equipment, and in fact all the implements

and supplies needed by an army corps.17

The requisitioned complement, numbering some 8,000 men, was still arriving at

the port by early April, but the French navy could not accommodate the ever-increasing

15 General Rochambeau to Louis XVI, 26 February 1780. Service historique,

Records de VExpedition Particuliere, Carton A4 48, items 45, 47.

16 Records de l’Armee, entry for 10 March 1780. Service historique, Ibid., item

117.

17 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 195.

21




logistical burden. After much inter-service accusation and deliberation, General

Rochambeau and Admiral Charles-Louis d’Arsac, chevalier de Temay, commander of

naval forces for the expedition, resolved to split the party into two divisions which would

travel to America in two separate convoys.

To Lieutenant General Rochambeau, putting foot soldiers ashore in America was

the paramount consideration. Despite the ships’ crews jettison ing all unnecessary stores,

in the first convoy the commanding general was able to include only five thousand men -

four of his six intended regiments. As the result, absolutely no horses would accompany

the first division. Even General Rochambeau’s own mounts, which would have taken up

the space o f twenty soldiers, had to remain in France.18 To the noble, inexperienced

colonels, majors and captains that were included as members of the Expedition

Particuliere, the dearth of space aboard the ships was especially galling. No one, not

even the genera l’s own son, could carry with him what he thought would be essential

equipment. “After many difficulties and words (and some crowns distributed here and

there), each o f us succeeded in providing for his narrow quarters in these old tubs, so

heartily detested by all who are no t professional sailors.”19 Volunteer officers who hoped

18 To the prince de Montbarey, General Rochambeau wrote on 27 March 1780

that “It is with the greatest regret that separate myself from two war-horses that I can

never replace, but I do not wish to reproach myself that they are occupying the space o f

twenty men, who otherwise might have embarked.” Henri Doniol, His toire de lar r t

Participation de la France a VEtablissem ent des Etats Unis d ’Am erique (Pans, 1886-1892), V, 331.

19 Baron Ludwig von Closen, The Revolutionary Journal o f Baron Ludwig von

Closen, 1780-1783 [hereafter Closen, Journal], Translated and Edited with an

Introduction by Evelyn M. Acomb (Williamsburg, Virginia, 1958), 6.

22




Figure 2.The comte de Vergennes

selected Rocham beau to lead the Expedition

Figure 4.

Rochambeau had hoped to retire to Chateau

Rochambeau, Thore-La-Rochette, Vendome

Figure 6.

The due de Lauzun (later General

Biron) led Lauzun’s Legion 23

Figure 3.Lieutenant General Rochambeauwould serve under Marshal of France

George Washington

Figure 5.

Rochambeau’s Apartemente in Paris

Figure 7.

Axel von Fersen was an original

member of the General Staff




to gain combat experience and receive favors at court vociferously appealed to

Rochambeau to take them along, but the general summarily denied them passage.20

One officer, however, who was not originally chosen by General Rochambeau,

managed to obtain a position on the commanding general’s staff. As a result of his

father’s influence at the court o f Versailles, Colonel Axel de Fersen received orders from

Vergennes to report to Rochambeau as aide-de-camp in the general’s personal entourage.

Quickly summing up his situation at the docks o f Brest, Fersen tried to sell his personal

mounts, but with no luck.21 Even for the commanding general’s son, the load o f personal

20 Alexandre Berthier, the future Prince of Wagram and Napoleon I’s chief of

staff, and his brother, were among the last to arrive at Brest after the departure o f the

fleet. Dressed in naval linen jackets and breeches the two young men hired boats to chase

down the expedition’s flagship, the Due de Bourgogne, and begged Temay to take them

on as common sailors. Owing to an absolute lack o f space aboard the ship, the admiral

had to refuse. Some weeks later the indefatigable Berthier brothers found passage to

America by way of traders to the French colonies. Once arrived in America, both

rendered distinguished service in Rochambeau’s army, especially Alexandre, whose

hand-rendered maps o f the French areas o f operation remain the best o f the period.

Alexandre Berthier, Journa l (Princeton, 1972), 223.

21 Fersen, Lettres, 53-55. Though Hans Axel von Fersen would eventually

become a M arshal o f Sweden under Gustavus IV, in 1780 the young courtier had to rely

upon the influence o f his diplomat father, Lieutenant General count Fredrik Axel von

Fersen, who arranged through Vergennes a place for his son on General Rochambeau’s

personal staff. General Rochambeau knew General von Fersen well. The elder von

Fersen served in the French Army until he retired in 1748 as a brigadier general, and later

(as a lieutenant general) comm anded Swedish troops throughout the entirety o f the Seven

Years War. After his first interview with General Rochambeau, Axel Fersen wrote to his

father saying “ [wjhen I spoke to M. de Rochambeau, he said all sorts of civil things to

me, and talked to me a long time o f you, father; he ended by saying he was charmed to

have me with him, and be able to show how much he esteemed you and how sincerely hewas attached to you.” Hans Axel von Fersen to Fredrik Axel von Fersen, 2 March 1780.

Axel Fersen, Diary and Correspondence o f Count Axel Fersen Grand-Marshal o f Sweden

Relating to the Court o f France [hereafter Fersen, Diary and Correspondence].

Translated by Katherine Prescott Wormeley (London, 1903). Fersen’s detailed journal of

the voyage was lost in a shipwreck when the ship carrying his mail to his father sank after

24




comforts allowed him must have been scarce. Another o f the general’s personal aides,

Baron Ludwig von Closen, remarked that “Three months’ war pay was advanced to the

officers, and a subsidy of fifty livres was given them for the purchase o f tents, hammocks,

and other campaign effects!!! Don’t [even] ask me if we had anything left after these

essential purchases [for] cooking equipment, etc.!”22

O f the four regiments which were to travel to North America, Donatien

Rocham beau’s command, the Bourbonnois, were the first to board their ships on 6 April.

Within minutes, these men, like those who w ould soon follow, had already begun to fight

their first battle - the battle for space. Due to the general’s insistence upon carrying the

maximum possible number o f troops, conditions aboard the expedition’s ships were

already cramped, but the fleet also packed provisions for four months at sea and another

three months on shore.23 Carefully picking their way through the vast amounts o f stores,

the last soldiers boarded their vessels three days later, only to wait until the next month

for favorable winds to carry the fleet out of Brest Roads and into the Atlantic.

With General Rochambeau’s first contingent filling their transports to beyond

capacity, General Louis Adolphe Pierre, comte de W ittgenstein took command o f the

remaining two regiments (the Neustrie and the Anholts), 300 men o f the Lauzun legion,

and the remaining artillery detachments with the understanding that he and the remainder

hitting a rock while leaving Newport. Axel Fersen to Fredrik Axel von Fersen, 5 Aug

1780. Fersen, Diary a nd Correspondence, 24.

22 Closen, Journal, 5.

23 Axel Fersen to Fredrik Axel von Fersen, 4 April 1780. Fersen, Diary and

Correspondence, 23.

25




of the force would travel to America in a second lift as soon as was possible.24 The

convoy and escorts bound for the west totaled forty-six vessels, guarded by eight ships of

the line, two frigates and a cutter. Tem ay’s flagship, the Due de Bourgogne carried the

most celebrated members of the expedition. Aboard with the admiral and General

Rochambeau were the senior regimental commanders: the brothers comte Charles-

Joseph-Hyacinthe and baron Antoine-Charles du Houx de Viomenil; Fran^ois-Jean de

Beauvoir, chevalier de Chastellux; Pierre Francois, chevalier de Beville (Rochambeau’s

Chief of the General S taff and Quartermaster General) and Colonel Donatien

Rochambeau.25 After numerous false starts, which included a transport accidentally

crashing into one of Tem ay’s ships of the line, the Conquerant (74), the fleet finally set

sail on 2 May 1780.

To all but a precious few of the most senior officers, the corps’ destination

remained a closely guarded secret. Almost miraculously, the details of General

Rochambeau’s mission had not found their way out o f the confines o f the palace at

Versailles, but throughout the many months o f preparation enemy operatives at Brest

provided detailed intelligence to the ir contacts in England concerning the expedition’s

preparations. Though lacking the m ost critical piece o f intelligence (where was

Rochambeau going?), by early May the British Admiralty ordered Admiral Thomas

Graves to lead a squadron to locate and destroy the Expedition Particuliere. Accordingly,

Graves set out in pursuit from Portsmouth on 17 May after having been driven back for


25 Wheelen, Rochambeau, 81.

26




some days by fierce winds from the south. Fortunately for the French, their intelligence

services remained equally well-informed o f British preparations in Portsmouth. Knowing

that Graves would quickly intercept them i f they took the most direct sea lane to America,

General Rochambeau and Temay chose an unusually circuitous route south along the

Spanish coast. Among the sailors, hugging the coast o f Spain only served to reinforce the

common opinion among them that the fleet was headed for the French colony o f Saint-

Domingue to jo in with forces already there for an attack on British Jamaica.26 Even after

the fleet’s course change to the west-south-west, the prevailing opinion among the

soldiers and sailors was that they would soon be fighting in the Antilles.

By 2 June, the convoy’s escort frigates captured a British cutter that was en route

from Halifax, Nova Scotia to the Caribbean island o f Saint Christopher and whose

commander gave the French their first tentative news of Lieutenant General Henry

Clinton’s capture o f Charleston, South Carolina.27 On the nineteenth, Temay’s warships

captured yet another British vessel, the merchantman Botetourt. Among those on board

were several of Clinton’s officers who not only confirmed the fall of the Charleston, but

who carried with them the articles of surrender. These officers further informed General

Rochambeau of General Clinton’s [actually General Lord Charles Cornwallis’]

subsequent march northward. Fearing a possible British invasion of Virginia,

26 Mathieu Dumas, Souvenirs du Lieutenant-General Comte Mathieu Dumas de

1770 a 1836 [hereafter Dumas, Souvenirs] (Paris, 1839), I, 30.


27




Rochambeau ordered the fleet to set a course for Chesapeake Bay.28

The French had been fortunate to encounter only single ships to this point,

especially since Graves’ sole purpose was to find them. As deep as they were into

British-controlled waters however, chances favored that at any time they would run into a

much more formidable enemy. Rochambeau and Temay did not have to wait long. The

very next day, 20 June, the Frenchmen encountered a British naval squadron returning to

Europe from Bermuda. The action that followed constituted Donatien Rochambeau’s

first exposure to combat and caused a great debate among the members o f the expedition

and accounts o f the fight appear in nearly all o f the journals o f those present.29

At 1:30 p.m., the French convoy signaled the sighting o f several sail. Temay

immediately sent his two best-sailing warships, the Neptune (74) and the Eveille (64), to

reconnoiter. The unidentified ships continued to bear down upon the French, and

ordering the transport ships safely to leeward, Temay brought the French warships into

line of battle. At 1600 hours the Neptune signaled that the unidentified vessels were

indeed an English squadron composed of five warships: the Sultan (74), the Hector (74),

the Lion (64), the Bristol (50), and a frigate.30

28 Claude Blanchard, The Journal o f Claude Blanchard, Commissary o f the

French Auxiliary Army Sen t to the United States D uring the American Revolution. 1780-

1783. Translated from a French Manuscript by William Duane (Albany, New York,

1876), 16-20. Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 198.

29 Donatien Rochambeau, whose presence aboard the flagship afforded him a better understanding of the sequence of events, left in his own jou rnal what remains by far

the best account of the action.

30 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 198-202; Blanchard, Journal, 27; Closen,

Journal, 36. Ironically, the British squadron was commanded by Commodore William

28




Immediately the ships’ drummers beat the call “to quarters,” ships’ chaplains

issued their benedictions, and all hands (soldiers and sailors) assumed their posts in

preparation for the imminent fight.31 The line took some time to form. The Provence

(64) was a slow sailing ship and was unable to assume its proper place in the French line

leaving a large break in the formation. As the result, Temay ordered the Neptune and the

Jason (64), who were in front of the convoy, to shorten sail so that they might fill in the

gap. One o f the smaller English ships, the Ruby (64), which had become separated from

the rest o f the English squadron, was thought by all aboard the French vessels to be cut

completely o ff from her comrades by the Neptune. As the French ships came about,

Temay signaled the Neptune “to haul close to the wind in order to separate the enemy

vessel from the rest o f her line which was impossible to do.”32 Combining audacity with

skillful maneuver, the English vessel escaped by tacking between her own squadron and

Cornwallis (Lord Charles Cornwallis’ brother). Some discrepancy exists as to which

British vessels actually took part in the cannonading. Blanchard copied his list (above)from the report that Commodore Cornwallis had reprinted in the 27 October 1780 issue

of the Gazette o f Utrecht and the 13 October 1780 issue of the Courier ofEuro pe. Based

on information that he received from an English officer at Newport, Closen lists the ships

as being the Ruby (74), the Sultan (74), the Lion (64), the Bristol (64), the Reasonable

(50), and the frigate Triton (28).

31 Similar in concept to the modem shipboard signal for “general quarters,”

Rochambeau’s aide, baron Cromot du Bourg, describes the drum roll order “to quarters”

in his diary as “to put aside every thing that can be in the way o f action, to prepare the

guns, each man going to his post. “To quarters” is always given the moment a vessel is

met, and often even at other times to accustom the crew to be prompt in case o f surprise.”Cromot du Bourg, “Diary o f a French Officer, 1781 (Presumed to Be That o f Baron

Cromot du Bourg, Aide to Rochambeau).” The Magazine o f Am erican H istory 4(1880-

1881): 208.


29




running the length of the entire French line. Though firing wildly, this lone British ship

suffered the bulk o f the French fire. Following this first exchange o f cannon, Temay

“gave the signal to take by countermarching, desiring by that means to get near the

enemy.”33 The English, seeing themselves outnumbered and outgunned, made no move

to counter Tem ay’s maneuver and after some more long-distance cannonading, the

English squadron withdrew at sunse t.34

Everyone aboard the vessels o f the French expedition seems to have had an

opinion as to the outcome o f Ternay’s encounter with the English squadron. Donatien

Rochambeau was no exception, but admitting that he was no seaman, he attempted to

leave as honest an account as he could, complete with detailed sketches of the event. In

brief, the two most common arguments among the army officers were that the admiral

was wrong to have ordered the Neptune, who was in contact with the smaller English

ship, to shorten sail when it surely held the advantage. The second was that Temay had

not capitalized on the decided superiority of his force. Temay, however, was determined

to follow his orders not to risk the safety of the fleet in any way and to land the army as

soon as possible. Though he was much maligned by his own officers and many in

Rochambeau’s army for not having taken the opportunity to claim an easy victory over

English warships, for his part, General Rochambeau staunchly defended Temay’s

33 Blanchard, Journal, 21.

34 Ibid, 22; Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 199; Fersen, Diary and

Correspondence, 24.

30




actions.35

On 4 July 1780 the Expedition Particuliere sailed for the first time into the

Chesapeake Bay and at 4:00 p.m. hours the flagship displayed the signal to rally the ships

in preparation for an anchorage to land the sick and to take on water before continuing

north. Everyone aboard the vessels was stunned to see only a few minutes later the signal

for the fleet to tack to the wind and to execute feinting maneuvers throughout the night

without lights.36 To the Frenchmen’s surprise, an undetermined number o f ships o f yet

another enemy squadron occupied Chesapeake Bay. Believing that this might be their

pursuer Admiral Graves, Temay turned his ships back out to sea executing a number o f

feints in the darkness and headed north for the predetermined rallying point at Newport,

Rhode Island.

Rochambeau and Temay, though, had not evaded the British. At dawn the next

morning, the Frenchmen discovered that during the night, two English frigates, the Iris

35 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 199; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoirs o f

the Count de Rochambeau, 8; Blanchard, Journal, 26; Closen, Journal, 22-23; Mathieu

Dumas, Souvenirs, 33-38. It is noteworthy that according to nearly all of the subordinate

officers’ accounts, it was General Rochambeau who regularly gave the orders for

Temay’s ships to fight or not. As ignorant as they were o f the concept o f join t operations,

the supposition that the army commander held precedence over those o f the navy is not

surprising. In his own memoirs, General Rochambeau clearly admits that he was only an

observer of and sometimes advisor to Temay. Remarking on the action, baron Closen

admits that “[o]n board the transport we had nothing better to do than to judge the

maneuvers and to make some deductions, in truth, like blind men who like to talk about

colors.”

36 Blanchard, Journal, 32. “If our general had not been so cautious, they could

not have escaped us, because he was determined to execute the court’s orders to prevent

any harm to the convoy, which was so near to the vessels that it could have been sunk.”

Closen, Journal, 25.

31




(32) and the Guadeloupe (28), had maneuvered into the midst of the French fleet. The

Due de Bourgogne (74) drew fire at close range from the English vessels. Temay ordered

two frigates into pursuit but both failed to catch the interlopers. Again, the admiral met

with the dissatisfaction of his subordinates for having failed to estimate the actual number

of enemy vessels and for not having pressed an attack if the situation proved

advantageous. The state of affairs in the French convoy, however, was becoming more

perilous by the day. While scurvy, dysentery and other maladies raged among the sailors

and soldiers in the vessels, physicians and their attendants were busy disposing of corpses

through the various ships’ lowest portholes. “[The troops]....had suffered a great deal

during such a long voyage, and....a third were stricken with scurvy. It was even feared

that this miserable disease might make greater ravages because o f the hot weather,

crowding of the men on board, and poor quality of the water, salted meats, and dried

vegetables.”37

Though some members o f the expedition advised the admiral to make for the

known security of the port o f Boston, Temay refused. Rhode Island, he maintained, was

closer and the growing number o f sick required that he put in to port as soon as was

practicable. The admiral was certainly justified in his decision, for as Commissary

Claude Blanchard mentioned, “a battle would not be more murderous than a longer stay

at sea.”38 W hile the majority troops suffered their miserable conditions, the officers o f


38 Blanchard, Journal, 35; Closen, Journal, 24-25; Donatien Rochambeau,

Journal, 202-203; Fersen, Diary and Correspondence, 24. Blanchard also describes the

water on board the ships as being “black and unpleasant to the sight, [although] it had not

32




the generals’ staffs and certainly those aboard the Due de Bourgogne appear to have fared

better throughout the course o f the journey. “As for the general sta ff’ Closen (who was

aboard the flagship) reported, “it was very well nourished and had plenty to drink. Our

cows and chickens were continuously productive and in good condition, and our captain

was well supplied with rice and sugar, etc., etc.”39 Though having remained reasonably

comfortable during the seventy-day voyage, Colonels Rochambeau and Laval m ust have

been especially heartened by the p rospect of leaving Temay’s flagship as soon as they

possibly could. Probably due to some unpleasantry during the embarkation process, a sort

o f quiet feud had erupted between the admiral and the two commanders o f the

Bourbonnois regiment. As another passenger, the future due de Castries, who was also

aboard the Due de Bourgogne observed, “Monsieur de Rochambeau, the younger, and the

Marquis de Laval cannot hold out anymore, after all, Monsieur de Temay has not spoken

to either o f them since we left France.”40

Through a thick fog, the French fleet sighted land and anchored in Rhode Island

waters on the afternoon of 9 July 1780. Still unsure o f the presence of the enemy, Temay

had his vessels move cautiously toward land. After meeting with his second in command,

the comte de Viomenil, General Rochambeau decided that he, Viomenil, Donatien

Rochambeau and selected members o f the sta ff would go ashore once they sighted the

a bad taste.” Captains took regular precautions such as cleaning their ships everyday

(often swabbing the decks with perfume) and opening all hatches to let air circulate belowdecks. Nevertheless, sickness ravaged the crews. Castries, Journal, 8.


40 Castries, Journal, 65-66.

33




prearranged signal that the marquis de Lafayette had arranged earlier. The next morning,

two Bourbon flags flying from both sides of the opening into Point Judith signaled that

Newport was secure and open for landing. As the army prepared for debarkation, sailors

rowed the two Rocham beau men and their advance party from the Due de Bourgogne to

the frigate Am azone which then proceeded into Newport.41

41 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 195-199; Blanchard, Journal, 35.

34




Chapter III

Newport to New York:

July 1780 - August 1781

Stepping onto land for the first time in three months, young Colonel Rocham beau’s

initial impression of America was o f the lack o f enthusiasm and gratitude that the people of

Rhode Island showed for the Frenchmen’s arrival. For some time the streets remained

empty, the citizens o f Newport having been taken somewhat by surprise by the arrival of

their French guests. As one officer described the scene “M. le Comte de Rochambeau went

ashore immediately, accompanied by several others, and when he reached the town was

astonished to find hardly a soul. The shops were closed, and the local people, little disposed

in our favor, would have preferred at that moment, I think, to see their enemies arrive rather

than their allies.”1 The attitude of many of the townsmen appears to have ranged anywhere

from terror to uninformed prejudice. In an often-cited quote from his New Travels Through

North America, the French army chaplain Abbe Claude Robin observed that the Americans

perceived the French to be deformed, idolatrous slaves o f tyrannical oppressors, “incapable

of anything solid or consistent; entirely taken up with the dressing o f their hair, and painting

1 Jean-Fran?ois-Louis, comte de Clermont-Crevecoeur, Journal o f the War in

America D uring the Years 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783 (Princeton, 1972), 17.

35




their faces; without delicacy or fidelity, and paying no respect to even the most sacred

obligations.”2

Many o f New port’s citizens found it at least difficult to contain their bitterness and

suspicion o f late enemies now come as occupiers. British operatives in the Northeast took

full advantage of these sentiments and made every effort to inflame American popular

opinion against the French, even going so far as to claim that once the French became

established in the area, their ambition was to reestablish themselves as colonial overlords.

The combination o f these and a variety of other presentiments certainly served as sufficient

reason for Colonel Rochambeau to remark in his memoirs that it seemed to him:

....that the greater part of the people has little energy, that it is even

filled with quite a marked indifference about all eventualities that

might take place, and that their Liberty which they have made so

much of is pursued more in conversation than in reality. Only the

smallest part of the population takes a leadership in affairs or wishes

to do so, or pretends to distinguish itself from the common run of

human beings, or is gifted with that force o f character and diligence

of spirit which should be the distinguishing attribute of those who

have brought about the most amazing revolution in the annals o f the

modem world....3

The knowledge that the French army and nav y’s conduct in the succeeding months

would be a great determinant in the success or failure o f the exped ition’s mission was not at

all lost on General Rochambeau. In his first address to the leading citizens o f Newport, the

general announced that the French army had come to America to assist the people in winning

their freedom and did not wish to be a burden to them. “The troops,” he asserted, “would

2 Abbe Claude Robin, New Travels Through North America [hereafter Robin,

New Travels] (New York, 1969), 19.


36




maintain themselves in good discipline and that they would pay for what they used in cash.”4

Most French officers found the effect o f the general’s statements on the people o f Newport

to be what they considered typically American. “At this mention of hard money or cash their

countenances brightened and, if they had been serious and reserved up to that time, they

began to smile, seeing that the presence o f the French far from being harmful to them would

bring them positive advantages.”5

General Rochambeau’s promises produced the desired effect, though the situation in

those first days at Newport remained slightly unsettled. Fortunately, Lafayette had visited

Rhode Island some weeks before the Rochambeau contingent and had set about organizing

the local support required by the arriving army. The result of the marquis’ and state militia

commander General William Fleath’s efforts was that despite their apparent initial apathy,

the town leaders found suitable accommodations and facilities for the foreigners. After

having sat apprehensively for two days aboard their ships, on the evening o f 11 July French

troops finally felt the first positive effects o f being in America.

The troops aboard the vessels had for dinner many vegetables, fruits,

and other fresh provisions, which we devoured with a wonderful

appetite. There was continuous joyfu l cheering!!! both [sic] by those

4 Ibid., 205.

5 Ibid. The continued use of French gold and silver currency (most often Spanish

piasters) later came to be a serious problem for both General George Wash ing ton and the

Continental Congress as it steadily devalued not only the receipts from W ashington’s

army but also the paper currency being issued from Philadelphia and other northeasterncapitals. Local inhabitants throughout New England soon came to refuse to deal with the

Americans, preferring instead French bullion. When silver eventually began to become

scarce among the French, Rochambeau’s commissaries began to take out loans against

French credit with interest rates running as high as thirty-three per-cent, while American

money sold at 700 per-cent discount. Closen, Journal, 78; Blanchard, Journal, 106-107.

37




who were arriving and by the inhabitants, who had been expecting us

for a long time. It will be easily understood that after such a long

voyage, during which one has been so uncomfortable, bored and

sometimes dirty in an unhealthy old tub, there is no joy to compare

with that o f setting foot on terra flrm a and changing one’s diet; for

the water and some of our provisions, with exception of the wine, had

spoiled. As the latter beverage overheats one, and as the water had been rationed half way across, I often saw the crew exchange a glass

of wine for a glass o f water.”6

After the maj ority o f New port’s cit izens cerem oniously welcomed the newcomers by

illuminating the tow n’s houses and setting off fireworks, the bulk o f the French expedition

debarked their ships between 12 and 15 July.7 Both the comte and the vicomte de

Rochambeau made their quarters in the home o f William Vernon, which stands today at the

corner o f Clarke and Mary Streets, while the army’s senior officers and principle staff found

billets in the numerous other houses in New port.8 The remainder o f the army, minus the

Lauzun Legion who made a separate camp in Connecticut, would camp in the open fields and

orchards just outside the city to the southeast, deliberately isolated from the city’s


7 According to the then-president of Yale University, Ezra Stiles, the citizens o f

Newport demonstrated the ir welcome of the new guests as follows: “[tjhe Whigs put

thirteen lanterns in their windows, the Tories, or those who were undecided, four o r six.

As to the Quakers, they preferred not to show the light o f their candles, and had their

windows smashed.” Merlant, Soldiers and Sailors o f France, 118.

8 In the garden to the north o f the Vernon house, the general later ordered the

construction of a large assembly building which closely resembled the main house.

Though this action was apparently undertaken without Vernon’s consent, “French Hall”

as it becam e known, stood until 1894. The building not only served as an officialmeeting place for the officers of Rochambeau’s corps, but also as their club. When the

French army left Newport in the summer of 1781, Vernon presented General

Rochambeau with a bill o f $450. This payment was not for rent, but for damages to the

property during the general’s stay. Document reprinted in The Magazine o f Am erican

History 3, No. 7 (July 1879): 426.

38




inhabitants. By virtue of their seniority, the grenadiers and chasseurs o f the Bourbonnois

regiment (that body of troops who would later constitute Donatien Rochambeau’s primary

combat command) were the first to disembark.9

Debarkation from the crowded ships proved anything but easy. Knowing that the

British could profit immeasurably from an immediate attack at Newport, General

Rochambeau considered the timely placement o f his cannons to guard the harbor a matter o f

principal importance and demanded that they be brought to shore as quickly as possible. To

his frustration however, the heaviest (and most critical) artillery pieces had been loaded at

the bottom o f the ships to serve as ballast. A severe shortage of small transport boats only

exacerbated the problem. While both soldiers and sailors fought to hoist the guns from the

lowest holds, junio r officers forced a hodgepodge o f troops and supplies into the town aboard

what few rowboats the Americans and the French could make available. Further, one

transport, the Isle de France, had become separated from the rest o f the fleet in the midst of

the dense fog which for four days had preceded the fleet’s arrival. Temay sent the Hermione

(36) to find the lost ship, but to no avail. The possible loss of the Isle de France caused a

great deal of concern especially among the French officers as it carried not only 350 men o f

the Bourbonnois Infantry, but also much o f the general officers’ personal baggage. The

missing ship finally put into Boston on 20 July.10

9 It is probable that at least some of the grenadiers accompanied the advanced party into Newport to act as a bodyguard. The possibility o f Tories harassing or even

kidnaping the dignitaries seemed to be a major concern to Temay. Lee Kennett, The

French Forces in America, 1780-1783 (Westport, Connecticut, 1977), 48.

10 Blanchard, Journal, 42; Closen, Journal, 29.

40




Naturally, the first concern o f the senior officers of the expedition was to establish

local security. With the aid of General Heath’s Rhode Island militiamen the Frenchmen

quickly established their camp and set about improving the city’s defenses which had been

half-heartedly constructed by previously occupying British troops between D ecember 1776

and October 1779. Surveying the remnants o f the British effort, Colonel Rochambeau

remarked that even though the enemy constructed interconnected redoubts on all of the

surrounding hills, the work had been carried out very badly. In his opinion, the breastworks

were too thin and the wings o f the fortifications too short to be o f substantial defensive value.

British successes at Newport, he asserted, could only have been the result of the lack of

seasoning o f the American troops sent to capture the town.11

In their own opinion, the French could only do better. After some weeks o f heavy

construction carried out in the midst o f the oppressive summer heat, both the vicomte de

Rochambeau and his father were well pleased with Newport’s renovated defensive works.

Their efforts came not a mom ent too soon. Though Admiral Graves had completely missed

contact with the French fleet on the Atlantic, by 19 June he had arrived in New York, joined

with another British fleet under Admiral M arriot Arbuthnot, and then sailed for Newport as

part o f a com bined land/sea effort that would decisively destroy the Expedition Particuliere.

In retrospect, it remains clear that a swift, successful British attack on New port in that

summer of 1780 may have dramatically altered the course of the war in Britain’s favor.

Certainly this notion was not lost on the British Commander o f His Majesty’s Forces in the

American Colonies. Accordingly, throughout late July and early August 1780, nineteen

11 Donatien Rochambeau, Journa l , 207-208.

41




British warships blockaded the entry into Rhode Island while General Henry Clinton

gathered a force in New York o f 6,000 men aboard transports to advance a land attack on

Rhode Island’s capital city. Fortunately for the French, Clinton vacillated. When word later

reached Newport that an overanxious Clinton had called off the planned attack because of

a possible attack against New York by General George Washington, young Colonel

Rochambeau proudly (and somewhat naively) declared that the real reason that the British

attack had been aborted was that Clinton was obviously “disgusted” by how w ell the French

were established.12 Throughout August 1780, the French continued to improve their

positions at Newport while Admiral Graves’ squadron (with 2,000 soldiers aboard)

alternately appeared and disappeared of f o f the coast at Martha’s Vineyard in hopes o f

capturing not only any French vessel that may attempt to leave Rhode Island, but more

especially to intercept the arrival o f the expected second division o f Rochambeau’s army.

Finally confident that they were well buttressed against any attack by the British,

Rochambeau’s men received on 28 August a most unusual mission of Oneida, Tuscarora and

Caughnawaga Indians who came to call on the French forces. The English had hoped to gain

the friendship of these and other Indian tribes in the area by repeatedly telling them that the

rebels in America had absolutely no alliance with the French, a fact, they said, that was

proven by the absence of any French land or sea force. The N ative Americans were not so

easily duped. Upon their arrival at Newport, General Rochambeau personally led the party

12 Ibid., 207-210; Blanchard, Journal, 45; Closen, Journal, 32-35; James Breck

Perkins, France in the American Revolution (Williamstown, Massachusetts, 1970), 318.

In his memoirs, General Clinton blames the moves by W ashington toward New York for

his abandoning the project.

42




on a tour o f the camp and the ships of the squadron, proving conclusively to his apprehensive

guests that their former French friends were once again in America to act in their best

interests.

T o most of the powdered, perfumed French officers, the Indian delegation’s visit was

a curious and amusing, but physically revolting, intrusion.13 During their consultations in

France however, the marquis de Lafayette had wisely apprized General Rochambeau o f the

benefits o f bringing gifts for and entering into fraternal dialogue with his potential Indian

allies. Upon Lafayette’s advice, the general had loaded his personal baggage appropriately,

and was later able to offer to the tribes’ representatives steel axe blades, Charleville muskets,

blankets, j ewelry, and the most coveted gift o f all, necklaces bearing portraits o f the Indians’

“holy father” King Louis XVI. While most of his contemporaries characterized their guests

in derisive terms, Colonel Rochambeau (who certainly understood the political ramifications

of a French/Indian camaraderie) described the “savages” as:

....agile, robust, tall, [and] well built. They usually go without

clothing and this is the most advantageous condition for them to be

seen in; for, dressed, they look weighted down and cramped. They

seemed satisfied with what was shown to them, though they gave no

expression of it, for they pride themselves on not seeming surprised

at anything. They danced for us and their dances, done to the sound

of the drum or some barbaric and noisy instrument mingled with

horrible cries seemed to me to have a certain analogy to their kind of

13 The Native Americans who visited the French camp habitually slathered

themselves with fish oil which they used as an insect repellent. Most o f the French

officers could barely stand the smell. Gaspard de Gallatin, “The Narrative of Baron

Gaspard de Gallatin,” reprinted in Warrington Dawson, “With Rochambeau at Newport,”

The Franco-American Review, I, No. 4 (Spring, 1937): 333.

43




life - that is to say, it seemed to be an image of war.14

After asking for news of the marquis de Levis, France’s former governor of Canada, the

tribesmen “went away loaded with presents and very pleased with the French.”15

Throughout the ensuing months in Newport, General Rochambeau remained more

than true to his word concerning the good behavior o f his army, and a series of draconian

orders, reinforced by remarkably stiff penalties, ensured that the behavior of his forces

remained well beyond reproach. Besides, every Frenchman present knew well that it was

incumbent upon him to dispel the disadvantageous prejudices o f the American people.

Officers whose noble positions in France accustomed their habits not only toward pomp and

luxurious living, but also offered them the latitude to engage in nearly any sort of

debauchery, were on their best behavior. Even the French army chaplain Abbe Robin’s

unusually critical eye noted that everyone “sacrificed something to his own feelings, in order

to accomplish this desired end” and that the officers especially displayed the best behavior

traditionally characteristic of the nobility and gentry of refined France.16 At the numerous

balls, dinners and other diversions hosted by both French and American officers during the

fall and winter of 1780-1781, Rochambeau’s officers displayed a remarkable degree of

14 Ibid., 211. Baron Closen offers an especially useful description o f the day’s

events: “This delegation was treated with much distinction. M. de Rochambeau showed

them the army. Fie gave them some gold and silver medals with the head o f Louis XVI.

They were also presented with some blankets, knives, and other objects o f hardware,

which gave them much pleasure. They left us in return their sandals, belts and manyother trinkets, also some scalps.” Closen, Journal , 37-39.

15 Ibid.

16 Robin, New Travels, 21.

44




reserve in their behavior and took extraordinary measures to ensure the comfort and good

will o f their American associates.17

In the meantime however, more portentous events continued to develop. Since just

after the French fleet’s arrival at Newport, Lafayette, who initially enjoyed Washington’s

complete confidence in matters dealing with Rochambeau’s contingent, had acted as the

American com mander’s mouthpiece to the French army in America. Initially, General

Rochambeau patiently abided the m arquis’ youthful ebullience as he enumerated the myriad

reasons for an immediate attack on New York, but after some weeks he became more than

a little disturbed that Washington had not communicated with him personally. After all,

Rochambeau was the American commander’s highest-ranking subordinate and the French

corps his primary auxiliary force. Further, suspicion grew in the French camp tha t the

youthful, inexperienced marquis might be misrepresenting Washington’s intent in favor of

his own enthusiastic enterprises of capturing the city.18 Though various jun ior French

17 Ibid. To while away the idle months, many French officers hired local tutors inan effort to better acquaint themselves with the English language. As Hans Axel von

Fersen added early in August 1780, “We have not left our island; we occupy it peacefully,

and with the best order, in a very healthy camp, well placed and perfectly well trenched;

the works are not yet finished, but they are going on. The strictest discipline is

maintained; nothing is taken from the inhabitants except by their free will and for ready

money; we have not yet had a single complaint against the troops. Such discipline is

admirable and astonishes the inhabitants, who are accustomed to the pillage o f the

English and even of their own troops. The greatest confidence and the best harmony are

established between the two nations; if that could suffice for the success o f our expedition

we might feel sure o f it.” Hans Axel von Fersen to Fredrik Axel von Fersen, 8 September

1780. Fersen, Diary a nd Correspondence, 25.

18 In their diaries, nearly every contemporary French author in America

denounces the marquis de Lafayette, the second wealthiest and most influential man in

France next to the king, for having abandoned the traditions o f his noble background in

favor of the plebeian manners of his new American friends. Though tainted by an

45

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officers’ accounts would seem to offer grounds for debate on the point, to this day, no

documents exist to indicate that Washington acted with anything but the best intentions

toward his new ally. Certainly Lafayette, Washington’s filial confidant and heir to the

second greatest estate in France next to the king, would appear as the American general’s

natural choice as an intermediary to the French king’s representatives. Unknown to

Rochambeau, W ashington had long considered that laying siege to the British garrisons in

the city of New York offered the best chance o f a politically important victory that would

inspire fresh volunteers to sustain the dwindling ranks o f the Continental Army. Further, his

be lief that General Clinton’s army w as not yet fully reestablished in N ew York after the ir

sojourn in Charleston, South Carolina, only fueled Washington’s anxiousness.19

Lafayette echoed and amplified Washington’s desire loudly, ultimately causing a

great deal of ill feeling on the parts of Rochambeau and Temay. The French corps could not

possibly execute the immediate move against New York that Lafayette so vehemently

promoted. The transportation and supplies needed for such an undertaking were hopelessly

slow arriving at the corps’ depot at Providence, while the relatively small number o f French

warships erased the chance for naval superiority against Clinton’s sea forces. Lafayette,

however, persisted, and a flurry o f accusatory letters followed between the marquis and the

incalculable potpourris o f jealous sensitivities, these officers’ protests were not without

reason - on countless occasions when dining with his French countrymen, Lafayette,

following American table customs, made it his habit to grandiosely wipe his mouth in the

American manner, using the ho st’s tablecloth as a napkin.

19 The French arrived in Newport three weeks after Clinton reestablished himself

at New York. Further, the considerable number o f those sick with scurvy (800 of the

5,000 o f the land forces alone) caused Rocham beau to estimate that it would be at least a

month before he could begin any type of campaign. Blanchard, Journal, 46.

46




French commander. The infuriated Rochambeau, who had not heard anything from

Washington personally on the topic, soon became convinced that the poor idea of the

proposed siege of New Y ork was solely Lafayette’s. Following repeated requests by General

Rochambeau, a somewhat embarrassed Washington finally mediated, writing to the French

commander on 7 September 1780 a letter urging that the two meet halfway between their

respective camps at Hartford, Connecticut on the 20th.

Owing to a recent illness sustained by Temay, the party traveled by carriage. Thus

the French contingent which set on out 18 September to meet with the Americans numbered

only six, the comte and the vicomte de Rochambeau; Admiral Temay; the general’s chief of

engineers, Brigadier General Jean-Nicolas Desandroiiins and two of the general’s aides,

Fersen and Mathieu Dumas. The party’s route took them through “Siturate, Coventry,

Voluntown and in the state o f Connecticut, Canterbury, Scotland, Windham, Bolton, East

Hartford and [finally to the meeting place at the home o f Colonel Jeremiah W adsworth in]

West Hartford on the right shore o f the Connecticut River.”20 They were greeted by General

Washington’s entourage, all of whom traveled by carriage, which included Lafayette;

General Henry Knox, Washington’s chief o f artillery; another Frenchman, M. de Gouvin,

Washington’s chief o f engineers; Colonel Alexander Hamilton and five other aides de camp

and an escort o f twenty dragoons.21

Lafayette, who after having received a gentle admonition from Rochambeau had


21 Ibid.; Hans Axel von Fersen to Fredrik Axel von Fersen, 23 September 1780.

Fersen, Diary an d Correspondence, 30.

47




reconciled with the general, joined his countrymen at W ashington’s headquarters to act as

translator between the two allied commanders, neither of whom spoke the other’s language.

Both Colonels Rochambeau and Fersen were markedly impressed by the American

commander. In their respective memoirs, both men commented on Washington’s air of

nobility, his martial, yet sad visage and his thoughtful reticence.22 The Am ericans received

the French delegation graciously, and over many bowls of punch and cider, the commanding

officers discussed their strategy.

At w hat later became known as the Flartford Conference, Washington insisted that

a campaign to lay siege to the city o f New York offered the best possibility for the defeat o f

General Clinton’s northern army. The French general disagreed, but remembering the king’s

instructions to support the colonists in every way, he deferred to Washington who he ld firm

to his desire to attack New York, especially if the timely arrival of another French fleet

would tip the balance o f the naval forces in the a llies’ favor.23

The American commander did however agree in principle to an assault into the

Southern states (or even into Canada) if events proved favorable. He further proposed the

possibility of combining the allied armies in front of New York while holding the French

navy in reserve in Boston. Though such positioning could obviously accommodate a variety

o f contingencies, both Rochambeau and Temay demurred. Insisting that their orders from

Vergennes forbade the separation o f the French army from its supporting fleet, the French

22 Fersen, Lettres, 82; Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 210. Washington

discovered Benedict Arnold’s treason just days before the Hartford meeting.

23 Alexander Hamilton, The Papers o f Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1961),

437.

48




Rochambeau Meets Washington at

Hartford, Connecticut

Figure 9. Rocham beau Meets Washington at Hartford, Connecticut




commanders maintained that it was best to keep their army and navy on Rhode Island during

the winter, as far as possible from the A merican populace whose customs and manners were

so alien to the French. “General Washington remarked, that the instructions of the Court

must o f course decide the point; but that he hoped the inconveniences apprehended from an

intercourse with the inhabitants would not be found on experience, and thought they could

not happen more from a commerce with the people on the Continent than with those on the

Island, whose genius tempers and habits were the same.”24

No firm plan of action was decided at Hartford, but the two commanders parted

company at least armed with a sense o f mutual trust and respect. For Donatien Rochambeau,

who was the only aide of the French general to attend the actual closed meeting with

Washington, the exchange between his father and George Washington bore a particularly

weighty responsibility.25 Returning with his father to Newport, Colonel Rochambeau

familiarized himse lf with his new mission: to sail immediately to France to ask the king for

more troops, naval forces, and most importantly, money.26 Until his son returned with word

from Versailles, there was little for General Rochambeau to do but settle his troops into

winter quarters and await the arrival o f his second division.27

24 Ibid., 437-438.

25 Fersen and Dumas waited outside. Castries, A Middle Passage, 104.

26 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoirs o f the Count de Rochambeau, 17-26.

27 Beginning with the Bourbonnois regiment on 1 November, Rochambeau’s

army began to take up winter quarters in the town o f Newport. Empty houses that were

formerly occupied by Loyalists now became barracks. Lauzun’s Legion was the

exception. The duke sought to operate as much as possible as an independent command.

As the result, Rocham beau sent the legion to quarters in Connecticut. Blanchard,

50

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An excess o f idle time since their arrival a t Newport had strained discipline in the

French ranks. Courtier officers had come to America seeking combat action, but in the dull

absence o f an opportunity to be mentioned in the commanding general’s dispatches, all were

becoming restless. The almost regular arrival of bad new s at the French camp only served

to increase the melancholy. General Benedict Arnold’s treason at West Point and

Washington’s infamous execution o f Major John Andre; the defeat o f General Horatio Gates

by Lord Charles Cornwallis a t Camden, South Carolina, and unfounded rumors o f American

militiamen under General Nathaniel G reene defecting to the British all served to heighten a

sense of futility among Rochambeau’s corps. Further, the social whirl of Newport had severe

limitations and the effects o f a scarcity o f young women, theater, and other diversions began

to take its toll most notably on the morale o f the officers. In Europe, the custom among

Bourbon military officers during the army’s usual winter lull was to take leave either to

return home or to call upon the royal court. Rochambeau, concerned that W ashington might

summon his forces into action at any time, granted precious few passes and usually only

within close p roximity o f his headquarters.28

Especially in light of the depressing state o f affairs, many senior officers expected

that the general would choose them to return to France when the frigate Am azone (36) sailed

in October. When General Rochambeau favored his own son over his more senior

Journal, 75.

28 General Rochambeau remained uncompromising in his restrictions and the

application of discipline to all ranks. In one instance, he had the second-in-command o f

the Saintonge regiment, Armand-Charles-Augustin de la Croix de Castries, comte de

Charlus (son o f the marshal and future Due de Castries) arrested for failing to return on

time from a visit to Wash ington’s headquarters. Kennett, French Forces, 88.

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commanders to carry his and Washington’s requests to the king, the French commander

rankled them.29 The general’s overt display of nepotism was certainly unpopular, but for a

variety of reasons was probably the best choice that he could have made. Thus, on 28

October 1780, Colonel Rochambeau left Newport aboard the Am azone, commanded by the

masterful Captain Jean-Fran9ois de Galaup, comte de la Perouse and escorted by the

Surveillante (16) and Hermione (36). Aware that if he were overtaken by British forces he

would have to throw the crucial correspondence overboard, the younger Rochambeau

committed to memory the entirety o f the five packets o f dispatches in his charge.30

As i f by design, a severe windstorm temporarily scattered the English squadron laying

in wait of f of Newport and before they could regroup, allowing La Perouse and his escorts

29 Kennett, French Forces, 88. To his father, Hans Axel von Fersen wrote o f the

planned voyage that “This is the first safe opportunity I have had for a long time to write

to you my dear father. I am certain this letter will reach you, and without being read; it

goes by a frigate that M. de Rochambeau is sending to Europe.... An officer is to be sent

to France in this frigate to give an account o f the state and situation o f the army and o f

our dear allies, both of which are bad enough. We do not know who will be charged with

this commission; everyone names me; several of the o f the general officers, M. DeChastellux and the Baron de Viomesnil [sic] have spoken to me as one who could carry

out the intentions of the general in this respect. I do not know what will be the result; I

shall take no steps to obtain the appointment, neither should I refuse it if the general were

to offer it to me. Nevertheless, I would much rather not be selected for this service.

Something interesting might happen during my absence, and I should be in despair at

having missed it.” Hans Axel von Fersen to Fredrik Axel von Fersen, 16 October 1780.

Fersen, Diary and Correspondence, 28.

30 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 214; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoirs o f

the Count de Rochambeau, 25; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires,

Historiques e t Politiques de Rochambeau, Ancien Marechal de France, et Grand-Officier de la Legio n-d ’Honneur [hereafter Jean-Baptiste Rochambau, Memoires Militaires]

(Paris, 1824), I, 256; Jean-Jacques Jusserand, With Americans o f Past and Present Days

(New York, 1917), 47; See appendix for copy of the actual memoir submitted by

Donatien Rochambeau to the king’s new war minister, Philippe-Henri, marquis de Segur.

Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 214.

52




to sail through their midst. The enemy, however, did not fail to notice the small convoy and

set out in pursuit. Temporarily hidden by a dense fog, the three French ships skirted the

Northeastern coastline evading for twenty-four hours two frigates and another unidentifiable

vessel of the British patrol. The natural concealment did not last however, and when the fog

lifted, the Am azone was barely out o f reach o f the English and rapidly was losing ground.

In a desperate effort to gain speed, La Perouse ordered that the ship’s deck cannons be

dumped overboard. The Am azone was able to move somewhat faster, but still could not

manage to throw off her pursuers. Once again, fate intervened. Just when a fight seemed

inevitable, a storm so severe that it ripped the topmast o ff of the Amazone struck, sending the

English ships scurrying for safer waters. Colonel Rochambeau and his fellow travelers were

saved. After La Perouse repaired the damage with a spare mast, the Surveillante and

Hermione changed their course for Boston. After a remarkably fast crossing o f twenty-four

days, the Amazone arrived at l ’Orient and four days later the vicomte de Rochambeau and

Captain La Perouse presented themselves at Versailles.31

Meetings with the w ar ministry produced disappointments at every turn for the two

envoys.32 From Louis XV I’s new Minister o f Marine, Marechal Charles Eugene Gabriel de

31 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoirs o f the Count de Rochambeau, 26;

Merlant, Soldiers and Sailors o f France, 131; Closen, Journal, 43-44. La Perouse went

on to destroy the British settlement at Hudson’s Bay in 1782 and in 1785 headed a much-

heralded expedition to circumnavigate the globe. It was during this expedition that he

was shipwrecked and drowned in the New Hebrides islands.

32 Lauzun, Memoirs, 198. Lauzun [later “Citoyen General Biron”] who at the

time had intimate connections at Versailles, wrote that the young Colonel Rochambeau

“had not been able even to have himself taken seriously.” This might seem unusual under

the circumstances, but given the exclusive atmosphere at the French court and his

family’s well-established distance (both physical and social) from it, Donatien

53




la Croix, marquis de Castries, the vicomte and Captain La Perouse learned that the ministry

had tried to send the second division of the expedition to America, but had been frustrated

either by British blockaders o ff the port o f Brest or by obligations elsewhere. Further, the

king had reorganized nearly his entire council. Not only had he replaced his M inister of

Marine, but Pierre Maurice Henri, comte de Segur, had taken over the Ministry of War from

Montbarey.33 The new officials had just begun to review their plans for the conduct of the

American campaign when Rochambeau and La Perouse arrived. To complicate matters

more, 6 December 1780 brought news o f the death o f the queen’s mother Maria Theresa o f

Austria. Uncertain o f the intentions of her successor Joseph II, policy makers at V ersailles

were reluctant to deplete their military manpower a t home. Faced with this new misgiving

concerning Austria and their conviction that the main British war effort in the Americas

would take place in the Antilles, the king’s counselors relegated W ashington’s conflict to

Rocham beau’s appearance at Versailles must certainly have been somewhat of an

unwelcome surprise. Noialles, Lauzun, Viomenil, Chastellux, or even Fersen or Vauban

would certainly have been more acceptable choices at court, and each vied for the honorof leaving America. Considering the expected bitterness that arose from his selection,

General Rochambeau’s motives must certainly have been well-calculated. Even Donatien

Rochambeau himself reports that he left France “very tired and quite dissatisfied with the

small success o f my poor mission.... we reached Boston very displeased with the small

quantity o f flattering hopes which we were permitted to entertain.” Donatien

Rochambeau, Journal, 215-216.

33 Montbarey to General Rochambeau, 9 December 1780. Service historique,

Guerre d’Amerique, Lettres divers des Officiers Generates, Carton XLVIII, item 454/235.

Immediately following his replacement as Minister o f War, Montbarey took the time to

write to General Rochambeau assuring him that his son had arrived safely and that on 26 November the younger Rochambeau had m et with him to discuss his army’s needs.

Montbarey had then arranged for Donatien Rochambeau to meet with the king personally

to discuss his dispatches. His letter unofficially details in advance most of the

uninspiring news that General Rochambeau would later receive from the new Minister of

War.

54




secondary importance. A more prudent plan, they believed, was to increase only monetary

aid to America’s army. As the respective ministries drew up their revised policies for North

America, Segur ordered the general’s son to remain at Versailles until the new details were

complete .34

Colonel Rochambeau, carrying new instructions from Louis XVI’s war council,

finally left France on 24 March 1781 aboard the Concorde (36). In the meantime, Admiral

Temay had died on 15 December apparently of a severe attack o f asthma; accompanying the

vicomte was his replacement Jacques-Melchior Saint-Laurent, comte de Barras.35 After a

forty-two day passage, the frigate landed at Boston on 8 May and the vicomte rushed to join

his father in Newport. In his dispatches, the general’s son bore grim news from Segur. The

ministers at Versailles had indeed shifted the war’s major efforts in the W estern Hemisphere

to the Antilles and no troop reinforcements, not even General Rochambeau’s second

division, would arrive in America in the foreseeable future. The king’s council ’ s instructions

even went so far as to advocate to General Rochambeau an expedition against

Newfoundland. On the whole, the general’s son recalled, the Council’s new instructions

were “so vague and poorly conceived, badly thought out, in truth so erroneous that General

Rochambeau dismissed them completely from his mind.”36

A few bits o f good news did arrive in the dispatches; the government was sending the

34 Kennett, French Forces, 89-91.

35 Closen, Journal, 47, 78; Blanchard, Journal, 83. In the interim, Temay was

replaced by Charles-Rene-Dominique Gochet, chevalier de Destouches, who had hoped

to be given permanent command o f the squadron.


55




Americans six million livres to apply to the campaign of 1781, and a small convoy was en

route to New England with limited amounts o f badly needed supplies and some 600 infantry

replacements. Donatien Rochambeau brought one million livres in specie, 153,000 livres

in paper and a promissory note from Benjamin Franklin (America’s de facto representative

at Versailles) o f two million livres to be paid by the king to the colonial congress; the convoy

would bring more.37 W hat most interested the general, however, was Segur’s confidential

message regarding a French fleet of twenty-six ships of the line commanded by Admiral

F ra n c is Joseph Paul de Tilly, comte de Grasse. Then sailing for the West Indies, de

Grasse’s warships would be available to Rochambeau beginning in July or August carrying

with them goods for the French army, two companies of artillery and five hundred

replacements drawn from the different regiments who remained in France.38 According to

Segur’s memorandum, de Grasse would free the naval squadron at Newport and then “aid

in all operations judg ed advantageous to the common cause.”39

Despite what he perceived as the French king’s denial o f further military aid to the

American colonies, Washington remained steadfast in his desire to attack New York.

General Rochambeau, a veteran of at least fourteen sieges, knew well that the smaller

combined army of French and American forces would lose the fight against General

37 Prince de Montbarey to General Rochambeau, 9 Decem ber 1780. Service

historique, Guerre d’Amerique, Lettres divers des Officiers Generates, Carton XLVIII,

item 454/235, 2.

38 Blanchard, Journal, 103.

39 Philippe-Henri, marquis de Segur to de Grasse, 12 December 1780, quoted in

Kennett, French Forces, 104-105.

56




Clinton’s well-entrenched British in and around New York. Instead, he urged Washington

to consider attacking the English army then operating in Virginia. In General Rochambeau’s

view, the Franco-American army would have a decided numerical advantage over these

southern forces commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Charles Cornwallis. Washington

refused. Donatien Rochambeau, suspicious o f Wash ington’s intentions, denounced what he

considered a jealous nature in the American commander. “It was therefore necessary” the

vicomte said, “to fool him and to seem to adopt his plans but to form others.”40 “General

Washington” the young colonel asserted, “had his reason for attacking New York - he was

to be in command o f this attack himself, while he disliked the march on the South because

he feared that General Rochambeau would want to attribute to himself alone the glory o f a

victory which the French general could win without Washington. It was then seen that there

was his personal interest and his pride to overcome, but the French general did no t hesitate

to sacrifice to him that little glory....”41

Thus began an extraordinary charade between the two allied commanders. From 22

to 23 May 1781, Washington and Rochambeau held a council of war at Wethersfield,

Connecticut, to discuss the news from Versailles. Under orders from Segur, who feared that

the Americans would compromise his scheme, Rochambeau could only refer to assistance

by de Grasse’s fleet as a possibil ity. Again the French general suggested an attack upon the

British in Virginia, but Washington, who had discovered from his own agents in France the

plan for de Grasse’s arrival, remained unswayed. At length, Rochambeau resolved to


41 Ibid., 218-219; Whitridge, Rochambeau, 153.

57




outwardly agree to Washington’s plan to act against New York while he continued to pursue

a strategy of his own.42 In this vein, Rochambeau wrote to de Grasse pointedly asking him

to sail his fleet to Chesapeake Bay bringing with him all of the ready cash that he could

possibly borrow in Havana.43 Despite the French General’s alternate arrangem ents for de

Grasse, however, Rochambeau issued the necessary orders to his army for a move to attack

New York.

Spring remained unseasonably cold, but with the advent in early June of good

weather, the time for action was at hand. The commissaries had spent weeks in Providence

stockpiling the army’s supplies in advance and everyone in the French camp, it seems, knew

that the troops were soon to move. Rocham beau’s officers were more than a little displeased

at how much of their personal baggage they had to leave behind them in Newport, baggage

that supposedly would be brought later by Barras when his fleet would join de Grasse.

We were very much annoyed to have to leave our heavy baggage

behind and seemed to foresee the misfortune of losing it, which

eventually occurred. Officers were taxed by weight for the

belongings they took with them. Captains were allowed 300 poundsand lieutenants 150. The camp equipment alone weighed this

amount. Each o f us bought horses, which were sold to us at a very

42 Prince de Montbarey to General Rochambeau, 9 December 1780. Service

historique, Guerre d’Amerique, Lettres divers des Officiers Generates, Carton XLVIII,

item 454/235, 3; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires, I, 271. According to

Montbarey’s letter o f 9 December 1780, the king made known that he wanted

Washington treated “delicately.” Further, Montbarey noted that the king had so far been

exceptionally pleased with R ochambeau’s work.

43 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 218; Kennett, French Forces, 107-109; Jean-

Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoirs O f The Marshal Count De Rochambeau, Relative To The

War O f Independence O f The United States [heretofore The War o f Independence] (Paris,

1838), 50-61.

58




high price .44

Beginning on the morning of 10 June 1781, the corps boarded small ferry boats and

began their move from the ir island at Newport to their mainland departure point at

Providence. The distance was short, but many of the boats ran aground in the receding tide,

forcing the soldiers to spend a night cramped aboard the vessels without food until the next

morning’s tide freed them. General Rochambeau held Barras’ squadron in reserve at

Newport and left the marquis de Choisy with 500 French and 1,000 American militia to

guard both the squadron and the siege guns which remained at Providence. To ease

congestion on the roads and overcrowding at the prearranged campsites, the general divided

his army into three divisions o f regiments with the order that regiments would move in one

day succession o f each other.

Once the bulk o f his army was ashore on the mainland, the comm anding general left

Newport with his staf f on 14 June to lead the first division in the march to New York.

Maintaining his semi-independent command, the due de Lauzun set out with his legion along

a different route to screen the corp’s left flank. Four days later, the Bourbonnois regiment,

with Colonel Donatien Rochambeau at its head, led the French army from Providence.45

44 Clermont-Crevecoeur, Journal, 27. Naturally the senior officers were allotted

more space. While General Rochambeau allowed fourteen wagons per regiment, each

general officer was allowed two. The general’s six aides de camp shared two wagons,

while Rochambeau kept only four for himself. Closen, Journal, 84.

45 Berthier, Journal, 246-247; Ordre de Marche de VArmee par tant de North-Castle, pou r se rendre aux White-Plains, 4 July 1781. Service historique, Guerre

d’Amerique, inclus la siege de York, Carton XLIX, item 14. In his capacity as assistant

quartermaster general, the vicomte de Rochambeau commanded a battalion of the

Bourbonnois grenadiers and chasseurs as an advanced scouting, quartering and foraging

party. This was standard procedure throughout the corps. The vanguard elements o f each

59




The march proved unusually arduous. Torrential New England rains turned the

country roads into quagmires severely impeding the progress of the supply wagons and

artillery carriages. The British had destroyed numerous bridges along the route and more

often than not, artillery crews themselves were forced to tug their pieces through waist-high

river fords. In the more sparsely populated areas, decent lodging was impossible to find.

Alexandre Berthier describes one example o f the paucity of adequate quarters atN orth Castle

[Mount Kisco], New York: “The headquarters was very poorly housed - ju st how poorly you

will understand when I tell you that the assistant quartermasters-general were obliged to sleep

in the open on piles of straw, which was, to boot, rather too green.”46

In addition to the physical privations suffered by the Frenchmen on the march, a

French officers’ financial burden o f campaigning in America was unusually high. Fersen

recorded the best description o f a colonel’s routine expenses, having had to make account

to his father for his expenditure o f4,500 o f his credit line o f 12,000 livres. Remarking to his

father that the sum provided was not sufficient to meet his needs in America, he noted that

division employed a similar system w ith each led by an assistant quartermaster general.

Captain Charles de Lameth (AQMG) led the baron de Viom enil’s second division, while

Captain Collot (AQMG) led the comte de Viomenil’s third division. See appendix for

march time line and distances. According to historian John Austin Stevens, the

Bourbonnois grenadiers and chasseurs arrived at Bedford where they linked w ith the

Lauzun regiment who was screening the left flank to join Washington’s Americans for

the proposed attack on Clinton’s forces at New York. John Austin Stevens, “The Allied

Annies Before New York, 1781,” The Magazine o f American H istory 4 (1880): 3.

46 Ibid., 248. For the officers, the march was not always so impossible. At many

points along the way, R ochambeau’s more senior commanders entertained and enjoyed

the hospitality of American ladies. An undeterminable number o f spouses, children and

other camp followers helped ease the burden of at least some of the men. Closen,

Journal, 84-87.

60




“he had needed horses, which were very expensive, and that a good one could not be had for

less than seventy to eighty lo u is ”47

The life o f an officer and of an aide-de-camp often depends on the

quality of his horse; I myself needed two of this (higher) quality and

three for my people o f a lesser price o f twenty to thirty louis. Thusthey are not very good. I have a valet de chambre and two grooms;

I pay them forty sols per day and a ration of bread and meat.

Everybody pays the same thing and many give fifty sols, bread and

meat. There is my state o f affairs; it is the same as that o f my

comrades, no more, no less. My three domestics are mounted and I

have two horses for me. My equipment is carried with that of the

general.48

Fersen went on to enumerate several other expenses including that the shoeing o f a

horse normally cost seven livres, but if there were ice, it cost ten livres and ten sols. In a

subsequent monthly recapitulation, Fersen’s expenses totaled 420 livres, 120 for the two

domestics, 100 for the valet, four horses’ rations at five livres per day, fifty for laundering,

and various other expenditures at sixty livres. Everything, he noted, had to be paid fo r in

gold. As his best estimate, the young colonel figured that 500 livres per month and 6,000 per

year would be sufficient to meet his needs.49 Certainly both the general and the vicomte de

Rochambeau paid at least as much for their routine expenses.

After covering 183 miles, the Frenchmen joined forces with the Americans just short

of New York at Phillipsburg on 9 July.50 Here, Rocham beau’s corps established their camp

47 Fersen, Lettres, 102.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 102, 125.


61




on high ground to the left (the traditional position o f a subordinate force) o f the Americans.

In the French view, the camp could not have been better chosen, for according to Colonel

Rochambeau, “Between us and the enemy lay a difficult country which they would not have

dared cross without greatly endangering themselves, for it could be easily defended and the

commanding positions were all on our side.”51 Having settled their two armies, the two

commanders undertook to reconnoiter the British defenses at New York. Though the French

commander was under no illusions concerning the lack o f promise o f attacking the city, he

ostensibly agreed with Washington, know ing that such movements would further disguise

his real plans for an attack in the South to finish off the severely weakened Cornwallis. By

19 July, Washington and General Rochambeau had made out six British camps on M anhattan

Island.

The increased activity around New York further cemented British suspicions that an

attack was imminent. Colonel Rochambeau and the other assistant quartermasters-general

were kept especially busy, deliberately foraging as close to the enemy as possible.

Being definitely on the edge o f enemy territory, the army was ordered

to forage in advance of the position, as close to the enemy as possible.

The assistant quartermasters-general were continually employed in

reconnoitering forage so as to lead the army to it. These foraging

expeditions covered an area between the camp and Long Island

Sound extending from Rye, Mamaroneck, East Chester, and Chester

to a point as close as possible to King’s Bridge. When we ran out of

grass, we foraged in the bams, which are all full. We also discovered

along the shores o f the Sound large caches o f hay and oats destined

for shipment to the enemy in New York. These foraging expeditions

were always supported by a detachment of 1,500 men and a troop ofhussars. Although we succeeded in carrying off all the forage in their

51 Ibid., 221.

62




neighborhood, the English never interfered.52

All around them, the French witnessed the desolation of the prolonged revolution,

“....the houses [were] plundered, ruined, abandoned or burnt. These Americans so soft,

pacific and benevolent by nature, are here transformed into monsters implacable, bloody and

ravenous....”53 Wishing to get a closer look, the generals dispatched a detachment o f 5,000

men, ha lf French, half American, to probe the British positions around King’s Bridge. With

the possibility o f combat now at hand, Donatien Rochambeau officially received his first

large command.

For this “reconnaissance-in-force” the elder Rochambeau allowed his son to resign

from the army’s general staff and to take permanent control o f the Bourbonnois reg iment’s

battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs.54 The allied generals divided the force into four

columns, two American and two French, and set the groups in motion at eight o ’clock on the

night of 21 July. Under the commands o f Major Generals Samuel Parsons and Benjamin

Lincoln, the two American columns marched along the banks of the Hudson River. The

chevalier de Chastellux commanded the two French columns, the Bourbonnois and the Royal

Deux-Ponts regiments forming the right brigade, and Lauzun’s Legion and the grenadiers and

chasseurs o f the Soissonnois regiment forming the left. Once again, Colonel Rochambeau’s

battalion (guided by Alexandre Berthier) led the brigade of Colonel Laval’s Bourbonnois and

the Royal Deux-Ponts regiment on the eight-mile march to a predetermined position at

52 Berthier, Journal, 249.

53 Robin, New Travels, 31.

54 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 222-223.

63




Valentine Hill from which they could over watch the Americans’ movement.55 Alexandre

Berthier best described the scene: “This march over execrable roads, on which the column

was halted every few minutes by guns that had bogged down or overturned in the pitch

darkness, took all night.”56 Indeed, road conditions were so severe that the marquis de Laval

ultimately abandoned his colum n’s artillery to have it catch up later.57

The center column finally arrived at Valentine Hill at one o ’clock the nex t morning.

Following his father’s instructions, the younger Rochambeau ordered his grenadiers and

chasseurs to deploy in absolute silence, sending outposts forward. Behind him, the brigad e’s

two regiments settled into a T-formation on the high ground.58

55 Captain Berthier had reconnoitered the route earlier, apparently under more

favorable weather conditions. Captain Charles de Lameth guided the left column along

the Tuckahoe Road. Both columns, each of whose artillery support consisted of two

twelve-pound cannons and two howitzers, would rendezvous at Valentine Hill. Berthier,

Journal, 251; Frantjois Soules, Histoire des Troubles de VAmerique A nglaise (Paris,

1787), III, 378; Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 222; George Washington diary entry, 21

July 1781. The Diaries o f George Washington (Charlottesville, 1978), III, 398.

56 Berthier, Journal, 251.

57 Though Berthier stridently warned the marquis not to leave the brigade’s

artillery troops without guides, the artillerymen did indeed get lost. Consequently,

Berthier spent the remainder o f the night trying to find them himself. Berthier, Journal,

252.

58 Berthier, Journal, 251; Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 222. Fortunately for

Colonel Rochambeau, his battalion remained in stationary positions in the vicinity o f

King’s Bridge/Valentine Hill for forty-eight hours. They were not part of a subsequent

action, in which the due de Lauzun led his German legion augmented by a party ofAmerican and French grenadiers along the Hudson River to Morrisania and then to Frog’s

Neck, N ew York. After brisk fighting, members o f this reconnaissance element allegedly

took to pillaging the homes o f the local inhabitants, many of whom appeared to be British

sympathizers. The actions of the soldiers under Lauzun’s command caused nothing short

o f a scandal among the members o f Rocham beau’s army.

64




For the next several days, the French remained virtually unmolested by the British

and continued to probe the British positions, even stealing large amounts o f fodder that the

enemy had stockpiled at Rye, Mamaroneck, Chester and New Rochelle. Only minor

skirmishes against British outposts ensued, during which the French captured or sent into

flight a small numbers o f British forward observers, allowing the generals to carry out their

own reconnaissance m ore easily.59

British resistance stiffened as the allied detachments inched closer toward New York,

prom pting General Rochambeau to remark that “....shots were poured upon us from the

fortifications of New York, as well as from all the small men-of-war stationed around it.

This active cannonading had no other effect than that which I desired, namely: o f diverting

the whole attention of the enemy to this principle bulk o f its forces.”60 Increasingly,

Washington came to recognize the futility of attacking New York, and news o f the pending

arrival of British reinforcements at the city only further dampened his ardor.61 By the

beginning o f August, Washington for the first time began to consider ser iously a move

59 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 222-223. Certainly the most famous o f these

small but fierce actions was the fight that took place at Morrisania on 22 June be tween a

band of Tories and Generals Washington and Rochambeau and their staffs. In this, as in

the other engagements, the French lost no soldiers, but had two horses killed. The comte

Charles Damas lost the first while the second was shot out from under Berthier. It was

here also that von Closen lost his hat and had to return to pick it up under fire asimmortalized in the painting by Albrecht Adam in 1825.

60 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, The War o f Independence, 58.

61 Ibid., 56.

65




against one o f the British garrisons in the South.62 The question only remained as to which

one....Charleston? Savannah? Perhaps am ove against Lord Charles Cornwallis in Virginia?

It was a vexing question for the American general, but Admiral de Grasse provided the

answer on 14 August. Somewhat surprisingly, the American headquarters received the news

a whole day before Rochambeau: the comte de Grasse was leaving Saint-Domingue with

3,200 land troops and was headed for Chesapeake Bay. Rochambeau decided that the time

had finally come to inform W ashington of his plans, and a bit o f skillful diplomacy averted

a potential crisis:

The moment had now come to enlighten General Washington and to

persuade him to operate in the South, in spite o f the advice o f his

aide-de-camp, Hamilton, in whom he had great confidence and who

obstinately wished to attack New York. My father sent for the

Brigadier General [Louis le Begue de Presle] Duportail, [and] told

him o f his ideas, which he completely approved, and asked him to use

all of his influence with the Am erican commander to make him adopt

them. He gave himse lf to this with zeal and enthusiasm; but, seeing

the latter’s indecision and the obstacles which he created, he guessed

that pride had much to do with his refusal. General Rochambeau,

sacrificing his to the good which should result from this maneuver,

proposed to the American General [sic] that he detach the Southern

[sic] corps from the Army o f the North [sic], to add to it a detachment

of light infantry from any part o f the French army and to come and

command the expedition himself. From then on the obstacles were

removed, the march south was resolved upon and definitely planned.

We wrote to Admiral Barras to give him a date for meeting us at

62 Washington had pinned m ost o f his hopes for success upon promises from the

various states for troops and supplies. By August 1781, the states had sent little if any

aid, causing Washington to lament that “....I could scarce see a ground upon which tocontinue my preparations against New York - especially as there was much reason to

believe that part (at least) of the Troops [sic] in Virginia were recalled to reinforce N ew

York and therefore I turned my views more seriously (than I had done before) to an

operation to the Southward [sic]....” George Washington diary entry, 1 August 1781,

Diaries, 405.

66




Chesapeake Bay w ith our siege guns .”63

After finalizing a strategy to trap Cornwallis in his fortifications in Yorktown, the two

generals set in motion what would become the decisive operation of the American

Revolution.

63 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal , 224. The next day, on 16 August, Washingtonlearned that Cornwallis, under pressure from Lafayette, had moved from Hampton Road

and was putting up defensive works along the York R iver at Yorktown and Gloucester.

George Washington diary entry, 16 August 1781, Diaries, 411. Barras left Newport on

23 August remaining virtually incommunicado until his rendezvous with de Grasse in

Virginia the next month.

67




The Sailors of the Expedition Particuliere

Admiral de Barras

jL-*"

De Grasse’s Statue in Grasse, France

’2’22 & f -2 222 22 22 4 'I' '

22 22 22 '2- 2’ 22 2" i ,X 4 4, ^4 , 4 , ^

<4 4: i : 4 = 4 4 22 i

2/ 22

2' 2' 1

•v. ■%> 2 -I*4. 4 , 4v >;

The comte de Grasse

I < # ■ *

^ ( A R I F .

UKCIUMl. iS.>. i/NMKiuyrr.

1n

De Grasse’s Plan to Block British

Naval Forces at Yorktown

The Ensign of the

French Naval Forces Captain La Perouse

Figure 10. The Sailors o f the Expedition Particuliere

68




The Campaign against Cornwallis

BCT&llirar..*' ' ’ I i* ■■

s~ * - !V : c i i A u i .K s M A i i o r i s r o u x w A r j . r s .

Lord Cornwallis in

1783

N E W Y O R K fsn n M uiniM i mimjiiJv

Principal Flags of

British Forces in 1781

Union

1

Navy

a

P E N N SY L V A N IA

Allied army of

Washington &

Rochambeau

De Barras, with French

siege guns

Lafayette

mWILLIAMSB

British fleet

arrived 5 Sept

Battle of the Capes

(5-8 Sept)V IR G IN IA

De Grass e s FrenchFleet arrived 30 Aug

C A R O L IN A

Army

Figure 11. The Cam paign against Cornwallis

69


C o u r t e s y

N a t i o n a l P o r t r a i t G a l l e r y



Chapter IV

To the “Miracle” : New York to Yorktown

July - October, 1781

For the allied plan to realize any chance o f success, it was imperative that Sir

Henry Clinton not reinforce Cornwallis in Virginia. Consequently, Generals Washington

and Rochambeau employed every means at their disposal to deceive Clinton as to their

change of strategy. Displaying for the British comm ander’s benefit detailed preparations

for an assault onto Staten Island from New Jersey, the allied army marched back up the

Hudson River to the crossing at King’s Ferry where the Hudson Highlands would mask

their subsequent movement south.1

1 After detaching a sizeable force to observe New York, Washington ordered

thirty flat boats be placed on carriages and sent to the town of Chatham on the New

Jersey side o f the Raritan River facing Staten Island. Further, Rochambeau ordered the

French army’s commissary officer to establish elaborate bakeries at Chatham. The

commissary played the role so well that even the British batteries at the m outh o f the

Raritan river fired on his workers w hile they were trying to collect the necessary bricks in

the area. Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 224-225; Closen, Journal, 104, 109.

Washington’s aide Jonathon Trumbull described the preparations: “French ovens are

building at Chatham in Jersey. Others were ordered to be prepared at a p lace near the

Hook [Paulus Hook - now Jersey City]. Contracts are made for forrage [sic] to bedelivered immediately to the French Army on their arrival at the last mentioned place.

Here it is supposed that Batteries [sic] are to be erected for the security and aid o f the

Fleet [sic; de Grasse], which is hourly expected. By these maneuvres [sic] and the

correspondent march o f the Troops [sic], our own army no less than the enemy are

completely deceived.” Jonathan Trumbull, The Trumbull Papers. Collections o f the

70




Only luck and Clinton’s obsessive belief that the combined enemy armies would

attack him in Manhattan preserved allies’ elaborate deception plan. By mid-August, at

least one female spy (only known as “Miss Jenny”) had infiltrated the French camp, while

Hessian reconnaissance troops were able to report unmistakable preparations for a

massive Am erican move south through New Jersey.2 Had Clinton believed the

remarkably accurate intelligence that he received from his German Jagers, he might

easily have altered the course of the war. Indeed, one particular Frenchman’s indiscretion

should have conclusively alerted the British general that his attentions were focused in the

wrong direction. Hessian Sergeant Berthold Koch, of the Trumbach regiment noted the

following in his diary:

18 August - the enemy army is moving and crossing the North

River. Everyone believes that Washington plans to attack Staten

Island. At least General Clinton is of this opinion, although

Lieutenant Colonel von Wurmb, who has permission to engage

spies, gave the General a report that New York will not be

attacked, but tha t Washington is marching to Virginia. This is

based on two reasons: first because the commissary has ordered

forage and bread to be collected and ready as far as Trenton and

Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Mass., 1902), I, 332. This, coupled with two

letters intercepted by Clinton from W ashington and Chastellux which still talked of

imminent operations against New York, only served to further Clinton’s suspicion.

2 “Miss Jenny” entered the French camp on 11 August ostensibly to find her

father. She was interrogated by none other than General Rochambeau who ordered her

detained for several days and her head shaved. Fortunately for the French and Americans

“Miss Jenny” wrongly reported to Clinton’s intelligence officers that even by 15 August

1781, Washington still planned to attack New York. Major Nicholas Dietrich, Baron vonOttendo rf to Henry Clinton, “Deposition of Miss Jenny after returning from the French

camp,” 15 August 1781, Collected Papers o f Sir Henry Clinton (Intelligence Reports),

facsimile on-line at http://www.sils.umich.edu/spies ; Diary of Baron Cromot du Bourg

[hereafter Cromot du Bourg, Diary], reprinted in The Magazine o f Am erican H istory 4

(1880): 304.

71


http://www.sils.umich.edu/spies

http://www.sils.umich.edu/spies



along the Delaware River; second because an American woman,

mistress o f a distinguished French officer, was sent to Trenton,

where she is to await the arrival o f the army....3

Again, C linton’s erroneous preconceptions led him to ignore a potentially

devastating source o f intelligence, for the “distinguished French officer” was none other

than Donatien Rochambeau. Considering all the precautionary efforts made by the

French commander to deceive the enemy and conceal his own operations, it seems

inconceivable that his own son would be so self-indulgent that he put the entire operation

in jeopardy. In an 18 August letter, a British spy operating under the name M aquard

reported to Clinton that Rochambeau's son, “the Viscount [sic] de Rochambeau, has

dispatched his mistress to Trenton, New Jersey, to make a rendezvous with the Viscount,

since the General, his father, permits no kept mistresses."4 Despite all evidence to the

contrary however, the allies’ enemy on Manhattan Island determined to wait for the

impending attack against him. Meanwhile, the French and American troops progressed

steadily southward, the clement weather o f the late summer and early fall often gracing

the arduous march w ith favorable road conditions.5

3 Sergeant Berthold Koch quoted in Bruce E. Burgoyne, Enem y Views. The

Am erican Revolutionary War as Recorded by the Hessian Participants (Bowie, MD,

1996), 459.

4 Maquard to Clinton, 18 August 1781, Collected Papers of Sir Henry Clinton

(Intelligence Reports, 18 August 1781), University of Michigan Special Collections.

5 Owing partially to the extreme heat, Rochambeau’s officers paid close attentionto the welfare of the soldiers during their marches. The troops were regularly encouraged

to drink water, often mixed with a bit of rum to purify it. “M. le Comte Saint-Maime,

Colonel commandant o f the Soissonois, always at each halt, and each place o f

encamping, sent out, and purchased barrels o f cider, which he caused to be distributed

among his troops, at a very low rate. His example was afterwards followed by the other

72




Whenever possible, Colonel Rochambeau and his father, accompanied by a few

select officers, took time along the way to study various sites of military interest. These

French students could not have asked fo r a better teacher, for General W ashington

himself normally accompanied the foreign delegation on their battlefield visits. On 22

August, while Rocham beau’s corps was crossing the North (Hudson) River at King’s

Ferry, New York, the generals and their entourage walked the battlements o f Stony Point,

where two years earlier General “Mad” A nthony Wayne and his troops waded across the

shallows o f the adjacent bay to launch a nighttime bayonet assault which took the British

defenders completely by surprise. Stony Point was particularly interesting to the French.

In the July 1779 battle one o f Rochambeau’s own majors in the Saintonge regiment,

Fran9ois-Louis Teissedre, vicomte de Fleury, distinguished him self by being the first into

the British positions, where he personally struck the British colors.6

corps, and produced the happiest effects.” Robin, New Travels, 33. This same officer

had purchased much lighter linen breeches for his regiment prior to their departure from

Newport. As the result, the Soissonois regim ent suffered the fewest heat casualties o f anyon the march.

6 “....[Fleury] happened to be commander o f one of the three columns which were

to storm it, and he had the good luck to lead his [men] so well that he reached the foot of

the parapet and jumped on top o f it all alone [sic], without the besieged seeing him, and

sword in hand, planted the American flag there. Some moments later, his troops also

climbed up. In this way, he took possession of the fort, whose comm ander surrendered

and gave him his sword.” Closen, Journal, 108. For being the first to plant the American

flag on Stony Point, the Continental Congress struck a silver commemorative medal

especially for Fleury (designed and executed by Benjamin Duvivier in France). The

vicomte wore the medal (depicting a general in Roman costume standing on ruins andholding a drawn sword and a flag, over the inscription “ pr imus super m orus” - the

attached ribbon was alleged to have been made from the British flag taken at Stony Point.

This remains known to be the only medal awarded by Congress to a foreign officer and

Fleury wore the decoration permanently with the special approval of Louis XVI. J. F.

Loubat, The Medallic History o f the United States o f Am erica (New York, 1878), I, 22-

73




The Battle at Stony Point,

New York

Figure 12. The Battle at Stony Point, New York

74




The next day, the American comm ander escorted his guests to the river fortress at

West Point, the site o f General Benedict Arn old’s late treachery.7 As the combined

armies moved through New Jersey over the next six days, Rochambeau’s entourage

visited other sites including Washington’s former camps in Pompton Plains, New Jersey,

the battleground at Trenton, and Washing ton’s Crossing. After fording the Delaware

River shallows the group arrived on 29 August at Princeton. Once again, Washington

personally conducted a tour of the battle field.8

By the last days of August, the combined armies were nearing Philadelphia where

the American general hoped to arrange for supplies and transport to move the bulk o f the

forces to Virginia by water. Unfortunately, even W ashington himself could not arrange

for the necessary boats and instead suggested that the armies march to M aryland where

vessels might be gathered from around the Chesapeake Bay and then sent up the Elk

River as far as the small town o f Head o f Elk (now Elkton). Leaving General

Rochambeau and his aides in the able care o f France’s minister plenipotentiary to the

American Colonies, Anne Cesar, chevalier de la Luzerne, Washington and his staff

proceeded to Elkton to make the necessary arrangements.

27; Closen, Journal, 108; Louis Fr an c is Bertrand Dupont d’Aubervoye, comte de

Lauberdiere, Journal de I ‘armee aux ordres de monsieur le comte de Rochambeau

pend an t les campagnes de 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783, dans V’Am erique septrionale

(unpublished, no date), 2er Cahier, 94.

7 Closen, Journal, 108; George Clinton, “Washington’s Itinerary During the

War,” Public Papers o f George Clinton, Firs t Governor o f New York. 1777-1795 - 1801-

1804 (Albany, New York, 1904), 410.

8 Ibid., 115.

75




On 3 and 4 September the French troops entered Philadelphia and paraded in

review for the President of the Continental Congress and its assembled members. The

reception was splendid. Stopping in America’s capital afforded a welcome respite for the

road-weary soldiers. Even the highly-critical Donatien Rochambeau was markedly

impressed with Philadelphia, remarking on the beauty o f the city and its suburbs and

noting how astonished the inhabitants seemed to be by the neatness and the discipline o f

the French troops after so long a march.9

On 5 September, La Luzerne held a sumptuous state dinner for Rochambeau’s

officers. Amid the pomp and gaiety, however, a pall fell suddenly over the group.

“Hardly were we seated at the table, when an express arrived: a disquieting silence

immediately seized every guest - our eyes were fixed upon the Chevalier de la Luzeme,

everyone endeavoring to guess what the message would turn out to be. ‘Thirty-six ships

o f the line’ said he, ‘commanded by Monsieur le Comte de Grasse, are arrived in

Chesapeak-Bay [sic], and three thousand men have landed and opened a communication

with the Marquis de la Fayette .’”10 Stunned officers roared their eager approval and

toasts were made in profusion. All present knew that the trap was rapidly closing on

Cornwallis.

Surprisingly, General Rochambeau and his son were the last to know of the

French fleet’s arrival. The first division of the French corps had left Philadelphia on the

morning of 5 September. While the soldiers marched, the Rochambeau men and two of


10 Robin, New Travels, 45; Closen, Journal, 117.

76




the general’s aides opted to travel to the next bivouac site by boat to study the Delaware

River battle sites at Mud Island, Redbank and Billings-fort. The tour went quickly, and

as the party reached their rendezvous point at Chester, Pennsylvania, they were surprised

to see George Washington standing on the shore excitedly waving his hat. The American

simply could not wait to tell his ally about de Grasse’s arrival and according to those

present, the two generals embraced warmly w hen Washington gave Rochambeau the

news.11 As the armies continued their march toward W ilmington, Delaware, the next

morning, Colonel Rochambeau organized a side trip with his twenty-one-year-old cousin

Louis Francois Bertrand Dupont d’Aubervoye, comte de Lauberdiere and his father ’s

aides, baron Ludwig von Closen and baron Cromot du Bourg, to explore the battlefield at

Brandywine, where in September 1777, British generals Howe and Cornwallis handily

defeated Washington and his army. Such side trips would continue over the next few

days as the group visited the Germantown battlefield and later inspected what the younger

Rochambeau termed the “good winter quarters” o f Washington’s camp at Valley Forge.12

Meanwhile, and unknown to both the French and the Americans, Admiral de

Grasse's armada had driven off Admiral Graves’ New York-based flotilla, and then

established a rigid blockade o f Cornwallis' small fleet at Yorktown. After landing his

infantry regiments outside o f Jamestown, Virginia, the French admiral sought to use his

empty transport ships to expedite the movem ent o f Rocham beau’s first division who, by 7

11 Cromot du Bourg, Diary , 384; Closen, Journa l , 123.

12 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 226; Closen, Journal, 124; Cromot du Bourg,

Diary, 385.

77




September, had descended upon Elkton.13 De Grasse intended to ferry all of

Rochambeau’s army down the Chesapeake Bay, but his fleet included only deep-water

transports that could not possibly navigate the shallow Elk River. As a result, de Grasse’s

captains were forced to remain further down the bay at Annapolis.

Meanwhile, W ashington and his commissaries, who did not know o f the French

naval plan, had spent days contracting throughout the Chesapeake Bay area for any

transport boats that the British had not destroyed earlier. Neither money nor time could

be wasted, and Washington made the decis ion to send as many of the troops as possible

to Annapolis aboard the few transports that he had on hand to meet de G rasse’s larger

ships.14 As the French and American troops marched into Elkton, they were pleased to

find transport vessels awaiting them, but were understandably dismayed when they

discovered that there was only room for a portion o f the force. After some discussion,

Washington and Rochambeau agreed that the allies would share the boats with each army

providing half (about 1,000 men each) o f the ships’ cargo.15

Given the limited space, the French general determined to send his vanguard (the

13 The adm iral’s messenger who brought word o f the impending arrival o f the

French transports intercepted the French ground forces at Elkton, arriving only one hour

before Rochambeau’s advanced guard. Donatien Rochambeau observed that “....it is

perhaps the most unusual o f coincidences that an expedition, made up from the

Windward Islands and from the northern parts o f America, should meet from such distant

points w ithin one hour o f each other.” Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 227.

14 Soules, Histoire des Troubles de VAmerique Angla ise, 388; DonatienRochambeau, Journal, 221.

15 The American troops refused to embark until they were given at least some of

the back pay that was owed to them. Accordingly, General Rochambeau gave

Washington fifty-thousand livres to pay these troops. Closen, Journal, 124.

78




full complement o f his army’s grenadiers and chasseurs) and the infantry o f Lauzun’s

Legion aboard the available ships, and to put the two Viomenil generals in charge o f the

remainder of his forces for a foot march to Baltimore. Washington and Rochambeau,

with only a light guard, would travel ahead by land to Williamsburg. On the morning o f

9 September, Donatien Rochambeau, again placed by his father in temporary command o f

a battalion of the Bourbonnois regim ent’s grenadiers, marched about three miles outside

of Elkton to a deeper water embarkation area at Plum Point and boarded the ships with

his men.

The transports finally sailed on 11 September. Though Colonel Rochambeau

somewhat stoically made no mention o f the misery o f the trip in his journal, what should

have been a short trip down the Chesapeake proved to be anything but easy. Minus their

provisions (which they left with the remainder o f the land troops), delayed by adverse

winds and then harassed by frightful weather, those on the transport vessels endured

continual torment until they landed in Virginia a full eighteen days later. Unfortunately,

only enough rations had been loaded for a short journey and no cooking was a llowed on

the boats so the enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers had to content

themselves with eating biscuits and cheese, while the officers were reduced to dining on

cold m eat.16

By the morning o f 12 September, the winds became favorable enough to allow the

squadron to sail into the Chesapeake Bay, but that evening a ferocious storm hit leaving

16 Blanchard, Journal, 139; Robin, New Travels, 51.

79




the men “cruelly tossed about all night....almost everyone was sick.”17 The nex t day the

weather improved and w hile the lead vessels came within sight of Annapolis, another

twenty boats had disappeared. The situation was made even more grave by the threat of

pirates that roamed the bay.18 This menace (exacerbated by de Grasse’s decision to leave

his anchorage at the mouth of the York River with his principle warships to fight the

combined English squadrons o f Admirals Graves and Hood), prompted General

Washington to order that the Elkton transports put in at Annapolis rather than continuing

on to Virginia.19 The infantry of the Lauzun Legion left the transports at Annapolis in

order to move on to Virginia to link up with its cavalry which had already arrived at

Gloucester. Others soon took their place, filling to capacity not only the Elkton boats, but

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid. Indeed some o f the French vessels were menaced by pirates, but the latter

abandoned their project when they realized the number o f men on board the apparently

defenseless vessels.

19 Admiral Samuel Hood, with twelve ships reconnoitered the Chesapeake on 25

August on his way to New York from the Caribbean. Finding the bay empty he continued

north to link up with General Clinton and Admiral Thomas Graves who, at the time,

commanded seven ships of the line. Forty-eight hours after Hood left Virginia, de Grasse

arrived in the Chesapeake Bay. Clinton was thrilled to see Hood at New York and

planned to use him and the infantry reinforcements that he carried against Barras and the

members o f Rochambeau’s corps that remained at Newport. Barras, however, sailed first

leaving Newport abandoned. Quickly overcoming his initial shock, Clinton sent the

combined squadron back to Virginia to relieve Cornwallis o f de G rasse’s blockade.

Leaving four ships to continue to bottle up Cornwallis’ ships in the York River, de Grasse

quickly sailed into the bay with twenty-four ships to confront the nineteen ships o f Gravesand Hood. In the bri ef Battle of the Virginia Capes on 5 September 1781, de Grasse’s

fleet overwhelmed the British who soon sailed once again for New York. When de

Grasse returned to the York River on 11 September, Barras, who carried the remainder of

the Newport garrison, Rochambeau’s siege pieces and a sizeable complement o f much-

needed supplies, was there to greet him.

80




also de Grasse’s transports. Only after de Grasse again ensconced himself opposite

Cornwallis did Washington order the reinforced convoy to continue south. Colonel

Rochambeau’s troubles and those o f his men, however, were far from over:

The hardships [that those aboard the transports] had endured wereincredible. Several vessels, battered by winds and storms and on

the point o f shipwreck, had lowered their boats and sent their men

to take refuge in the warships anchored at the entrance o f the York

River to blockade Cornwallis. They were expecting to rest there

and spend a pleasant night after the bad experiences and dangers o f

the preceding days when Cornwallis sent fire-ships to attack them.

These rained firebrands down on the crews all night and spread

terror among them. By the greatest good fortune they escaped

injury, though they were attacked by no less than seven fire ships.20

Between 23 and 25 September the transports finally disembarked their charge

along the sandy beach at Archer’s Hope on the James River.21 The route from Arch er’s

Hope to their rendezvous point at Williamsburg, Virginia, took Rochambeau and his men

through old Jamestown, where the more informed o f the group looked forward to

spending a few moments at an important American landmark. Once at the settlement,

however, they were m et by a gruesome spectacle: “ [t]he enemy, shortly before quitting

his post, had left ineradicable traces of his presence. This little town, one o f the oldest in

America, was in great part destroyed. Ruins were found there, vestiges of fire, tombs

broken open, fine monuments wrecked, a church partly tom down, and houses still

standing but containing corpses whose stench fills the air. Every means o f devastation

20 Clermont-Crevecceur, Journal, 52.


81




had been applied in the town and in the country.”22

On 25 September, Colonel Rocham beau and his command arrived at

Williamsburg and joined with the remainder o f the allied troops. Now totaling nearly

16,000, and having traveled nearly 600 miles, Wash ington’s Franco-American army was

poised to besiege Cornwallis .23 While de Grasse sealed Cornwallis’ navy in the York

River, Lauzun’s Legion and other French infantry under Brigadier General Claude

Gabriel de Choisy moved to con tain Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s cavalry on

the other side o f the York River in the tow n o f Gloucester.

The bulk of the allied armies left Williamsburg on 28 September. The next day,

after a twelve-mile march through stifling heat and burning sand, the French and

Americans broke into three columns. Using the cover and concealment of woods,

fortifications and creeks, they closed to w ithin pistol range o f the British in their forward

defensive works.24 Washington’s Americans were temporarily held up in their advance

on the right by a bridge-less morass in front o f the British defensive works, bu t the French

regiments on the British right were able to advance rapidly. Cornwallis (who had

22 Louis-Floxel de Cantel, chevalier d’Ancteville, “The Chesapeake Cam paign,”

reprinted in Warrington Dawson “The Chevalier d’Ancteville and His Journal o f ‘The

Chesapeake Campaign,”’ Legion d ’Honneur (New York, 1931), 87-88.

23 The combined strength of the allied forces besieging Yorktown totaled 24,600

men. Wash ington’s army comprised 326 officers and 15,600 other ranks (including

Lafayette’s division); Rochambeau’s Frenchmen added 8,670 combatants. Cornw allis’army numbered only 430 officers, 7,039 other ranks, and 800 Royal Marines. Brendan

Morrissey, Yorktown 1781, The World Turned Upside Down (London, 1997), 32-35.

24 Closen , Journal, 138; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, The War o f Independence,

65; Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 230.

82




Comte De Rochambeau

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83


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received word from General Clinton that reinforcements were en route to Yorktown)

ordered his men to evacuate their outermost redoubts near Pigeon Hill during the night o f

29 September and to retreat into the fortified tow n’s more secure first parallel.25

Surprised the next morning to find the British positions empty, General Rochambeau

wasted no time and ordered his son, and the remainder o f the grenadiers and chasseurs of

the Bourbonnois regiment, to occupy the abandoned outer works.26

By midnight on 6 October no relie f from Clinton had appeared. Thus, while

Donatien Rochambeau’s grenadiers and 2,800 o ther troops provided security, infantrymen

of the Bourbonnois and Soissonnois regiments began digging the allies’ first parallel no

more than 250 yards from Cornwallis’ first parallel. The next morning, the British “were

very astonished to see when day came the trench opened all around them.”27 French and

American artillery answered sporadic British cannon fire with terrible vengeance. Those

rounds, especially those o f the guns supporting the French effort in the center, which did

not land in the midst o f Cornwallis’ densely packed army, sailed over the fortifications to

25 Cornwallis’ men constructed two main defensive rings of walled

entrenchments, or “parallels” around Yorktown. Directly attacking an enemy entrenched

in this way usually was done at a high cost in lives as fortune usually favored the

defender. For the allied armies to reduce Cornwallis’ works, it was necessary for French

and American soldiers move forward in the night and then to dig their own trench line

parallel to the enemy works. Once completed, art illerymen could then move the ir own

mortars and heavy siege guns into the newly-dug forward positions. This process was

repeated as often as necessary until the defender surrendered.

26 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 230. For detailed account o f the process ofthe siege of Yorktown, see French eng ineer officer Gaspard de Gallatin, “The Narrative

of Baron Gaspard de Gallatin,” reprinted in Warrington Dawson, “With Rochambeau at

Newport,” The Franco-American Review, I, No. 4 (Spring, 1937)

27 Ibid., 231.

84




Donatien Rochambeau’s Opening Move

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Figure 14. Donatien Rochambeau’s Opening Move

85




set fire to the British ships trapped jus t beyond in the York River. By the night o f 11

October, the French had taken the British outer line and were d igging their second

parallel.

Four days later, Cornwallis’ lines were effectively broken. Nevertheless, isolated

British batteries, especially two redoubts (Numbers 9 and 10) in front o f the Americans,

continued to hold. Success appeared imminent, but General Rochambeau, who in his

long military career had participated in fourteen such sieges, continued to demand tha t the

work proceed methodically and with great caution. The commander of the first French

division however, Major General de Viomenil, was showing marked impatience with the

army’s progress. In his opinion, the allied cannon fire had effectively suppressed the

enemy in the two redoubts and General Rochambeau was needlessly delaying the final

attack. “You are mistaken” Rochambeau told Viomenil, “but in reconnoitering the works

more closely we can be sure.”28

He gave the order to cease fire, forbade us to follow him, and

allowed only his son, the Vicomte de Rochambeau, to accompanyhim. He left the trench, descended slowly into the gully making a

detour, and, coming up again on the opposite escarpment, he

approached the redoubt as far as the abatis which surrounded it.

After having gotten a good look, he [with his son] returned to the

battery without the enemy having bothered h im with a single shot.

“Well,” he said, the abatis and the palisades are still intact. It

requires redoubling our fire to break them down and to knock o ff

the top o f the parapet; we shall see if the pear is ripe tomorrow.29

The Rochambeaus’ “good and noble lesson” stymied Viomenil’s impatience for a

28 Dumas, Souvenirs, I, 84.

29 Ibid., 84-85.

86




The Battle of Yorktown as Seen by the

Participating Nations

L S h S a f c - * « * s * a

A Contemporary French View of the Siege

l f r

The Franco-American View of the Siege

LAFEYETTE TAKING A REDOUBT AT YORKTOWN.

The French at Redoubt

Ten

A Contemporary British Lampoon of the Martinet

Rochambeau Training his

Troops Prior to the Battle

The Americans Storm Redoubt Number Nine

Figure 15. The Battle o f Yorktown as Seen by the Participating Nations

87




day, but on the night o f 14-15 October, Viomenil and Lafayette personally led their troops

against the two remaining strongholds on Cornwallis’ right in what would later be

remembered in American Revolutionary history as the Battles of Redoubts Nine and

Ten.30 Tragically, French sappers and infantrymen discovered during the attack that the

redoubts and their abatis had not been sufficiently reduced by the artillery even after

several days’ bombardment. As the result, eighty Frenchmen died while the English lost

only eighteen - the highest single instance o f French casualties during the siege.31

Throughout the siege, Cornwallis, who remained critically short of ammunition

and personnel, made va in attempts to break through or to circumvent the allied lines; a

body o f 600 men even managed to spike the guns o f a French battery o f the Agenois

regiment with the points of their bayonets on the night of 15-16 October. The British

general’s pitiable attempts were, however, m ore a matter o f salvaging some ounce o f

national or personal pride than an attempt at meaningful combat. By 17 October, the

allied artillery had taken such a dreadful toll of the British land and naval forces in and

around Yorktown that at nine o’clock that morning Cornwallis sent an officer under a flag

of truce to discuss a twenty-four hour cease-fire. Washington flatly refused, referring to

30 After manually tearing out or simply climbing over the abatis and chevaux des

fr is es in front o f Cornwallis’ positions, Lafayette’s American soldiers took redoubt

Number ten within in a few minutes. Viomenil’s plan, which had been to infiltrate his

grenadiers and chasseurs [including Colonel Rochambeau] into redoubt Num ber nine,

was discovered and soon met by stout resistance. As the result, Viomenil stalled his

attack before the works at redoubt Number nine, opting to wait for his sappers to clear theobstacles. During the interval, the marquis de Lafayette rode over from his own position

to ask Viomenil if he needed help. The infuriated baron refused and the next morning,

scathingly rebuked Lafayette for w hat he perceived as the marquis’ impertinent insolence.

31 Gallatin, Journal, 12, 16.

88




the reprehensible British conduct the previous year against the Am erican garrison at

Charleston, South Carolina, as a model o f how he w ould conduct any remaining action.

Hours after the allies recommenced their barrage, Cornwallis sent a second and final

messenger across the lines, this time to discuss terms of surrender.32

On 19 October 1781, the beaten and exhausted British at Yorktown signed the

formal instrument of surrender and began their march out o f the wrecked town. Lord

Cornwallis, who claimed illness, sent his sword by his second-in-command, Brigadier

General Charles O’Hara, to the official surrender ceremony. Whether by ceremonious

accident or by arrogant design, O’Hara first approached the comte de Rochambeau with

Cornw allis’ sword. The French general politely rebuffed the British commander,

ushering him instead with a simple, elegant hand gesture to his own superior officer,

General Washington. O’Hara made a visible grimace, but complied.33

In his journa l, the vicomte de Rochambeau totaled that between the garrisons at

Yorktown and Gloucester, the British surrendered 7,050 English and German troops,


33 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee, Memoirs o f the War in the Southern

Department o f the United States (Philadelphia, 1812), 360-362. Thomas-Jacques de

Goislard, chevalier de Villebresme, Souvenirs du Chevalier de Villebresme,

Mousquetaire de la Garde duRoi , 1772-1816, Guerre d ’Amerique, Em igration (Paris,

1897), 91. By coincidence, fifteen years later, jus t days short o f the anniversary o f hissurrender at Yorktown, the British government exchanged Lieutenant General Donatien

Rochambeau, prisoner on parole in America, for Lieutenant General Charles O ’Hara.

Order of the Commissioners for taking care of Sick and Wounded Seamen and

Exchanging Prisoners o f War, 7 September, 1795. Service historique, Carton Yb 381;

dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 66.

89




C e l e r a f t o

" H l k "

Various Interpretations of the Surrender at Yorktown

Surrender at Yorktown

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FIRST DAY OF ISSUE

Figure 16. Various Interpretations of the Surrender at Yorktown




twenty-two flags, 160 assorted pieces o f cannon, 1,050 sailors and forty ships.34

Surprisingly, the final numbers o f soldiers and guns captured after the battle tend to vary

not only between major participants, but also between the comte and vicomte de

Rochambeau. However, as the allies occupied Yorktown, the situation there appears to

have loaned itself to some confusion. As General Rochambeau’s aide the baron von

Closen observed, “ [o]ne could not make three steps without running into some great

holes made by the bombs, some splinters, some balls, some ha lf covered trenches, with

scattered white or Negro arms or legs, [and] some bits o f uniform s.”35

The English had requisitioned large numbers o f slaves as laborers

who had spread the plague in Yorktown - [T]hese miserable

creatures could be found in every comer, either dead or dying. No

one took the trouble to bury them, so you can imagine the infection

this must have engendered. Still, a large number of them survived.

Most were reclaimed by the inhabitants. Negroes without masters

found new ones among the French, and we garnered a veritable

harvest o f domestics.36

In the days following the surrender, the senior members o f the French and the

British armies dined together on more than one occasion, the more senior British officers

making a favorable impression on their Continental hosts. Closen noted in his diary that:

All the general and superior officers, English and German, dined

34 Donatien Rocham beau, Journal, 239. D ’Ancteville reported the capture of

5,500 infantry, 500 cavalrymen, 1,200 sailors, 1,700 various soldiers sick or wounded,

and 2,000 slaves.


36 Clermont-Crevecceur, Journal, 64. As the few remaining French soldiers

evacuated Saint-Domingue in 1803, Lieutenant General Donatien Rochambeau carried

with him at least one long-service slave. Whether or not he first acquired this slave after

Yorktown remains unknown.

91




on November 2 at M. De Rocham beau’s residence; Lord

Cornwallis is distinguished particularly by his reflective, mild, and

noble bearing. He spoke a great deal of his campaigns in the

Carolinas, and although he was victorious on several occasions, he

admitted himself, nevertheless, that they were the source o f his

present m isfortunes. All, with the exception o f Tarleton, spoke

French. O’Hara, especially, spoke it perfectly.37

After fifteen months in America the Expedition Particuliere had finally triumphed

in a major engagement, and in the days immediately following the victory, General

Rochambeau personally drafted lists of graces or “favors” for the king to bestow upon the

general’s more distinguished subalterns. The graces contained not only an account o f an

officer’s services, but also recommended decorations, pensions or promotions. In the first

list, which the due de Lauzun personally delivered to Segur in late November, General

Rochambeau pursued for his son nothing less than a full and permanent colonelcy, the

coveted Order o f Saint Louis, and a pension o f 6,000 livres.3&

The war, however, was not over. After the allied soldiers filled in or leveled the

entrenchments around Yorktown, Washington and his Americans marched north toward

37 Closen, Journal, 160. “Lord Cornw allis needed 100,000 ecus [about £150,000]

to pay his troops - the French generals and colonels lent him this sum. When he arrived

in New York, the General [sic] returned the money together with 100 bottles o f porter and

a large quantity o f Chester cheese to express his appreciation to those w ho had rendered

him this service.” Clermont-Crevecceur, Journal, 64; Closen, Journal, 167. Certainly the

dinners with their captives proved to be good instruction for young Colonel Rochambeau,

who cannily summarized Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown as the result o f three major

mistakes. First, he said, the British general failed to attack Lafayette’s and Saint-Simon’s

troops before General Rochambeau’s army arrived. By not resolutely defending his outer

works, Cornwallis committed his second mistake, and thus lost any advantage that hemay have had by his potentially strong defense. Finally, the British general failed to

attempt any significant counterattacks. Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 239.

38 Comte de Rochambeau to the comte de Segur, 5 December 1781, Service

historique, Carton Yb381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 30.

92




New York while Lafayette and his army marched south.39 In o rder to be in a position to

offer his army’s assistance in either direction, General Rochambeau remained in the area

and settled his troops into winter quarters at various points in Yorktown, Williamsburg,

Hampton and Gloucester.

The recent horrors o f the war had left a deep scar on the civilian inhabitants in and

around Virginia’s former capital. As the result, the French army at first was greeted with

the same sort o f timid reception that they initially had received in New port.40

Nevertheless, the winter camp in Virginia proved fairly comfortable (despite food and

fodder shortages due to the long occupation o f the area by the various armies) and by 15

December, the general’s headquarters and other homes in W illiamsburg had become the

scene for a host o f gala balls and other festivities.41 On that particular evening following

the singing of a Te Deum for the capture o f Yorktown, General Rochambeau gave a large

dinner and ball to the leading citizens o f Williamsburg, to which all the ladies were

invited. “The fair sex in this city are very fond of minuets” baron von Closen remarked,

“....[i]t is true that some o f them dance rather well, and infinitely better than the women

up North. ...”42

Throughout the winter lull in Virginia, General Rochambeau and his son

39 Donatien Rochambeau, Journal, 241-242; Closen, Journal, 160-161.

40 Lauberdiere, Journal, 153.

41 Closen noted some “difficulty foraging in Virginia as Cornwallis’ and

Tarleton’s troops had despoiled the countryside - horses are left to run in the swamps to

feed or are fed com husks and wet maize.” Closen, Journal, 174.

42 Ibid., 169.

93




participated in numerous fox hunting and sightseeing expeditions into the interior and the

mountains o f the state. When he was not in the company of his father, Donatien

Rochambeau passed the hours with at least one young lady in Williamsburg. As his

companion Lauberdiere wrote in his journa l, “ ....lodging with the Vicomte [sic] de

Rochambeau, m y cousin, we took great advantage of the resources of the country and of

the society of a widow nam ed Madame Ridte [Susanna Riddel] who had two friendly

nieces, Miss Rachel, and Camilla Warrington. As the song says ‘let us make love, let us

make w ar’ these two things were full of attractions. We had effectively found the one

allied with the other and our desires had been fulfilled.”43 Unfortunately for the two girls,

the Warrington sisters’ liaison with Rochambeau and Lauberdiere scandalized

Williamsburg, prompting one of the town’s ladies to remark that “[T]heir late conduct

has been So extraordinary that all eyes are fixed upon them.”44

Orphaned in 1770 upon the death o f their father, the Reverend Thomas

Warrington, the two girls lived in Williamsburg with their wealthy aunt Susannah Riddel.

As one contemporary Williamsburg native wrote, Camilla Warrington was “ ‘pretty

enough to have been a belle,’ sharp o f wit, and thoroughly indulged by her aunt and

uncle.”45 Rachel, the older o f the two, “had more bewitching talents for seducing a

43 Lauberdiere, Journal, 168-169; Robert A. Selig, “Lauberdiere’s Journal,”

Colonial Williamsburg, Autum n (1995), 36.

44 Mildred Smith to Betsey Ambler, 1780, Letter No. 1, Ambler Family Papers,cited in Catherine Kerrison, “By the Book, Eliza Ambler Brent Carrington and Conduct

Literature in Late Eighteenth-Century Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine o f History and

Biography 105, No. 1 (winter 1997): 36.

45 Betsey Ambler to Mildred Smith, 10 January 1786, Ibid.

94




guileless heart than any human I have ever known.”46 Donatien Rochambeau and

Lauberdiere apparently visited the Riddel home often and by spring 1782, Rachel was

pregnant w ith Lauberdiere’s son, the future Commodore Lewis L. Warrington.47 As the

French army marched from their winter quarters on 1 July 1782, the comte de

Lauberdiere left behind forever the mother o f his only child, while the vicomte de

Rochambeau left the beautiful Camilla “mortifi[ed] beyond description,” apparently

afraid that her sister’s subsequent disgrace might undermine her own social standing.48

Upon returning to the W indward Islands in 1782, Admiral de Grasse’s fleet

suffered a sound defeat in the Battle of the Saintes on 12 April by British naval forces of f

o f Saint-Domingue and the admiral himself was taken prisoner. New s of this tragedy

coupled with the sicknesses incurred in the inhospitable coastal Virginia climate

prompted General Rochambeau by July 1782 to move h is army to rejoin Wash ing ton in

New York, in hopes o f possibly preventing Clinton from dispatching further

reinforcements south against the French colonies.

46 Mildred Smith to Betsey Ambler, 1780, Ibid.

47 Though Lauberdiere actually was the father of the future naval hero, fo r many

years after 1782, Virginians incorrectly attributed the paternity o f Commodore

Warrington to Donatien Rochambeau. This assumption was reinforced in 1850 in

Reverend John B. Dabney’s Sketches a nd Reminiscences o f the Dabney a nd Morris

families . In 1996 however, Doctor Robert Selig and Joanne Young of Norfolk, Virginia,

finally corrected the historical record. A contemporary letter from Rachel W arrington’s

confidante Lucy Randolph to her lover Colonel Christian Forbach, comte de Deux-Ponts,states explicitly that on 3 November 1782, Rachel W arrington gave birth to “a son, whom

she named Louis after his father Monsieur Lobidier [sic].” Robert A. Selig,

“Lauberdiere’s Journal,” Ibid., 36.

48 M ildred Sm ith to Betsey Ambler, 1782, Ibid., 39.

95




By spring of 1782, General Rochambeau had also begun to question his

government’s resolve on continuing their war with England in the American colonies.

Confirming the general’s suppositions, minister of war Segur notified Rochambeau in

April that he intended to close the North American theater o f operations, but gave few

other instructions. In the event of a British evacuation o f Charleston or New York, Segur

directed, Rochambeau’s forces would proceed to the Antilles. Without money, transport

or specific orders, the soldiers could only wait. With Clinton still in New York, however,

the allied armies could not afford to wait in Virginia. Thus, by late September,

Rochambeau and Washington had returned to their earlier positions along the Hudson

River and were considering another attempt to take New York. This campaign never

materialized, but Segur’s plan did.

By September, the remaining ships o f de Grasse’s battered fleet, now under the

command o f Louis Philippe de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, lay at anchor in Boston to

take the French troops to the West Indies.49 Following a leisurely march to

Massachusetts, the majority of the officers and men of the Expedit ion Particuliere sailed

southward on 2 December 1782. Honorably relieved o f his command, the comte de

Rochambeau and his son rode to the headquarters o f the American army at Newburgh,

New York, to bid farewell to Washington and his off icers.50 Their goodbyes said, the

49 Kennett, French Forces, 160-162.

50 A button, found recently while digging a post hole at Wash ington’s Newburgh

headquarters, is that of an officer o f the Bourbonnois regiment. Scholars can only guess

as to its former owner, but the possibilities are reasonably limited to two, M ajor General

Viomenil or Colonel Rochambeau.

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Rochambeaus took leave o f this company and headed to Annapolis, Maryland to meet the

ship that would return them to France.

The Rochambeau’s departure on 5 January 1783 did not escape the attention of

the British. No sooner had the Emeraude slipped past three British warships that lay in

wait in Chesapeake Bay than she encountered another just o ff of the Chesapeake Capes.

Narrowly escaping a full broadside, the Emeraude raced eastward for thirty hours with

the British ship in close pursuit. The crew evaded capture, but on 16 February, nature

became the Rochambeau’s enemy, for in the midst o f a violent hurr icane, lightning

blasted one the ship’s topm asts to pieces. On 20 February 1783, the crippled Emeraude

finally slipped into the harbor at Nantes. For the comte and vicomte de Rochambeau, the

expedition to America was over.51

For his first taste o f combat, Donatien Rochambeau was fortunate to learn the art

of war from a succession of masters, especially his own father and George W ashington.

O f course, the siege of Yorktown was a model o f the classic style o f warfare in

contemporary Europe, and a perfect opportunity for the younger Rochambeau to actually

participate in that which he had only studied at Verberie and Strasbourg. However, the

war in America certainly offered the colonel insight into some more unconventional

tactical methods. American patriots were notorious for their departures from the

European battlefield traditions. As such, acquiring a practical knowledge o f ambushes,

snipers, defenses in depth and cavalry raids only added to Donatien Rochambeau’s

already extensive military repertoire. Such information was indeed useful. Ten years

51 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, The War o f Independence, 100.

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Rochambeau the Conqueror

Paris

W . F

Washington, D.C.

and the General's

“Grandson”

Louis L. Warrington

Hero of the War of 1812

The P aris Journals

Figure 17. Rochambeau the Conqueror

98




later, Lieutenant General Donatien Rochambeau, as Governor General of the W indward

Isles, would adapt many o f these same unconventional tactical principles to the

unorthodox warfare that he waged against those islands’ warring factions.

99




Chapter V

From Revolution to Revolution:

1783 - 1792

Following his return to France, Donatien Rochambeau’s star began to rise at

Versailles. On 11 November 1782, Louis XVI approved the vicom te’s promotion to

Mestre de Camp (equivalent to a Brigadier General), giving the twenty-seven-year-old

command o f the Saintonge regiment.1 Indeed, when the king approved the list of graces,

Donatien Rochambeau received nearly everything for which his father had asked. In an

official notice written 13 June 1783, Marshal de Segur notified the younger Rochambeau

that the king had awarded him a pension o f 4,000 livres and would present him the O rder

of Saint-Louis the following August.2

Donatien Rocham beau remained in command o f the Saintonge regiment for less

than eight months. As both he and his father expected, the promotion of Jean Antoine

1 The rank of Mestre de Camp has no modem army equivalent, but similar to the

naval rank o f Commodore, it rested between the field and flag grades; in this case

between colonel and brigadier general.

2 Marshal de Segur to Colonel Donatien Rochambeau, 13 June 1783. Service

historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, items 31, 32; Graces list,

13 June 1783. Service historique, Travail du Roi, annee 1783, Juni-Juli, Carton YA

514/380. Donatien Rochambeau immediately allocated the pension to his wife Frantjoise.

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Germaine, marquis de Rostaing, to Marechal de Camp, left the command o f the Royal

Auvergne Infantry (Jean-Baptiste Rocham beau’s former command) available, prompting

the younger Rochambeau to seek the vacancy. He unofficially took command o f the

regiment in early June and on 1 July 1783, the move became permanent.3 Rochambeau

took back the 15,000 livres that he had paid for the Saintonge and paid the requisite

10,000 livres for command o f the Royal Auvergne, while Claude Victor, vicomte de

Broglie, assumed command o f the Saintonge regiment which had established its new

garrison at Sarrelouis.4 Rochambeau would remain in command o f the Royal Auvergne

until his promotion to Marechal de Camp on 30 June 1791. In the interim, however, he

becam e involved in national politics along with his father beginning in 1787. In that year,

the elder Rochambeau became a deputy of the nobility of the Provincial Assembly o f

Orleans and joined the Monsieur’s Bureau of the Assembly of Notables.

Unfortunately, records from the period betw een 1784 and 1792, one o f the most

critical in French history, have left few c lues as to Donatien Rochambeau’s activities.

Because he remained close at his father’s side for most o f these years, integrating the few

available details concerning the vicomte into accounts o f his father’s activities have

proven useful. By early 1784, Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, with his

new headquarters in Calais, had risen to the position of Commander in Chief in France’s

3 Donatien Rochambeau was still technically in command o f the Saintonge

regiment, but on 13 June, sent a declaration to the war department confirming his receiptof the 4,000 livres pension and referring to him self as comm ander o f the Royal Auvergne

Infantry.

4 Regimental sale and transfer list, 13 June 1783. Service historique, Travail du

Roi, annee 1783, Juni-Juli, Carton YA514/380.

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Northern D istrict, an area which encompassed not only Picardy, but also Flanders and

Artois. Since he was not to assume his command at Calais until the following year,

immediately after his return to France, the general occupied his time at his city apartments

on Paris’ Rue du Cherche-Midi. During this interlude, the former commander o f French

troops in America, working c losely with his former ally George Washington, founded the

French Society of the Cincinnati.

Originally conceived in America as a charitable fraternity o f Washington’s

officers, the fundamental charge o f the society was the support of the widows and

children of their fallen brother officers. As later happened in America, the French society

soon adopted a more political bent. For Rochambeau’s former officers in the American

colonies, their participation in the colonies’ fight for independence was more than simply

a mark o f honor or a means toward promotion. In the increasingly turbulent years leading

to revolution in France, wearing the coveted Order o f the Cincinnati became a symbol o f

distinction as one who had fought for the ideals of liberty and republicanism.5 Though

the wearing o f foreign orders had long been illegal in France, Louis XVI granted an

enthusiastic exception for the officers of the Cincinnati. Somehow Donatien

Rocham beau’s name had not made W ashington’s original list, and after receiving the

5 See Samuel F. Scott, “The Army of the Comte de Rochambeau Between the

American and French Revolutions,” Proceedings o f the Annual Meeting o f the Western

Society fo r French History, XV (1988), 150-153; Gilbert Bodinier, “Les Officiers du

corps expeditionnaire de Rochambeau e t la Revolution fran9aise,” Revue historique des Armees, III, no. 4 (1976): 143. Despite their service in the American Revolution, the

majority of Rochambeau’s former officers in America either were not able, or chose not

to advertise their experience to further the cause of liberty in the early days of the French

Revolution. Eight of Rochambeau’s former officers did, however, serve in the National

Assembly.

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decorations from Philadelphia, his father quickly set about to correct the oversight. By

1792, however, French members no longer w ore the golden eagles o f the Cincinnati.

Robespierre and hosts o f other radicals saw the organization as a threatening body of

aristocrats and anyone known to possess the order was in danger. Many o f the French

society’s charter members, including its president, Admiral d ’Estaing, met their end on

the guillotine.6

At Calais, General Rochambeau spent the next four years dutifully training his

troops.7 The command, however, was not without some minor problems. Upon the

general’s arrival at Calais, the city’s mayor informed him that because o f a shortage of

funds, he was unable to properly furnish the general’s quarters. The two men discussed

the matter for a year, after which General Rochambeau, obviously tired o f quibbling with

the bureaucrat, took up residence with his son and daughter-in-law.8 The year 1784 also

witnessed the birth o f the first of Donatien Rochambeau’s children, Augustine E leonore ,

who was bom on 27 November. A second daughter, Constance-Therese, was bom the

6 Whitridge, Rochambeau, 258-260. The French Order of the Cincinnati was

officially reconstituted only in 1923.

7 Ibid. Since Calais was a continental terminus for diplomats and foreign

dignitaries, General Rochambeau, no longer impaired by his governm ent’s lack of

financial support, paid special attention to organizing grand military reviews and fe tes

impressing all who visited with the excellent equipment, precision and professionaldiscipline o f his troops. Certainly, his son ’s Auvergne Infantry were featured

participants.

8 Ibid. At the time, Donatien Rochambeau’s Auvergne infantry regiment made up

a part o f the Calais garrison.

103




following year, and Frant^oise gave birth to the couple ’s only son, Philippe, in 1788.9

Despite the rigors o f regimental comm and and h is considerable family responsibilities,

national crisis soon called Donatien Rochambeau and his father to an additional duty of

political service.

The note of Royal Council of 5 July 1788 invited all instructed persons to furnish

documents and to draft reports on the conditions o f the last convocation o f the Estates

General in 1614. Holding the principle seat on the Vendome bench as Grand Ba illi

d ’Epee (Grand Bailiff for the local nobility), Donatien Rochambeau returned to his

ancestral home to comply with the council’s directive. Based on what he considered

common sense and his experiences in America, his father, as a full member o f the second

Assembly o f Notables, warned against France making the same mistake as the English

had in America. The king, the elder Rochambeau admonished, had to recognize the right

of the people to decide how they should be taxed. Donatien Rochambeau may have

shared the same opinion, but no concrete evidence exists.

Rochambeau’s fellow officers, those who would oversee the writing o f the cahiers

(lists o f grievances and policy recommendations to be sent to the king) and who would

9 Like his predecessors, Auguste-Philippe-Donatien de Vimeur would later

become a soldier, ultimately rising to the grade of colonel o f the cavalry under Marshal

Joachim Murat. Both Augustine Eleonore and Constance-Therese have almost drifted

completely into obscurity. Obviously inheriting the Rochambeau line’s notable

longevity, Constance-Therese, bom 27 Novem ber 1785, lived to be eighty-two years old,

dying in Paris on 1 December 1866. She survived her husband, Lieutenant GeneralAlexandre-Louis Valon du Boucheron, comte d’Ambrugeac. Augustine Eleonore de

Rochambeau married Victor Emmanuel de Morde to become the marquise de la Gorce.

Her name finally surfaces in 1837, when she wrote to King Louis Philippe seeking to help

her sister and brother-in-law claim their father’s military pay which he had not received

while a prisoner in England from 1804 until 1811.

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ultimately select the representatives to the Estates General, totaled five. The Grand

Bail li ’s lieutenant for general civil and police law was Jacques-Franqois de Tremault, an

attorney and member of the Parlement de Paris. Four other officers, a lieutenant for

general criminal law, a special lieutenant for civil and criminal law, a King’s Prosecutor,

and a chief secretary comprised the remainder o f the bench.10 The preliminary meeting of

the assembly o f the bailliage took place on 9 M arch 1789 in the Sainte-Trinite church in

Vendome. The assembly noted the presence o f 196 deputies, representing ninety-one

towns, parishes or communities. Only two parishes failed to send a representative

resulting in their default from the congregation (they sent representatives instead to

Tours). As per regulation, the members swore an oath to the assembly and the first

meeting proceeded.

The first issue before the assembly concerned which bailliage would constitute

the secondaries. The group handled this first issue fairly easily; the officers working in

conjunction with the Keeper o f the Seals decided that the bailliage of Mondoubleau and

Saint-Calais would serve as secondary representatives.11 The next problem was not so

easy. Difficulties arose between the three lieutenants over who was morally eligible to

preside over the Third Estate. As members o f the bourgeoisie, the lieutenant for general

10 Armand Brette, Recueil de Documents Relatifs a la Convovation des Etats

Generaux de 1789 (Paris, 1895-1915), III, 458. These are respectively: Jean-Franqois

Leger de Chauvigny; Jacques Lemoine de la Godeliniere (another lawyer en parlement)-, Jacques-Joseph-Andre Godineau de l’Epau (King’s Prosecutor in Vendome); and

Leonard Breton.

11 Ibid.

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criminal law and the special lieutenant for civil and criminal law rivaled to replace

Tremault, saying that because the latter belonged to the nobility, he should be ineligible.

None o f the men present could come to a conclusion and the matter w as again referred to

the Keeper of the Seals. Another group, Les Peres de VOratoire, representing the royal

military school at Vendome felt that certain articles o f a 12 February Estates General

regulation from Versailles slighted them as an organization useful to all three state orders.

Throughout these deliberations, the threat of violence grew in the Vendome area. Fearing

a plot by disenfranchised citizens o f the bailliage, the King’s Prosecutor wrote to the

Keeper o f the Seals on 10 March that “popular em otion threatens to put fire to four

sections o f the city” and that he had made the city’s police ask the commander o f the

army regiment at Blois to send 150 soldiers to keep order in Vendome.12

On 16 March, Grand B ailli Rochambeau convened another meeting o f the three

orders, who again met at the Sainte-Trinite church. At two o’clock the clergy were

admitted, followed by the nobles and finally the representatives o f the Third Estate .13

12 Ibid., 460.

13 Ibid., 461. The representatives o f the clergy consisted of 106 cures, one abbe,

twenty-eight beneficiaries, fourteen monastic representatives and four sisters o f the local

convent. Sixteen cures, one Commander of the Knights o f Malta, twenty-two sermoners,

one nun and twenty-two beneficiaries defaulted by failing to appear. Members o f the

nobility consisted of the following: twenty-one nobles without fiefs, seventy-six with fiefs

(o f this last group, the due d ’Orleans, by prerogative o f his high station, allowed Donatien

Rochambeau to represent him), eleven noble ladies possessing fiefs (five daughters, three

widows and three wives), and two groups o f heirs. As women were not allowed asrepresentatives at the Estates General, these nuns and ladies o f Vendome could only

participate in the election of a male representative. Eleven nobles and three groups of

heirs defaulted. Not surprisingly, none o f the representatives of the Third Estate

defaulted and consisted of ten deputies of the cities of Vendome and Montoire, fifty more

deputies from Vendome’s outlying areas, and twelve deputies each from the secondary

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After a two-day meeting, Rochambeau and his fellow officers decided upon the

separation of the estates and adjourned until the next week. In the final meeting o f the

full assembly on 24 March 1789, the representatives o f the three estates submitted their

finished cahiers and proces-verbaux. O f the cahiers presented that day, certainly that of

the Third Estate was the most remarkable. Members o f this order read aloud a report

addressed by the Societe des Amis des Noirs (Society of the Friends of the Blacks) o f

Vendome, w hich called for the revision of race laws in the French colonies. Receiving

the report favorably, the members placed an article in favor o f the blacks in the main

cahier that would come before the assembled Estates General. Donatien Rochambeau

could not have know n it at the time, but three years later he would find himself a deeply-

involved participant in the war for slave liberation in the French colonies.14

The assembly then agreed upon their representatives to the Estates General. Jean-

Pierre Bodineau, a cure from V endome’s Sainte-Bienheure church stood for the clergy

while Gilbert, comte de Sarrazin, a former captain o f dragoons, would speak for the

nobility. For the Third Estate went Louis-Fran?ois Pothee, an alderman o f the city of

Montoire, and Jean-Baptiste Creniere, an iron merchant in Vendome. Closing the

meeting, the representatives, w ith hands folded in prayer, swore an oath “on their honor

and conscience....to vigorously demand a free constitution and to courageously suppress

baillages o f Montdoubleau and Saint-Calais.

14 By July 1790, the Vendome contingent of Le s Am is des Noirs, would count

among their ranks the new Constitutional bishop of Loire-et-Cher (diocese o f Blois), none

other than the former Abbe Elenri Gregoire. Ultimately, Gregoire would be best

remembered as one of, i f not the, principle leaders o f the French Revolutionary

abolitionist movement.

107




abuses.”15

While his son managed political events in Vendome, General Rochambeau did the

same in Calais, reporting that all o f their meetings had gone “marvelously .” 16 The

general’s pleasant tenure in Calais came to a close, however, when the war ministry

assigned him as commander in the Alsace region. By the summer o f 1789, Alsace, like

Paris, had become a hotbed of rebellion. The elder Rochambeau reported to Versailles on

12 July 1789 for further instructions from the new minister of war, Victor Frangois, due

de Broglie, who simply ordered the general to assume his post as quickly as possible and

to use his best judgement. Rochambeau returned to a riotous Paris only to have to flee on

horseback from his apartments two days later .17

With his work in Vendome completed, the younger Rochambeau presumably

returned to his regiment where, like his father (now in Strasbourg), he involved himself

with trying to restore order to his unit. Quelling food riots involved many regular troops.

This, combined with the efforts o f “Federations” o f National Guard who sought to

undermine the traditional authority o f the noble officer corps, caused the maintenance of

discipline in army units to become an almost insurmountable problem. Regular troops

fell under the direct influence o f revolutionary clubs, and so ldiers’ deputations often took

internal military affairs into their own hands. By January 1790, with the royal family

15 Brette, Recueil de D ocuments Relatifs a la Convocation des Etats Generaux de

1789,461.

16 General Rochambeau to Biron, 19 March 1789. Service historique,

Correspondance: Armee du Nord, Carton DXXV/50/477.

17 Whitridge, Rochambeau, 266.

108




safely ensconced in the Tuileries, some semblance o f stability appeared to reign in Paris,

yet the situation in the kingdom’s army units still remained tense. By August 1790

soldiers’ revolts in the garrisons o f Nancy and Metz had brought vividly the military

discipline issue to the attention o f the National Assembly. At the same time that France

was coming to face external enemies from all sides, her professional army was falling

apart. In Paris, members o f the Jacobin Club made matters even worse by denouncing

what it considered the ruthless suppression of the army mutineers and by justifying the

soldiers’ revolts in Nancy and Metz.

For the undyingly loyal General Rochambeau, disappointment with the king and

his officials began to grow. The crown had been unable to support the general as he

attempted to subdue several riots in Alsace, and both the king and a succession o f war

ministers had failed to protect officers in the field from the abuses o f the government’s

more radical factions. Sick both physically and in spirit, the elderly commander left

Strasbourg in early spring 1790 for a six month medical leave o f absence to Vendome.

By 4 September, however, a desperate Louis XVI summoned Rochambeau to Saint-

Cloud. After initially receiving the general cooly, the king tried to persuade Rocham beau

to come back to active service as comm ander o f a proposed Army o f the North to be

constituted that December .18 The general, despite his deep discontent, accepted.

Donatien Rochambeau may have shared his father’s increasing disaffection with

the government, bu t rather than remain unswerving in his allegiance to the crown, he

18 Ibid., 274-275. Ramsay Weston Phipps, The Armies o f the First French

Republic (Oxford, 1926), I, 62.

109




began to take an active role in radical revolutionary politics. By 3 February 1791, the

vicomte had made his first significant appearance in P aris’ political daily Le Moniteur

Universelle. According to the paper’s account, on 31 January a Monsieur Sainte-Luce

challenged the younger Rochambeau to a duel to be held the following day in Paris ’ Bois

de Boulogne. Upon the complaint of one of its members (perhaps the vicomte himself),

the general assembly o f Paris’ Croix-Rouge (later Bonnet-Rouge) section, moved quickly

to place the vicomte under special personal protection. Rochambeau’s bodyguard

consisted of no less than the commander o f the Paris National Guard’s Ba ttalion des

Enfans [sic] and several volunteers, who, obviously seeking to safeguard the life of a man

who they considered a powerful fellow radical, vowed to station themselves a t his side

until the matter came to resolution. The proposed encounter never took place. The

incident would certainly have passed unnoticed excep t that on 4 February the Croix-

Rouge assembly published an appeal against the disgrace o f public dueling. The letter

was distributed not only to the National Assembly, but also to forty-seven of the city’s

other sections, the mayor, the city’s municipal corps, the General Council of the

Commune o f Paris, the editors o f the public papers, and to “M. Rochambeau fi ls of the

Club des Am is de la Constitution.” 19 Donatien Rochambeau had joined the Left.

While his son involved himself with the activity o f the Jacobins, General

19 “Deliberations de 1’Assemblee generale de la Section de la Croix-Rouge, 4February 1791.” France, Archives de la Ville de Paris, Prefecture Du Departement de la

Seine, Ville de Paris (Inventaire Sommaire des Archives de la Seine), Partie Municipale

Periode Revolutionnaire 1789-AN VII, Fonds de l ’administration generale de la

Commune et de ses subdivisions territoriales (Serie D), Carton VD* 799; Le Moniteur

Universelle, no. 34 (3 February 1791): 1.

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Rochambeau, turning more to his military duties, continued to try to distance himse lf

from Paris politics. Sagely refusing the king’s offer o f Minister of War, the general

instead buried himself in the business of preparing his new army to defend France’s

northern frontier .20 Donatien Rochambeau received a promotion to Marechal de Camp

on 30 June 1791 and imm ediately moved to fill the position as second-in-command o f his

father’s army’s 1st D ivision at Maubeuge under General Armand-Louis Biron, the former

due de Lauzun. While the older Rochambeau sought desperately to maintain military

discipline (even if it meant running afoul o f the Jacobins), the younger struggled to prove

his loyalty to his new political brethren .21

By fall 1791, even the British government knew of the vicomte de Rocham beau’s

Jacobin activities, and in the view of James Gower, the British ambassador to France,

Donatien Rochambeau posed even more o f a threat to British interests than his father. As

early as November, the ambassador, “judging from the character and the sentiments of

Mr. de Rochambeau the younger, who is of the society of the Jacobins,” suggested the

possibil ity that Donatien Rochambeau might actually lead a diversionary invasion against

20 Whitridge, Rochambeau, 276-277.

21 Ibid., 278. General Rochambeau even went so far as to confine to barracks one

of the battalions o f the Beauce regiment in Arras for wearing cocardes tricolores (tricolor

cockades) on their uniforms - against the protests o f Maximilien Robespierre who wasthe deputy of that city. Robespierre appears to have never forgiven the slight. After

attaining ultimate pow er several years later, he o rdered the elderly general arrested under

the Law of Suspects, and arranged that he was sentenced to death. Rochambeau missed

the guillotine by one day, Robesp ierre’s own execution the previous morning effectively

ending the Terror.

I l l




British-held Holland in an effort to “compose matters at home .”22 In early December,

Gower detailed to the Foreign Office a speech at the Jacobin Club in Maubeuge by the

younger Rochambeau to a group o f disaffected Austrian Netherlanders know n as the

Patriots Brabangons. In the most inflammatory part of his address, Rochambeau

provocatively procla imed “Patriots, you knew how to value liberty, you desired it; but

unfortunate events have prevented you from obtaining it. The Friends of the French

Constitution comprehend the w hole world in their system o f philanthropy, and on that

account they hope that when you return to your own country you will sow the seeds o f our

benevolent intentions so they may produce an abundant harvest.”23 Rochambeau’s

exhortations could be understood by no one as anything short o f an invitation to French-

supported rebellion. The peeved Austrians, whose control over the Brabant area was

already tenuous, complained directly to the French court, who promptly assigned the

Ministry of the Interior to conduct an official investigation. It was Earl G ower’s sincere

be lief that the French court, with Donatien Rochambeau’s help, was at work on some sort

o f menacing international scheme. He could not have been more correct.

The new French minister of war, Louis-Marie-Jacques-Amalric, comte de

Narbonne-Lara, was a devoted Royalist who believed that the monarchy would fall if

something was not done to vindicate the royal family’s aborted flight to Varennes. As

such, he devised a plan that he thought would unite the French people and bring the

22 James Gower to William Grenville, British Foreign Secretary, 18 Novem ber

1791. The Despatches o f Ea rl Gower, English A mbassador at Paris fr om June 1790 to

Augus t 1792 (Cambridge, 1885), 135.

23 Ibid., 5 December 1791. 140.

112




Revolution to a quick end - declare war. Narbonne’s plan was relatively simple. The

hotbed o f French emigres at Trier offered a ready pretext for an invasion into the

electorate and a quick, victorious military action would allow the army to impose its will

on the National Assembly. In case the war expanded to include Austria and Prussia,

Narbonne envisioned a truce which would result in a congress o f rulers to res tore Louis

XVI to his position o f authority. The British may not have been privy to the political

details, but they certainly could not miss the obvious preparations for war. On 16

December 1791, the British ambassador reported that Narbonne had undertaken to move

150,000 men to the frontiers in less than a month, explaining to his superiors that the

French had formed three major armies under the commands o f General Jean-Baptiste

Rochambeau ( Nord ), General Lafayette {Centre), and General Nicolas von Luckner

( Rhin).24

When news reached him o f the impending operation, Donatien Rochambeau set

about organizing a new club at Maubeuge, La Societe des Amis de la L iberte

Brabangonne. He further endeared himself to the Jacobins in Paris by arresting on New

Year’s Day 1792, Lieutenant-Colonel Quigny, a would-be emigre who was attempting to

leave France with a convoy containing 25,000 livres.25 The senior Rochambeau had also

24 Ibid., 16 December 1791. 142.

25 Ibid. 143; Donatien Rochambeau to Biron, undated. Service historique,

Correspondance: Armee duNord, Carton B1 1, folio 1 “pieces sans date”; “Seance duDimanche l er Janvier 1792,” Francois Aulard, La Societe des Jacobins; Recueil de

Documents Po ur I ’Histoire du Club des Jacobins de Paris (Paris, 1892), III, 305. In the

same report to the Paris Jacobin Club, the younger Rochambeau swore a renewed oath o f

attachment to the club and promised to remain true to the constitution, defending it in

“peril o f his life and fortune.”

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tried to placate the Jacobins, but spuming politics, his involvement with the club seems to

have been little more than sending reassuring letters to Paris and the occasional address to

the National Assembly.26 The general, who with General von Luckner received his

marsha l’s baton on 28 December 1791, had greater problems.

Opposed by both von Luckner and Lafayette, the newly-promoted Marshal

Rochambeau tried to persuade the king o f the weaknesses o f the operation, pleading that

such a war would only escalate causing even greater problems at home. Louis XVI’s only

alternative was to dismiss Narbonne, whom the king suspected o f conspiring against him.

Narbonne’s successor, Pierre-Marie, marqu is de Grave, was little m ore than titular head

of the ministry. The real organizational power lay with the quintessential conspirator

General Charles-Fran^ois Dumouriez, who for political reasons favored the invasion of

Austrian territory. Generally despised as a factionalist by the three army commanders,

Dumouriez had no success trying to convince Marshal Rochambeau o f the merits of

invasion.

Despite the misgivings of its commander, Dumouriez had a willing accomplice in

the Army of the North - 1st Division Comm ander Biron. The former due de Lauzun had

convinced himself (as had his second-in-command Donatien Rochambeau) that at the

outset of a French attack, the Flemish would revolt against their Austrian masters and that

thousands o f Austrian troops would defect to the French side. Biron had little trouble

convincing Dumouriez o f this, connivingly offering his assistance even as fa r as taking

26 “Seance du Mardi 6 Septembre 1791 and du Dimanche l er Janvier 1792,”

Aulard, La Societe des Jacobins , 116, 305.

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over command o f the Army o f the North himse lf for the mission.27

Whether unwittingly or not, Donatien Rochambeau was certainly an accomplice

in the plans o f Dumouriez and Biron. When the expected deserters came through the

French lines, it would be the younger Rochambeau who would round them up and send

them “dressed, armed and mounted” to Paris, and have them address each o f the political

clubs.28 In Dumouriez’ view Donatien Rochambeau was perfectly suited for the task as

he was “one who know s the way of Paris” and someone o f whom the public papers o f the

capital city were “ringing festively.”29 Moreover, Biron, who described young

Rochambeau as “full o f zeal and activity,” had secretly loaned his second in command

money to accomplish certain activities toward this en d.30

While Dumouriez and Biron plotted during the first months of 1792, France and

her enemies maintained a tense status quo, but with the death of Austria’s Leopold II in

March 1792, de Grave (at Dumouriez’ urging) revived Narbonne’s plan for a preemptive

strike against the Austrians and on 20 April pushed it through an eager National

27 Ibid. 284-285; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires, I, 430; Biron

to Rochambeau (fils), 20 April 1792. Service historique, Correspondance: Armee du

Nord et du Rhin, Correspondance Intime et Politique du Gen’l Biron - 9 Decembre 1791

au 10 Decembre 1792, Carton B 'l0 4 , items 156-58; Phipps, The Armies o f the First

French Republic, 76-77.

28 Dumouriez to Biron, 13 April 1792, Correspondance Diplomatique de Talleyrand (Paris, 1889), 203.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 207.

115




Assembly .31 The strategy called for two simultaneous main attacks, the first under

Lafayette who was to move his Army of the Center from Namur and then to Brussels or

Liege. After augmenting his own division with units taken from throughout Marshal

Rocham beau’s command, Biron was to lead the second major movement to occupy

Mons. Marechal de Camp Donatien Rochambeau would command Biron’s rear-guard.

On 20 April, with forty pieces o f heavy cannon, ten battalions o f infantry and an equal

number o f cavalry squadrons all ready to cross the frontier, Biron wrote to the younger

Rochambeau that he felt confident that they would seize Mons within ten days .32

Unknown to the willing participants, however, the minister’s propaganda had not

demoralized either the Flemish or the Austrians into dropping their weapons and coming

over to the side of the French “liberators.” As Marshal Rochambeau had foreseen,

Dumouriez’ bold plan, while basic enough in its concept, turned into a disaster.

At the outset of the operation, all seemed well. A small band o f uhlans abandoned

their positions at the frontier town of Quievrechain, giving Biron the opportunity to plant

a liberty tree inside enemy territory while his troops got drunk, danced, and sang “(7a Ira”

into the night. The next morning, however, the general was less fortunate. As his army

neared Mons, Biron noticed that General Jean-Pierre Beaulieu, whose garrison Biron had

31 Whitridge, Rochambeau, 283. In an address to the National Assembly just

days before, Marshal Rochambeau pleaded for the maintenance of peace. He returned to

his headquarters at Valenciennes to find that his request had been overruled.

32 Biron to Rochambeau (fils), 20 April 1792. Service historique,

Correspondance: Armee du Nord et du Rhin, Correspondance Intime et Politique du

Gen’l Biron - 9 Decembre 1791 au 10 Decembre 1792, Carton B1104, item 156; Gow er to

Grenville, 3 May 1792. Despatches, 178.

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expected to mutiny, occupied the high ground in front o f him in preparation for the attack.

Further, news soon reached Biron of the fate o f General Theobald Dillon. Dillon had

commanded a supporting effort that had moved toward Tournai with orders only to test

the enemy’s resistance. Nevertheless, the general ventured so close to the enemy that the

Austrian troops attacked his force as the horses of his cavalry and staff were grazing.

Believing that their commander had betrayed them, Dillon’s troops fled in panic, hacking

their commander to pieces in their frenzied retreat.33 Donatien Rochambeau volunteered

to assist in rallying Dillon’s troops at Tournai but, upon his arrival, was unable to restore

order .34

Realizing that his force was not strong enough to dislodge Beaulieu’s army and

fearing a fate similar to his fellow general officer, Biron decided to rest his troops for

several hours prior to ordering a withdrawal. By five o ’clock in the afternoon, the

general’s troops only had engaged the enemy in a minor skirmish, but by ten o ’clock in

the evening the regiment o f the Q ueen’s Dragoons began to flee the battlefield, apparently

thinking that they too had been betrayed. The general was able to round up the majority

of this regiment, but when he returned to his own army he found their confusion had

devolved into pandemonium. Biron immediately ordered a full retreat and his army fell

back tow ard their encampment o f the previous evening. Once again at Quievrechain, the

Uhlans, that Biron’s force had displaced the day before, attacked. The effect was a

33 Gower to Grenville, 3 May 1792. Despatches, 180.

34 Donatien Rochambeau to the Paris Jacobin Club, “Seance du Mercredi 30 May

1792,” Aulard, La Societe des Jacobins, III, 630.

117




complete rout. The commanding officers, including Donatien Rochambeau tried their

best to maintain order, but any discipline was irretrievable. Biron narrowly escaped with

his life while Marechal de Camp F ra n c is Louis Teissedre de Fleury, the hero o f Stony

Point and now Donatien Rocham beau’s second-in-command, was severely wounded by

shots fired at him by his own troops. Biron’s army fell back to Valenciennes abandoning

artillery, baggage, tents and provisions .35

The effect of the army’s setbacks led to shock and disbelief in Paris. While a

stunned National Assembly contemplated a possible Austrian counterattack, the Jacobins

wildly denounced as traitors the bulk o f the involved senior officers and officials.

Dumouriez quickly attempted to fix blame for the defeat upon anyone else bu t himself,

even accusing Marshal Rochambeau o f inactivity due to ill-health, and o f colluding with

the enemy through an organization known only as “the Austrian Committee.” Marshal

Rochambeau maintained that he had repeatedly warned the Assembly, the king and the

war minister against the invasion. “It is impudent to assert....despite evidence to the

contrary, that the generals gave up....one can only attribute the disasters to the

extravagances of the plans which have been the prelude to this campaign. I was then

well-informed, but like Cassandra, one deprived me o f all trust.”36 Demoralized, his

health broken, and unable to work any longer with a government that cavalierly would

35 Gower to Grenville, 3 May 1792. Despatches, 181; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau,

Memoires M ilitaires, I, 434.

36 Marshal Rochambeau to Claude-Emmanuel Pastoret, 11 July 1792, “Memoire

sur la guerre en reponse a M. Pastoret, President de la Commission Extraordinaire de

l’Assemblee Nationale.” Service historique, MR 1160, 1; “Seance du Lundi 1 May


118




send troops into battle who “for thirty years have not heard a ball whistle,” Marshal

Rochambeau, against the protests o f the National Assembly, tendered his resignation and

handed over his command to Marshal von Luckner .37 On 20 May 1792, the same day that

his father left the Army o f the North, Donatien Rocham beau submitted his resignation as

well.

The army’s loss of the two Rochambeaus was a shock to the nation. Von

Luckner, who lacked the experience of his predecessor, begged the senior Rochambeau to

remain at the head o f the Army o f the North; he emphasized his concern by offering to

serve as the latter’s aide-de-camp.38 Though aware that desertions of officers in the field

were further crippling the army’s ability to function, M arshal Rochambeau, because o f his

failed health, held to his decision to leave. By 25 May, he had returned to Paris and

began to defend his decision and publicly condemn the behavior of those off icers who

had needlessly resigned. The marshal included his own son in this rebuke, and made it

well-known that he wished for Donatien to return to his post.39

Eager to take revenge on those whom they felt had betrayed them, the Jacobins

made plans to establish military tribunals to try all o f those involved in the fiasco,

especially Dumouriez and Marshal Rochambeau. Even the radical Donatien Rochambeau

did not escape the fallout from the Jacobins’ suspicion of his father. On 29 May 1792, he

approached the club ’s secretary to renew his ow n membership in the club and was

37 Marshal Rochambeau to Pastoret, Ibid., 2.

38 Gower to Grenville, 18 May 1792. Despatches, 184.

39 Ibid., 185.

119




immediately detained. The club’s members were hastily assembled for a special meeting

to argue over the younger Rochambeau’s culpability and motives. One member

suggested that he be brought before those assembled to explain his desire to resign.

Another, a Monsieur Desfieux, replied that he had spoken with the younger Rochambeau

and had asked him that very question. “I don’t believe that a general officer can serve in

the army after having been shot at by his soldiers” was the vicomte’s reply.40 Desfieux

then informed the membership that Rochambeau had offered to defend the pa trie as a

volunteer. The response from other members was decidedly against this proposition.

Monsieur Hion observed that Rochambeau could not possibly serve among troops in a

manner that would not be politically injurious to them. Hion continued that the Minister

o f War had decided to punish officers who had resigned and that Rochambeau should be

excluded from the organization. Several voices at once then cried out that Donatien

Rochambeau was coming to the club as a spy.

The meeting quickly took on an even more hostile tone. “At what moment,”

noted a Monsieur Baumier, “had the generals chosen to give their resignation ?” “At the

moment that hostilities had commenced. What are their intentions ? They complain of

indiscipline; I have never seen men of ability complain. Why? Because they know how

to inspire confidence.”41 Baumier closed his diatribe by demanding that all officers who

were members o f the society be excluded from membership. Other members called for

40 Hion to the Paris Jacobin Club, “Seance Extraordinaire du Mardi 29 May


41 Baumier to the Paris Jacobin Club, 29 May 1792, Aulard, Ibid., Ill, 626.

120




the recall of Rocham beau’s membership certificate and his expulsion from other Jacobin

Clubs throughout France. Adrien Legendre, noting that the discussion had gone on too

long stopped the debate saying that such discussion would not punish those culpable. If

Rochambeau had time to come to club to renew his membership, then he had time to

address the members. Baumier then recommended that Rochambeau stand before a

tribune of the assembled members the following day to explain himse lf .42

The next morning, the members o f Paris’ Jacobin Club apparently had forgotten

the demands o f the previous day. Immediately starting into business concerning the

reorganization o f the king’s military schools, one member interrupted, saying that

“Monsieur” Rochambeau was waiting to address the meeting. With permission granted,

Rochambeau began by noting that he had heard of the meeting the previous day and had

hurried to tell them his motives for his conduct. “I do not believe,” he began, “that

having lost the soldiers’ confidence, I can remain at their head.”

[H]ow was it possible for me to remain in the middle o f cowards

who had fled before the enemies o f the state and o f brigands whohad fired upon their officers? Yes, Gentlemen, in the Tournai

affair, having volunteered to rally the runaways, they called me to

arms, the same as the other officers. I believed that it was serving

the pa trie to leave a post where I could no longer be o f use .43

Blaming the ministers for the disasters at Mons and Tournai, Rochambeau then

reminded the assembly that the arms which the w ar ministry had designated for use o f the

42 Adrien Marie Legendre to the Paris Jacobin Club, 29 May 1792, Aulard, Ibid.,

Ill, 627.

43 Donatien Rochambeau to the Paris Jacobin Club, 29 May 1792, Aulard, Ibid.,

Ill, 630.

121




soldiers at the front had remained in the depots at Saint-Denis and Versailles on 20 April.

The general claimed that plans for the campaign had even been disclosed to the enemy in

the public papers. “I believe that it is urgent, in the circum stances.. . . to send to the

soldiers an address inviting their subordination to and a confidence in their officers.”44

The assembled members o f the club were not mollified by Rochambeau’s

explanation for his resignation, and were even less impressed by his appeal to the

members to address the soldiers. Edmond Crance-Dubois responded to the general’s plea

saying that no officer’s resignation merited public confidence and that the French were

always disciplined for those who knew what they were doing. “I don’t know the minister

of war” he said, “but I know a pa trio t.. . .”45 Amid rounds o f applause, the inquiry by the

club members seemed to grow increasingly ominous. However, one of the members,

Jean-Louis Carra, reminded the group that Rochambeau’s patriotism had been previously

well attested to by his soldiers. Remarking that he was simply angered by Rochambeau’s

resignation, he suggested that the best way to repair the damage was for the general to

return immediately to his post. Maximilien Robespierre, who had been listening quietly

to the deliberations, now entered the discussion. Rochambeau’s personal beliefs, he

began, were not relevant to the discussion. Despite the confusion which reigned at the

moment, Robespierre continued, no soldier was insubordinate who was willing to spill

his blood for the patrie. The worst thing that the nation had to fear was the despotism of

44 Ibid., Ill, 631.

45 Edmond Dubois-Crance to the Paris Jacobin Club, 29 May 1792, Aulard, Ibid.,

Ill, 631.

122




its generals.46

As the discussion continued, its focus changed suddenly. Soon the question

became not whether Rochambeau should rem ain in the army, but whether he should be

allowed to remain in the Society. According to F ra n c is Doppet, the general obviously

had lost the confidence of his soldiers by addressing them as his “soldiers,” not, as

Lafayette had done, as his “friends” or “companions” or “brothers-in-arms.”47 The

members then called upon Rocham beau to remind them once more o f his complaints.

The general recounted that he had lost public confidence and that he had been fired upon

by his troops , but this time, realizing the unpopularity of his indictment o f his soldiers’

determination, he flatly denied that he had spoken of their lack of discipline. A storm o f

protest ensued, with many members shouting in unison that he indeed had used the very

words “indiscipline” and “insubordination.” Soon the members were shouting to put

Rocham beau’s dismissal from the club to a voice vote. Seeing that further defense was

useless, Rochambeau indignantly stormed out o f the hall while the members continued to

hurl abuses at him. After Monsieur Chambertois had wryly noted that by his leaving, the

general had condemned himself, the members called the question of Rochambeau’s

membership in the Jacobin Club to a vote. The response was tumultuous and within

minutes the Society pronounced that Donatien Rochambeau, former long-time member of

46 Maximilien Robespierre to the Paris Jacobin Club, 29 May 1792, Aulard, Ibid.,

Ill, 632.

47 F ra n c is Doppet to the Paris Jacobin Club, 29 May 1792, Aulard, Ibid., Ill,

634.

123




the Jacobins, was struck from their rolls.48

For over a year Rochambeau had sought to prove him self worthy o f the Jacobins.

By the end o f May 1792, however, both his patriotism and his military ability had been

called into question by those whom he had tried to serve. Rocham beau’s political

ostracism was not a result o f any dereliction o f duty or a lack o f devotion to the nation,

but rather his inability to adapt to societal changes as they affected members of the

military. As an officer of the ancien regime, Rocham beau had been schooled in an

environment o f unquestioning and rigid discipline. Strict order had been his father’s

watchword and the younger Rochambeau had known nothing else. While the general

may have suffered a blow to his political career, a new phase o f his military profession

was just beginning. Donatien Rochambeau resigned from the army on 5 May 1792, but

in late June he received an offer from the Legislative Assembly to become Governor

General of France’s wealthiest Caribbean colony, Saint-Domingue. Rocham beau’s

refusal of this appointment certainly should not have surprised the members o f the

Assembly. Indeed, Saint-Domingue as the legislators in Paris knew it had ceased to exist,

consumed by a civil, race war that had raged for nearly a year. Instead, Rochambeau

accepted the Assembly’s subsequent offer to become Governor General o f Martinique

and the Windward Isles, and to bring those breakaway colonies back under metropolitan

control.49

48 Ibid., Ill, 634-635.

49 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires, I, 435.

124




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Chapter VI

The Colonies Ignited:

1789 - 1792

Between 1789 and 1792, events in Paris exported a particular chaos to the nation’s

Caribbean colonies, an area that like Continental France, long had balanced precariously

between order and upheaval. Frenchmen in the islands expressed social, political and

economic grievances similar to their fellows on the Continent, but comparable issues that

colonials represented to their home government in 1789 were complicated by both a

unique economic h istory and myriad questions regarding the colonies’ varied racial

composition. To an uninstructed observer in metropolitan France, the reasons for revolt

in the colonies of Saint-Domingue, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Sainte-Lucie and Tobago

might have appeared (with the exception o f slavery) to be basically the same as those at

home. The truth, however, was far removed from any common popular perception.

Dissimilar economic and racial concerns, coupled with the Caribbean’s great

distance from metropolitan France, had bred a tradition of semi-autonomy in the colonies

that successive governments in Paris never managed to dominate completely.

Furthermore, distinctive circumstances on the various islands had, over time, resulted in

local colonial governments cham pioning issues unique to their island’s particular

126




situation. The potential for the colonists’ diverse complaints turning explosive, however,

was mitigated by the colonies’ vulnerability to foreign invasion, their moral a ttachment to

France, and a characteristic inertia comm on to the tropics .1 As the result, during the

French Revolution the number and severity o f violent acts in the colonies varied from

island to island, but the causes underlying them in the most general terms originated from

common economic and societal roots.

For more than a century the French Caribbean colonies had borne the onus of the

mercantile system established by Louis XIV’s finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert. In

fact, C olbert’s overseas trade policies, known collectively as the Exclusif, had been

conscientiously designed to ensure that the wealth o f the colonies should benefit only the

mother country. For French possessions in the Caribbean, the consequence was that

subsequent ministerial statutes traditionally had favored those associated with the

enormously lucrative sugar trade. This arrangement allowed the colonies’ largest

plantation owners, or grands blancs, to gain the most economic benefit from France’s

exclusionary policies, while colonial merchants involved in legal, non-sugar-related trade

faced dizzying tarif f penalties that increased proportionally with the co lonies’ ever-

expanding wealth.

Unfair practices concerning tariffs (or impots), however, comprised only a portion

of the French Caribbean businessman’s complaints. Indeed, questions of actual markets

offered an even more vexing set of issues for both the colonial merchant and the home

1 David P. Geggus, Slavery War and Revolution, the British Occupation o f Saint

Domingue 1793-1798 (Oxford, 1982), 31.

127




government. For instance, to protect the nation’s wine industry, France’s government

barred completely the importation o f rum and m olasses, two items which the Caribbean

colonies produced in abundance. British possessions in the Americas, especially the

future United States, were more than willing to accept the cheap importation o f both

items from their French neighbors, who had no market for such products at home.

Further, while both the white and slave populations in the French islands quadrupled

during the early and mid-eighteenth century, the metropole proved itself increasingly

incapable o f providing her colonies with adequate quantities of high demand goods and

material. Illegal trade and profiteering were the natural outgrowths of this state o f affairs,

with nearby British territories and the United States absorbing the colon ies’ rum and

molasses, and in return supplying much-needed commodities that included iron, cattle,

flour, house frames and refuse fish necessary for feeding the French colon ies’ hundreds o f

thousands of slaves.2

On the whole, imports from outside the French trade triangle meant better, less-

expensive goods, and colonial businessmen relentlessly petitioned the home government

to relax its stance on high taxation of extra-national commerce. Such rumblings grew

even more vociferous after 1784, when the Ministry of Marine allowed the opening o f

free-trade ports in the colonies. While this policy ostensibly purported to grant to

colonial businessmen some o f the leeway that they had long demanded, the French, like

their British counterparts, had actually done very little to relieve problematic local

commercial issues. The bulk of colonial goods destined for France continued to flow

2 Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 1789-1804 (Knoxville, TN, 1973), 7.

128




from the colonies’ main ports, while the free ports became the emporia for both legal and

extra-legal goods. Following the conclusion o f the American Revolution, it was through

these free ports that the bulk of plantation supplies arrived from the young, and

increasingly insatiable United States. Not surprisingly, the French home government

demanded their share of the spiraling trade and increased the already heavy import duties

in 1787 and 1788, while strengthening an extant embargo on American flour and foreign

slave ships.3

Certainly the economic stakes in the colonies were high, but those who stood to

lose the most were the colonies’ grands blancs, who, p rior to and even during the early

years of the French Revolution, enjoyed the m ost elevated station within the islands’

“plantocracy.”4 It was this landed gentry, often aristocratic and in many cases absentees

living in France, who sought to determine much o f the political and economic direction o f

the French Caribbean colonies, especially since many of them owed tremendous sums of

borrowed capital to the maritime bourgeoisie of French port cities such as Bordeaux and

Nantes. As the result, the ministries were not solely guilty for causing colonial economic

discontent; for in the French Caribbean, protectionist trade inequities received

reinforcement at the local level by “royal advisory councils” composed primarily o f the

colonies’ propertied elite. Successions of Governor Generals, those senior officers who

represented the King in the Crown Territories, relied upon these colonial councils to act

when needed as their ch ief consultative body. Thus, the opinions of a privileged minority

3 Geggus, Slavery War and Revolution, 11.

4 Ibid., 8.

129




often had perhaps the greatest local influence on the implementation o f the home

governm ent’s various colonial policies.5

Despite his vaunted position in the islands however, the resident grand blanc had

limited political prerogative in France except for what he might achieve through his

influence over the colony’s Governor and Intendant. In reality, it was these two officials

and the itinerant royal bureaucracy who supported them, that formed the true aristocracy

in the colonies. While the king ultimately ruled his possessions, it was the M inister of

Marine in Paris who acted as de-facto colonial lawgiver and who appointed those

executives that the king would entrust with the colonies’ local administration. The top-

ranking o f these officials, the Governor G eneral, served as the Crown’s principal

representative and comm ander o f the colonial military forces.6

The Governor General’s word was law, against which there was no recourse. His

tenure, however, was usually short-lived; by the time he had acquired the requisite

experience necessary to govern his sovereign’s domain judiciously, he was replaced. His

civilian assistant, the Intendant, performed primarily civil functions such as supervising

public finance, works and trade. Often possessing an imperiousness derivative o f their

royal authority, these two men essentially monopolized political and economic

jurisdiction in the colonies, but the poten tial for an effortless ty ranny was m itigated by the

two officials’ often working at cross purposes. In the majority of cases, the resident

5 J. Saintoyant, La Colonisation Franqaise Pendant la Revolution (1789-1799)

(Paris, 1930), II, 13.

6 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 5.

130




colonial landed gentry felt only loathing toward the “arrogant, despotic pretensions” of

the European bureaucrat who arrived in the colonies bent upon making a quick fortune

and returning to France to spend his new-found wealth.7

Such remained the case until 1787, when the Crown officially allowed colonists to

organize “superior councils” which, in theory, would allow the islands’ permanent

residents a greater degree o f control over their own affairs. This new relaxation of policy

naturally was well-received, but by late 1789, the grands blancs faced a distressing

conundrum. Members o f the planter class had long sought governmental

decentralization, but they were nonetheless beholden to the Crown for their authority. As

events caused by the Revolution unfolded in Paris, the planters were quick to realize that

the winds o f liberty could blow in different directions. On the one hand, an end to royal

rule could possibly lead to more local freedom in colonies; on the other, the subsequent

loss of French protection could spell the doom of colonies’ seigneurial class. Sensing the

threat to their status if events in Paris took a wrong turn politically, the majority o f the

planters (who were becoming increasingly leery of the personalities and agendas that

were taking center stage in the new home government) would have preferred to keep their

interests separate from the tumult in Paris.8

While the Revolution posed a threat to the colonies’ privileged class, the

remainder o f whites on the islands saw opportunity. In the fevered revolutionary

7 Carolyn Fick, The Making o f Haiti; the Saint-Domingue Revolution fro m Below

(Knoxville, TN, 1990), 17; Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 5, 9.

8 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 5, 28.

131




environment, open fighting over economic issues and political representation broke out

between the grands blancs and their supporters, and the islands’ remaining white

population. These colonists, known as pe tits blancs, comprised the full spectrum o f the

white colonial middle class, and included everyone from merchants and artisans to

fishermen and soldiers.

For these citizens, the Revolution held only immense promise. Now afforded the

opportunity to raise their social and economic standing at the expense of the colonies’

other classes, the pet its blancs were initially the most volatile element in the white

colonial hierarchy, and those who later would prove the most prone to support the cause

of the Jacobins. Styling themselves “patriots,” the pet its blancs sought to acquire for

themselves in the colonies what they perceived as the gains of similarly disenfranchised

citizens in metropolitan France. While the grands blancs sought to protect their various

prerogatives, the petits blancs’ antagonism toward and opposition to both the islands’

elite and the institutions o f the ancien regime increased steadily. The islands’ poorer

whites jealously despised both the wealthy and members of the aristocratic ranks, but they

also fostered a particular hatred of the colonies’ bi-racial element, the gens de couleur .

Indeed, for decades, tensions had run high between whites o f all classes on the one side,

and free blacks and mulattoes on the other .9

While the causes for revolution in metropolitan France revolved in large part

around class distinction and economics, similar questions in the colonies were further

9 Theodore Lothrop Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo (Boston

and New York, 1914), 75-83.

132




complicated by even more problematic racial questions. The preponderance of immediate

issues facing legislators on the Continent in 1789 had little to do with a Frenchman’s

color. Indeed, the farther one traveled from the racially diverse colonies, the less

important any type of nonwhite distinction seemed to become. Racial differentiation in

the Caribbean colonies, however, carried tremendous significance. Any issue dealing

with economic, political or social rights necessarily included considerations of a man’s

racial background, as the majority of potential “active Citizens” on those islands were

neither white nor slave.

From the earliest years of French presence in the Caribbean, societal partitions

that characterized metropolitan French society under the old regime were blurred in the

island colonies by a complex interrelationship between black and white that policy

makers in Versailles and Paris never could seem to reconcile. As early as 1685, Louis

XIV’s Code Noir had established in theory the inalienable political rights of all free men

of color. Known also as affranchis, these persons of mixed-blood were often the product

of liaisons between master and slave, who once bom, were bom free. The ambiguous

metropolitan legal term “gens de couleur ” included up to fourteen gradations o f mixed

Negro and white blood, but in their official correspondence the government in Paris

recognized no particular differentiation between terms of classification like quadroons or

octoroons. While such a distinction had little meaning in Paris, in the islands, social

stratification based upon ancestral quartering had very real ramifications in a person’s

daily treatment.

Though denied in practice the political rights and social status guaranteed under

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the tenets o f the Code Noir, free gens de couleur had the ability to accrue great amounts

of land and capital, often matching and sometimes exceeding that o f the wealthiest

grands blancs. At first, the affranchis had been competition only for the pe tits blancs,

but as they became wealthy plantation and slave owners, they posed a disturbing rivalry

for the islands’ white planter class. Further, colonial mulattoes, especially the more

wealthy, unremittingly sought to erase their black heritage and to elevate themselves to

equal status with their white counterparts, even going so far as to educate their children in

France, purchasing large numbers of slaves, and adopting cultural habits usually reserved

for whites. While grands blancs and gens de couleur shared between them many of the

same concerns, the potential for their alliance against the petits blancs was made

practically impossible by an almost instinctive prejudice. Whites of all classes sought to

deny social parity to those o f mixed blood, regardless o f either how wealthy the mulatto

might have been or how much land he may have owned. Before the Revolution,

mulattoes and free blacks who were engaged in colonial commerce abided the same

governmental discrimination as other members o f the Third Estate, but because o f their

ethnic heritage, their particular suffering was far worse.10

The whites’ fear of the mulattoes was by no means limited to the latter’s growing

pecuniary influence. More disturbing was tha t free blacks and mulattoes, owing to the ir

color, their free status, and especially their rival numbers, represented a threat to white

racial hegemony in the colonies, and by extension, a threat to the maintenance of slavery.

Whites could only combat this development through repressive social legislation such as

10 Fick, The Making o f Haiti, 19; Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 13.

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curfews, denial of the right to congregate, stiffer criminal penalties for the same crimes as

those committed by whites, and by denying gens de couleur the opportunity to hold

public office or to practice in most o f the professional trades. In 1789, the promulgation

of the Declaration of the Rights o f Man and the Citizen brought to the forefront of

colonial political affairs a new and tremendously divisive question: would the new

government truly recognize nonwhites as citizens?

Gens de couleur did possess a certain degree of influence in their respective

colonies, especially as regarded the colony’s defense. Once he had reached military age,

a male mulatto was required to serve in the marechaussee, a para-military police

organization whose prime function was general law enforcement, especially the tracking

down of fugitive slaves. After three years they joined the rank and file o f the local

militias, where after providing their own uniforms and equipment, they were to serve in

separate units under white officers. This remained an obviously dangerous situation as

revolutionary agitation grew. Coupled with their majority in the colonial militias, the

mulattoes’ ever-increasing numbers and economic strength proved a constant source of

worry to colonial whites.11

With Louis XV I’s 1788 announcement o f the convocation o f the Estates-General,

both white and nonwhite members of the colonial business class finally saw an

opportunity to redress what they considered the economic injustices heaped upon them by

deaf, aristocratic governing bodies. It was no secret to anyone that trade in sugar, cocoa,

coffee and other items, that could only be had from the Caribbean, accounted for fully

11 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 13; Fick, The Making o f Haiti, 20.

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one-third o f the import/export economy o f pre-Revolutionary France, but as important as

the island colonies were, colonial leaders were stunned to discover that the king had

excepted them from the rolls o f those called to form this most important advisory body.

Their exclusion had not been intended maliciously. Louis XVI had determined not to

invite colonial delegates to the 1st Estates General, but to subsequent meetings once he

had resolved France’s more pressing internal issues. To colonial leaders, however, any

rationale on the king’s part was beside the point, and ad hoc committees in the islands

simply chose their own officials to represent their particular interests in Paris. Not

surprisingly, the majority of colonial legislators in 1788 and 1789 who organized

themselves as the Colonial Committee, usually spoke for white, monied plantation

owners.12

Though they would have a direct voice in France’s new National Assembly, the

ranks o f the grands blancs remained divided throughout the early years o f the Revolution.

In 1789, the majority of planters (believing tha t the recently unstable political conditions

in France should be dealt with cautiously) did not organize in enough time to properly

represent their interests in Paris. Instead, more indiscriminately elected delegates seated

in the National Assembly loudly proceeded to demand more home rule and economic

latitude .13 The aristocra ts’ renunciation of privileges on 4 August 1789 coupled with the

12 Sidney Daney de Marcillac [hereafter Daney], Histoire de la Martinique (Fort-

de-France, Martinique, 1978), 13. In the cases o f Saint-Domingue and Martinique, therepresentatives elected by the islanders arrived in Paris to find that grands blancs and

mulattoes residing in France had already elected representatives from among their own.

From these “representatives” were established the Colonial Committee.


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Assembly’s subsequent adoption of the Declaration of the Rights o f Man and the C itizen

on 26 August, froze even those delegates into a stunned silence. Now, the aristocracy of

the colonies stood to lose everything. The National Assembly, who they had formerly

seen as a potentially malleable ally, now showed its true colors as a terrifying enemy.

Indeed, a die had been cast in Paris that potentially could destroy the colonies’ entire

social structure.

The colonies’ privileged class could find some comfort in the Declaration of

Righ ts’ guaranteed protection o f private property which, by extension, included their

slaves. The tenuousness o f this particu lar condition, however, was virtually ignored.

Instead, grands blancs both in Paris and in the colonies fixated on the ramifications o f

propertied gens de couleur potentially qualifying as “active Citizens.” Initially, the

Assembly had made no mention o f this peculiarity, and for weeks, colonial whites in

Paris prayed that the matter would die a natural death. Mulattoes in the capital, however,

were not about to let this happen. On 20 September a delegation of gens de couleur

addressed the National Assembly and called for the guarantee o f their active citizenship

under Article Fifty-nine of the Code Noir. The Assembly sought to evade the issue for as

long as possible. After having been tirelessly lobbied by the Colonial Committee, the

Assembly assented to the demands of the grands blancs and referred adjudication o f the

issue back to the colonial assemblies. Rather than easing the situation, the Assembly only

aggravated the issue and intensified the debates. The National Assembly could not ignore

the “Mulatto Question” for long. Already facing the tremendous implications of the

Declaration of Rights, every colonial white soon confronted yet another enemy, the

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French abolitionist society Les Amis des Noirs, among whose mantras was the battle cry

“[Resistance is always justifiable where force is the substitute of right: nor is the

comm ission o f a civil crime possible in a state o f slavery!”14

While not a particularly new organization, Les Am is des Noirs had recently gained

prominence in the Assembly through the positions of some of its more renowned

members including the marquis de Lafayette, Honore Gabriel Mirabeau, Jacques-Pierre

Brissot de Warville, Abbe Henri Gregoire and Maxim ilien Robespierre. Indeed, it was

the de facto National Assembly leader Mirabeau who, at the formation o f the assembly,

had given the Colonial Committee a taste of the attitudes then prevalent in the metropole.

When the Colonial Comm ittee audaciously demanded that they be allowed twenty seats

in the Assembly (representative o f the entire island population and what they perceived to

be the co lonies’ supreme importance to France), Mirabeau quickly shut them down.

“You want representation in proportion to the to the number of

inhabitants? But have the blacks and free persons o f color

competed in the elections? The free blacks are property owners

and taxpayers. Yet they could not vote. And, as to the slaves,

either they are men or they are not; i f the colonists consider them to

be men, let them free and make them eligible for seats; if not, have

we, in proportioning the number o f deputies to the population of

France, taken into account the number o f our horses and mules?” 15

14 Societe des Amis des Noirs, Decree of 15 May 1792, quoted in Bryan Edwards,

“An Historical Survey o f the French Colony in the Island o f St. Domingo:

Comprehending an Account of the Revolt o f the Negroes In the Year 1791 and a Detail o f

the Military Transactions o f the British Army in that Island, In the Years 1793 & 1794,”from Edwards, A History, Civil and Commercial o f the B ritish Colonies in the West

Indies (Philadelphia, 1806), IV, 90.

15 Mirabeau to the Comite Coloniale, September 1790, translated by Fick, The

Making o f Haiti, 77.

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Ultimately, the National Assembly allowed only six colonial delegates to take their seats,

but throughout the summer and into the fall of 1789, the activism of the Am is des Noirs

and the pronouncement o f the Declaration of Rights steadily undermined the agenda o f

the white colonial planter class. Nevertheless, while many grands blancs would have

preferred to opt out o f the Revolution entirely, others continued to press the ir interests in

the Assembly.

The Revolution’s startling turns of events in Paris set off different alarms among

the various colonial groups. For free blacks and mulattoes who took the Declaration of

Rights’ guarantee of political and social equality at face value, the Revolution meant

achieving all o f those advantages inherent in true citizenship. Less limited economic

opportunity and the chance to acquire a greater share in the rewards of the seemingly

incalculable wealth generated by the colonial trade, they thought, would assuredly follow.

The pe tits blancs wanted no such rivalry. In their minds, the Revolution was both for and

about them alone. To the average, middle-class, colonial white, political equality meant

having enough votes to dismantle a socioeconomic hierarchy dominated by the grands

blancs while simultaneously imposing legislation that would keep free blacks and

mulattoes from competing with them economically. Once in control, the pe tits blancs

vowed, they would not share power with any gen de couleur.

Unlike the threatened aristocracy in France, grands blancs in the colonies proved

considerably less altruistic than their Continental counterparts in relinquishing their

privileges and property. Seemingly protected by physical d istance from national forces

that would enforce the Assembly’s radical legislation, colonial gentry continued to fight

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for self-determination, maintaining that metropolitan statutes could not possibly be

applied in the colonies due to their unique situation. On the islands themselves however,

class battles had begun to take a violent turn, and the drastically outnumbered grands

blancs faced two choices; they could either relinquish power or they could fight back with

any weapons at their disposal to maintain the status quo. Not surprisingly, the former

choice seemed an impossibility. In the minds of the planter class, the most compelling

argument for societal preservation was obvious - a general slave insurrection. With the

ratio on some islands of slaves to white colonists reaching ten to one, the grands blancs

argued vehemently both at home and in Paris that the plantation system, with its brutally

effective control mechanisms, offered the only guarantee against the islands’ slaves

vindictively massacring all other of the islands’ inhabitants. Throughout 1789 and 1790,

the planter class’ appeals fell largely upon de af ears. Both the pe tits blancs and the gens

de couleur dismissed the planters’ slave revolt argument as self-serving fear mongering

and continued to fight for their own agendas.

Slave emancipation was certainly not part o f any colonial’s agenda. To all classes

o f whites, the idea was absolutely incomprehensible. Similarly, the majority of colonial

mulattoes remained bent upon maintaining slavery while demanding their own social

emancipation. By late 1790 into early 1791, however, radicals in Paris were championing

in earnest the cause of equality for both groups. As early as March 1790, the National

Assembly had formed a twelve-member Comite des Colonies charged with finding

solutions to the brewing colonial crisis. Initially headed by Antoine Pierre Joseph

Bamave, the committee had originally included no one with Am is des Noirs

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connec tions.16Bamave’s tenure was short, however, and Brissot de Warville soon came

to head the body. Brissot, who also led the upwardly mobile Jacobins, had been an actual

founder of the Am is des Noirs. Thus, as he and his fellow “Brissotins” gained influence

in both the National Assembly and the soon-to-be-formed Legislative Assembly, so too

did the immediacy of resolving the colonial race question.

By spring 1791, the Amis des Noirs m anaged to push through a portion o f their

racial agenda. Under intense pressure from Brisso t’s friends in the National Assembly,

Louis XVI hesitantly enacted the Decree o f 15 May 1791, a statute granting full civil

rights to a portion of free gens de couleur. This measure merely intensified the colonies’

factional tensions. As the official packets containing the details o f the king’s decree

arrived in the various French Caribbean islands, extant Governor Generals desperately

sought to tailor the edict to what they considered their own colonies’ particular

conditions. In Saint-Domingue, France’s wealthiest and most heavily slave-populated

colony, the pronouncement added fuel to an already particularly volatile situation.17 On

that island, the Decree of 15 May became public in mid-June, but whites continued to

deny both political and social equality to their free black and mulatto peers. As the result,

by July, gens de couleur throughout the colony had organized into armed bands to do


17 According to the contemporary French historian and colonial representative to

the National Assembly Mederic-Louis-Elie Moreau de Saint-Mery, the population of

Saint-Domingue at the time o f the Revolution numbered around 520,000. O f these,

approximately 40,000 were white; 28,000 freemen (including those of mixed blood); and

452,000 black slaves. Mederic-Louis-Elie Moreau de Saint-Mery, A Civilization that

Perished: The Las t Years o f White Colonial Rule in Haiti (Boston, 1985), 15.

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ba ttle w ith white “patriots” who jea lously guarded their own recently-gained political

authority.

The resulting “revolution” was short-lived however; while the two antagonists

focused their attention on crippling each other, the violence in Saint-Domingue took on

an entirely new dimension. On the night of 22 August 1791, tens of thousands o f the

island’s slaves revolted throughout Saint-Dom ingue’s Great Northern Plain. Inflamed by

revolutionary zeal, and fortified in their determination by their Vodun religion, runaway

slaves burned fields and plantations, and massacred nearly every white inhabitant

“regardless o f age or sex” that they could get their hands on. By early autumn, the

island’s commercial capital, le Cap Fran?ais (le Cap), had turned into a fortified camp

under siege.18

A British witness summed up the events appropriately by saying that “ [s]uch a

picture o f hum an misery - such a scene of woe, presents itself, as no other country, no

former age has exhibited. The rage of fire consumes what the sword is unable to destroy,

and, in a few dismal hours, the most fertile and beautiful plains in the world are converted

into one vast field o f carnage - a wilderness o f desolation.”19

18 Donatien Rochambeau, “Aper 9u sur les troubles des Antilles Franyaises de

1’Amerique (et Specia lement de Saint-Domingue) Precis de la Guerre dans cette Partie du

Monde,” 18 Novem bre 1802, [hereafter Rochambeau, “Troubles des Antilles Fran9aises

de 1’Amerique”], Service historique, MR 589, 10. As French Revolutionary historian H.

Morse Stevens noted in 1908, “[no] war is ever marked by such horrors as a slave war,

for the atrocious cruelties of savages, who have the wrongs o f years of servitude toavenge, are always met by the most terrible reprisals. The slave war in San Domingo

formed no exception.” H. Morse Stevens, A History o f the French Revolution (New

York, 1908), II, 471.

19 Edwards, A History o f the British Colonies in the West Indies, IV, 68-69.

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On some few estates indeed the lives of the women were spared,

bu t they were reserved only to gratify the brutal appetites o f the

ruffians; and it is shocking to relate that many of them suffered

violation on the dead bodies o f their husbands and fathers! The

buildings and cane fields were everywhere set on fire; and the

conflagration, which was visible from [le Cap], in a thousand

different quarters, furnished a prospect more shocking, andreflections more dismal, than fancy can paint, or the powers o f man

describe. They seized Mr. Blen, an officer of the police, and

having nailed him alive to one of the gates of his plantation,

chopped off his limbs, one by one, with an axe. A poor man

named Robert, a carpenter by trade, endeavoring to conceal himself

from the notice of the rebels, was discovered in his hiding place;

and the savages declared that he should die in the way o f his

occupation; accordingly they bound him between two boards, and

deliberately sawed him asunder. All the white, and even the

mulatto ch ildren whose fathers had not joined the revolt, were

murdered without exception, frequently before the eyes, or clinging

to the bosom o f their mothers. Young women of all ranks were

first violated by a whole troop o f barbarians, and then generally put

to death. Some o f them were indeed reserved for the further

gratification of the lust o f the savages, and others had their eyes

scooped out with a knife .20

The white citizens of le Cap, who now cursed the name o f Le s Am is des Noirs,

tore down the Tricolor and debated raising the banner o f Great Britain in its stead. The

black rebels had adopted a new standard as well - a white infant, it is reported, impaled

upon a stake. While wom en and children fled to the ships in the harbors of le Cap and

Fort Dauphin, the rebels fired upon them with captured cannons, stolen amm unition and

powder having been delivered to them by black com patriots who worked in the city

arsenals. Shamefully, unscrupulous American merchants would soon replenish these

stocks in exchange for rum and molasses plundered from the burning plantations.21

20 Ibid., 74-80.

21 Ibid., 75, 82.

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The devastation in the colony was appalling. According to Donatien

Rochambeau’s own estimate, in the island’s Northern Province alone, at least 2,000

whites and 10,000 slaves had perished. Further, the revolt had destroyed 180 sugar

plantat ions and over 900 coffee, indigo and cotton settlements , and had reduced more

than 1,200 formerly wealthy families to abject poverty. Whites and mulattoes in the

colony temporarily put aside their differences to deal with the emergency and temporarily

managed to check the insurrection. By late September however, thousands o f slaves

(including a then-unknown Toussaint Louverture) escaped to the safety of the rugged

mountains along the colony’s border with Spanish Santo Domingo where they organized

themselves into armed camps led by such powerful black chiefs as Boukman and Jeannot,

and their successors, Jean-Frantjois Papillon and Georges Biassou.22

The whites o f Saint-Domingue would certainly not have survived the insurrection

without the aid of the colony’s mulattoes. Accordingly, on 20 September 1791, the white

citizens o f Port-au-Prince officially withdrew the ir opposition to the Decree o f 15 May

22 D onatien Rochambeau, “Apercpu General sur les troubles des Colonies

Fran9aises de 1’Amerique. Suivi d’un precis de la Guerre dans cette partie du Monde,” 13

Juin 1811, [hereafter Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies”], Service historique, M R

593,11. Both Boukm an and Jeannot remain famous for their cruelty, but their terrible

reigns ended in November 1791. While Boukman met a dramatic death in battle,

Jeannot, whose inhum an torture of white prisoners threatened possible negotiations

between the whites and the revolting slaves, would be deposed and executed by Jean-

Fran9ois and Biassou. During this first revolt, Toussaint, who had not yet adopted the

moniker “Louverture” (initially spelled “l’Ouverture”), had remained on the Breda

plantation , and had personally assis ted the escape of his masters. Once they were safe,however, Toussaint, still wearing his coachm an’s livery, joined the rebels. Not only was

“Toussaint Breda” well-respected among the slaves as one of the island’s premier

herbalists, but he was one of, if not the only black among the rebel slaves who was

literate. At first becoming a trusted advisor to Jean-Fran9ois, he would later rise to lead

the entire movement.

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and determined that it was now safe to reintegrate gens de couleur into new companies of

armed militia. For the moment, the fighting in the colony had subsided, but news o f the

island’s reconciliation had not reached Paris.23

Just as the National Assembly in Paris was dissolving itself to form the new

Legislative Assembly, news of Saint-Domingue’s slave rebellion caused the retiring

jud icial body to repeal immediately the Decree of 15 May and to prom ulgate instead the

Decree of 28 September 1791, which gave to the colonies the power to determine the

status of the mulattoes. This about-face by the lame duck National Assembly confirmed

in all colonists’ eyes their suspicion that the home government in its current upheaval was

incapable o f judiciously managing colonial affairs. By this time however, the question o f

which decree had the worse effect on the colonies was moot. When word o f the decree’s

revocation reached Saint-Domingue, mulattoes and free blacks in the Western Province,

who believed that they had been betrayed by the k ing’s opponents in Paris, now embarked

upon a war o f extermination against the whites.24

The ferocity with which the opposing sides in the West executed their particular

brand of genocide equaled or exceeded the monstrosities that had become legendary in

the North. In one example, whites placed a mulatto prisoner “....on an elevated seat in a

cart , and secured him in it by driving large spiked nails through his feet into the boards.

23 Stevens, A History o f the French Revolution, II, 471. Mediated by a powerful planter in the area, M. de Jumecourt, the agreement between the whites and mulattoes of

Port-au-Prince came to be known as the “Concordat of Port-au-Prince.”

24 Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593, 12;

Stevens, A History o f the French Revolution, II, 469.

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In this condition he was led a miserable spectacle through the city. His bones were

afterwards broken, and he was then thrown alive into the flames.” For their part,

mulattoes made white cockades from the ears of their dead enemies and attached them to

their caps “in hideous token of their Royalist sentiments.” The atrocities perpetrated

upon the white women and children, however, were almost beyond belief.25

In the neighbourhood o f Jeremie a body o f them attacked the house

of M. Sejoume, and secured the persons o f both him and his wife.

This unfortunate woman (my hand trembles as I write) was far

advanced in her pregnancy. The monsters, whose prisoner she

was, having first murdered her husband in her presence, ripped her

up alive, and threw the infant to the hogs. They then (how shall I

relate it) sewed up the head of the murdered husband in — !!! [sic]

Such are thy triumphs, Philan thropy!26

Almost simultaneously, the slaves who had taken refuge in the mountains came out of

hiding and once again set about ravaging the colony’s plantations. Sadly, the colony’s

Governor General, Philibert-Frangois Blanchelande, was powerless to intercede and could

do little more than w atch as the terror continued.

Such was the situation when three Civil Commissioners arrived at le Cap in

November 1791. These men, two of them Paris lawyers, had been chosen by the

moderate National Assembly to help restore order in the colony, but their promises o f a

general amnesty and the full implementation of the National Assembly’s Constitution of

1791 fell upon deaf ears. Indeed, this First Civil Comm ission had little to offer any of the

warring parties. Their patriotic pronouncements only incensed the mulattoes, who

25 Edwards, A History o f the British Colonies in the West Indies , IV, 98;

Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo, 151.

26 Ibid.

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executed thirty-four white prisoners to demonstrate their contempt for the metropole's

legislation. As far as the whites were concerned, without troops to reinforce their powers,

the Com missioners’ efforts counted for little. The revolting slaves, o f course, had no

reason to suspend their rampage short o f complete emancipation, or the annihilation of

bo th the whites and the mulattoes. Unable to effect any type o f posit ive resolution on the

island, the First Civil Commission’s members returned separately to France between

March and April, 1792. In the mean time, Saint-Domingue continued to bum.27

France’s remaining Caribbean colonies (Martinique and her subsidiary colonies of

Guadeloupe, Tobago and Sainte-Lucie), had not escaped the turmoil caused by events in

Paris, but smaller populations and those colonies’ diminished importance to France had

mitigated the types of tensions that prevailed in Saint-Domingue. Furthermore, between

1789 and 1791, Martin ique’s two Governor Generals were men who were well-

acquainted with colonial revolution. Charles-Joseph-Hyacinthe du Houx, comte de

Viomenil, and Joseph Louis Cesar, comte de Dam as-d’Antigny, had both served with

distinction as members o f Rocham beau’s corps during the American Revolution, and

both sought to display equal measures of wisdom and moderation while dealing with the

brewing crises in Martinique and her subsidiary islands. Ultimately, these two officers

managed to contain the outbreak of violence in their colonies to the greatest extent

possible, bu t their respective tenures were not without incident.

The first clashes on Martinique occurred while Viomenil was acting as Governor

General during a prolonged absence by Damas. After receiving word o f the fall o f the

27 Stevens, A History o f the French Revolution, II, 472.

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Bastille, inhabitants of the island’s commercial capital, Saint-Pierre, followed the

example o f revolutionists in Paris by affixing cocardes tricolores to their hats and then

parad ing the Revolution’s new red, white and blue flag in the streets. Rioting broke out

within minutes. Saint-Pierre’s Royal Army commandant, Colonel Laumoy, attempted to

quell the disorder, but his small garrison at Saint-Pierre was no match for the mobs that

besieged him.

News o f the Saint-Pierre uprising was not long in reaching the Governor General

in Fort-Royal. Believing it wise to yield to the impetuosity of the moment, Viomenil

ordered that new tricolor banners be made and then blessed at a church ceremony in

Saint-Pierre where he and his principles would preside. For the pet its blancs in the city,

the ceremony was an unqualified success, and was soon followed by a grand festival in

the colony’s administrative capital at Fort-Royal to celebrate the new alliance between the

royalty and the nation. The rioting in Saint-Pierre was extinguished temporarily, but

following the festival, new troubles awaited the Governor General in the more

conservative Fort-Royal. There, the Tricolor issue became the source of intense

controversy between the city’s whites (who claimed the sole authority to wear the

cockade), and mulattoes who demanded to wear it as well. When Viomenil supported the

gens de couleur (even going so far as to publically embrace a mulatto as a gesture of

solidarity), both the island’s grands and pet its blancs resorted to publicly denouncing

him.28

Throughout the remainder of his occupancy, Viomenil tried in vain to appease

28 Daney, Histoire de la Martin ique, 10.

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bo th sides of the conflict; the result, predictably, was a failure. In less than one month ,

Viomenil found h imself under attack from both the planters o f Fort-Royal and white

radicals in Saint-Pierre. Viom enil’s own Intendant, Foullon d’Ecotier (himself a native o f

Saint-Pierre with direct links to the business class) spoke the most vociferously against

his counterpart. Naturally, it suited both sides to discredit the governor’s royal authority,

and on 10 October 1789, a tribunal composed o f members of both groups declared

Viomenil incompetent to preside over the colony’s affairs, but allowed him to remain a

figurehead under the control o f a new island government.29 Having thus u surped the

Governor General’s powers, on 17 October 1789, Martinique’s official colonial body

formed a separate “General Colonial Assembly” with the purpose o f electing

representatives to the National Assembly. Of course, Martinique’s electors were furious

to discover later that Paris’ Colonial Comm ittee had already chosen the island ’s deputies.

With “true” voice o f the colony thus neutralized, islanders clamored for the formation o f

a new, more locally powerful general assembly and soon received it. On 16 November,

Martinique’s outlaw General Assembly convened under the presidency of the well-

pedigreed planter Louis-Fran9ois, chevalier Dubuc. Martinique’s royal council continued

to exist, but it now ceased to function.

An original intent o f Martinique’s new Colonial Assembly had been to allow

proportional representation o f all o f the island ’s eighty-one parishes, and, for the first

29 Alfred Martineau and L.-Ph. May, Trois Siecles d ’Histoire Antillaise

Martinique et Guadeloupe de 1635 a Nos Jours (Paris, 1935), 153. By 22 October, the

body had further determined that Viomenil must be recalled to France and sen t letters to

the king asking that he be replaced. Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 11.

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time, mulattoes were permitted to serve as representatives. While this arrangement would

seem to have been the panacea for Martinique’s particular issues, factions on the island

would doom any new-found accord to failure. Simply put, Saint-Pierre and Fort-Royal

(who both enjoyed the largest populations o f the island), retained the representative

majority, while those parishes outside either o f the two cities remained a potential

“swing” vote. Nevertheless, early controlling members o f this “government” drafted a

revised list o f grievances and elected a new group o f representatives to travel to France to

present the colony’s key issues to the National Assembly.30

Hatred continued to boil between delegates from liberal Saint-Pierre and

conservative Fort-Royal. No t surprisingly, any unanimity between the Colonial

Assem bly’s members was short-lived, and between 23 November and 2 December 1789,

more conservative members sought to establish “municipalities” for each parish,

complete with a mayor for each who only would answer to the assembly. Delegates from

Saint-Pierre quickly recognized the associated threat - mayors in the country parishes

would be (or would be controlled by) planters who had the co lony’s royal militia to back

them up. As the result, Saint-Pierre’s delegates refused to recognize articles thirty-one

and thirty-two o f the assembly’s decree, which mandated that municipal officers were

responsible to quell any acts of disorder that they could prevent, but to call on the

executive power, namely the Governor General, for ones that they could not. In the eyes

o f Saint-Pierre’s delegates, the decree gave back to the conservative military authorities

30 Daney, Histoire de la M artin ique, 17.

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permission of the copyright owner. Furthe r reproduction prohibited without permission.



the prerogatives that the creation o f the municipalities had sought to mitigate.31

The “municipalities” issue found no resolution among the collected members of

Martinique’s General Assembly, and by 8 December 1789, conservatives announced that

the assembly wou ld reform itse lf with Saint-Pierre’s representatives being reduced in

number by three-quarters. Liberal members stormed out of the meeting house in Fort-

Royal and rioting again broke out in Saint-Pierre. Three days later, the remaining

assembly members in Fort-Royal declared a state of martial law to repress the protest

movements, but by this time, either unequivocal guidance or military aid from home was

needed to save Martinique. The colony received neither. Apparently unaware o f the

situation, Minister o f Marine Anne Cesar, chevalier de la Luzerne sent a ship laden w ith

breadfruit plan ts and specific instructions on how they should be cultivated. Convinced

that Viomenil could neither solve their problems nor shield them from the puppet-masters

in Fort-Royal, many Martiniquais clamored for the return of Governor General Damas.

Almost simultaneous w ith the arrival of Paris’ breadfruit, the comte de Damas returned to

the island in January 1790 and immediately joined forces with Fort-Royal’s conservative

politicians.32

Dam as’ arrival heralded an uncomfortable truce on Martinique until late February

1790. For three weeks after his arrival the Governor General supported the existing

martial law, with the result that loyal soldiers in the colony’s regiments d isplayed a

31 Ibid., 15-16; Martineau, Histo ire Antilla ise, 153-155.

32 Martineau, Histoire A ntillaise, 153-155; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 20-

26.

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smugness that could do nothing but antagonize members o f Saint-Pierre’s revolutionary

set. Damas’ “peace” was shattered, however, when two officers o f the Saint-Pierre

garrison went into a theater wearing on their hats the white cockade of the Royal Army.

As the two left the building, they were mobbed outside by Saint-Pierre bourgeoisie who

demanded that they replace their white cockades with cocardes tricolores. The officers

refused, and stomped into the dust the tricolor cockades that were offered to them. The

assembled mob responded by arresting the two officers and throwing them into the city’s

dungeon. The inevitable outcry among the conservatives was tremendous. Completely

surrounded in a hostile environment, Saint-Pierre’s loyal troops shouldered arms and

marched to Fort-Royal to join forces with their brethren stationed there.33

Now with the reduction o f the city’s military forces, liberals of Saint-Pierre called

for aid from anyone in the surrounding countryside while sending cries for help to the

colony’s neighbors. Their pleas did not go completely unanswered, and by 5 March, 110

volunteers from Guadeloupe under the command o f General Jean-Fran§ois Coquille

Dugommier arrived at Saint-Pierre, and with the support of the city’s National Guard,

demanded that Martinique and the other islands form a pro-revolutionary federation.

Guadeloupe’s intervention was hardly enough to turn the tide in favor o f Martinique’s

radicals, but in spite of the surrounding colonies’ limited support, revolutionary fervor

grew increasingly heated in Saint-Pierre, culminating in the city’s assembly voting itself

33 Martineau, Histoire Antilla ise, 155.

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control o f all military forces which remained quartered there.34

On 1 March, a reformed, conservative, general assembly in Fort-Royal had voted

to grant speaking authority in the home government to Caribbean historian Mederic

Moreau de Saint-Mery and the comte de Dillon in Paris, both of whom had been original

delegates to the National Assembly from Paris’ resident, conservative “Colonial

Committee.” The response from both Saint-Pierre and the colony’s other cities to this

move by the conservatives was a clear, absolute “no.” Within two weeks, the assembly

had separated again, and conservative members began canvassing the countryside for

support in a military action against Saint-Pierre. Fortunately for all concerned, the attack

never m aterialized.35

By summer, the factionalism had not resolved itse lf and street battles again raged

in Saint-Pierre between planters and mulattoes on the one side, and revolutionist

members of the middle class on the other. The time had now come for the Governor

General and his conservative supporters to act decisively. On 4 June, Damas and his

loyal troops occupied Saint-Pierre and imprisoned the principle agitators, but

revolutionist troops o f the Saint-Pierre garrison took to the streets, freed Dam as’

34 Jean-Franfois Coquille Dugom mier was bom in Basse-Terre, Guadeloupe in

1736. An ardent Revolutionist, he had arrived in Martinique and had gained the support

o f much of the colony’s National Guard, but was soon deputed by the Republicans o f the

colony to return to France to seek aid. Instead of returning to the colonies, he gave his

services to France first at the siege o f Toulon in 1793, and then became commander o f the

Army o f the Pyrenees-Orientales. Under his command, this army captured from theSpanish Saint-Elme and Collioure. Dugom mier was killed on 17 November 1794 at

Sierra Negra. Henry Lemery, La Revolution Franqaise a la M artinique (Paris, 1936),

321.

35 Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 42-43.

153




prisoners and forced the Governor General, with the assistance of the city’s mulattoes, to

abandon Saint-Pierre to the rebels. Damas was able to resist the rebe ls’ subsequent

advances upon Fort-Royal, but on 6 September, Dugomm ier appeared once again in

Saint-Pierre with 300 volunteers. Pitched battle raged for over one month on the island,

but Dugom mier’s tiny army was finally defeated at Camp du Grand-Mom e by a group of

mulattoes under the command o f the planter Henri de Percin. The war, however, had

only reached a stalemate. President Dubuc called upon neighboring English colonies for

military aid, but the British refused to intervene.

Word o f the fighting eventually reached Paris, and on 29 November the National

Assembly sent to Martinique four Civil Commissioners and 6,000 troops who suspended

the colonial assembly and reopened trade in la Trinite and Fort-Royal. The following

year, the king replaced Damas w ith Lieutenant General Jean-Antoine Behague, who

arrived on 12 March with four new Civil Commissioners. The colony submitted to

Behague’s heavy-handed rule and once again, Dugommier and his remaining troops left

Martinique. In one of his first official acts, Behague reestablished the sovereign council

in the place of the colonial assembly. While the Civil Commissioners formed a “council

of conciliation” o f twelve elected delegates from Saint-Pierre, Royalist troops occupied

the island’s principle forts and boycotted Saint-Pierre by diverting all island trade to the

loyal ports o f la Trinite and Fort-Royal.

In early May 1791, Behague further consolidated his hold over the colony by

trimming what he considered the most potentially subversive elements from his own

army. No t surprisingly, the revolutionist soldiers at Saint-Pierre were the first to be

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deported, but Behague did not stop there. To weaken possible internal resistance from

soldiers stationed in the island’s principle garrison in Fort Bourbon, Behague ordered

twelve o f the most “patriotic” battalions on the island either to France or to Saint-

Domingue under the pretext o f a possible insurrection by those troops in favor of the

radical factions in France. Thus, with most of the armed pro-Jacobins out o f his way, the

Governor General could more assuredly turn away any representatives of the new

government who might try to impose the ever-changing national will on the island .36

When official dispatches arrived from France containing the infamous Decree of

15 May 1791, Behague ignored them. Though this deception appears criminal on the

surface, Behague certainly had what he must have thought were justifiable reasons. It

would no t have escaped his notice that when the Decree o f 15 May had been published,

the colony’s only official representatives in Paris, Moreau de Saint-Mery and the com te

de Dillon had resigned from the National Assembly the next day. Further, the Governor

General already enjoyed the support o f the mulattoes. What reason would he have had to

initiate a new wave o f violence in the recently calmed colony?

Events in July and August 1791 could only have served to solidify Behague’s

resolve. On 3 July, the colony learned o f the king ’s flight and subsequent arrest,

prompting renewed factional violence in Saint-Pierre. Behague and his Royalist

36 Bailleu l et autres membres com posant le ci-devant Comite de Salut Public de

Republique-ville a la Martinique, “Compte rendu a la Convention Nationale pa r le

Comite de Salut Public de Republique-ville, des evenements qui ont eu lieu a la

Martinique depuis l ’arrivee de Rochambeau en cette lie le 3 Fevrier 1793, ju sq u’a la

reddition du Fort-de-la-Convention le 5 Germinal de l ’an second de la republique [sic]

une et indivisible,” 19 Pluviose, l’an 4 (7 February 1794), [hereafter Bailleul, Report ].

AN, Archives Fonds AF m/207, 1, 2.

155




adherents now firmly believed that those in Paris who purportedly spoke for the king

could not be trusted to make proper decisions for the colonies. With Louis XVI and his

family now under constant surveillance in the Tuileries and Leopold II of Austria and

Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia anxious for their liberty, it thus was not difficult for

island conservatives to come to the honest conclusion that the government in Paris had

usurped all proper authority. Worse, if it happened that war was declared and Britain

allied with Austria and Prussia, it would only be a matter of time before the island was in

imminent danger o f foreign invasion.

The s ituation in Paris was certainly bad enough, but the entire Caribbean soon

froze in stark terror when news o f Saint-Domingue’s slave revolt circulated in late

August. Trade became paralyzed throughout the French colonies, heaping yet another

potential disaster upon the already troubled island. Soon, the already conservative

Behague became a staunch counterrevolutionary, joine d by leagues o f formerly

equivocating white and mulatto merchants.

Once again, peace on the island was short-lived. Behague could not keep secret

the Decree of 28 September 1791, which revoked the Decree of 15 May and relegated the

question of the mulattoes to the colonial level. While no slave insurrection occurred in

Martinique as had happened in Saint-Domingue, mulattoes in Martinique nonetheless

broke from supporting the grands blancs. Even Behague’s Civil Commissioners were

split in their loyalties between the government in France and the warring parties in

Martinique. By December 1791, liberal representatives from Saint-Pierre, who had

stepped in to fill the vacancy left by Moreau de Saint-Mery and the comte de Dillon, were

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demanding in front o f the Legislative Assembly in Paris the recall o f Behague and all of

the French civil functionaries, who, in the minds o f the representatives had been the real

cause of Martinique’s most recent troubles.37

While island liberals in Paris were calling for the governor’s recall, December

found Behague organizing a general congress o f the four islands under his governorship,

including Martinique, Guadeloupe, Sainte-Lucie and Tobago. During meetings at Fort-

Royal between January and April 1792, the congress repudiated the decrees of both the

National and Legislative Assemblies bu t to keep the peace, agreed to enact certain basic

tenets of both the Decree o f 15 May and 28 September by granting certain civil rights to

their colonies’ lighter-skinned mulattoes. Further, the four colonies declared themselves

part o f the “French Em pire” but the islands’ new, unelected deputies in the Legislative

Assembly would have no consultative voice on island affairs.38

Naturally, tensions between the colony and the homeland escalated. Radicals who

soon came to dominate Paris politics would certainly not tolerate any recalcitrance from

the colonies against what the Legislative Assembly considered the best interests o f the

nation. In an effort to reconcile what they perceived were injustices against the nation’s

mulatto and free black citizens, the Assembly decreed the soon-infamous Law o f 4 April

1792. News of the recent war may well have arrived on Martinique at the same time as

the Law o f 4 April, but regardless, at the end o f the month, Martinique and her three

confederates actually seceded from metropolitan France. Hence, any new Governor

37 Martineau , Histoire Antillaise, 158-159.

38 Ibid.

157




General would have the responsibility to bring not only Martinique, but also Sainte-Lucie,

Tobago and Guadeloupe back into the national fold.39 Under the circumstances, Behague

may well have felt secure from at least the French government’s intervention in his

colonies’ affairs. The reverse was true. On 3 July 1792, a new decree by the Legislative

Assembly recalled Behague and the colony’s lead Commissioner, M. M ontdenoix, to

France to appear before the assembly and to account for their actions.40 As Donatien

Rochambeau, the soon-to-be Governor General of the islands, remarked:

At that time, more important events occupied France. The royalty

was on the point o f being abolished, and the democratic parties had

adopted a system o f general subversion. It was therefore necessary

to make the colonies participate in the introduction of this new

doctrine. Anyone could debate voting on the decrees that accorded

the rights o f the citizen to all free men o f color or free blacks, but

this was nothing but a prelude to any projected operations.41

In the early summer o f 1792, planning for “projected operations” against

Martinique was already well underway. With the advent of the Legislative Assembly in

Paris, Jacques-Pierre Brissot and his entourage, many o f whom were members of the

Amis des Noirs, found themselves in a pos ition to direct affairs absolutely not only in the

colonies, but also in France. By the beginning of the year Brissot and his closest

supporters had advanced themselves to the highest offices o f the French government.

39 Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 157-165. Ironically, Behague had served in

1790 as a Marechal de Camp under General Rochambeau Sr. at Brest. Roster of

Officers, Armee duNord; Janvier 1790. Service historique, Guerre d’Amerique, CartonXLIXa, item 36.

40 Ibid., 169.

41 Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593, 13.

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These men, who by spring 1792 filled major positions in the ministries and also the chief

advisory positions to the king, now sought to discredit the monarch who had effectively

abrogated his royal authority by attempting to flee the country the previous summer.

Under intense pressure from his new Brissotin ministers, Louis XVI signed the

Legislative Assembly’s “Law of 4 April, 1792.” While essentially a re-institution of the

previous year’s Decree o f 15 May, the Law of 4 April not only gave people o f color and

free blacks equal political rights, but also ordered the immediate re-election o f any and all

colonial assemblies, who alone would make any determination on slave issues.

Brissot was not about to make the same mistakes that both he, and a tepid

National Assem bly had made the previous year. Once enacted as law, responsibility for

implementing the Law o f 4 April passed, according to custom, to the Minister of Marine

and the Colonies. The previous minister, the chevalier de la Luzerne, had sent to the

various colonies not only the previous year’s Decree of 15 May, but also the first group o f

Civil Commissioners. As both the Decree of 15 May and the First Civil Com mission had

proved perfect failures, Brissot ensured that the Law of 4 April would no t meet such an

ignominious fate. Not only would this new measure attack the very heart o f colonial

resistance by demanding the dissolution and subsequent re-election o f the islands’

representative bodies, but also a new group o f reliable, Jacobin, Civil Commissioners,

reinforced by new Governor Generals and Republican national troops, would travel to the

colonies to enforce the new decree properly.

The burden of organizing a suitable force to alleviate the intolerable situation in

the colonies fell to a new Minister o f Marine, baron Jean-Baptiste LaCoste. LaCoste was

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neither a Brissotin nor a member of the Amis des Noirs , but rather a scion o f the

consummate schemer Dumouriez. Thus under particular suspicion by the current

government, LaCoste was careful to appoint new governors and Civil Commissioners

who had demonstrated the correct political leanings. After some two weeks of

deliberation, LaCoste chose as Governor General o f Saint-Domingue the seventy-two

year-old General Jean-Jacques-Pierre, comte d’Esparbes de Lussan and three Civil

Commissioners, Jean-Antoine Ailhaud, Etienne Polverel (a lawyer from Navarre), and

Leger Felicite Sonthonax (radical Jacobin lawyer, intimate o f Brissot, and mem ber o f the

Am is des Noirs). To solve the problems in Martinique, he chose Donatien Rochambeau.42

By early May 1792, LaCoste had calculated the details for such an expedition at

nearly ten million l i v r e s f While the national treasury could hardly withstand such an

expenditure, the Legislative Assembly and the ministers saw that because o f their

potential as a source of future revenues, the importance of bringing the lucrative colonies

back under the national government’s control was paramount. LaCoste organized the

expedition into two forces, with the strongest contingent going to Saint-Domingue. This

body included no t only the island’s new Governor General and the three new Civil

Comm issioners, but also two battalions o f regular infantry, eight battalions o f National

Guard and three companies of dragoons; in all jus t over 6,300 officers and men. A

42 Robert Louis Stein, Leger Felicite Sonthonax: the Lost Sentinel o f the Republic

(London, 1985), 24; Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593,

13.

43 LaCoste to the National Assembly, 5 May 1792. Service historique, “Troubles

de Saint-Domingue,” Carton DXXV 55, items 539-542.

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permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited withou t permission.



smaller force would sail to the Windward Islands with a troop complement o f one

batta lion of regular infantry and two batta lions of National Guard; slightly under 2,000

officers and men.44 LaCoste designated Donatien Rochambeau to command the smaller

expedition, accompanied by four Civil Commissioners and two generals, Georges-Henri-

Victor Collot and Nicolas-Xavier de Ricard, who he would install on Guadeloupe and

Sainte-Lucie respectively. Rochambeau would sail in early August with one fleet to

assume his new position as Governor General of Martinique and the Windward Isles,

while Sonthonax, Polverel and Ailhaud would travel with their own convoy to Saint-

Domingue.45

Behague certainly must have known by June o f the promulgation of the Law o f 4

April, and that an unfriendly force was preparing to sail against him from France. As the

result, the Governor General did not remain passive. Anticipating the arrival of both the

new law and its enforcers, and undoubtedly seeking to protect himself, Behague finally

44 Ibid. With the installation o f the National Convention, the notedmathematician, Gaspard Monge assumed LaCoste’s duties as Minister of Marine.

Apparently calculating only absolute numbers, M onge’s first official report to the new

government enumerated that the government’s ships stationed in Martinique included one

man-of-war, three frigates, two corvettes, two packet-ships, and two ships armed en flute

(all but two forward guns removed to make room for transported troops). Further, Monge

optimistically assured the Convention that the 4,000 troops assigned to Martinique (those

on-station and those en route) “should assure the execution o f the decrees.” Then

unknown to the Paris government, many o f these ships and men had turned against them.

Gaspard Monge, Compte Rendu a la Convention Nationale, par le Ministre de la Marine,

de I ’Eta t de Situation de la Marine de la Republique, le 23 Septembre de I ’an premier;

Imprime, et envoye aux 83 departemens et a I ’Armee, par ordre de la Convention Nationale.

45 During the American Revolution, Captain de Collot had been an original aide-

de-camp to General Jean-Baptiste de Rochambeau, and had served as Assistant

Quartermaster General in Colonel Donatien Rochambeau’s Bourbonnois regiment.

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extended full political rights to all o f the colony’s mulattoes and free blacks. Thus, by

mid-July, a sizeable portion o f Martiniquais contented themselves that the current

governor had done more to mend the scission between whites and mulattoes than any

earlier decrees o f both o f the previous national assemblies in Paris. Though Martinique’s

government essentially had repudiated those decrees by her secession, many free blacks

and mulattoes continued to feel that they had already been emancipated in accordance

with the Decree o f 4 April and feared an armed incursion from the metropole which

might once again turn against them. Behague cleverly cultivated this belief, assuring the

islanders that they were already being obedient to the decrees o f the Assembly and that

they must help repulse any new government that the Assembly might send to run the

colony. Rochambeau would be the first to test Behague’s resolve.46


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Chapter VII

The Governor General:

September 1792 - January 1793

Having chosen Rochambeau to succeed the recalcitrant Behague, the Assembly

issued instructions for him to restore order in the French Windward Isles and to bring the

former Governor General to justice. Giving the new general full legislative authority and

supreme comm and in the King ’s name over all land and sea forces in Martinique and its

subsidiaries, Rochambeau’s instructions charged him com prehensively with the defense

of the nation’s interests. Specifically, he was responsible for re-establishing interior

peace, bu t “with the assis tance of the overs ight and the resolutions” o f four other Civil

Commissioners who would accompany him .1 Despite this vague restriction, the breadth

of Rocham beau’s civil authority was impressive, specifying that he and his Orderer gain

immediate control over such establishments as the island’s hospitals, police, magazines

and water distribution system. Finally, the general would recover the taxes and financial

obligations due to the state.2 On 9 July 1792, in one o f his last official acts, Louis XVI,

1 Legislative Assembly to Rochambeau, 8 July 1792. Service historique, Carton

Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 34.

2 Ibid.

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gave the necessary orders promoting Rochambeau from Marechal de Camp to Lieutenant

General, thus investing him with the rank commensurate with his task.3 After completing

final preparations, which included the general’s personal requisition for the fastest courier

boat available , a lesson he had certainly learned during the American Revolution,

Rochambeau and his force sailed from l’Orient on 6 August 1792.4

Rochambeau and the new Civil Comm issioners arrived of f o f Martinique’s Cap

Salomon on 16 September with a flotilla that included only one capital ship, the

Semillante (74), another ship armed en flute, and seven transports. The ships’ apparently

unheralded arrival caused near-pandemonium on the island, and an immediate gathering

o f the island’s colonial assembly. Once the members had determined that the naval

forces on-station at Martinique were sufficient to crush the approaching squadron, a

surprisingly short debate then ensued over what actions to take next. Much to his

surprise, Behague soon learned that he was no longer in control on Martinique.5

At the insistence of the island’s de facto leader, Louis-Franqois Dubuc, the

3 Promotion order, 9 July 1792. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier

lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 42.

4 Rochambeau to LaCoste, 26 July 1792; Mission certification letter, Signed

Monge, 4 October 1792. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general

no. 1299, items 43, 44; Daney, Histo ire de la Martinique, 169.

5 In his work La Revolution Frangaise a la Martinique, political historian Henry

Lemery, cited deliberations o f the island ’s colonial assembly which make clear that

Behague was in control o f Martinique, but only as an official foil for the island’s true

leader, the planter Louis-Franqois, chevalier Dubuc. According to the registers, it was

Dubuc who actually guided the assembly’s debate on 16 September toward attacking

Rocham beau’s party, knowing full well that new Civil Commissioners were aboard.

Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la M artinique, 157-159.

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island’s colonial assembly concluded tha t the small fleet transported illegal

representatives charged with the overthrow o f the colony and should therefore be

repulsed. “Messieurs,” Behague cried, “have you thought this through properly?

Certainly I am as fervent a Royalist as you, but we are rebelling against France....!” “We

are not rebelling against France at all, Sir,” Dubuc retorted, “we are refusing to obey

villains who have usurped power and have raised a criminal hand against our legitimate

sovereignty.” Dubuc continued, “ [t]he presence among us o f officers of the [French]

royal navy should be a guarantee to you of the justice o f our cause. Therefore, we respect

your scruples, and as they could be a cause o f embarrassment for us, we respectfully ask

you to kindly await the end o f this affair in an apartment that we have reserved for you at

Fort Saint-Louis. As soon as we have repulsed these brigands we will render to you the

high functions that His Majesty has confided in you and that you so kindly exercise for

the colony’s greater good.”6

Faced with temporary imprisonment, Behague had little choice but to accede to

the demands o f the assembly, and soon afterward, an alarm went up throughout the

colony’s capital. As Rocham beau’s flagship, the Semillante, maneuvered into Fort-

Royal, heavy guns from the harbor’s guardian fortress (Fort Bourbon) greeted

Rocham beau’s convoy with well-placed cannon shots across the Semillante '’s bow.

Simultaneously, the city’s mulatto population drew arms. Realizing the futility o f a

general engagement, the crew aboard Rochambeau’s flagship failed to return fire. As the

result, Behague and the members o f the island’s colonial assembly sent a pilot boat to

6 Cited in Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la Martinique, 159.

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determine the status of the newly-arrived force. Once satisfied that the vessels were

indeed French, the Intermediary Committee of the Colonial Assembly of Martinique

appointed three agents (Mssrs. Lecamus, Sinson-Preclair and Grenonville) to report to the

new French commander and the Civil Commissioners. Behague’s orders to the

delegation were to represent the colony’s interests by informing the new Governor

General o f the current state o f affairs on the island, to advise them o f the island’s plan to

raise the white flag of the Bourbons, and to inquire as to the status o f the sh ips’ arrival

and the fate o f the colony.7

The reception tha t the colony’s agents received aboard the frigate Semillante was

initially cordial, but far from sympathetic. After they had demanded to speak with the

new Civil Commissioners, the squadron’s commander, Admiral Eustache de Bruix,

informed Behague’s delegation that they had missed the Commissioners by several

minutes (they had disembarked on a smaller ship, ironically named the Bienvenue (28), to

confer with the island ’s authorities on land). Events were not going as Behague had

planned. While the deputies nervously deliberated among themselves, Rocham beau’s

vessels continued to move toward the anchorage point, causing one o f the island’s

emissaries to boldly forbid de Bruix from dropping anchor, and to insist that he continue

under sail “for his proper safety.”8 The three deputies soon left the Semillante in search

7 Bailleul, Report , 2; Colonel Henri de Poyen, Les Guerres Des Antilles; de 1793

a 1815 (Paris, 1896), 5; Daney,

Histoire de la Martinique, 171; Saintoyant,

La

Colonisation Frangaise, 213.

8 Rochambeau to Monge, 3 October 1792. Service historique, Indes

Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Carton B91, folio 3, 1; De Poyen, Les

Guerres Des Antilles, 5.

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of the new Civil Commissioners. Finding and then boarding the Bienvenue, the delegates

handed the Commissioners a local policy letter concerning the island’s free men o f color

and a message from the colonial assembly, allowing only the expedition’s enlisted men to

come ashore. Behague’s delegation then demanded that the Commissioners arrange for

their ships to anchor at the farthest point from the capital city, under the “protection” of

the cannons at Ilet a Ramiers (Pigeons’ Isle ).9

Permitting Rochambeau’s enlisted men to disembark without the supervision of

their officers was simply inconceivable and the Commissioners wisely demurred.

Insisting that they, the soldiers, and the new Governor General were inseparable, the

Commissioners asserted that they were simply passengers until they had been properly

installed by the new Governor General who was waiting aboard the Semillante. Shocked,

the colonial delegation replied that they had just been on the frigate and had not been

aware of Rochambeau’s presence. Now both parties immediately made their way back to

the Semillante, where after apologizing profusely to Rochambeau, the colonials verified

his instructions and presented their demands .10

The requests o f Behague’s representatives were fairly simple, that no harm would

be done to them or the islanders, and tha t they would not be deported to France.

Rochambeau refused this demand, but agreed to their request that no soldiers be allowed

to communicate with the island’s inhabitants; beyond that he would make no promises.

The new G overnor General next asserted that he would make no determinations

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 2.

167




whatsoever until he had been properly recognized in his position and had toured and

appraised the entire island. At this point, Admiral de Bruix spoke, insisting that his

specific orders from the king gave him full responsibility for the safety of the vessels.

Contrary to what the colonial delegation had offered, he would only anchor his ships at a

normal anchoring point. Now fully aware o f Rocham beau’s position, the deputies asked

the Governor General for time to deliberate with the colonial assembly. Rochambeau

agreed, but stated that at nine o ’clock the next morning he would install him self “in his

government” 11

Until he had read the delegate’s letters, Rochambeau remained unaware tha t the

island’s rebel assembly, despite their recent secession, had already determined to abide by

the king’s earlier decrees concerning colonial autonomy and political empowerment o f its

non-white citizens. Citing their adherence to these previous laws and maintaining that

they were simply exercising caution in the face of the recent war against France by

arming the batteries around Martinique, the assembly clambered to mitigate the severity

of their most recent actions. The colony, they maintained, had remained in a state o f

peace and was enjoying a prosperous, uninterrupted trade w ith France. Moreover, they

alone had fully implemented the Law of 4 April, and had guaranteed equal political rights

to all of the island’s citizens regardless o f color. In the eyes of the colonial assembly,

clearly no problem existed that warranted such armed “assistance” from home. Saint-

11 Bailleul, Report, 2; Rochambeau to Monge, 3 October 1792, Ibid., 3.

168




Domingue, they asserted, needed help; not Martinique.12

Throughout the remainder o f the day Rochambeau waited impatiently for a

response that never seemed to come. By early evening, the frustrated general volunteered

to go ashore to meet personally with Behague and the colonial assembly. Taking counsel

of his better judgement and the advice of his entourage, however, Rochambeau quickly

abandoned the project and continued to wait. By midnight, he still had received no word

from Fort-Royal and thus dispatched his First Aide-de-Camp, Philippe-Paul Daucourt to

the capital. With specific instructions to find Behague himself, Daucourt carried with

him a letter from Rochambeau which asked simply if the former Governor General and

the assembly would at least give official recognition to the Law of 4 April. Daucourt

arrived in Fort-Royal at half-past-one in the morning on 17 September, and went

immediately to the government building where he was informed that Governor General

Behague was in council at the city’s Hotel de Ville. Undaunted, Daucourt reached the

building and asked again for Behague, only to have local colonial bureaucrats offer the

emissary a variety o f possible locations for the Governor.

Doggedly, Daucourt retraced his steps to the government building, and upon

entering was immediately placed under arrest by order o f the colonial assembly and he ld

until eight-thirty in the morning.13 To this point, Rochambeau and his aide had done

12 Colonial Assembly of Martinique to the ship owners and merchants o f the ports

of France, 19 September 1792. Service historique, Indes Occidentales: Expedition desisles du Vent, Guadeloupe, Carton B92, item 11.


Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Carton B91, folio 3, 2. Daucourt received

very cordial treatment during his captivity and that morning was reassured that the

169




nothing threatening. The delays on the part of the colonials, however, were nothing more

than an attempt to buy time. Unknown to either Daucourt or to anyone aboard the

Semillante, a certain ancien Officier de la Martinique (a Martiniquais officer o f the

French ancien regime army) Noroy and his artillery company (who styled themselves

“Tyroliers”) had been working throughout the night to prepare the port’s cannons for

firing upon Rochambeau’s ships.14

When he finally was allowed to return that morning to the Semillante, Daucourt

informed his general that the government o f Martinique had terminated all

communication with the convoy, had declared the colony in a state o f imminent danger,

and would allow no one else to come ashore. Further, Behague had warned that if

Rochambeau’s ships continued to move toward anchorage in Fort-Royal, he would

repulse them by force.15 Rochambeau and his fellows must surely have been even more

shocked to see the Tricolor struck over the capital and the pavilion blanc of the Bourbons

raised defiantly in its place.

French naval personnel on the island, believing the acting Governor General’s

alarmist propaganda, earlier had sworn their allegiance to Behague and quickly had two

vaisseaux, the Ferme (74) and the Calypso (74), and two corvettes ready for action, all

four still flying their own tricolor flags. The Calypso and the corvette Marechal de

Castries now weighed anchor and fixed their sails in preparation for an attack. As the

Governor General and the assembly had read Rochambeau’s dispatch.

14 Bailleul, Report, 2.

15 Ibid.

170

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduct ion prohibited without permission.



ships began to maneuver against the Semillante, cannon batteries on shore fired first at

one o f the general’s transport ships, the Saint-Nicolas, and then at the Bienvenue.

Outgunned in every direction, both Rochambeau and de Bruix determined that their only

reasonable course o f action was to put to sea, thus avoiding a potentially disastrous

engagement. While Rocham beau’s convoy sailed south toward Sainte-Lucie, three of the

warships from M artinique followed them closely until all were far from the island.

Behague and Martinique’s Royalists had won the first round.

“What a vast field it is for somber reflection,” wrote Rochambeau to the Minister

o f Marine, Monge, “that the four vessels which were at the brink o f combat were French,

each flying the national flag....” 16 As they departed the island, Rochambeau penned a

narrative of the preceding days’ events to the C olonial Assembly o f Martinique; it was a

vain attempt to inform the islanders o f his true intentions and actions. “I hope,”

Rochambeau wrote Monge, “that the badly-instructed French of Martinique will one day

repent their disobedience and that they will think kindly o f our moderation. This is the

only suitable manner o f response to the unjust prejudices that they have shown to the

troops that were under my o rders.” 17

Sobered in the aftermath of the event to the realization that they had jus t effected

an act of war against France, nearly all involved parties on Martinique attemp ted to justify

their behavior in various letters to the Minister o f Marine, to the Assembly, and even to


Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Carton B91, folio 3, 5; De Poyen, Les

Guerres Des Antilles, 6; Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la Martinique , 160.

17 Ibid.

171




merchants in the metropolitan ports. Behague was no exception. Still apparently

believing tha t the king had been reinstalled to his throne, Behague audaciously wrote to

the Minister of Marine on 20 September: “I have saved Martinique, that is my crime.” 18

Further, Behague offered that “[i]f France wants to save the Windward Isles, she has not

an instant to lose in sending some ships to Saint-Domingue that might stop the

destructive devices o f M. de Rochambeau .” 19 For their part, the colonial assembly wrote

to the Assembly on 8 October that they had only acted to prevent the destruction of the

colony. In their opinion, they could never recognize an authority that had usurped power

in France; moreover, they had only sought to maintain stability and order in the midst of

civil war.

A growing number o f islanders on Martinique, however, did not share either

Behague’s or the colonial assembly’s self-serving views. In an effort to quell any

potential the unrest over the incident, Behague issued a general proclamation throughout

the island which began: “[w]ho would believe it? The orders that we have given to arm

the batteries defending the bay o f Fort-Royal, in consequence o f the declaration o f war

which we have been officially sent....serve today as a pretext to [our] mal-intent to incite

to rebellion the troops of the line, the crews of the state’s ships and both the free and the

slaves o f the towns and the countryside.”20

18 Behague to Monge, 20 September 1792. Service historique, Indes

Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Guadeloupe, Carton B92, item 1, 2; Daney, His toire de la Martinique, 175.

19 Behague to Monge, 20 September 1792. Ibid., 3.

20 Behague, Proclamation, 14 September 1792. Ibid., item 11, 1.

172




Behague’s diatribe further announced that Rochambeau’s force’s appearance

before Fort-Royal was pro of enough of the bad intentions of the state, which had come to

take over the island’s troops and navy, as well as the island’s free blacks and slaves.

Reprinting a testimony o f loyalty from the sailors o f the frigate the Ferme, Behague went

on to bluster that “under such circumstances proper to legitimize the new fears o f a

colony constantly loyal to the nation, the law and the King, of a colony which has never

given any idea of wanting to reject the decrees o f the National Assembly, then it is right

not to allow into [the colony] anyone whom [the colony] has not received with respect

and self-sacrifice....”21 The Governor General should have known by this time that the

Colonial Assembly would not support him in a time o f crisis. In a letter read in Paris

before the Legislative Assem bly on 19 October, former members of Martinique’s

Intermediary Committee of the Colonial Assembly stated unequivocally that Behague had

posted the proclamation on the day before Rochambeau and the Civil Commissioners had

even arrived at Martinique .22

Within days, Behague’s actions against Rochambeau rose from being simply an

21 Ibid., 2.

22 M. Paige neg otiant a l’Assemblee Nationale, 19 October 1792. Service

historique, Indes Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Guadeloupe, Carton B 92,

item 1. While obviously self-serving, the former committee members’ accusation is not

unfounded. Though claiming to have issued the proclamation after Rochambeau’s

departure from the island, Behague carelessly neglected to modify the proclamation’sactual printing date - 14 October 1792. The committee members’ letter goes on to say

that the Governor General had pu t all o f island’s gun batteries and warships on standby a

full day prior to Rochambeau’s arrival. If this is true, it clearly calls into question the

documents cited by Lemery which describe Behague as nothing more than a victim of

President Dubuc’s treachery.

173




internal affair, to being an embarrassing matter of international interest, with the English

applauding Behague’s and the colonial assem bly’s accomplishment against the new

representatives o f the radical French government.

The Governor [Behague] who presides over the affairs of thecolony, with the general approbation of its inhabitants, under

standing there were 1800 troops, and three Commissioners,

deputed by the National Assembly, on their way from Old France,

dispatched a frigate from the road of St. Pierre, to meet the fleet,

and acquaint the commanding officer, that the inhabitants of the

island being at length, after a struggle of two years, in a state of

perfect security, and having forgotten all polit ical animosities, were

determined that no intrusion from France, in her present situation,

should subject them to a renewal o f former disorders; that, when

France should be capable o f governing herself, it would be time to

acknowledge her supremacy; and that at present not one would be

suffered to land.”23

Meanwhile, Rochambeau and his convoy, still shadowed by Behague’s two

frigates, abandoned as impracticable the idea of landing at Sainte-Lucie, and instead

turned north toward Guadeloupe. After two days’ sailing, the enemy vessels had returned

to Martinique, but when Rochambeau’s convoy arrived at Guadeloupe, they found this

island also under the drapeau blanc. Rocham beau’s hopes of installing General Collot

on the island were dashed. Again rebuffed by the Royalists and unable to take effective

action in the Windward Islands, Rochambeau saw little choice but to sail west for Saint-

Domingue to await further orders. There, he believed, he could not only assist his

counterpart, General Desparbes, and Commissioners Sonthonax, Polverel and A ilhaud in

quelling the continuing slave revolt; at the same time, he could also gather army and

23 “Authentic Intelligence from various Parts of the Continent; Martinique.” The

Gentleman’s Magazine 63 (January 1793): 80.

174




naval forces sufficient to recapture the Windward Islands from Behague .24

Proving yet a further embarrassment to the French, newspapers in England now

jeered the unfortunate Rochambeau, saying that “ [djeputies from the islands of Martinico

[sic] and Guadeloupe have lately arrived in London, who solicit the protection o f our

government to these two islands from the plunderers whom the French Republic is

disposed to send there, in order to place the inhabitants on the same footing with Santo

Domingo. It is well known that Martinico and Guadeloupe have driven away the Jacobin

Rochambeau and his 3000 [sic] men, who were destined to reduce them to the same state

of anarchy with the rest o f the French settlements.”25 In the case of Saint-Domingue, the

British press’ choice of the word anarchy was entirely appropriate.

After learning in November 1791 o f Paris’ revocation of the Decree o f 15 May,

Saint-Domingue’s mulattoes initiated an horrific rampage against whites throughout the

colony’s various provinces. Despite the conciliatory efforts of the First Civil

Commission, including the promulgation o f a general amnesty which only lost for them

the respect of the whites, the situation in Saint-Domingue continued to deteriorate. In


Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Carton B91, folio 3, 6-7; Jean-Baptiste

Rochambeau, Memoires M ilitaires, I, 436; Docteur Magnac, La Perte de Saint-

Domingue, 1789-1809; La Revolution a Saint-Domingue et VExpedition du General

Leclerc (Paris, 1910), 46. Sainte-Lucie lay too close to Martinique for Rochambeau to

effect any decisive action - the convoy was still under “escort” by Behague’s frigates.

For reasons that are not clear, Rochambeau and de Bruix had to abandon the Bienvenue inthe British island o f Saint Christopher (now Saint Kitts). The British allowed the vessel

to sail to directly to France. Bailleul, Report, 3.

25 “Authentic Intelligence from various Parts of the Continent; West India

Intelligence.” The Gentlem an’s Magazine 63 (January 1793): 79.

175




December 1791, however, the slave leaders Jean-Fran9ois and Biassou had actually

offered the members o f the First Civil Commission the last best chance to end the revolt.

In return for their own permanent freedom and that o f a few hundred slave leaders,

especially “acculturated” slaves who had been bom on the island, Jean-Fran^ois and

Biassou were willing to betray the majority o f their followers, and to actually assist the

whites in re-enslaving the bulk o f those slaves who had most recently been imported from

Africa. The Civil Commissioners agreed, but whites of Saint-Domingue’s assembly

sabotaged the negotiations. Hearing o f the attempted betrayal by their leaders, hundreds

of blacks under the comm and o f the mulatto leader Candi, now turned against their slave

brethren and sided with the mulattoes .26 According to British reports:

....murders and massacres are without number; the canes on one

plantation or another, are set on fire every night by the Blacks, with

whom are joined great numbers o f the Mulattoes, between whom

and the Whites, joined also by the Mulattoes and the Blacks, are

continued skirmishes and battles. The prisoners taken are pu t to the

most unheard-of cruel tortures: one favorite revenge they practice

is, the pressing or screwing the unfortunate person taken between

two boards, and then sawing them into small pieces, beginningeither at the head or the feet, as cruelty or chance dictates....there

was a fight, in the town o f Cap Fr an c is [sic], between the

Aristocratic and the Democratic parties, wherein six of the

principle merchants were sacrificed; one o f whom, supposed to be

the richest there, and a warm friend of the old government, was

mangled and cut into small pieces, which they stuck on the point o f

their swords, or fixed in their hats, and, so decorated, paraded the

town in triumph. Want o f order and subordination reigned also on

board the men of war in the harbor, the crew having comm and, and

26 Robert Heinl and Nancy Heinl, Written in Blood; the Story o f the Haitian

People, 1492-1971 (Boston, 1978), 53-54.

176




the officers being subject to their caprice.27

At the same time that Rochambeau was engaged at Martinique and Guadeloupe,

Saint-Domingue’s new Civil Comm issioners, Sonthonax, Polverel, and Ailhaud had

arrived with their own convoy at le Cap on 18 Septem ber 1792. Despite the factional

violence, they would, Sonthonax swore, enforce the Law o f 4 April. Given broad latitude

to ensure their success, the new Com missioners’ powers included “the right to suspend or

dissolve existing colonial assemblies and to organize new ones; the right to investigate all

the causes o f the troubles in Saint-Domingue and arrest all guilty parties; and the right to

requisition public force whenever they felt it necessary for their own security or for the

execution o f their orders.”28

27 “Authentic Intelligence from various Parts o f the Continent; W est India

Intelligence.” The Gentlem an’s Magazine 63 (January 1793): 79. France’s re-conquest

o f Saint-Domingue was a grave issue not only of national unity but also o f economics.

As one British observer wrote: “The Island of St. Domingo (I mean the French part o f it

which has been desolated by the black insurgents) produces more sugar than all o f the

British Colonies together; a plentiful crop o f our colonies is estimated at 160,000

hogsheads, a middling at 140,000 hogsheads, and a very short one at 120,000. Themedium of these crops is 140,000 hogsheads, and, as the whole importation of sugar into

Europe, from all the West India settlements belonging to the British and foreigners, does

not exceed 400,000 hogsheads, take the produce o f St. Domingo out o f the market, and

only 260,000, instead o f 400,000 hogsheads, will remain the consumption for all o f

Europe.” Anonymous letter to the editor describing the reasons for the increased price of

sugar in England, The Gentlem an’s Magazine 62 (February 1792): 112. Yet another

Englishman observed that “ [t]he loss of the produce o f this extensive and once valuable

island will be most severely felt throughout all o f Europe, particularly in the a rticles o f

coffee and sugar; of cotton too, the annual export was 10 millions of pounds, 50,000 bags

of 200 lbs each. “West India Intelligence; Kingston, Jan 19.” The Gentlem an’s Magazine

62 (April 1792): 375.

28 Stein, Sonthonax, 24; J. Ph. Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les Troubles de

Saint-Domingue (Paris, 1799), III, 127. In Rochambeau’s estimation, the new Civil

Commissioners were simply the tool o f the mulattoes and the Am is des Noirs in Paris,

and had no real interest whatsoever in the colonies. Rochambeau, “Troubles des

177




The slave revolt, then entering its second year, was by far the Com missioners’

greatest concern.29 After an enthusiastic reception by the recently installed governor,

Philibert-Fran9ois Blanchelande, and the island’s colonial assembly, Sonthonax and his

confederates immediately set about their task o f reorganizing Saint-Dominguan society.

Having been apprized o f the deteriorated state of the beleaguered forces in the colony,

France ’s Minister of Marine and Colonies, Gaspard Monge had sent with the delegation

two-thousand regular soldiers and another four-thousand carefully selected National

Guard under the command o f General Desparbes. Prior to leaving France, however,

tension had begun to develop between the Commissioners and the experienced and

respected general, who, once conducting operations on the ground, obstinately refused to

allow the civilian politicians to direct what he considered the conduct o f simple military

procedures .30

Leger Sonthonax was the complete antithesis of his military counterpart. Only

twenty-nine years old when he arrived in the colony, this country 1awyer-turned-enrage

had found his opportunity in the Revolution, and been elevated as the result of his fierce

Jacobin radicalism. In a place where conciliation had consistently failed, the corruptible,

paranoid Sonthonax would effectively combine duplicity and terror as means to

accomplish his objectives. Having cowed his associates before they had even arrived in

Colonies”, Service historique, MR 593,13.

29 By late September-early October 1792, Desparbes’ forces had recaptured most

of the island’s southern and western provinces, leaving most rebel activity relegated to

Saint-Domingue’s mountains and Northern Plain.

30 Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo, 180-186.

178




the colony, Sonthonax quickly emerged as the de facto leader of the triumvirate, and

mercilessly implemented the powers granted him by the Legislative Assembly. He

ordered Governor Blanchelande, who had len t official support to the Royalists, arrested

and returned to France to face trial and subsequent execution. Roume, the only remaining

member of the First Civil Commission, traveled from the W est province to le Cap to offer

his support to the new Comm issioners; quickly realizing that his services were neither

needed nor wanted, he wisely fled the island.

Throughout fall 1792, Sonthonax continued to strengthen his position in the

colony. Only days after promising no change to established procedures regarding the

status of the slaves, on 12 October 1792, Sonthonax dissolved Saint-Dom ingue’s colonial

assembly, but instead o f holding the new elections mandated by the Law o f 4 April, he

replaced the body altogether with an “Intermediary Comm ission” of six whites, five

mulattoes and one free black .31 This single act won him the support of the island’s

mulattoes and free blacks, but Sonthonax was far from finished. Exercising his unusual

gift for mob appeal, and believing that he also could en list the support o f the island’s

poorer whites , Sonthonax next m obilized the pe tits blancs in the North against the

Royalists.

The Com missioner’s approach, while exceedingly dangerous, was quite effective.

Organizing Jacobin-style clubs throughout the island, Sonthonax split the white minority,

31 Edwards, History o f the Brit ish Colonies in the West Indies, IV, 114. In reality ,

the Intermediary Commission neither legislated nor advised (as Sonthonax claimed), but

was simply a rubber stamp body of toadies convened by Sonthonax to lend some air of

legitimacy to his arbitrary policymaking.

179




Figure 20.

Vue de le Cap Fran^ais ca. 1790

180




channeling the hostility o f the disenfranchised petits blancs into an executive arm o f

government that he could control himself .32 The grands blancs, who had assumed that

Sonthonax could be tamed, now began to fear the Civil Commissioners, but their fear

turned to terror and rage when they learned that Jacobin-led mobs in Paris had stormed

the Tuileries, deposed the king, and had called for the formation of the National

Convention. If this was how the Jacobins planned to handle the royalty in France, the

white planters felt, surely they themselves would receive even worse treatment on Saint-

Domingue.

Now fearing certain disaster and hoping to copy the example o f Martinique, the

island’s Royalists orchestrated a plan to depose the implacable new Commissioner and

his associates. With the support of the disenchanted General Desparbes and loyal soldiers

of the King ’s Irish Legion (the Dillon and W alsh regiments) who had been sent earlier to

le Cap, the conspirators prematurely launched their planned coup on 17 October, when a

fight broke out between club members and men of the Walsh regiment over anti-Royalist

placards that had posted throughout the city. A mob seized the arsenal, but when

Desparbes called out all of the city’s troops to retake the compound, the National Guard

declared their loyalty to the Commissioners. When the inevitable showdown came,

Desparbes refused to give the orders necessary for the Royalist troops to cut down the

National Guard; the event collapsed into failure. Immediately, Sonthonax had Desparbes

32 Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo, 190-193; Stein, Sonthonax,

40-52. Originally named “Les Amis de la Constitution,” the club at le Cap was later

renamed “Les Amis de la Convention.”

181




and the more highly placed Royalist officers arrested and sent to France for trial.33 Now

leaderless, loyal junior officers soon fled the island, severely weakening the possibilities

of an organized, military-supported Royalist threat in the North. Such was the situation

upon the arrival one w eek later o f Lieutenant General Rochambeau.

Rochambeau had written to the Minister o f War on 15 October 1792 that because

of the events that had taken place at Martinique, he would take his troops to Saint-

Domingue to put them immediately under the control of General Desparbes to assist in

the defeat of the colony’s rebellious slaves. To Rochambeau, this plan must have seemed

perfectly reasonable based on his communications the preceding m onth with Saint-

Domingue’s new Civil Commissioners. Unaware, however, of the events that had

transpired after his leaving Martinique, the general maintained a naive optimism. “One

must always hope,” he said, “that the old habits and the old customs that we know of the

colonists will easily recognize the constitutional character of the Civil Commissioners

and the governor who [now present] themselves....relieving [the colonists] o f their vain

fears....”34

Certainly Rochambeau was surprised to learn upon his arrival at le Cap that

Desparbes was incarcerated. Nevertheless, he did not resist when Sonthonax, with the

approval of the other two members o f the Commission, appointed Rochambeau Governor

33 Stein, Sonthonax, 40-52; Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo, 191-192. Though accused o f treachery by the Convention, the Revolutionary Tribunal

acquitted Desparbes.

34 Rochambeau to Joseph Servan, 15 October 1792. Service historique, Indes

Occidentales: Expedition des isles du Vent, Carton B91, folio 3, 1- 2.

182




General of Saint-Domingue three days later on 27 October 1792.35 Previously unaware

that the general was even coming to the colony, Sonthonax unofficially had designated

Louis-Maximilien-Fran9ois-Herman d ’Hinnisdal de Fumal, military commander in the

North and the most senior of the three provinc ial commanders in Saint-Domingue, to the

position first. The Legislative Assem bly in Paris, however, had selected Rochambeau as

military commander over all o f the French Windward Island colonies, affording him

superiority over any o f Saint-Domingue’s remaining officers. More important, as

Rochambeau was a well-known Jacobin, it appeared clear to Sonthonax not only that

supporting him as the Com mission’s choice for Governor General was in accordance with

the newly-established National Convention’s wishes, but also that this Governor General

might prove invaluable to his plans.36 Thus, in an ironic twist of fate, Donatien

Rochambeau came to accept the very position that he earlier so repugnantly had declined

before the Legislative Assem bly .37

35 Second Civil Commission of Saint-Domingue, Proclamation, 27 October 1792.AN, Correspondances des Commissaires Civils Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et

son successeur, Septembre 1792 a Janvier 1793, Carton Colonies CC9A8; Letter of the

Civil Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, 28 October 1792. Service historique,

Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 45.

36 Stein, Sonthonax, 53.

37 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires M ilita ires, I, 437, II, 31. By November

1792, Marshal Rochambeau, ever the concerned father, made constant demands to the

Minister of Marine for news o f his son. By now considered persona non grata, the senior

Rochambeau was repeatedly ignored by the ministry and its Jacobin officials. Only the pleas o f Donatien Rochambeau’s wife, Madame d’Harville de Rochambeau brought news

to the family of the lieutenant general. See letters Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau to Monge,

31 October and 6 December 1792; Secretary of the Minister of Marine in re. numerous

requests by Franfoise Eleonore d ’Harville de Rochambeau concerning her husband, 4

November 1792. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299,

183




D’Hinnisdal was furious. Feeling slighted by the Commissioners, the general

fought with them and with Rochambeau over prerogative, but received no satisfaction.

He therefore resigned as commander in the North and returned to France in early

November. Similarly, General Adrien-Nicolas Lasalle, commander in the West,

complained to the Convention that he too had been overlooked, despite his seniority.

Lasalle need not have worried, he would become Governor General before the year’s

end.38

The “Desparbes affair” had much more far-reaching consequences than simply the

dissent caused within the colony’s military command structure. Besides establishing the

supreme authority of the Civil Commission in the colony, the attempted coup allowed the

Commissioners to divide their efforts into three distinct jurisdictions which, they thought,

would afford them greater mastery over the entire colony. Under the new arrangement,

Sonthonax would control the North, Polverel the West, and Ailhaud the South .39 Since

the headquarters o f the Governor General was in le Cap, Rochambeau, in his secondary

role as commander of troops in all the colony would thus fall under Sonthonax’

items 47, 50, 53, 54. By the first days of December 1792, Monge and Marshal

Rochambeau had finally established a dialogue whereupon the minister provided copies

o f Donatien Rochambeau’s dispatches to the m inistry to the marshal. The elder

Rochambeau later discovered that his son’s personal letters to him had been intercepted

by the English.

38 Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint-Domingue, III, 196.

39 Soon afterward, Ailhaud, who had no stomach whatsoever for the task at hand,

slipped away on the next ship to France, possibly at the urging of Sonthonax and

Polverel. At his trial, he too was acquitted by the National Convention.

184




immediate control.40 Both Rocham beau’s troops and his authority were all that

Sonthonax needed, and with the largest part of the internal Royalist military threat

mitigated, the two men set out to address the problem of the rebellious slaves.

Organizing an expedition to subdue the slaves in the North had been a topic o f

discussion in Saint-Domingue for weeks prior to Rochambeau’s arrival. Where his

predecessors only had debated, however, the new Governor General prepared to act.

Sonthonax had made the job slightly easier by decreeing on 11 October 1792 that all

businessmen, workers and inhabitants of le Cap make available to the Administrator o f

Finances all equipment, slaves or animals that could be of military use. Further, all those

artisans employed in the island’s various service industries would become employees o f

the administration. By 27 October, the decrees became more imperative, demanding not

only hard currency, foodstuffs and merchandise for the war effort, but also that each

citizen register his personal contribution w ith the finance administrator .41

Sonthonax’ efforts to meet Rocham beau’s needs were indeed impressive, but one

critical problem remained. Since their arrival on the island, hundreds o f Continental

French soldiers in both the Martinique and the Saint-Domingue convoys had fallen victim

to the usually fatal yellow fever, with the number of infected increasing daily. The Civil

Commissioners, therefore, could not rely only upon the regulars and National Guard to be

40 Stein, Sonthonax, 53.

41 Extract from the register of the Colonial Assembly of the French Portion of

Saint-Domingue, 11 October 1792. AN, Correspondances des Comm issaires Civils

Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et son successeur, Septembre 1792 a Janvier 1793,

Carton C olonies CC9A8, item 2.

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available for duty. It thus became necessary for Sonthonax to augment his troops with the

colony’s militia, and as the result, Sonthonax and the other Civil Commissioners wasted

no time establishing their influence with mulatto leaders throughout the colony .42

Gens de couleur, who Sonthonax referred to as the true “Citizens o f 4 April,”

were natural allies of the Commissioners, and to cement their support, Sonthonax’

Intermediary Committee took the politically important step on 30 October o f allowing

pensions and a medal for all gens de couleur who were wounded or killed in the defense

of the island.43 Soon, nearly 7,000 mulattoes had reported for duty, and with 14,000 to

15,000 Republicans now under arms throughout the colony, Rochambeau and the Second

Civil Commission next set out to destroy Jean-Frantpois and Biassou.

The first days of November 1792 found Rochambeau making the final

preparations to equip his expeditionary force, but the general had other worries as well.

42 The total (on paper) o f troops available to Sonthonax upon his arrival in Saint-

Domingue was approximately: 6,000 brought with him from France; 700 troops o f the DuCap regiment; 1,000 of the Artois and Picardy regiments; 7,000 militia (gens de couleur )

and 1,200 irregular troops raised and paid for by the colony. Edwards, History o f the

British Colonies in the West Indies, IV, 145.

43 Extract from the register of the Colonial Assembly of the French Portion of

Saint-Domingue, 30 October 1792, 1 November 1792. AN, Correspondances des

Commissaires Civils Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et son successeur, Septembre

1792 a Janvier 1793, Carton Colonies CC9A8. Sonthonax further antagonized the pe tits

blancs by employing only mulattoes to fill vacant administrative posts. If taken alone,

this action would have caused only a minor stir, but Sonthonax waited until Rochambeau

was near death with the fever to order on 7 November that his Intermediary Committeeappoint (with no possibility of appeal) six mulattoes to supervise the collection o f forced

loans among the le Cap’s general citizenry. Naturally, pe tits and grand blancs were

equally outraged. For all practical purposes, Sonthonax had pronounced General

Rochambeau, their only hope for equity, dead. Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les

Troubles de Saint-Domingue, III, 201-203.

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of the skirmish, however, and in his typically terse style, all that the general had to say

was simply that “this day was long and tiring .”44

Having thus received his first taste o f battle in Saint-Domingue, Rochambeau

finally arrived at Fort-Dauphin at eight o’clock on the evening of 4 November 1792, and

remained there for the next three days. Certainly, the enemy knew o f the expedition’s

presence. However, the lull in the action was necessary for the general to correct a

critical lack o f provisions among the nearly 1,200 of the colony’s troops that

accompanied him. While his Orderer zealously collected any available supplies in Fort-

Dauphin, Rochambeau inspected the military posts in the vicinity and finalized his plans

for a dramatic sweep through the North .45

The general’s concept, which involved four simultaneous attacks through several

districts, would clear an area of nearly 700 square kilometers. Successful opening moves

were critical, and Rochambeau honored Candi and his irregulars by permitting them to

make the first assault. The mulatto leader’s orders were simple, but his task was not: rout

44 Rochambeau, “Exped ition sur les quartiers de Maribaroux et Ouanaminthe,

enlevees aux Brigands par le General Rochambeau, le sept Novembre 1792" (Cap

Fran9ais, Saint-Domingue, 1792), Service historique, Indes Occidentales (1792-1829),

Guadeloupe-Correspondance, Carton B92, folio 2, item 1 6,1 . Candi is described in

numerous contemporary sources as being particularly vicious. By fall 1792, it was

common knowledge that he and his followers had committed countless atrocities against

white women during the uprisings in the Northern Plain. Once he had attained real

power, however, Candi’s personal infamy reached mythic proportions as the result of

favorite form of interrogation - forcing his victims to talk by plucking their eyes out witha corkscrew.

45 Ibid., 2; Rochambeau to the “President o f the National Assembly,” 12

November 1792. Service historique, “Troubles de Saint-Domingue,” Carton DXXV 55,

item 4, 1.

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the enemy camps to his front, and then continue to drive the rebels south and west as far

as the parish o f le Trou, while preserving the security of Fort-Dauphin. This first strike

was a success.46

The second attack involved Colonel d ’Assas and his Du Cap regiment driving the

enemy to the west of le Cap as far as le Mome Rouge, turning south, and then making a

second attack in the Dondon parish. In executing this maneuver, Colonel d ’Assas would

effectively cordon o ff the w estern side o f the N orthern Plain, thus protecting

Rochambeau’s main columns from an enemy attack in their rear. Once he had placed

troops in defensive positions between M ome Rouge and Dondon, d ’Assas and the

remainder o f his troops then would move east to assist Rochambeau’s main body in

attacking the principal objective, the rebel stronghold at Ouanaminthe.47

The Governor General divided his remaining forces into two columns tha t would

move due east against the rebel slaves who had sought refuge in the mountains near the

Spanish border. The right column, led by the general’s adjutant, Colonel Etienne-

Maynaud-Bizefranc de Laveaux, included 304 infantrymen of the 84th Line (recently

arrived from France), forty of Candi’s irregulars and 110 mulatto cavalrymen from

various groups. After first sweeping through Maribaroux and destroying any rebel groups

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid. Rebel slaves had held this frontier garrison (which immediately

overlooked Saint-Domingue’s border with the Spanish half of the island) since the

insurrection of 1791, and had used the fort as a conduit for supplies and arms donated to

them by sympathetic Spanish colonists wishing to undermine their French counterparts.

Rochambeau to the “President of the National Assembly,” 12 November 1792. Service

historique, “Troubles de Saint-Domingue,” Carton DXXV 55, item 4, 2.

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that he found, Laveaux’ orders then were to attack Ouanaminthe on the south side.

Rochambeau’s larger detachment would move directly toward the rebel stronghold and

attack the stronghold from the center and north .48

Laveaux’ troops began their movement early on the morning o f 6 November, but

were slowed down throughout the day by torrential rains that made moving critical

artillery pieces along the unpaved roads nearly impossible. Even Rochambeau’s own

column, which had begun its movement during the evening o f the 6th, had to wait until the

following morning to leave Fort-Dauphin. Following the main road to Ouanaminthe, the

Governor General’s route would take him past the plantations o f Beaujeau and Thilorier,

both o f which Rochambeau knew to be enemy strongho lds49

The advance progressed well, but at eleven o ’clock his column reached the

48 Ibid. Rochambeau does not mention the number of troops under his immediate

command, but their strength could not have been more than 700. Rochambeau to the

“President of the National Assembly,” 12 November 1792. Service historique, “Troubles

de Saint-Domingue,” Carton DXXV 55, item 4, 2. Though Georges Six spells thisofficer’s name Lavaux, all contemporary manuscripts (and subsequent histories) speak of

Colonel Etienne Laveaux. A competent and reliable soldier, he rose quickly to the rank

of General de division, and in October 1793 accepted the Convention’s appointment as

Governor General of Saint-Domingue. With nearly no support from France, Laveaux was

able to do little more than try to preside responsibly over a civil race war, while the threat

o f foreign invasion served as a constant backdrop. By March 1796, he had been captured

and imprisoned by the colony’s rebellious mulattoes, only to be freed from prison by

Toussaint Louverture and members o f his army o f former slaves. As the result, on 25

March 1795 Laveaux breveted Toussaint to the rank o f colonel in the French Army

(Toussaint was already a general o f the Spanish army of Santo Domingo), and four days

later, named him “Lieutenant to the Governor General.” By fall 1796, Laveaux finallyleft Saint-Domingue after being elected to the Council of Ancients in Paris.

49 Ibid., 3; Rochambeau to the “President of the National Assembly,” 12


item 4, 3 .

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Beaujeau plantation where he was confronted by the first entrenched enemy position.

Established on the far side of a small river that ran through the plantation, the rebel slaves

fired several cannons as Rochambeau’s force approached. Once his advance guard was in

place, however, the general forced the enemy’s heads down with two shots each from his

obusier and his 4-pounder, drew his sword, and personally led his cavalry in a charge

across the river and into the enemy position. The rebel slaves, who for reasons unknow n

were unable to fire their cannons again, desperately attempted to hold off the onslaught

with a line of musket fire, but to little effect. Within minutes, Rochambeau and his

cavalry had overrun the position and had put the rebels to flight.50

Three hours later, the general’s column reached the Thilorier plantation. This

time Rocham beau’s men faced well-placed fire from an 8-pounder and carefully

positioned sharpshooters. Using the cannon o f both his advanced and his rear guard to

reduce the enemy position, Rochambeau led the charge against this second enemy

stronghold. With eight of his staff officers and a handful o f men from his advance guard,

the general soon took possession o f the enemy’s main battery. Once more, the surviving

slaves fell back toward Ouanaminthe. This time, Rochambeau and his cavalry pursued

the retreating enemy to their remaining stronghold, cutting down the undisciplined rebel

slaves who ran before them. Once in sight of Ouanaminthe, however, devastating

artillery and musket fire from the works stopped Rochambeau’s pursuit dead in its

tracks.51

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 4.

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The Governor General did not hold back for long, however. When his full

complement o f artillery had arrived and began hurling shot into the stronghold, he

attacked. Sending his cavalry to flank the position to the left and two infantry battalions

to attack the center, the general led his dragoons to assist Colonel Laveaux’ column to

encircle Ouanaminthe on the right. The rebel slaves fought valiantly, serving their

cannons well, and rained ordered volleys of musket fire on their French enemy. The

weight o f Rocham beau’s numbers, soon turned the tide, however, as the more disciplined

French troops mounted the walls of Ouanaminthe, and the fighting became hand to hand.

Within minutes the drapeau blanc lay crumpled in an officer’s hands and the Tricolor

flew above Ouanaminthe. Rebels who managed to escape the carnage attempted to flee

into the mountains, only to be hunted down throughout the night by Colonel Laveaux and

his cavalry.52

The capture of the outpost yielded not only five cannons (three of large caliber),

many blacks, and some white Frenchmen and Spaniards, but also the correspondence and

the white hat plume o f none other than Jean-Fran9ois, who had led the defense himself .53

Thousands o f slaves, however, including Jean-Franijois, remained at large. Now the

52 Ibid., 5.

53 Ibid.; Rochambeau to the “President of the National Assembly,” 12 November

1792. Service historique, “Troubles de Saint-Domingue,” Carton DXXV 55, item 4, 3, 7.

In May 1792, war had been declared between Saint-Domingue and Spanish Santo

Domingo. The revolting slaves in Saint-Domingue had not only found refuge, but also a

source o f military supplies across the border, and by February 1793, both Jean-Framjois

and Biassou, as well as Toussaint Louverture had formally joined forces with the Spanish,

all three receiving the rank o f general in the Spanish army o f Santo Domingo. The white

Spaniards that Rochambeau captured were artillerymen that the Governor o f Santo

Domingo had furnished the rebels for their combat against the French.

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authorities tried a new approach. Sonthonax and Polverel’s policy of mandatory war

contributions, a burden which fell particularly hard on the island’s mulattoes, had filled

the colony’s coffers to the point that the Governor General was able to issue a

proclamation to all o f the island’s troops, offering any man four gourdes for every rebel

slave that was returned to his master .54 By 9 November, Rochambeau had even secured

the cooperation o f the Spanish governor (just across the border at Laxavon) for the

extradition o f all French slaves hiding in his city.55 The general’s military successes

against the rebel slaves, however, would prove to be short-lived. Almost immediately

after the fall of Ouanaminthe, Rochambeau him self fell victim to the deadly fiev re

ja une.56

Both before and throughout Rochambeau’s foray into the eastern provinces, social

stability in le Cap had degenerated steadily. In October, Sonthonax had pushed for the

implementation o f a new twenty-five-per-cent territorial tax, an issue over which he and

Commissioner Polverel were sharply divided. While the two men argued over this and

over what Polverel saw as Sonthonax’ unwarranted and wholesale deportations, more

radical “Jacobin” factions in the city stepped up their activity against their traditional

54 Gourdes - Saint-Domingue silver coin, approximately the equivalent of a

Spanish Piastre. Robert Lacombe, Histoire Monetaire de Saint-Domingue et de la

Republique d ’H ait ijusqu’en 1874 (Paris, 1958), 39-40.

55 Rochambeau, “Expedition,” 5-7. This was quite an accomplishment as

Governor Donatien Gaspard Cassasota may have sheltered up to 1,500 of Saint-Domingue’s rebel slaves. Rochambeau to the “President of the National Assembly,” 12


item 4, 6-7.

56 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires M ilita ires , I, 437.

193




enemies, the mulattoes and the remaining grands blancs. As the result, fanatical pe tit s

blancs pressured Sonthonax to deport “enemies” that they had identified, and outbreaks

o f violence had erupted throughout the city. Sonthonax and Rochambeau had attempted

conciliation, but their efforts had met with little success, and when the general left le Cap

in early November, the clubs saw an opportunity to strike at Sonthonax. The Civil

Commissioner, who had retained a large portion of Rochambeau’s troops in the city, was

not particularly weakened by the absence o f the Governor. “I am the delegate o f all

legislative, executive and administrative authority” he had proclaimed, “and by them I am

clothed with unlimited pow er .”57 Indeed, Leger Sonthonax was not a man to be trifled

with.

Conveniently unable to defer to the Governor General while the latter was on

campaign, Sonthonax published a decree on 12 November 1792 giving the Civil

Commissioners authority to pass immediate judgem ent on any matter if the governor was

not available. Though couched as an emergency powers act, the move was nothing short

o f a silent coup, the ramifications o f which Sonthonax would discuss with the general

upon his return. He may have believed that his 12 November decree would suffice to

contain the violence in le Cap, but two days later, a single event took place which forever

ended any hope for reconciliation between the warring factions. Not twenty feet from the

Commissioner’s door, white militants murdered two fellow whites (deserters), a mulatto,

57 Michel-Pascal Creuze-Dufresne, “Lettre de Michel-Pascal Creuze, Membre du

Conseil des Anciens a Jean-Philippe Garan (de Coulon), Depute du Loiret, sur son

Rapport des Troubles de Saint-Domingue, distribue au Corps Legislatif en Ventose, An

V, dix-huit apres la cloture des debats” (Paris, 1797), 9; Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur

les Troubles de Saint-Domingue, III, 201-203.

194




and nine blacks that Rochambeau had sent from the front as prisoners to Sonthonax. No

white in le Cap, not the city’s archbishop, the municipality, or any members of Les Am is

de la Convention protested the brutal slaying, or sought to bring the perpetrators to

justice. Their inaction proved conclusively to the Commissioner that the so-called

“aristocrats of the skin” were indeed not his supporters, and thus were no longer useful to

him. Describing the northern “Jacobins” as a “horde of dissenters,” Sonthonax deported

scores of the club’s most serious agitators and, ostensibly with Rochambeau’s approval,

he directed the brutal suppression and closing o f Les Am is de la Convention on 30

November. Now left only the mulattoes and free blacks as his allies, the Commissioner

prepared to do battle against the colony’s rad ical pe tits blancs.58

It remains difficult to determine the extent o f Rochambeau’s role in the events

that transpired in le Cap during the last two weeks of November and the first week of

December 1792. When he eventually did return from Ouanaminthe near the end of the

month, he was so gravely stricken with fever that Sonthonax faced the very real

58 Second Civil Commission of Saint-Domingue, Proclamations, 12 and 15

November 1792, and Sonthonax to Monge, 19 November 1792. AN, Correspondances

des Commissaires Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et son successeur, Septembre

1792 a Janv ier 1793, Carton Colonies CC9A8; M. Antoine Dalmas, Histoire de la

Revolution de Saint-Domingue, depuis le Commencement des Troubles, Jusqu ’a la Prise

de Jeremie et du Mole Saint-Nicolas pa r les Anglais (Paris, 1814), II, 87; Stein,

Sonthonax, 58. The 15 November proclam ation not only announced the murders, but also

put severe restrictions on the clubs. Les Amis de la Convention tried in vain to m ake

appeals to Rochambeau, but the general sided with Sonthonax, especially since he was

away. The club then turned their attentions to his secretary, Claude-Pierre-Joseph

Leborgne de Boigne, believing (probably correctly) that it was he who was acting against

them in the governor’s name. The petits blancs soon turned to England for help, begging

the King o f England to reassert his powers over the colony with the help o f a party led by

the Baron o f Santo-Domingo. Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint-

Domingue, III, 217-221.

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probability that his erstwhile ally would, at any moment, be dead. As commandant of

troops in le Cap, Colonel Laveaux was breveted to brigadier general and temporarily took

control of military operations in and around the city, while Rochambeau’s secretary,

Pierre-Joseph Leborgne, who held the additional title o f Commissary-Auditor of War,

appears to have made decisions and signed documents in the general’s name. Against all

expectations, Rochambeau slowly began to recover, but with the assistance o f the

general’s seconds, the Civil Comm issioner had already begun a new civil war in le Cap .59

Sonthonax already enjoyed the support of the gens de couleur, but he permanently

endeared himself to his co-conspirators in the mulatto caste when he ordered the

promotion of the first non-whites to officer rank in the regular French forces; they were to

fill those lieutenants’ positions that had been left vacant either by emigre flight or recent

deportation. Rochambeau and Sonthonax had earlier filled three vacant lieutenancies in

two o f the colony’s regiments with newly-promoted mulatto officers, all o f whom had

served with distinction in the National Guard since the troubles of 1791. The newest

regulation, promulgated on 1 December, provided that fully one quarter of the vacant

lieutenants’ positions in the conservative Du Cap regiment be filled by mulattoes as well.

The reaction among the colony’s various white factions was predictable. After their

complaints fell on dea f ears, some officers circulated a forged decree o f the Paris

government that proscribed the promotion o f men o f color to the officer corps; despite

their efforts, Sonthonax forced the issue. While both the pe tits and grands blancs viewed

the integration as yet another effort on Sonthonax’ part to promote mulatto ascendancy

59 Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint-Domingue , III, 223-234.

196




over them, the officers o f the Du Cap regiment further saw the order as a gross, deliberate

insult, especially since the mulatto candidates had been elevated to the officer ranks

without their having worked their way through the subordinate grades. Many o f the

regiment’s officers cast off their uniforms and began to leave the colony, either to find

refuge in America or in the ranks of the Spanish army on the other side of the island.

Those who remained, however, accepted the new regulation with what grace they could

muster, only to have the regiments’ non-commissioned officers and enlisted men continue

to refuse to serve under any person o f color. Nevertheless, Sonthonax was determined to

unite the colony’s army. In a parallel decree, he combined all of the city’s loyal troops

under Rochambeau’s single command and ordered Laveaux to bring the Du Cap regiment

back under control. By the following morning, the Commissioner had decided that he

would address his combined force, and directed Laveaux to assemble the Du Cap

regiment, 300 National Guard and 150 men o f the mulatto battalions on le Cap’s Champs

de Mars. The mulattoes, however, showed up in full force.60

According to their instructions, the Du Cap regiment and the National Guard

mustered, armed but without ammunition, and marched to the field only to find a superior

number o f mulatto companies standing at attention waiting for them. Sonthonax also

arrived with the entire general staff and the Intermediary Commission, and soon began to

exhort to the assembly the need for unity, warning that he would arrest the Du Cap

regiment’s well-liked major, Robquin, i f that unit persisted in their rebellion and did not

respect the rights of their mulatto brothers. The murmuring among the soldiers had

60 Ibid., 225,227-230.

197




already made the situation tense, but soon the mulattoes began to shout threats and

abuses at the white soldiers. The Du Cap regiment, however, remained relatively calm,

and it was only when the assembled gens de couleur began to throw rocks and load their

pistols in pla in view that the regulars steeled themselves for a fight. Several minutes

later, a black man with a large bag hoisted over his shoulder began to move furtively

among the mulattoes’ ranks. Loud voices from the assembled crowd cried out

“Massacre/” and “Tuez-leF Laveaux, doing what he could to maintain calm, shouted to

his men that the black was only handing out bread. When Laveaux ripped the bag open

however, he found that it indeed contained bread on the top, but underneath were fully

loaded cartridge boxes. The plot discovered, the mulattoes in the front ranks dropped

while those in the rear fired a volley into the midst o f the le Cap companies. With no

other option, the regulars and the National Guard fixed bayonets and charged, causing a

bloody hand-to-hand melee. The mulattoes held for some time, but when amm unition

arrived from the Du Cap regiment’s armory, they finally broke ranks and fled the field,

with the white companies close behind them.61

After collecting two cannons from the la Fossette battery, the mulattoes moved

into fortified positions in the heights that comm anded le Cap, but darkness ended the

fighting of 2 December. The following morning, drummers beat the Generate and the Du

Cap regiment and the National Guard companies once again went on the offensive, this

time aided by the majority of the sailors stationed in the city. No one, it seemed, could

61 Ibid., 229-230; Dalmas, His toire de la Revolution de Saint-Domingue, II, 89-

90; Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo, 200-201.

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prevent the bloodshed that was soon to follow. While Laveaux and the National Guard

commander, Colonel Lachaise, rode ahead o f the attackers to try to persuade the

mulattoes to disarm, Sonthonax appealed to the city’s municipal officers and the general

staff to stop the attack. To his shock, however, bo th groups sided with the Du Cap

regiment. Several white officers demanded that the Commissioner support them against

the mulattoes, but the distraught Commissioner’s only response was to have the men

immediately arrested. The attack continued, and by the evening of the 2nd, six men lay

dead and another twelve were seriously wounded.62

By the morning of 3 December, both Sonthonax and Laveaux had gone to

Rochambeau’s sick bed, perhaps to seek his advice on restoring order, but more probably

to persuade the general to make a public appearance to appeal for calm. What is known

is that at the very least, the Governor General issued orders, this time in his own hand,

that the mulattoes return their cannons to la Fossette, and that the white soldiers return

their weapons to their own armories. Furthermore, he ordered all of the city’s soldiers to

return to their barracks. Initially, not everyone responded to his directives. Colonel

Vemieul, who now led the white troops, answered tha t until the mulattoes put down their

weapons, the white troops would continue to march and would exterminate their colored

enemy once and for all. Fortunately, an unusually intense rainfall prevented a renewal of

62 Ibid., 231-234. Garran de Coulon, who by order o f the National Conventioncompiled sworn statements and nearly every relevant document from the period for his

official report on Saint-Domingue, cautioned that there are conflicting accounts regarding

the whereabouts of Laveaux and Sonthonax during the attack. Naturally, the two men

insisted that they were in the middle of the fray attempting to reconcile the two sides. A

number o f other sources, however, affirmed that both were hiding in Government House.

199




the fighting, but for two days negotiations continued, both sides disregarding any orders

that came from the government in le Cap. It was only on 6 December that a settlement

was finally reached.63

Rochambeau, now fully returned to duty, was able to persuade the mulattoes to

come out o f the hills only after he had ordered the arrest and deportation the chief white

leaders, including the archbishop of le Cap, and the m ost resistant soldiers of the Du Cap

regiment. The following morning, the mulatto companies marched into le Cap where

they were met by a formal delegation composed o f the Governor General, Sonthonax, the

Intermediary Commission and a gathering of unarmed white soldiers. Whether

engineered by Sonthonax or the result of a demand by the mulattoes, the reception was

important symbolically. Sonthonax claimed that the solemn gathering recognized an

“injustice” and represented the reign of law and equal rights. Indeed, the scene presented

an image o f a mulatto triumph over the whites, who would keep the ir distance and

maintain their humility. For now, the troubles seemed to be over.64

For Sonthonax, Rochambeau had proved a powerful ally, but after the Civil

Comm issioner’s poor handling of the “Affaire du Cap,” the general seems to have lost

any desire to continue to support his regime. Blaming his being still weakened by the

fever, and not having been able to attend to his troops for over three weeks, the Governor

63 Ibid., 234.

64 Ibid., 236-237. Rochambeau sent the remainder of the Du Cap regiment to a

new posting fifty miles to the w est at Fort Dauphin, and apparently not oblivious to his

new unpopularity, now traveled with an armed body guard o f eight mounted dragoons -

their swords constantly drawn. Dalmas, Histoire de la Revolution de Saint-Domingue, II,

92.

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General offered Sonthonax his resignation on 8 December. The Commissioner, however,

desperately needed the general, and with much flattery, attempted to persuade him to stay.

Without his help, Sonthonax implored, the blacks would easily overrun le Cap, thus

destroying the colony. Skillfully avoiding being trapped in Saint-Domingue by

Sonthonax’ prerogative, Rochambeau remonstrated that his mission was in Martinique,

and not having received any new directive to the contrary from the M inister of Marine, he

was obliged by law to follow his last orders. As the result, he would leave the colony at

the new year.65

Rochambeau would not leave Sonthonax empty-handed however. Discussions

had once again turned to a new campaign against the blacks, but though reinforcements

had come from France, fever had continued to claim thousands of French troops. Even

by the time of the capture of Ouanaminthe, for example, the Second Battalion, 16th Line,

had lost 317 o f its 595 men to sickness, and Rochambeau had been forced to return the

remainder of the decimated unit to France soon thereafter. By 16 December, personnel

shortages had become so acute that Sonthonax, at Rochambeau’s request, issued a

65 Sonthonax to Monge, 8 December 1792. Service historique, Carton Yb 381;

dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, unnumbered item. In his letter, Sonthonax praised

Rochambeau highly and expressed deep regret at his leaving. It had been asserted that

Sonthonax had bought Rocham beau’s support with a gift of 66,000 livres, an indictment

that, for a time, raised a g reat deal of suspicion in Paris concerning the new Governor

General. In his contemporary chronicles of the events in Saint-Domingue, however, the

Secretary to the National Convention, Garran de Coulon, staunchly defended

Rochambeau and made clear in his report to the Convention that the author o f that particular accusation had been the former Governor General Desparbes. The secretary

then went on to point out that even i f the accusation was true, Desparbes could not

possibly have known about it. Desparbes had made the careless mistake of reporting

events that he had supposedly witnessed more than three weeks a fter his deportation.

Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint-Domingue, III, 203.

201

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proclamation authorizing the Governor General to form not only a company o f black

guides, but also six compagnies /ranches.66 Each composed of fifty free blacks and/or

citizens o f color, these regular army companies not only knew the area and the nature of

the island’s guerrilla warfare, but were also men who were fully acclimatized, ensuring

continuous service without loss due to fever. Rochambeau had full control over the units’

organization, equipment and selection of officers and noncommissioned officers. For the

first time, black and m ulatto citizens o f France would serve in the na tion’s regular armed

forces. Later proving their loyalty to Sonthonax and to the Revolution, these troops

would prevent a second capture o f le Cap Fransais by rebel slaves, but they would be led

by Laveaux.67

Though the point was now moot, by the New Year 1793, General Rochambeau

finally had received a reply to his appeals to Monge for updated orders. The first words

of his new instructions, composed on 9 Novem ber 1792, helped the general little,

haranguing that “the news attending Louis XVI has caused the French to abolish the

monarchy forever! The French Republic is avenged forever of the tyrants who had

66 Rochambeau to the “President of the National Assembly,” 12 November 1792.

AN, Correspondence of Polverel and Sonthonax, DXXV 50/477, item 4, 5; Second Civil

Commission of Saint-Domingue, Proclamation, 16 December 1792. AN,

Correspondances des Commissaires Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et son

successeur, Septembre 1792 a Janvier 1793, Carton Colonies CC9A8. These companies

had been unofficially in existence (though the National Assembly had known of them and

had applauded the mulattoes’ efforts) since the first slave uprising in August 1791.

Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint-Domingue, III, 225.

67 Second Civil Commission of Saint-Domingue, Proclamation, 16 December

1792 and Sonthonax to Monge, 6 January 1793. AN, Correspondances des Commissaires

Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et son successeur, Septembre 1792 a Janvier 1793,

Carton Colonies CC9A8, unnumbered items.

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thought to invade this territory with iron and flame, and carries to all the torch of reason,

love of liberty, and the glory of French arms.” Following a few more lines o f pompous

propaganda, the letter ordered Rochambeau to leave Saint-Domingue and to assume his

original posting in Martinique. Further, and decidedly more helpful, the instructions gave

the Governor General broad powers of retribution against any enemy, personal or

combatant.68

In one o f his final acts, Rochambeau penned an appeal to the islanders, warning

them of the dangers that lay ahead i f they failed to band together for the defeat o f their

common enemy, the rebel slaves.69 Sonthonax named General Adrien-Nicolas Piedefer,

former marquis de, Lasalle interim Governor General in his stead. Since, however, he

was not only Commander o f the West, but also resident in Port-au-Prince, Lasalle in turn

gave command of the North to Rochambeau’s former adjutant, General Etienne

Laveaux.70 For his part, Sonthonax seemed genuinely sorry to let Rochambeau go, telling

the general that he was the only man who could save the colony. Rochambeau replied

that he left the island with great regret, the two men having had reciprocal confidence in

68 Executive Council of the National Convention to General Rochambeau, 9

November 1792. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299,

item 48.

69 Public letter of Rochambeau to the free men of Saint-Domingue, 11 January

1793. Service historique, “Troubles de Saint-Domingue,” Carton DXXV 55, item 1.

70 Rochambeau to Monge, 10 January 1792. Service historique, “Troubles de

Saint-Dom ingue,” Carton DXXV 55, item 3, 1. In the contemporary writings, Laveaux

is referred to as “general.” He was not officially promoted until 6 June 1793, but he may

have been breveted to brigadier general by Rochambeau and Sonthonax in December

1792.

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their operations and sentiments, but, he again reminded the Commissioner, he must obey

the orders that he had received. With a flattering touch o f sentimentality, the governor

general closed his letter saying “I hope that one day we will rejoin each other in this part

of the world.” Unfortunately for Rochambeau, this wish w ould come true.71

Despite Rocham beau’s parting plea and Sonthonax’ heavy-handed rule, the

fighting in Saint-Domingue continued. Notwithstanding the heroic efforts o f General

Laveaux, Rochambeau’s military successes on the island were quickly reversed, and by

January, bands o f rebel slaves once again occupied the Northern Plain. But though events

during the months after his departure would make Rochambeau’s efforts in Saint-

Domingue seem in vain, the general’s first tour on the island represented a series o f

crucial firsts both for him, and for the nation. He had, after all, been responsible for

integrating the first non-white troops into the French army, but it was here that the general

had his first contact with mulatres in their own environment. The gens de couleur

resident in Saint-Domingue were far different from the urbane sang-meles resident in

Paris, and w hile their motivations may have had common threads, Paris’ mulattoes

enjoyed the luxury o f loftiness o f purpose while the actual colonials that they supposedly

represented pursued more dangerous, practical, and immediate designs.

Just as important, Rochambeau had received his first taste of island warfare. In

71 Sonthonax to Rochambeau, 2 January 1793, Rochambeau to Sonthonax, 3

January 1793, and Sonthonax to Monge, 7 January 1793. AN, Correspondances desCommissaires Polverel et Sonthonax; Rochambeau et son successeur, Septembre 1792 a

Janvier 1793, Carton Colonies CC9A8, unnumbered items. After several provisioning

stops Rochambeau finally sailed from Saint-Domingue on 11 January 1793.

Rochambeau to Minister of Marine, 10 January 1793. Le Moniteur Universelle, no. 55

(24 February 1793), 1.

204




Saint-Domingue his enemy had not been the disciplined troops o f the British or Austrian

armies fighting from meticulously constructed earthworks, or formed as lines o f well-

drilled battalions on the field. Among his new adversaries were guerrillas, attacking from

jungles, mountains and sugarcane fields, slipping into the French camps to slit the throats

of unsuspecting white soldiers as they slept, or laying in wait to ambush columns as they

trudged over steep jung le roads. By late 1792 and throughout 1793, the majority of the

rebel slaves no longer fought as the frenzied mobs of 1791, blindly intoxicated by Vodun

and tafia rum, and oblivious to musket or cannon balls.72 Under the guidance o f

Toussaint Louverture, the black armies of Saint-Domingue, were increasingly learning to

use the white soldiers’ own tools and techniques to their own devastating advantage.

Indeed, as he sailed from Saint-Domingue, Rochambeau could only have had an idea that

the unique political and military instruction that he had received in Saint-Domingue

would soon serve him well. The enemy, he had learned, showed himself in all colors and

all classes, the most dangerous, perhaps, being those who most loudly professed their

loyalty to him and to the Republique FrangaiseP

72 Tafia was a low-grade rum product produced and sold mainly for slave

consumption. Tradition surrounding the death o f the slave leader Boukman in mid-

November 1791 serves as a vivid example o f the early combat techniques o f Saint-

Dom ingue’s rebel slaves. While leading a mass attack against a well-fortified French

position, Boukman wrapped his body around the mouth of an enemy cannon, calling out

that Ogun, the vodoun god o f war, would save his children from the mouth o f fire. The

gun was fired, and Boukman became a legend.

73 It is both telling and somewhat prophetic that after digesting many thousands o f

pages o f first-hand text dealing w ith the events in Saint-Domingue, Garran de Coulon still

could form no absolute opinion concerning Donatien Rochambeau. Going against such

documents that were put before the eyes o f the bloodthirsty National Convention, he

concluded his narrative on the general by saying simply that Rochambeau was constantly

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accused by the Com missioners’ enemies o f being a willing accomplice in the works and

opinions of Sonthonax, and that similarly, those around Sonthonax and Polverel hadmaintained that he had done too little to defeat the rebellious slaves. Rochambeau

himself, he added, had countered that he was consistently hindered in these efforts by the

activities of the “aristocratic colonists” in le Cap. Curiously, throughout the general’s

career, at least two opposing viewpoints have always been left to posterity concerning the

actions o f this enigmatic marshal’s son.

206

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England to assist de Curt in raising support for the colonies’ cause.1

In October, when the news of Louis XV I’s deposition and arrest in August arrived

in the island colonies, the reactions in both G uadeloupe and Martinique had been bo th

quick and severe. Local authorities had purged the colonial assemblies, and the mass

deportation of revolutionaries had become the order of the day. Governor General

Behague forced those remaining in positions of authority to swear oaths o f allegiance to

the King, and further pitted the colony of Martinique against France by publicly

reaffirming the colony’s loyalty to the Bourbons. Now desperately in need of allies, on

16 October, the colonial assemblies o f Martinique and Guadeloupe comm itted treason by

authorizing de Curt to represent the islands by securing assistance from England against

the French Republic. The British government welcomed de Curt’s overtures openly, and

by 5 December, the colonial emissary had met with Charles Jenkins, Lord Hawkesbury,

who was at the time head o f the Board o f Trade in the Home Office, to request English

military aid. Hawkesbury, however, could only demur, for England and France were still

at peace.2

Rather than face deportation to France, hundreds of Behague’s revolutionary

opponents had fled to the nearby islands of Saint-Lucie and Dominique, where

throughout October, November, and December 1792, they plotted against the Governor

1 Martineau, Trois Siecles d ’Histoire Antillaise, 161-162; Saintoyant, La Colonisation Franqaise Pendant La Revolution, II, 211.

2 Genevieve Leti, Fort-de-France; Ville Militaire (1639-1985) (Fort-de-France,

Martinique, 1985), 80; Kieran R. Kleczewski, Martinique an d the British Occupation,

1794-1802 (Washington, D.C. 1988), 65-68.

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and the Colonial Assembly. Despite these exiles’ failed machinations, events on the

Continent soon turned the tide of good fortune in their favor. By early November 1792,

official word had arrived from France telling o f the Republican success against the

Prussians and their emigre allies at the Battle o f Valmy, and the subsequent proclamation

of the “One and Indivisible French Republic.” Throughout the winter, the news for the

Bourbon faction only worsened. In December, they learned of France’s defeat o f the

Austrians at Jemappes and the ongoing trial for treason of Louis XVI. A despairing

Behague continued to publish specious propaganda, calling upon islanders to rally around

the drapeau blanc, but the Governor’s support continued to wane. On 13 December

1792, in a final act of supreme defiance, Behague and Martinique’s Colonial Assembly

formally declared war against France. The cause o f the Bourbons, however, was lost.

The Royalists’ days on Martinique were numbered.3

Perhaps the surest evidence o f Behague’s pending downfall arrived at the

beginning of that same m onth in the person of Captain Jean-Raymond Lacrosse. By 1

December, Lacrosse, who represented the vanguard of a French fleet of seven capital

ships charged with subduing the breakaway colonies, had appeared before Saint-Pierre.

Before his departure from Brest, Lacrosse received word that the commercial capital of

Martinique would quietly submit to the will of the nation upon his arrival. When his

frigate the Felicite (12) came within view o f Saint-Pierre, Lacrosse was shocked to see

the drapeau blanc still fluttering over the city. Conveniently, the corvette Ballon (2) lay

3 Stevens, History o f the French Revolution, II, 479; Martineau, Trois Siecles

d ’Histoire Antillaise, 163.

209




whom the Royalist colonists had always painted the patriots as bloodthirsty monsters.”6

Once again, Martinique devolved into anarchy.

Lacrosse next turned his attention to Tobago, but like Rochambeau at Martinique,

he was rebuffed by the Royalist governor of that island on 12 December 1792.

Nevertheless, citizens o f nearby Sainte-Lucie maintained the Tricolor. Without

hesitation, they swore their fidelity to the Republic, leaving Lacrosse free to address the

situation on Guadeloupe, where he arrived on 5 January. Almost immediately, patriotic

clubs sprang up throughout the island while scores of Royalists fled on any available

vessel.

Within three weeks, Lacrosse and the men aboard the Felicite had paved the way

for Rochambeau’s return to the Windward Isles. Only Martinique remained

unconquered. Simultaneous reports soon reached Martinique that Guadeloupe had fallen,

and the National Convention planned to send 8,000 men against the French West Indian

Islands. Now branded an outlaw by the Convention, and with no promise o f help in sight,

Jean-Antoine de Behague finally faced the realization that he could no longer retain his

authority on Martinique. After plundering the island’s treasury, the traitor-general fled

the island for the British colony o f Saint Vincent during the night of 10-11 January 1793,

taking with him an entourage of Bourbon sympathizers.7 By dawn on the 11th, a blood-

6 Bailleul, Report , 4-6.

7 Donatien Rochambeau, “Troubles des Antilles Fran9aises de 1’ Amerique,”

Service historique, MR 589, 17; Others o f the islands key leaders left on board the Ferme

(74), the Calypso (74) and the Coureur (20) for Trinidad, then governed by Don Chacon.

Bailleul, Report, 3, 4.

211




red banner flew over a militarized Saint-Pierre warning the Royalists to stay out, while

the Tricolor waved defiantly above the island’s capital o f Fort-Royal.

Throughout the month o f January 1793, de Curt met with Lord Hawkesbury on no

less than six separate occasions, each time pleading for British action to occupy the

islands. In their last meeting, de Curt presented Hawkesbury a proposal for articles of

capitulation for the island colonies. O f course, the Royalists were only willing to betray

their country by surrendering the colonies to an agent o f the crown with British assurance

that they would be allowed to retain their economic domination of the islands. Except for

possibly m itigating the loss o f life associated with a British invasion o f the islands, the

ten articles o f the proposal offered little incentive for England to attack the colonies.

Naturally, the document did guarantee a return, in some form, of the previous status-quo

for the islands’ Royalist planter caste.8

For the British, the costs o f invading the French Caribbean colonies were

potentially high, but the benefits were higher. Martinique had tremendous strategic value.

The island possessed the finest harbors in either the Windward or Leeward Islands, each

easily defensible, and each able to provide adequate shelter for large ships during the

hurricane season. Furthermore, if England controlled Martinique and Sainte-Lucie, the

Royal Navy would have perfectly situated bases from which to control the Lesser Antilles

from Saint Kitts all the way to Grenada. As appealing as these two considerations may

8 Kleczewski, Martinique and the British Occupation, 65-71. King George III

signed a formal agreement with the French representatives on 19 February 1793. The

treaty guaranteed the colonial aristocracy’s privileges, trade, and religion, with the former

French colonies enjoying the same status as the British colonies. Lemery, La Revolution

Frangaise a la Martinique, 226.

212




have been, the g reater concern was the possibility o f a strong French revolutionary enemy

threatening British possessions in the Antilles; a concern which bore more weight daily,

as England and France drew closer to war. Influenced in part by the entreaties of colonial

French emigres in Great Britain, King George III authorized Secretary of the Home Office

Henry Dundas to take possession of both Martinique and Guadeloupe, granting to those

Royalists who would support the capitulation all o f the terms that de Curt had requested.

Ironically, the king announced his decision on 1 February 1793, jus t hours before France

declared war on Great Britain and Holland.9 The mission was subsequently given to

General Henry Bruce, Commander of British Forces in the Windward Islands to take

possession o f the two islands. A very satisfied de Curt set out to deliver the new s to the

Windward colonies while Dubuc remained for some weeks in London as chie f negotiator.

Unfortunately for the British, de Curt, Hawkesbury and Dundas p lanned the

takeover o f Martinique without crucial information. For instance, they could not know o f

the Royalist flight from the island, which resulted in the defection o f forty-four regular

officers and twenty-seven enlisted regulars, and that by 13 January, Martinique’s regular

military force stood at only twenty-eight officers and 270 men, with no navy. As might

be expected, the Royalist officers who fled took the bu lk of the island’s military treasury

of nearly 16,000 livres, money intended to pay the soldiers who had chosen to remain.10

Furthermore, no one in London could have known that Rochambeau had left Saint-

9 Ibid. As early as December 1792, the Royal Navy had begun to seize French

merchantmen.

10 Leborgne to Monge, 9 March 1793. Service historique, Indes Occidentales:

Expedition des isles du Vent, Carton B92, unnumbered item, 1-2.

213




Domingue, installed General Collot at Guadeloupe, and then left the island with Captain

Lacrosse to reclaim M artinique for the Republic.11

While a large number o f Martinique’s civil functionaries had fled with the

Royalists, some members o f Martinique’s Colonial Assembly, now calling themselves the

“Intermediary Assembly,” had decided to remain. Afraid of what might befall them in

the capital city, the remaining legislators moved their sessions to the tow n o f le Lamentin,

some seven miles east o f Fort-Royal. Immediately, the body passed an order instituting

the Tricolor, and began to address the future of the island with the immediate aim of

preventing complete anarchy. Their deliberations would not continue for long. Before

the members o f the Intermediary Assembly were able to quell disorder on the island, o r to

even begin planning for its defense, the combined forces o f Rocham beau’s small army

and Captain Lacrosse’s squadron arrived at Saint-Pierre on 3 February 1793.

This time, the Governor General’s reception was quite different. Crowds o f

armed Republicans swarmed around their hero o f the day, proudly singing La

Marseilla ise amid a roaring backdrop of cannon fire.12 Following a short stay in Saint-

Pierre, Rochambeau proceeded to Fort-Royal to make his official powers known. Once at

the capital, he proclaimed the Colonial Assembly dissolved, declaring that the body had

been formed at a tim e of public upheaval, when treacherous leaders had held sway over

11 Martineau, Trois Siecles d ’Histoire Antillaise, 204. Rochambeau, “Troublesdes Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593, 16-17. On his way to Martinique,

Rochambeau and Lacrosse also stopped at Sainte-Lucie and finally placed General Ricard

in charge o f that island.

12 Daney, Histo ire de la Martinique, 184.

214




The Dictator’s Right Hand

Captain Jean-Raymond Lacrosse

Figure 21. The Dictator’s Right Hand

215




Old Saint-Pierre

If:

The Harbor A Downtown Street

The Chappe Telegraph The Docks

Figure 22. Old Saint-Pierre

216




the island’s affairs. Branding the assemblymen “rebels and traitors,” Rochambeau turned

his attention to the interim council formed after Behague’s flight. He dismissed them,

suspending their deliberations until new Civil Commissioners, who were expected at any

time, had arrived .13

In the place o f the Intermediary Assembly, Rochambeau recalled members o f the

Republican “Council o f Conciliation” of 1791 who, as the “Sovereign Council of

Republique-ville,” would officially register both his and the Republic’s orders. With this

submissive body in place, the governor proceeded to enact his own legislation.

Immediately, he renamed Fort-Royal “Republique-ville,” and the principal fortresses in

the city “Fort-de-la-Republique,” and “Fort-de-la-Convention,” titles which he believed

would clearly symbolize the new governmental au thority.14 The next order o f business

13 Rochambeau, Proclamation, 4 February 1793. AN, Lettres de General

Rochambeau, commandant des forces Fran9aises et d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-

1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A101; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 184; Kleczewski,

Martinique and the British Occupation, 75.

14 Ibid.; Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la Martinique, 209. In this first in a

series o f name changes that would later be made throughout Martinique, the city of Fort-

Royal became “Republique-ville,” while the ancient lower bastion, Fort Louis, became

“Fort-de-la-Republique.” In deference to the new national government, Fort Bourbon, the

larger, relatively newer fortress above the city, received the title “Fort-de-la-Convention.”

Construction on Fort Bourbon had begun in 1763, when it was determined after the

British assault of 1762, that the harbor bastion of Fort Louis was not sufficient to defend

the city. After paying 50,000 livres to Richard Gamier de la Roche for the necessary plot

on Mome Gam ier, the work commenced under the direction of Henri de Rochemore.

This engineer died in 1768, and the project passed to Charles le Boeuf (chief engineer),

who completed the works with the assistance o f the later-celebrated mathematicianCharles-Augustin de Coulombe. Situated at the southern edge of Mom e Gamier, Fort

Bourbon stood over 450 feet above Fort-Royal and commanded the entirety of the bay.

When it was completed in 1771, the French government had paid a total o f 7,375,000

livres for its construction. Though it would sustain heavy damage from British naval

artillery in 1794, the works were repaired during the Napoleonic wars, when the bastion

217




Fort-de-la-Rep ublique

Aerial View of the Fort Inside Fort-de-la-Republique Looking across the city to

Today Fort-de-la-Convention

Fort-de-la-Convention

Coulombe The Fort Today

. Tsii S? I.fruuf?]

Relative Layouts of thehelped design Fort-de-la

Conventiontwo Forts

Bastion Diagrams of Fort-de-la-Convention

lunette Bouille

Figure 23. Fort-de-la-Republique, and Fort-de-la-Convention

218




was to try to restore order among the island’s citizens. Rochambeau had come, he said in

his first proclamation to the colony, “to put down the signal of revolt, to raise once again

the Republican standard, to pursue the traitors and rebels without pity.”15 Entreating the

Republicans to “regain their courage, to maintain their vigilance and their adherence to

the law,” he promised the citizens that “they would not wait long before enjoying the

benefits o f a French regeneration.”16 He admitted, “[y]ou have suffered the vio lent shock

of the treason and perfidity of your leaders; but rally around me, and in concert with the

Civil Commissioners who are invested with the confidence o f the nation, we will assure

the happiness and prosperity o f your colony.”17 Instead of “happiness and prosperity,”

however, the best that Rochambeau could manage during the next three months was the

imposition o f a tenuous peace, reinforced by an unsought dictatorship.

The Governor General next followed the example o f his associate Sonthonax by

overseeing the establishment o f “patriotic clubs” throughout the island, ensuring that

admission to these patriotic societies was open to all free men. Naturally, the effect upon

the island’s mulatto and free black population was tremendous; finally every free gen de

couleur enjoyed equal political rights with his white counterparts. Rochambeau himself

later took the name Fort Desaix in honor o f the late hero General de division Louis-

Charles-Antoine Desaix, who had been killed at Marengo on 14 June 1800. When the

French defenders once again surrendered Martinique in 1809, the British, using several

tons of underground explosives finally destroyed much o f the original works. The fort

continues to this day to serve as Fort-de-France’s principal military base.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

219




presided over the first m eeting o f Republique-vil le’s club, “La Societe des Am is de la

Convention N a tio n a le on 7 February 1793, where he promised to “fight to the death the

hated rebels o f the Mere-patrie , the enemies of liberty and Republican equality.” 18

Similarly, Captain Lacrosse opened Saint-Pierre’s club, “La Marseillaise ,” four days

later.19

Hundreds o f citizens in the principal cities o f Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre

rallied to the R epublican cause, but scores o f Royalist planters remained in control of

many areas o f the countryside. Only the districts of le Lamentin, le Fran?ois and

“Rochambeau” (formerly Gros-Mome), dared to imitate the example of Republique-ville

and Saint-Pierre by forming popular societies.20 Having recently suffered under a

governmental authority that had sought to suppress them, the Republicans o f Martinique

were overjoyed that the authorities would work to their benefit. The least that they could

do, the Republicans believed, was to assist the new authority in its endeavors, and just as

18 Rochambeau, quoted in Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 186.

19 Martineau, Trois Siecles d ’Histoire Antillaise, 163-164; Bailleul, Report, 6.

When Rochambeau and Lacrosse organized the patriotic clubs in Republique-ville and

Saint-Pierre, they ensured that each club had its own Committee o f Public Safety, both of

which were soon subordinated to the Governor General’s Committee o f General Security

in Republique-ville. As Martinique’s Revolutionary government matured, the

Committees o f Public Safety o f Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre evolved from “club

police” into powerful executive arms o f their ci ties’ municipal governments.

20 Bailleul, Report, 6. Bailleul continues “....[in] substituting this name

[Rochambeau] for that o f Gros-Mome, the inhabitants of this district had two objects:first to forget a name considered “execrable” in their town since the establishment o f the

aristocratic camp in 1790, and in the second place, they believed that it would be good

policy to perpetuate the name in the colony o f the First Patriot General whom they

regarded as the protector of their country. The end proved that they acted too hastily.”

To avoid confusion, “Rochambeau” will continue to be referred to as Gros-Mome.

220




in metropolitan France, denunciations would become a patriotic responsibility.

Now armed with a reasonably secure base of support, Rochambeau turned his

attention to the disastrous state of the colony. It was immediately obvious that factional

fighting, coupled with the previous government’s neglect and subsequent flight, had left

even the most basic functions of the colony in a deplorable state. Municipal organization

throughout the island had virtually collapsed.21 None of the most recent French laws had

been implemented, and the treasury contained only 100 livres and 12 sous. Similarly, the

majority of the colony’s defensive works had fallen into disrepair. None had been

recently provisioned, and the only troops o f the line that remained on the island were the

barely 200 infantiymen of the regiments Marechal de Turenne, Sarre, and Bassigny, and

fifteen artillerymen that he had brought with him. Martinique’s National Guard, while

extant, was more a concept than a reality. In short, Rochambeau observed, “order is not

to be found .”22

To gain any real control over the remainder of the island, Rochambeau decided to

establish a legal, loyal legislative body and a powerful executive arm at the first

opportunity. Accordingly, his first thought was to hold general elections for the

21 The “municipalities” experiment had failed in 1789, but soon after Behague’s

departure, true Republicans, as well as Royalists-tumed-Republicans, had attempted to

fill the administrative void throughout the island by reestablishing the local assemblies.

22 Rochambeau, Proclamation, 8 February 1793, AN, Lettres de GeneralRochambeau, commandant des forces Franqaises et d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-

1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A101; “Volny Foumiols, depute de la Martinique a ses

collegues du Comite de Salut public, 11 August 1795," reprinted in Sidney Daney de

Marcillac, Documents Pour Servir a I ’Histoire de la M artinique (Saint-Pierre,

Martinique, 1857), 191-192.

221




municipalities and a legislative assembly, but too many suspect colonists remained on the

island to make direct elections feasible. In addition, once news reached the surrounding

islands that Rocham beau and Lacrosse had arrived on the island and successfully

assumed control, “patriotic refugees” began to reappear in M artinique in ever-increasing

numbers, all staunchly proclaiming their support of the new order.23 Loyal Republicans

warned Rocham beau against undertaking such a sweeping reorganization when the

Royalists still had so much influence on the island. They also warned, since his arrival,

the counterrevolutionaries would operate under assumed names and place themselves on

local election ballots at the offices of the commandant o f the National Guard in

Republique-ville.24

Now the Governor General found him self in a serious predicament. He was

desperately in need o f seasoned administrators, but it remained nearly impossible for him

to know who was reliable. Nevertheless, he would have to form the nucleus of a new

colonial government from among the hundreds o f Martiniquais citizens who professed to

23 Bailleul, Report, 6, 7; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 185. The positive

response to Rochambeau’s actions throughout early February and March was truly

remarkable. Writing to the Minister of Marine, Rochambeau’s newly-appointed Auditeur

et Ordonnateur des Fonds, Leborgne, described the patriotic societies as “an intimidating

operation, [that] terrorized the rebels and assured for the Republic the conquest of the

Windward Isles without commotion and without bloodshed.” “Further,” he said, “if, as

we have been warned, we are attacked by the British, France can rest assured that we will

resist so vigorously that we will bury ourselves in the forts before we surrender. Nothing

is impossible for Frenchmen who are led by a ch ief in whom they have suchconfidence....” Leborgne to Monge, 7 March 1793. AN, Lettres de General

Rochambeau, commandant des forces Fran9aises et d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-

1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A102, item 114, 3.

24 Ibid., 7.

222




be “good Republicans.” Faced w ith the immediacy o f the situation and a lack of options,

he quickly worked out what was perhaps the best solution possible. He abandoned the

notion o f colony-wide elections for the time being, and on 8 February created a central

Committee of General Security in Republique-ville, with subordinate Committees o f

Surveillance and Police serving as interim m unicipal governments throughout the

remainder o f the colony. Undoubtedly, Rochambeau’s authority on the island would

remain susceptible to Royalist sabotage, but for him to have any hope o f destroying

counterrevolutionary activity, it was imperative to have some sort o f local judicial and

law enforcement bodies under his control. As the result, Rochambeau would have to

settle for the reinstallation at least some members o f the former rural bureaucracy, with

his only hope for the policy’s initial success being tha t at least a small majority o f those

selected would adhere to the laws o f France.25

Certainly the most reliable group o f Republicans on Martinique was the colony’s

25 Rochambeau, Proclamation, 8 February 1793. AN, Lettres de General

Rochambeau, commandant des forces Franchises et d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-

1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A101; Bailleul, Report, 6, 7; Leborgne to Monge, 7 March

1793. AN, Lettres de General Rochambeau, commandant des forces Franchises et

d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A102, item 114, 3; Daney,

Histoire de la Martinique, 185. Republique-ville’s Committee of Surveillance and Police

totaled seven members, Saint-Pierre eleven, la Trinite five, and the remaining parishes

three. As with the municipalities, it had been Rocham beau’s intent to hold elections for

positions on the Surveillance Committees, but such an action would beg the original

question of problems with voting for municipalities and a general assembly. As a

temporary measure, the government at Republique-ville selected members based upon perceived notions and citizens’ personal recommendations o f “civism.” Though the

patriotic societies and their associated Comm ittees o f Public Safety went a long way

toward offering suitable candidates, by spring 1793 the composition o f the Surveillance

Committees remained suspect. The government, it was assumed, would be reorganized

following the arrival of Civil Commissioners.

223




recently-empowered gens de couleur, and it was they who Rochambeau saw as the

guarantors o f his “Republican dictatorship.”26 As the result, the governor took every

opportunity to curry favor with the colony’s nonwhite population. Whether he was acting

out o f political expedience or out o f genuine loyalty to the R evolution’s basic tenets o f

equality is impossible to determine. The fact remains that from the beginning of his

governance, Rochambeau not only decreed and enforced civil and political parity as a

matter o f law, but also recruited, trained and bestowed military and civil honors on men

of all colors throughout the colony. Mulattoes and free blacks flocked to support the

colony’s new administration, and many donned a tricolor sash identifying them as

members o f the new Surveillance Committees, while others would soon wear the epaulets

of officers o f the National Guard.

Despite his best efforts, the ranks o f Rochambeau’s most important government

bodies continued to harbor counterrevolutionary agitators, many of whom continued to

engage in regular correspondence with exiles who sought to reclaim the island for the

Royalists. As one Republican noted, “....most of the citizens who served on the

Committees o f Surveillance and Police were those who declared no allegiance to a

particular country or political persuasion, but who instead were willing to sacrifice

everything to conserve their own personal fortunes and who, through their reputations of

humanity and moderation, gained the support o f the local populace. Rochambeau

26 In his 1936 work, La Revolution Franqaise a la Martinique, Lemery repeatedly

refers to Rochambeau as a tyrannical despot, even titling his Chapter Nine “La Dictature

Republicaine.” This work borrows Lemery’s title with a view toward its obvious irony.

224




organized the island’s National Guard using the same criteria.”27

Eight days after his arrival on the island, Rochambeau was joined by two talented

civil functionaries from Saint-Domingue, Mssrs. Pierre-Joseph Leborgne and Jean-Marie

Pelauque. Pelauque, a former member o f Paris’ National Constituent Assembly, had also

served as the general’s secretary in Saint-Domingue, and would continue this role on

Martinique. Leborgne was a different matter. Now styling himself as “the Marat o f the

colonies, the M issionary of the Convention,” Leborgne had proved in the preceding

months that he was not only a remarkably gifted administrator, but also a staunchly loyal

Republican, who saw his enforcement o f racial equality in the colonies as the highest of

Republican callings.28 Sonthonax had not wanted him to leave Saint-Domingue, but

Rochambeau insisted that he needed an ally such as Leborgne in Martinique. Finally, the

Civil Commissioner allowed him to accompany the general once again in the role o f

Commissary-Auditor o f War, charged with the task o f forming a patriotic army to defend

the island from both internal and foreign threats.29

In addition to their other functions, the two m en became Rochambeau’s

representatives to the island’s principle patriotic clubs at Saint-Pierre and Republique-

ville. As a result o f the markedly different traits between the two cities, their respective

patriotic societies found it nearly impossible to work together. Saint-Pierre and

Republique-ville had long maintained their differences, but by mid-February 1793 those


28 Lemery, La Revolution Franqaise a la Martinique, 212-213.

29 Bailleul, Report, 7, 8.

225




same characteristics that defined one as a center of commerce and the other as a purely

legislative capital almost underm ined the spirit of revolutionary cooperation that

Rochambeau had tried so hard to foster.

By this time, Saint-Pierre, once the most thriving port in the French Caribbean,

was enduring the full effects o f a near-complete stagnation of trade. The continued loss

of commerce with France only exacerbated the problems o f customs violations, lack of

available credit, and smuggling. It was under these conditions that on 16 February,

Rochambeau created a new group o f enemies when he ordered the closing o f all of the

ports o f the colony to any foreign trade, with the exception o f a tightly-controlled Saint-

Pierre. His reasoning was twofold. First, he believed that isolating the island would

mitigate the external threat by at least hampering further Royalist infiltration through the

more remote seaside villages in Martinique. Second, he assumed that the island’s weak

economy could be bolstered by reestablishing exclusive commerce w ith France.

While the policy was galling to the colony’s businessmen, Rocham beau did not

consider his decision unreasonable. Exclusive trade remained the law, since he did not

know o f the recent commencement of hostilities between England and France. On the

other hand, local merchants may have had second-hand knowledge o f recent events in

Europe, and could certainly predict the effect that the Royal Navy would have had on

trans-Atlantic and Caribbean shipping. Worse still, the declining competence o f the

French Navy following the flight of so many officers was obvious to anyone involved in

maritime industry. Indeed, the prospects for French shipping appeared bleak, but even

without France’s declaration o f war against England, colonial businessmen long had

226




known that exclusive trade with France was no guarantee o f economic prosperity.

Despite their furious protests, Rochambeau prevailed, and the local Surveillance

Committees were soon given the responsibility to close the ports o f the island and to

enforce tariffs and customs restrictions, while every citizen was encouraged to report

infractions immediately. Predictably, many officials profited from this otherwise onerous

responsibility and am assed small fortunes through bribery and smuggling, while other

less corruptible authorities performed their duties in dead earnest. Either way, by virtue

of one proclamation, Rochambeau had alienated the colony’s merchant class, and had

thus deprived him self of one of the most influential bases o f support in Martinique.

Ultimately, his decision would devastate an already debilitated island economy. For

months , no ships appeared in Saint-Pierre, effectively ending legal trade. In the

meantime, Saint-Pierre’s “Za Marseillaise” club abandoned the Governor General and

delivered their support to Captain Lacrosse.30

After his experiences with Saint-Domingue’s petits blancs, Rochambeau was not

inclined to accept opposition from Saint-Pierre. The following day, he stalked through

the doors o f the former church to address the recalcitrant society members. Rather than

giving the audience the verbal lashing that they deserved, Rochambeau invoked the spirit

o f the sweetly fulsome Sonthonax, and handled his audience gently. He began by

thanking them for their earlier support, and then kindly admonished them never to forget

30 Under intense pressure from the colony’s merchant class, Rochambeau

eventually opened three more colony ports the following May and then all of them in

December. Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 186-187, 191-192; Leti, Fort-de-France,

80.

227




that they were united under a single principle:

Citizens, you have encouraged me by your confidence in the

painful functions that I perform, arid your attachment to the

Republican government sustains me in my work. Never has a

be tter cause been offered to the tribunal o f humanity. The French

Revolution is not an affair of one city or province, but is an affairo f the entire world. It is not the object o f interest of a single day or

year or even a century - this fight belongs to posterity. [The

Revolution] is finally the first seed of this union, of this former

dream o f a universal league, and it is about to be realized. The

slightest touch could carry it, like a sign scratched with a needle

into the bark o f young oak, the mark will grow with the tree, and

posterity will later read the large letter. Yes citizens, I will be

worthy and I will fight to the death the hated rebels of la Mere-

pa trie , those enemies o f liberty and Republican equality.31

After explaining his reasoning and emphasizing the absolute necessity o f his decree,

Rochambeau succeeded in mollifying the indignant citizens o f Saint-Pierre, but there

were others who received the general’s sweeping reforms with even greater ire.

Within the ranks o f the island’s armed forces, Martinique’s National Guard posed

a particular problem. After reorganizing the body without any distinction o f color,

Rochambeau and Leborgne found that among the free black and mulatto members o f the

officer corps were scores of whites who had previously served in the Royal Militia. The

potential threat was obvious, and Leborgne, with Rochambeau’s support, demoted these

men and integrated them into the force as common infantrymen. Not surprisingly, these

soldiers refused to perform their duties, claiming that they would ne ither obey the orders

of, nor serve with, either mulattoes or blacks. Once again, traditional resentments would

ultimately lead to armed challenges against the Governor General’s authority, and within

31 Rochambeau to “La Marseillaise” club, 17 March 1793, cited in Daney,

Histoire de la Martinique, 186.

228




two weeks an armed faction, led by five or six o f these same d isgruntled soldiers, began

to gather at a coffee plantation outside Republique-ville. Initially, few people noticed that

this band was gathering strength daily, and even fewer knew that they were receiving

weapons smuggled onto the island by the powerful and well-respected Royalist planter,

Henri de Percin.32

By the end o f February 1793, Rocham beau’s decrees had created a tense

environment on Martinique, a condition exacerbated by his publishing and promising to

enforce all current national law relative to the colonies. The situation soon become even

more dangerous as the result of the general’s personal indiscretions. His adversaries

believed that after assuring the initial success of both the clubs and the Surveillance

Committees, Rochambeau seemed to focus on a “fem me de mauvais vie,” Madame de

Tully. According to reports composed by members o f the Committee o f General

Security, even the genera l’s aides-de-camp joined in the courtship o f suspect aristocratic

women on the island. Not surprisingly, Martiniquais Republicans were incensed when

32 Bailleul, Report, 7. The faction grew even more quickly after the declaration of

war against England which Rochambeau made public on the island on 14 March 1793.

Henri de Percin had been a ch ief agitator against the Revolution until soon after

Rochambeau’s arrival. Eventually convinced that his resistance to the new authorities

was in vain, he quietly retired to his town home at Case-Pilote. Surprisingly, he soon was

offered a commission in the National Guard with command o f the Case-Pilote area. He

refused, so the command passed to a free black named Fran?ois Eusebe. Acting within

his new authority, Eusebe sent a mulatto dragoon to de Percin’s home with orders that the

aristocrat report for duty at Case-Pilote’s garrison. It was this single act that reignited the

civil war on Martinique. De Percin beat the messenger, renewed his vow to make waragainst the authorities, and moved to his coffee plantation “Le Maitre” (also referred to as

Lemetre). The topography of the “Le Maitre” plantation made it the perfect site for an

armed camp, and he was soon joined by scores of other vengeful colonists. Together the

group changed the name o f “Le Maitre” to “Camp-Decide,” a name which they used

interchangeably with “Camp de Percin” when referring to the group itself.

229




The Early Enemy

Henri de Percin

Allan Gardner

Figure 24. The Early Enemy

230




news got out o f the general and his staff consorting with potential enemies.33

In a very short time, the island’s Republicans came to believe that Rochambeau

had “abandoned the works o f the Societe (des Amis de la Convention Nationa le)'’ and had

distanced himself from his loyal supporters. Furthermore, several officers o f the National

Guard, each o f them suspected as being aristocratic sympathizers, had worked the ir way

into the Governor General’s good graces. One Committee of General Security member

(and future chronicler o f events on Martinique to the national Committee of Public

Safety), M. Bailleul, noted that “ ....already he had begun to lose the animosity that he had

shown and began to frequent the houses o f those who were well-known for their

aristocratic persuasions.” Only the general’s mulatto aide-de-camp, Lahoussaye de

Cypre, showed disdain for the so-called “Republican patriots” that surrounded the

general. He warned Rochambeau o f the dangers of his actions, but the general ignored

his admonitions.34

Members o f the Com mittee of General Security were even more disturbed when

Rochambeau and his staff began to preempt other bits o f advice o f their most loyal

Republican supporters. Throughout February and March 1793, many of Martinique’s

more vigilant Republicans offered Rochambeau suggestions on how to break up island ’s

ever-growing Loyalist conclaves. To their dismay, he and his aides discounted their fears

as simple illusions. Indeed, fully expec ting that both reinforcements and Civil

33 Ibid., 6; Rochambeau, Proclamation, 26 Fevrier 1793. Library Company of

Philadelphia [hereafter Library Company], #Am 1793 Roc Log. 1784.F.

34 Ibid.

231




Commissioners would arrive at any time, Rochambeau and his staff appear to have

becom e too comfortable in the ir supposedly secure surroundings , with the effect tha t their

off-handed dismissal o f the Republicans’ very real concerns not only fueled the laughter,

but also the fervor o f the counterrevolutionaries. As the result, incidents o f violence

against Republicans on Martinique increased, but the authorities in the colony did little.35

Almost certainly, Rochambeau felt that he could calmly bide his time. By the

second week o f March, a messenger ship had arrived from France bringing news of the

recent declaration of war against England and Holland, but jus t as important among the

dispatches was a letter from Minister o f Marine Gaspard Monge who promised to send

enough reinforcements immediately to Martinique to defend all of France’s Caribbean

possessions.36 To Rochambeau, it seemed that his pleas had been answered. He proudly

procla imed the news to the colony on 14 March and began to draft p lans to expel Royalist

sympathizers from Martinique and the neighboring French islands. “I am like the

Greeks,” Rochambeau wrote to a friend in late March, “I have burned the boats and I will

never retreat. I soon will march in triumph.” Now, anticipating the arrival of Republican

35 Ibid. In one case, two citizens, Mssrs. Flomvers and Guerin (a National Guard

colonel of artillery) were found nailed to trees in one of the island’s forests. Local

Republicans appealed to their police, who appeared to take no action.

36 Monge’s rel ief force was indeed organized, but never actually left France. The

fleet, which carried troops, supplies, and four new Civil Comm issioners was scattered by

a storm which severely damaged the flagship the Pique (38). Afte r limping into the

harbor at Rochefort, the British Navy prevented the vessels from ever again attempting to

reach the Caribbean. Daney, Histoire de la M artinique , 192.

232




reinforcem ents, counterrevolutionaries on Martinique decided to strike.37

Since leaving the colony in December, Behague had never completely

relinquished his hold over Martinique. The former Governor General maintained close

contact with Royalists still on the island who convinced him that Rochambeau’s hold

over the island was weak, and plotted his triumphal return to Republique-ville. At best,

Behague was simply delusional. A British contemporary, General Henry Bruce,

described him as “a man of great civility,” but “puffed up and overly concerned with his

position as Governor [even though at the tim e o f their meeting, Behague was in exile].

He imagined him self to be well loved and thought o f as the savior o f Martinique, while

most reports showed him to be disliked even among other Royalists.”38

In Behague’s mind, the Revolution had not brought about his overthrow. Instead,

his exile was the result o f the machinations o f a “Judas in London” (namely Dubuc)

whom, the former Governor General believed, intended to install him self as overlord of

37 Rochambeau to M. Maurice, 30 March 1793. AN DXXV/50/477, item 9, 3-4.

Still primarily involved with events closer to home, the National Convention finally

declared on 5 March 1793 that as on the Continent, a state of war existed in all o f the

French colonies. This second declaration of war would have arrived on Martinique at the

beginning of April. It instructed all Governor Generals and other m ilitary agents, as well

as officers of the civil administration, to act in concert with the Civil Commissioners and

obey all their requests. Further, the order gave license to all free men in the colonies to

unite as irregular “legions or companies” for the defense o f their particular colonies,

under the control of the Governor Generals and the Civil Commissioners. Governor

Generals and Civil Commissioners were authorized to make any changes that they judged

necessary to maintain the peace in their colonies. Convention Nationale, Collection Complette des Decrets de la Convention Nationale; Imprim es dans I ’Ordre de leur

Publication, dans le Department du Nord (Douai, 1792-1794.); Daney, Histoire de la

Martin ique, 187.

38 Kleczewski, Martinique and the British Occupation, 72.

233




Martinique.39 Behague planned to get there first, and assembled on Trinidad a force of

exiled Royalists. Believing that the British backed Dubuc and that he could retake

Martinique by himself, the former governor did no t solicit any type of English support.

Behague’s confidence was no t without foundation; in April, Rochambeau’s forces were

too weak to fend o ff a strong invading force. While Behague only plotted from the safety

of Trinidad however, de Percin and his followers on Martinique decided to act. Intent on

capturing much-needed supplies, de Percin’s group attacked the coastal batteries at

Sainte-Catherine during the early hours o f 15 April 1793.40 They quickly overwhelmed

the thirty-man contingent at the battery, forced the guards to turn over their arms and

powder supply, and then fled to the ir nearby hideout at “Camp-D ecide.”41

New s of the raid spurred Rochambeau to action, and the next day he made his

move against the Royalists. After gathering approximately 500 troops and a collection of

artillery pieces from the garrison of Fort-de-la-Convention, he split the force into two

columns, one under his own command and the other under Colonel o f Artillery Rene

Saint-Cyran. Just as he previously had done fighting the slaves on Saint-Domingue,

Rocham beau’s plan was a simple flanking maneuver. He would march directly toward

the rebel camp, which was sited only three and on e-half miles from Republique-ville on

the road running from Fort-Royal to the Pitons du Carbet, while Saint-Cyran’s column

39 Ibid., 74; Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a, la Martinique, 218.

40 The Sainte-Catherine works lay astride the main road to Republique-ville

approximately one mile southeast of the capital’s ship park, Case-Navire.

41 Bailleul, Report, 8; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 194.

234




Camp Decide

“Here was Camp Decide Camp Decide’s works as they appear today.

- so named because of the dispositions which motivated those

who were resolved to defend it. 15 April 1793.”

Republique-ville (Fort de France) Xhe pitons du Carbetseen from Camp Decide

The Ambush Point Along Rocham beau’s Route Saint-Cyran’s Route

(The right slope is app roxima tely 10 meters high. To the left is a 200 meter drop.)

Figure 25. Camp Decide

235




would move along the coast road to Case-Navire, and then flank the rebel post from the

west.42

To a soldier with Rochambeau’s experience, Camp-Decide would have seemed an

easy target. The coffee plantation, almost completely open to the south-east, was

protec ted only by a gently sloping escarpment, and cris-crossed by hastily-constructed

breastworks and trenches. De Percin’s entourage, many of them former military officers,

recognized the weakness o f this main line o f defense however, and used other terrain

around the plantation to the best advantage possible.

The men of Camp-Decide expected that the Republicans would arrive from the

Republique-ville road and launch their attack against the trench works. Thus, they

carefully cleared fields o f fire in front o f their positions while removing any trees or brush

that might offer Rocham beau’s troops cover. This standard precaution was jus t the

beginning. Approxim ately one hundred meters down the slope from the trenches rose a

prominent, tree covered cl iff that overlooked the road. De Percin posted a group of men

on this cliff, thus turning his otherwise weak defensive line into a perfect L-shaped

ambush. Still farther down the road, he stationed ten men under the command of the

popular Royalist leader Jaham Derivaux. Derivaux’ mission was critical. His well-

hidden detachment would ambush the lead elements of Rochambeau’s column and then

42 Ibid., 9; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 196. “Loyal” Republican civilians

who claimed to know the various routes which led to the rebel camp w anted to assist in

the raid, but Rochambeau refused to let them accompany his troops. Under the

circumstances, this decision is understandable, but the general’s slight angered many

Republicans.

236

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited withou t permission.



Saint-Pierre

Camp D£cid£

Repnbliqiie-ville

De Percin’s Attack - Ro cham beau’s Riposte

Enlarged Area

Figure 26. De Percin’s Attack - Rocham beau’s Riposte

237




fall back to Camp-Decide, leading the Republicans directly into de Percin ’s trap.43

Just as planned, Derivaux’ guerrillas surprised Rochambeau’s column, but the

Republicans were quick to recover. The general ordered his regulars, grenadiers of the

Turenne regiment, to clear the enemy position; after several minutes o f close combat, they

had overwhelmed the tiny Royalist force. Most o f the rebels escaped, but Derivaux,

badly wounded, was taken prisoner. Nevertheless, de Pe rcin’s plan succeeded. The

Republican troops charged ahead toward the plantation and were soon caught in the full

fury o f the R oyal ists’ crossfire.44

Retreat was not an option. Rochambeau had no choice other than to fight his way

forward. Unable to move against the Royalists hidden atop the cliff, he immediately

brought up his artille ry and began blasting the rebel positions to his front, while his

infantry companies fired well-ordered musket fire in both directions. Scores of

Rochambeau’s men fell around him as de Percin’s sharpshooters fired volley after volley

into the mids t of his exposed formations. Try as they might, the Republicans cou ld make

no headway against the rebel fortifications, so the general’s lead units began to fall back.

Leaning low in his saddle, Rochambeau galloped his horse into the ranks o f his lead

companies, yelling and gesturing to his men to hold their positions. Now clearly visible

in the midst o f the chaos, he became a special subject of rebel attention. One Royalist, a

renowned marksman nam ed Le Pelletier, fired his carbine repeatedly at the general,

cutting his hat plume in half, riddling his uniform with holes and killing his horse, but


44 Ibid., 198.

238




Rochambeau continued to fight.45

Four hours after the initial attack, the Republicans still had made no progress. Not

once did the Royalists’ fire slacken; musket barrels became so hot that de Percin’s men

began to wrap them in handkerchiefs to prevent their hands from being burned. The

Royalists continued to decimate their enemy’s ranks, while the Republicans’ fire was

completely ineffective. Rochambeau’s infantrymen hit none of the enemy who hid

behind trees or in the trenches. Similarly, most o f his artillery, firing uphill, sailed safely

over the rebel camp. A forceful bayonet charge offered the best chance to break the

stalemate, but Rochambeau never gave the order. The success o f such a charge depended

on Colonel Saint-Cyran’s secondary attack on the cam p’s flank, but that attack never

came - Saint-Cyran was dead.46

Rocham beau’s choice o f Saint-Cyran had been unfortunate. The colonel had been

a member o f the old Colonial Assembly o f Guadeloupe, but had later sworn his loyalty to

the Revolution. Despite having gained a reputation of integrity and moderation, at least

some of his troops still suspected him as being a potential Royalist sympathizer. While

Rochambeau and his men tried to fight their way out of de Percin’s ambush, Saint-Cyran

moved his column so slowly it was impossible to come to the general’s aid. The troops in

the colonel’s column were so outraged that one o f his soldiers, Barberousse, declared

Saint-Cyran a traitor and shot him dead. Now leaderless, the soldiers o f the second

column wandered back to Republique-ville. After four hours of waiting, Rochambeau

45 Ibid.

46 Le Moniteur Universelle, no. 207 (26 July 1793): 1.

239




ordered his ow n troops’ withdrawal.47

The Royalists, whose total casualties amounted to the loss of one slave, rejoiced

in their victory. A defeated Rochambeau returned to Republique-ville and on 17 April,

posted an order to the cit izens to disband any armed assemblies, regardless o f polit ical

affiliation, within forty-eight hours, or suffer the pain of public action. While intended as

an act o f forcefulness, the contrite tone o f the decree indicates that the Governor General

lacked support from all sides o f the conflict.

Certainly it is malevolent gossip that by this attack we wish to

bring war to the planters. Surely they cannot take alarm at public

force engaged against a faction which desires to rend this colony

apart by troubles....rather, action is taken....to maintain peace and

security. It is the rebels and de Percin who are responsible for the

end of public order.48

Not surprisingly, the proclamation met with limited success. Seeing that the

regular troops were no t reliable protection, most Republicans feared being unprepared

against surprise attacks by the Royalists; they remained hesitant to put down their arms.

Still others actually grouped themselves into vigilante units and offered their services to

the local Committees o f Surveillance and Police. This, coupled with the raid against

Camp-Decide, gave de Percin and his followers a solid pretext for forming their own

armed mobs. By their reasoning, it was Rochambeau and the Republicans under his

orders who had shown that they were determined to violate the Royalists’ persons and

47 Bailleul, Report, 9; Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la Martinique, 232;

Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 199.

48 Rochambeau, Proclamation, 17 April 1793, quoted in Kleczewski, Martinique

and the British Occupation, 76.

240




property. They would disarm, they claimed, only a fter the Republicans had surrendered

their own weapons. Unable to mount another attack against the counterrevolutionaries,

Rochambeau had little choice but to accede to their demands; when de Percin offered an

armistice, the Governor General forcibly broke up the Republican bands. De Percin

pretended to adhere to the cease-fire, but in preparation for the ir next offensive, continued

to supply rebel forces throughout the island with food and weapons.49

Martiniquais Republicans were under no illusions concerning their safety.

Despite the truce, those who did obey Rochambeau’s order to disarm feared moving

freely on the island. Such fears were soon justified. Following several days of relative

quiet, a group o f Royalists murdered a mulatto named Jacques Laguerre on the road from

Fort-Royal to Lamentin. Sadly, Laguerre had committed no crime other than refusing to

abandon the liberty bonnet symbol that the Royalists had tom from his hat. The news

was met with indignation throughout the colony, but Republicans were even more

incensed that the government made no effort to find the culprits.50

In reality, Rochambeau was powerless to reconcile the two factions. By

disarming the Republicans and showing little resolve against the Royalists, he had once

again estranged a majority o f his supporters. This demonstration o f political ineptitude

was only the beginning. Soon after his failed attack on Camp-Decide, Rochambeau

convened a summary court to try Barberousse for the murder o f Colonel Saint-Cyran.

The general and his entourage were naturally outraged by Barberousse’s act and sought to


50 Ibid.

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influence the proceedings against him, but while Rochambeau may have seen the trial as

a necessary means o f reimposing discipline among his troops, certain facts complicated

the case. While removing Saint-Cyran’s body from the field, soldiers had found in the

colonel’s coat an envelope containing 45,000 livres. In his pockets were another 800

tournois (gold coins from the city o f Tours) and twenty-seven Portugese moi'des. To the

members o f the court, the colonel certainly would not have been carrying such large sums

of money into battle unless he planned to defect to the enemy. Under these

circumstances, the jury declared that Rocham beau had no place in accusing Barberousse

of murder. Rather than allow the Governor General to force a showdown against his own

court, Commissary Leborgne intervened with an appeal that the trial be suspended until

the arrival o f the Civil Commissioners.51

Apparently stung by the court’s handling o f the Barberousse case, Rochambeau

took the matter of the captured rebel leader, Jaham Derivaux, into his own hands. The

Committee o f General Security had recently mandated that all rebels who had taken arms

against the pa trie be judged within twenty-four hours, but Rochambeau preempted any

decision by both the Committee and the court by ordering that Derivaux be imprisoned

until the Commissioners had arrived. Clearly Derivaux was guilty. The terms of his

imprisonment, however, stipulated that he be fed at a daily cost to the government o f

twelve livres. To the loathing of the Republicans, Rochambeau ordered that Barberousse,

who the jury had tentatively cleared of all charges, be forced to survive on bread and

51 Ibid., 10.

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water.52

A two-week period o f relative quiet followed the raid against de Perc in’s camp,

creating a false sense of security in Rochambeau’s mind. He ignored the repeated

warnings o f his remaining Republican adherents, and made several trips into the interior.

After being met in every town with courtesy and guarantees o f support, Rochambeau

returned after each visit only to report that he had seen nothing to cause him any alarm.

Martiniquais, however, sensed an imminent danger. Any absence of action on the part of

the Royalists, they believed, was only the prelude to renewed violence.53

After two months as Governor General o f Martinique, Rochambeau could claim

the establishment o f a Republican administration, but the tangible effects o f his

governance were ephemeral. His defeat at Camp-Decide demonstrated clearly that an

internal Royalist threat to the new administration was never far away. Moreover,

Rochambeau, who had no choice other than to trust those around him who claimed their

loyalty to the Republique, continued to inadvertently integrate men o f questionable

loyalty into the new military and civil administration.

Rochambeau undoubtedly would have been better served had he given more

credence to the admonitions of the true Republicans in his camp, whoever they were, but

being unaware of British preparations for military action against the French Windward

Island colonies, it is reasonable that he continued to rely on the M inister of Marine’s

52 Ibid. Daney, who throughout his life was able to interview scores o f actual

witnesses to the period’s events, maintains that Rochambeau had Derivaux shot. Bailleul,

however, makes no mention o f such an important execution in his detailed report.

53 Ibid., 12.

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promises o f reinforcements. Thus, there was no immediacy in forming a more potent

force to battle renegade Royalists in the colony. However, the English were on their way

to Martinique with a force that was far more convincing than any Royalists alone could

muster.

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Chapter IX

The Royals Attack:

April - June 1793

By the last week of April 1793, orders arrived from Home Office Secretary Henry

Dundas addressed to Vice-Admiral Alan Gardner and General Henry Bruce at Barbados.

While not specifying how or when, D undas’ instructions authorized the two officers to

assist the Royalists on M artinique with both naval support and a land force o f up to two,

five-hundred-man battalions o f infantry. The news was manna for the hundreds o f French

aristocrats who had sought refuge throughout the British Caribbean possessions. Scores

of Royalists, each o f them self-styled situational “experts,” offered their services to their

newest ally. On 7 June, representatives o f Mar tinique’s outlawed colonial assembly

confidently reported to General Bruce that their armed comrades on the island had

succeeded with their preliminary movements, and that a small British contingent o f only

eight hundred men would be adequate to force the surrender o f the commercial capital at

Saint-Pierre, and then to secure the island from the revolutionaries.1

Gardner and Bruce m ust have wished for be tter than to be surrounded by a gaggle

1 Bruce to Dundas, 8 June 1793. Great Britain, Public Record Office, London,

MSS [hereafter PRO], Colonial Office [hereafter CO], 318.12, 293.

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of disenfranchised French colonials. Behague had made clear to everyone concerned that

he intended to reestablish his former seat on the island, but as planning for the anticipated

invasion continued, he began to com plain that he was being slighted by the British for

their failure to consult with him on every matter relating to “his” colony. As a result, he

hesitated for weeks before reluctantly agreeing to support his British “allies.” For their

part, Admiral Gardner and General Bruce secretly welcomed the former Governor

General’s hesitation. Both Behague, and the recently-arrived Dubuc, had become

especially unpopular among their erstwhile supporters on Barbados. Bruce outwardly

treated the two men with the greatest deference, yet he secretly scouted among the

counterrevolutionaries for a new leader to take charge o f them when the invasion o f

Martinique actually did take place. Gardner and Bruce eventually came to choose Jean-

Joseph Sourbader, chevalier de Gimat.2

As a former aide-de-camp to the marquis de Lafayette, colonel in the Martinique

Infantry regiment, and former Governor o f Sainte-Lucie, de Gimat was qualified for his

new role by virtue o f his credentials, and also by his remaining well-liked among the

planters on Martinique.3 Behague was rabid. Not only did he refuse to serve under de

Gimat, he also refused to participate in any land attack that General Bruce might

undertake.4 Gardner and Bruce made no further mention of the matter.

2 Ibid., 293-295; Bailleul, Report, 11.

3 Bruce to Dundas, 8 June 1793 and Dundas to Bruce, 9 August 1793. PRO, CO,

318.12, 2 93,299 .

4 De Poyen, Les Guerres D es Antilles, 28.

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On 27 April 1793, the English frigate Blanche (32) left Dominica and secretly

disembarked Colonel de Gimat at one of Mar tinique’s northern ports. He carried with

him the same terms for the island’s capitulation that had been signed by de Curt, Dubuc

and Hawkesbury two months earlier, as well as word tha t an English flotilla and troops

were en route to subdue the Republicans. Emboldened by the news, thousands of

Martinique’s Royalists rallied to the chevalier’s camp, eager to begin the fight. The

counterrevolutionaries did not wait long to begin their campaign. During the last days o f

April and the first days of May, colonial aristocrats, aided by slaves and pro-Royalist

mulattoes, quickly captured the harbor forts in la Trinite and le Marin, the southern

coastal gun batteries at Pointe Dunkerque, and Pointe Borgnesse, and the island’s

northernmost batteries at Basse-Pointe. Even worse, Royalists under de Perc in’s

command ensconced themselves in strongholds in the Pitons du Carbet to block land

communications between Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre at w ill.5

At the same time, other mulatto counterrevolutionaries, led by Pothuau

Desgatiere, began construction on an extensively fortified camp on M ome Vert-Pre, from

which they conducted raids in the adjacent districts o f Gros-Mome and le Robert.6

Before anyone at Fort-de-la-Republique could react, the Royalists controlled six o f the

5 Donatien Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entry

for 27 April 1793. AN, Colonies CC 8A1, item 66; Daney, Histo ire de la Martinique,

194, 204. Hundreds of the Royalists’ slaves remained faithful to their masters and

continued to cultivate the plantations and to hide their owners’ personal possessionsduring their absence.

6 Daney, Histo ire de la Martinique, 194. The heights of Mome Vert-Pre (to the

west o f le Robert) not only dominates two o f the island’s older, primary interior roads,

but also has a commanding view of both sides of the island.

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island’s most important coastal and interior districts.7 With their initial takeover

complete, the counterrevolutionaries (now w earing black mourning cockades honoring

Louis XVI) proclaimed de Gimat governor, raised the Bourbon flag, and prepared to fight

to the death.8 Rocham beau’s situation was perilous. When confronted by the news of the

Royalists’ successes, he wrote urgently in his journal:

It is noteworthy that since my arrival in this colony, I am without

soldiers, without officers, without engineers, without artillery,

without money, w ith few provisions, and only the citizens of Saint-

Pierre and a few other patriots to defend the colony against the

English and nearly all of the white inhabitants....the Executive

Council told me on 9 November that at the end o f that month it

would send me a force powerful enough to conquer this rebellious

island; it is now 2 May and nothing has appeared.”9

The sudden turn o f events electrified the colony’s Republicans, and mem bers o f

Republique-ville’s patriotic society demanded, in emergency sessions, that the Governor

General immediately arrest de Gimat and m ove to crush the Royalists before the English

arrived. To their horror, Rochambeau took no action. In the eyes of the increasingly

desperate Republicans, the general and his staff appeared to suffer from a paralysis that

smacked o f negligence; accusations soon abounded concerning their collective

incivisme,10For the moment, Rochambeau could only weather their criticism. If the news

7 Case-Navire, Gros-Mome, la Trinite, le Robert, le Fr an c is , le Marin and le

Lamentin.

8 Donatien Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entryfor 2 May 1793; Daney, His toire de la Martinique, 194.

9 Ibid., entries for 27 April 1793 to 26 June.


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from de Gimat was true, then the Royalists’ attacks were only a prelude to a much more

dangerous English invasion. With only 300 regular soldiers available, it was impossible

for him to m an his principle defenses as w ell as take decisive action against the rebels.

Nevertheless, the result o f the general’s inaction was that panicky Republicans in Saint-

Pierre and the capital began mustering in the two cities, intent upon fighting the

counterrevolutionaries with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on.

Rocham beau (who appears to have been caught completely of f guard by the Royalist

attacks) desperately needed troops, bu t to allow the island’s untrained Republicans to take

arms and form ad hoc, vigilante bands would have meant an instant return to a chaotic

civil war that he could no t possibly control.11

The Governor General had a partial solution. Similar to what his colleague

Sonthonax had done on Saint-Domingue the previous year, Rochambeau determined to

undermine the strength of the rebel force (and to supplement his own), and issued a

proclam ation promising a monetary reward and permanent freedom to any slave who

would come to the service of the Republic. At least several hundred slaves broke away

from their masters’ service and reported to Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville. The cities’

authorities organized them into companies o f road laborers, and their primary work would

be to improve the island’s roads and gun batteries.

Rochambeau next issued a heretofore unprecedented call to Martinique’s

11 Ibid. It was probably for this very reason that Rochambeau had dismissed an

earlier proposal by the societies to form a 1,200-man auxiliary force, the “volontaires

nationaux,” to patrol the island’s interior in search o f Royalist sympathizers. Daney,


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mulattoes and free blacks. Calling upon all free men of color to volunteer for uniformed

military service, he prom ised those who would join him full civil and political rights, as

well as full military honors. The tremendous response surprised everyone. Several

hundred formerly disenfranchised free blacks and mulattoes, as well as scores o f white

Republicans, poured into Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre, where they reported to the

cities’ garrison commanders. Immediately moving to gain control of these new

“soldiers,” Rocham beau posted on 2 May 1793 a proclamation creating an entirely new

type o f volunteer force, the Corps des Chasseurs de la Martinique}2 Unlike any o f its

predecessors, the Chasseurs was open to all free men, regardless of race; and though they

would initially be supervised by his own officers, Rochambeau hand-picked the elite

among the white and mulatto volunteers to serve in company-grade and s taff positions.

The ranks o f the first battalion swelled quickly, and eventually a second battalion would

be created .13

Finally the general had the beginnings o f a reliable auxiliary force; despite his

efforts, many of the island’s Republicans continued to believe that he still was moving

too slowly. De Perc in’s group had not cut sea communications between Republique-ville

and Saint-Pierre, and members o f the two c ities’ patriotic societies continued, without

Rochambeau’s knowledge, to plan their own campaign against the Royalists.

Commissary Leborgne made repeated appeals for calm, but both societies agreed that “no

12 While in the French military lexicon chasseur refers to mounted light-infantry,

it is significant that the word’s primary translation is “hunter.”

13 Donatien Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entry

for 2 May 1793; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique , 195; Bailleul, Report, 12-13.

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enemy should find asylum or supply in any o f the Royalist plantations, and that the

citizenry should march, torches in hand, to bum them to the ground.” For the time being,

Rochambeau remained silent regarding the Republicans’ agitations, choosing instead to

continue organizing and training the Chasseurs, and to prepare his garrisons at Case-

Navire and Republique-v ille for the expected English attack.14

Lacking any directive from the Governor General, members o f Saint-Pierre’s La

Marseil laise club began a secret correspondence with the popular mulatto leader Major

Louis Bellegarde (a resident of Trou au Chat who had recently been commissioned in the

National Guard), asking him to form a m ilitia in tha t area. In nearby le Lamentin, citizens

assembled under the comm and o f another National Guard officer, Captain Sougue, who

continued to gather more “ soldiers” from the neighboring towns o f le Robert, le Francois,

le Vauclin, le Saint-Esprit, and le Marin. Acting under the purported guidance o f the

local Committees o f Surveillance and Police, these and other armed bands launched a

series o f attacks against Royalist camps and plantations throughout the island, thus

threatening to escalate the entire conflict. On 2 May for example, Bellegarde and forty

men joined Sougue in the town of le Lamentin to attack a nearby rebel encampment.

Unfortunately for the Republicans, the rebels learned o f the plan and withdrew, only to

return to their positions the next day. While Bellegarde’s initial plan was spoiled, he

continued to gather reinforcements, and two days later set out once again for the le

Lamentin camp. This time, the Republicans’ attack met with some success, and after a

14 Bailleul, Report, 12-13. In Martinique and the other French colonies,

habitation normally referred to plantations (sugar, coffee, etc.).

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quick exchange, Bellegarde’s irregulars drove the enemy from their works and summarily

burned the plantation to the ground.15

Within two days, the civil war that Rochambeau had sought to avoid had broken

out in earnest. This time, however, the contest included a disheartening new element.

Having learned of the Governor G eneral’s promise o f freedom, hundreds more o f

Martinique’s slaves took the opportunity to revolt. Initially burning several plantations,

they soon came to offer their services to Bellegarde, who chose from among them the

most reliable to join his band. By 5 May, an additional 400 Republicans (black, mulatto

and white) from Saint-Pierre had responded to the general’s proclamation, but even with

these reinforcements, Rochambeau still could count only 700 men with enough

experience to man his main garrisons properly.16

Republican groups under various leaders continued to occupy posts throughout

the island, including a series o f entrenchments in the district o f “Rocham beau” (formerly

Gros-Mome), at Mome Regale (a height that dominates the districts of le Saint-Esprit,

Riviere-Salee and Riviere-Pilote), and others at les Trois-Ilets, les Anses-d’Arlet, le

Diamant and Ilet a Ramiers (overlooking the bay o f Republique-ville). Similarly,

scattered groups occupied several batteries along the coast and on the mountains

overlooking Saint-Pierre.17 The Republican successes, however, were no t necessarily

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.; Donatien Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,”

entry for 7 May 1793; Daney, His toire de la Martinique, 200.

17 Ibid. These included the Pitons du Carbet, Mome Calbasse and the hills at

Pamasse, as well as the batteries around le Precheur which guarded the coast in that

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decisive. Royalists still controlled the southern and northern parts o f the island, and most

important, continued to threaten Republique-ville.

On 7 May 1793, the rebels’ principle warship, the Ferme (64), appeared in the

Baie du Republique-ville. Two days later, eight English warships, two o f one-hundred

guns, five o f seventy-four guns, one o f fifty guns and another Royalist frigate, arrived at

Case-Navire.18 Thus, with British naval support in place, de Percin and a sizeable force

marched from their camp in the Pitons du Carbet, intent upon overrunning Rochambeau

and his garrison at Case-Navire. The governor made no effort to resist. Instead, he

abandoned Case-Navire as indefensible, and after sending 200 o f his men to reinforce

Saint-Pierre, he consolidated his rem aining troops at Fort-de-la-Convention and prepared

for a siege.19 Under the circumstances, the move was undoubtedly wise. The effect,

however, was to leave Rocham beau and 500 men completely isolated inside Fort-de-la-

Republique and Fort-de-la-Conven tion with absolutely no means of outside

communication. He still had issued no orders for the Republicans to attack, and now, any

such orders would become increasingly difficult to send.20

The appearance o f the English squadron only fueled the Republicans’ desire to

district.

18 Lacrosse to Monge, 1 June 1793. AN, Colonies CC 8A102, folio 22, 2.

19 Donatien Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entryfor 7 May 1793; Bailleul, Report, 16.

20 Two days later, the Royalist ships Calypso (74) and Coureur (20) appeared in

the Baie du Republique-ville, further tightening the counterrevolutionaries’ hold over the

capital.

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fight. After apprizing the general of the perilous situation throughout the rest o f the

colony, delegates asked his permission to attack the most important of the enemy

outposts. Still, Rochambeau refused. In the Republicans’ view, the general had thrown

them to the wolves, and because he appeared concerned only with the defense o f the

island’s principle forts, Martinique’s complete capitulation appeared inevitable. Minus

organized resistance from the authorities at Republique-ville, the guerrilla war on the

island continued with a renewed fury. Republicans burned Royalist homesteads

indiscriminately, enraging the counterrevolutionaries, and atrocities once again became

commonplace. In one instance, Royalists captured M. Fenelous, a prominent, hotly anti-

aristocratic notary o f le Lamentin, as he tried to make his way home from Republique-

ville by boat. Taken hostage as soon as he landed on shore, Fenelous and six other

Republicans were shot in the back while standing over graves that they had been forced to

dig only moments before.21

Alarmed by Rochambeau’s perplexing behavior and desperate for action,

members o f the Surveillance Committees turned to Captain Lacrosse to try to enlist his

support. Not surprisingly, they were astonished when Lacrosse assured them that he

wanted to help, bu t that for the time being, he could not abandon the G overnor General.

Further, he said, it was incumbent upon him to keep his only ship ready to sail in case the

situation got worse.22

Day by day, the Republicans became increasingly panicked. They pleaded (to any


22 Ibid., 18.

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frivolous forays against the enemy. Instead, he becam e increasingly convinced that the

only practical way to save the island was to occupy its principle forts and gun batteries

with as many men as possible, then to attrit the English forces with a combination of

superior firepower and carefully planned raids. However, even this approach held little

promise of success. Both Fort-de-la-Republique and Fort-de-la-Convention remained

drastically undermanned, and he could only find a handful o f National Guard who knew

enough about artillery to service the coastal batteries around les Trois-Ilets, le Diamant

and les Anses -d’ Arlets. As the result, by 7 May, the governor had ordered tha t Fort-de-

la-Convention’s outer works be abandoned in favor of properly manning the fo rt’s

interior. Three days later, troops under Rochambeau’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Daucourt,

had set fire to the ship berths in front o f Fort-de-la-Republique in order to prevent the

enemy from landing there.25

Though he refused to give his full support, Rochambeau finally allowed

Bellegarde to execute his plan, but only under Pelauque’s supervision. On 11 May at

4:00 a.m., Pelauque and a few other Republicans sailed the armed longboat across the

Baie du Republique-ville and soon began blasting the enemy’s works at the Levassor

plantation. With nearly eight-hundred black and mulatto troops under their command,

Major Bellegarde, Captain Sougue, and Captain Octavius (commander of the Chasseur

company from le Robert) left le Lamentin in three columns and attacked the rebel camp

three hours later. Again, the fighting was unusually fierce. In one area, the youthful

25 R ochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entries for 7

and 11 May 1793. The guns placed inside Fort-de-la-Conven tion’s interior offered a

better line of sight on the enemy than those in the exterior works.

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vicomte Legendre de Fougainville, who was comm anding a company of Royalist

volunteers, distinguished himse lf by continuing to rally his men while fighting his way

out of a murderous ambush by Bellegarde’s troops. Like Rochambeau in the earlier fight

against de Percin, Fougainville would not be stopped. Even after he had sustained several

grievous wounds from Republicans’ muskets and sabers, the vicomte led the remainder of

his men to safety.26

The counterrevolutionaries’ resistance was stubborn, but the Republican

onslaught would not be halted. Despairing Royalists soon abandoned the works at

Levassor and retreated to the nearby Maltide and Gam ier plantations, leaving their dead

and wounded to the care o f their loyal slaves. Those who could not escape immediately

became Bellegarde’s prisoners, and within minutes the Levassor compound w as pu t to the

torch. By any measure the rout was complete, but in the opinion of the Republicans,

Rochambeau had failed to capitalize on this “brilliant” success. It would have been easy,

the Republicans suggested, for the governor to have sent a column from Republique-ville

to cut the rebels’ retreat, but he had done nothing whatsoever to help the Chasseurs. Their

accusations were partially tme. Rochambeau had done nothing to help Bellegarde, but

instead had remained focused on the imminent threat to the capital.27

In his official report to the Committee o f Public Safety in Paris, Bailleul reported

that the gens de couleur had distinguished themselves well enough in this operation to be

accepted on an equal footing militarily by the whites. Pelauque also reported to

26 Bailleul, Report, 19; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 201.

27 Ibid.

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Rocham beau immediately after the battle, and effusively praised Bellegarde’s conduct.

Realizing that he might have found a worthy subaltern in the mulatto major, the Governor

General promoted Bellegarde to lieutenant colonel, and gave him the command of the

now battalion-sized Corps des Chasseurs. After issuing his newest officer orders to

occupy the M altide plantation, and then to reestablish communications with le Lamentin,

he again turned his attention to the British.28

By this time, Rochambeau and British commanders had come to com pletely

different conclusions regarding the confusion on Martinique. The same lack o f order and

discipline that the Governor General had found so annoyingly distracting, had convinced

General Bruce and Vice-Admiral Gardner that taking Martinique could not be done as

easily as their “allies” had predicted. Bellegarde’s most recent success against the

Royalists at the Levassor plantation had only deepened their apprehension. The

Royalists, however, saw the loss at Levassor as only a minor setback. Attempting to

show the British that they were still a viable force on the island, the following day,

counterrevolutionaries conducted a surprise attack against the small, but strategically

significant village of Gros-Mome. After promising the Republican defenders that they

would not be harmed, Dubuc’s men occupied the town and its batteries, and soon Bruce

and Gardner were listening patiently to Dubuc and de Gimat. They explained that this

potentially decisive victory marked a true turning point in their fight, and now was the

time, the two maintained, for the English to land their troops and make the ir conquest

28 Ibid., 20; Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entry

for 11 May 1793.

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complete.29 Despite their pleas, the British commanders delayed action. This hesitation

was a godsend to Rochambeau, w ho became convinced o f what he termed the

“circumspection” o f the English. In his opinion, both the enemy fleet and the rebels on

the island apparently had erred toward caution, and thus had moved too slowly. In the

previous days, the Governor General had simply wanted to conduct the battle

methodically. Now, he decided to take the offensive, and to “conquer Martinique for

France in the face o f the British army and navy.”30

Between 13 and 14 May, Bellegarde and his men continued their success by

driving the enemy from their encampments at the Popote and Gamier plantations. When

news o f this most recent success reached the French headquarters, Rochambeau finally

left the confines of Fort-de-la-Republique. Almost immediately, the Republicans’

suspicion of their governor melted away; at last, they believed, he was taking an

appropriately active part in the island’s defense. Rochambeau inspected the recently

captured posts and began to issue detailed orders for the placement o f soldiers and sailors

to secure all of the areas that had recently been recaptured from the rebels. The

Republicans were even more inspired when their general personally began to lead attacks

against other enemy positions. Following a series of small but important actions, the

Republican area o f control began to expand north from R epublique-ville and le Lamentin,

29 Once the rebels had taken the town, they immediately executed ten of itscitizens. Bailleul, Report, 21.

30 Dubuc and Clairfontaine, “Recit des Operations Militaires,” AN, Colonies CC

8A102, folio 140, 26 June 1793, 3; Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la

Martinique,” entry for 11 May 1793.

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toward the Royalist strongholds at Camp-Decide and Gros-Mome .31

Aware tha t Republican forces in the southern part of the island remained weak,

rebels countered the governor’s success in the north by establishing several strong points

near Riviere-Salee and les Trois-Ilets. Rochambeau, however, could not let this last

village fall and risk the possible capture o f the critical harbor battery at Ilet a Ramiers.

After ensuring the security o f his recently-won positions above Republique-ville, he

organized an expeditionary force o f 500 regular grenadiers and Chasseurs with the

mission to swing around the Baie du Republique-ville and retake the two villages. Due to

Bellegarde’s recent victories, Rocham beau had come to trust the martial qualities o f at

least some of the Republicans, so he gave comm and o f this new expedition to another o f

his recently-promoted mulatto officers, Lacorbiere. Again using Captain Lacrosse’s

armed longboat to provide covering fire from the bay, Lacorbiere commenced a series o f

brutal pre-dawn attacks against the two villages. By 18 May, he held both les Trois-Ilets

and Riviere-Salee. Farther north, Bellegarde enjoyed similar success. Royalist forces

collapsed under intense pressure from the Chasseurs, abandoned le Lamentin, and within

days were in full retreat toward the south. At this point, Gardner and Bruce needed no

further evidence that the Royalists were not masters o f the island. During the afternoon

of 18 May, the bulk o f the English fleet sailed for Sainte-Lucie, leaving only the Ferme

and two smaller ships to blockade Martinique .32

31 Bailleul, Report , 21.

32 Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entry for 18

May 1793. With no ships coming in to Republique-v ille, the Royalists ’ blockade

accomplished little more than keeping Lacrosse and the Felicite bottled up near le

260




By 21 May, Bellegarde’s continued attacks had pushed a m ajor portion o f the

Royalist forces into the southern third o f the island, and the Chasseurs turned their

attention to destroying the remaining rebel camps between le Lamentin and Republique-

ville. Two days later, his troops had swarmed through the Surirey, Preclair, Tully, and

Tiberge plantations. Planters in Bellegarde’s path fled in panic, often burning their own

homes to the ground lest their property be captured by the Republicans.33

With Republique-ville and the bay secure, Rochambeau spent the remainder of

May consolidating his gains and continuing his advance upon Cam p-Decide and Gros-

Mome. Under the governor’s leadership, the Republicans continued a string of victories;

within two weeks, the Royalists controlled only the hills outside o f Saint-Pierre, the coast

road between Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre, the roads to la Trinite and Basse-Pointe,

and the batteries around Sainte-Anne .34 One attempt was made to land troops at the inlet

near Sainte-Luce, but National Guard Commandant La Rochette, whose troops were

stationed at Mome Regale and Riviere-Pilote, beat them back into the sea. Republicans

steadily continued their advances, and by 31 May, Rochambeau was personally

reconnoitering the enemy’s advanced posts on the western side of Gros-Mome. Even so,

Dubuc and his confederates continued to declare to their English comrades that they were

Lamentin. Nevertheless, the Royalists did manage to capture one unsuspecting GoldCoast slaver that had wandered into the bay.

33 Ibid., entry for 23 May 1793.

34 Bailleul, Report, 21; De Poyen, Les Guerres Des Antilles, 25-28.

261




still in control.35

Fortunately for Mar tinique’s defenders, a period o f relative calm followed the

British squadron’s departure. With the Royalists in check, the island’s Republican

leadership now had the chance to address many issues that had remained since the

beginning of the crisis. While unity should have rem ained a paramount consideration

among the governor and his staff, Pelauque and Rochambeau began to argue. Having lain

dormant for several weeks, the question surfaced once again concerning the twelve livres

per day to mainta in the Royalist prisoner Jaham Derivaux. No communication had

reached Martinique from the government in Paris, and the governor could no longer

substantiate his earlier demand to keep D erivaux incarcerated until the new Civil

Comm issioners arrived. The men’s differences over the disposition of the prisoner were

short-lived. Rather than continue to spend such an apparently enormous sum to sustain

the prisoner, Rochambeau chose the more inexpensive option and ordered Derivaux

shot.36

Pelauque, however, was no t through, and an even more heated discussion erupted

over Rochambeau’s aristocratic mistress, Madame de Tully. From the time that this

“remarkably beautiful woman” first appeared at Government House, Republicans

suspected that de Tully, who came to hold great sway over the general, had influenced


8A102, folio 140, 26 June 1793, 4. Soon after the British attack, Rochambeau appointedMajor La Rochette deputy commander o f the 1st Chasseurs. Bellegarde never trusted his

executive officer, and believed that the general planted the major in his ranks to spy on

the Chasseurs.

36 Bailleul, Report, 21-22; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 199-200.

262




Rochambeau to favor the Royalists. Certainly, the governor’s earlier refusal to move

against the Royalists only fueled their distrust. When the two men had come to verbal

conflict over the affair, Pelauque stormed out o f the headquarters at Fort-de-la-

Republique, saying that he would have nothing more to do with the general if he did not

remove de Tully from the building. Rocham beau refused, preferring to retain his mistress

rather than his most formidable ally. As the result, Pelauque left Republique-ville to join

forces with Bellegarde, and soon became the Chasseur commander’s close friend and

principal advisor .37

With such internal political turmoil occupying the attention of those in the capital,

few Republicans believed that the respite in the real combat was going to be brief. Two

of General Bruce’s officers, Colonel Jonathan Meyers and Captain Fiddes, had remained

on the island following the squadron’s earlier departure, and returned to Barbados on 31

May with intelligence that appeared to confirm the Royalists’ confidence in the success o f

an invasion. De Gimat, who now believed Saint-Pierre to be the weak link in the island’s

defenses, badgered the British leadership incessantly, arguing that a coup de main against

the town would tip the balance sufficiently in their favor. Again, the island’s planters

optimistically asserted that all that was needed w as an imm ediate British attack on

Martinique with jus t a very small force. Days later, a deputation from Martinique’s so-

called Intermediary Committee arrived at Barbados and bolstered Colonel Meyers’

findings. Because they no w controlled some “very important posts” on the island (the

deputation’s members claimed), a force o f only 800 men would suffice in order to prompt

37 Ibid.

263




a “great number o f Royalists to declare themselves, who only awaited the arrival o f the

British for this purpo se.”38

To reinforce his case, de Gimat expectantly counted the Republican army at no

more than 190 regular soldiers, a collection of sailors and other whites (all without

sufficient equipment), and little more than a handful o f the island’s armed mulattoes and

blacks. In contrast, the rebels claimed that they already had 2,000 to 2,500 men on the

island, and that the English potentially could land 1,600 to 1,700 men, with still another

500 to 600 sailors. Eventually, Bruce yielded to the arguments in favor of a proximate

attack, but disagreed entirely with the idea of a direct strike against Saint-Pierre. Instead,

he insisted, the greatest chance for success lay in an indirect assault, capturing first the

gun batteries guarding the town’s surrounding heights. De Gimat may have been

disappointed with B ruce’s methods, but the promise o f action quieted him temporarily.39

While the Royalists bickered on Barbados, Rochambeau continued to move

against rebel strongholds to the north and west of Republique-ville. On 1 June he

attacked an enemy outpost at M ont Rosiere, where after fierce fighting, he not only put

the rebels to flight, but also captured most o f their supplies and a much-needed 2-pounder

cannon. With this victory complete, the governor had to make one o f two choices -

38 Bruce to Dundas, 23 June 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12, items 285, 303, and 304;

“Extract o f a letter from Major-General Bruce to Henry Dundas, At Sea, of f Martinico, 23

June, 1793.” Reprinted in “Intelligence from the Pelew Islands and the West Indies.”The Gentleman’s Magazine 63 (August 1793): 759.


8A102, folio 140, 26 June 1793, 6 ; Bruce to Dundas, 23 June 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12,

item 303.

264

produced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction proh ibited without permission.



either reestablish communication with Saint-Pierre, and in the process destroy Camp-

Decide in the north, or force h is way farther west and then move north toward la Trinite.

He decided on the second option. The Republicans in Saint-Pierre had held their own to

this point, and without the help o f the English, de Percin had little hope of making an

effective move against Republique-ville. On the other hand, if Rochambeau successfully

fought his way to la Trinite, the Republicans would have cut the island in half, and the

town would be available as a second, secure port for the expected French reinforcements.

Only two major obstacles were in the way, Gros-Mome and Mome Vert-Pre. The latter,

the Republicans knew, would be the mos t difficult to overcome.40

It was not by accident that the Royalists chose Mome Vert-Pre and its associated

village as their principle redoubt. From various points atop the mountain, they could

monitor activity for miles in every direction, and two of the colony’s main interior roads

intersected in the town. The rebels fully appreciated the strategic importance o f the area,

and had put great time and effort into improving the works begun by Pothuau Desgatiere

one month earlier. Republicans had labeled the extensive series of earthworks “the

rebels’ Gibraltar” and nothing short o f a potent offensive against this mountain

stronghold offered any chance o f success.41 Steeled by his most recent victory at Mont


June 1793.

41 At nearly 1,000 feet above sea level, Mom e Vert-Pre is one o f the highest points in central Martinique. In 1793, on two of the mountain’s southern points, the

Royalists had constructed the posts Gravier and Legrand. The only access roads from the

north and south were covered by o ther cannon batteries, while on the northern plateau

was a semaphore device. Fifty years later, the works were still visible. Daney, Histoire

de la Martinique, 202. Even today, one can find Royalists’ cannons ornamenting the

265




Morne Vert-Pre

Morne Vert-Pre seen from the Northeast The Center of the Royalist Positions

The Comm anding View from Morne Vert-Pre Gros-Morne as seen from Morne Vert-Pre

to la Trinite

A Long-Forgotten Field Gun of 1794 A Cleared Field of Fire on Morne Vert-Pre

Left from the Fighting at Morne Vert-Pre

Figure 27. Mome Vert-Pre

266




Rosiere, Rocham beau remained undaunted. After summoning reinforcements from Fort-

de-la-Republique, on 7 June he advanced his own posts toward the enemy stronghold and

issued orders fo r yet another three-pronged attack to take place the following morning.

One o f the governor’s regular officers, Colonel Lacorbiere, commanding the first column,

had instructions to assault the enemy positions from the Gros-Mome road. Rochambeau

him self would lead a column over the mountainous eastern coastal road toward the town

of le Robert, and then storm the enemy from the right flank. Colonel Torrail commanded

a third column that would a ttack from the le Lamentin road, hitting the enem y’s

southernmost works, while Bellegarde divided his battalion o f Chasseurs into three

companies to form the lead elements for each o f the columns .42

The three main bodies comprised e ither regular soldiers, National G uard or

Chasseurs; finally conceding to the criticisms of the capital city’s Republicans,

Rochambeau agreed to give a company o f volunteers from Republique-ville the chance to

prove themselves. To their commander, Lieutenant Ducassous, the general gave very

simple and specific orders: secure the southern flank by occupying the nearly-abandoned

enemy post at the Coulombe plantation. Ducassous began his march with eighty or ninety

men, but apparently many of his troops felt slighted by their ignoble task. By the time he

reached Coulombe, at least half of his force had deserted in favor o f joining Bellegarde’s

now-famous Chasseurs de la Martiniqu e.43

entrances to several farms on the mountain.


43 Ibid., 23.

267




At 5:00 a.m. on 8 June, the three columns were in position, and with their final

coordination made, they moved to assault Mome Vert-Pre. Rochambeau’s group was the

first into the fight and the other columns soon were engaged as well, but the recent string

of easy victories had come to an end. From the protection of their many breastworks, the

rebels maintained a devastatingly strong resistance, and while they sustained

comparatively few losses, over the course o f the morning the Republicans lost nearly 500

men, killed or wounded. The topography of Mome Vert-Pre made it nearly impossible

for Rochambeau to effectively control the battle, with the result that the three Republican

commanders’ uncoordinated attacks faltered, and then collapsed, under the enemy ’s

withering fire.44

By noon, the situation was rapidly becoming irretrievable. The Royalists would

not to be dislodged by any amount o f tactical dexterity, and with no other options

available to him, Rochambeau concluded that an assault en masse was the only method

by which the Republicans could ever hope to carry the battle. He ordered his men to fix

bayonets, and w ithin minutes nearly 1000 Republicans followed their general over the top

of the enemy’s entrenchments. A murderous hand-to-hand stmggle ensued; when the two

other columns entered the rebels’ outer trenches, the Royalists finally retired to their

second defensive line. There the fighting became even more furious, and it was only after

a desperate, three-hour battle that Rochambeau’s men finally overwhelmed the enemy’s

northern flank. As Republican soldiers poured into the breach, panic-stricken Royalists


June 1793.

268




broke ranks and ran, leaving behind more than one hundred dead, and hundreds more

wounded. This time, Rochambeau would take no prisoners. While the wounded were

shot where they lay, he ordered one o f his companies o f regular dragoons to pursue and

annihilate the fleeing enemy, “an order,” he said, “that they happily obeyed .”45

By early evening, the Republicans had pushed the enemy to within a mile o f Gros-

Mome, and Rochambeau’s exhausted troops made preparations to storm this second

mountain position the next morning. At around 3:00 a.m., however, word arrived at the

Republican camp that the enemy had abandoned the town and its batteries. Further

reports described columns o f terrified Royalists and their families rushing toward la

Trinite to escape the island aboard any boat that they could find. The general wasted no

time descending upon the city, where he found hundreds o f men, women, and children

crowding themselves into already-full sugar barges bound for Dominica. The complete

destruction o f a large part o f Martinique’s counterrevolutionary opposition was finally

within Rocham beau’s grasp, but after surveying the pitiable scene, he ordered an

immediate cease-fire. In a gesture of compassion, he took only eighty-seven key Royalist

leaders prisoner, and allowed the remainder o f the refugees to leave the city.46

The rout was complete. In only twenty-four hours, the Republicans had captured

thirty-three cannon o f all calibers, all o f the Royalists’ magazines in the area, and reams

of correspondence. Leaving Bellegarde and his Chasseurs to occupy la Trinite and to

45 Ibid.

46 Bailleul, Report, 24; Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la

Martinique,” entry for 8 June 1793.

269




catalogue the recently-won prizes, Rochambeau and his regulars returned to Fort-de-la-

Republique to prepare a new campaign against Camp-Decide and the enemy strongholds

in the south. Henri de Percin and his followers, however, would prove to be only a minor

consideration.47

At the same time that Rochambeau was savoring his victory at la Trinite, General

Bruce and Admiral Gardner left Barbados on 10 June with a fleet of nearly fifty ships,

destined for Martinique. This time, combined British and Royalist troops would invade

the island as two separate bodies. Along with British regular and colonial infantry troops

under Bruce’s command, w hich numbered close to 1,100 men, Colonel de Gimat would

lead nearly 800 Royalists, many o f whom were already waiting on the island. Two days

later, when their ships appeared before Saint-Pierre, de Gimat again urged the British

general to launch his initial invasion directly against the city rather than the surrounding

heights. Once more he insisted that such an attack would easily make the British masters

of Saint-Pierre, and that w ith the combined assistance o f the Royalists there would be

enough to bring about the complete submission of the rest of the island, excluding

Rochambeau’s headquarters at Fort-de-la-Republique. Once this initial phase was

complete, de Gimat and his associates asserted, even Fort-de-la-Republique would be

forced to surrender for want of sufficient provisions. Bruce was unimpressed; while

Gardner’s ships cruised between Saint-Pierre and Case-Navire, a frustrated de Gimat

4 7 Ibid.

270




soon left the British commander and went ashore to gather his army.48

Royalists throughout the island continued to engage in sporadic skirmishing with

the Republicans. One band surprised and captured Ducassous’ weakly defended post at

Coulombe, while another group attacked a Republican outpost at the G amier plantation in

order to retrieve a much-needed cache o f supplies. Fortified by these minor successes,

the two groups joined forces to intercept General Rochambeau and his troops as they

returned from la Trinite. By sheer good fortune, Captain Lacrosse and some o f his sailors

(who earlier had joined Rochambeau for the attack on Mome V ert-Pre), discovered the

rebels and scattered them before they could lay their trap.49

In early June, Rochambeau led a column to the town of les Trois-Ilets to drive out

a group of aristocrats who had assembled at the d’Audiffredy plantation. The president of

the parish’s Comm ittee of Surveillance and Police, M. Marlet, begged the general to

temper the destruction that was about to fall upon his district, but h is pleas for moderation

fell upon deaf ears. Rochambeau ordered that the majority of the Royalist plantations in

the area be burned, and that the aristocrats be rounded up and sent to the gaol. Within

hours, plantations around les Trois-Ilets lay in smouldering ruins, but there was one

suspected Royalist for whom the general made an exception. Accompanied by her two

small children Eugene and Hortense, Marie-Joseph Rose Tascher de Beauhamais sought

refuge at her childhood home in Martinique while her husband, Alexandre-Fran9ois-

48 Bmce to Dundas, 23 June 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12, items 303 and 304; Daney,

Histoire de la M artinique, 206.

49 Bailleul, Report, 24-25.

271




Marie, campaigned with the French Army of the Rhine. Whether or not Rochambeau

knew the vicomte de Beauhamais personally, he certainly was aware of the creole

general’s reputation, and o f his notable service to the patrie throughout the course o f the

ongoing war in Europe. At the very least, military protocol dictated that Rochambeau do

everything in his power to protect the family of a fellow Republican general. After

explaining to Rose tha t under the circumstances she would be much safer in Republique-

ville than at her plantation, he soon found h imself personally escorting the future Imperial

family to new accommodations in the capital city.50

Indeed, the situation was growing more dangerous daily. The majority of the

Royalist enemy had reassembled at Camp-Decide, where Colonel de Gimat was finalizing

plans for an imminent invasion. Operations at the rebel camp, however, were halted by a

temporary interruption. Ever eager to reassert his late authority on Martinique, Behague

arrived on the island and immediately challenged de Gimat for command o f the Royalist

forces. Their arguing was short-lived; the majority o f the island’s planters by now had

come to heartily detest the former Governor General. Before Behague could have his

50 Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 205. Since leaving the Army of the North in

August 1792, de Beauhamais served as chief o f staff o f the Army o f the Rhine under

General Biron. He was promoted to General de division on 3 March 1793, and was given

command of the Army o f the Rhine on 30 May 1793. Immediately following publication

of the National Convention’s ban on former nobles serving in the military, de

Beauhamais resigned his command on 18 August and was later guillotined for allegedly

remaining inactive for two weeks at Mainz. Unfortunately for General Beauhamais, the

national government’s Representatives on M ission to the Army of the Rhine was

Robespierre’s sycophantic young disciple, Louis Antoine Leon (de) Saint-Just.

Presumably, he made the recommendation to have the general executed - the respected

veteran never stood a chance against an accusation made by the twenty-five-year-old

politician.

272




baggage unloaded from his ship, de Gimat’s Loyalists had forcibly convinced him and his

suite to return to Saint Vincent. Unfortunately for General Rochambeau, he was unable

to capitalize on the temporary division among the Royalist leadership. While they argued

among themselves, G ardner’s warships kep t constant pressure on the Republicans by

cruising along the coast between Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville, taking random shots

at the coastal batteries and making travel on the coastal road impossible. The governor’s

forces were helpless to intercede. The plucky Captain Lacrosse was in no position to take

on the British squadron with only the Felicite, and Gardner routinely anchored his ships

at night well out o f range of the guns in and around Republique-ville. The best that

Rochambeau could manage was to arrange for two small fire ships to be launched against

the enemy squadron on the night of the 12th. The attempt failed .51

By 13 June, Bruce believed that the time was right for his attack; he landed

elements o f his 21st Foot on the beach at Case-Navire the following morning. Since de

Percin’s men still held the battery at Case-Navire, the British unit moved to block the

road from Republique-ville to Saint-Pierre, while de Gimat organized his Royalists. Thus

far, the operation was proceeding smoothly. In an effort to divert the French governor’s

attention toward the south, other rebel groups attacked and captured posts at le Vauclin

and Riviere-Salee. Rochambeau was not so easily fooled. He knew well that the focal

point o f the main attack would be where the British chose to station their seaborne

firepower - the question only remained as to where that was going to be. By 15 June, he


June 1793.

273




had his answer. While two of the larger English ships maintained their blockade o f

Republique-ville, two smaller vessels concentrated their fire on the battery at le Carbet,

forcing its defenders to withdraw. Now Rochambeau was certain that the target was

Saint-Pierre. In the predawn hours o f 16 June, he led 400 mounted soldiers from Fort-de-

la-Republique and headed north, riding unseen around the Pitons du Carbet by the same

road that had supported their earlier attack on Mome V ert-Pre and Gros-Mome. After

gathering additional militia from a camp near the Riviere Capot, the exhausted

detachment arrived at Saint-Pierre jus t before noon. Rochambeau made a quick

inspection of the tow n’s defenses, and then turned his attention to the enemy.52

On 16 June, with the battery at le Carbet now abandoned, Bruce landed the

majority of his remaining forces at the tiny seaside village o f Case-Pilote, and de Gimat

and his battalion descended from their rallying point in the Pitons du Carbet to join their

British allies. De Pe rrin ’s men and the British contingent remained in positions near

Camp-Decide and Case-Navire, with orders to cut o ff any reinforcements that the

Republicans might send from the capital. Bruce had realized the first part of his plan

easily, but Saint-Pierre’s northern batteries at le Precheur and les Abymes remained in

Republican hands. Though three English warships blasted the two positions throughout

the day, the Republicans manning the guns would not be dislodged. It was integral to

Brace’s plan that at least the guns at le Precheur were silenced, but clearly, the only

alternative for forcing le Precheur would be by a direct ground attack. The next day, de

52 Bruce to Dundas, 23 June 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12, items 303, 304; Donatien

Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entry for 16 June 1793;

Bailleul, Report, 26.

274




Gimat directed more than 200 o f his men to storm the battery. As they tried to move their

6-pounder cannons into position, they were attacked by a company of irregulars from

Saint-Pierre, under the command of a respected mulatto National Guardsman, M ajor

Edouard Meunier. The Royalists fought off Member’s group, but the distraction upset

Bruce’s schedule by an entire day. After plundering and then burning the village at le

Precheur, frustrated Royalists prepared to try again the following morning .53

The feeble attack north o f Saint-Pierre further convinced Rochambeau that the

main effort against Saint-Pierre would come from south o f the city, probably early the

following morning. However, the governor faced a serious problem. His best chance for

success was to hit the enemy quickly at the water’s edge before they could properly

deploy, but with only 400 troops, he was outnumbered by more than five-to-one.

Rocham beau’s solution was remarkable for its simple audacity. During the afternoon of

June 17, he divided his small “army” into two, 200-man columns, and gave them their

orders. The first column, under Colonel Cyprien Bihan, was to wait in Saint-Pierre until

dark, and then move south along the mountainous coast road to meet the advancing

enemy. The second column, under Colonel Meslon, would march from Saint-Pierre into

the dense forest o f the Pitons du Carbet, and in the darkness, descend upon the enem y’s

right flank. Throughout the afternoon, Meslon’s men crept along the highland paths to

within a short distance o f the enemy, w hile Bihan patiently waited for nightfall.54


June 1793; Bailleul, Report, 26; Bruce to Dundas, 23 June 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12, item

303.


275




men slipped into the darkness leaving behind only two wounded m en .56

On their side, the Loyalists also had suffered remarkably few casualties, but de

Gimat lay dying with a broken skull and a bullet in his chest.57 Unable to rally their

comrades the next day, and seeing the impossibility of taking Saint-Pierre alone, General

Bruce held a brief council o f war, where he determined to evacuate the island. Between

19 and 21 June, the British re-boarded their ships, taking with them as many o f their

Royalist comrades as possible. The aftermath o f the aborted invasion proved worse than

the failed action itself. Captain Lacrosse brought the Felicite out o f hiding and terrorized

the evacuating parties from the sea, while Colonel Daucourt hunted fleeing rebels on the

land. At Camp-Decide, a demoralized Henri de Percin and a handful o f his remaining

adherents defiantly raised the British flag over the le Maitre plantation, and then

abandoned it. De Percin was not finished. Firing from the batteries both at Case-Pilote

and Case-Navire, he and his men fought frantically to cover the allied evacuation, but

eventually, they too joined the remainder o f the Royalist refugees aboard the English

vessels. Finally, Governor General Rochambeau and his troops marched triumphantly

56 Bailleul, Report, 27; Camille-Marie, chevalier de Valous, Avec le s“Rouges”

aux lies du Vent (Paris, 1930), 191. Rochambeau’s forces took eighty prisoners in the

action.

57 Owing to the almost complete absence o f light in the semi-jungle conditions of

the areas’ forests, the Republicans killed or wounded far fewer o f the enemy than wouldhave been the case in daylight. Accord ing to Bruce’s report to Secretary Dundas, the

British lost only one captain (to exhaustion), three rank and file wounded, and one rank

and file killed. Bruce to Dundas, “Return o f Killed and Wounded in a Skirmish with the

Enemy on the Island of Martinico on 17 June 1793,” 23 June 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12,

item 303.

277




into an empty Camp-Decide.58

Based upon his earlier performance at M ome Vert-Pre and les Trois-Ilets, panic

soon spread among Royalists throughout the island that Rochambeau w ould effect harsh

reprisals - the English offered the only salvation. “As the Royalists would certainly fall

sacrifices to the implacable malignity o f the Republican party,” Bruce wrote, “as soon as

we quitted the island, it became in a manner incumbent upon us, in support o f the

National character, to use our utmost exertions to bring these unhappy people from the

shore....”59 The English could not move quickly enough. Turning his ships to the south,

Gardner scrambled to evacuate counterrevolutionaries and their families, who were now

crowding the docks in Sainte-Anne, le Marin, and le Vauclin. To his dismay,

Rochambeau had also turned his attention to the south. Scores of Royalists managed to

reach the British ships on 22 June, but by the next morning, the Republicans were

rounding up prisoners in all three villages. Hastily spiked cannons and broken carriages

were quickly put back into action by Rochambeau’s regular artillerymen, who then

opened fire on the British ships and their refugee cargo.60

Despite the best efforts o f General Bmce and Admiral Gardner, only four hundred

Royalists managed to escape with the British squadron, while the rest fled into the

58 Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entries for 19

and 21 June 1793.

59 Bmce to Dundas, 23 June 1793. Reprinted in “Intelligence from the Pelew

Islands and the West Indies.” The G entlem an’s Magazine 63 (August 1793): 759.

60 Rochambeau, “Journal du Blocus et du Siege de la Martinique,” entries for 23

and 25 June 1793.

278




mountains. For the next five days, boats o f all types, many hired by the English, slipped

away from points all along the island’s coastline carrying white refugees and nearly

12,000 slaves. “These,” Bailleul reported, “belonged to the Royalists, the others now

belonged to the Republicans.”61

In his own report to English authorities concerning his failure to secure Saint-

Pierre, Bruce asserted that the French Royalists had proven themselves untrustworthy and

that English assistance should never have been given to the counterrevolutionary forces

on Martinique. Attributing his personal lack of success to his age, his health, and his

unfamiliarity with the area, Bruce asked Secretary Dundas for his relie f in favor o f

another officer. Some weeks later, his request was granted. Bruce’s true failure,

however, had been to delay his leaving Barbados for nearly six weeks, giving

Rochambeau ample time to organize his ad hoc regiments o f white Republicans,

mulattoes, free blacks, and slaves. Despite the odds, the Republicans had won the first

round, and the immense pride that they felt was more than justified. Eh bien! For a brief

moment, even Governor General Rochambeau would allow himself to gloat, albeit ever

so slightly. Indeed, through his characteristically terse journal entry for 26 June 1793, he

has passed on a fitting epitaph to the first British invasion:

Remember to their glory that patriots alone have conquered for the

French Republic the colony of Martinique. This they have done

without assistance from Europe, and in opposition to the English

army and navy who have sustained the rebellion.62



June 1793; Bruce to Dundas, 24 June and 10 July 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12., items 304,

279




Throughout May and June 1794, Rochambeau came perilously close to losing the

tenuous hold that he had gained over Martinique. In his first three months as chief

military authority, he failed to organize the National Guard, former militia, and other

irregular forces on the island - a choice probably based upon his adverse experiences with

volunteer forces in the Austrian Netherlands and in Saint-Domingue the previous year.

As a result, the general had few available options when a formidable enemy attacked the

colony; when threatened with a seaborne invasion, his response was to consolidate his

regular troops in the forts in Republique-ville. Though Rochambeau and his regulars may

have succeeded in defending the capital, it is clear that he planned for the remaining

troops on the island to fend for themselves. Fortunately for the Republicans, the efforts

o f volunteers acting outside the general’s control prevented a Royalist takeover o f

Martinique; Rochambeau only assumed physical command of irregular troops after he

was convinced that a British invasion was not forthcoming. Poor timing on the enemy’s

part guaranteed that Rochambeau and his victorious Republican units rem ained in the

field when the ill-fated invasion finally did occur.

By the end o f June 1793 it was clear to Rochambeau that he could no longer count

on the troops promised by Monge the previous November. Nevertheless, the rout of the

combined Royalist and British forces proved that the Chasseurs and National Guard were,

possibly, a capable substitute. It was essential tha t Rochambeau harness and cultivate

these volunteer units as a supporting arm o f his administration. With the Royalists

315, 316; De Poyen, Les Guerres Des Antil les, 28-30; Kleczewski, Martinique an d the

British Occupation, 79; Lemery, La Revolution Franqaise a la Martinique, 244-245.

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beaten, his next task was to implement the full measure o f Revolutionary authority

Martinique.

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Chapter X

La Dictature Republicaine:

July 1793 - February 1794

While the defeat o f the rebels and their British allies temporarily mitigated one o f

the difficulties facing the colony, at the end of June 1793, the general situation on

Martinique was far from stable. Unknow n numbers o f counterrevolutionaries had failed

to leave with the British, or had deliberately chosen to remain. Many proved savvy

enough to feign Republican sympathies convincingly enough to blend back into

Martiniquais society, but local Committees o f Surveillance and Police continued to round

up hundreds o f suspect Royalists, bringing them before the various tow ns’ civil

authorities. In an effort to close the matter, Rochambeau offered a general amnesty to all

who would pledge their loyalty to the French Republic. Many former Royalists

responded favorably to the governor’s offer, but nearly 140 others refused to take the

oath. These recalcitrants were summarily locked away in prison hulks with nearly 2,000

other of the island’s slaves, free blacks, women and children. Others chose a third option,

and retreated into the island’s mountainous interior. From camps hidden in the nearly

inaccessible forests, those who had decided to continue to fight conducted a series of

sporadic raids, brutally murdering Convention Loyalists, and then looting and burning

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their estates.1

Though sensational, such attacks by white-led rebel groups paled in comparison to

the devastation being wrought by wandering bands o f hundreds, perhaps thousands, o f the

colony’s masterless slaves. Rochambeau’s forces had never been able to extinguish

completely the limited insurrection o f the previous May, and amid the confusion o f the

late civil war and the attempted invasion, the rebel slaves’ numbers had grown steadily.

Referring to themselves as “worker com panies,” these well-armed packs o f men

indiscriminately murdered, raped, pillaged, and burned their way across the island’s more

remote northern and southern districts. Undoubtedly, the rebel slaves had the example o f

the 1791 revolt in Saint-Domingue in mind, and the great majority probably believed that

universal terror directed against all whites and mulattoes ultimately would force their

emancipation. The Royalists were quick to try to turn the situation to their own

advantage by telling slave leaders that it was the white Republicans who, despite their

rhetoric, had continued to deny them their freedom .2

Aside from the immediate destruction that was being caused by the revolting

slaves, their two-month absence from the plantations had nearly destroyed M artinique’s

agriculture-based economy. Commerce with France, or any other non-belligerent, had

dwindled considerably since the implementation of Rochambeau’s trade policies in

February. By summer 1793, so many sugar plantations sat idle that there was little to


2 Rochambeau to Monge, 5 August 1793. AN, Archives Fonds, III/209/953, item

19, 1-3; Rochambeau, Proclamation, 2 Julyl793. AN, Archives Fonds, III/209/953, item

15.

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trade. Martinique’s treasury, which Leborgne had reported in April contained 100 livres,

twelve sous, had been only partially replenished after Rochambeau’s proclamation that

asked all loyal citizens to make a voluntary contribution. His subsequent authorization of

the National Guard to enforce tax collection had done little to improve the situation.

What monies had come into the treasury had quickly been spent to prosecute the island’s

recent conflict.

On 2 July 1793, Rocham beau took action to solve both the economic and the

slave question, and during the morning and afternoon o f the 4th, crowds gathered at notice

boards throughout the island to read his latest proclamation:

The laborers are idle. A great number o f slaves have abandoned

their work to run into the camps, and have fled into the countryside

committing arson, murder and hideous brigandage. All friends of

France must oppose such excesses. The patriots must work

together to make the slaves return to their masters and to the

cultivation o f the land.

It is the duty o f the Committees o f Surveillance to propagate this

doctrine; it is the duty o f the brave National Guard to respond, and

I am sure that the free men o f color whom I have seen fight with

complete courage will understand the true usefulness o f these

actions. Everyone well knows that the properties of the emigres

must be cultivated to support the patriots since it is they who are

serving the Republic, and that it must be the rebels who must pay

the cost of this civil war. I therefore order the Committees of

Surveillance:

1. To confiscate all emigre land and possessions;

2. To tally the amount of sugar, coffee and other goods, or anything else that they can

find o f value, leaving nothing uncounted;

3. To disarm all the slaves, who under the title o f “worker companies” are devastating

the countryside. I reserve the right to form and to take into the service o f the state a corps

of free men under the name of the Chasseurs de la Martinique', o f which I have already

named the com mander, Bellegarde, and several officers;

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4. To require, above all, that military commanders whom we have given responsibility

for the execution o f the aforesaid object and for the disarmam ent of the slaves, are

responsible fo r the abuses of their own troops;

5. The Committees of Surveillance are further required take the names o f the armed

slaves that have distinguished themselves in this war, who I will set free immediately

after making arrangements w ith their masters, and for whose permanent liberty I willarrange with the new Commissioners;

6 . I order all slaves, armed or unarmed, to return peacefully to their master’s plantation

within three days o f this proclamation after having given his musket to the local

Committee o f Surveillance, or he will be arrested by the National Guard and executed

without due process if he resists;

7. The Committees of Surveillance will issue to the aforementioned slaves, form

certificates that will attest to their good conduct and docility;

8. Proprietors will not take punitive measures against these slaves when they return to

their plantations;

9. Proprietors, or those managing sequestered property, are required to plant the greatest

amount o f crops possible to replace those that have been destroyed during the course o f

the campaign.

Fort-de-la-Republique, 2 July 1793, the Second Year o f the French Republic.

Dtn. Rochambeau,3

Though almost hidden in a proclamation that dealt primarily with fugitive slaves,

the first two articles of Rochambeau’s decree caused an instant uproar. Martiniquais

Royalists (including emigres and those still on the island), employed every means at their

3 Rochambeau, Proclamation, 2 July 1793. AN, Archives Fonds III 209/953, item

15. Rochambeau’s official correspondence from the period underscores the urgency of

the slave situation. “The Negroes have been armed by the aristocracy” he wrote to the

under-secretaries of the Ministry of Marine. “We have followed the same course,

employing the same means, and the beating given to the workers has been violent. We

must return them to their work and to their masters, disarm those who have no use for

guns, and prevent the idea that has been spread by several secret agitators o f a general

freedom. I will thus be obliged to set a rather large number o f them free and use them for

heavy labor until the arrival of the Civil Commissioners.” Rochambeau to “The

Ministers,” 20 July 1793. AN, Archives Fonds, III/209/953, item 13, 1.

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disposal to prevent the proper execution o f the new law, and denunciations quickly

becam e a useful tool for both sides. The resulting flood of accusations against both

Republicans and counterrevolutionaries caused such confusion that it became impossible

for either the Governor General or the Committee o f General Security to determine which

were scurrilous and which were not. To complicate matters, a disturbingly large number

of local Committees o f Surveillance and Police were apparently bribed or threatened by

the enemy. Police became increasingly reluctant either to arrest islanders who had been

denounced by fellow citizens, or to take effective action to seize Royalist property.

Others, however, pursued their task with such alacrity that even staunchly Republican

officials came to view the Governor G eneral’s confiscation and arrest policies as a

flagrant violation of citizens’ rights. Abuses were not limited to the Com mittees o f

Surveillance and Police. Though they had not been asked to participate in the collection

process, Bellegarde’s Chasseurs w ould quickly become some of the government’s worst

offenders .4

4 During the fighting of the previous May and June, Rochambeau had declared

that he would be unable to supply Bellegarde’s men, and had allowed them to prov ision

themselves by confiscating and selling emigre property. With Pelauque’s help,

Bellegarde had secretly worked around the governor’s port closure order and had turned

his wartime activity into a thriving business with the Americans. Bellegarde skillfully

avoided scrutiny from M artinique’s civil authorities by promising them that he was only

buying much-needed supplies for his troops. Increasingly, Rochambeau came to lose

trust in his Chasseur commander and even less in Pelauque, but without substantial proof

against them, he could do nothing to curtail their activities other than to accuse them of

pillaging. Bellegarde and Pelauque protested vehemently against such accusations.Maintaining that they had no other recourse, they countered repeatedly over the next few

months that Rochambeau and his commissariat chief, Charles-Antoine Daigremont, who

held the join t title o f Ordonnateur (the Revolutionary equivalent of the colonial

Intendant), were deliberately ignoring their needs. The accusations against Rochambeau

and Daigremont were unsubstantiated. Letters from American businessmen that later

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The confiscation tenets of the 2 July proclamation were vague and open to

misapplication by its executive agents, but by all indications, the document had been

drafted primarily as a measure to address the immediate slave problem. Rochambeau had

included the first two articles simply to begin the action of sequestering emigre property;

two weeks later, he would publish a lengthy, fourteen-point regulation that clarified in

great detail how his 2 July mandate was to be applied. Until the second order had

undergone judicial review, however, the Governor General had other matters to attend to.

In the wake o f the recent fighting, it was important that Rochambeau and his civil

authorities inaugurate a public relations campaign. The anniversary of the fall of the

Bastille was quickly approaching, and it was reasoned that 14 July would provide the

perfect occasion both to celebrate the Republic’s most recent, local triumph over its

adversaries, and to intimidate those potential enemies who remained. Despite the

colony’s penury, no expense was spared to make the occasion as grand as possible, and

Saint-Pierre (where Rochambeau had recently established a more comfortable residence),

was chosen as the principle center for the festivities .5

The event was a tremendous success, except for a single event. Since

assassinating Colonel Saint-Cyran on 16 April, Barberousse had remained in Saint-

turned up in Martinique proved conclusively that Bellegarde and Pelauque had hidden

hundreds of thousands of dollars in American banks. Bailleul, Report, 34.

5 According to tradition, the Governor General o f the Windward Islands

maintained quarters in the capital city inside Fort Saint-Louis (Fort-de-la-Republique).

Another official government residence did exist in Saint-Pierre however, and

Rochambeau became the second Governor General to establish his primary residence

there.

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Pierre’s jail until the colony’s new Civil Commissioners (who still were expected to

arrive at any time), could rule on his appeal. In the interim, many of the city’s

Republicans had never stopped believing that Barberousse’s incarceration was completely

unjust and a gross violation of the law. Throughout the celebration, crowds chanted for

the prisoner’s release, and probably reasoning that the liberation o f the prisoners in the

Bastille served as an appropriate precedent, a group of high-spirited sailors decided that

they would similarly liberate Barberousse. Appointing themselves as a “revolutionary

tribunal,” the sailors stormed Saint-Pierre’s jail, overpowered the guards, and set the

prisoner free.6

Rochambeau was faced with a serious, and very delicate, situation. He certainly

would have been acting within his rights to have all those involved arrested, but under the

circumstances, the public outcry from the Republicans undoubtedly would have

outweighed any satisfaction that he might have gained from punishing them.

Rochambeau mulled over his decision for an entire week, and then finally settled the

matter. In a 22 July proclamation, he announced that “important and pressing matters”

had diverted his attention from dealing with the issue, and reminded the island’s citizens

that Barberousse had been found guilty by a jury. Only the Civil Commissioners, he said,

had the authority to adjudicate the case. That the affair merited the printing and

distribution o f an official proclamation indicates the gravity o f the situation. Meanwhile,

Barberousse remained at large. Rather than trying to pursue the fugitive, Rochambeau

ordered, in the name of the Republic, that Barberousse give himse lf up at Fort-de-la-

6 Ibid., 36.

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Republique, and once again wait for the arrival of the Civil Commissioners. To the

sailors who had set Barberousse free, he announced simply “I leave his liberators to their

remorse and to the shame that their actions should have caused.”7

Rochambeau’s handling o f the Barberousse affair may well have been a blatant

political capitulation, but he truly had been occupied by “ important and pressing matters,”

especially his new regulation addressing the disposition of emigre property. This policy

appeared in print on 17 July 1793, and though tailored to meet Martinique’s particular

needs, was m odeled closely after the 8 April 1793 law that had been applied to emigre

property in metropolitan France. Foremost among the differences was that, unlike in

France, much o f the real property in Martinique had been either damaged or completely

destroyed during the recent fighting. The 17 July Reglulation acknowledged this state o f

affairs from the outset, and then instructed the Committees o f Surveillance and Police in

each arrondissement to appoint salaried administrators to manage all confiscated or

abandoned rebel estates regardless of their condition. In official circles, it was reasoned

that the comm ittees’ search for potential administrators would not be very difficult. The

governor mandated that hiring preference be given to those who had an interest in the

lands’ prospering, especially wives who held join t title to property and whose husbands

had either taken flight or were in prison; brothers, sisters, partners, or m ajor creditors

were then considered; and finally, overseers who “merited the confidence o f the

7 Rochambeau, Proclamation, 22 July 1793. AN, Archives Fonds III 209/953,

attachment to item 16.

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but members of the Committee of General Security were quick to remind the

commissaries that they served purely at the pleasure o f the Committee, and thus were

subject to their recall.9

At the outset, the new plan seemed adequate, but the proclamation’s Article XIII

presented an unexpected problem. As in France, Martinique’s creditors were required to

follow the procedures laid out in the National Convention’s 25 August 1792 decree which

unequivocally outlined procedures for creditors to reclaim debts against confiscated

estates. Though the national rules were clear, conditions in France varied tremendously

from those in Martinique. How, the colony’s creditors demanded, could they be expected

to make loans toward rebuilding plantations, when prior to their being destroyed, those

same plantations had already been serious debt? Most o f the island’s creditors believed

that they had already sustained a total loss on property damaged during the recent

fighting, but their refusal to make reparation loans threatened to stall Rochambeau’s plan

completely. As the result, he and Daigrem ont were compelled to revise the Regulation on

2 September, mandating that the island’s creditors would be reimbursed before treasury

received any money. Furthermore, available financing to rebuild ruined estates would

9 Ibid.; Bailleul, Report, 28-29. By 5 August Rochambeau had written to the

Minister o f Marine and the Colonies that “I have kept the peace but there are those w ith

ulterior motives all around. We have seized all of the emigre goods that weren’t

destroyed or stolen, and have been able to collect from their sale enough to make payment

to the American captains for 3,000 barrels of flour. I have named two trusted

businessmen, the first to investigate the rest o f the colony’s businessm en looking forhidden emigre goods that have not been reported, while the second (who serves in the

quality of Commissary of the Republic), will be based out o f Saint-Pierre and will handle

the sale of the goods and the transfer into the public treasury. We will send you the

details once all of this is done.” Rochambeau and Daigremont to Monge, 5 August 1793.

AN, Archives Fonds III 209/953, item 19.

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come in the form of public loans from M artinique’s already bankrupt treasury.10

The 2 September proclamation contained another revision as well. Under the 17

July regulation, M. Lavau, Rochambeau’s Commissary o f the Navy and Colonies, was

charged to handle the accounting o f processed sugar in the colony’s ports. This was a

dramatic change in procedure, but transferring what had formerly been a police function

to a professional bureaucrat had become an absolute necessity. By the end o f August

1793, so many o f Martinique’s officials in the Committees o f Surveillance and Police had

proven themselves so corrupt that Rochambeau and Daigremont relieved them from the

responsibility of overseeing the program completely, and left it entirely under Lavau’s

supervision.11

Rochambeau had enough problems with disloyal agents on the Committees of

Surveillance and Police, but he soon found even more resistance among the colony’s

ever-mistrusting Republican parliamentarians. As their actual control over the colony’s

finances became increasingly limited, it did not take long for suspicion to grow among

the Committee o f General Security members that Rochambeau was diverting income

from the sale of confiscated property for his own use. While mistrust was strong, the

10 Ibid.; Rochambeau and Daigremont, Proclamation, 2 September 1793. AN,

Lettres de General Rochambeau, commandant des forces Franqaises et d’Aigremont,

Ordonnateur, 1793-1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A101, item 23.

11 Rochambeau and Daigremont, Proclamation, 2 September 1793. Ibid. The

days o f the Committees o f Surveillance and Police were numbered. At the end o f August,

Rochambeau further eroded their influence by transferring oversight of all aspects o f the

police to Lavau. Even the Committee of General Security could not deny tha t there were

serious problems with various local Surveillance Committees throughout the island.

Some flagrantly abused their authority, Bailleul noted, some protected the aristocrats, and

others were simply incompetent. Bailleul, Report , 36-39.

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evidence against the governor was quite weak. With Lavau’s assent, Rochambeau had

established a general fund from the sale of captured sugar stocks from which he drew

thirty-three livres per day while conducting a subsequent inspection tour o f the island.

Considering the devaluation o f the currency, and the fact that the Governor General was

required to board and feed himself and his entourage, thirty-three livres was probably

reasonable. To the committee members, the amount seemed both exorbitant and

fraudulent. More than once, Rochambeau had preserved the Revolution in Martinique,

but the colony’s Republicans could never forgive the general’s aristocratic heritage.

Thirty-three livres per day, they complained, could only be used to maintain the governor

in the high style more befitting a general o f the ancien regime than a good Republican.

Their ire was further piqued when free blacks, slaves, and their representatives began to

make claims against the government for non-payment o f services rendered to the

Republic. To the Republicans, it seemed unconscionable that the colony’s leadership

would see to their own comfort without first offering some form of recompense to these

good patriots for their labor . '2

The lack o f support that Rochambeau received from his own authorities was

problematic enough, but almost immediately he had to turn his attention to those who

12 Black workers made the unsettling observation that it was their labor alone that

had brought any measure o f salvageable wealth back to the colony, and that as the result it

was they who could best administer its disbursement. The men may have had a legitimateargument, but the Committee o f General Security appears to have made no effort to

persuade anyone in the white community to rel inquish any o f the colony’s financial

administration. It was much more politically expedient for the Republicans to accuse

Rochambeau and his administrators o f mismanagement, while at the same time

demanding that he protect them. Bailleul, Report, 28-29.

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would seek to undermine his regime externally. Throughout July, August and September

1793, hundreds o f exiled Royalists began to return to Martinique under the g overnor’s

amnesty. Many came to assume those available positions as administrators o f emigre

estates, but just as many others arrived seeking to sabotage the Republican

administration. The continued influx of the former enemy was sure to present problems,

but i f Rochambeau and the Committee o f General Security were to give any credence to

their professed support for the Declaration of the Rights o f Man and the Citizen, they

could not deny anyone who claimed a change o f heart the right to resettle in the colony, as

long as they committed no crimes. On the face of it, the Committees o f Surveillance and

Police were reporting the names o f all returning emigres; neither Rochambeau nor the

members of the Committee of General Security believed that any among those on the lists

were principle counterrevolutionary leaders. It was hoped that new “Citizens” would aid

civil order, rather than seek to destroy it. The governor applied the same principle o f

tolerance to prisoners that remained captive in the colony’s forts, prison hulks, and jails,

leaving to the Committees o f Surveillance and Police the authority to release anyone they

believed innocent. Those who had committed actual illegalities would remain

imprisoned until the arrival o f the Civil Commissioners.13

Certainly, Rochambeau was not deluded regarding either the internal or external

threat to M artinique, but by virtue o f his position, he faced the nearly impossible task of

reconciling a Republican governance w ith the immediate necessity to maintain a sem i

authoritarian regime. In either case, it was incumbent upon him to present the appearance

13 Daney, Histo ire de la Martinique, 213-214.

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of absolute control. His official correspondence, however, belies the actual tenuousness

of his situation. “We have our secret agitators,” he wrote to the Minister of Marine and

the Colonies at the end of July, “and I must warn you that just as I did in Saint-Domingue,

I will bring war to those among us who wear a costume of patriotism.”

I am so accustomed to dealing with fools that soon I will attack

them vigorously. I might be reproached for operating outside the

law; I have considered that. Nevertheless, I will employ every

means at my disposal to preserve this post for France. It is

necessary to remedy this problem violently, and I will make all o f

this colony ashes rather than cede to any foreign power. If I must

abandon it, I will leave it uninhabitable. P.S. Therefore, send us

ships, men and money - engineers, artillerymen, and above all,

staff officers.14

As straightforward as he was with the Minister of Marine and the Colonies, a

second letter addressed to the under-secretaries o f the Ministry o f Marine was even more

candid as it appraised the menace tha t was never far from Martinique’s shores.

“Nothing,” Rochambeau opined, “is more dangerous to our overall political situation than

if no help comes to us from Europe and i f the loyal citizens think that they are abandoned

by France. The fleets and the armies of such powerful foreigners as England sail all

around us, and tell the inhabitants:

‘France has abandoned you and has left you to get by with only

what you now have. We will protect your property and your

commerce the same as we do our own. You will soon be asked to

come under English law. Your land and capital debts can all be

honored when you have once again assumed your legitimate titles,

otherwise you must submit to the terms o f the rebels. Render

yourselves to the reasonable conditions of English law.’ This has astrong effect since so many are in debt and do not want to suffer

14 Rochambeau to Monge, 20 July 1793. AN, Archives Fonds III 209/953, item

16, 1-2 .

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the deprivations of a second war or siege. I have no reason now to

suspect the loyalties o f the good citizens o f this colony, but I

cannot predict what will happen i f France continues not to act .’15

At the very least, the governor should have been able to count on the service o f his

own creation, the Chasseurs de la Martinique, to assist him in matters o f internal and

external security. With the promulgation o f the 2 July decree, Rocham beau had (as in the

previous May) enjoyed a tremendous response to his call for blacks who had served

during the recent crisis that they come permanently into Bellegarde’s battalion. The

numbers, however, were prohibitive. The mercurial Lieutenant Colonel Bellegarde

already commanded a battalion-sized unit, and Rochambeau was opposed to pu tting

several hundred more men under his command. Instead, the general created a second

Chasseur battalion in Saint-Pierre. As Major Edouard Meunier had become a local

legend after his fight against the Royalists during the late invasion, Rochambeau

promoted the mulatto officer to Lieutenant Colonel, and gave him comm and of the new

battalion. The general’s choice was not unopposed. Bellegarde had looked forward to

doubling the size of his command, and was not only jealous of Meunier, but was

displeased that this second battalion was created predominantly from the troops that had

been under his orders. To anyone who would listen, he complained bitterly tha t he had

been slighted by Rochambeau since Pelauque joined his camp.16

15 Rochambeau to “ The Ministers,” 20 July 1793. AN, Archives Fonds III

209/953, item 13, 1-2.

16 Bailleul, Report, 31. Aside from the obvious need to distribute his forces

effectively throughout the island, another o f Rochambeau’s reasons for establishing the

second battalion at Saint-Pierre was to contain the potentially troublesome Chasseurs in

separate military camps where they would pose less o f a threat to the general population.

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Regardless o f what Bellegarde thought, Rochambeau wanted a second, reliable

force on the mutinous eastern side of the island. He ordered Bellegarde’s battalion to

occupy positions at Gros-Mome and la Trinite, while he posted M eunier’s battalion

several kilometers to the north, in the seaside town of Sainte-Marie. Even after the

Royalist evacuations, the areas around la Trinite and Sainte-Marie had remained major

hubs o f counterrevolutionary activity, a problem which only became worse as refugees

returned under Rochambeau’s amnesty. Since it was impossible to judge how much

influence the Royalists had over the Committees of Surveillance and Police in the area, it

stood to reason that the Chasseur units could at least curtail any overtly treasonous acts.

O f the two towns, Sainte-Marie was considered the more dangerous, so Meunier and his

new recruits expressed their reservations to the general concerning their first assignment.

For whatever reason, Rochambeau minimized their concerns. He declared the absolute

civism o f the district by saying that Sainte-Marie’s Comm ittee o f Surveillance and Police

was the only one to communicate with him regularly during the war, and that the tow n’s

Republican officials had local affairs well under control. Either the general was correct,

or Meunier and his Chasseurs were lucky; despite their initial worries, the second

battalion occupied Sainte-Marie without incident. Bellegarde, on the other hand, would

Furthermore, suspicion was growing in government circles that Bellegarde (who was

coming increasingly under the influence o f Pelauque), coveted Rochambeau’s positionand sought eventual command o f the colony for himself. As Meunier had no previous

history with the general, the creation o f a loyal, second battalion could have been

designed with the object o f serving as a counterweight against Bellegarde and his men.

This may better explain why the two units would subsequently be stationed within five

kilometers o f each other.

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prove to be a serious problem .17

Only days after the Chasseur reorganization, the covetous Bellegarde came to

believe that Meunier commanded more men than he. Rather than following

Rochambeau’s intent by assisting the National Guard in returning runaway slaves to their

masters, Bellegarde welcomed the runaways into his own camp. Rochambeau was

enraged. Without consulting Bellegarde, he ordered Colonel Daucourt, who he had

recently named commander of Martinique’s 37th regiment, to march against the slaves at

la Trinite and to force them to return to work. The published order was clear that anyone

who resisted would be shot, but several refractory slaves were killed while skirmishing

with Daucourt’s regulars.18

Rocham beau’s subsequent accusations concerning Bellegarde’s and Pelauque’s

pillaging only exacerbated the tension caused by Daucourt’s raid. Indeed, relations

between the general’s s taff and the 1st Chasseur Battalion became so hostile tha t the

Committee o f General Security eventually had to send one o f their own members to

intervene. Jean Isaac, a free black member o f the Committee, tried his best to mollify the

situation, and finally was able to arrange a series of fruitful meetings between Bellegarde

and Rochambeau. Pelauque, however, refused to attend, claiming repeatedly that he had

17 Ibid., 31-32.

18 Ibid., 33. Incensed Republicans in the capital maintained that Bellegarde

could have used his influence among the blacks to persuade them to return to work. As

neither Bellegarde nor Pelauque had been forewarned of Daucourt’s mission, it is

impossible to determine how (or even if) they would have intervened. It is also

significant to note tha t the 37me Regim ent Coloniale de la Martinique was formerly the

Regim ent de Turenne. When writing of this unit, Rochambeau always referred to it

(parenthetically) by its ancien regime title.

298




information that Rochambeau was consorting with the rebels. O f course, any aristocrat

was considered a Royalist if it suited the purpose o f Martinique’s Republicans, and it was

common knowledge that the governor kept regular company with the colony’s upper

class. Social functions in his Saint-Pierre home were regularly attended by “citizens

known for their Incivisme,” and Rochambeau and his aristocratic mistress M me de Tully

often would return to Republique-ville and the plantation owned by General Arthur

Dillon, to spend time in the company of those w ith comparable education and social

19grace.1

Common Republicans could never accept the governor’s contradictory behavior,

especially since they believed that it was these same former aristocrats who were trying to

persuade the governor that Bellegarde and Pelauque were unreliable. For his part,

Pelauque may have been quite clever to use the Republicans’ resentment of Rochambeau

and his entourage to his own advantage, especially if his denunciations were intended to

draw attention away from his own illicit activities. Nevertheless, Pelauque could

produce no evidence against the general, and though intermediaries made several attempts

to bring the two former friends together, the feud between the governor and his former

secretary only escalated.20

Rochambeau could easily survive the loss o f Pelauque as an ally, but by late

August 1793, he had also los t Captain Lacrosse and the one regular naval asset available

to Martinique, the Felicite. Apparently, based on an earlier order that the governor had

19 Ibid., 34-36.

20 Ibid.

299




given, the ship’s crew had demanded for weeks that they be released to return to France.

Martinique’s civil authorities had refused to allow the vessel to depart, alternately

haranguing the crew with threats and impassioned pleas o f how absolutely necessary they

were to the defense of the island. The men o f the Felicite had good reason to feel

otherwise. Since the end of the fighting in July, they had done little but sit idle in

Republique-ville. Meanwhile, the captains and crews of a few civilian merchantmen

(who referred to themselves somewhat anachronistically as “filibu stier s”) had armed their

vessels and had begun patrolling the various French and British island possessions,

presumably to monitor the m ovements o f the emigres. This in itself would have caused

little problem, but when a tiny “corsaire,” under the command of Jean-Auguste Jung

single-handedly attacked and captured the British frigate Blanche (32) o ff Barbados, the

few members o f the professional navy in Martinique began to feel that their role had been

usurped. Although Jung had lost his own vessel in the fight, he had returned to a hero’s

welcome in Saint-Pierre, as the Tricolor waved defiantly from the English warship. Even

more galling to the crew o f the Felicite was the news that Jung had captured enemy

correspondence telling o f a planned British invasion o f Martinique. When Rochambeau

finally ordered the Felicite to action, it was only to reconnoiter Barbados and then return

to Republique-ville. Instead, Lacrosse defied the general’s order and sailed for France .21

Aside from providing Rochambeau with early warning o f a potential English

attack, the capture o f the Blanche had other, more immediate implications. Along with

21 Ibid., 39; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 221-222; Lemery, La Revolution

Frangaise a la Martinique, 257. For his part, Rochambeau viewed Lacrosse’s action as

desertion.

300




the ship, Jung and his crew had detained several well-known emigres, and when the prize

arrived in Saint-Pierre, many o f the towns’ citizens clamored to execute the Royalists in

revenge for the ravages of the previous month. The city’s National Guard eventually took

control o f the near-riotous situation, bu t not before Saint-Pierre’s municipal authorities

called upon Rochambeau to send reinforcements from Fort-de-la-Republique to help

safeguard the prisoners’ lives.22

The event might have passed unnoticed, except that it brought to the attention o f

the new government in Martinique the immediate need for an effective, civilian-

administered judicial system. The citizens of Saint-Pierre sought to address the problem

unilaterally by forming their own Revolutionary Tribunal, and were stalled in their effort

only by the fact that they lacked a presiding judge. City councilmen begged Pelauque

(who had been a former member o f the National Assembly) to assume the position, but he

refused for several reasons. First, he said, he would not leave his friend Bellegarde, and

more important, he would assume no position that might put him in contact with the

Governor General. Were he to assume the presidency of Saint-Pierre’s Revolutionary

Tribunal, Pelauque warned brazenly, he would be forced to put nearly the entire

government under arrest, since he had papers in his possession that proved conclusively

that Rochambeau and scores o f others were traitors. Naturally, the Committee o f General

Security was quite interested in seeing such papers, bu t when they asked Pelauque to

show them his evidence, he refused to give anything up .23

22 Ibid., 43-44.

23 Ibid.

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Unlike Rochambeau, m ost Republicans in Martinique had never had to defend

themselves before the Jacobins in Paris. The result was that in their ignorance, colonial

radicals would unwittingly attempt to employ the most radical institutions o f France in

Martinique, by arguing vehemently that the creation o f Revolutionary Tribunals was the

only sure means o f combating seemingly omnipresent enemies o f the state. True, the

governor’s military justice system had proven problematic, but more moderate citizens

were not deceived by the rhetoric o f the would-be “Jacobins.” One did not have to look

as far as Europe to witness the supreme abuses o f power committed in the name of the

Revolution, and by summer 1793, Sonthonax’ continued depravity in Saint-Domingue

had proven beyond any doubt that no one was safe from so-called “Revolutionary

Justice.”

The announcement of the formation o f a tribunal in Saint-Pierre spread terror

among Martinique’s former aristocratic class. Certainly it was they who had the most to

fear from such a development, and through persuasion, bribery and threats, they did

everything in their power to try to prevent the establishment o f more tribunals before the

idea spread past Saint-Pierre. Ironically, the “former” Royalists found their savior in the

person o f the Governor General.

Familiar as he was with the modus operandi o f the Jacobins in Paris, and probably

still smarting over the Barberousse affair, Rochambeau believed that Revolutionary

Tribunals in Martinique would make a travesty o f justice. More than 300 Royalist

prisoners remained in the colony’s jails, and after the capture o f the Blanche, the potential

existed that more would be imprisoned. Royalists or not, Rochambeau steadfastly

302




maintained that those armed citizens who had been captured in the recent fighting

(especially those aboard the Blanche) were to be considered prisoners o f war. As such,

they could not be legally tried by a civilian court. He refused to recognize the Saint-

Pierre tribunal, stalled the creation of any others, and created a military comm ission of

five members to deal first with the prisoners of war. Ultimately, the Governor General’s

justice was no less harsh than tha t practiced in Paris. He exercised what Bailleul

described as an “eagle’s clutch” over his new “courts-martial,” especially after he

mandated that all prisoners of war could expect sentencing within twenty-four hours. Of

the nine “emigre” prisoners captured aboard the Blanche, five were immediately

condemned to death and shot, three were found innocent, and the last (who was able to

prove that he was a naturalized Spanish citizen), was locked away in Sa int-Pierre’s ja il to

await the Civil Commissioners.24

Through either political deftness, or more probably through sheer luck, by mid-

September Rochambeau had managed to hold the fractured colony together for almost

two months. Nevertheless, recent events such as the Blanche incident, the colony’s

continued penury, the ongoing slave revolt, the recalcitrance o f the Chasseurs, the

Royalist and British threat, and the myriad abuses o f power by the colony’s Comm ittees

of Surveillance and Police, all combined to finally convince him that he could no longer

delay convening a central legislative body. Thus, it was with great fanfare that on 13

September 1793, Governor General Donatien Rochambeau decreed that the colony’s

24 Ibid., 45-46.

303




government would be transformed through “direct” elections.25

The date for the general elections was set for 16 September, and for the first time,

all qualified citizens in Martinique voted for “Representative Commissaries” and their

substitutes, who would in turn create a new colonial assembly. More significant at the

local level, the Committees of Surveillance and Police were to be replaced by

municipality police; voters would choose municipal officers as well as officers for their

local National Guard units. Here the voters’ “direct” influence ended. Citizens in each

parish were allowed to elect only one deputy for every fifty voters, but they were

empowered to decide upon their own representatives’ term length. While the method for

selecting judges and deputies to the National Convention followed essentially the same

pattern, the actual elections were delayed until such time as it would be safe for them to

travel to France where they could be officially recognized. Not all of the island’s parishes

participated in the process (Royalists still controlled seven or eight of the more rural

parishes), but for the most part, the elections proceeded remarkably well. On 20

September, the delegates convened in Saint-Pierre’s city’s cathedral, the site of the first

meeting o f the city’s La Marseillaise society. Rather than begin business that day, a

unanimous motion passed that the representatives wait two days to commence their

deliberations - the first day of Year Two on the new Republican calendar .26

At exactly 9:00 a.m. on 22 September 1793, Rochambeau opened the new

government’s first official session with one of his finer speeches. After reminding the

25 Ibid., 40.

26 Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 215.

304




delegates o f the importance o f the task that lay ahead o f them, he observed that they must

be guided in the ir deliberations by three simple principles, “first, to always think o f the

public good; second, to employ every man according to his talents; and third, to render to

each man that good fortune that he deserves from his government.”

“We will find the happiest results by abandoning the long list of prejudices of our

fathers,” he continued, “and if one can reduce m en and things to their true worth, after

reviewing the sad fragments o f our past, one discovers that this is the primordial germ

that makes societies prosper. Thus, administrators require more character than spirit, and

less talent than virtue .”27 Though his own children were being raised in Paris,

Rochambeau next spoke to the assembly as a Republican father:

A vast field is open to your meditations, and you will reap in great

abundance the fruits of liberty that you have sown in future

generations. The national education must take hold of the children

while their thoughts are still pure, and never leave them when they

become citizens. For this to be, we must develop in them a

national character that will inspire in them a love for the patrie.

She will not have to wait for long if they constantly speak o f great

men, if the public festivals recall immortal images, and i f they

receive these feelings throughout their entire being .28

The first lines o f the governor’s speech bordered on the platitudinous, but later in

his address, he bravely broke with Jacobin tradition on the matter o f religion. Since

coming to power jus t over a year before, the radicals had mercilessly persecuted

clergymen in France. Nevertheless, the majority of slaves, if not actually practicing

27 Rochambeau to Martinique’s Representative Assembly, 22 September 1793,

cited in Daney, His toire de la Martinique, 215.

28 Ibid., 215-216.

305




Christians themselves, had a healthy respect for, or at least fear of, the clergy. Clouded in

their judgemen t either by their prejudice or their paranoia, most colonial Frenchmen

failed to understand that the multi-theistic Voodoo religion had actually been conceived

as a method o f reconciling Catholicism with traditional tribal religions. Even during the

bloodiest days of the slave uprisings in Saint-Domingue, a number o f rural priests roamed

freely in the camps of the murderous Jeannot, Biassou, and Jean-Franqois, where they

continued to spread God’s word while simultaneously performing last rites for the white

prisoners. It was thus unusually astute o f Rochambeau to observe that:

The peasants o f this colony have asked w ith loud cries that we

replace the religious ministers that they have lost. These kind men

have, in the exercise of their daily functions, done deeds which

often escape notice, but which are precious to piety. Do not wait to

pu t them back among the workers, they come before the poor in

their sadness, and they calm the voice of poverty. Intermediaries,

so to speak, between God and man, they are for many the

dispensers o f His grace, the organs o f His threats, and the

interpreters of His laws.29

In each of its subsequent points, the governor’s speech brightly championed

sentiments o f harmony and k indness that, at the time, were quite alien to the French

Caribbean. Amid the glow of recent victories over their enemies and the prevailing

“peace,” he might be excused for being somewhat magnanimous, but Rochambeau was

no dupe. If indeed there was peace on Martinique, it best served him to promote and

maintain that state of affairs for as long as possible. “One must always remember that

respect for the lives o f men m ust be among all nations the first of sentiments,” he said,

29 Ibid., 216.

306




“since it is the basis fo r social order .”30

Far from being a dictatorship, Donatien Rocham beau’s civil/military

administration in Martinique can be counted as one of the rare instances in French

Revolutionary history that a Republican government was forced upon an unwilling people

without a reversion to terror. Indeed, the “Jacobin” Governor General o f the Windward

Islands spumed the methods o f Revolutionary “justice” that were fast becoming de

rigueur in the pa trie. Even had the guillotine been available in the colonies, Rochambeau

remained loathe to permit executions in the name o f the state.

While he adopted a more enlightened approach in implementing his new

administration, two factors hobbled the creation o f a true “Dictature Republica ine.”

First, even though France was at war, Rochambeau willfully diluted his authority by an

almost slavish preoccupation with conforming to the tenets of the Declaration o f the

Rights of Man and the Citizen. He remained quite prepared to administer military justice

under appropriate circumstances, but he balked at extending martial law to any case that

could be construed as falling within the realm of civil jurisdiction. Thus, by refusing to

create Revolutionary Tribunals and repeatedly holding cases in abeyance until the arrival

o f Civil Commissioners, he appeared indecisive, if not weak, to civilian Republicans in

Martinique. In fact, his restraint is obvious when one considers the general’s recent

history. Rochambeau had served under both o f these administrative bodies, and

witnessed their frightful potency over military and civilian authorities.

Second, any potential for a military dictatorship was nullified by the absence o f

30 Ibid.

307




such a system’s key component - a functioning, loyal military. Despite their earlier valor,

the Chasseurs proved themselves a liability in peacetime. The Committees of

Surveillance and Police were equally troublesome, and the N ational Guard, as yet, were

unreliable.

Rochambeau certainly was well-schooled in all aspects of the military art, bu t his

years of training and experience left him grossly deficient in the skills required to

confront matters o f civil administration - the same was true o f the general officers that he

installed as governors in the other French Windward Island colonies. Regardless, the

Nation expected these soldiers to impose the new regime whatever the circumstances.

Thus, Rochambeau relished forming a conventional, centralized legislative and judicia l

body in Martinique. He was delighted to oversee the formation of Martinique’s nascent

assembly; soon he could expect the subsequent leisure o f executing the more traditional

prerogatives of the off ice o f the Governor General.

308



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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE EARLY CAREER OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL

DONATIEN ROCHAMBEAU

AND THE FRENCH CAMPAIGNS IN THE CARIBBEAN,

1792-1794

VOLUME II

CHAPTERS 11-18

By

JAMES LAFAYETTE HAYNSWORTHIV

A Dissertation submitted to the

Department o f History

in partial fulfillment o f the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor o f Philosophy

Degree Awarded:

Summer Semester, 2003

Copyright © 2003

James Lafayette Haynsworth IV

All Rights Reserved




Chapter XI

The New Order:

September 1793 - January 1794

The first session of Martinique’s new legislature was particularly busy. After

some deliberation, the members rejected the “odious” title of Assem blee Coloniale, and

took instead the name Assemblee Representative de la Martinique. Once they had

decided to continue holding their sessions in Saint-Pierre, they chose the Ursulines chapel

in the city to be their meeting place. While it was incumbent upon the legislators to deal

with the needs of the colony, it was typically democratic o f the legislators to take care o f

themselves first. Deliberately copying their contemporaries in the United States, the

Assembly voted for itself a salary of twelve livres per day while they were in session and

another forty for travel expenses.1

The lawmakers faced some rather daunting problems. It was unthinkable to re

enact laws from the previous Assembly, since most either were no longer applicable, or

had been drafted under the influence of the counterrevolutionaries. In addition, any

Colonial Assembly proceedings written before 1790 had been archived in the Maritime

Agency at Brest, and were unavailable. Nevertheless, a legislative framework had to be

1 Bailleul, Report, 41; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique , 217.

309




put in place before the group could enact any meaningful statutes; the Governor General

would provide the guidance and supervision, but the Representative Assembly essentially

had to start from scratch.2

The Law o f 4 April 1792 had given all colonial assemblies the power to write a

constitution for their colony, subject to the approval o f the Governor General. Under the

circumstances, Martinique’s new Assembly found this especially difficult. Hundreds o f

questions of procedure remained to be answered and, given the unpredictable turnover o f

governments in Paris, it was nearly impossible to determine what was currently legal.

Thus, the Assembly was forced to set aside the drafting o f a constitution. As a result,

simple matters o f colonial administration proved to be that much more difficult to resolve

over the coming months. Despite the lack of a constitution, some issues could be

addressed immediately. The Assembly chose an easy first target. Knowing that the

action would be in keeping w ith the latest rulings o f the National Convention, the

Assembly voted to nationalize all church property on Martinique on 24 September .3

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 42. The Assembly eventually did follow Rochambeau’s advice, and on 4

November provisionally installed pries ts in the pay of the state. The power of the

Catholic Church in Martinique, however, had been destroyed. In addition to taking the

church’s lands, the Assem bly’s 24 September law broke up the religious orders, and

suspended religious vows, replacing them with oaths to the state. This measure, like

subsequent acts concerning the sale of the clergy’s goods (18 November), the exemption

of the clergy from military service (29 November), and the status of monks and nuns (4

January 1794), followed similar procedures adopted in France under the 1790 CivilConstitution o f the Clergy. There was some room for modification however. Since the 2

November 1789 French seizure o f church property had not been effected on Martinique,

members of the Assembly argued successfully that the colony’s church was an

“independent entity.” As the result, the French national laws could be adapted to suit the

colony’s specific needs. Clergymen, with the permission of the local municipalities,

310




Seizing the clergy’s goods may have placated Martinique’s Republicans, but it did

little to relieve the colony’s indigence. Rochambeau had already realized that his

embargo policy was untenable due to the scarcity of ships that had braved coming to

Martinique, and when his 26 August deadline for closing all o f the colony’s ports arrived,

he extended the date until 1 January 1794. The extension proved too little, too late. By

the time of the Assem bly’s convocation, the refusal o f so many of the colony’s slaves to

work had reduced crop production on the island to the point that M artinique’s plantations

and farms could not produce even enough food to sustain the colony. With no other

option, the Assembly took the further step on 25 September of revoking many o f the

Governor General’s prohibitive trade laws, and opened four o f the island ’s ports to

neutral shipping until April 1794 to allow the colony to receive the most basic

provisions.4

While opening ports was a worthy stopgap measure, goods from neutral countries,

primarily A merica, still had to be paid for. The Assem bly adopted several measures to

raise money, which included a vote on 2 November to sell emigre’s furniture, and to

could keep and dispose o f their personal property, while the municipality ensured that

they maintained sufficient furnishings to conduct their business. Assemblee

Representative de la Martinique [hereafter Assemblee Representative], Extra it des

Registres des Deliberations de I 'Assem blee Representative de la Martinique [hereafter

Deliberations], Decrees of 4, 18 and 29 November 1793, 4 January 1794, Saint-Pierre,

Martinique, 1793-1794. AN, Lettres de General Rochambeau, commandant des forces

Frangaises et d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A101; Daney,

Histoire de la Martinique, 217-218; Kleczewski, Martinique and the British Occupation, 85-87.

4 Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 214; Assemblee Representative,

Deliberations, Decree of 24 September 1793; Kleczewski, Martinique an d the British

Occupation, 103.

311




suspend all government pensions, but Martinique still remained deeply in debt. By 18

November, the Assembly had no choice but to declare the colony officially bankrupt.

Although they had tried, Rochambeau and the delegates finally admitted that they could

no longer avoid imposing a mandatory tax on all of the colony’s citizens. After

announcing that the state o f the treasury jeopard ized public safety, the Assembly voted

that the colony’s sugar producers, manufacturers, and landlords would “donate” seven

and a half per-cent of their gross revenues to the government. All others would pay five

per-cent. The Assembly appointed a Finance Committee to manage the money, and the

Assemblymen asked Daigremont to assist the C omm ittee’s initial efforts by supplying a

full account of the state of the treasury since the beginning of his administration. The

request was not unreasonable. As early as 1 April 1793, Rochambeau had called upon the

island’s citizens to make a voluntary contribution {emprunt) to help bolster the colony’s

depleted treasury. These funds, combined with the ongoing seizure and sale o f emigre

goods, should have amounted to a considerable sum. To the Assembly’s dismay,

however, Daigremont stalled, claiming that he could not deliver his report until his own

Special Rece iver of the Republic, Volny-Aristide Foumiols, had completed his work .5

Daigremont’s weak response was disturbing to the Assembly, who expected that

he would have managed the colony’s treasury at least as well as Leborgne had managed

5 Bailleul, Report, 57; Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decrees o f 2 and

18 November 1793; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 225; Kleczewski, Martin ique an d the British Occupation, 106. Foumiols did not complete his report until over two months

later, jus t days before the British invaded the island. Foumiols would later be elected

from Martinique to the Council o f 500, and serve in the Thermidorean Committee of

Public Safety where he publicly defended Rochambeau’s actions during his tour as

Governor General o f the W indward Islands.

312




unofficial contributions made earlier in the year. Shortly after Rochambeau’s arrival in

February, the c itizens of Saint-Pierre had learned o f the state o f the co lony’s finances, and

turned their abundant energy to remedying the problem. As a result, the Republicans in

the city conducted a drive for voluntary donations, which in a short time had netted an

astounding 300,000 livres. No one trusted Daigremont with such a considerable sum, and

the money was given to the government under the condition that Leborgne took

responsibility for its safe keeping. Leborgne made regular, detailed reports to Saint-

Pierre’s Comm ittee o f Public Safety o f payments made from the fund, and before he

returned to France in late October, he left to the city of Saint-Pierre a full account o f how

the money had been spent during his tenure as trustee .6

For months the Finance Committee did not receive Daigremont’s register, so

numerous complaints began to surface from all quarters about the status o f the sale o f

emigre property. Many citizens demanded payment for goods and services to the

government, only to be told by Daigremont that they would have to address their claims

to the Assembly. Consequently, many in the colony concluded that the Orderer was

corrupt. Despite repeated requests to the Governor General to fire Daigremont and to

replace him with someone that they and the colony’s creditors could trust, Rocham beau

kept him in office.7

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 42, 56-57. Charles-Antoine Daigremont had come to Martinique from

Sainte-Lucie to replace the previous Intendant, M. Vievigne, who had been chiefly

responsible for plundering the island’s treasury during Behague’s flight. In light of recent

history, the very position o f the Orderer was suspect, but Daigremont’s aristocratic

background undoubtedly contributed to the pub lic ’s distrust o f him. On nearly every

313




Between November 1793 and January 1794, it seemed that no matter what actions

the Assembly or its Finance Committee took, they could not reduce the colony’s

staggering debt. The Committee itse lf had little power to enforce tax collection, and what

monies did come into the treasury could neither sustain Martinique’s civil administration

nor pay even one quarter of the debt left over from the latest conflict. Moreover, the

system was fraught with abuse. Suspect citizens were hounded mercilessly for

extraordinary donations, and those who neglected to make regular or “special”

contributions, or to send their share of slaves to do public works, could expect to have

their property confiscated. Despite such Draconian measures, the state of Martinique’s

finances remained a disaster .8

A second issue that immediately faced the Assembly was the question of creating

an official judicial body. Rochambeau had dealt handily with the prisoner o f war

question, but nearly 300 suspect citizens, many he ld on dubious charges, remained in the

colony’s jails awaiting the arrival of the Civil Commissioners. Even the most spiteful of

Mar tinique’s Republicans viewed such arbitrary detention as a cruel violation o f the

Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, but as the Assem bly’s functions were

purely legislative; it was outside of their purview to resolve the prisoner issue. Once

proclamation from the period his name was misspelled as d’Aigremont, and each tim e the

mistake had to be corrected by hand. His cavalier attitude concerning the colony’s

finances absolutely cemented any mistrust surrounding his activities. That he was

unfailingly protected by the Governor General did no t help his situation, and he wouldlater be accused o f only paying his and Rochambeau’s aristocratic friends for goods and

services purchased by the government.

8 Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 224-225. In many cases, suspects were

required to pay “rent” on their own property.

314




again, Rochambeau provided the solution. On the first day of their deliberations, the

Assembly approved the dissolution of the Governor General’s Committee o f General

Security and created its own Committee o f General Security to serve as an interim

judicial arm of the new government. As a result, Rochambeau departed slightly from his

earlier refusal to institute colony-wide Revolutionary Tribunals, and proposed to the

Assemblymen they follow the national example and form a single Revolutionary

Tribunal, answerable to the Committee o f General Security of the Representative

Assembly .9

To all but M artinique’s Republicans, the specter of any type o f Revolutionary

Tribunal was fraught with negative implications. Debate over the issue raged for two

days, with the greatest point of contention being whether or not the Assembly was within

its rights to even consider creating such a body without the assent o f the Paris

government. The issue came to a vote on 28 September, and passed the Assembly by

three ballots. The delegates recognized their authority to implement Rochambeau’s

suggestion, and charged the new Committee of General Security to organize and define

the powers o f the colony’s new Tribunal Revolutionnaire. 10

The text o f the 28 September decision left a thorough catalogue of the numerous

9 Bailleul, Report, 41; Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decree o f 28

September 1793; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 217-219; Kleczewski, Martinique

and the British Occupation, 89. Martinique’s new Committee of General Security was

composed o f twelve o f the Assembly’s own members. In addition to creating theRevolutionary Tribunals, the Committee o f General Security was charged with

disbanding the Committees o f Surveillance and Police. Assemblee Representative,

Deliberations, Decree of 24 September 1793.

10 Ibid.

315




perceived threats to the island’s security. Undoubtedly, the number o f

counterrevolutionaries being held by the government would only grow as the corsairs

brought in more prisoners, and enemies o f the state, both internal and abroad, were doing

everything in their power to incite revolt among the island’s citizens.11 The very real

possibility existed that i f these agitators could somehow jo in forces with those who were

imprisoned, the island’s authorities would be faced with a riot that they would not be able

to control. Therefore, it became incumbent upon the Committee of General Security to

“overawe the counterrevolutionaries that are hidden and blended into the colony with the

example o f a terrible justice .” Exactly one month after the Assembly’s vote, the

Committee completed their proposals to the Revolutionary Tribunal, and their

recommendations passed the Assembly without issue .12

11 Overcrowding in the colony’s jails and forts had become so severe that in

Republique-ville, Rochambeau was forced to keep nearly 150 prisoners confined on a

barge anchored below Fort-de-la-Republique.

12 Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decrees o f 28 September and 28

October 1793; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 218-219, 222; Kleczewski, Martinique

and the British Occupation, 89. Undoubtedly fearful themselves of possibly facing the

National Convention’s “terrible justice,” the Assemblymen went to great lengths to

explain in the 28 October decree that because o f the war’s preventing communication

with France, they had been forced to act as sovereign for the protection of their citizens.

Martinique’s Tribunal Criminel Ex traordinaire was designed along similar lines as its

Continental counterpart, and was charged “to judge all counterrevolutionary enterprises,

all attempts against liberty, equality, unity, and the indivisibility of the Republic; the

internal security of the colony, all plots attempting to reestablish the royalty or to

establish any other authority that challenged the liberty, equality or sovereignty of the

people.” The principle difference between the colony’s court and tha t o f metropolitanFrance was that M artinique’s Revolutionary Tribunal had two, twelve-man juries, while

France’s Revolutionary Tribunal had only one in Paris, with sub-courts throughout

France. Because of the high number of prisoners awaiting trial, Martinique’s Assembly

arranged that one jury served in Saint-Pierre, while the other decided cases in

Republique-ville.

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The Revolutionary Tribunal was independent o f the ordinary criminal tribunals

already in place on the island, and was to concern itse lf specifically with

counterrevolutionary activities directed against the state or its citizens. The Tribunal was

five judges rather than a jury, and each elected by the Representative Assembly. Once

they had passed sentence on the prisoners detained in Saint-Pierre, they then traveled to

Republique-ville to do the same. The Tribunal was given broad latitude to exercise its

power, but held the authority to pass judgem ent only on offenses comm itted since

Rocham beau’s arrival on 4 February, when he had first proclaimed the Revolution in the

colony. Thus, any prisoners who had been involved in the Behague affair were tried in

the regular criminal courts.13

From the beginning, the Tribunal was saddled with an impossible backlog. To

assist them, the Assembly named a six-member commission composed of its own

delegates, with the responsibility to evaluate and report on arrests, information, and the

hundreds o f denunciations that had already been sent to Saint-Pierre by the Committees

of Surveillance and Police. As in France, denunciations had become a lucrative business

on Martinique. If a denunciation was found to have any validity, those making the

accusation normally expected to receive a cash payment up to as much as fifty per-cent of

the fine levied. It was hoped, therefore, that by creating the new commission and by

imposing other restrictions at the municipal level, the system contained enough steps to

13 Ibid., Decree of 28 October 1793; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique , 219, 222-

224; Kleczewski, Martinique an d the British Occupation, 88-90.

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ensure that only the most serious cases came before the Tribunal.14

In fact, the advent o f the screening commission made processing a denunciation

decidedly more complex. Once an official report was made at the municipal level, an act

o f accusation was delivered to the commission, where the six members would review the

accusation, interview the accuser, com municate with the Tribunal’s judges, and then

report to the Assembly. The Assembly made the final decision as to whether or not to

refer the case to the Revolutionary Tribunal for prosecution. The judges merely presided

over those cases that actually came to trial; the jury decided the fate o f the accused. All

sentences were executed without possibility of appeal, and the property of those

condemned was transferred to the state; it became responsible for the spouses and

children of the condemned i f they had no other means of support. With the judicial

process thus complete, the condemned was transported to the guillotine at the capital’s

Place du Fort, where Rochambeau personally gave the order for the execution. In truth,

Mar tinique’s courts system was more severe in theory than in practice, especially when

compared to the executions that were taking place in France during the same period. By

the end o f March 1794, only three people had lost their heads at the Place du Fort,

including M. Genaille, an emigre who was found aboard an English ship, M. Dupin, a

former notary, and a black .15

At the local level, elections for municipal officers proceeded almost as smoothly

14 Kleczewski, Martinique and the British Occupation, 88-90.

15 Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 219, 222-224; Kleczewski, Martinique an d

the British Occupation, 88-90. The crimes committed by the last two men are unknown.

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as those for the Assembly, and once installed, the municipalities proved eager to put an

end to the Surveillance Committees and their acts of venal impunity. Rochambeau and

the Assembly were only too glad to support this effort, and mandated on 18 November

that the Surveillance Committees had fifteen days to settle their affairs, compose

complete accounts of all their activities, and deliver the reports to their municipality’s

new police detachment. Supported by a reliable Republican police force, municipal

officials became vigilant watchdogs over the colony’s interior security, and subsequent

decrees by the Assembly incrementally augmented their authority.16

The various municipalities’ most daunting responsibility was to prevent the free

movement o f counterrevolutionaries, especially by sea. Initially, any Frenchman who in

time o f war swore an oath to, or had any communication with an enemy o f the Republic

would not be allowed to set foot on the island lest he be treated as an enemy as well. By

December 1793 the threat from counterrevolutionaries was so serious that any contact

whatsoever with emigres became a capital offense. Port authorities throughout the island

were ordered to register all boats and their passengers, while Martiniquais commuting by

water were required to carry a passport from their municipality’s offices. Free men,

especially foreigners who could claim no municipality, only were allowed to leave their

ships if they carried a letter signed by the company’s captain for whom they worked; in

addition, no captain, French or otherwise, was allowed to disembark passengers unless he

16 Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decree of 18 October 1793; Daney,


319




had received permission from the municipality in which he was anchoring.17

The colony’s transit policies were especially stringent regarding French citizens.

Any French captain who brought an emigre into the colony, or who assisted their arrival,

would be brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal, while foreign captains who

committed similar offenses would face the regular criminal courts, as well as have his

vessel and cargo seized. All mail coming into the colony was to be inspected by

municipal officials prior to delivery, and no foreign ship was allowed to leave any port

after 6:00 p.m. Nevertheless, by early 1794, Martinique’s authorities found that all of

their restrictions and penalties had only minimally impacted the activities o f the colony’s

enemies. Despite the precautions put in place by the municipalities and the central

government, Royalists continued to pass valuable information concerning the state o f the

colony, and its defenses, to their confederates abroad .18

The free movement o f the island’s rebel slaves posed an entirely different set of

issues. Municipalities were capable o f managing the slave population within their

immediate areas o f responsibility, but hunting down armed, m utinous workers in the

interior o f the island was more appropriately a mission for the army. As the nearly-empty

treasury could barely sustain feeding the troops in garrison, it was nearly impossible for

the government to send their troops on prolonged slave-hunting expeditions. Despite the

17 Ibid., Decrees and deliberations o f 11 and 21 October; 2,1 2 ,1 9 and 23

November; 18-19 December 1793; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 219-220, 222.

18 Ibid. By early October the Assembly clarified their definition of emigre as any

Frenchman, who for any amount o f time, had resided in a colony belonging to an enemy

of the Republic. Municipalities were ordered to provide the Assembly with regularly-

revised lists of all reputed emigres in their area.

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obstacles faced by the military authorities, the “worker companies” problem appears to

have solved itself. Neither Rochambeau nor his contemporaries have left any indication

of the success o f his July amnesty policy which offered a good conduct pass to those

armed slaves who had put down their weapons and returned to their masters. Similarly, a

noticeable lack o f references to continued attacks by black-led rebels indicates that during

the fall and winter o f 1793, the movement had either lost its momentum or had died

altogether.

There are at least two explanations for the apparent suspension o f the slave revolt.

First, it was quite possible that because o f the severe labor shortage on the island, white

colonists took an active part in rounding up fugitive slaves for work, and the rebels

judged it safer to rem ain in hiding rather than risk capture. Second, the news would

certainly have arrived in Martinique by October that Sonthonax, who in the summer of

1793 was steadily losing a new war against Saint-Domingue’s mulattoes, freed the slaves

in the colony’s North on 29 August. While Martinique’s rebellious slaves may not have

understood the ramifications and political circumstances surrounding their neighbors’

emancipation, it nevertheless appeared that the Republicans offered the best real chance

for freedom. The governor’s subsequent legislation regarding Martinique’s slaves may

have served to confirm that belief .19

Rochambeau neither forgot nor altered his earlier promise to free those slaves who

served with distinction during the late fighting, but he believed that he was unable to

19 It is also possible that Martinique’s slaves had learned something of the

earnestness with which their cause was being debated in Paris. The National Convention

would free all of the colonies’ slaves in February 1794.

321




legally fulfill his obligation without the approval o f the Civil Commissioners. O f course,

these men had not arrived, and the Assembly was now in a position to enact the necessary

legislation. Only a technical problem remained. Under the laws o f earlier colonial

assemblies, to set a slave free, a master was required to pay an enormous tax to the

Intendant. Martinique’s new Assembly thus had the opportunity to profit from a sudden

windfall; despite the colony’s penury, Rochambeau would not a llow the government to

derive any monetary advantage from what he saw as the Revolution’s highest moral

obligation. Between 6 and 9 October, he steered an act through the Assembly which

delineated the proper procedure for emancipating the colony’s slaves. According to the

governor’s plan, a m aster could free any o f his slaves at no expense, but he or she had to

put in writing that from that day forward, they renounced all claim to the individual.

Former masters were then required to provide 300 livres per year, paid monthly, to slaves

over the age of fifty and to those who were sick. However, Rocham beau’s emancipation

edict did contain certain control measures. If a slave was freed for distinguished military

service, the captain under whom he served was required to verify that service. Further, to

ensure that a newly-free slave would not pose a threat to public safety, his actual release

was made subject to the approval o f the municipality in which he resided.20

While the emancipation procedures were open to potential abuse or

discrimination, Bailleul, who was always quick to criticize the Governor General and his

policies, admitted that this particular act was received very well. Apparently, many

20 Assemblee Representative, Delibera tions, Decree o f 9 October 1793. Female

slaves who had formerly been the property o f the church had to rem ain and be registered

in their own municipality.

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Martiniquais c itizens welcomed the opportunity to repay their slaves for outstanding

service, either civil or military, while others liberated all of their slaves simply as a matter

o f conscience. So strongly did the Governor General believe in the justness of his cause,

that he took extra precautions to ensure that all emancipations on Martinique were made

permanent by the highest government authority. For weeks his functionaries compiled a

list of all o f the colony’s newly free men and women, and in November 1793,

Rochambeau arranged for his aide, Colonel Lahoussaye de Cypre, to carry the list to

France for approval by the National Convention. His order for the first slave

emancipation in the Windward Islands was a transcendent moment in Rochambeau’s

career. Unfortunately, Bellegarde and his 1st Chasseurs would soon spoil the occasion by

forcing the governor to issue a series o f reactionary laws against those blacks in the

colony who remained in bondage.21

Serious problems with the 1st Chasseurs arose soon after the governor and the

Assembly turned their attention to matters o f colonial defense. Since their creation on 2

May, Rochambeau had given the 1st Chasseur Battalion little in the way of support or

guidance; they had, after all, been created in a state of emergency as an irregular force,

intended simply to augment the national troops. In Rochambeau’s opinion, the Chasseurs

could not be compared to the National Guard, since the great majority of Bellegarde’s

men were not citizens, and since the general personally had selected and then breveted the

officers. In an attempt to resolve their questionable status, Rochambeau signed on 29

September a ruling making the Chasseurs de la Martinique an auxiliary corps of troops o f


323




the line, in the pay o f the French Republic, although the government, in fact, had no funds

to support it.22

Bellegarde’s battalion certainly rejoiced in their new-found recognition, but four

days later, Rochambeau and the Assembly announced a general military draft. O f the

island’s twenty-six parishes, the fourteen that were not considered Royalist strongholds

received orders that all men aged seventeen to fifty-five would enlist in militia units.

Upon mobilization, the new units were to report to the various forts and armed camps

throughout the colony, and await further orders from Rochambeau. Those men too old

for regular service were not exempt, but would report to the National Guard or the

municipal police in the capacity o f “veteran companies,” to be called upon as needed by

the local authorities. A separate draft was imposed for an elite force of 460 men, 200 o f

whom would come from Saint-Pierre; their sole responsibility was to garrison the forts in

Republique-ville. What stung Bellegarde and his men, however, was that the decree also

formally announced that Edouard M ember’s 2d Chasseur Battalion was to be on an equal

footing with the 1st Chasseur Battalion .23

22 Assemblee Representative, Deliberations , Decree of 25 September 1793.

23 Ibid., Decree o f 3 October 1793; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 220;

Kleczewski, Martinique an d the British Occupation, 88 , 105-106. Bailleul maintained

that many problems in the 1st Chasseur Battalion could have been avoided had they

undergone a proper organization, but that Rochambeau had basically ignored the unit ever

since the English had left the island. This newest announcement certainly was not the

type o f organization that they had in mind, and as the result, both Bellegarde andPelauque came to believe that the Governor General intended to disband them altogether.

Bailleul, Report, 42, 47. The 3 October decree also mandated that those o f military age

who were absent from the colony had to either pay a special replacement tax (enough to

maintain a soldier for one year) or find a replacement. The money would be paid into

their municipality’s general fund.

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Certainly, Bellegarde and Pelauque saw the provisions o f this 3 O ctober decree as

a threat to their preeminence. More important, however, new troops meant more

demands in a bitter competition for limited resources. The Military Committee o f the

Representative Assembly was responsible to figure out the division o f assets, but based

upon his Commissary’s recommendations, Rochambeau retained the right to decide what

supplies the Chasseurs needed. Though his illicit business with the Americans was

making him a wealthy man, Bellegarde claimed publicly that he and his men had been

cheated by the Governor General. Pelauque wrote an indignant letter to the Assembly on

his partner’s behalf, in w hich he demanded money and supplies, claiming that the failure

of the Assembly to tend to the immediate needs o f his battalion was causing a serious

inconvenience. Rochambeau was not impressed. While he may have been prejudiced

against the first battalion, especially after Pelauque’s later defection, it was the

Assemblymen who reminded Pelauque that the colony did not have funds to rearm

Martinique’s forces. Furthermore, the normal expenses incurred by Bel legarde’s

Chasseurs during their last campaigns had to be balanced against the claims o f citizens

whose property the Chasseurs had destroyed or stolen. The costs had run into the

hundreds o f thousands o f livres; with only the emigres’ property available for payment,

the government had to be careful in their disbursements. This line o f reasoning by the

Assembly should have been no surprise to Bellegarde and Pelauque. The last sentences

of the Assembly’s letter, however, must certainly have caught the two men o ff guard; the

Chasseurs would have to wait for any funding until after the Assembly’s Finance and

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Military Committees had conducted a complete review of the battalion’s organization.24

While the Finance Committee tallied the Chasseurs’ debt, the Assembly’s two-

man Military Committee discovered that Bellegarde had illegally allowed 180 fugitive

slaves to join his battalion in the weeks following the recent fighting. Rather than

returning these slaves to their masters, the Military Committee recommended putting all

180 of these men into the 2d Chasseur Battalion, thus making the two units approximately

equal in strength. The news came as a shock to the Governor General. Once he was

informed o f the surplus, he immediately issued a proclamation on 13 October which

directed that if slaves in Bellegarde’s ranks had n ot actually fought in the previous

conflict, then they must be sent back to their plantations by the time that he arrived for an

upcoming inspection. Immediately, Bellegarde took actions to stall the transfer.

Convinced that it was they who had informed the Assembly of the extra soldiers, he

began to treat as spies the other officers that Rochambeau had appointed to his battalion.25

When the municipality o f la Trinite com plained about sinister nightly meetings

Bellegarde was having with his trusted officers, the A ssembly knew that they had to act.

Through a series o f denunciations, the municipality assured the Assembly that Bellegarde


25 Ibid., 49. Bellegarde actually began to harass the officers that Rochambeau

placed in the battalion as early as m id-September. In fact, a Chasseur “Council o f War”

threatened the life o f the battalion’s executive officer, Commandant La Rochette, andforced him to flee his post. When La Rochette reported the event to the Governor

General, an irate Rochambeau condemned the “disgusting” behavior o f the Chasseurs,

ordered La Rochette to return to his station, and vowed to courts-martial those who had

threatened him. Rochambeau to La Rochette, 16 September 1793. AN, Correspondance

a V’Arrivee Recue aux Colonies, D XXV/50/477, items 11 and 17.

326




and his men were planning to destroy Meunier’s battalion, and that they had sworn they

would march on Saint-Pierre and make everything “fire and blood” i f the government

persisted in their efforts to transfer their 180 troops .26 Naturally, Bellegarde denied any

such meetings. La Trinite was still suspect as a haven for Royalist agitators, and no one

in Saint-Pierre or Republique-ville knew whom to believe. To determine the facts, the

Committee o f Public Safety o f Republique-ville came up with a rather ingenious plan.

They chose two of their own members, Jean Isaac, a free black member, and M. Colon to

visit Bellegarde’s camp under the pre text o f presenting an official unit flag to the 1st

Chasseur Battalion. This disguise, it was believed, would not arouse the suspicions o f the

Chasseurs or the citizens o f la Trinite, and might even improve relations between

Bellegarde and the government.27

Bellegarde and Pelauque knew well that the Chasseurs were almost as much a

creation of the Republicans as they were of Rochambeau, and it did not take long for the

two men to coopt the delegates. Soon after arriving at the camp, Isaac and Colon were

seduced by Bellegarde’s platitudes and Pelauque’s promises, swearing that they only

wanted what was good for the colony. As the result, it was not long before the two

delegates concluded that the municipality’s complaint against the battalion was based

purely on rumor. The Chasseur leadership pushed their luck even farther by presenting

the Committee’s emissaries with a new list of officer candidates. In the end, Isaac and

Colon returned to Republique-ville well-satisfied. After expounding upon the sincerity

26 Ibid., 49-50.

27 Ibid.

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and gallantry of Bellegarde and his men, they presented the list o f officers to the

Committee, and further informed them that the Chasseurs were nearly naked and needed

uniforms. Daigremont had been totally negligent, they charged, and Rocham beau had

done nothing to alleviate the Chasseurs’ suffering .28

With this news, the Committee o f Public Safety o f Republique-ville asked the

governor to do something to meet the needs of the corps that he had created. However, it

was not in the general’s power to grant anything without a vote o f the Assembly. The

provis ioning of all o f the island’s troops, including both battalions o f Chasseurs, was

solely the responsibility o f the Assembly, and until a bill was brought to him for

signature, all that he could do was make recommendations. This, in fact, he did, and

within days the cash-less Assembly instituted a drive for voluntary contributions for

uniforms for the Chasseurs. The politicians set the example by being the first to donate

cash, and the money collected was put under the direction of the Assembly’s Finance

Committee.29

Contracted tailors in Saint-Pierre worked feverishly to make the uniforms as

quickly as possible, and in a short time they were ready for distribution - ha lf to the 1st

Chasseur Battalion, and the other hal f to the 2d Chasseur Battalion. Naturally, the

Chasseurs were thrilled, and Bellegarde soon sent his executive officer, Commandant

Naverres, to Saint-Pierre to send the 1st Chasseur Battalion’s uniforms by boat to le

Lamentin. There, however, the uniforms stayed. Until Bellegarde released the 180 men

28 Ibid., 50-51.

29 Ibid.

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to the 2d Chasseur Battalion, Rochambeau ordered, they would not be allowed to move

the cargo to la Trinite. This preemptive action only further incensed the 1st Chasseur

Battalion, and significantly intensified Rochambeau’s feud with Bellegarde and Pelauque.

Ultimately, the colony’s slaves would lose the most by this confrontation.30

On 20 October, the Governor General set out to conduct the troop inspection that

he announced in his 13 October proclamation. Bellegarde had been allowed plenty of

time to rid himself o f the non-veteran blacks in his companies. Rochambeau further

prepared for his v isit by ordering all of the colony’s slave owners to post announcements

listing which slaves were missing from their plantations. When the general arrived at

Gros-Mome, he discovered that the Chasseur commander had only formed a small

number o f his troops for inspection. Initially angered by this obvious refusal to follow

orders, Rochambeau demanded that the captain tell him where his troops were. The

officer replied simply that since it was his company, he had given his soldiers the option

of returning to their plantations if they wished. As a result, his ranks were dramatically

thinned by the defection o f a large number o f slaves, who actually preferred to work on

the plantations rather than face the privations currently endured by the neglected

Chasseurs. Rochambeau’s anger turned to shock. When a message arrived moments

later from Bellegarde, instructing the captain to move his troops to la Trinite,

Rochambeau ordered him to keep his men where they were, and sent word to Bellegarde

that he was not to send anyone anywhere until he had received express orders to do so.

Rather than proceed to la Trinite, Rochambeau immediately returned to Republique-

30 Ibid., 51.

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ville.31

Bellegarde was sure that Rochambeau was about to dissolve his battalion. He left

his headquarters under the pretext o f conducting his own inspection o f all o f his detached

companies - Captain Octavius in le Robert; Captain l’Enclume (dit Compere) in le

Marin; Captain Rene-aine in Case-Navire; and Captain Laudan at Mome Vert-Pre. The

“inspection,” however, was nothing o f the sort; Bellegarde, Pelauque, and several o f their

trusted lieutenants, turned the tour into an illegal recruiting spree. Accusing one

plantation owner, M. Legendre-O’Neil, o f “debauching” one of his house servants,

Bellegarde forcibly removed the slave from Legendre’s house, and countered the master’s

protests by saying only “you know what you know, and I know what I know .”32

When w ord spread throughout the area that Bellegarde was “liberating” the slaves,

hundreds o f them left their work, thinking that they would not be pursued if they were in

the company o f the Chasseurs. Naturally, the proprietors argued violently with the

mulatto colonel to persuade him to send their workers back, but Bellegarde refused.

Immediately after returning to la Trinite with his new recruits, he wrote to Rochambeau

begging to keep the slaves that he had taken, in order to replace those that either had

returned to the plantations, or been killed or wounded. If he could keep these men,

Bellegarde promised, he would no longer hesitate to send the 180 others to the 2d

Battalion. This was nothing short of blackmail, but after turning his powers over to the

31 Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decree of 16 October 1793; Bailleul,

Report, 52.


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Assembly, Rochambeau had no legal means o f forcing Bellegarde’s hand. Accordingly,

he sent the matter to the Assembly. Still in the middle o f their review, the Assembly’s

Military Committee was in no mood to address the issue o f recalcitrant Chasseurs. “You

are troops of the line,” they railed in a letter to Bellegarde, “refer to the Decree of 13

October!” The Committee’s anger was not only directed at the Chasseurs, but also at

Rochambeau. After they had made very clear to the general how upset they were by his

sending the matter to them at that time, Rochambeau responded by simply agreeing to

Bellegarde’s demands.33

To the Republicans, the Governor General’s unilateral action was outrageous.

The combined strength o f the two Chasseur battalions now stood at somewhere between

1,300 and 1,600 men. Rochambeau, they charged, easily had enough soldiers under arms

to impose a military dictatorship! No t only that, he had directly violated the Declaration

of the Rights o f Man and the Citizen, which decreed that no man had the pow er to

dispose of another’s property without consent, unless it was in a case o f emergency. The

Assembly correctly concluded that the idea o f a coup was ludicrous, but they agreed with

the radicals that the property issue presented a serious legal challenge. Either the

National Convention or the new Civil Commissioners would have to be the ultimate

arbiter. In the meantime, the Assembly asked Rochambeau and his staff to tally the

amount that the Republic would eventually have to repay to the proprietors. For all

practical purposes, the point was moot. Whatever figures the governor’s staff reached,

there would be no money to pay to the slaves’ owners. Rochambeau settled the matter for

33 Ibid., 52-53.

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the time being by ordering commissaires throughout the colony to compile the bills and

then deposit them in the Assembly’s archives.34

The opinion o f Republique-ville’s Committee o f Public Safety was that

Rochambeau was acting “perfidiously,” and was violating his own 13 October decree. In

truth, his apparent capitulation to Bellegarde was calculated to satisfy both the immediate

security needs of the colony and his personal honor. In a 25 October letter to the Deputy

Ministers of the Marine and Colonies, Rochambeau reported that he had decided to

augment his military force by creating two battalions of 1,334 mulattoes and newly-

emancipated blacks. These soldiers were all that he had to fight the English who were

once again joining forces with the rebels. Moreover, he said, he had given his word that

these men w ould remain free, and that he had promised their masters that they would be

reimbursed, with faith that he would not be disavowed by the Republic. “This debt,” the

general maintained, “is sacred, and I trust that you will regard it as such .”35

Bellegarde’s recent actions, coupled w ith the fact that Royalists on neighboring

islands were attempting to smuggle well-coached black rabble rousers into Martinique,

prompted the Assembly to circulate a flurry o f heavy-handed slave decrees. In the last

days of October, a 3000 livre penalty per slave, more than twice an average slave’s selling

price, was levied against anyone harboring fugitives. Further, administrators of

sequestered emigre property were required to report, after eight days, the names of any

34 Ibid., 54.

35 Rochambeau to “The Ministers,” 25 October 1793. AN, Lettres de General

Rochambeau, comm andant des forces Fran9aises et d’Aigremont, Ordonnateur, 1793-

1799, Carton Colonies CC 8A101, item 98.

332




slaves who were missing from their properties. If a slave arriving in Martinique was

found to belong to an emigre, he immediately was sent to prison. No slave, especially

those who had come from British possessions, would be sold without the seller first

clearing the sale through their municipality. The municipality would have to determine

not only whether the slave posed a threat to the island’s security, but also if the slave’s

emancipation was legitimate. If a slave were found to have been freed either fraudulently

or against his master’s wishes, the emancipation was rescinded and the slave was returned

to his master .36

It was a fairly simple matter to determine if a slave had been freed by a master

who resided within a municipality’s area o f responsibility. The problem remained,

however, that blacks traveling to Martinique claimed to have been freed outside the

colony; only time could tell whether or not these men and women were Royalist agitators.

Even under a heightened state o f security, the government was loath to incarcerate these

immigrants or to return them slavery. The best that Rochambeau’s administration could

do lawfully was to temporarily detain them for observation. Thus, for a newly-arrived

black to secure his freedom of movement on the island, he w as required to post a public

petition three times in a month, that announced his presence. He was only considered

free if no one argued his claim. In case the black, or any white as well, caused trouble in

the colony, the Assembly ordered in November that “incitement to revolt” was henceforth

36 Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decrees of 22 and 24 October, 8 and

9 November 1793.

333




a capital offense.37

With no other dedicated labor available, the slaves of Martinique became heavily

involved in defense construction. Since mid-September, Rochambeau had undertaken an

ambitious road construction program connecting le Robert, la Trinite, and Saint-Pierre, in

case Republique-ville should ever again be blockaded. He ordered the Committee of

General Security to supervise the building of a highway running through the Champ-Flore

between their city and G ros-Mome, but when the Committee requisitioned slaves from as

far away as Basse-Pointe and le Marigot to work on the road, it became obvious that a

new system o f labor distribution would have to be devised. Ultimately, responsibility for

the maintenance o f the colony’s roads was divided equally among the island’s citizens by

toises (approximately six feet), with one toise being assigned to each inhabitant of an area

where the work was to take place. In most cases, it was Martinique’s slaves who

performed the actual labor. Except for coffee plan tation owners, whose property was

cultivated year-round, those citizens who owned slaves were also required to provide one

laborer for every six he owned to assist with other government projects. Those slaves

already owned by the government, usually those abandoned by emigres, were kep t in

Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville specifically to work on those city’s forts.38 '

37 Ibid., Decrees o f 8 and 9 November 1793.

38 Comite de Surveillance et de Police de Saint-Pierre, Decree of 14 September

1793. Library Company of Philadelphia, Rare#Am 1793 Mar Log 1837.F, Afro-Americana, 6412; Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decrees of 15 November, 3

December 1793; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 221. By mid-November, the Champ-

Flore road was still not complete. As a result, the Assembly decreed on 15 November

that Gros-Mome, la Trinite and le Robert provide between them an extra sixty slaves per

day to complete the work.

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Improvements to the island’s defenses met with considerably less success than

Rochambeau’s road projects. Nearly all o f the colony’s fortifications remained in sore

need o f provision and repair, and actual progress toward correcting any deficiencies was

restricted to what the colony could afford, both in terms o f money and public labor. As

the chief military authority on the island, Rochambeau was responsible for determining

which forts would be repaired and when. He delegated the bulk of this authority to his

commandant o f artillery, Colonel Le Mestre, a meticulous taskmaster who w ould later be

accused o f devoting more attention to the quality of the island’s works than to their

quantity. Between November 1793 and January 1794, the Assembly was able to provide

Le Mestre with 3,000 livres per month and a considerable percentage of the nearly 5,000

total work days of slave labor that had been made available to the government. As in the

case of the roads, the burden o f work on the island’s forts would be shared equally

between all those who lived near a particular fortification. The citizens o f le Lamentin

and Case-Pilote for example, living near Fort-de-la-Convention, were responsible for its

improvements .39

Throughout the fall and winter o f 1793-1794 it seemed that there simply were not

enough available slaves on Martinique to provide the necessary labor to bring the island

to the state of readiness that Rochambeau sought. An ever-increasing disinclination by

the citizens to provide the necessary laborers when required only aggravated the situation.

By early November, slave owners’ refusal to cooperate had become prevalent enough that

the Assembly ordered that, with the exception o f those on the coffee plantations, Le

39 Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 221; Bailleul, Report, 58-59.

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Mestre could order armed detachments to forcibly collect those slaves whose masters

refused to honor their commitment. Moreover, the government threatened to confiscate

the property of anyone who refused to send his allotment o f slaves to do public works.

By 24 December, even the owners o f coffee plantations had to contribute, and if a master

could not be found or did not properly reclaim his slaves when their service was done,

they become permanent property of the government. Similarly, any slaves found not to

be gainfully employed either in the fields or on public works projects became permanent

laborers for the Republic.40

While the government did what it could to bolster the defenses around Saint-

Pierre and Republique-ville, the ever-irksome Bellegarde accused Le Mestre o f neglecting

the works on the eastern side of the island. As the result, the Chasseur commander took

matters into his own hands, and began to construct his own battery in la Trinite, atop the

Anse Tartanne. While establishing works overlooking the city’s harbor should not have

been a problem, the orientation of this particular battery was such that in the view of the

city’s inhabitants, the guns proved more of a threat to them than to any enemy attacking

by sea. Once again, com plaints from la Trinite became so vociferous tha t Rochambeau

sent Le Mestre to assess what Bellegarde was doing. The artillery commandant soon

found that the citizens o f la Trinite had been right. Rather than focusing on the harbor,

the battery instead covered the roads leading into the city and was therefore useless as a

means of external defense. Rochambeau immediately ordered Bellegarde to cease work

40 Assemblee Representative, Deliberations, Decrees of 11 and 16 November, 24

December 1793; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 224-225.

336




on the fortifications; despite the governor’s order, he and his men continued their

project.41

As money slowly became available from the emprunt and the sale o f emigre

property, Rochambeau himself did the most to perpetuate the treasury’s indigence by

immediately diverting what he could to fund work on the island’s defenses. Large

amounts however, such as the 100,000 ecus (600,000 livres) that the governor was able to

A #spend on restoring and adequately provisioning the harbor fortress at Ilet a Ramiers, were

seldom available. When he was able to resource such a major project, Rochambeau

immediately became subject to the radicals’ criticism. Few among the colony’s

Republicans had any training in the art of war, and thus could not comprehend the benefit

of creating larger, more heavily-armed works, as opposed to numerous smaller ones. This

same ignorance made them unable to express their dissatisfaction through any tactical

debate with Rochambeau; the best argument that they could devise was that the G overnor

General was apparently doing little to prepare the colony for war. The radicals

immediately expected to see soldiers and gun emplacements everywhere, and intangible

progress, such as the Assembly’s converting Saint-Pierre’s Jacobin Order Hospital of

Saint Jean-Baptiste into a military hospital, did not impress them at all.42

While he did not mention it in his own writings, Rocham beau’s rationale for not

catering to the Republicans’ untutored observations would have been obvious to anyone

41 Bailleul, Report, 54-55; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis

du Siege et la Prise de l’Isle Martinique par les Anglais en Mars 1794,” [hereafter

Anonymous, “Precis du Siege”]. Service historique, MR 587, 2.

42 Ibid., 56.

337




with even a rudimentary understanding of the enemy’s capabilities. It was only a matter

of time before the British returned, and the Governor General would have to employ his

scant resources as best he could against an opponent whose forces possessed superior

firepower and, presumably, superior numbers o f well-trained infantry. Only a finite

number o f heavy cannons were available to Martinique. To thwart an English attack from

the sea, these guns were to be placed in the most advantageous positions possible, and

then effectively manned by the few professionally-trained artillerymen stationed on the

island. It made little sense to construct heavy gun batteries in the island’s interior when

British naval forces would, in all likelihood, concentrate their firepower on the defenses

at Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre. The next battle would be one of attrition -

Rocham beau’s heavy guns would have to serve as the anti-ship guns that they were

originally designed to be.

The same reasoning applied to the few campaign pieces that the general had

available for use in the field. Just as during the earlier fighting against the Royalists and

the British, he could not afford to lend these smaller guns to patriots who fancied

themselves qualified defenders of the Republic. At this stage of their development,

Mar tinique’s militiamen and National Guard could not be expected to conduct an

effective mobile defense against seasoned redcoats i f the British were to force another

landing on the island. Indeed, well-intentioned Republicans might be quickly overrun,

and their precious field pieces become the property of His Britannic Majesty.

Despite compelling reasons to allow Rochambeau to implement his master plan

for the defense o f Martinique, the Republicans could not comprehend why, by mid-

338




November, the Chasseurs still had not been paid, and the Assembly’s Finance Committee

still claimed to have no money. That their fertile imaginations would have found cause to

criticize their government on defense issues is not surprising. At the end o f October

1793, a singular event diverted their attentions from questions o f public administration

and civil rights, to something that they knew even less about - wa r .43

Sometime in late October, a French trading vessel finally brought some recent

news o f events on the Continent to the isolated colony. The ship carried no official

dispatches for the Governor General, thus it may well have been from old copies o f Paris’

daily Moniteur Universelle that citizens of Martinique read with fascination stories of the

Revolution’s “marche terrible” of earlier months. To say the least, the news was

arresting. Details of Jean-Paul Marat’s murder by Charlotte Corday, the revolt in Toulon,

the surrender o f the city of Mayence to their own General de Beauhamais, and the transfer

o f the queen to the Conciergerie were all stunning bits of information.44

The papers also contained items of more immediate relevance to the colony,

including the news that the National Conven tion had installed Citoyen Jean Dalbarade, a

former corsaire o f the Basque coast, as the new Minister of Marine. This would

43 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege de la Martinique par les anglais, soutenu par le

General Rochambeau du 4 Fevrier 1794 [hereafter Rochambeau, Journa l du siege],”

entry for 11 February 1794. AN, Collection Moreau Saint-Mery, Microfilm F340, item 7;

Assemblee R epresentative, Deliberations, Decrees o f 27 October, 18 November, 3

December 1793. The Republicans failed to observe that Martinique’s regular troops,

from the lowest private to the Governor General, also had not been paid; the colony wastruly bankrupt. Though the confiscated hospital’s slaves were sent to work on the forts,

only lodging and food could be provided to the w ounded veterans housed in the hospital

itself. Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 224-225.

44 Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 225.

339




undoubtedly have an impact on the Governor General, but it was news concerning the

progress o f the war on the Continent that had the most electrifying effect on Martinique.

Forced to fight the allied armies o f England, Holland, Austria and Prussia, a long with a

gruesome civil war that had erupted in the Catholic Vendee, the C onvention announced

the Levee en masse on 23 August. This famous decree ordering nearly every man,

woman and child to support the war effort became the source o f the highest inspiration to

French citizens in the threatened colony. Without delay, the Assembly reprinted and

distributed copies o f the Levee, and attached their own proclamation which declared that

“the Assembly has hastened to take its turn to show its ardent love for liberty and equality

in vowing to preserve them or to die in their defense .”45

Partake o f this delicious sentiment inspired by the general will, for

the Assembly has no other object than the interest of the people;

she has received an invincible force before which must cringe all

the barbaric hordes o f the enemies o f liberty, like ghosts in the

night they will disappear before the star of light. Yes, warriors of

Martinique, it is in your hands that the fate o f the colony is

placed!46

Despite the proclamation’s hyper-patriotic rambling, the propagation o f the Levee en

masse decree had an invigorating effect on the citizens of Martinique, but their

subsequent threats did little more than stiffen the resolve o f the British and the Royalists

on the neighboring islands to avenge their earlier defeat.

It was less exciting, but certainly jus t as important, that one o f the newspapers

45 Ibid.

46 Assemblee Representative, Proclamation, 26 October 1793, cited in Daney,

Histoire de la M artiniqu e, 226.

340




contained all 122 articles o f the National Convention’s “Stillborn” Constitution o f 1793.

Though the war would prevent its implementation, the document, ratified on 4 August,

would become the guide from which M artinique would model its own constitution.

Nearly two months after they had first met, I ’Assemblee Representative de la Martinique

approved a final draft. France’s constitution, humbly delivered to Martinique in stacks of

newsprint, inaugurated a fountain o f legislation, most o f which copied political and

organizational decrees adopted in the pa trie. The patriotic clubs, which Rochambeau

maintained were the true vehicle o f the Revolution, became officially recognized and

protected in October. By January 1794, the clubs were required in every one o f the

colony’s villages. More significant, however, on 30 October Rochambeau signed into

law a monumental Assembly decree which elevated the colony of Martinique to

Department of France. Henceforth, the government of Martinique would be completely

independent o f the other French colonies, and a new “Provisional Administration” would

assume control o f the day to day affairs of the new departement .47

Members o f the Provisional Administration o f the colony would come to office

through an even m ore indirect electoral process than that o f the Representative Assembly.

To define the qualifications o f a voting “Citizen,” Martinique’s Assembly followed the

47 Ibid., Decrees of 26-28 and 30 October, 18 November, 8 December 1793;

Bailleul, Report, 42-43; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 227; Kleczewski, Martinique

and the British Occupation, 93-94. Mar tinique’s administration was to remain

provis ional until such time as its creation was ratified by the National Convention. Theisland was divided into four arrondissements, Republique-ville, Saint-Pierre, la Trinite,

and le Marin, which then were divided further into twenty-seven cantons. In December

1793, the island’s smaller villages were consolidated into the larger neighboring

municipalities. Martinique maintained basically the same organization until Saint-Pierre

was destroyed by the eruption of Mont Pelee on 8 May 1902.

341




national model; it excluded potential Royalists by adding a provision mandating military

service. A Martiniquais “Citizen,” therefore, included all free Frenchmen who were at

least twenty-one years old, bom in the colony or in any other French territory, and who

had served in the National Guard for a minimum of six months. The policy was indeed

exclusive, but it was possible for a foreigner to become a Citizen if they had served in the

National Guard for one year, owned property, worked in the colony, or was m arried to or

adopted by a French citizen, or took care o f an invalid.48

A m ulti-tiered voting system similar to that mandated by the N ational Convention

was designed to choose those who would serve in the Provisional Administration. On

election day, Citizens in each canton were to meet, select both a canton President and a

ballot examiner, and then vote for an elector to represent them in the subsequent e lections

at the arrondissement level. At this point, the system diverged from its French

counterpart. Once the canton electors gathered at their arrondissement assemblies, they

would hold two votes. The first, a simple majority verbal vote, would decide on the

Director of the arrondissement. The second, a secret, departement-wide ballot, would

contribute to the selection of the administration’s highest official, the General Procurator.

Once the voting was complete in the arrondissement, the four men selected as Directors

would travel to their new offices at Republique-ville to count the secret ballots for the

General Procurator. If no candidate won by a clear majority, the Directors could order a

re-vote. While this system held great promise for the colony, there would not be enough

48 Ibid.

342




time to implement it. In little over a month, Martinique would once again be at war .49

Throughout late summer and fall 1793, affairs seemed to be going well for the

Governor General, but it was during this period that he lost one o f his most powerful

allies. Leborgne, the trusted “Marat of the Colonies,” had a serious falling out with

Rochambeau. While the details remain sketchy, the crux of the disagreement involved a

denunciation made by Leborgne against someone in the general’s suite. That person, in

turn, wrote Leborgne an insulting letter, but Rochambeau appears to have m ade no move

to censure the individual. As the result, Leborgne (like Pelauque) took the view that the

governor was siding with the Royalists. The break between the two men had probably

been only a matter o f time, but Leborgne, who also had sided with Pelauque during the

controversy surrounding Mme de Tully, now decided that he was useless on Martinique.

Consequently, he left the island with the excuse that he would travel to France to b rief the

National Convention on the state of the colony and to ask for reinforcements. Instead, he

sailed to Saint-Domingue where he once again offered his services to Sonthonax .50

The loss o f Leborgne was probably o f less consequence than the fact that by

November, both the Ministry of Marine and the National Convention remained ignorant

49 Ibid. The Provisional Administration simply codified an extant “Directory”

that Rochambeau had established during the early days of the first British invasion. At

that time, he had named Directors for each of Martinique’s four “districts,” who served

purely at his discretion. While it may have been a simple oversight, the new constitu tion

contained no provision to relieve these four individuals of their duties. Under the newsystem, in addition to the four elected Directors and the Procurateur-General-Syndic, the

Provisional Administration also counted a secretary-recorder, and a general treasurer who

managed receivers o f funds in each o f the arrondissements.

50 Bailleul, Report, 37; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 227.

343




of recent events in their newest departement. It was for this reason that Rochambeau sent

his aide-de-camp, Colonel Lahoussaye de Cypre, to France with all of the most recent

news o f the colony. He would only find out years later that Lahoussaye had never

accomplished his mission. Arriving in Paris at the height of the Terror in December

1793, the aristocratic Lahoussaye was imprisoned, his dispatches casually examined, and

then forgotten.51

In late 1793 the metropolitan government in France was afforded a fleeting

opportunity to benefit from the work done by Rocham beau in the nation’s newest

departement of Martinique. Revolutionary order was imposed upon the fractious colony,

and, within the limits o f troops and materiel available, Republican forces were organized

to prepare to repel a foreign invasion. However, policy makers in France were

completely consumed by the war on the Continent; the government in Paris paid little

attention to the military opportunities offered in any o f the W indward Island colonies.

Events on Martinique left Rochambeau little time or military resources to deal

with the counterrevolutionaries in his other colonies. He was fortunate, however, to have

51 Foumiols to the Comite de Salut Public, 11 August 1795, reprinted in Daney,

Documents , 190. This source is particularly noteworthy. Before being elected to

Martinique’s Representative Assembly, Foumiols had been a successful businessman in

Saint-Pierre, and thus one o f the same group that would have held so much resentment

against Rochambeau for his trade policies. After the British occupied Martinique in late

March 1794, at least a part of the Assembly continued to function in absentia, and

Foumiols was elected as one of the departement 's deputies to the National

“Thermidorean” Convention. It was in this capacity that he and several of his colleaguesfrom Martinique were in positions to make recommendations to the new national

Committee o f Public Safety regarding Rochambeau’s performance as G overnor General

and his potential reinstatement to command. To a man, each o f the former businessmen

and planters, all considered good Republicans, praised the general’s performance from his

arrival in the colony until its eventual surrender.

344




installed subordinate governors who were resourceful enough to fend for themselves on

their respective islands. Guadeloupe, Sainte-Lucie, and Tobago, the three colonies that

comprised the remainder o f the French Windward Islands under Rochambeau’s

supervision, also suffered tremendous upheaval. Revolutionary government lasted on

Guadeloupe and Sainte-Lucie until mid-1794. Tobago was the exception. Rochambeau

had barely installed himself in Republique-ville in February 1793 when France lost the

tiny colony to its previous owner, the King o f England .52

52 Today’s Saint Lucia was “Sainte-Lucie” during the French occupation.

345




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ii



Chapter XII

Les Isles du Vent :

August 1789 - January 1794

Tobago

By 1789, Tobago had been a French possession for only six years - one o f

England’s concessions to France as a result of the 20 January 1783 armistice ending

hostilities in the American Revolution. When French soldiers under Colonel Arthur,

comte de Dillon arrived on the island in 1781, they forced the island’s population o f

Spaniards, Indians, blacks, and British subjects (the majority of whom were Scottish

plantation overseers working for absentee English landlords) to become “neo-Frangais”

by swearing allegiance to Louis XVI. Since colonial repossessions were historically

commonplace in the Caribbean, the transition took place without incident. Dillon and a

handful of French administrators settled in the island’s capital, Port-Louis, while native

colonists remained as socially distant from their new masters as appropriate .1

1 Edwards, A History o f the British Colonies in the West Indies , IV, 281-282. In

the intervening years, there was little interaction between Tobago and Paris, owing in

large part to the colony’s governor, Arthur Dillon. As commander o f Dillon’s Irish

regiment during the American Revolution, he led the 1781 French capture o f Tobago, and

later married into one o f Martinique’s preeminent sugar-producing families. Destined to

become governor, and principle rum importer, of Tobago, his native English-speaking

347




In late summer 1789, Dillon left Port-Louis to serve as deputy to the new National

Assembly in Paris. He appointed the commander o f the island’s battalion o f regular

troops, Lieutenant Colonel, sieur de Jobal, to serve as governor until his return. De

Jobal’s governorship might have passed without incident had Tobago remained isolated

from France, but in the m iddle of October 1789 news reached the colony describing the

tumultuous events that had occurred in Paris earlier that fall. As a result, on 18 October

pro-Revolution soldiers from de Jobal’s battalion joined with Tobagonese civilians to

raise new Tricolors over several buildings in Port-Louis; de Jobal intervened with his

remaining Loyalist troops to have the provocative flags taken down. Days later, the

island’s liberal Colonial Assembly attempted to remodel itself as a Patriotic Assembly.

When the Assembly tried to swear-in some o f the island’s Republican troops as members,

de Jobal again intervened and prohibited the assembly from meeting.2

For several months, de Jobal managed to keep tight control over the colony’s

affairs, but the dissatisfaction among his battalion’s enlisted soldiers eventually resulted

in his downfall. In February 1790, hundreds o f the garrison’s troops revolted when their

officers refused to ease strict regulations governing the soldiers’ use of their barracks

cantine. For two days, mutinous infantrymen controlled Port-Louis until Loyalist officers

ability and his non-invasive leadership style were reassuring to the Tobagonese. Dil lon’s

governorship appeared so successful that policy makers at Versailles concluded that the

majority of non-French Tobagonese fully supported the French administration. In fact,Tobago was so far removed from France that little taking place in the metropole had any

appreciable impact in the colony.

2 Saintoyant, La Colonisation Frangaise Pendant La Revolution, 227-228.

Tobago’s Assemblee Patriotique lasted only three days.

348




and members of the island’s National Guard drove the men back into their barracks,

where they remained until they revolted again in late April. This time, the rebellious

troops accidentally set fire to part of Port-Louis during the night of 2-3 May 1790,

causing de Jobal to fully mobilize Tobago’s National Guard. Within a few days time, the

entire garrison was forcibly embarked for France.3

During spring 1790, news o f the radical proceedings o f the National Assembly

arrived in Tobago which further aggravated the more liberal members o f Tobago’s

Colonial Assembly. French legislators in the colony desperately wanted to follow a path

similar to their counterparts in Paris, but de Jobal refused to compromise. Even worse for

the pro-Republican faction, a fresh battalion of the 31st Line arrived from France in

summer 1790, supporting de Jobal’s provocative stance against the Tobago’s

Republicans. The new battalion pledged their support to de Jobal, but warned that they

too would attack and pillage Port-Louis if they were not paid regularly .4

Throughout the remainder of 1790 until spring 1791, de Jobal maintained his

authority by threatening to deploy the 3 1st Battalion against Tobagonese Republicans.

Eventually, the National Assembly learned o f the interim governor’s disobedience; on 17

February 1791 M. de Marguerot was named governor of Tobago, and de Jobal was

ordered to Martinique to explain his actions to the Civil Commissioners that had recently

arrived there with Governor General Behague. Instead o f sending de Jobal to Martinique,

de Marguerot defied the Assembly and allowed de Jobal to remain at the head o f the

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., 228-229.

349




island’s troops. Behague raised no objection. Over the course of the year, the

conservative de Marguerot repeatedly demonstrated his support o f Behague’s political

policies, and the Bourbon’s flag continued to fly over Tobago.5

On 12 December 1792, Captain Lacrosse arrived at Tobago, claiming that he

came on behalf of the national government to ensure the colony’s loyalty to the

constitution. De Marguerot knew that national intervention in his colony’s affairs was

simply a matter o f time, so he countered Lacrosse’s subsequent declarations by claiming

that not only did he consider the Cap tain’s word unofficial; moreover, in accordance w ith

certain protection clauses guaranteed by the 1783 armistice, he had decided to put the

government wholly under English law. With only the sailors and marines aboard his

ship, Lacrosse did not have enough manpower to overwhelm the island’s garrison.

Rather than force the issue, he sailed north toward Sainte-Lucie. De Marguerot

maintained his hold over the island for several more months until a new Republican

antagonist arose in the person o f Lieutenant Colonel Monteil, the newly-arrived

commander of Tobago’s contingent of the 31st Line .6

Although de Jobal restricted the French troops to their barracks, the soldiers

maintained enough contact with the island’s Republicans to realize that they had been

deceived by the colony’s leadership. Thus, it became a simple matter for Monteil to

organize a revolt against the island’s Royalist government. When the news arrived from

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 229. Between summer 1790 and winter 1792, scheduled troop rotations

had almost completely republicanized the battalion that had earlier sworn its loyalty to de

Jobal.

350




Martinique that Behague had declared w ar against la Metropole on 13 December 1792,

Monteil planned his own war against the Royalists. This time, there was no fighting in

the streets of Port-Louis; when de Marguerot learned that Rochambeau had taken charge

of Martinique and that Behague had fled, he abandoned Tobago with a handful o f

Royalists . Lieutenant Colonel Monteil re-established military control over the colony

and soon received word from Rocham beau that he was to continue as Tobago’s governor

until his replacement came from France. With only 300 regulars and as many National

Guard, Monteil was expected to defend Tobago against any enemy.7

In spring 1793, no one in Tobago knew that they would be the first target o f

England’s new war against France. On the other hand, British policy makers had known

for months that war was imminent, and the promise o f easy victories and immediate

financial gain in the Caribbean held far greater appeal than a costly land attack against the

French on the Continent. Throughout the winter of 1792-1793, sta ff officers in the

British army and navy ministries designed plans to carry out their country’s war aims in

the West Indies. Soon after the war was announced, Secretary Henry Dundas issued

orders on 10 February 1793 to General Sir John Cuyler and Admiral Sir John Laforey to

capture Tobago.

The ministers at Whitehall reasoned that because o f the potentially high numbers

of British sympathizers on Tobago, that island would be a comfortable first step toward

reducing French power in the Windward Islands. On 14 April 1793, when Admiral Allan

7 Ibid., 229; Edwards, A History o f the British Colonies in the West Indies , IV,

281-282.

351




Gardner’s squadron appeared in Tobago’s Great Courland Bay, General Cuyler sent a

messenger ashore offering Lieutenant Colonel Monteil the opportunity to surrender the

island without a fight. Rather than accept a dishonorable surrender, Monteil decided to

defend the colony.8

Cuyler estimated that he did not have enough men to conduct a siege o f Port-

Louis, so he opted instead to attack the city’s principle defenses at Fort-Farewell-la-

Roque on the fort’s northwest side, where the works remained unfinished. Between 2:00

and 3:00 am on 15 April, British infantrymen began a stealthy march toward the north of

the fort. When they reached the village o f Scarborough, a local French inhabitant saw the

formation moving in the darkness and sounded an alarm. Surprisingly, no one in the fort

fired at the advancing troops, but the alarm frightened the slave leading the English

grenadiers, causing him to flee into the night. As the result, the British column split; the

grenadiers and part of the light infantry went one way, and the remaining light infantry

went another .9

Fortunately for the British, the mishap caused the attack to proceed better than

they had planned. General Cuyler and the main body of light infantry arrived first at the

fort’s barrier gate and distracted the French defenders, while the grenadiers and remaining

light infantry stormed the fort’s weak flank. Within minutes, fifty-eight men of the 3 1st

Line surrendered, along with ten gunners, and nearly eighty National Guard and sailors.

8 Lieutenant Colonel Monteil to Rochambeau, 15 April 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12,

item 219.

9 Cuyler to Dundas, 18 April 1793. PRO, CO, 318.12, item 187.

352




uinasnpvi auiijuiqM |euoi)e\[ \s3jjn03

Figure 29. “The Capture of Tobago by Major General Cuyler,

and Vice Admiral Sir John Laforey”

353




Monteil and the remaining French defenders retreated into the fort’s innermost ramparts.

Casualties on both sides were remarkably light. Among the British, only General Cuyler

was injured, while the French counted six men killed and seven others wounded. At

dawn, Lieutenant Colonel Monteil surrendered his sword to General Cuyler, and he and

his men boarded a British prison ship bound for Barbados.10

When the news was made public in Martinique, the fall o f Tobago was regarded

as a harsh blow to the prestige of Rochambeau’s new Republican regime. However, the

loss of this smallest French Windward island spurred events that bolstered Rochambeau’s

reputation both in the eyes of the British and his detractors. Gardner was flushed by his

victory at Tobago, and it was this easy British success that emboldened him to make his

ill-fated and premature move against Rochambeau at Martinique the following month .11

Guadeloupe

Though they were spared an English invasion in 1793, French citizens on

Guadeloupe and her satellite island, Marie-Galante, faced many o f the same difficulties as

their counterparts on Martinique and Tobago. Simple geography ensured that

Rochambeau and Guadeloupe’s governor, General Georges-Henri-Victor Collot,

remained largely ignorant o f what was happening on each other’s islands throughout 1793

and 1794. It was problematic enough that the British colony of Dominica, the haven o f

choice for Martinique’s emigres, lay directly between Guadeloupe and Martinique. Even

worse, once war was officially proclaimed, British warships from Antigua and Saint

10 Ibid. For Return o f Ordnance Captured at Tobago, see appendix.

11 Edwards, A History o f the British Colonies in the West Ind ies, IV, 282.

354




Kitts, both to Guadeloupe’s north, intensified their efforts to ensure the isolation of

Guadeloupe from government authorities on Martinique. The Royal Navy blockaded

Guadeloupe, and it was rare when news arrived from, or could be sent to, Rochambeau,

less than one hundred miles away.

As in Martinique, political activity on Guadeloupe centered around the island’s

two main cities of Basse-Terre, the commercial capital, and the legislative capital at

Pointe-a-Pitre. It was in Pointe-a-Pitre that the effects of the French Revolution were first

felt in Guadeloupe. When news o f the storming of the Bastille arrived on the island in

early fall 1789, Republicans in Pointe-a-Pitre joyously celebrated developments in Paris,

while the Royalist commander o f the island’s regular troops made preparations to call out

his men and crush any sign of rebellion. Seeking to avoid bloodshed, the colony’s

governor, General Marc-Antoine, baron de Clugny, offered both sides what he believed

was a lawful compromise. He would recall the colony’s extant Colonial Assembly to

Pointe-a-Pitre to decide if the colony should follow the National Assembly.

To the Royalists’ surprise, the Colonial Assembly split into two opposing camps.

To preserve the peace, de Clugny sought help from Governor General Damas d’Antigny

in Martinique. Damas, however, was saddled with his own difficulties. General Coquille

Dugommier and his men, who had left Guadeloupe earlier in the year to “help” Saint-

Pierre’s Republicans, continued to threaten Fort-Royal and spread pro-Revolution

propaganda among Martinique’s National Guard. Since Damas was compelled to keep

his remaining loyal troops close at hand in case Martinique’s National Guard mutinied, he

was unable to send reinforcements to Guadeloupe. Such was the situation until in March

355




1791, Guadeloupe’s Colonial Assembly learned that Damas had been recalled to France,

and that a new Governor General, Antoine Behague, had arrived in Martinique .12

Republicans and conservatives in Guadeloupe’s assembly knew that Behague was

an aristocrat, but because he was selected by the “radical” National Assembly neither side

could be sure of his political leanings. In an effort to find out, Guadeloupe’s legislators

sent a deputation to Martinique to meet with Behague, and to apprize him of the situation

on their island. He soon learned from the delegation that Guadeloupe’s Assembly

ostensibly had accepted the decrees o f the National Assembly, but the situation in the

colony remained unchanged. While Behague saw this as good news, the Civil

Commissioners that accompanied him were not pleased. These men were determined to

dissolve the old colonial assemblies and to enact the newest laws o f the National

Assembly; with Behague’s help, de Clugny’s deputation persuaded the Civil

Commissioners that the situation on Guadeloupe was delicate, and that maintaining the

comparatively moderate Colonial Assembly o f Guadeloupe was the only way to keep the

peace. Eventually, the Civil Commissioners allowed de Clugny to maintain the status

quo, and agreed to send only one battalion o f fresh troops to the colony instead o f

replacing the island’s entire regular garrison.13

The presence o f General Dugom mier and his G uadeloupian volunteers on

Martinique posed only a temporary threat to Governor General Behague. Shortly before

Behague’s arrival and Damas’ subsequent return to France in April 1791, Saint-Pierre’s

12 Saintoyant, La Colonisation Frangaise Pendant La Revolution , 196-199.

13 Ibid., 203.

356




revolutionaries persuaded Dugommier to go to Paris to seek aid for their cause. Once the

general was out o f their way, the Civil Commissioners in M artinique ordered

Dugommier’s troops to return to their own colony. Behague understood clearly the

danger of returning armed antagonists to his subordinate colony without supervision, and

predictably, as soon as Dugommier’s volunteers landed in Pointe-a-Pitre, Guadeloupian

radicals approached them to try to win their support for a coup against the existing

government. A renewed outbreak of violence on Guadeloupe appeared imminent, but

several days later the impending insurrection was checked when Behague’s “police”

arrived aboard the frigate Calypso (12), commanded by Captain de Mallevault.14

Few on Guadeloupe understood why de Mallevault, who claimed to come to the

island only to prevent trouble, had turned up. Nevertheless, Behague’s reinforcement was

ju st what de Governor de Clugny needed. Under his protection, Royalist soldiers o f the

capital’s garrison joined de Mallevault’s sailors to quash pro-Revolutionary activity in

Pointe-a-Pitre, while de Clugny focused his efforts on suppressing the now-rebellious

National Guard in Basse-Terre. Pro-Revolutionary civilians on Guadeloupe could offer

no serious resistance to de Clugny’s soldiers at first, but when de Mallevault’s sailors

began to abuse private citizens and confiscate personal property, the municipalities of

Sainte-Anne (near Pointe-a-Pitre) and Basse-Terre took steps to defend themselves by

forming protective federations with their surrounding parishes. Soon, the continued

depredations o f de Mallevault’s men prompted Guadeloupe’s moderates in the Colonial

14 Ibid. De Mallevault’s expedition was purely Behague’s work and was not

sanctioned by the Windward Islands’ Civil Commissioners.

357




Assembly to bring the smaller federations together into a larger, general federation. They

wanted to avoid armed conflict, but Guadeloupians were past the point o f trying to reason

with de Clugny’s and Behague’s unrestrained counterrevolutionary men-at-arms. In fact,

distrust of the conservative military forces became so unyielding that the colony’s

Assembly declared that any soldiers of Pointe-a-Pitre who refused to swear loyalty to the

new federation would be arrested.15

For two, very different reasons, in the minds of the Governor General Behague

and his Commissioners, de Clugny was obviously not in control of Guadeloupe. To

Behague, his subaltern appeared too tolerant o f the Republicans, while to the

Commissioners, de Clugny seemed to be working against the enforcement o f the National

Assembly’s Revolutionary principles. When the Commissioners protested his handling

of Guadeloupe, Behague cunningly arranged that they should leave Martinique. He

convinced them that the situation on Guadeloupe demanded their full attention, and

ordered all four of the government functionaries to sail to the colony to remedy de

Clugny’s mismanagement. The Commissioners relished the chance to implement the

directives o f the National Assembly w ithout Behague’s interference, and upon their

arrival at Pointe-a-Pitre, they seized the colony’s archives and copied the most damning

records to provide ammunition for their denunciations. Within days, they declared all

Guadeloupian federations illegal regardless o f their pro-Revolutionary affinities.16

Despite initial successes, the Civil Commissioners met increasing resistance to

15 Ibid., 204-206.

16 Ibid., 208-209.

358




their attempts to control the colony’s government. He could not admit it publicly, but

Behague was undoubtedly displeased with the Commissioners’ failures; his plan to end

what he considered de Clugny’s “moderate” administration was collapsing, and the

Commissioners were doing little to advance his agenda. Thus, when Republicans

threatened the conservative administration of Sainte-Lucie in September 1791, Behague

saw little damage in ordering the Commission to split into two pairs, one remaining in

Guadeloupe and the other to address the problems in Sainte-Lucie.17

With two Civil Commissioners gone and the majority o f Guadeloupians now

supporting him fully, de Clugny defied the remaining two Commissioners by refusing to

promulgate their orders. The men were outraged by the governor’s obstinance, but when

they persisted in attempting to make policy on the island, Governor de Clugny and his

Intendant, Rene-Marie, vicomte d’Arrot, offered their resignations. Guadeloupe’s

Assembly was not prepared to lose their moderate associates to what they perceived as

the machinations of two radical Parisian functionaries. As the result, they forcibly

interceded to prevent the governor’s resignation and reduced the Civil Commissioners to

the status of spectators.18

Behague seethed. He issued a proclamation ordering the Commissioners to take

control of Guadeloupe’s government, but when they attempted to put the decree into

effect, the Assembly officially declared them incompetent to perform their functions.

Beaten and powerless, the two Commissioners returned to Martinique, only to have

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 210.

359




Behague order their immediate return to France. Almost simultaneously, the two other

Commissi oners returned from an unsuccessful sojourn in Sainte-Lucie. Once Behague

had confiscated their papers, they too were sent home. Behague had no choice but to deal

with de Clugny, and following a reconciliation between the two governors, the two men

ruled their respective colonies according to their own will, imposing only those laws o f

France that best fit their needs. When de Clugny died in August 1792, d’Arrot continued

in his stead, but instead o f continuing de Clugny’s policy of moderation, d ’Arrot

embraced de Mallevault’s fervent Royalism and adopted a much more confrontational

stance against the Revolution.19

Only days before Rocham beau made his first appearance at Martinique, Behague

and his adherents received a specious report from the British colony at Montserrat that a

combined Prussian/Austrian army had occupied Paris and restored Louis XVI to his

throne. At Captain de Mallevault’s insistence, a twenty-one gun salute signaled Basse-

Terre’s once again raising the white Bourbon flag over the city on 12 September 1792,

and the captain him self presided over the public spectacle o f burning piles o f desecrated

Tricolors in the city’s square. Almost immediately, Guadeloupe’s regular army garrisons

divided into two factions, one loyal to the nation, the other loyal to the Bourbons. In an

effort to determine where his battalion’s allegiances truly lay, Colonel Fitz-Maurice, the

Royalist troop commandant on the island, ordered his men to pledge that “I swear to be

loyal to the King, my master, and to the colony, and to employ all my energy to repulse

the national brigands.” To the colonel’s dismay, a surprisingly large number of troops

19 Ibid., 210-211.

360




refused to take the oath, and countered with the promise that “ [W]e swear to remain true

to the Nation, to the law, and to the King, and to die with our brethren to defend these.”

If their military superiors refused to accept this oath the pro-Revolutionary soldiers

demanded that they be returned to France. Rather than acquiesce to the demands o f

disloyal revolutionaries, Governor d’Arrot ordered the arrest of nearly 200 soldiers,

several officers and forty colonists and deported them to France to face trial for treason .20

Once the purges were complete, de Mallevault and the crew o f the Calypso sailed

to Martinique to deliver the news that the Revolution was over on Guadeloupe. Behague

was certainly pleased, but de Mallevault’s ship had barely dropped anchor in the capital

city when R ochambeau arrived, carrying with him the National A ssembly’s decree o f 2

July relieving Behague, d’Arrot, and any Civil Commissioners remaining in the

Windward Islands. When Rochambeau was denied permission to land on the island, de

Mallevault himself led the Royalist naval squadron that chased him from Martinique, and

forced him to proceed to Saint-Domingue rather than attempting to land at Guadeloupe.21

The news that Behague had abandoned Martinique and the appearance o f Captain

20 Ibid., 212; Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la Martinique, 162-163. All

these men were acquitted.

21 Ibid., 212. Having been slowed by his transports, Rocham beau’s squadron

barely outran de M allevault’s squadron. The Bien-venue broke dow n during the pursuit

and was forced to put into the nearest port at the British colony o f Saint Christopher.

With Rochambeau safely out of the way, de Mallevault and his sailors returned to

Guadeloupe. Just days after his arrival, de Mallevault effectively took control o f the

colony and established a brutal counterrevolutionary dictatorship. In time, he persuaded

the British to return the Bien-venue, which soon afterward sailed triumphantly into

Martinique’s capital with the tidings that Guadeloupe had submitted completely to the

authority of Governor General Behague. Lemery, La Revolution Frangaise a la

Martinique, 162-163.

361




Lacrosse in December 1792, finally quieted the counterrevolution on Guadeloupe, but not

before the Calypso and the corvette Marechal de Castries (8) evacuated a considerable

number o f aristocrats from the colony. In the absence o f a governor or Governor General,

Lacrosse assumed the role of lawgiver on the island and in his first address to the island’s

Republicans, he challenged his audience that Guadeloupe had the opportunity to be the

first of the French Caribbean colonies to model themselves according to the principles of

the Revolution. Ultimately, Lacrosse had little time to fully implement his Revolutionary

government on the island, managing only to create a General Extraordinary Commission

in early January 1793 to replace Guadeloupe’s Assembly. In the course o f his return to

Martinique from Saint-Domingue later that month, Rochambeau arrived at Guadeloupe

and installed General Collot as governor, and took Lacrosse with him to Martinique as his

second-in-command.22

Collot initially worked well with the Extraordinary Commission, but the

counterrevolutionary threat was never far away. Within six months, Royalists infiltrated

the revolutionary society in Basse-Terre, and worked their way into the company o f the

governor himself. By fall 1793, counterrevolutionists had even formed a powerful party

of their own in Basse-Terre, focusing their efforts to upset the Extraordinary

Commission’s proceedings. Throughout the winter the situation only deteriorated.

Increasingly, Royalist agitators attacked individual Republicans, and eventually menaced

the Extraordinary Commission until the members moved their meeting place from Basse-

Terre to Point-a-Pitre. Eventually, even Collot and his own government were at odds. By

22 Bailleul, Report , 70-72.

362




the new year 1794, his disagreements with the Com mission became so violent that the

general made plans to elect a new assembly for the colony rather than continue to deal

with the increasingly radicalized Extraordinary Commission. Collot made no actual

arrangements to disband the Commission; the group disbanded itself after realizing the

futility of trying to compete with another conservative governing body. One month later,

Guadeloupe fell to the English .23

Sainte-Lucie

The French Revolution in Sainte-Lucie had a unique, but similarly violent

narrative. Before Rochambeau and Lacrosse arrived in Sainte-Lucie in January 1793, the

Revolution was waged almost single-handedly by a mulatto leader, Jean-Louis Gentil.

That Gentil’s efforts were unsuccessful was due in the largest part to his being the

island’s chief agitator for an immediate, general emancipation o f all o f the colonies’

slaves. A strong conservative element existed in Sainte-Lucie, but in their short tenure on

the island, Lacrosse and Rochambeau enjoyed a tremendous response to their call for

Republicans to support the Revolution. Good citizens on the island rallied to Governor

General Rochambeau by the hundreds, but as would happen in Martinique weeks later,

with the Republicans came scores o f counterrevolutionaries, all claiming to support the

Republic. Once Rocham beau raised the Tricolor above the government building at

Castries, the island became known as Sainte-Lucie-/a-/ic/e/e, and its capital renamed

Felicite-ville. More difficult issues demanded their attention in Martinique, so

23 Ibid., 73. D’Arrot again rose to power as the colony’s overseer for the British.

To this day he remains vilified as a traitor.

363




Rochambeau and Lacrosse remained in Sainte-Lucie for only a few days. When the time

came for them to depart, they left General Nicolas-Xavier Ricard in charge .24

Following Rochambeau’s instructions, Ricard organized a patriotic society in

Sainte-Lucie, but this club enjoyed considerably less success than its counterparts in

Martinique. Not only did the elderly Ricard lack Rochambeau’s and Lacrosse’s

dynamism, but Felicite-ville’s club also could not gamer the same measure o f support

offered by the Republicans o f Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville. Within six months,

many o f Felicite-ville’s most sincere Republicans were edged out of positions close to the

governor by more influential Royalists who pretended their loyalty to the Republic;

Sainte-Lucie’s legislative body would soon follow. After General Ricard held elections

for a new Colonial Assembly, those same delegates who earlier proclaimed their fidelity

to the governor and to the Republic soon came to demonstrate a decidedly conservative

bias. When Gentil and his allies pushed for the implementation o f the Law of 4 April, the

predominantly aristocratic assembly did everything in its power to nullify the measure. It

did not take Ricard long to realize that he had to change the composition o f the Assembly

or he would get nothing done. He dissolved the body and called for new elections for an

Assembly that would meet on 4 October 1793.25

When the appointed date came, few delegates showed up. Not only were the

counterrevolutionaries conspiring to sabotage the Assembly by remaining conspicuously

24 Ibid., 60.

25 Ibid., 61-62; Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, M R

593, 18.

364




absent, but the colony’s Republicans came to believe that Ricard was a Royalist. The

general stubbornly issued several proclamations mandating that the delegates report for

deliberations on 29 October; once again, only a handful of deputies responded to his

order. Ricard gave the others two days to change their minds, but when the 3 1st Line

arrived, the Assembly was no larger. Rather than admit defeat, Ricard told the deputies

present that he would continue to wait for those who were absent; in the mean time, he

organized an “Emergency Deliberative Assembly” composed o f himself, the municipal

authorities of Felicite-ville, and selected military and administrative officers.26

Gentil and his radical confederate, M. Pelouse, were enraged. Both men had been

properly elected to the partially attended Assembly, but now they were denied the

opportunity to fight for their agenda of enforcing the Law o f 4 April. When copies of the

National Convention’s “Sti llborn” Constitution arrived from Martinique , Gentil and

Pelouse maintained that they alone would fight for any o f the new constitution’s

provisions that promoted the cause of racial equality in the colonies. By early November,

Gentil’s protests became so fierce that Ricard personally arrested him. Ricard formed a

detachment o f the colony’s 3 1st Line, but only told the men that they were going to seize

public demonstrators who were stirring up the troops in the garrison at M ome Fortune.

As the result, they were quite surprised when Felicite-ville’s Procurer appeared before the

column and ordered them to halt. In the Procurer’s opinion, Ricard and his troops were

about to com mit a crime against the constitution. A violent argument ensued between the

general and the city official, but when the troops learned the true object of their mission,

26 Ibid., 62.

365




they immediately refused to continue. The resulting stalemate was potentially explosive.

Ricard returned to his offices, but the citizens o f Felicite-ville could do little more than

await his next move. On 6 November, anxious members of the Emergency Deliberative

Assembly dispatched a delegation to M artinique to alert the Assemblee Representative to

their problems, and to seek guidance from Rochambeau .27

Sainte-Lucie’s delegates arrived in Saint-Pierre the next day. Led by GentiFs

associate, Pelouse, they went immediately to report to Martinique’s Committee of

General Security. The delegates vehemently denounced General Ricard’s “arbitrary”

actions, and asked that Rochambeau write an address to the Assembly o f Sainte-Lucie

ordering the aristocrats to adhere to the will o f the Republicans. Rochambeau found little

merit in their accusations. He made perfectly clear to Sainte-Lucie’s delegation that he

supported Governor Ricard, and saw nothing wrong with his actions. To reinforce his

point, he followed-up his interview with the delegation by writing a letter to R icard not

only praising his actions, but encouraging him to continue.28

Since members o f a subordinate governing body had come to M artinique without

the permission o f the colony’s governor, Rochambeau had every right to arrest the

Republicans from Sainte-Lucie for treason. Owing to recent legislation, such a

potentially impolitic move was not necessary. A heightened threat from Royalist

infiltrators in early Novem ber 1793 caused Rochambeau and the Representative

27 Ibid., 63.

28 Ibid., 64; Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colon ies,” Service historique, MR 593,

18.

366




Assembly to order a complete embargo on all ships in Martinique’s ports. As the result,

the Sainte-Lucie delegates were forced to remain in Saint-Pierre for nearly a month.

When the Sainte-Lucie delegates appealed to Martinique’s Representative Assembly,

their unofficial detention was made worse when they received a stem reprimand from the

legislators for even coming to M artinique.29

Meanwhile, in Sainte-Lucie counterrevolutionaries, ostensibly reconciled with the

government, formed their own Colonial Assembly. Claiming their full support for

Ricard, this new Assembly sent their own deputation to Martinique to explain their

activities. Once they arrived in Saint-Pierre, the group unblushingly announced to

Rochambeau and to M artinique’s Assemblee Representative that everything that had

recently transpired in Sainte-Lucie was “nothing more than an unfortunate mistake that

was best simply forgotten.” Having both deputations in Saint-Pierre was a serious

problem for Governor Ricard and for Martinique. Both groups claimed that they were the

voice of the constituted government in Sainte-Lucie, and each claimed that the other was

simply a faction bent on destroying the rule o f law. Martinique’s moderate Assemblymen

declared their support for Ricard, and accused Saint-Lucie’s Republicans o f being

criminals determined to incite a slave rebellion so that certain leaders could exploit the

confusion by pillaging. Conversely, Martinique’s Republicans maintained that their

brethren in Sainte-Lucie were being persecuted by R icard and the aristocrats, whose only

true motive was to promote the cause o f the counterrevolutionaries.30

29 Ibid., 63-66.

30 Ibid., 65-66.

367




While Martiniquais citizens wrestled with the dissension in their ow n ranks, the

Sainte-Lucie abolitionist, Pelouse, attempted to create a rift between the regular troops of

both islands. During his “detention” in Saint-Pierre, he ingratiated h imself with the city’s

La M arseil laise club, who asked him to deliver a written greeting to their city’s own

detachment o f the 31st Line on b ehalf o f Sainte-Lucie’s troops. Pelouse was happy to

accept the invitation. After praising the gallantry of the regiment’s counterparts on

Sainte-Lucie, Pelouse went on to say that in reality, it was the colonies’ soldiers who had

the greatest respect for the law, certainly more than their political leaders did.

Beware o f the greetings that will soon follow from the second

[Sainte-Lucie] deputation. They have employed all sorts of ruses

to destroy the soldiers’ spirits, and it is they who follow the same

path as the counterrevolutionaries in France. Do not listen to them.

In their effort to distort the truth and achieve their goals, they will

tell you not to fraternize with Martinique’s patriots, and will bring

false letters to that effect from your officers in Sainte-Lucie. The

soldiers o f the 31st in Sainte-Lucie will not have even seen them !31

Fortunately for Rochambeau, neither delegation found great numbers o f

supporters in Saint-Pierre. Believing that both o f Sainte-Lucie’s deputations were simply

a means to excite Martinique’s citizens to support their respective agendas, the Assembly

remained circumspect. When Ricard was apprized of the situation he was mortified. He

immediately wrote both to Rochambeau and to M artinique’s Assembly apologizing

profusely for the inconvenience, offering h is own account o f events in Sainte-Lucie.

Neither of the two delegations, he reported, was legitimate. As the result, the citizens of

Martinique, the majority o f whom were now genuine supporters o f Rochambeau and the

31 Ibid., 64-65.

368




Assembly, agreed. In early December, both of Sainte-Lucie’s representative groups were

told to return to their own island.32

Peace was maintained on Martinique, bu t the situation in Sainte-Lucie devolved

into a mini-civil war; the colony’s extant problems were exacerbated by the actions o f

two Republican officers of Sainte-Lucie’s detachment of the 3 1st Line. For reasons which

remain unclear, Captain Sabatier-Saint-Andre, the ba ttalion’s chief of staff, and Captain

Kermene, the first captain, learned that Ricard planned to have them arrested. In

response, Felicite-ville’s Republicans, who believed that they would soon lose two o f

their best military allies, took up arms to protect the two officers. After penning their

resignations, Sabatier-Saint-Andre and Kermene left their headquarters accompanied by a

strong escort, and traveled into Felicite-ville to put themselves under protection o f the

colony’s civil legal authorities. Still feeling threatened, the two men soon decided to

leave the colony altogether. After setting sail in a small boat, they were immediately

pursued. Sabatier-Saint-Andre was fortunate to escape, but Kermene was captured and

thrown into his garrison’s brig, where he subsequently committed suicide, allegedly by

slashing his own wrist.33

The Republicans were astonished. They refused to believe that Kermene took his

own life, and maintained that he had been executed. The response by the battalion’s

conservative leadership to the Republicans’ allegations did nothing to help the situation.

Whether Kermene committed suicide or was executed was irrelevant, the battalion

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 66-67.

369




commander told his troops, in either case, his death had been for the best. Kermene, he

maintained, was an aristocrat who plotted to overthrow General Ricard and install himself

as commander o f Sainte-Lucie. To make matters worse, Captain Kermene’s military

wake was a disgrace. One soldier punched the corpse as it lay in the coffin, while another

ripped out a fistful of Kermene’s hair to give the dead man, he said, “a proper Sainte-

Lucie sendoff .”34

More arrests followed the purported coup attempt, and key leaders of the slave

emancipation movement, including Pelouse, M. Leveneur, and M. Gex, were

immediately imprisoned. Gentil and his adherents fled into the island’s forests rather

than attempt to promote their cause from the confine’s of Felicite-ville’s jail. With the

full support of the Assembly, Ricard set out after them, willingly accompanied by soldiers

of the 31st Line. In fact, he was helped by scores o f the colony’s mulattoes, who had

become convinced that the activities of Gentil and his band would wreck the new status

that they had recently gained from the Republicans.35

It did not take long for Ricard’s posse to surround Gentil and his men in their

jungle hideout; with only sixty men, the fugitives could not resist for long. Captain

Sabatier-Saint-Andre, who had eluded capture earlier, was among the first of those killed

in the ferocious fighting - after his former comrades tore his corpse apart, they impaled

his severed head on a pike and carried the grisly standard in front of their ranks. Just

before his camp was completely overrun by R icard’s troops, a panicked Jean-Louis Gentil

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 67-68.

370




disbanded his group and ordered them to escape to the surrounding islands. Gentil

followed his own advice, and pu t to sea in an unseaworthy rowboat w ith four o f his

companions. For two days the party was batted about in the straits between Sainte-Lucie

and Martinique, but jus t as the craft was about to sink, the men swam ashore at Saint-

Pierre.36

Gentil may have eluded Ricard, but he would not escape Rochambeau. Even the

most radical citizens of Saint-Pierre would not allow Gentil to bring his particular form o f

rebellion to their colony, and they heartily complied with Rochambeau’s order to take

him and his followers into custody. Gentil and his compatriots cheerfully agreed to

remain in prison until the Civil Commissioners arrived, and offered to make the best of

their incarceration by working with the labor crews in the colony’s military camps.

However, there was a method to the prisoners’ apparent cooperation. If their plan

succeeded, they soon would be working in the company o f the same slaves that they

intended to incite to rebellion.37

Martiniquais Republicans were surprised and distressed by the apparent lack of

concern that Rochambeau displayed concerning events in their neighboring colony. The

fragmented reports and wild rumors that reached the colonial capital did little to paint a

complete picture of what was occurring in Sainte-Lucie, and certain citizens, especially

members o f Martinique’s Committee of General Security, began to imagine that

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.; Foumiols to M. de Fermont, membre du Comite de Salut Public, 11

August 1795, reprinted in Daney, Documents, 199.

371




Rochambeau was involved in a grand, inter-island, counterrevolutionary conspiracy.

Such uninformed suspicions were intensified by what they considered Rochambeau’s

typical negligence in matters o f their own public security. When members o f Saint-

Pierre’s La Marseilla ise club approached Rochambeau concerning the possibility o f

sending troops to Sainte-Lucie to support the Republicans and help put down the

seemingly uncontrollable Royalists, he simply replied that such a move would be useless,

especially since he had full confidence in the patriotism and capabilities of Governor

Ricard. “I know he has a few bad subjects that want to make trouble,” Rochambeau told

the assembled club members, “but several musket shots will make them see reason .”38

In Rochambeau’s opinion, the Sainte-Lucie affair had caused enough trouble in

Martinique. Though Governor Ricard’s colony may have been on the brink of civil war,

Rochambeau and the Representative Assembly did their best, especially through

censorship o f unofficial correspondence, to prevent Sainte-Lucie’s problems from

affecting Martinique. Rochambeau began a more active communication with Ricard,

whom he ordered to bring the situation in his colony under control. In response, Ricard

arrested and then deported scores o f the colony’s agitators, though no official judgements

38 Ibid., 68-69. The response by Rochambeau did little to satisfy Martinique’s

more radical Republicans, who surmised that the governor must have been referring to

them, since in their opinion, the majority o f Sainte-Lucie’s inhabitants were obviously

Royalists. In fact, the seemingly off-hand comment soon came back to haunt

Rochambeau w hen a Saint-Pierre radical, M. David, wrote to a comrade in Felicite-ville

detailing the remark. The response was intercepted by a member o f the Representative

Assembly, and formed the basis of a subsequent denunciation against M. David. In the

return letter, the Republican in Felicite-ville boasted that “the affair of Sainte-Lucie, will

indeed be solved - by several musket shots, several houses burned, and several

plantations destroyed.”

372




could be passed until Civil Commissioners arrived from France.39

The volatile political situation throughout the French Windward Islands

demanded action, or at least distraction. To contemporary chroniclers, it appeared that

Rochambeau found a useful outlet for the frustration o f his citizens by promoting the idea

of carrying the Revolution to the neighboring British colonies. Martiniquais Republicans

began to write o f serious preparations for war in December 1793, but in fact,

Rochambeau had been considering an expedition against England’s Caribbean

possessions for months. As early as July, he admonished sta ff officers in the Ministry of

the Marine and Colonies:

In previous letters, I asked for a ship that would not be intercepted

by bell igerents. I also told you that the Map Depot [in Martinique]

was pillaged during the first insurrection, and that I must have the

duplicates that are in the Paris depot relative to the Windward Isles

or the English, Dutch, and Spanish possessions in our area. My

requests have been ignored. I cannot complain about not being

able to do anything offensive when you do not even provide me

what I need for a defense. Think about this....and send me what I

need.40

Throughout summer and fall 1793, such demands continued unanswered, and by

October, his exasperation had reached a breaking point. Tired of relying upon ministry

functionaries, Rochambeau w rote directly to Minister Monge:

Simply give me some sailors, some weapons, some money, and

eight or ten thousand troops that I can land. I am convinced that

the situation in the theater is so good that I will have no trouble

entering into a favorable situation. Do not make me an empty-

39 Ibid., 69-70.

40 Rochambeau to the Under-secretaries of the Marine and the Colonies, 20 July

1703. AN, Archives Fonds AF III 209/953, item 18.

373




booted laughing stock !41

On 29 December 1793 a courier ship, the Union, arrived from France. At last, it

appeared that the M inister of Marine and the Colonies had honored Rochambeau’s

requests. Without doubt, the news that Rochambeau and the citizens o f Martinique

received was nothing short of remarkable. According to Monge’s dispatches,

reinforcements were scheduled to arrive shortly, including at least six ships of the line, a

large number o f frigates and 13,000 men. In the jaundiced view of Bailleul, it appeared

that “at this moment, there was no t a single person who did not pretend to be the best

Republican in the colony.” Indeed, unreconstructed Royalists in the Windward Islands

certainly had reason to fear for their future. To their shock, they learned that the French

Army was enjoying spectacular successes against their enemies on the Continent - the

Levee en masse had saved France and the Convention troops had taken the offensive. If

the war on the Continent were brought to a close, the Royalists reasoned, it was only a

matter o f months before the C onvention would turn their attention, and undoubtedly their

military forces, against the Caribbean colonies.42

Not everyone on Martinique was so quick to believe the ministerial reports.

Pelauque and Bellegarde sent out Chasseurs from la Trinite to warn islanders that the

41 Rochambeau to Monge, 16 October 1793. AN, Archives Fonds AF III

209/953, item 18, 1-2.

42 Bailleul, Report, 73; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis duSiege,” 2. Because the Union had made its first stop in Guadeloupe, conspiratorial

rumors emerged in Martinique that Rochambeau and his governors planned to arrest

radical Republicans and then use the Union to deport them to Royalist-controlled areas in

France. In fact, the Union remained in Martinique until the colony capitulated to the

British in March 1794.

374




recent news was a trick engineered by Rochambeau. Information from the most reliable

sources, they claimed, was that if any squadron was coming to Martinique, it would be

British. The Chasseurs’ prevarications had no small effect on the Assembly members,

who, in turn, sought answers from Governor General Rochambeau. After several days,

Rochambeau admitted to the Military Committee that he was aware of an English naval

squadron and troops assembling at Barbados, but he noted that they were returning to

their respective garrisons. To promote his point, he published a message in Saint-Pierre’s

newspaper saying that he knew from a reliable source that the Court o f Saint James

vowed not send additional British forces to the West Indies. Initially, Martinique’s

authorities were placated. They believed that Rochambeau maintained a reliable

intelligence network throughout the Caribbean colonies, and when sealed letters arrived a

short time later, Rochambeau presented the packet to the Assembly to be opened publicly

and then read aloud. To the relief of the Representative Assembly, the commercial

intelligence confirmed what Rochambeau had said concerning the disposition o f British

forces in the Caribbean.43

Now enjoying the full support of the Assembly and the promised support of the

Minister of Marine, Rochambeau prepared to go on the offensive. Men o f all ages and

colors in M artinique’s various National G uard companies rallied to support Rochambeau.

Company commanders drilled their men almost daily, and civilian supporters collected

available supplies. Still, the enthusiasm of potential action was threatened by a lack o f

available funds. When Rochambeau announced to the Assembly that he wished to form a

43 Ibid., 74-75.

375




company o f guides, asking for the necessary money to equip and pay the troops, he was

told that he could raise the unit and appoint the officers but that the Assembly would not

be able to pay the men until they were put into action.44

War fever infected the Republicans o f Martinique, but as always, the financial

problems were obvious. Rochambeau repeatedly found himself encumbered or opposed

by the legislative body that he had created. Nevertheless, the members o f the Assem bly

believed they were quite supportive o f him. On 12 November they unanimously voted to

subordinate themselves to Rochambeau by passing an extraordinary measure which stated

that in time o f war, military authority would override civil authority. In addition, the

Assemblymen passed a series o f Draconian measures in early winter 1793 intended to

enforce discipline among members of the island’s military establishment. They enacted

the national laws of 25 July and 26 August 1792, which condemned to death any

commander of a fortified place who surrendered his station while he still had the means

to resist. Likewise, any public functionary who abandoned his post would meet the same

fate, along with civil administrators or public functionaries who attempted to persuade

defenders to capitulate prematurely. The impact of such acts did not stop with the

military or civil servants. According to the ruling of the Representative Assembly, a

death sentence also awaited any private citizen who advocated the surrender o f a place

under siege.45

44 Ibid., 75-76. The guide company was never formed. The British arrived in

Martinique before Rochambeau could field the unit.


376




After 6 December, all citizens were denied passes from the island; anyone who

actually left the colony was subject to property confiscation. If called upon, those who

refused to serve in the National Guard would be deported and their property seized. In

summary, the Revolutionary government o f Martinique expected all citizens to defend

their posts to the end. The enemy would find no neutral ground in the colony when the

pa trie was at war. Certainly such bellicose legislation from the Representative Assembly

was useful to those who would actually conduct the fighting, but when the warriors

approached the Assembly to ask for the necessary funds to prepare for the inevitable

combat, the legislators were unresponsive. When it came to disbursing the limited

treasury funds, Assemblymen were quick to point out that no war was currently being

fought in Martinique.46

Another more serious problem with Rochambeau’s war plans was that in his

enthusiasm to prepare for an inter-island invasion, he inadvertently appeared to neglect

Martinique’s own defenses. Just as his father had prepared for the French invasion of

England in 1780, Donatien Rochambeau spent the majority o f his time on the field

drilling his troops for combat. Moreover, he had delegated all engineering efforts to the

officer most suited for such an undertaking, his commander o f artillery, Commandant Le

Mestre. In the intervening months, Le Mestre improved principal fortifications o f the

island. The artilleryman focused on detail and quickly used his allotted 5,000 hours of

46 Kleczewski, Martinique and the British Occupation, 99; Daney, Histoire de la

Martinique, 224, 221. By January 1794, the Assembly decreed that anyone who

communicated with the enemy would be considered a traitor, while Rochambeau ordered

a complete embargo on all ships in the colony’s ports and roads. All vessels were to be

searched, even if they were French.

377




slave labor to do very specific work at the expense o f more general modifications on

works throughout the island. For the colony to be truly fortified, Le Mestre needed more

time, more money, and more laborers; none o f these were available in quantity on

Martinique.47

Yet, in the last weeks o f 1793, none of these shortcomings seemed to matter.

When the comm ander of the Union, Captain Mary, docked his ship in Saint-Pierre, he

announced at the end o f December 1793 that the long-awaited French squadron was only

eight days behind him. By the end of January 1794, the vessels had not yet arrived. To

some, Monge had indeed made Rochambeau an “empty-booted laughing stock,” but to

others, the failure of the Paris government to fulfill its promises had more sinister

connotations. It did not take long for the Martiniquais Republicans to conclude that

Rochambeau was creating his own personal army to impose his will upon the island

without fear of the civilian authorities. Indeed, when he engineered the dismissal of

several civil servants with whom he had become displeased, the Assembly began to

realize jus t how easily Rochambeau could dispose o f anyone who did not agree with him.

Fearing rumors o f a military coup, the Representative Assembly reversed their earlier

supportive stance and decreed in January 1794 that no military unit would be put into

movement without their express consent.48

In concert with these suspicions, Republicans again promoted the idea that

Rochambeau was favoring Royalists who had infiltrated their ranks. Similar distrust


48 Ibid., 77.

378




affected members o f the Assembly, who demanded that jus t as in France, certificates o f

civism be issued for all public functionaries. Rochambeau refused this measure, saying

that according to the Assembly’s own laws, the Popular Society of Republique-ville held

that particular responsibility. Furthermore, they already had the certificates in their

possession. The Assemblymen fought Rochambeau, but he held firm, thus averting a

potential purge of the Representative Assembly by the organization’s more radical

Republicans.49

While internal dissension became stronger in the ranks o f the government

officials, Rochambeau again found himself under attack from his irregular military forces.

By December, the subject o f rations gave the Chasseurs a new reason to complain, and

messages from Bellegarde and Pelauque at la Trinite told Rochambeau that their men

were starving. Like other regular troops in the colony, the Chasseur leadership

complained that they wanted salted beef. Pelauque charged that Commissary Daigremont

prevented the Chasseurs from purchasing anything from the government warehouses in la

Trinite, since all captured goods were put at the disposal of the government. In truth,

Daigremont was faced with the same limitations as Rochambeau. The fault rested with

the Military Committee of the Representative Assembly. They controlled the disposition

of government property for the island’s military forces, but they failed to pay for or to

distribute much-needed supplies for the Chasseurs in la Trinite.50

Attempting to follow established procedure, Rochambeau turned the m atter over

49 Ibid., 78.

50 Ibid., 79.

379




to Daigremont, who in turn brought the issue before the Military Committee; weeks later,

the Assem bly finally sent two o f its representatives to investigate the C hasseurs’

accusations. They found that what Bellegarde and Pelauque alleged was in fact true, and

that owing to a similar lack of proper coordination, the Chasseurs were not allowed to use

the city’s hospital. The delegates sent their findings to the Military Committee, but

nothing happened. As far removed as they were from the colony’s seat of government, it

is unlikely that the Chasseurs fully understood the relationship between Rochambeau,

Commissary Daigremont, the Military Committee, and the Assembly; Rochambeau and

Daigremont once again became the object of their suspicion. Sympathy for the Chasseurs

grew in Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville. When Rochambeau and his Comm issary tried

to explain the situation, citizens began to suspect that they were trying to blame the

situation on the Assembly.51

In mid-January the Chasseurs again displayed their talent in causing problems for

Rochambeau. Despite the severe restrictions placed on travelers to the colony, M.

Dautreman, a free black from the British colony of Grenada, made his way into la Trinite.

When Municipality officials denounced him and alleged that he was an agent o f the

British who had come to promote a general slave uprising, Rochambeau immediately

ordered the foreigner arrested. A dispatch rider was sent to la Trinite to deliver the order

and to bring Dautreman to Republique-ville, but when he arrived, he found that five o f

Bellegarde’s Chasseurs had put Dautreman under their protection. The Chasseurs, who

drew their sabers lest anyone attempt to take Dautreman, would not allow anyone near

51 Ibid., 80-81.

380




him.52

Since the Chasseurs chose to violate a direct order from Governor General

Rochambeau, the M unicipality o f la Trinite sent a company o f the city’s National Guard

to arrest Dautreman. However, the members of the fugitive’s escort were not intimidated;

during a heated exchange, one o f the Chasseurs used his saber to slash the executive

officer of the National Guard across the face. Thus thwarted in their efforts to execute the

law, la Trinite’s Municipality appealed directly to Bellegarde to bring Dautreman into

custody. The next day, Dautreman appeared before the city’s Hotel de Ville escorted by

fifteen of Bellegarde’s Chasseurs, but his arrival was not to offer his surrender. When

Dautreman called for the city officials to present themselves, his new escort arrayed

themselves for battle and threatened to bum the building if the Municipality persisted in

trying to arrest him. To emphasize their point, the Chasseurs then fired a volley of

musket shots at the building and returned to Fort Bellegarde.53

In essence, Bellegarde and his men had revolted against the colony’s authorities,

but both Rochambeau and the Assembly failed to deal with the crisis quickly and

decisively. The two Assembly delegates who had come to la Trinite the previous month

to address the rations issue were too frightened to stand up to the Chasseurs, and once

again the Committee o f Public Safety o f Republique-ville sent Jean Isaac and M. Colon to

Bellegarde’s camp to attempt to defuse the situation. Rochambeau considered sending

regular troops against the Chasseurs, but decided against it, realizing it would cause even

52 Ibid., 82-83.

53 Ibid.

381




more serious problems. Even with four government representatives in la Trinite calling

upon Bellegarde and Pelauque to obey the law, the situation was never resolved - the

English w ould arrive first.54

In fact, the Dautreman affair was only one incident in a much larger British effort

to smuggle Royalists and other agents onto Martinique. Despite the government’s best

efforts, in January 1794 counterrevolutionary guerrillas once again began to conduct

sporadic nightly raids against remote, w eakly-held Republican positions. Throughout the

month, the Royalists’ numbers and activities steadily increased, but they were never able

to muster enough strength to overpower Rocham beau’s forces. Their only hope for

success lay with an invasion by the British. Contrary to what they were being told by the

government, intelligence arriving in the colony’s ports in January 1794 began to convince

Martiniquais citizens that another British attack was imminent; as their fear grew,

Republicans again attacked Rochambeau. Since his arrival, they maintained, he had done

little to try to save the colony or to prepare the troops for the island’s defense. Instead,

54 Ibid. No official explanation exists for Bellegarde’s protection of Dautreman,

but his motives may have been either racially or politically based. On 30 N ovember

1793, the Assembly passed a law that i f a slave was convicted by the Revolutionary

Tribunal, that conviction would be permanent and without appeal. However, death

penalties were to be com muted to life sentences for slave leaders, while those who were

forced by their masters to engage in counterrevolutionary activity would only receive five

years labor in the fields. While the new laws appeared lenient to the colony’s whiteleaders, such measures remained intolerable to the blacks in Bellegarde’s battalion. For

this reason, the Chasseurs de la Martinique may have sought to protect the presumably

innocent Dautreman from receiving a requisite life sentence. On the other hand,

Bellegarde and Pelauque may have protected Dautreman because he truly was a British

agent.

382




they asserted, “he had done nothing more than act like a general of the ancien regime.”55

After a twelve months as Governor General o f the W indward Islands,

Rochambeau could no t have been deluded that the difficulties in his and the other

colonies within his jurisdiction were not o f his own making. France’s inablility to

properly sustain Tobago resulted in the loss o f that colony, but Rochambeau had installed

his own men, Collot and Ricard, in Guadeloupe and Sainte-Lucie. On these islands, the

men that Rochambeau entrusted with the nation ’s Revolutionary stewardship proved

unequal to their task. Collot’s tenuous administration in Guadeloupe may largely have

been the result of hostile topography, but Ricard could claim no such handicap. Sainte-

Lucie’s proximity to Martinique guaranteed that his gubernatorial failures directly

impacted Martinique.

Without money, troops, ships, or support from France, there was little that

Rochambeau could do to bo lster his multi-island administration. Thus, he directed his

energies to Martinique. Unfortunately for Rochambeau, his noteworthy successes in

Martinique proved ephemeral. While his Representative Assembly quibbled over

finances, his Chasseurs flirted with treason. Indeed, the organizations that Rochambeau

created to sustain the Revolution became the forces that would prevent him from

preserving it.

55Ibid., 82-83.

383




Chapter XIII

Invasion!

6 - 7 February 1794

The British did no t accept their earlier failure to seize Martinique, and considered

the defeat an affront to the nation’s honor and a temporary setback. Just weeks after

reports from General Bruce reached England concerning his aborted invasion attempt,

Secretary Dundas organized a second, more potent force under the command o f two o f

England’s most distinguished officers, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Grey, and Vice-

Admiral Sir John Jervis. In a lengthy set of secret instructions to Grey, Dundas ordered

an immediate attack on the islands o f Martinique, Guadeloupe and Sainte-Lucie

respectively. If he could not capture Martinique’s Fort-de-la-Convention, Dundas

instructed Grey, then he was to turn his attack into a blockade and take the other islands.1

1 Dundas to Grey “Orders and Secret Instructions,” 11 Novem ber 1793. PRO,

CO, 318.13,452-453, 455. As a major general, the future Lieutenant General Charles

Grey (1729-1807), then Baron Grey de Ho wick, commanded in several victories during

the American Revolution, most notably against Major General Anthony Wayne at

Germantown, Pennsylvania in 1777. It was this loss that Wayne later sought to avenge in

1779 with his attack at Stony Point, New York. Grey returned to England in 1782, where

he was appointed commander in ch ief in America, but the war ended a short time later, so

he never assumed the post. Following extensive duties in the West Indies, he retired from

military service in 1801, and was raised to Viscount Howick and Earl Grey in 1806.

Admiral Sir John Jervis’ most notable performance came while serving under

Horatio Nelson in 1797 when, with fifteen ships under his own command, he defeated a

384




The King’s Men

Sir Henry Dundas

* V

t —

3

Vice-Admiral

Sir John Jervis

Lieutenant General

Robert Prescott

Lieutenant General

Sir Charles Grey

H.R.H. the Duke of Hannover

Figure 30. The King’s Men

385




In his initial estimates for the expedition against the French Windward Islands,

Dundas placed fourteen infantry regiments, or about 11,000 troops, under Grey’s

command. However, in late September 1793, Dundas diverted eight of Grey’s regiments

to bolster allied operations in Flanders. Consequently, Dundas was compelled to revise

his campaign strategy for the Windward Islands by attacking the islands o f Sainte-Lucie

and Guadeloupe before attempting to invade the more formidable defenses o f

Martinique.2

Despite the reductions, Grey maintained 6,085 infantrymen under his command,

including a de tachment o f black soldiers known as the “Carolina Dragoons,” while

Jervis’ fleet included four First Rate ships, nine frigates, and scores of corvettes, bomb

ketches, and transports. The expeditionary force left Portsmouth on 26 November 1793.

Upon its arrival in Carlisle Bay, Barbados on 6 January 1794, the squadron was joined by

the Asia (64) and another three frigates. Although the last instructions that Dundas gave

twenty-seven ship Spanish squadron off Cape Saint Vincent. For this action, Jervis

received a peerage, and became Earl o f Saint Vincent. While serving as First Lord o f the

Admiralty (1801-1806), Jervis concentrated on restoring discipline in the ranks o f the

Royal Navy primarily attending to matters o f shipboard health and sanitation. For a short

time in 1806, Jervis returned to sea as Comm ander in Chief, Mediterranean until his

health began to fail later that year. In 1821, he became the second officer in the modem

Royal Navy (after William Henry Hanover, Duke o f Clarence in 1811) to hold the rank o f

Admiral of the Fleet. He died in 1823.

2 David Geggus, “The British government and the Saint Domingue slave revolt,

1791-1793,” English Historical Review, XCVI: 379 (1981): 300-301. One month later,five of these eight regiments were again reassigned, this time to support French Royalists

in Brittany. When Royalists opened Toulon to a British naval squadron at the end of

August, Dundas was offered another tempting opportunity to strike at the French on the

Continent. Dundas ordered that more o f Grey’s allotted troops (those stationed at

Gibralter) go to Toulon.

386




to Grey were to take the smaller islands first, detailed reports from French emigres in

Barbados convinced Grey that an initial attack against Martinique would succeed.3

Whether by D undas’ design, or as the result of his ignorance o f military affairs, it

helped the British effort because General Grey was given the latitude to modify his orders

as best suited the situation. Dundas’ primary goal was for Grey to capture all of the

French Windward Islands, but regardless of the order, Martinique remained the key. Grey

knew that once he controlled this strongest of the French possessions, he could easily

force the surrender of Sainte-Lucie and Guadeloupe, but not vice-versa. Indeed, the

amount o f troops required to conquer and occupy the other islands would dangerously

deplete the forces that he needed for a successful campaign against the principle French

force under Rochambeau. Worse still, if he did not capture Martinique in the 1794

campaign season, the anticipated arrival of French reinforcements would make his

mission considerably more difficult, i f not impossible.4

3 Rev. Cooper Willyams, Expedition A gainst The French West India Is lands.

(London, 1796) 15-16; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 228; Kleczewski, Martinique

and the British Occupation, 130-135. Grey’s reported personnel totals did not include

224 men who remained sick aboard the ships, or 977 sick men who were left at Barbados.

Nevertheless, Rochambeau, who based his information on the latest reports that he

received from France, still believed that Grey had anywhere from 12,000 to 16,000 elite

troops at his disposal, with even more arriving from Canada under the command o f his

Royal Highness, Prince Edward. Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 4 February

1794.

4 Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 21; Kleczewski, Martinique an d the British Occupation, 132-133. Dundas put very few stipulations in his

“secret instructions” to Grey, demanding primarily that the general acquire the islands “in

the most expeditious manner, and with the least loss or hazard to our troops.” Dundas to

Grey “Orders and Secret Instructions,” 11 November 1793. PRO, CO, 318.13, 452-453,

455.

387




Once the fleet arrived in Barbados, it became imperative that Grey and Jervis

commence their operation before verifiable information concerning the latest disposition

of British forces could reach Martinique. Thus, Jervis did not wait to begin the first phase

of the attack, and by 10 January, several British warships blockaded the island from

positions over the horizon, just beyond Martinique’s lookouts. The enemy squadron did

their job well. For an entire month, Rochambeau and the citizens of Martinique received

no outside communication whatsoever, and remained oblivious to what was taking place

around them.5

Grey’s strategy called for a well-timed, three-pronged attack at critical points on

the island, forcing the defenders to divide their forces and make his own landings easier.

As the fleet closed on the island, Jervis was to divert twenty ships to the Baie du Galion

on Martinique’s eastern side, where Secretary Dundas’ nephew, Major General Thomas

Dundas, would drive Bellegarde and his Chasseurs from their defensive positions, and

then seize la Trinite. Simultaneously, Grey and the remainder of his troops were to sail

directly into the southern Baie du Marin, where after disabling the enemy batteries at

Pointe Borgnesse and Pointe Dunkerque, Lieutenant General Robert Prescott and his men

would ashore at the village of Trois Rivieres. With these first two a ttacks fully developed

and the Republican defenders focusing their efforts in the south and the east, Grey would

then send Colonel Charles Gordon’s brigade northwest to launch yet another attack at

Case-Navire, isolating Republique-ville from Saint-Pierre. With their initial objectives

taken, all three brigades were then to move inland, surround Republique-ville, and force

5 Ibid.

388




The British Master Plan

A View of

MARTINIQUEand ike Mand's Defensive Works

« 1793English Miles

? 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 t o

K i l o m e t r e so i s 4 6 8 to iz

te-MuieLe P n

Saint-Pi j General

^ ^ Dundas’

A brigade lands

% aTGalion 6

v February-

\ Commodore bert

!v/i r

♦*r ♦ Case-Pilote

continues to

^a Trinite

Ca*e-Sta.-C

Pte.dej

Mome />>-

lie^auclin

Cap Salomon.

Pte. BouigantItfAnftf 1'AiU

n

Adm iral Jem s and Pte. B

Colonel Gordon ’s \

brigade continues

north to attack

Case-Navire - \ initial attack in the Baie ( / p*« / fo rc cdKbnJx ^ /

^ at Trois-Rivieres 6 -7

%February1794

Case -P ilote on 8

February

l - o n g i l u d e W e s t 6 r o t ' G r e e i n v i e l i

Figure 31. The British Master Plan389




the colony’s surrender.6

A critical contribution to the general’s planning was well-informed reports from

many o f Martinique's key Royalist leaders concerning the dispositions of the Republican

troops and the state of the fortifications on the island. Henri de Percin offered his

services as one of the most useful informers.7 Thus armed with solid and current

intelligence, the British expeditionary force remained in Barbados’ Carlisle Bay for just

over a month, making extensive preparations for w hat all expected would be a heavily-

resisted invasion. Grey and his subordinate army commanders drilled their infantry and

artillerymen on shore, while Admiral Jervis personally supervised details shipboard,

including training his sailors as pike bearing foot soldiers, and assembling prefabricated

gun boats that the fleet had brought from England.8

6 Royalist informers on Martinique also informed Grey and Jervis that Bellegarde

defended la Trinite, and that he and Rochambeau were at odds. Willyams, Expedition,

10; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33; Daney, Histoire de la

Martinique, 229. Gordon temporarily commanded the third brigade in the place of

H.R.H. Edward Augustus Hanover, Duke o f Kent, who was expected to arrive fromCanada with reinforcements.

7 De Perc in’s associates included Fort-de-la-Convention’s former ch ief engineer

M. de Guignod, Pothau Desgatiere, and scores of others. Years earlier, de Guignod had

assisted the noted French fortifications engineer, Claude Fr an c is , marquis de Bouille, in

the construction o f Fort-de-la-Convention. Once the British began their campaign on

Martinique, these emigres immediately returned to their plantations and put their

demoralized slaves, who had heard rumors concerning the Civil Com mission’s

emancipation of Saint-Domingue’s slaves, back to work. Rochambeau, “Journal du

siege,” entry for 9 February 1794. Unfortunately for the island’s slaves, the National

Convention’s 4 February 1794 emancipation decree arrived on Martinique just days afterthe British forced Rochambeau to surrender the colony. The liberation of Martinique’s

slaves did not actually occur until many years later.

8 These lateen-rigged gun boats were well-suited amphibious attacks, especially

for close-in work against seaside towns and fortifications. Small and extremely difficult

390




Admiral Jervis’ Gun Boats

Top and cutaway views - the gun boats’ principal armament was a 24-

pounder cannon in the fore. When fired, the cannon rolled back on

wooden rails. Ropes helped absorb the main gun’s recoil. The gun boats’

secondary armament was small-bore swivel guns, which were

permanently replaced in 1801 with 12,18,24, or 32-pounder carronades.

Gun boat model at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England. This version, ca. 1808, shows the boat outfitted with a standard

carronade.

Gun boats in action with the H.M.S Sirius

Figure 32. Admiral Jervis’ Gun Boats

391




As the sun set on Tuesday, 4 February 1794, lookouts on Martinique were barely

able to discern topsails as they began to appear over the island’s southern horizon. From

such a distance it was impossible to recognize the nationality of the approaching fleet.

When the news reached Republique-ville and Saint-Pierre, Martiniquais citizens, who

like Rochambeau believed the ships to be the long-awaited French reinforcements, made

preparations to receive their saviors with great celebration. By 2:00 p .m. on the 5th, the

erstwhile celebrants’ joy turned to panic as it became clear that between ninety and one

hundred ships were sailing toward the Baie du Marin, and were positively English.9

The army headquarters was caught completely by surprise. Martinique’s military

leadership immediately knew that they were drastically outnumbered; the intelligence that

Rochambeau received from France months earlier described a British invasion force o f

twelve to sixteen-thousand men possibly destined for the Caribbean. Despite Dundas’

diversion, the decrease in the num bers o f British troops preparing to land in Martinique

made little difference. Rochambeau commanded only four to five hundred regular troops

in the whole o f the Windward Islands, and a considerable number o f those had

succumbed to tropical illnesses.10

to hit, they were quite deadly. Each boat carried a 24-pounder mounted in the bow, and

either four swivel guns (two per gunwale) or a carronade (a short-barreled gun also

known as a “smasher” that could effectively fire rounds weighing between twelve and

sixty-eight pounds up to 500 yards) mounted aft.

9 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 87; Daney, His toire de la Martinique, 228.

10 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 4 February 1794; Daney, Histo ire de

la Martinique, 228-229. Rochambeau could only count among his veteran troops o f the

line on Martinique sixty men of the former Royal Sarre and Marechal de Turenne

Regiments, who were now serving as members o f the 3 1st Line. In addition, he had under

392




By 4:00 p.m., Jervis’ lead ships were receiving heavy fire from the French

batteries at Pointes Dunkerque and Borgnesse. The fleet remained out o f range of Pointe

Dunkerque, but the guns at Pointe Borgnesse had to be silenced before Grey could begin

his landing at Trois Rivieres. Several vessels quickly maneuvered into the Baie du Marin

and anchored within point-blank range o f Pointe Borgnesse. Almost immediately, Jerv is’

flagship, the Boyne (98), and the Veteran (64) fired full broadsides against the battery,

while a detachment o f Royal Marines landed to storm the works from the beach below.

Once they noticed the British landing party, the majority of the garrison at Pointe

Borgnesse, mostly citizens from the village o f Riviere-Pilote, fired several shots from

their cannons and then fled. The fight for Pointe Borgnesse, however, was not over. The

battery commander, a mulatto National Guard captain named Compere, chose to stay

behind w ith eleven other men, and the ensuing hand-to-hand fighting continued until

most o f his remaining troops were dead. Though Compere himself was seriously

wounded, he alone managed to escape capture. After twenty minutes, Pointe Borgnesse

belonged to the British. The Royal Marines raised the Jack over the battery, amid three

loud cheers from the squadron.11

While the British focused their attention against Pointe Borgnesse, at the nearby

village of Sainte-Luce, the local cure and a handful o f doughty Republicans attempted to

assist their beleaguered brethren from their town’s own tiny battery. The British shut

his direct command only three companies of Chasseurs, and the island’s militia units. In

total, his available forces numbered around 900 supposedly reliable men.

11 Willyams, Expedition, 20; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 88; Rochambeau,

“Journal du siege,” entry for 5 February 1794.

393




ramant

SainteMar

Rivieres

Pointe Boxgneu

Generals Prescott and Gref Land the Bulk of the British Invasion

Force

6W e B l l l y

1 1

Saintja-Arine

PbinteDKoval Marines

\ i i i i \ I nrees

bngf lsc mc vm

Admiral Jarvis Attacks

in the Baie du. Matin 5-7 February 1794

The British Invasion in the South

5-7 February 1794

Enlarged Area

T*

Figure 33. The British Invasion in the South 5-7 February 1794

394




down the cure 's guns without hesitation. After the priest and his compatriots hit the

Boyne with a heated ball from one of the village’s two 24-pounders, crewmen aboard the

Veteran opened fire with their lower deck cannon and blasted the Frenchmen out o f their

works.12 Next, several other ships turned their guns against the battery at Sainte-Anne;

after a quick series o f broadsides, the Republicans vacated these works as well. A

detachment of Royal Marines landed there to spike the guns, and destroy their carriages.

With Sainte-Anne secure, Grey landed a detachment o f infantrymen in the village with

orders to move south to take the battery at Pointe Dunkerque from the rear. By early

evening, the soldiers had accomplished their mission; Sainte-Luce Channel and the

entrance to the Cul de Sac du Marin were open for the main British landing.13

On the other side of the island, the citizens of le Robert and la Trinite also

discovered that the twenty ships sailing toward them were enemy. When the British

squadron appeared in the Baie du Galion late on the afternoon of 5 February, Bellegarde

sent a rider to Republique-ville to alert Rochambeau to prepare reinforcements. This

second British attack proved to be a complete surprise to the staff at army headquarters at

Fort-de-la-Republique. In fact, Rochambeau was in Saint-Pierre reviewing troops that,

12 Both Rochambeau and Bailleul mention the heroic actions o f Sainte-Luce’s

cure. However, the official history of the village (one copy remains in the Sainte-Luce

library) maintains that during the period, Sainte-Luce had no cure. While certain details

o f the encounter may be legend, Reverend Cooper Willyams, who witnessed the

engagement from aboard the Veteran, was quite specific in his description of the event.To this day, a weathered 24-pounder cannon rests in a concrete carriage on a blu ff above

the village.

13 Willyams, Expedition, 20; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 88; Rochambeau,

“Journal du siege,” entry for 5 February 1794.

395




Attack at le Marin and Landing at Trois Rivieres

Entrance to the Baie du Marin Pointe Borgnesse and the entrance

(Pointe Bunquerque is in foreground) to the Cul de Sac du Marin

The Battle fo r le Marin as seen fro m Admiral Jervis’ Flagship

Baie du Marin from the city’s fort Sainte-Luce Today

The British Landing Site at Trois Rivieres

Figure 34. Attack at le Marin and Landing at Trois Rivieres

396




ironically, he was drilling for his proposed expedition against the British Caribbean

possessions. Colonel Daucourt was acting as temporary comm ander o f Republique-

ville’s garrisons. When Bellegarde’s message reached the headquarters, he left the capital

immediately to carry the news to his chief personally.14

Daucourt arrived at Saint-Pierre at 7:30 p.m. and gave Rochambeau clear

confirmation of both attacks. The general spent the next thirty minutes repositioning

forces in Saint-Pierre for the defense o f the island. The soldiers at Saint-Pierre would not

carry the Revolution to the British colonies, but they would fight once again for the

survival of their own city. Having done what he could in Saint-Pierre, Rochambeau

turned his attention to the rest o f the colony.

In his most recent letter, Lieutenant Colonel Bellegarde had assured Rocham beau

that “barring any unforseen circumstances” he could hold la Trinite; he was already

ensconced in “Fort Bellegarde” with three o f his five Chasseur companies. Thus,

Rochambeau ordered Major Edouard M ember’s battalion to leave Saint-Pierre to

reinforce the position at Mome Vert-Pre. This first task was difficult enough, but

Rochambeau complicated the orders by saying that should Saint-Pierre become

threatened, M eunier and his troops were to return to positions overlooking the city at le

Mom e Rouge. Since no enemy was currently in sight near Saint-Pierre, the city’s defense

was left initially to its own citizens and National Guard. Similarly, the citizens o f Case-

Navire and Case-Pilote would be responsible for the ir tow ns’ defense, but they would not

14 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 90; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry

for 5 February 1794.

397




be without help. Rochambeau was confident that the regular artillerymen manning the

batteries around the two towns could defeat a British landing in that area and prevent an

overland enemy advance toward Saint-Pierre. Nevertheless, Rochambeau designated

Fort-de-la-Convention as the final rallying point for forces defending the island, and

prepared a small group of his most experienced soldiers to march to Republique-ville to

occupy the fortress .15

Before leaving Saint-Pierre, Rochambeau delivered a letter to the Representative

Assembly, apprizing them o f the situation on the island. That evening, the Assembly

officially declared Martinique in a state o f siege, and selected twelve volunteer members

to serve as a general Committee o f Public Safety for Martinique. After awarding the new

committee full legislative powers to defend the colony by whatever means necessary, the

Assemblymen issued a final proclamation calling upon Republicans to “remember their

strength and their earlier victories, and to fight to the death rather than surrender the

island.” With these parting words, the Representative Assembly dissolved itself, and its

members quickly returned to their own parishes. Rochambeau, on the other hand, set out

to find the enemy. When he stopped at Republique-ville to change horses, he confirmed

to the anxious city authorities that the British had invaded several points on the island,

15 Ibid., 91; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 5 February 1794; Daney,

Histoire de la Martinique, 229. Rochambeau further advised Bellegarde to fall back to

Gros-Mome i f he were unable to hold la Trinite, but he kept two o f Bellegarde’s

companies in reserve, one under Captain Octavius in le Robert, the other in Republique-ville. Further, though Major Edouard Meunier was instructed to eventually move to

Saint-Pierre, Rochambeau gave him contradictory orders to put him self and his men

under Bellegarde’s command if the situation warranted it. Meunier ignored this second

order - a decision that would have grave consequences when the British attacked

Bellegarde at la Trinite.

398




and that he was on his way to Pointe Borgnesse to reconnoiter the main British attack

himself. Rochambeau then disappeared into the twilight.16

On the morning of 6 February, Major General Dundas’ brigade encountered fierce

resistance in his landing in the Baie du Gabon. Elements of 1st Chasseur Battalion

augmented by National Guard from la Trinite delayed the British landing for several

hours by ambushing Dundas’ troops from sugarcane fields, several yards from the beach.

They withdrew toward their entrenchments only after being driven out o f their positions

by British bayonets.17 Despite the delay, by mid-morning Dundas disembarked 800

infantrymen and two field pieces. He made his first encampment at a nearby plantation

whose Royalist overseer, M. Charton, offered to guide the enemy to Mome Vert-Pre,

where Dundas and his troops could easily overwhelm Edouard Meunier’s recently-arrived

Chasseur battalion. This diversion was not in his instructions, but to Dundas, protecting

his southern flank by clearing the Republicans from the former “Royalists’ Gibralter”

seemed to be sound military reasoning. When the British reached Mom e Vert-Pre that

afternoon, however, they were surprised to discover that Meunier and his battalion were

16 Ibid., 89, 94; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 5 February 1794.

While the new Committee o f Public Safety in Saint-Pierre organized itself, three former

members of the Assembly’s Committee o f General Security in Republique-ville held all

government power throughout the night o f 5-6 February. At around midnight, this

intermediary body learned from another Chasseur messenger that not only had la Trinite

fallen to the British, but that Rochambeau had been beaten on the field. Further, theChasseur announced, the British mandated that all committees and assemblies on the

island were to cease their functions immediately. Fortunately for the French, the

committee members took no action - the message was a complete fabrication.

17 Willyams, Expedition, 34; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 87.

399




General Dundas *Landing

The Landing BeachBaie du Galion

Road up from the Landing Dundas’ Campsite

Beach

Galion - in 1794, this plantation was owned by Dubuc and

managed by M. Charton

Figure 35. General Dundas’ Landing

400




not alone in the works.18

While Dundas’ troops landed at le Galion, Republican soldiers from throughout

the area around Mome Vert-Pre concentrated at the mountain stronghold. They came for

a variety o f reasons. When the citizens o f le Robert saw the British squadron pass the

previous afternoon, the town’s National Guard company took positions at M ome Vert-Pre

in hopes of stalling a British land attack from the north. Likewise, Captain Octavius, who

commanded the Chasseur company originally stationed in reserve in le Robert, took his

soldiers to Mome Vert-Pre, where he believed he would be in a better position to assist

Bellegarde. Several hours later, Commandant Cezaire and his National Guard company

from Gros-Mome marched to the more secure Mome Vert-Pre when they learned that

they would be left to defend their town’s works alone. As the result of these unauthorized

troop movements, by mid-moming on the 6th, Meunier’s one battalion had become two

battalions.19

Dundas’ first attack column never reached the main works at Mome Vert-Pre. As

the unsuspecting British infantrymen climbed the winding road from the Galion

planta tion toward the Republican positions, Captain Octavius and his Chasseur company

surprised them from ambush positions well ahead of the principle entrenchments. After

losing several men, the stunned British fell back to their camp, where Dundas made hasty

preparations to move against the Republicans along another route. Octavius learned of

this change in the enemy plans, and simultaneously moved his company in order to

18 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 89.

19 Ibid., 89-90.

401




BELLEGARDE

V jB lt f Jtt kalian

j 4 l | r > N D A S

Le Robert

Dundas’ Landing and Attacks Near Morne Vert-Pre6 February 1794 - Major Gene ral Thomas Dundas landed his troops at Galion. Elements

of Bellegard e’s 1st Chasseur Battalion and National Guard from la Trinity offered stiff

resistance at the beach and then retreated. Dundas made two attempts to take the Republican stronghold at Morne Vert-Pre, but was stopped by Lieutenant Colonel

Edouard M eunier and companies of the 1st and 2d Chasseur Battalions (augmented by

National Guard from le Robert and Gros-Morne).

9

Enlarged

Area

Figure 36. Dundas’ Landing and Attacks Near Morne Vert-Pre402




ambush the British on their new route o f advance.20

Had Meunier augmented Octavius’ company with some of his own men, the

Chasseurs of the 1st Battalion could have done considerably more damage to the British

infantrymen. Rather than put his own men at risk, Meunier chose to follow only the letter

o f his instructions in fulfilling Rochambeau’s intent. He ordered the National Guard from

Gros-Mome to assist Octavius, rallied his own Chasseurs, and then moved west along the

mountain roads to occupy the preplanned secondary positions near Saint-Pierre. After all,

he reasoned, the area between Gros-Mome, M ome Vert-Pre and la Trinite was

Bellegarde’s responsibility, not h is.21

With only two companies, Octavius managed to halt the British column a second

time. Again the enemy retreated to the Charton plantation, where Dundas abandoned his

fruitless enterprise and returned his attention to his primary mission of taking la Trinite.

Once Dundas’ cavalry were landed at le Galion, he put them at the head of his infantry

and advanced to attack Bellegarde.22

La Trinite was only a short distance to the north along the coast road, but Dundas

attempted to turn Bellegarde’s flank. Instead of taking the more direct route, he marched

his brigade west and then north along difficult mountain trails. Scouts of the Chasseur

detachment provided Bellegarde w ith solid intelligence concerning the latest enemy

movements, but he opted to take advantage o f Dundas’ poor choice o f roads with a

20 Ibid., 90; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 7 February 1794.

21 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 7 February 1794.

22 Ibid.; Willyams, Expedition, 34.

403




La Trinite

La Trinite H arb or V iew from the old la

Trinite B attery

The old W aterfront The Cann ons o f

“Fort Bellegarde”

Figure 37. La Trinite

404




minimum of risk to his unit. He posted the National Guard from Trou au Chat

(Commandant Preville) and Gros-Mome (Commandant Cezaire) along the route to

ambush the enemy, but he contributed only a handful of his own soldiers, led by his least-

trusted Chasseur officers. With nearly 160 troops in place, Bellegarde returned to his

fort, apparently, to retrieve more ammunition for his soldiers. He was not to be found

when the British force met the Republicans.23

The National Guard tried desperately to stem the British advance, but this time the

enemy would not be stopped. Now employing all of his available resources, Dundas

massed his artillery, cavalry and infantry, and drove headlong into the Republican

positions. The shock was tremendous. After losing what may have been the only officer

present, Bellegarde’s Chasseur detachment broke before the disciplined fire o f the British

Redcoats. No t surprisingly, the National Guard performed no better. Untrained to resist

the enemy’s ordered volleys, these soldiers scattered to the safety of their own homes.

Within minutes after the start o f the engagement, the majority o f the Republicans had

thrown down their weapons and were in full flight, while those remaining fell to their

knees and begged the British for quarter. “In a word ,” commissaire Bailleul wrote, “the

terror was so great in the troop, that this human debris could not be rallied by their leaders

until they had run nearly six leagues away from the battlefield, beyond the Riviere

Capot.”24

23 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 91-92; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,”

entry for 6 February 1794.

24 Ibid., 91-92; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 6 February 1794;

Willyams, Expedition, 34.

405




Sainte-Marie

wifi

BBaie d u Gallon.

|l pONDAS

■ S il l

Le Robert

Dundas’ Attack at la Trinite6 February 1794 - Dundas attacked la Trinite. Bellegarde abandoned the city’s defenses,

set fire to the warehouse district, and fled toward Saint-Pierre. In defiance of

Rochambeau’s orders, Bellegarde and his men did not occupy Gros-Mo rne, and left the

main road to Republique-ville open.

Enlarged

Area

Figure 38. Dundas’ Attack at La Trinite

406




Dundas’ men immediately seized the initiative and poured into Fort Bellegarde,

only to find the works abandoned. In fact, the Chasseur commander and a select group o f

Chasseur officers had retreated to the city’s eastern battery, Fort-de-la-Trinite, nearly an

hour before the British approached Fort Bellegarde. From this position Bellegarde and

his men fired wildly from the battery’s two 24-pounders to slow Commodore Charles

Thompson’s squadron as it maneuvered into la Trinite harbor. The efforts were futile.

Within minutes after capturing Fort Bellegarde, Dundas continued his march toward the

city. Bellegarde and his ten or twelve officers abandoned Fort-de-la-Trinite, and rushed

into the city to try to bum the city’s warehouses before the British arrived.25

The ill-placed fire offered by the Chasseurs at Fort-de-la-Trinite failed to slow the

British naval approach to the city. When Commodore Thompson saw the British colors

raised over both forts, he ordered his ships into the inner harbor o f the city. His sailors

boarded the captured French vessels, while Dundas and his infantry occupied la Trinite.

Once again, Bellegarde managed to escape, but not before leaving the evidence of his

criminal trade in flames. The British soldiers and sailors in la Trinite had little success

salvaging provisions from the blazing warehouses; instead of resting, they spent the night

and most of the next day desperately trying to save la Trinite from complete destruction.

As the result, it was not until the evening of 7 February that Dundas was finally able to

leave the smoldering ruins to begin his march into the interior.26

25 Willyams, Expedit ion, 34; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 91.

26 Ibid. Rochambeau warned Bellegarde against taking any ill-chosen positions,

and was astonished to learn how quickly Bellegarde had “been beaten completely and had

evacuated all of his posts without a fight.” Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 6

407




On the western side o f the island, Lieutenant General Robert Prescott met no

opposition in his landing at Trois Rivieres on 6 February. By late morning, 2,484

infantrymen and his full complement o f artillery and cavalry were assembled on the

beach. With the bulk of his southern invasion force ashore, General Grey landed and

prepared to encircle the Grande Anse peninsula. He ordered Brigadier General Alan

Whyte to lead a battalion of light infantry along the road from Trois Rivieres to le

Diamant, and then continue to les Anses-d’Arlet, where he was to seize the coastal

battery at Pointe Bourgant (modem Pointe Burgos). Whyte and his m en were then to take

the village of Grande Anse, and capture a second battery at Cap Salomon. Grey’s intent

was simple. Not only would Whyte’s march secure the bottom half of the peninsula, but

capturing the batteries at Pointe Bourgant and Cap Salomon would leave the critical

fortress at Ilet a Ramiers unprotected from the south.27

Since Grey expected Whyte’s advance to be much slower than his own, he

ordered the battalion to leave Trois Rivieres at 12:00 p.m., five hours ahead of the main

body. The battalion was slowed temporarily at le D iam ant by a force o f fifity-five

National Guard. Despite the ir initial success, the Republicans retreated tow ard les Anses-

d’Arlet, allowing Whyte’s men to continue their march. Precisely at 5:00 p.m., General

Prescott’s brigades left Trois Rivieres and followed the relatively flat road from to

Riviere-Salee. Prescott encountered no resistance; by early evening, his forces were

February 1794.

27 Ibid., 20-24.

408




Republique-ville

Le SafaHiS]

iCOTT

Cul de*Sac dii/Marin

Generals Whyte and Prescott Attack Across the Grande Anse6 - 7 February 1794 - Brigadier Whyte led a battalion across the Grande Anse peninsula.

After minor skirmishing at le Diamante, Whyte and his men pushed on to les Anses-

d’Arlet. National Guard offered only token resistance and then retreated northward to

Morne Charles-Pied.

Enlarged Area

Figure 39. Generals Whyte and Prescott Attack Across the Grande Anse

409




encamped at Riviere-Salee, having lost only one soldier to the extreme heat.28

Now under attack from two sides, the defensive posture o f the Republican forces

on the island devolved from confusion to near-chaos. Rochambeau moved widely about

the southeastern side of the island on 6 and 7 February attempting to rally his troops, but

everywhere he rode, he found that hundreds o f panic-stricken National Guard had either

surrendered to the British, or were hiding in their homes or in the forests far from their

assigned positions. Since rumors o f his defection to the enemy were spreading quickly,

the majority of the Republican soldiers were relieved to see Rochambeau, but after he

gave them instructions and then departed, many troops went back into hiding, or

reassembled so slowly that they would be little use against the invaders.29

Before leaving Admiral Jervis’ flagship to go ashore at Trois Rivieres, Grey

prepared a packet containing a surrender proclamation and notes to both Rochambeau and

the military commander at le Marin, offering to negotiate a peaceful settlement i f either

would concede defeat. Jervis prepared a small vessel to deliver the message, and with a

white flag o f truce, two o f his lieutenants and his ship’s chaplain set out to deliver the

messages to the authorities le Marin. When the party came within range o f the heavy

guns at le Marin’s garrison, however, they came under fire. The lieutenants were unable

to deliver Grey’s message directly to the authorities in le Marin, but during their return to

the Boyne, they noticed several blacks who appeared to be congregating on the shore near

28 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 88, 93; Willyams, Expedition, 20-24; Daney,


29 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 6 February 1794; Bailleul, Report

{Seconde Partie), 93.

410




Pointe Borgnesse. The blacks scattered when they saw the English boat coming toward

them, and when the officers came ashore, they discovered that the men were assisting a

white man whose leg had been shattered by a cannon ball. Rather than offering to assist

the wounded Republican themselves, the lieutenants simply left him with a copy o f the

surrender proclamation and returned to their ship.30

Another message was sent the next day, but Rochambeau had received the British

terms, apparently sent by the wounded man, while inspecting le Marin the previous day,

and was singularly unimpressed. Grey had hundreds o f placards distributed warning

Martiniquais against futile resistance, and asking the troops to lay down their arms and

pu t themselves under the protec tion o f King George III. Rochambeau had seen the

hackneyed verbiage before. “This placard,” he remarked in his diary, “was copied from

the same proc lamation that Lord Hood addressed to the city o f Toulon, the only

difference being that this time, the British generals were taking possession o f the colony

for George III, and not some imaginary young king.” Refusing to honor the summons

with a reply, Rochambeau instead sent a company of National Guard to le Marin with

strict orders to hold the city at all costs.31

By the afternoon o f 6 February, the British plan was becoming obvious to the

30 Willyams, Expedition, 20-24. Republicans in le Marin later answered the

accusation of firing on a flag o f truce by saying that because the messenger boat was

flying a white flag, they assumed that it was the detested pav ilion blanc o f the Royalists.To the British, this reply was pure nonsense. Following the incident, however, Jervis

made arrangements with Rochambeau that in the future, any truce ship would fly the

French Tricolor from the fore, and the British national colors aft.


411




colony’s professional soldiers; while Rochambeau contended with the deteriorating

situation in the southeastern side of Martinique, Colonel Daucourt rode to les Trois-Ilets

to ensure the loyalty of the Republicans encamped at the base o f Mome Charles-Pied.

Rochambeau depended on this garrison to protect Ilet a Ramiers from the east, but w hen

Daucourt arrived at the fort, he found tha t only a score o f Republicans remained at their

post - the rest had fled to their homes. Daucourt augmented the garrison with

replacements from Republique-ville and then he returned to Fort-de-la-Republique. Later

that evening, a Royalist spy named Bouteiller infiltrated the camp and convinced the

defenders that Rochambeau had concluded a secret treaty with the enemy and was now

advancing against them. If this news was not shocking enough, the Republicans were

further stunned to learn that Rocham beau would attack them in the morning with 1,800

crack British troops. Within minutes, the post at Mome Charles-Pied was abandoned.32

By the morning o f 7 February, the isolated citizens of Republique-ville received

unsubstantiated reports concerning the fall of la Trinite. This news was confirmed by the

National Guard commander at le Lamentin, who, after delivering the sad tidings,

immediately begged to be excused from service because of a sudden illness. The

situation in the capital became even more confused the next morning when Colonel

Daucourt failed to fire the general alarm from Fort-de-la-Republique. Immediately,

members o f the Commune and scores o f National Guard seeking ammunition descended

upon Daucourt’s quarters; he was pulled from his bed by Republique-ville’s mayor, who

32 Ibid.; Bailleul, Report {Seconde Partie), 93. The remains of the fort at Mom e

Charles-Pied can be found today overlooking Anse Mitan.

412




demanded to know why the alarm had not been sounded. “What good would it do?” the

exhausted Daucourt asked. “Commander,” the mayor said forcefully, “I require you in

the name of the law to fire the gun on the field to warn the Citizens o f this city that the

colony is in danger.” Rather than try to explain to the mayor the futility o f his demand,

Daucourt complied and fired the prescribed signal. To everyone’s horror, however, the

normal response was not heard from the battery at Case-Navire - either the artillerymen

there were negligent, or they had abandoned their posts. Under the circumstances,

Daucourt distributed ammunition to the National Guard.33

Most disturbing of all, Rochambeau could not be located. He had not been heard

from in the capital for over twenty-four hours, and various rumors circulated that he was

seen treating with the English at le Marin, had fallen in battle, or was taken prisoner by

the enemy and shot. Coupled with Daucourt’s inertia, this latest “news” inspired the

inhabitants of Republique-ville to take matters into their own hands. A group o f civic

leaders appeared at the door of the General Counsel o f the Commune of Republique-ville.

In Rochambeau’s absence, they agreed that some sort of decisive action was warranted.

Probably unaware that the Representative Assembly had created a colony-wide

Committee o f Public Safety in Saint-Pierre the day before, the General Counsel agreed to

the creation of an “Emergency Committee o f Public Safety” for Republique-ville. This

second committee was formed w ithout hesitation, and soon two “commissaires” were

assigned to army headquarters at Fort-de-la-Republique, primarily to watch Daucourt.

33 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 95. In fact, the battery at Case-Navire did

not have enough gunpowder at the time to fire a sufficiently audible response.

413




The colonel was understandably displeased at the appearance o f these political police, but

with Rochambeau potentially missing in action, he could do little to rebut the mandate o f

this newest government body.34

A short time later, the Emergency Committee sent a delegation by boat across

Republique-ville Bay to inspect the defenses around Ilet a Ramiers and to confirm that

there was a commander o f artillery present. When the inspectors arrived at Mome

Charles-Pied, they learned that Rochambeau remained alive, loyal, and in command, with

stray units of National Guard there. The arrangements appeared satisfactory to the

inspectors, so the delegation returned to Republique-ville. Later that afternoon, a dragoon

delivered an official dispatch from Rochambeau confirming his whereabouts and the loss

of la Trinite, but he assured the city officials that the English had not captured the island

and that he had not been beaten on the field. Though this was good news to the citizens

of Republique-ville, their hope would be short-lived.35

The previous evening, the mayor of les Anses-d’Arlet, M. Mazieres, sent a

dragoon to reconnoiter the British advance to his district. The dragoon returned later that

evening and excitedly informed the m ayor that his town was to be attacked the nex t

morning by three British columns o f nearly 1,000 men each. Mazieres could not be sure

if the report was entirely correct, but with the survival of his district in mind, he

announced the next day that in his capacity as Justice o f the Peace o f his district, he

34 Ibid., 96-97; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 3.

35 Ibid. More important, the delegation from the Emergency Committee of Public

Safety was tasked to verify a rumor that 15,000 muskets may have been cached there.

414




would surrender the batteries at Pointe Bourgant and Cap Salomon after only a token

fight. When the British attacked the next day, at least 100 National Guard marched

directly to Mome Charles-Pied, while another 300 men obeyed the mayor’s directive and

offered the British “honorable” resistance. They managed to slow the enemy advance by

firing cannon and mortar rounds into the advancing British columns, but the invaders’

discipline and numbers steadily overwhelmed the Frenchmen. Under constant British

pressure, the defenders of les Anses-d’Arlet slowly fell back toward the camp at Mome

Charles-Pied, and by the evening of the 7th, Whyte’s men occupied the two batteries and

were preparing to continue toward Ilet a Ramiers. Mayor Mazieres made good on his

pledge - he saved h is town, but at the expense of his honor.36

Though British infantry gained control o f much o f the Grande Anse peninsula on

6-7 February, their ultimate goal remained to capture or destroy the harbor defenses at ilet

a Ramiers. With this fort out of commission, Jervis ships could move his ships freely

into the Baie de Republique-ville, while remaining out o f range o f the guns at both Fort-

de-la-Republique and Fort-de-la-Convention. Grey did not assume that Whyte could

establish positions overlooking the island without resistance from French troops posted at

Mome Charles-Pied. By nightfall on 8 February, the only impediment remaining between

Grey and Ilet a Ramiers was the reinforced National Guard camp at Mome Charles-

Pied.37

36 Ibid., 107, 111. According to Whyte, the force defending les Anses-d’Arlet

was composed of only about 150 mulatto militia. Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO,

CO, 318.14, 33.

37 Willyams, Expedition, 26.

415




The French garrison at Mome Charles-Pied numbered less than 200 men, but

Grey cautiously waited until well past midnight to launch his attack. After the majority of

the Frenchmen were asleep, British artillerymen quietly dragged two howitzers to the top

of Mome Charles-Pied and opened fire. The Republicans had no time to organize a

defense before the British 70th Foot charged and drove them from the camp.38

On the eastern side of Martinique, General Dundas’ brigade also was making

rapid progress. After garrisoning the smouldering ruins of la Trinite, he set out on the

evening o f 7 February for Gros-Mome. Dundas knew the danger that lay ahead of him;

he already was pursuing several groups o f Republicans who were retreating southwest

toward Gros-Mome, and Bellegarde and his Chasseurs certainly would be well-

entrenched in the fortified camp, fully prepared to stop his advance toward Republique-

ville. Expecting the worst, Dundas arranged to reach the fortified village late in the

evening, and then delay his attack until after midnight. Captain Octavius’ company and

the National Guard from le Robert repeatedly tried to block the enemy advance, but each

time they were driven deeper into the mountain forests. When the British arrived at Gros-

Mome just after midnight, they were delighted to find that Bellegarde had made no effort

whatsoever to occupy the extensive works. Had the 1st Chasseur Battalion chosen to

make a stand, the entrenchments would have drastically mitigated the four-to-one

advantage that Dundas had over Bellegarde’s men. Instead, Bellegarde retreated with the

38 Ibid.

416




majority o f his battalion to Saint-Pierre.39

When Rochambeau learned what Bellegarde had done, he was furious. His

instructions to Bellegarde had been clear - if he could not hold la Trinite, he was to retire

along the road to Gros-M ome to delay the British approach toward the capital. Instead,

Bellegarde left the road to Republique-ville completely open by circumventing Gros-

Morne altogether and taking the northern toward Saint-Pierre. In a scathing entry in his

journal, Rochambeau wrote that Bellegarde’s “carelessness” showed jus t how little he

deserved his good reputation. Not only had he speeded the advance o f the enemy by

seven or eight days, he had also made a terrible example for the National Guard. “I

believe this maneuver rid iculous,” Rochambeau wrote, “and the result o f correspondence

between Bellegarde, Pelauque, and the mulattoes, with the English and the colony’s

emigres. I believe that they [Bellegarde and Pelauque] received money for this [treason],

and their conduct at the time of the embargo is a certain indication, since it would have

been to the ir future advantage.”40

After doing little to prevent Dundas’ brigade from advancing inland from la

Trinite, Bellegarde and Pelauque slipped into Saint-Pierre on the afternoon of the 7th with

the remnants o f their battalion. Since rumors had already spread throughout the colony

that Bellegarde was a traitor, the citizens of Saint-Pierre were understandably shocked

when he and his men entered the city. When questioned, Bellegarde and his “intimate

39 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 7 February 1794; Willyams,

Expedition, 35; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 229.

40 Ibid.

417




friend” Pelauque maintained that it was Rochambeau who was the traitor - he had not

given the order to release Bellegarde’s two other companies from Republique-ville. The

two men also claimed that Rochambeau would soon sell out the colony to the British!

The crowd remained skeptical. Pelauque continued to harangue the citizens o f Saint-

Pierre for another thirty minutes, but seeing that he was having little impact, he demanded

to make his case before the new Committee o f Public Safety o f Martinique.41

Once he met the committee members, Pelauque described in great detail the fall o f

la Trinite, and how Bellegarde had performed his duties admirably during an intense

battle that lasted more than three hours. To jus tify their coming to Saint-Pierre, Pelauque

explained that a soldier informed Bellegarde early on the morning o f 6 February that

British soldiers had taken a battery near the city. Bellegarde responded by leaving la

Trinite and moving as quickly as possible to attack the enemy from the rear. The attack

was a failure, Pelauque lamented, and the outnumbered Chasseurs came to Saint-Pierre in

search of reinforcements so that they could undertake a counteroffensive against the

enemy. Undoubtedly, Pelauque’s pleas were compelling, but when he finished, the

Committee asked that he excuse himself so that they could deliberate the issue in

private.42

In fact, the committee members only feigned an interest in this latest installation

41 Bailleul , Report (Seconde Partie), 100-101. In fact, Bellegarde’s adjutant,

Commandant Naverres entered Saint-Pierre ahead o f his commander, and attempted to pave the way for Bellegarde’s arrival. During a loud argument with some of the city’s

National Guard, Major Naverres faithfully proclaimed Bellegarde’s loyalty, bravery and

military prowess.

42 Ibid.

418




in the Chasseur saga. Knowing the questionable history o f the 1st Chasseur Battalion, the

Committee appeared to believe that Bellegarde and his men were, or were soon to

becom e traitors. The request by Pelauque for re inforcements, they reasoned, was nothing

more than a ploy to strip Saint-Pierre o f its own troops so that it might fall more easily

into the hands o f the enemy. As the result o f his failed meeting, a disbelieving Pelauque

begged the group to allow him to consult w ith Bellegarde and then return the next

morning to give them a more definitive account of the previous days’ events. The

Committee agreed, but the next day, none in Saint-Pierre would have time to listen to

Pelauque’s fabrications.43

While the British army enjoyed virtually uncontested success on land, Admiral

Jervis attempted to force the surrender o f le Marin. Once all six of his prefabricated gun

boats were assembled and launched, the English squadron bombed le Marin for several

hours. The principal fort in le Marin, Fort Saint-Etienne, was heavily damaged in the

process, but the National Guard who occupied positions around le Marin offered such

stout resistance that the British were unable to land troops. In addition, French musket

fire from the city was so intense that officers of the fleet debated whether all of the

Republican defenders were waiting for them at le Marin.44

Rochambeau finally returned to Republique-ville late in the evening on 7

February, bringing with him every mem ber o f the National Guard that he could find.

Officials in the capital were reassured by his return, but as he passed through le Lamentin,

43 Ibid.


419




Rochambeau had seen yet another British squadron heading north past the Baie du

Republique-ville. Although he immediately realized that this was another attack force

destined for Saint-Pierre, he appeared before the Emergency Committee o f Public Safety

in Republique-ville to reassure them and make a full report on all that had transpired

during the previous two days. The committee members, however, could not be certain

that what Rochambeau told them was the truth. In their eyes, he had done nothing, at

least operationally, to turn the course o f the English invasion in favor o f the French.45

Rocham beau’s calm demeanor and his humorous rebuttals against accusations

that he had joined the British went a long way to sooth the uneasy civic leaders. He

assured the group that, owing to his personal reconnaissance o f the island, he knew that

reports of the size o f the invading English force were greatly exaggerated. Furthermore,

he also knew the names o f the British generals and their principle officers. The task that

lay ahead, he asserted, was to organize the remaining Republican units into a cohesive

force capable of halting the various English incursions on the island. With the colonies’

chief authority once again in the capital, the Emergency Committee o f Public Safety

ceased its functions, but not before former members of the Representative Assembly

gathered the island’s archives and moved them to the protection o f Fort-de-la-

Convention.46

In two days, General Grey's army had progressed far beyond establishing a

foothold on Martinique. Dundas occupied the most important port in the east and was

45 Ibid., 102-103.

46 Ibid.; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 7 February 1794.

420




Chapter XIV

“A Phalanx that Nothing Can Withstand”:

8 - 12 February 1794

On the morning o f 8 February, the senior Republican officer commanding the

southern part of the island, Comm andant Soudon-Longbois, dispatched a letter from his

headquarters at Mome Regale begging the commander at le Marin to send him

reinforcements. If he did not receive help immediately, Soudon warned, he would be

forced to surrender Mome Regale to the enemy. The British were nowhere near Mome

Regale, but the previous day panicked National Guard threatened Soudon so effectively

that he was forced to leave his station to seek refuge at his plantation near Riviere-Salee.

When Rochambeau discovered what had happened, he was outraged, and ordered that

Soudon resume; when he returned, the Mome Regale entrenchments were empty. Now

alone and completely unaware o f the enemy situation, he ordered two local militiaman to

contact the closest towns, le Vauclin and le Marin; Republicans in both towns responded

immediately and marched to Mome Regale, burning the plantations o f suspected

Royalists along the way.1


for 6 February, 1794; Chapter title borrowed from Willyams, Expedition, 24.

422




When the National Guard from le Marin arrived at Mome Regale that night, they

were surprised to find that their comrades from le Vauclin had continued on to

Republique-ville - Soudon was preparing to defend Mome Regale with only a handful of

local mulattoes. The enemy remained far from Mome Regale, but a besieged le Marin

had sent away at least half of its defending force. It was fortunate for the French that at

the same time, Jervis broke off his attack of le Marin and moved elsewhere.2

Thus far, the British invasion had proceeded exactly as Grey had planned. The

bewildered Republicans had no idea where to focus the ir efforts, and Grey was taking full

advantage o f the confusion. With la Trinite and Gros-Mome under Dundas’ control, and

Prescott preparing to attack ilet a Ramiers from land, Grey decided that the time was right

to initiate his third attack. On the morning of 8 February, the same thirty-ship squadron

that Rochambeau saw the previous evening attempted to land a third brigade commanded

by Colonel Sir Charles Gordon at Case-Navire; Republican resistance in the tow n was

much better organized than the British expected. Regular artillerymen expertly manned

the harbor battery, and a company of Chasseurs commanded by Captain Rene occupied

reinforced positions on the beach. As the enemy squadron approached the town,

Republican artillery pounded the British transport ships, the Chasseurs helped thwart the

British landing with repeated musket volleys that stmck Gordon’s men as they attempted

to exit their landing boats. The British warships redoubled their fire while ever-

increasing numbers of infantry attempted to reach the shore, but each subsequent attempt

was stopped with disastrous consequences. Indeed, the Republicans’ determination to

2 Ibid., 101; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 6 February, 1794.

423




prevent the British from landing at Case-Navire was so resolute that Rochambeau, who

arrived shortly after Gordon began his attack, wrote in his diary that he was truly amazed

to see such a small group of men holding off a large English force. After nearly an hour,

a frustrated Colonel Gordon decided to launch his attack elsewhere.3

Gordon chose Case-Pilote, only a few m iles north of Case-Navire, as his new

landing point. For ten hours, Captain Josias Rogers’ frigate, the Quebec (32), and a

second man-o-war, pounded the village battery, but with only thirty cannon rounds

available, the artillerymen in Case-Pilote could do little in retaliation. Meanwhile, other

English ships discovered a nearby landing spot that was not effectively covered by the

French battery at nearby Fond Capot. While enemy naval artillery bombarded this

position, Gordon landed his troops. Again Captain R ene’s Chasseurs resisted the landing

from positions on the beach and the surrounding bluffs. Faced with being overrun by the

hundreds o f men that Gordon landed, however, Rene eventually ordered his Chasseurs to

retreat to redoubts in the hills above the village.4

By nightfall, Gordon’s entire brigade occupied Case-Pilote. The naval squadron

continued to pummel the surrounding French batteries, negating an infantry attack against

them. Meanwhile, Gordon realized the dangerous possibility that he and his men might

become caught between French reinforcements moving south from Saint-Pierre and north

3 Willyams, Expedition , 30; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 104; Rochambeau,“Journal du siege,” entry for 8 February 1794; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO,

CO, 318.14, 33; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 229. Case-Navire was the site of a

successful British invasion in 1762.

4 Ibid.

424




Gordon’s Landing

—

Looking across Case-Navire to Sainte-Catherine and

Fort-De-France (Republique-ville)

Gordon’s first landing attempt failed here.

Case-PiloteGordon and his brigade landed here successfully, but

quickly abandoned the town.

Figure 40. Gordon’s Landing

425




Saint-Pierre

Le Carbet

Republique-ville

Gordon Attacks at Case Navire8-9 February 1794 - A British squadron first attacked at Case-Navire, but was repulsed by

Republican regular artillerymen and Captain Ren e’s Chasseur company. The squadron

then succeeded in landing Colonel Charles Gordon’s brigade at Case-Pilote. Gordon immediately moved his men deep inland, surprising and capturing scores of National Guard

in hilltop redoubts. In Saint-Pierre , National Guard repositioned to defend the city.

Enlarged Are i

Figure 41. Gordon Attacks at Case Navire

426




from Republique-ville. So, Gordon abandoned Case-Pilote and marched inland from the

village into the relative safety of the Pitons du Carbet. For hours the British infantrymen

groped through the darkness along wiry jungle trails until his battalions were able to

attack the French redoubts above Case-Pilote from the rear. When the British

commenced their assault, Rene’s Chasseurs were caught completely by surprise. He and

his men managed to escape, but scores o f National Guardsmen were taken prisoner; by

daybreak on the 9th, Gordon had seized several strategically important vantage points.

With the British now behind them, the beleaguered French defenders in the batteries

surrounding Case-Navire and Case-Pilote realized they had little chance of holding the

positions. By late morning, the ir works were empty.5

When they heard the opening shots at Case-Navire, alarmed city officials in Saint-

Pierre ordered that defensive positions be occupied throughout the municipality. On the

morning o f 8 February, sailors on armed vessels in the harbor manned their guns, while

many o f their comrades volunteered to serve in batteries on shore. The garrison

commander o f Saint-Pierre, Lieutenant Colonel Mollerat, assembled his National Guard

and divided them into three battalions; the first battalion took a position to the south at le

Carbet; the second joined forces with Edouard Meunier’s Chasseurs in the north at le

5 Ibid.; Bailleul, Report (,Seconde Partie), 104; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,”

entry for 8 February 1794; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du

Siege,” 3; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33; Daney, Histoire de la

Martinique , 229. The presence of the British squadron off of Case-Pilote already prevented any communication by sea between Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville. With

the capture of the fortified positions above the village, Gordon effectively blocked any

communication by land. More important, Gordon’s brigade established such a strong

foothold inland that Grey could move against Republique-ville from the south (Prescott),

from the east (Dundas) and from the northwest (Gordon).

427




Precheur, and the third blocked the road leading southwest from Mome Rouge.

Bellegarde remained with his Chasseurs in Saint-Pierre. When they made no attempt to

resist the British landings at Case-Pilote, the Committee of Public Safety ceased all

communication with the 1st Chasseur Battalion; rather than include them as part o f the

city’s defense, the Committee ordered them to leave Saint-Pierre and to report to General

Rochambeau at Republique-ville. At least there, the Committee reasoned, Bellegarde’s

men might be of some use in the forts. Bellegarde ignored the order, while his friend

Pelauque orchestrated fresh problems for the Committee.6

Earlier that morning, Pelauque offered to recapture la Trinite if Bellegarde were

sent reinforcements, but he was immediately rebuffed by the Committee o f Public Safety.

La Trinite, the members retorted, was nothing but ruins while Saint-Pierre, Case-Navire

and Republique-ville were in the greatest danger. Pelauque would not be dismissed so

easily. He claimed that Bellegarde had too few men to break through the British lines

near Case-Pilote, and asked permission to raise 400 irregular troops in the Saint-Pierre

area. With this augmentation, he reasoned, Bellegarde could move east through the

Pitons du Carbet and then south to secure the critical road network around le Lamentin.

While the Committee debated the issue, Pelauque slipped away from the deliberations,

and within a few hours had unilaterally enlisted the support of several hundred sailors in

the city. As soon as the Committee learned what had happened, they ordered every law

enforcement body in Saint-Pierre to stop him, but they were too late; Pelauque,

Bellegarde, and their new-found reinforcements had escaped. Once out of the reach o f

6 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 99, 105.

428




the authorities at Saint-Pierre, Bellegarde and his Chasseurs dismounted their horses and

marched east with their new recruits into the Pitons du Carbet and then south toward

Republique-ville7

At Mome Regale, Commandant Soudon-Longbois found that though the National

Guard companies from le Marin and le Vauclin had abandoned him, nearly 300 other

citizens and slaves had responded to his call for help. Unfortunately, many of these men

were armed with only farm implements. Such well-intended support brought little hope

to the demoralized Soudon, but he did welcome the volunteers with a rousing speech,

inviting them to join him and fight to the death. Soudon, however, had no intention of

fighting the British. After ordering his remaining lieutenants to defend the farm hands in

Mom e-Regale’s trenches, he excused himself to write a report to Rochambeau. When he

emerged a short time later, instead of allowing a dragoon to deliver the message to

Rochambeau, he announced that for personal reasons, he would deliver the report

himself, after first stopping to check his plantation near Riviere-Salee. Later, the

volunteers learned that Soudon traveled to Riviere-Salee not to inspect his estate, but to

offer his services to the English commander who had established his headquarters there.8

The English were gratified by the number o f defections among Martinique’s

defenders; hundreds of reformed counterrevolutionaries flocked to various enemy camps,

volunteering themselves as guides, or offering their services. The treasonous Soudon

proved an especially willing too l of the invaders. On 9 February, he wrote a detailed

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 106.

429




letter to his brother-in-law, Colonel Rivecourt, describing many particulars of ongoing

British operations on the island, and emphasizing the uselessness of further resistance. “It

is plain for all to see,” he wrote, “that it is impossible for you to receive forces from

France. Look at how your navy is destroyed and how your ports are blockaded!”9

Because Soudon knew that Rivecourt would pass the contents of his letter to the

Rochambeau, he also proposed that i f the general would surrender the island, he would

immediately find himsel f safe aboard a frigate that the British had already made available

to him and his associates. But, Soudon added, for Rochambeau to receive any favorable

treatment from the British, he must not wait until the works had been breached. Like most

of the military hierarchy on Martinique, Soudon was well-apprized o f the animosity

between Rochambeau and his former secretary, Pelauque. With a final, inflammatory

twist, he closed his message by warning that if Rochambeau failed to comply with the

British commander’s instructions, Grey would have no alternative but to open direct

negotiations for the surrender of the island with Pelauque. After all, Soudon asserted

provocatively, “it was Pelauque who [was] probably best-suited to handle such delicate

negotiations with the British.”10

When word reached the men at Mome Regale that their commander was a traitor,

many returned to their plantations, while the few who remained elected a new leader to

replace Soudon. The mens’ choice was Captain Compere, the distinguished former

9 Ibid., 110

10 Ibid.; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 9 February 1794. Rivecourt

not only was Rochambeau’s aide-de-camp, but also among his closest friends.

430




commander o f Pointe Borgnesse, who immediately marched toward Republique-ville to

jo in Rochambeau. The captain did not have everyone’s support however. When

Compere made a final call for volunteers among the citizens of le Vauclin, few answered.

Worse, a National Guard detachment from le Saint-Esprit deserted him and returned to

their own municipality, where they were forced to surrender their weapons to the British

soldiers who had recently occupied the village.11

To the south, Admiral Jervis abandoned his attack against le Marin, and on the

morning o f 9 February, rendezvoused with Brigadier Whyte’s troops at Grande Anse.

After landing provisions and heavy artillery on the village beach, two hundred sailors,

armed only with pikes and pistols, joined Whyte’s infantry battalion to move north to

occupy Momet Matherine, a dominant height on Pointe Blanche no more than 400 yards

from Ilet a Ramiers. Though the distance was relatively short, the British quickly

discovered that the mountain road leading north from Grande Anse to Pointe Blanche was

more difficult than anyone had imagined. Rainfall the night before had turned the steep

dirt road into a quagmire, and the artillerymen who were attempting to drag heavy siege

cannon over five miles of nearly-impossible terrain were unable to keep up with the light

infantry. When the artillerymen finally arrived at Mom et Matherine the next day,

however, they discovered that Whyte’s men not only occupied the strategic vantage point,

but had already dug and reinforced the siege gun positions.12

11 Ibid., 108.

12 Ibid., I l l ; Willyams, Expedition, 27-30; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794.

PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.

431




Republique

S a i n t s

Cap Salomon

Lea Ansea d Arlete

Pointe

Culde<Sae du/Marin

ABritish Maneuvers Against Ilet a Ramiers

8 - 1 1 February 1794 - Admiral Jervis ended his attack at le Marin to deliver heavy guns

and supplies to Brigadier Whyte at Grande Anse. During the night of 8 - 9 February,

Prescott’s troops attacked the Republicans in the works at Morne C harles-Pied and

overwhelmed them. Whyte and his men began their attack on Ilet a Ramiers on 9

February. The fortress fell on the 11th.

Enlarged Area

Figure 42. British Maneuvers Against Ilet a Ramiers

432




y\

Ilet a Ramiers

Pigeon Island, Martinique

The route to Ilet si Ramiers from Grande Anse

Mornet-Matherine (left) & Ilet a Ramiers

Figure 43. Ilet a Ramiers

433


C o u r t e s y

N a t i o n a l M a r i t i m e

M u s e u m



Inside Ilet a Ramiers, meanwhile, the French prepared for the impending battle.

Nearly thirty regular artillerymen manned the guns, while another sixty volunteers cached

gunpowder in rock openings on the opposite side the island. Though it was clear that the

British intended to initiate their attack from Momet Matherine, the defenders at Ilet a

Ramiers had to conserve their ammunition in anticipation of an attack from the sea. As

the result, the Republicans fired at the British land forces only occasionally during the day

and night of the 9th to dismpt their entrenching operations and harass them.13

By midday on 9 February, Bellegarde, Pelauque and a handful of Chasseur

officers walked down from the Pitons du Carbet into Republique-ville, bringing with

them soldiers and sailors who continued to trickle into the capital city throughout the

evening. Rather than arrest Bellegarde and Pelauque, Rochambeau welcomed them.

Citizens in the capital, disgusted by the 1st Chasseur Battalion’s poor performance at la

Trinite, were even more surprised when Rochambeau loaned Bellegarde one of his

personal mounts, and asked him to choose whatever mission he thought he could best

support. Bellegarde’s response was to establish an encampment north o f Republique-

ville at the Tiberge plantation on the southern end o f the Surirey Heights. From here,

Bellegarde told the general, he and his Chasseurs could conduct a series of attacks that

would a least slow down, i f not halt, General Dundas’ advance from the west.14

While it appeared to the Republicans that the falling out between Rochambeau

and Bellegarde had been nothing more than a “bizarre game,” Rochambeau, at least, was

13 Ibid., 108; Willyams, Expedition, 27-30.


434




Saint-Pierre

Le Carbet

DUNOAS

Cuc-Naii t

Republique-ville

Bellegarde’s March on Republique-ville

9 February 1794 - After leaving Saint-Pierre with his recruits, Bellegarde arrived at Republique-ville. Rochamb eau ordered the Chasseurs to occupy the Surirey Heights to

block Dunda s’ advance on the capitol.

Enlarged Are

Figure 44. Bel legarde’s March on Republique-ville

435




concerned with more pressing matters.15 Dundas had left Gros-Mome early that morning

and was steadily closing in on Republique-ville; it was imperative that he be delayed for

as long as possible. Rochambeau knew that he could not rely on Bellegarde and his

motley collection of soldiers, but they were the only forces available to block the British

advance. With no other option, Rochambeau agreed with Bellegarde that the most

effective course o f action was for the Chasseurs to block the enemy west o f the Surirey

Heights. Perhaps as the result of accurate intelligence, or perhaps by good fortune,

Dundas did not reach Surirey on the 9th. At noon, the British halted short of Surirey at

Mome le Brun, and occupied the abandoned defensive works known as “Fort Maltide.”

From the British perspective, the day’s march was a complete success. Except for minor

skirmishing, they had met no serious resistance; now, from their new positions, they

could clearly see Republique-ville and its defenses.16

Rochambeau and his staff received only bad news throughout the afternoon and

evening of 9 February. The British had overrun the camp at Mom e Charles-Pied, in

itself, a disaster, and Captain Rene’s troops had abandoned the regular artillerymen in the

batteries around Case-Pilote and Case-Navire. Subsequent reports proved that Rene’s

retreat had resulted in desertions throughout Republique-ville’s western defenses;

artillerymen in every position from Case-Pilote to the Sainte-Catherine works had spiked

their guns and evacuated their posts. Rochambeau was dismayed that the captain who

15 Ibid., 107

16 Ibid.; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 9 February 1794; Willyams,

Expedition, 35.

436




had displayed so much promise the day before had been beaten so easily. According to

the Emergency Committee of Public Safety in Republique-ville, Rene and his m en were

told that their leaders had betrayed them to the enemy - information that in all likelihood

was propaganda circulated by B ritish sym pathizers.17

On the morning o f 10 February, a group of Republique-ville’s more radical former

Assemblymen advised Rochambeau that since communications from the Committee o f

Public Safety in Saint-Pierre were being intercepted by the British, he should choose from

among them a group to serve as a permanent Com mittee o f Public Safety for the capital

city. Whatever the Assemblym en’s motives, Rochambeau realized that a second

Committee of Public Safety could be useful as long as they supported him so he carefully

selected the members o f the small, but powerful group. To represent the mulattoes, he

selected Jean Isaac, a man whom he knew well and trusted. The city was represented by a

notable in the Commune of Republique-ville, M. Bailleul. The remaining four members,

M. Baboul, M. Laniboire, M. Lamaury, and M. G randmaison were selected based upon

their previous service in the Representative Assembly.18

The members o f the new Committee suspected that Rochambeau’s ulterior motive

was simply to leave them to oversee political affairs in the city while he managed the


18 It was these men who would later sign Bailleul’s 100-page chronicle of

Rochambeau’s time on Martinique, referred to throughout these chapters as “Bailleul,

Report .” After the fall of Martinique, Bailleul was repatriated to France by the British

and delivered the work to the Committee of Public Safety in Paris. Maxim ilien

Robespierre signed as having read the report on 27 July 1794, the very day o f his fall

from power.

437




colony’s defense. The last thing that Rochambeau wanted was untrustworthy radical

politicians influencing, and possibly compromising, his military operations.

Rochambeau’s reprieve from political oversight, however, was short-lived. As soon as

Republique-ville’s Committee o f Public Safety was officially inaugurated, M.

Grandmaison declared that one of their principal responsibilities was to be visible among

the troops. Rochambeau had no disagreement with that point, but when Grandmaison

announced that at least two members of the Committee would accompany him as

“Representatives o f the People,” he realized that now, just as in France, his every order

would be scrutinized by the Martiniquais equivalent o f the Representatives on Mission.

Nevertheless, he made the best of the situation. He chose Jean Isaac and Lamaury as his

new associates, and set out to find Captain Rene. Within hours, Rene and his men had

been severely reprimanded by Rochambeau and the Representatives, and were sent back

to their assigned positions.19

Rochambeau and his two companions left Republique-ville with an escort of

dragoons and volunteers under the command o f Commandant Jean Ducassou, an officer

who was known not only for his bloodthirstiness, but also for his ability to inspire

soldiers. Though the composition of Ducassou’s unit included 400 men and one field

piece, his infectious desire to kill British troops and Royalists considerably influenced his

troops. The men begged for an opportunity to attack the enemy, but Rochambeau had a


for 10 February 1794. In his journal, Rochambeau claimed that the creation of the new

Committee o f Public Safety was actually intended to restore the flagging morale of

citizens in Republique-ville.

438




better idea. Instead of sending the hasti ly-ra ised volunteers directly against the British

professionals, he arranged for Ducassou to set up an ambush astride Gordon’s most likely

route of advance, on the trail from Mome Bois d’Inde to Fond Lahaye. Once Ducassou’s

force was in position, Rochambeau sent one o f his regular artillerymen, Mestre

d’Artillerie Le Peltier, to take charge o f the guns at the nearby Sainte-Catherine.20

With the trap set, Rochambeau and his dragoons drew their swords and moved

north toward Bois-Ville (now Terreville) to determine the strength of the enemy advance

columns. To his surprise, the British were much closer than he thought. Within a ha lf

hour, he inadvertently stumbled right into the midst o f Gordon’s main colum n, turning

their reconnaissance into a fighting withdrawal. The dragoons, who believed that

Rochambeau was deliberately sacrificing them to the enemy, imm ediately fled the scene,

leaving their general to fend for himself. He called after his men to take one o f the

mountain trails back toward Sainte-Catherine, but the terrified dragoons chose to follow

the road directly toward Case-Navire. The minute they reached the coast road, the

dragoons were fired upon by a British corvette so close to the shore that the sailors on

board were able to hit them with volleys of musket fire .21

Fortunately, Rochambeau’s hapless bodyguards were saved by the guns at the

Sainte-Catherine batteries. Le Peltier and his artillerymen drove the enemy ship away,

bu t it soon returned jo ined by three larger British warships. Rochambeau, meanwhile,

was able to fight his way out o f the crowd o f Redcoats surrounding him at Bois-Ville and

20 Ibid., 114; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege ,” entry for 10 February 1794.

21 Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 5.

439




Saint-Pierre

Le Carbet

G O R D O N

Republique-ville

Rochambeau and Doucassou Ambush Colonel Gordon10 February 1794 - Rochambeau left Republique-ville to reconnoiter enemy

positions above Case-Navire. Gordo n’s troops repulsed Rocham beau’s

reconnaissance party, but marched directly into Doucassou’s ambush. A British

corvette fired on the retreating reconnaissance party, but was temporarily driven

away by French a rtillerymen in the Sainte-Catherine works.

Enlarged A r s>=

Figure 45. Rochambeau and Doucassou Ambush Colonel Gordon

440

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited withou t permission.



make his ow n way to Sainte-Catherine, where he immediately regained control of his

dragoons and took charge o f the coastal battery. From the outset o f the fight,

Rochambeau and Le Peltier were at a tremendous disadvantage; the previous occupants of

Sainte-Catherine had spiked all but two o f the heavy cannons in the batteries. The

British, on the other hand, brought the guns o f all four warships to bear on the position.

The mismatch in firepower was obvious to both sides, but unfortunately for the British,

the captains tried too hard to press their advantage. While attempting to land troops, most

of the British vessels maneuvered so close-in against the Republican works, they were

unable to elevate their cannons high enough to fire on the French. Similarly, Le Peltier

could not depress his two guns low enough to return fire.22

Though tempted to march to the fight at Case-Navire, Ducassou and his

volunteers remained in their ambush in the forest above Case-Navire. They did not have

to wait long, Gordon heard the gunfire at Sainte-Catherine and marched from their

position in the Pitons du Carbet to assis t his countrymen. His infantry marched in two

columns along the route where Ducassou was waiting, but the trap was compromised. As

the British neared the ambush, a group of undisciplined Republicans prematurely sounded

the alarm. With no other road leading to Sainte-Catherine, Gordon had to advance or

retreat. For more than an hour, his men attempted to overrun the Republican positions;

Ducassou and his volunteers held the British regulars at bay, and eventually forced them

22 Ibid.; Bailleul , Report (Seconde Partie), 114; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,’

entry for 10 February 1794. The fight around the Sainte-Catherine battery lasted nearly

four hours.

441




to retreat.23

Having beaten Gordon, Ducassou’s troops marched to Sainte-Catherine, where

they soon became part o f an unusual battle. Neither side could employ their artillery, so

Republican artillerymen and British sailors resorted to shooting at each other with their

muskets. Though French resistance at Sainte-Catherine was fierce, artillerymen firing

from the batteries could not stop the British from launching landing boats from the

unengaged sides of their ships. Ducassou immediately ordered his troops to the beach

beneath the battery, and for the next two hours regular musket volleys by the volunteers

prevented Royal Marines from occupying the landing boats. Rochambeau finally ended

the stalemate. Riding north with his bodyguard in search of reinforcements, he returned

with three field pieces, abandoned in a nearby battery. Once the guns were positioned on

the beach, Rochambeau ordered his artillerymen to load cannister - with that first shot,

the fight immediately turned in favor of the French. The British marines had no defense

against the guns, so they reembarked and the frustrated British turned seaward.24

By any measure, the engagement at Sainte-Catherine was an insp iring success for

the French. During their return to Republique-ville, however, Rochambeau candidly

confided to the two Representatives tha t regardless of the valor and the dispositions o f the

Republican defenders, the fall o f the colony was inevitable unless France break the

23 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 114; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entryfor 10 February 1794.

24 Ibid.; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 10 February 1794. The fight

around the Sainte-Catherine battery lasted nearly four hours. Remarkably, only one

Republican was killed.

442




Saint-Pierre

Le Carbet

GORDON

ROC HAM Bl DOUCA^C

Case-Navire

Republique-ville

The Land/Sea Skirmish at Case-Navire10 February 1794 - After defeating Gor don’s troops in an ambush near Bois-

Ville, Doucassou and his volunteers marched to assist Republican artillerymen

at Sainte-Catherine. The Republicans drove away the attacking British

squadron after Rochambeau employed light artillery from the beach.

Enlarged Are i

Figure 46. The Land/Sea Skirmish at Case-Navire

443




British blockade and send reinforcements. Unfortunately for the French, salvation

appeared increasingly unlikely. Isaac and Lamaury dutifully reported Rochambeau’s

comments to the Committee of Public Safety in Republique-ville; despite their

indignation, the committee members were realistic about the situation. Barring one or

two notable exceptions, recent events called into question the reliability of the Chasseurs

and the National Guard. Thus, the committee members agreed that Rochambeau had not

spoken treasonously, but they were alarmed by his defeatist tone. At what point, they

wondered, would he mention surrender?25

When Rochambeau appeared at the Hotel de Ville the next morning, the

Committee received their answer - Rochambeau would not give up. If French

reinforcements truly were en route, he explained, the British might be beaten. The key,

he said, was to hold Republique-ville for as long as possible. The shortage o f available

forces made it impossible to mount any large-scale counterattack, but he certainly could

delay the British by establishing a tight defensive perimeter around the capital city. He

reminded the Committee that remnants o f his battalions still held heavily-defended

outposts around Republique-ville. If these units conducted slow, fighting withdrawals

25 Unlike some members of the Committee o f Public Safety in Republique-ville,

Revolutionary dogma did not cloud Rochambeau’s military judgement - he held no

delusions concerning the condition o f the island’s defenders. “The enemy’s initial

success had taken a severe toll on the spirits o f the troops,” he wrote in his journal, “now

they were coming to realize their weakness.” The Committee of Public Safety in the

capital, was not prepared to admit the possibility of defeat. As a result of Rocham beau’ssober appraisals, they took steps to gain control of military affairs themselves. Perhaps

believing that they could control the general by controlling the army’s dwindling supplies,

the body ruled that the Orderer of military stores in the capital would release nothing

unless the requisition was approved by a member the Committee. Rochambeau, “Journal

du siege,” entry for 11 February 1794; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 114, 118.

444




toward Fort-de-la-Convention, then every day that the capital held might bring a miracle.

On 11 February, however, only disaster befell the defenders o f Republique-ville,

beginning with news of Bellegarde and his Chasseurs being routed at M om e le Brun.26

Bellegarde established a camp on Surirey, then he led his new recruits to attack

Dundas at nearby Maltide during the night o f 10-11 February. Cleverly, the men

advanced through the adjacent sugar cane fields to surprise the British outposts, but when

they reached their encampment, they discovered that the majority o f the enemy regiment

was not there. A rare opportunity for pillage now presented itself; Bellegarde’s crew

murdered the British sentries and began looting the supply tents. Their luck suddenly ran

out, and they were surprised by the return o f a British column. A furious, twenty-minute

skirmish followed, but when the British infantrymen fixed bayonets and charged, the

“Chasseurs” melted into the jungle, leaving scores o f abandoned weapons in the British

camp. Dundas ordered a pursuit. Throughout the night his troops clashed with the

retreating French troops as they tried to make their way back to Republique-ville. By

5:00 a.m. the next morning, British advance elements crossed the Riviere Monsieur and

established positions at Poste Calon, a hilltop on the Surirey heights that directly

overlooked F ort-de-la-Convention.27

While this latest failure threatened the Republican situation, it paled in

comparison to the day’s greatest tragedy, the loss of Ilet a Ramiers. The small island

26 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 116-117.

27 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 11 February 1794; Anonymous

(aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 5, 6; Daney, Histoire de la

Martinique, 232.

445




I g D U N D r i S

Republique-ville

Bellegarde’s Failed Attack at Morne le Brun1 0 - 1 1 February 1794 - Bellegarde made an ill-fated attack against Dundas’ supposedly

empty camp at “Fort Maltide” on Morne le Brun. The 1st Chasseur Batta lion was surprised,

repulsed and pursued. Dundas subsequently gained a foothold on the Surirey Heights.

Enlarged Area

Figure 47. Bellegarde’s Failed Attack at Mome le Brun

446




fortress at the m outh o f the Baie du Republique-ville constituted the first line o f defense

of Republique-ville, and remained a central element in his overall defensive strategy for

Martinique. Based upon long-held assumptions that the main effort of any invasion of

Martinique would be against the capital by sea, the heavy guns at Ilet a Ramiers, Fort-de-

la-Republique, and Fort-de-la-Convention were positioned in such a way that their

interlocking fires could prevent an enemy’s entrance into the bay. Hence, during the

preceding months Rochambeau invested the enorm ous sum of 600 ,000 livres to provision

the garrison at the island. Now, it appeared, the money was well spent. The Republicans

in Ilet a Ramiers severely hampered the construction o f British artillery positions to their

rear, and stopped several attempts by enemy infantrymen to maneuver within musket

range o f the island.28

Despite the bombardment from Ilet a Ramiers, the British completed their own

batteries on Mom et Matherine on the evening of 10 February. For hours , British and

French fired mortar shells at each other’s works, but few rounds from either side did any

serious damage. In fact, had Whyte continued the siege alone, the Republicans in ilet a

Ramiers might have held out. However, while British land forces continued to draw the

attention of the French toward M omet Matherine, Jervis sent a contingent of Royal

Marines by sea to assault the northern side o f the island. Throughout the n ight o f the 10th,

Whyte’s artillerymen maintained a steady bombardment o f ne t a Ramiers; British

transports moved from Grande Anse to Anse Noir to launch the marines as close to their

28 Bailleul, Report (<Seconde Partie), 116-117; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,”

entry for 11 February 1794; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.

447




objective as possible. The distrac tion succeeded. By 5:00 a.m. on 11 February, at least

thirty British landing boats enabled the marines to storm the rocky beach below the fort.

A ^

Indeed, this particular mission was unusually perilous. The garrison at Ilet a Ramiers

could only be reached by climbing ladders from the beach, up the cliff face. Once there

was enough light for the men to find their way around the rocks surrounding the island,

Whyte’s artillerymen halted their fire and the marines commenced their amphibious

attack .29

When the alarm announced the attack, the French accelerated their fire, this time

in two directions. Republicans manning the heavy guns in the fort doubled their efforts to

blast the British out o f their positions on Mom et Matherine, while their compatriots fired

muskets at the Royal Marines who were attempting to seize ilet a Ramiers by scaling the

ladders leading into the fort. As the battle progressed, enemy warships maneuvered into

the mouth o f the bay and added their own firepower to the fight. Echoes o f heavy cannon

fire reverberated across the water, and citizens in Republique-ville watched the desperate

battle that was taking p lace on the other side of the bay. The fight raged inconclusively

throughout the morning and Rochambeau, who felt confident that his men in ilet a

Ramiers would repulse the attack, joined members o f the city Committee o f Public Safety

on the ramparts o f Fort-de-la-Republique to observe the battle.30

At 11:00 a.m., the struggle for ilet a Ramiers suddenly ended when a British



{Seconde Partie), 116-117.

448




- f i D R O Q N

Republique-ville

/v

Royal Marines Attack Ilet a Ramiers11 February 1794 - Troop transports launched Royal Marines at Anse Noir. By 10:00 a.m. the

marines landed at Ilet a Ramiers. The fort exploded one hour later when a stray mortar round

landed in the powder magazine.

Enlarged Area

Figure 48. Royal Marines Attack Ilet a Ramiers

449




mortar round rolled into the main powder magazine on the island and set o ff a chain

reaction so violent that it “astonished everyone who witnessed it.” When the magazine

exploded, fifteen Frenchmen died instantly, and another twenty-five were severely

wounded. In fact, the echo from the blast was so powerful that it rocked buildings in

Republique-ville; the smoke cloud that enshrouded the island rose to a height o f more

than 100 feet. Understandably, witnesses in Republique-ville were held spellbound, but

when the smoke finally cleared, the drapeau tricolore o f the French Republic no longer

flew over Ilet a Ram iers - the flag o f Great Britain flew in its place.31

The store o f captured weapons that the British conquerors inventoried inside the

fort was impressive: eleven 42-pounders; six 32-pounders; four 13-inch mortars; and a

howitzer. In addition, the enemy found “huge quantities of stores and ammunition, a

good set of barracks, and a large stove to heat shot.” The loss was devastating, but

Martiniquais Republicans maintained a modicum of pride in their belief that only twenty

men had held Ilet a Ramiers for nearly two days.32 They reasoned that only the explosion

of the powder magazine had forced the capitulation. While citizens in the capital

discussed the matter, the first ships of Jervis’ squadron sailed into the Baie du

Republique-ville, just beyond the reach o f the guns at Fort-de-la-Republique.33

31 Bailleul , Report (Seconde Partie), 116-117.

32 In fact, the British counted 203 Frenchmen in Ilet a Ramiers. Grey to Dundas,

16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.

33 Willyams, Expedition, 27-30; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 9

February 1794. Those who wanted to believe in the defenders’ gallantry at ilet a Ramiers

were mortified to learn later that Captain Leonard, a former emigre who commanded the

fort, surrendered the garrison jus t after the explosion. Two other emigres, M. La Grange

450




SORtfON'■Sr> DUNb/tS^iMjr

Republique-ville

Jervis Infiltrates the Baie du Republique-ville11 February 1794 - After the fall of Ilet a Ramiers, Jervis moved his fleet into the Baie du

Repu blique-ville to re-supply British land forces. Prescot t marched his battalions of f of the

Grande Anse Peninsula to Riviere-Salee where Grey prepared the troops to march le Lamentin the

following day.

Enlarged Area

Figure 49. Jervis Infiltrates the Baie du Republique-ville

451




Ironically, the disaster at ilet a Ramiers simplified Rochambeau’s defense plans.

He had lost control o f the southern ha lf o f the Baie du Republique-ville, but the combined

firepower from Fort-de-la-Republique and Fort-de-la-Convention remained adequate to

defend the immediate area around the capital city. Without creating a new defensive

perimeter, Rochambeau issued the necessary orders to tighten the line.

Although Grey had phased his attacks with methodical precision, the time

advantage that Rochambeau gained by Grey’s deliberation was outweighed by the vast

numerical superiority o f the British troops. Grey understood well that time was on his

side; he spent the remainder of 11 February resting his forces for the main attack against

Republique-ville. After the capture o f Ilet a Ramiers, Generals Prescott and Whyte

reorganized their units and marched from Grande Anse Peninsula to link up with Grey at

Riviere-Salee. To the northwest of the capital, Gordon remained in his strongholds

overlooking Case-Navire, w hile east o f Republique-ville, Dundas rested his troops in

their camps at Poste Calon and Mom e le Brun.

After he issued his orders, Rochambeau left Republique-ville at noon on 11

February to inspect his remaining western outposts; his first stop was Camp-Decide.

Since de Percin’s previous stronghold sat astride the principle road that ran through the

and M. Percin-Comette, entered the fort ahead o f their British allies, where they found

Leonard at the head o f his wounded defenders, welcoming the English with open arms.

Immediately recognizing Captain Leonard as a fellow aristocrat, La Grange and Percin-

Comette were said to have then laughed contemptuously at the remaining defenders whohad been so easily duped by their commander. Once these men were rounded up,

Leonard was told to go home to get his Cross o f Saint-Louis so that he might wear it on

his uniform when he dined with his emigre friends that evening - the remaining defenders

of Ilet a Ramiers were taken in shackles to a British prisoner ship. Bailleul, Report

(Seconde Partie), 118.

452




Pitons du Carbet from Saint-Pierre to Republique-ville, Rochambeau expected the

soldiers posted there to stop any enemy troops (Gordon) who might move against the

capital from the northeast. Just as important, if Gordon chose to attack by way o f the

coast road from Case-Navire, then the Republicans at Camp-Decide were well-positioned

to attack the enemy battalions on their left flank or their rear. In fact, Rocham beau had

sent reinforcements to the p lantation several times over the previous three days, bu t when

he arrived on the a fternoon o f the 11th, he found that numerous desertions left too few

defenders at the plantation to counterattack the enemy or even to defend their own

encampment. Rochambeau had no additional troops to assist those who remained at

Camp-Decide, but Committee o f Public Safety members in the capital were quick to

criticize him. “Rather than augment [the troops at Camp-Decide] or try to bolster their

confidence,” they wrote, “ [he] simply abandoned them in their positions with only some

kind words.”34

Following the same mountain trail that de Percin and his band used in their own

raids months before, Rochambeau descended from the Pitons du Carbet to Case-Navire.

To his satisfaction, his artillerymen and Ducassou’s troops remained in their assigned

positions, maintaining a vigilan t guard against three British frigates that cruised the Case-

Navire roads ju st out o f range o f the Sainte-Catherine battery. By 8:00 p.m., a messenger

brought word o f yet another disaster: Colonel Gordon had attacked and then captured

Camp-Decide just minutes after Rochambeau departed. Gordon now controlled all of the

roads leading from the Pitons du Carbet to Republique-ville; unless Rochambeau and the


453




Republicans at Case-Navire moved quickly, the British might cut o ff their line o f retreat

to the capital. After securing his two field pieces and a mortar from Case-Navire,

Rochambeau ordered a withdrawal. Within thirty minutes, Gordon signaled his men to

continue their march toward Case-Navire.35

Fortunately for Rochambeau and his men at Case-Navire, Gordon chose not to

advance along the same road (through Terreville) where he was beaten the previous day.

Fully expecting to meet Ducassou’s volunteers along the way, Gordon and his men

inched their way down from the Pitons du Carbet, allowing Rochambeau and his troops

the time they needed to escape. Although the Republicans conducted their withdrawal

quickly and without the enemy’s knowledge, Rochambeau could not be sure that Gordon

was not also moving troops along the road leading from Camp-Decide to Republique-

ville. He sent a messenger to Bellegarde countermanding an earlier order to attack the

British encampment at Poste Calon, and instead told him to block the northern approach

from Camp-Decide. The messenger was too late; Bellegarde and his men had already

begun the first o f three failed attacks they w ould make during the night o f 11-12 February

against the Surirey Heights.36

It was not until dawn on 12 February that Gordon realized that the batteries of

Case-Navire and Sainte-Catherine were abandoned, so his troops moved into the

abandoned town and defenses. Gordon now controlled the coast road from Saint-Pierre


36 Bailleul, Report (,Seconde Partie), 118-119; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794.

PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.

454




to Republique-ville. Two days later, his brigade held eveiy battery between Case-Navire

and the city limits, and were camped within three miles o f the capital. On the other side

of the Pitons du Carbet, General Dundas defeated Bellegarde’s weak attempts to dislodge

his brigade from the Surirey Heights, and worked quickly to prepare positions for the

siege artillery that would soon arrive.37

O f all o f the British operations on 12 February, those by the British fleet most

clearly prophesied the end for Republique-ville. French military engineers in Martinique

had remained confident that no invading fleet could penetrate the Baie du Republique-

ville - a fact confirmed by the westward orientation of the bay’s fortifications. By

midday on the 12th, however, the seaborne enem y was swarming into the undefended

French rear. In fact, Jervis’ entry into the most heavily defended area of Martinique

happened with such ease, that rather than occupying themselves with the myriad tasks of

combat comm and, many o f the fleet officers simply marveled at the beauty of the scenery.

When Grey’s chief chaplain, who was aboard Jervis’ flagship first observed Martinique’s

capital, he noted that:

On the north we saw [Fort-de-la-Republique] and the town of

Republique-ville; and immediately behind it, on the top o f a steep

hill, was the strong fortification o f [Fort-de-la-Convention], which,

with the tri-coloured flag waving on its walls, formed a

conspicuous object in the landscape; the parapet being built of

white stone, strongly contrasted with the vivid glow o f verdure on

the surrounding hills.38

By midday on the 12th, transport and cargo ships anchored unmolested at les

37 Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.

38 Willyams, Expedition, 29, 49.

455




Case-Navire K&« jiflHI K i n

JtinteteHfeni ® (

Republique-ville

Closing In On Republique-ville by Land and Sea1 1 - 1 2 February 1794 - Gordon captured Camp Decide on the 11th and occupied Sainte-

Catherine on the 12th. Bellegarde attacked Du ndas’ positions at Poste Calon during the night of

11-12 February; after three defeats, the Chasseurs returned to Republique-ville. Grey and

Prescott continued to le Lamentin, while Jervis sent ships across the bay to begin unloading

troops and artillery at Pointe des Grives and the Cohe du Lamentin.

Enlarged Are;

Figure 50. Closing In On Republique-ville by Land and Sea

456




The British Gain Control of the Baie du _______________________ Republique-ville ________________________

View of Forts de la Republique and de la Convention as seen

from Jervis’ Flagship

British Troops Land at Pointe des Grives

Figure 51. The British Gain Control of the Baie du Republique-ville

457


C o u r t e s y

N a t i

o n a l

M

a r i t i m e

M u s e u m

C o u r t e s y

N a t i o n a l

M

a r i t i m e

M

u s e u m



Trois-Ilets to unload tons o f provisions needed by Prescott’s troops. Artillerymen at Fort-

de-la-Republique attempted to bombard the enemy vessels, but their rounds consistently

fell short. This encouraged Jervis to send more transports into the Cohe du Lamentin to

unload troops and heavy artillery even closer to Republique-ville. This maneuver was

also successful. A short time later the British brazenly began to construct a pier at Pointe

des Grives; there was little, if anything, that Rochambeau could do about it.39

Thus far, the British had gained military success against the most formidable

Republican garrison in the Windward Islands with remarkable ease. They moved so

quickly that Republicans did not realize the extent to which the British had subsumed the

island. At le Vauclin, for instance, Captain Compere could muster only seventy of the

600 men under his command. Nevertheless, he prepared these few National Guard to

march to Republique-ville the next day. At around 11:00 p.m, however, 250 British

soldiers killed his sentries and then surprised the encampment; Compere and his men

resisted, but finally were forced to withdraw, leaving two men dead and three others

prisoner.40

On the other hand, many in the 1st Chasseur Battalion escaped capture by making

sure that they were not even close to the battlefield. By late afternoon on the 12th,

hundreds o f Chasseurs were milling around in Republique-ville, well out of sight of the

British. Rochambeau detailed some of the Chasseurs to the city’s forts, but angrily

39 Ibid.; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.


458




ordered the rest to return to their camp at Surirey.41 Even with the arrival o f the 1st

Chasseur Battalion, the military defenders of Republique-ville numbered barely 800.

Nevertheless, Rochambeau might resist for weeks in Forts de-la-Republique and-de-la-

Convention if Bellegarde prevented the British penetrating the city’s northern and eastern

perimeters.42

The plan may have seemed clear enough to Rochambeau, but he was besieged by

questions from Committee o f Public Safety members in the city, who were repeatedly

confronted by distressed citizens. Field reports by stragglers from Camp-Decide and the

1st Chasseur Battalion described a catastrophic situation around Republique-ville. This

resulted in the spread o f unsubstantiated rumors, foremost was the tale that Rochambeau

was a traitor. When he went to the Hotel de Ville to report to the Committee o f Public

Safety, one of the members stupidly questioned Rochambeau on that particular charge.

Rochambeau hid his disgust and easily discredited the claim, replying simply that “were I

a traitor, Monsieur Commissaire, I certainly would not be making such sacrifices.” In a

scene reminiscent o f his cross-examination by the Jacobin Club in 1792, Rochambeau

was made to account for his actions before the very Committee that he had so recently

41 Rochambeau kept a small Chasseur detachment in Republique-ville to augment

the city police force, and two National Guard companies to assist in the forts.

42 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 120. When Bellegarde convinced the

general that his Chasseurs could hold the northern and eastern approaches to Republique-

ville, Rochambeau allowed Bellegarde to conduct a mobile defense. The Committee of

Public Safety in Republique-ville condemned this decision, even though there was no

available labor force. They preferred that the army dig a network o f defensive trenches

throughout the northern and eastern sectors of the city.

459




created.43

In fact, the Comm ittee of Public Safety o f Republique-ville was becoming

increasingly hostile toward Rochambeau. When a group of Chasseurs complained that

Rochambeau was not with them at the ill-fated attack at Maltide, the Committee

convened a special tribunal of three members to interrogate him. In the first round of

questions, a committee mem ber asked Rochambeau if he had been in the capital city

during the Chasseur attack. Obviously, Rochambeau had spent more time outside

Republique-ville than any of the comm ittee members, but he was careful when he

denounced the scurrilous intimation. Lamaury and Isaac, he said, could certainly account

for his time on the 10th. By the time that the Chasseurs began their attack, Rochambeau

and the Representatives had barely returned from the fight at Case-Navire, and were

deploying volunteers from Saint-Pierre in Fort-de-la-Convention. Rochambeau declared,

“[a] general must always be the first into the attack and the last in the retreat,” although

his own prowess on the battlefield was not being questioned, his platitudes did little to

reassure Republique-ville’s Committee o f Public Safety.44

When he finally dispelled the notion that he had been negligent by not leading the

Chasseurs against the Maltide camp, other committee members pointedly asked

Rochambeau if he was withholding critical information. Rochambeau had kept the

contents of the ministerial packets secret since they arrived the previous December, but

now the Committee demanded to know the contents. Rochambeau refused to produce the

43 Ibid., 119.

44 Ibid.

460




Minister of the M arine’s packet, arguing that the dispatches contained secret plans for an

upcoming French campaign in the Caribbean. What campaign Rochambeau and Minister

Monge were referring to was anyone’s guess. When the insinuations and accusations

became more vicious, Rochambeau finally confided to the commissaires that the

dispatches contained news that additional troops and money were en route to the colony.

The committee members were astonished by the revelation, and were crushed by the

national government’s failure to make good on such a solemn promise.45

When he was pressed on the issue, Rochambeau declared “[i]f you want my

personal opinion, I never believed tha t troops were coming from France.” One of the

committeemen replied, “[t]hen General, do you not see any way to save the colony?”

Rochambeau responded “I see none if we continue to do as Bellegarde did at la Trinite,

and as several companies that we placed in the posts covering the forts have done.” They

inquired if the enemy had sufficient forces to capture the forts, and he responded “[y]es, it

is quite possible; they certainly have the means.” When they asked about the size of the

British force, he admitted “[j]udging by the regularity and the slowness of his operations,

I would estimate that he has ten to twelve-thousand men....furthermore, I am expecting to

receive terms of surrender at any time which I will make known to the Committee so that

everyone can discuss them w ith me.” With that response, Rochambeau left the tribunal,

and the three committee members returned to the Hotel de Ville to submit their report to

the full Committee of Public Safety and Commune o f Republique-ville. The tribunal

members recounted in elaborate detail their interview with Rochambeau, and added that

45 Ibid., 120-121.

461




in their opinion, his responses were intended to sway the Committee to accept the first

enemy surrender proposals. Faced with such serious allegations against Rochambeau,

parliam entarians in Republique-ville argued about the realities o f the situation and the

undeniable truth tha t the British cordon around the capital was tightening quickly.46

Throughout the previous century, the “impregnability” of Martinique depended

heavily upon cooperation between Saint-Pierre and Republique-ville. In less than one

week, Grey and Jervis broke French resistance in the south, east and west of the island

with minimum loss to their own troops; Republique-ville was isolated. Had citizens in

Saint-Pierre even considered coming to the aid of the capital, Gordon’s controlling the

western coast road made that impossible. The military in Saint-Pierre now focused on a

possible siege against their own city - the commercial and legislative capitals of

Martinique would now face General Grey’s army alone.

46 Ibid., 122-123.

462




Chapter XV

Strangling Martinique:

13 - 20 February 1794

By the morning of 13 February, the bulk of Jervis’ fleet lay anchored in

Republique-ville Bay. Rochambeau h imself counted “no less than five ships of the line,

several more o f fifty and forty-four guns, a great number o f frigates and corvettes, two

bomb ships, seven gun boats, and scores o f transports.” In all, at least seventy-seven

ships hovered around Ilet a Ramiers, serving notice to the French that Jervis and Grey had

the resources to subdue Martinique. To reinforce the point, two British gun boats

brazenly maneuvered across the bay to within range of Fort-de-la-Republique, but were

quickly driven away by the French 24-pounders. Early the following morning, General

Prescott and the majority o f his brigade left their encampment at Riviere-Salee; by

midday, they established communications with Dundas at Mome le Brun and Surirey.

Rochambeau anticipated these maneuvers, and was no t surprised on the morning o f 15

February to see eleven British transports anchored in the Cul de Sac du Lamentin, with

their crews unloading heavy artillery.1

1 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entries for 13 and 14 February 1794;

Willyams, Expedition, 37. In fact, there were no ships o f fifty guns near Martinique,

unless Rochambeau included deck guns on ships of forty-eight.

463




Any chance that the Republicans had for holding the capital depended upon

finding and paying laborers to improve the city’s defensive works and supplies. Again,

the critical shortage of money proved an insurmountable obstacle. It was the duty o f the

Committee of Public Safety of Republique-ville to deal with the depleted city treasury;

after minimum deliberation, they decided a mandatory war loan was necessary. It was

impossible to collect from the municipalities, so the Committee chose to canvass the few

remaining ships’ captains and businessmen in Republique-ville. Rochambeau approved

the decision, and the Committee summoned available business leaders to the Hotel de

Ville to discuss the terms of the new law. The meeting, did not go as planned. The

businessmen refused to cooperate, and told the Commissaires that they had no faith

whatsoever that the current government could even protect their property, much less

repay a war loan. Even i f they were to loan the government money, they were doubtful

that their funds were safe in the hands of suspect government agents like Daigremont.

Unable to respond, the Committee adjourned the meeting without resolution, and called

on Rochambeau to help.2

On 14 February, Rochambeau and the three committee members met again with

the “Captains of Commerce,” but this time, there were no demands.3 Rochambeau simply

asked for any money that they could lend the government to sustain the defense effort,

and offered his personal guarantee that France would make good on the loan. After

Rochambeau presented h is request, the businessmen politely excused themselves,

2 Ibid., 121.

3 The three commissaires were Bailleul, Isaac and Lamaury.

464




probably, most believed, never to be heard from again. To everyone’s surprise they

reappeared a short time later and offered to provide 170,000 livres at no interest, asking

only that Rochambeau and the Committee write letters of guarantee that the Government

of France would reimburse them for their potential losses. There was one problem; the

merchants asked for reimbursement not in paper currency, but instead in gold Tournois,

which, at the time, held an exchange value of 1 = 1V 2 to the French livre. Naturally, the

committee members revolted at the idea o f a not-so-well-hidden fifty per-cent interest

rate, but despite their pleas to the lenders to support the patrie in good faith, the

merchants persisted in their demand. When Rochambeau assured everyone concerned

that the interest would pose no problems, the commissaires reluctantly acquiesced to the

terms. The treasury was empty, the committee members believed, and they did not want

to be held responsible for the capture of the colony by not approving the loan.4

As soon as Rocham beau and the Committee signed the agreement with the

lenders, a new battle between the military and civil authorities ensued over the

distribution of the funds. When Commissary of War Daigremont reported a short time

later that the supposedly depleted treasury still contained 56,000 livres, the shocked

committee members expressed outrage that they were not told that such a considerable

sum remained available. This knowledge could have improved the Committee’s

4 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 14 February 1794; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 124-125. The Tournois d ’or had been minted in various iterations

since the 9th Century, first by the Abbey o f Saint Martin in Tours and later by the city’s

municipal government. Until 1783, the Tournois d ’or, known also as the “Tournois

Pound” was equal in value to one livre, but as the paper currency depreciated, the

Tournois d ’or maintained its value on the international market.

465




bargaining position with the city’s businessmen considerably, and immediately, the

members accused the military of duplicity. They were soon made more suspicious when

Daigremont adjusted his initial report, announcing another 3,300 livres that he had

forgotten to include.5

Daigremont’s negligent accounting was more than the Committee of Public Safety

of Republique-ville was willing to tolerate. They immediately put the remaining funds

under their personal protection, demanded that Daigremont be relieved, and called upon

Rochambeau to justify why he had so vigorously promoted the idea that the colony was in

a fiscal crisis. The colony was indeed in financial straits, Rochambeau explained. Most

of the 56,000 livres had been committed already, and it was he, not Daigremont, who had

approved the expenditures. From memory, he enumerated several recent purchases,

including 14,000 livres to the head surgeon in charge o f the city hospital, and another

12,000 to be divided between the 32nd and 37th Lines in partial payment o f the regular

soldiers’ in arrears.6

That Rochambeau had obligated funds to pay his professional soldiers infuriated

the civilian committee members. Why should the French regular troops be paid, they

asserted, when good Republicans on the island were willing to fight for free? “Lest the

5 Bailleul , Report (Seconde Partie), 126.

6 Ibid. The situation worsened when the Committee discovered that the majorityof these commitments were made jus t before Daigremont was to make his report. Again,

committee members accused Daigremont o f Royalist sympathies, and included this

allegation in their justification to sequester the treasury. The Commissary o f War did his

best to dispel the supposition, but the former aristocrat found little sympathy among the

Republicans.

466




32nd and 37th Lines decided to ‘fight’ as well as the National Guard,” Rochambeau

countered, “it was a wise investment for him to do whatever he could to provide for

them.” Naturally, Republican zealots were piqued by the barb against the National

Guard, but there was little they could say in the troops’ defense. The indignant

commissaires turned the argument to one of proprietorship, declaring that Rochambeau

did not have the right to usurp their authority by spending money without their approval.

“On the contrary,” Rochambeau parried. Under the circumstances, it was he who must be

in control of the finances, because he was ultimately answerable for the colony’s defense.

Thus, the responsibility lay solely with him to divert whatever sums he deemed necessary

to pay the troops and to sustain military operations.7

Neither side wanted to back down, but the Committee eventually allowed

Rochambeau to spend the money that Daigremont already held in the treasury, and to take

an additional 50,000 livres o f the money that had just been loaned them to spend as he

deemed necessary.8 When the question turned to the use of the remaining 120,000 livres,

the commissaires maintained that Rochambeau no longer had proprietary authority; the

7 Ibid., 127. If not for the “machinations” of their commanding general, the

regular soldiers defending Martinique would never have received any of their arrears. It

was even more fortunate for the regulars that when the colony finally surrendered to the

British, the French soldiers were allowed to keep all of their pay.

8 Ibid., 128-129. These funds came under scrutiny when it was discovered that

Rochambeau paid his mistress, Mme. de Tully, in full for the services her slaves performed

in rebuilding the city arsenal; and 3,000 and 3,300 livres respectively were paid for goods

and services to the port captain Robert-Marguerite de Tascher de la Pagerie (brother o f

the future empress) and Lieutenant Destourelles shortly before the two men deserted the

island. Another creditor received 14,000 livres before the Committee knew what money

had been paid to “those in Rocham beau’s favor.” Ultimately, the Committee never could

account for any o f the second 50,000 livres.

467




lenders had given the money to the Committee o f Public Safety for them to manage.

Though a furious Rochambeau reminded the Committee that nearly all o f the 120,000

livres was owed to his regular troops for back salary, the Committee held firm. They

would pay nothing more to the regular soldiers until the island first was clear o f the

enemy threat, and then only after the treasury held over one million livres in reserve.

Rochambeau protested vehemently, but the Committee closed the discussion after

ordering Daigremont not to allow him to spend any more money without their personal

approval.9

That night, two British gun boats again slipped within range o f Republique-ville

and at around 1:00 a.m. opened fire on the city. Soon, a brig joined in the bombardment,

and the three vessels shelled the capital until 2:30 a.m. Alarms echoed throughout the

city. Most citizens sought cover in their homes, but others walked the streets loudly

announcing that the enemy action was only intended as harassment. The real attack, the

antagonists promised, was yet to come if Rochambeau did not surrender the island. Real

attack or not, at 4:00 a.m., the port captain, Robert-Marguerite Tascher de la Pagerie, and

two o f his associates, Marlet and Grandmaison Sainte-Rose, arrived at the Hotel de Ville

and asked commissaire Lamaury to join them in a private conference. Lamaury agreed,

9 Ibid. In this environment o f heightened distrust, the Committee of Public

Safety o f Republique-ville concluded that they were fully competent to conduct military

trials with or without Rochambeau’s approval, and published an order to the National

Guard commanders that committee members and Rochambeau bo th were empowered to

give military orders. The chaos which resulted was predictable; Royalist agents operating

among the Republican soldiers used every opportunity to confuse or distort instructions

issued by the colony’s “highest military authorities.” Rochambeau later attempted to

resolve the situation by asking the Committee to form a civil/military tribunal, with the

authority to impose capital sentences for treasonous actions.

468




and followed Tascher through the darkened streets and into a nearby office. Tascher drew

back the curtains to allow some m oonlight into the chamber and invited the committee

member to sit. Grandmaison Sainte-Rose informed Lamaury that they had evidence that

Pelauque and Bellegarde had entered into negotiations to surrender the colony, and that

they were waiting for the most opportune mom ent to deliver Republique-ville. The city

already was in immediate danger, Grandmaison Sainte-Rose asserted; according to what

he knew o f Bellegarde’s plan, Chasseur agents would soon attempt to take control of

Fort-de-la-Republique.10

When Grandmaison Sainte-Rose finished, Marlet took over the discussion, and

described the inevitable results o f France’s abandonment of the colony. In the current

circumstances, he asserted, there was no possible way that the national government could

save Martinique; the country had no naval forces available to save any of the colonies.

The room fell silent. Lamaury asked how the colony could be rescued from the “black

cloud” that it had fallen under. Tascher observed that the laws passed by the

Representative Assembly threatened death to those who discussed surrender. He believed

that such action would be the only way to prevent the horrors o f an impending British

siege. “Since we all have confidence in you,” Tascher reminded Lamaury, “we expect

that you will keep what we have told you a complete secret.” Lamaury responded that in

his opinion, there was nothing more that anyone could say.11

The meeting did not remain a secret for long. By morning, Lamaury finished

10 Ibid., 131.

11 Ibid., 131-132.

469




writing a full account o f the meeting, and Rochambeau was summoned to the committee

chambers. When Lamaury presented his report, Rochambeau remained inappropriately

undisturbed; he simply dismissed Tascher’s fears as alarmist, and left the building.12

Despite his coolness before the Committee, it was clear to Rochambeau that

Grandmaison Sainte-Rose was correct that the Chasseurs were M artinique’s greatest

internal threat. Since their rout at la Trinite, Bellegarde demanded to know why

Rochambeau spent so little time supervising their operations. They were abandoned, the

Chasseurs proclaimed publicly, and they vowed once again that before they were made

prisoners o f the British , they would “make everything in M artinique fire and blood.” The

earlier tension between Bellegarde and Rochambeau obviously had inflamed the

imaginations o f many Chasseurs. In fact, several o f the battalion officers repeatedly

wrote to politicians in the capital claiming that Rochambeau was a traitor and that the

government would soon have to make a choice - deal with him, or face their wrath. This

enmity came to a head on 15 February, when the city Committee of Public Safety

received intelligence that corroborated Grandmaison Sainte-Rose’s earlier report.

Selected Chasseurs planned to assassinate Rochambeau and then install Bellegarde in

Fort-de-la-Republique as military commander of Martinique. Once Rochambeau was

dead, the news alleged, Bellegarde would give the assassins, Elie and Pierre Millet,

command of Forts de-la- Convention and Republique.13

12 Ibid., 132.

13 Ibid., 132-134; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,”

7; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 15 February 1794.1n such a confused

atmosphere, no one could be sure whether the plot was real or jus t rumor. What was

470




On the morning o f the 15th, Rochambeau and several of his aides-de-camp left

Republique-ville to reconnoiter enemy positions and to inspect Bellegarde’s defenses at

Surirey.14 After giving Bellegarde express instructions to occupy and defend certain

positions along the road to the capital city, Rochambeau and h is entourage left the

Chasseurs to return to Fort-de-la-Republique - Elie and Pierre Millet followed. When the

general stopped to inspect a battery near the Hotel de Ville, he discovered that Elie and

Millet had also entered the position. Furthermore, Elie was engaged in a loud argument

with the sergeant in charge o f the artillery, and was commanding him to fire his cannons

over the hills to the southeast of the city (today Cite Dillon) in an attempt to hit the

English ships anchored in the Cohe du Lamentin. The artillery sergeant protested

vigorously. He could not see the enemy ships, much less determine their range. Elie

pulled a loaded pistol from his belt, put it to the sergeant’s head, and threatened to kill

him if he did not immediately fire three shots from his cannon. Faced with the

alternative, the sergeant fired his gun twice and was preparing to fire a third time when

Rochambeau approached and stopped him, demanding to know what was going on.

When the sergeant explained the situation, Elie tried to justify his actions, claiming that

certain was that Elie, a mulatto from Grenada, was arrested eight months earlier in Saint-

Pierre for inciting rebellion among the slaves in the city, and had remained a prisoner in

Fort-de-la-Republique until the assembly decided, jus t weeks prior to the invasion, that

there was no case against him. Following his release, Elie enlisted in the 1st Chasseur

Battalion, and reportedly had fought the British with conspicuous bravery.

14 Commandant Naverres (the 1st Chasseur Battalion adjutant and one o f the only

white officers in the unit) accompanied Rochambeau and his aides on this trip.

Bellegarde had dismissed the officer two days earlier, amid claims that he was a british

spy. Rochambeau intended to go before the Chasseurs on Naverres’ behalf to dispel the

rumors. Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 134.

471




he was checking the quality of the batte ry’s powder.15

Pierre Millet saw that the plot was in danger of being compromised. He joined

Rochambeau and Elie, and offered more ludicrous excuses on beh alf o f his associate.

Rochambeau was unconvinced. When he ordered Elie arrested, Elie once again

brandished his pistol , this time aiming it at Rochambeau, and threatened to “blow the

general’s brains out if anyone came near him.” Rochambeau remained perfectly calm,

walked toward Elie, and told him to give him the gun. Instead, the Chasseur pulled the

trigger - miraculously, nothing happened. Before the general’s escorts could seize the

would-be assassin, he leaped onto his horse, and with Pierre Millet, galloped toward the

battery exit. A quick-thinking sentry threw a pole across their path; both horses fell and

the men were immediately apprehended. Millet was imprisoned in Fort-de-la-

Republique, w hile Elie was b rought before a military tribunal at Fort-de-la-Convention

and sentenced to death.16

Though the c ircumstances leading to Elie’s trial and subsequent execution were

certainly remarkable, the courts-martial produced an even more sensational piece o f

news. Elie testified that Bellegarde was planning to raise the island’s slaves and

Chasseurs against the existing government. Anyone who was not involved in the plot,

Elie said, was to be put to death.17

15 Ibid., 135; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 7.

16 Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 7.


(aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 7.

472




When Rochambeau appeared before the Committee of Public Safety later that day,

the members were surprised that he seemed so undisturbed by the affair. He was aware

o f the plots against him, but he believed that it was simply the work of a few fractious

individuals. The denunciations were too vague, he said, and he would do nothing more

about it. Yet, Rochambeau did act. The next morning he posted an announcement that

ten men had failed in their attempt to assassinate him. “Men o f good conscience,” he

announced, “now have every advantage over the island’s conspirators and assassins, who

have proven themselves nothing more than timid cowards. Good men can brave all

dangers.”18

Although Rochambeau maintained a strong public appearance, he was gravely

disheartened. “Every day,” he wrote, “the same mistrust, the same apathy, and the same

weakness among the mulattoes; the desertions have not decreased. The whites do not

trust the mulattoes, and are fighting with them rather than with the enemy.” On the

afternoon o f 15 February, the second-in-command o f the 1st Chasseur Battalion,

Commandant La Rochette, defected to the British .19

While Rochambeau and the Committee of Public Safety battled the enemies

among them, the British prepared for their main attack. To the west of the city, Gordon’s

18 Bailleul, Report (Seconde P ar tie), 136.


(Seconde Partie), 136. Reporting this most recent desertion, Rochambeau again tried to

pu t the best light possible on the deteriorating situation. Just as he had in September

1793, Rochambeau told the Committee, La Rochette was again threatened day and night

by the treasonous Chasseurs at the Surirey post. Nevertheless, he general encouraged the

committee members. It remains uncertain whether La Rochette was among B ellegarde’s

co-conspirators, or whether he was attempting to save his own life.

473




brigade overlooked Republique-ville from positions on both the heights of Sainte-

Catherine and the road leading from Camp-Decide. In the east, Grey united with Dundas

and Prescott at Mome le Brun. With British forces now surrounding Republique-ville,

Grey gave Dundas new orders: return to Gros-Mome, move west over the Pitons du

Carbet, and attack Saint-Pierre.20

When they reached Gros-Mome on 14 February, Dundas halted his brigade and

ordered Colonel William Campbell to form an advance element composed o f his 66th

Foot and an additional battalion of light infantry. At 4:00 p.m., Campbell set out through

the Bois le Buc (known today as the Bois Lezards). Because o f the difficulty o f the

terrain, the baggage trains continued to la Trinite, where one o f Commodore T hompson’s

sloops stood by to carry the gear to Basse-Pointe. Dundas and the remainder o f his

brigade left Gros-M ome one hour later. By dawn o f 15 February, Dundas’ force had

crossed thirty miles o f mountains.21

Even though the Republicans in Saint-Pierre would not expect a land attack

northeast o f the city, Dundas anticipated significant opposition. Dundas concluded that at

least half of the National Guard from the Saint-Pierre district would be in positions

oriented to the south, but the French would also occupy positions east of the city at le

Mome Rouge. This village, situated northeast of Saint-Pierre at the base o f the Calbasse

Heights, controlled two principal roads, from Basse-Pointe, and Saint-Pierre to la Trinite.

Dundas sensed that Campbell’s detachment alone would not be sufficient, ordered the

20 Willyams, Expedition, 37.

21 Ibid.

474




JERVIS I

Le SaW^&j

British Land and Sea Movements Against Saint-Pierre14 - 15 February 1794 - Dundas received orders to attack Saint-Pierre by land. He marched to

Gros-Morne, sent his brigade’s baggage to la Trinite, and then continued through the Pitons du

Carbet to le Morne Rouge. Jervis held Thompson’s squadron in reserve at Basse-Pointe.

EnlargedArea +

Figure 52. British Land and Sea Movements Against Saint-Pierre

475




colonel to march only as far as le Mom e Rouge at Montigne, and to avoid contact with

the enemy until reinforcements could arrive .22

After resting for three hours, Dundas and his men crossed the headwaters o f the

Riviere Capot at Champflore, and reached the base of the Calbasse Heights. To their

front, the Tricolor flew above a fortified mountain encampment at the des Rosiers

plantation. The British rested again before beginning their climb, and then attacked up

the hillside w ith such energy that they immediately overwhelmed elements o f Edouard

Meunier’s 2d Chasseur Battalion. The Chasseurs disabled their single field piece,

scattered the ammunition, and fell back several miles to the Debut redoubt in le Mome

Rouge.23

It was fortunate for Dundas that the Chasseurs had abandoned such a potentially

unassailable post so quickly. Not willing to relinquish the initiative, he doggedly pushed

his men forward. Within an hour, they covered the remaining four miles to le Mome

Rouge, where they found Colonel Campbell and his battalions embroiled in a serious

skirmish at the Debut redoubt. Unfortunately for the British, nearly 600 Republicans

occupied the works - far more than Dundas expected. In addition to Meunier’s Chasseurs

another 400 National Guard moved into the village. When the commander of the

National Guard in the Saint-Pierre district, Commandant Lacorbiere, learned that the

British were attacking from the northeast, he ordered his men to vacate their

22 Ibid. Based upon intelligence from emigres that were familiar with the area,

Grey and Dundas estimated that Republican positions at le Mome Rouge would

constitute Saint-Pierre’s first line of defense in the east.

23 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 137-139; Willyams, Expedit ion, 38-39.

476




emplacements in the southeast and occupy new positions between le Mome Rouge and

Saint-Pierre.24

Although most of the Saint-Pierre Chasseurs preferred the relative safety of the

redoubt, two of his company commanders continued to attack. They gathered any men

they could find to join them, and repeatedly attacked Gordon’s battalions for nearly an

hour; Dundas’ arrival turned the tide. Now completely outnumbered, the Chasseurs

abandoned the redoubt, leaving nine men dead and ten wounded. This time, the British

also suffered important losses. When the smoke cleared, nearly eighteen British troops

lay dead or wounded on the field, including one senior officer who had been shot in the

head - Colonel Campbell.25

At noon, the British swept through le Mome Rouge, turned south, and then

captured another post at Lavemade, which indirectly protected the city’s military camp in

the Quartier du Fort. The Republican situation was becoming critical. The Committee of

Public Safety in Saint-Pierre desperately ordered more troops to cover this flank, but the

response of the National Guard was slow and weak. Only the arrival of 200 volunteers

under Pierre Boscq, another militia leader who was well-known for his bravery,

temporarily renewed the flagging confidence o f the Republicans in Saint-Pierre. With

Boscq leading a second column, Lacorbiere gathered his own forces and charged the

enemy near the Terrien redoubt. The action, however, was short-lived. The Republican

24 Ibid., 137-139; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 16 February 1794.

25 Ibid., 138; Willyams, Expedition, 39; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry

for 16 February 1794.

A l l




volunteers could no t hold their positions in the face of the British professionals, and

within minutes, the Boscq’s troops abandoned the fight either to surrender to the English

or to flee to their homes to hide. Lacorbiere was left with no choice other than to retreat

with the remainder of his National Guard to the military camp in Saint-Pierre.26

Throughout the afternoon and evening, Republican detachments around Saint-

Pierre half-heartedly reinforced positions along the eastern approaches to the city, but

there was little willingness to continue fighting. Contradictory orders to reposition their

units further demoralized the National Guard, who soon suspected that their constant

movement was a plot to exhaust them before they faced the enemy. Instead, many

dispirited Republicans chose to either desert or surrender to the English rather than fight.

As the result, the number o f available troops in Saint-Pierre dwindled hourly. Despite the

repeated reassurances by committee members, the politicians were unable to stem the

wave o f pessimism that overcame the troops.27

With so many Republicans surrendering or fleeing the field, Dundas pushed his

men throughout the night of 15-16 February to capture as many enemy positions above

Saint-Pierre as possible. In fact, Dundas could easily have captured Saint-Pierre that

night had he simply pursued the retreating Republican forces; fortunately for the citizens

26 Ibid., 138. In an effort to gain intelligence on the battles taking place northeast

of the city, the Committee o f Public Safety in Saint-Pierre sent the commander o f the city

garrison, Commandant Mollerat, to inspect the posts along the le Mom e Rouge-Saint-

Pierre road. When Mollerat arrived at Terrien, he noticed that the English were movingto cut of f a the Republicans’ retreat. Lest they be captured, Mollerat ordered the troops to

fall back to the Valminiere plantation. This order, however, was never followed;

Republicans that were not killed or captured, escaped into Saint-Pierre.

27 Ibid.

478




of Saint-Pierre, Dundas did not know how desperate the situation in the city had become.

By daybreak on the 16th, the British threat to Saint-Pierre proved to be overwhelming.

Without a single round having fallen on the city, civil authorities sent a message to the

British asking for three days to consider terms. Dundas responded that he would allow

only three hours before he resumed his attack. The citizens of Saint-Pierre never

responded. A short time after they received the British general’s response, an alarm went

up in the city that English warships were sailing into the Rade du Saint-Pierre.28

To assist the land effort against Saint-Pierre, Grey and Jervis had detached seven

heavily-armed warships and a bom b ketch from his fleet at Republique-ville, along with

transports carrying fifteen light infantry and grenadier companies. British naval gunners

spent most o f the day on the 16th ranging various targets in the city, and at 6:00 p.m., they

opened fire in earnest. When artillerymen in two o f Saint-Pierre ’s harbor batteries

attempted to drive the ships away with a crossfire o f heated shot, Captain Eliab Harvey’s

Santa Margarita (36) quickly silenced it. Seeing how easily the British crushed the main

harbor battery, Republican artillerists panicked and abandoned the remaining guns around

the harbor. Committee members and commune officials tried to recall the men to their

posts, even forcing Commandant M ollerat to order the repeated beating of the Generale,

but their efforts were in vain. Less than 100 volunteers ral lied to the city’s defense; most

soldiers sought places to hide.29

Shortly before 1:00 a.m. on 17 February, a member o f the Committee o f Public

28 Ibid., 138-139; Willyams, Expedition, 40-41.

29 Ibid., 140; Willyams, Expedition, 41.

479




Saint-Pierre

J E R V I S

The Battle for Saint-Pierre

15 - 17 February 1794 - Dundas and Campbell attacked Republican redoubts northeast of Saint-Pierre. Follow ing an initial skirmish at the Rosiers habitation, Meunier and his

Chasseurs withdrew to le Morne Rou ge. Dundas subsequently pushed the Republicans

through redoubts at Lavernade and Terrien, and finally into Saint-Pierre. Jervis sent a

squadron and infantry to assault Saint-Pierre by sea. Dundas remained in positions above

Saint-Pierre throughout the 16th and 17th -- the British captured the city from the sea.

Enlarged Art a

Figure 53. The Battle for Saint-Pierre

480




misinterpretation o f the law, there was no time for the loyal committee mem bers to argue

with him. Instead, they pressed Commandant Mollerat to protect the city from capture,

but with no troops available, he convened a council of war with the officers,

Assemblymen, and Committee o f Public Safety members who still remained in the city.32

It required only several minutes for the council to decide that Saint-Pierre was in

no condition to resist a siege, and that a suitable course of action was to declare the city

open. This decision was sent to the departing Counsel-General, who responded that

Commandant Mollerat was perfectly within his rights to surrender the city. In fact, the

Counsel-General offered to send a message to the English generals to ask for an

armistice. Rather than accept his offer, the Committee of Public Safety plundered the city

treasury and then disbanded, only to join the scores of other city dignitaries who managed

to board the last ship out of Saint-Pierre. Edouard Meunier, commander o f the 2d

Chasseur Battalion disguised himself as a woman and escaped the city in a rowboat. In

the end, only the mayor, M. Au Cane, honored his pledge to Rochambeau that he would

not surrender Saint-Pierre. The price of his loyalty was that he was the first city official

taken prisoner by the British. By 10:00 a.m. on 17 February, British troops occupied all

o f Saint-Pierre. Dundas, who was still contending with pockets o f loyal defenders, had

no idea that the city had fallen until he sent an officer to find out the delay of the

Com mittee’s response to his earlier ultimatum.33

32 Bailleul, Report (Seconde P artie), 142.


(Seconde Partie), 142; Willyams, Expedit ion, 42; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 232.

Conflicting accounts remain concerning the British occupation of the city. Grey had

482




When news reached the capital that the British controlled Saint-Pierre, members

of the Committee o f Public Safety of Republique-ville turned their bile against

Rochambeau, accusing him o f negligence for having left the road open between Saint-

Pierre and la Trinite. The general did not bother to rebut these new charges. For days,

the British had effectively contained Rochambeau’s forces in Republique-ville. The

British constructed new artillery positions around the capital, while enemy transports

landed more troops in the Cohe du Lamentin. In every quarter of Martinique, save the

capital city, the island’s defenses had collapsed. Ironically, it was now Bellegarde and his

Chasseurs at Surirey who constituted Rochambeau’s forward line o f defense.34

Just as Rocham beau was consolidating his defenses around Republique-ville,

Bellegarde and the remnants of the 1st Chasseur Battalion demanded the opportunity to

attack Prescott’s troops. Rochambeau ordered the battalion to fortify the Surirey

published specific orders banning looting under penalty of death. As a result, at least one

British soldier (a drummer) was hanged from the gates o f Saint-Pierre’s Jesuit College forthat crime. On the other hand, Rochambeau claimed in his diary that the English troops

forced wounded and sick Frenchmen out o f the c ity’s hospital and into the streets to make

room for their own soldiers. While not going into such detail, Rev. Willyams’ account

did confirm that British soldiers “found infinite use for our sick and wounded....in the

large and commodious hospital.” Willyams, Expedition, 42, 45; Rochambeau, “Journal

du siege,” entry for 16 February 1794.

34 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 138. Though he continued to rely on the

Chasseurs to hold Republique-ville’s eastern flank, Rochambeau was exasperated with

Bellegarde and his men. On the morning o f the 17th, a group of Chasseurs brought to his

headquarters a black man, who they said was a sorcerer in the service of the enemy.According to the Chasseurs, the man carried a charm in his pocket - a lemon - which

would guarantee that the British would capture the forts. Rochambeau dismissed this

ridiculous “ poltronerie ,” but to divest him o f his magical powers, the Chasseurs

nevertheless publicly shaved the prisoner from head to toe and threw him in the for t’s jail.

Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 17 February 1794.

483




encampment, but Bellegarde claimed the eastern defenses of Republique-ville were

secure, and asked Rochambeau for permission to attack the British troops landing in the

Cohe du Lamentin. Surprisingly, the general acquiesced, telling the Chasseur commander

to “do whatever he wanted.” Instead of attacking south, however, Bellegarde changed his

plan and prepared to attack the Maltide camp at M om e le Brun. When Rochambeau

learned o f Bellegarde’s intentions, on the morning o f the 18th, he immediately sent Jean

Isaac to their camp to warn Bellegarde that all military forces were to remain in their

current positions and not undertake any offensive action. Isaac arrived at the Surirey

camp that afternoon, but he was too late; Bellegarde and his men were already on their

way to Mome le Brun.35

Meanwhile, Rochambeau convened the Committee o f Public Safety for what he

described as an important announcement, and then read aloud the letter from Soudon-

Longbois to Colonel Rivecourt. When he finished, Grandmaison demanded to know why

they had not been apprized o f the letter earlier; Rochambeau jokingly replied that he had

kept the letter a secret, lest any of the committee members go over to the enemy. His

comments were not well-received.36

Grandmaison, who had a separate copy of the o f letter, noted the obvious


(Seconde Partie), 143-144, 148. Rochambeau later accused Isaac, who along with the

rest of the committee members was “ignorant of the art o f war,” o f allowing Bellegarde to

convince him to proceed with the attack. As a member of the Committee of Public Safetyin Republique-ville, it was certainly within Isaac’s power to prevent the attack from

taking place.


entry for 19 Februaiy 1794.

484




exaggerations in the numbers of enemy troops on the island, and made the point that the

letter had only been written to weaken Republican resolve. “Anyone,” he continued,

“who might be discouraged by such scurrilous garbage should be ashamed of himself.

True Republicans have no other choice but to fight to the death rather than cover

themselves with shame by asking for surrender.” Indeed, recent intelligence gathered by

a Committee spy who had actually infiltrated the enemy encampments, proved that there

were far few er British troops on the island than reported by the defector Soudon.

“Soudon was a friend of yours,” Grandmaison observed to Rochambeau, “is it possible

that you have been taken advantage of?” When Rochambeau made no reply,

Grandmaison continued. “Anyone with any sense can easily see that this English

proclamation uses every means possible to seduce one group and intimidate the other. Do

you, general, actually believe the promises o f the B ritish to refrain from harming

defenseless patriots?” “Yes,” Rochambeau answered, “I have their guarantee.” “Fine,”

Grandmaison replied. “So that you realize the solemnity of our oath, know that you

receive it in the name of the Republic, and that we have made it freely and openly: we

will hold to the death.” “Ba, ba, ba,” Rochambeau responded, “war is not made with

oaths and morality, it is made with men and cannon in fortresses, and by the selfless

service o f those who have decided to die for the Republic, not your oaths and

moralizing.”37

While the general drew diagrams for the Committee to explain his plans for the

city’s defense, the sound of nearby gunfire echoed throughout Hotel de Ville, and soon, a

37 Ibid., 145-146; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege” , entry for 19 February 1794.

485




messenger arrived announcing that Bellegarde had attacked Mome le Brun. “What a

perfectly foolish thing they are doing there,” Rochambeau cried, “Surirey is lost!”

Indeed, a short time later, an urgent message was delivered to Rochambeau confirming

that the remaining Republicans in the Surirey post were under attack, and that the

beleaguered com mander was asking for reinforcements. The meeting adjourned abruptly,

and Rochambeau hurried from the building to tend to the crisis. Now, the commissaires

agreed, Rocham beau was paying the price for allowing Bellegarde to be master of his

own military operations.38

Rushing into his headquarters, Rochambeau ordered Daucourt to co llect a

company of National Guard from the city, and to do his best to reinforce the troops at

Surirey. The colonel complied, but was too late. When Daucourf s reinforcements

arrived at Surirey, they were met by cannon fire from the captured camp; five

Republicans lay dead before D aucourt was forced to retreat.39

Bellegarde’s senseless offensive was a blessing for General Grey. In order to

invest Fort-de-la-Convention, he needed to control the Surirey Heights, which was

impossible while Bellegarde remained encamped there. When Bellegarde’s Chasseurs

moved to attack the enemy encampment at Mome le Brun from the east, General Prescott

arrived with reinforcements and crashed into the Chasseur right flank. Grey, who

realized that Bellegarde had left his own camp weakly defended, immediately ordered

38 Ibid., 147. As he was leaving the meeting, Rochambeau predicted that the post

would soon fall into enemy hands. Rather than attempt to help, the committee members

simply called after him that by law, they could not consider the English proposals.

39 Ibid.

486




GOR0J0N

Republique-viUe

J E R V I S

Destruction of the 1st Chasseur Battalion at Morne le Brun18 February 1794 - Bellegarde attempted to attack the British camp at Morne le Brun.

Prescott crushed the Chasseur right flank, while Grey counterattacked into the Chasseur

camp on Surirey. Colonel Daucourt was unable to save the camp.

Enlarged Area

Figure 54. Destruction o f the 1st Chasseur Battalion at Mome le Brun

487




three infantry battalions to storm the southern part o f the Surirey Heights. The result of

this successful maneuver was the capture o f the National Guard company at the Chasseur

camp, and the last two field pieces that Rochambeau had available.40

Once Bellegarde realized that the counterattack by Prescott was a feint to mask

Grey’s move against the Chasseur camp at Surirey, he broke o ff his own attack against

Mome le Brun. Certainly, Bellegarde was more interested in saving his supplies than in

rescuing the National Guard company who defended his post, but he arrived too late. The

National Guard were then prisoners and the materiel in the Chasseur camp was now

British property. With no other option, Bellegarde ordered his men to seek refuge in a

nearby redoubt. When Rochambeau arrived on the scene some minutes later, he ordered

Bellegarde to retire. This time, the Chasseurs obeyed Rochambeau’s order and withdrew

to Republique-ville, where to the horror o f the inhabitants, they rioted for pay and began

looting the city. Rochambeau was so irate that he ordered his regular troops to force the

Chasseurs at gunpoint to a encamp outside the walls o f Fort-de-la-Convention’s

northernmost fortification, lunette Bouille.41 Here they remained for several days during

40 Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33; Grey had already

issued orders for a bayonet assault against the Surirey camp to take place at 1:00 a.m. on

the 19th. Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 18 February 1794. These were

presumably the same two cannons that Rochambeau brought w ith him from Case-Navire.


(aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 9. Captain Magloire Pelage and his

Chasseur company held lunette Bouille (which directly faced the British artillery positions on Mome le Brun and the Surirey Heights) until the end o f the siege. With no

other mobile force between him and the enemy, Rochambeau could argue that his

decision to send additional Chasseurs to reinforce Pelage was based upo n operational

necessity. Indeed, forcing Bellegarde and his new “Chasseurs” to encamp so far from the

capital was not necessarily a punitive measure, and may have been simply protective.

488




the ensuing bombardment, until the general allowed them to move beside the city arsenal.

Clearly, Rochambeau was finished with Bellegarde and his renegade Chasseurs de la

Martinique ; the extent o f his disgust with “colored” troops was evident in his journal:

I sent two companies o f reinforcements, but all o f the attentionsand labor o f those sent to rally the fugitives o f this black corps,

especially my aides-de-camp and my adjutant, did little to get them

marching. The soldiers did not want to be beaten again, the

officers set a poor example by not putting themselves at the head o f

their troops, and the orders that were given were not strong enough

to produce any good effect. Their exaltation is always artificial.

They remain poltroons, until the m oment that they hear the whistle

of a ball, when they revert to their primary character.42

With the British tightening their cordon around Republique-ville, Rochambeau

had lost his last chance to face them in field combat before they began their siege. “I was

so weak,” he remarked dejectedly, “that one voice told me to wait for help from Europe,

while another called for negotiation; it was impossible for me to listen to either when I

had the business o f the forts and the traitors to attend to.”43

Republique-ville’s commissaires again blamed Rochambeau for Bellegarde’s

failure, and the following morning, he was again defending himself before the

Committee. They blamed the general’s own negligence for the fall o f Surirey. He

retorted that the Comm ittee, in the person o f Jean Isaac, either directly or implicitly, gave

Bellegarde permission to attack Mome le Bran. The disagreement continued unabated

They had, after all, made threats to bum everything in their path, including Republique-

ville.

42 Ibid.; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 147; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to

Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 9.

43 Ibid.

489




until a messenger brought word from the English commander. Again, Grey included a

copy of his proclamation, as well as a personal summons that Rochambeau surrender the

remaining forts. When he read the letter to the Committee and asked their opinion, the

members unanimously declared that it was not their place to pass judgem ent on w hat the

enemy had to say. Rather than waste more time debating with the Republican politicians,

Rochambeau read the messages to his soldiers at Fort-de-la-Republique. “I have

debarked fifteen-thousand elite troops o f the army and fleet,” he quoted to his men, “and

by the rapidity with which your exter ior defenses have fallen you have proven the

infallibility o f my later success. Many more ships of the line are arriving at Barbados to

reinforce the land and sea armies and I expect a greater advantage. Further resistance is

useless....” In response, every soldier in Fort-de-la-Republique, Republican volunteers

and regular troops alike, answered that “they preferred combat to a shameful

capitulation.”44

With his response drafted, Rochambeau sent his personal friend and aide-de-

camp, Colonel Rivecourt, to Surirey to deliver the message to Grey. This horrified the

Republicans, who believed R ivecourt favored surrender, especially since he was the

brother-in-law of the infamous turncoat Soudon-Longbois. Nevertheless, at 6:30 p.m. on

19 February, Rivecourt left Republique-ville to carry the message to the British garrison.

That he left the city with only his house servant as an escort, further fueled the committee

mem bers’ suspicion. Both men, however, returned from the mission a short time later,

44 Grey to Rochambeau, 17 February, 1794, reprinted in Daney, Documents, 174-

175; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 150; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for

19 February 1794.

490




severely wounded (the servant mortally), with both o f their horses each carrying four or

five musket ball wounds. The British had refused to deal with them.45

The following morning, Rochambeau again sent a message to Grey, but this time

he sent Bellegarde’s former adjutant, Commandant Naverres, to deliver the message by

boat to Admiral Jervis. When Naverres reached the Boyne, Jervis opened the dispatch to

read two separate replies, one straightforward, and the other intended to irk General Grey.

The first message was a terse response by Rochambeau, “I have communicated with the

troops of the Republic: they are resolved to defend themselves.” In the second message,

however, Rochambeau offered to surrender the island on the condition that Martinique

would be restored to Louis XVII if he should come to the throne. However, he added, i f

the French Republic won the war, then the colony would be returned to France. Of

course, such an arrangement was impossible.46

Within the hour, Naverres was escorted to Surirey and given an audience w ith the

English commander. After reading the message, a somewhat surprised General Grey

penned his own responses to Rochambeau, the first one official, and the second a

response to Rochambeau’s other offer. In his first letter, Grey offered Rochambeau


entry for 19 February 1794; Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du

Siege,” 8. Already incensed that Rochambeau did not consult them prior to sending his

response, the committee members felt further insulted that he selected another o f his

aristocratic aides to deliver the message rather than choosing a “loyal Republican.”

Rochambeau had little else to discuss with the Committee, who, as far as he wasconcerned, had abrogated their authority by asserting that they could not, by law, consider

surrender. The fate o f the colony thus became a matter for the military authorities alone.

46 Rochambeau to Grey, 19 February 1794, reprinted in Daney, Documents , 176;

Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 20 February 1794; Willyams, Expedition, 51.

491




twenty-four hours to reconsider, and warned “I will not listen to any more proposals, and

will treat with the greatest severity those which may be contrary to my generous offers.”

In his second, he replied simply that “I came expressly to take the island for his Britannic

Majesty; and I hope to take all o f the French islands in this quarter on the same

account.”47

When Naverres returned to British headquarters the following morning, the

response that he brought from Rochambeau was clear. In fact, Rochambeau had asked

his men a second time i f they would consider surrender. “No,” they replied, “we will

defend ourselves and will fight.”48 In the preceeding week, the French had lost the

majority of Martinique. Saint-Pierre was occupied by the British, and Gordon, Jervis and

Grey surrounded Republique-ville. The cease-fire afforded some time for the French to

reorganize, but the result of Grey’s campaign was decided. Nevertheless, Rochambeau

and the loyal soldiers occupying the forts would make a final, desperate effort to defend

the honor of the Republic.

47 Rochambeau to Grey, 20 February 1794, and Grey to Rochambeau, 20

February, 1794, reprinted in Daney, Documents, 176-177; Rochambeau, “Journal du

siege”, entries for 20 and 21 February 1794. Naverres spent most of the 20th in the British

headquarters, and upon his return to Republique-ville was summoned to testify before the

Committee o f Public Safety. Wanting to confirm their suspicions that the English force

was much smaller than Grey had previously represented, the members became indignant

when Naverres imperiously parroted the British claim that they not only had 15,000 men

on the ground, but also forty mortars pointed at the capital city, ready for action. The

commissaires booed the aide out o f their chambers, saying that he “sounded more like afarmhand than a general’s aide.” Bailleul, Report {Seconde Partie), 152; Anonymous

(aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege”, 8.

48 Rochambeau to Grey, 21 February 1794, reprinted in Daney, Documents, 178;

Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 21 February 1794; Willyams, Expedition, 51.

492




Chapter XVI

The Siege of Republique-ville:

21 February - 17 March 1794

British soldiers were not idle during the short cease-fire. Braving a torrential

rainstorm that continued throughout the night o f 20-21 February, nearly 300 men dragged

heavy siege artillery uphill for nearly five miles to establish batteries on recently-acquired

southern tip o f the Surirey Heights. No proper roads ran up Surirey, and after

constructing temporary bridges o f rocks and logs across the swollen Riviere Monsieur,

the troops forced their way to the top o f the hills along unimproved jungle paths.

According to one observer, soldiers, horses and artillery limbers making their way up the

sodden paths sometimes slipped backward twenty feet at a time, forcing men to crawl and

to claw the ground to get the guns up the mountains. This, the observer complained,

“[w jithout even an additional allowance o f grog as encouragement.” By the morning of

21 February, British heavy artillery was in position above both Republique-ville and Fort-

de-la-Convention. When Naverres returned to the British camp with Rochambeau's

negative response to their summons, Grey recommenced his attack with a renewed fury.1

1 Willyams, Expedit ion, 53-54; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 21

February 1794. The hill mass that the British referred to as the “Surirey (or Sourier)

Heights” included the Surirey and Tiberge plantations. Today, the approximate centers o f

493




The com bined land/sea attack against Republique-ville had already forced

Rochambeau to split his few artillerymen between Fort-de-la-Republique and Fort-de-la-

Convention. Now Grey and Jervis forced the Frenchmen in the two forts to fight in

nearly every direction. While gunners at Fort-de-la-Convention directed their fire west

and north toward positions held by Gordon and Grey, the men in Fort-de-la-Republique

focused their efforts on the gun boats that Jervis had sent to attack them from the bay.

That evening, Rochambeau described the deteriorating situation in his diary: “....we are

going to sustain a siege without having a single engineer to manage the defenses, without

artillerymen to serve the batteries, without troops to defend the fortresses, without sappers

to charge counter-mines, without palisades covering the streets, without staff officers,

without administrators, and without any money.”2

It was true that there was little hope of finding more money in the capital. The

Committee o f Public Safety scrupulously managed every livre that they received from the

city businessmen, but a rapid succession o f expenses threatened to empty the treasury

those properties are Poste Calon and Plateau Tiberge respectively. Grey’s men quickly

moved several kilometers farther south to the site o f Bellegarde’s former encampment at

the Tully estate (vicinity o f Floreal), and began the first of their siege trenches.

2 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 21 February 1794. In this same diary

entry, Rochambeau cursed Lacrosse for leaving Martinique with his only available heavy

naval asset, and lamented that “ [i]f only Lacrosse had no t deserted, certainly I would be

rid of these boats!” Such an observation seems unlikely until one considers how little the

artillerymen in Fort-de-la-Republique could depress their cannons. The British gun boats

were specifically designed to take advantage o f that limitation by being able to m ovemuch closer to an enemy fortification than any ships o f the fleet. Willyams, Expedition,

48. Even with the Felicite trapped in the anchorage next to Fort-de-la-Republique, the

height o f Lacrosse’s guns in relation to the water line would have allowed the gunners

aboard the Felicite to directly engage the British gun boats no matter how close they came

to the fort.

494




more quickly than anyone expected. On 22 February, the Committee ordered the

Commune o f Republique-ville to surrender all of the money that they had received from

the sale of emigre goods, but even this sum did little to alleviate the financial crisis. On

the other hand, Rochambeau mitigated his shortage o f artillerymen by impressing a

number o f sailors who were wandering the capital's streets. Merchant seamen in the

colony had already received orders to serve in various land batteries at the beginning o f

the invasion, but once the English invested Republique-ville, the sailors used the pretext

o f ensuring the safety o f their cargo to avoid serving in the land fortifications. As the

result, Rocham beau ordered the Commune to issue a warrant for all sailors in the harbor

area to report to Fort-de-la-Convention, where regular army soldiers could keep a close

eye on them in case they tried to desert.3

Even with the additional naval gunners, Republique-ville remained desperately ill-

prepared to withstand a siege. The citizens were alm ost completely unprotected from

enemy artillery, but worse, the m ain ammunition stockpile for Fort-de-la-Convention had

not yet been retrieved from the city arsenal. With every available regular soldier and

National Guard unit manning defensive positions around the capital, there were not

enough soldiers to accomplish the task - Rochambeau no longer had a civilian workforce.

The 5,000 work days provided by the corvee laborers had accomplished little more than

repairing some of the island’s principle fortifications. Since Daigremont failed to pay or

feed government laborers, many fled the city in search of food. Despite an order from

Daigremont to make laborers available to the army, the Commune refused to surrender

3 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie ), 160.

495




the blacks that remained under their control until the Committee o f Public Safety

intervened. When workers learned that the Committee had given Rochambeau 3,000

livres for the sole purpose of paying for their labor, scores of hungry men returned to the

city on their own volition; National Guard marched through the city rounding up any

others who had no t voluntarily responded to R ochambeau’s call.4

There was little incentive for anyone to remain in the capital in the closing days o f

February 1794. Citizens in Republique-ville had already withstood regular British

shelling o f the city for over a week, and by the evening o f 26-27 February, panicked

women crowded around the Hotel de Ville pleading either for protection or permission to

leave the city.5 In fact, Rochambeau gave such permission nearly a week earlier, but the

word reached few citizens. Imagining that the British might offer more favorable terms if

large numbers o f women and children remained in the city, the Committee o f Public

Safety ordered the commune to keep Rochambeau's order secret, and denied non-

combatants permission to go past the city gates. Now, it was too late for anyone to leave

the Republique-ville; the English refused to allow refugees seeking safety in the

countryside to pass through their posts. In an effort to cover their deception, the civilian

leadership o f Republique-ville declared that Rochambeau alone had the means and the

legal responsibility to protect the city’s non-combatants. When Commune officials wrote

4 Ibid., 158.

5 Ibid., 159. The women reported that several persons were seriously wounded,

and that two or three women had been killed, one the previous evening when a stray

mortar round fired from Fort-de-la-Convention fell through her ro of and exploded inside

her house.

496




a letter instructing Rochambeau to shelter women, children, old and sick in the casemates

of Fort-de-la-Republique, they were horrified when he refused.6

The difficult situation facing civilians in the capital was made worse by a citywide

food shortage. Since mid-February, National Guard troops had flocked to the city with

their families seeking refuge. In too many cases, while husbands organized to defend the

capital, their wives and children begged in the streets for bread. A few savvy locals

managed to slip out of the city to the Dillon and Valminiere plantations where slaves

traded them wheat and bananas for tafia rum, but the majority were not so well

connected. As food became more scarce, some wom en chose to seek the mercy of the

enemy rather than watch their children starve. Most remained in Republique-ville finding

food and shelter only through the kindness of a besieged citizenry. Again, the Committee

of Public Safety wrote to Rochambeau instructing him to feed any citizen and their family

who occupied a post in the city. The general agreed to this, but with only 4,800 barrels o f

6 Ibid.; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 22 February 1794. Bailleul

included Rochambeau’s response in his report to the Committee o f Public Safety in Paris,

but the attachment has since been lost. It is likely, however, that his refusal was based on

the fact that Fort-de-la-Republique was filled with its own military sick and wounded,

and that most o f the British naval artillery was being directed on that very site. Indeed,

the works in and around the fort had, by that time, suffered a great amount o f damage. A

typically curt response from Rochambeau to the city’s magistrates however, probably

would no t have explained this clearly, if at all.

At the same time, Rochambeau honored his grievously wounded best friend,

Colonel Rivecourt, by sending him home to Lamentin with the best military surgeon then

available. The Committee o f Public Safety had always distrusted Rivecourt, and wasangered by such a display of favoritism; their disapproval did not m atter to the general.

In a rare display o f personal sentiment, Rochambeau admitted a deep sadness at the loss

of his friend, and wondered privately if he would ever see him again. “It is a loss I shall

never forget,” he wrote, “I made a happy habit of his company.” Rochambeau, “Journal

du siege,” entry for 25 February 1794; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 161.

497




flour in the army magazine, he had to implem ent strict rationing. By the end of February

he arranged the cash sale o f a large stock o f army flour to the city bakers; one merchant

had his business confiscated a week later for inflating costs.7

French soldiers defending Republique-ville had little time to consider the moral

and physical state of the civilians that they were trying to protect. Beleaguered

artillerymen in Fort-de-la-Convention struggled to destroy the enemy mortars at Surirey,

but the British advanced steadily downhill tow ard the fort, building guns positions ever-

closer to lunette Bouille. Forty-eight hours after establishing their initial positions at

Surirey, Grey’s men began digging the first of their siege trenches near the lunette; they

expected to open the trench on 7 March. Similarly, Colonel Gordon’s artillerymen began

firing from newly-constructed positions imm ediately above the western part o f the city at

the Larcher and Lacoste plantations. Enemy cannon and mortars now surrounded

Republique-ville on land; Jervis made the ring complete by sending a mortar ship to

augment the gun boats besieging Fort-de-la-Republique.8

With his mortars and heavy artillery slowly destroying Republique-ville, Grey

attempted to end the siege by capitalizing on the animosity that he knew existed between

Rochambeau and the civil authorities. On 26 February, an emigre officer named Sansey

delivered a message to the Hotel de Ville, and asked that it be taken directly to the


8 The Larcher and Lacoste estates were located in the vicinity of the modem Fort-

de-France suburbs of Didier and Sainte-Catherine. These heights immediately

overlooked Republique-ville, making it a simple matter for Gordon’s artillerymen to

signal artillery corrections to the artillery commanders aboard the British warships. See

appendix for Rochambeau’s report o f British forces besieging Republique-ville.

498




Committee o f Public Safety. In the message, Sansey alleged that Rocham beau’s mistress,

Madame de Tully, and a dragoon officer named Domergue, visited the Dillon plantation

the previous evening to attend an emigre-hosted dinner that was attended by several

British officers. During the course o f the meal, Sansey reported, de Tully assured all

present that Rochambeau himself was quite ready to enter into negotiations with the

British, but that he was waiting to be asked by the “knaves” of the Committee and the

Commune. “It is only a question o f honor for the general,” de Tully supposedly said,

“[s]ince I am so close to the person o f M. de Rochambeau, I would rather see him

beheaded than to see his honor compromised.” Naturally, the comm ittee members were

furious, and labeled de Tully an “infamous prostitute!” in their official correspondence.

Subsequent queries proved that Sansey’s allegations were untrue. Grey’s ruse had failed.9

In the midst o f the chaos, Bellegarde had the temerity to approach the

commissaires to demand pay for his men. Bellegarde knew that the Comm ittee

controlled a considerable sum o f money, and he also knew that they might accept his

demand if threatened with a Chasseur insurrection. Initially, his scheme appeared

successful. To prevent further trouble, the members drafted a note against the army’s

cash allotment for a “gift” of 20,000 livres to the Chasseurs. Publicly they announced

that the money was intended to partially reimburse Bellegarde and his men for their

services defending the city. The only condition, however, was that the Chasseurs would

9 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 163; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO,

CO, 318.14, 33.

499




have to presen t the note to Rochambeau for payment.10

Bellegarde was convinced he could not persuade the general to honor the note, so

he asked Pelauque to negotiate the payment. At the time, the request did not seem

altogether absurd. Pelauque had recently visited the general’s wounded friend, Colonel

Rivecourt, prior to his being transferred from the m ilitary hospital to his home in le

Lamentin. During their conversation, Rivecourt gave Pelauque the impression that a

reconciliation was possible between the two enemies. In fact, Rivecourt confided to

Pelauque, Rochambeau was even considering using him as an emissary to the British.

Unlikely as that was, and despite being warned by another o f the genera l’s confidantes

that Rochambeau still considered him his sworn enemy, Pelauque rode to Fort-de-la-

Republique to demand payment o f the Committee no te.11

The interview never occurred. Rochambeau remained ill-disposed to deal with

any Chasseurs, and was dumbfounded that o f all people, his own traitorous secretary

would come begging for money. Pelauque was ordered out of the fort before he could

even dismount his horse .12

10 Ibid., 154-155. On 22 February, Bellegarde sought and received permission

from Rochambeau to attempt to divert the enemy’s attention by attacking into the

countryside. Curiously, the “attack” only progressed as far as the Dillon plantation,

approximately one mile from the city. Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 22

February 1794.

11 Ibid. Sadly, Rivecourt’s earlier failed miss ion to Grey’s camp resulted in the

amputation o f one o f his arms, and it was probably laudanum-induced de lirium thatcaused Rivecourt to confide in Pelauque that Rochambeau had changed his mind

regarding his former secretary.

12 Ibid.; Willyams, Expedit ion, 60. Pelauque rode directly to the Committee of

Public Safety to tell them o f his request and Rochambeau’s conduct. The committee

500




Having failed with Pelauque, Bellegarde next sent Captain Octavius to see

Rochambeau, who admired him, but it was obvious that Bellegarde was using the captain

as an unwitting stooge. Nevertheless, when Octavius reported to the Committee that he

too was refused by Rochambeau, the news caused such an uproar that commissaires

Bailleul, Lamaury and Grandmaison went to Fort-de-la-Republique to advise

Rochambeau of the threat to the city by angering so many Republicans. Rochambeau

refused to discuss any Chasseur issues. The three commissaires were baffled. Still

unaware o f the Chasseurs’ proven incompetence and treachery, they could not

comprehend why the general would slight Bellegarde and his men. The only twisted

rationale that made sense to the committee members was that Rochambeau was trying to

destroy the 1st Chasseur B attalion because they were hampering his negotiations with the

British .13

In fact, the only Republicans negotiating with the enemy in the last week of

February were Bellegarde and Pelauque; in an effort to conceal his ow n guilt, Bellegarde

members simply shook their heads at the absurdity o f the adventure. In their opinion,

Pelauque should have know n better, but once again, the conspiratorial answer made

Pelauque’s actions seem plausible - he had become Rochambeau’s agent to the enemy.

13 Ibid., 156. Rocham beau apparently was so astounded at the committee

mem bers’ accusation that when they asked that he reconsider the recent summons to

surrender, he resorted to a contemporary profanity to indicate his loss of confidence in

them. “All of you,” he said, “have become ‘ Jean Foutraille ’,” a challenge that in the

minds o f the commissaires effectively stripped them of their remaining power. “I know

that the enemy have 15,000 men on the island,” Rochambeau told them, “and that another6,000 are expected.” When the members questioned the numbers, Rochambeau’s retort

was simply that “a general would never lie.” Thus, in accordance with the Law of 25 July

1792, the Committee had no reason to deliberate the issue further. As the highest civilian

authority, they had given their perm ission to surrender; the final decision lay with

Rochambeau.

501




ordered the arrest o f seven of his own men, including a captain, who were “suspected o f

preparing to go over to the enemy.” When the prisoners went before Rochambeau, he

released them with permission to “desert” the unit. Meanwhile, the Committee of Public

Safety issued an eight article proclamation against desertion and sent the document to

Representant en mission a VArmee Grandmaison for Rocham beau’s signature. He

refused to sign the document; once again, the Committee had done too little, too late. To

try to enact a law against deserters at this point, “was nothing more than a cut on the limb

of a tree.”14

The situation among the defenders o f Republique-ville became more

unmanageable by the day. By 25 February, for example, Bellegarde and his men were

looting plantations close to their encampment. Sailors who were called to duty only

reported after the Commander of Artillery published a list of those required to serve in the

batteries. Those who did hide were hunted down by agents o f the Municipality; only

eighty sailors were foun d.15

As for the Chasseur leadership, Rocham beau predicted their every move. He

suspected that Bellegarde and Pelauque planned to defect to the enemy, and that

agitations in the 1st Battalion were only a cover for their leaders’ machinations. When

Rochambeau was informed that key officers o f the battalion were conferring with English

officers at the Dillon plantation, his suspicions were finally confirmed. “They do not

have the courage to desert until they have made the proper arrangements,” Rochambeau

14 Ibid., 162.

15 Ibid.

502




wrote in his diary, “they are embarrassed about w hat they have done and fear the deeds

that they have committed.” He never disclosed his source, but Rochambeau also knew

that the British offered Bellegarde and Pelauque 200,000 livres and passage to America

for their defection. “The Com mittee of Public Safety was told about these conspiracies,”

Rochambeau complained, “they did not dare do anything to hurt those whose false civism

and cowardliness they had so openly supported.”16

Rochambeau made no attempt to hide his anger concerning Bellegarde and his

men. He publicly pronounced that, with the exception o f the four companies stationed in

Republique-ville, he no longer considered the 1st Chasseur Battalion soldiers of the

French Republic. Thus, none of the remaining Chasseurs would be allowed to enter

Republique-ville’s forts; “they can all go to Hell.”17

Despite Rochambeau’s tirade, the leaders o f the Committee o f Public Safety

continued to fear retribution from Bellegarde. Committee leaders warned Rocham beau

that his threats to disband the unit were unjust and impolitic; they advised Bellegarde that

their continuing attacks on the enemy posts were the only way to salvage their reputation

with Rochambeau. By late morning on the 28 February, the committee members were

confident enough o f their mediation to order Rochambeau to distribute to supplies to the

Chasseurs as usual and without delay. They were horrified to discover, several hours

later, that Pelauque and Bellegarde had finally “executed their project.” Shortly before

noon on the 28th, Bellegarde ordered an attack, and then led them straight to the Dillon

16 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 25 February 1794.

17 Ibid., entries for 26 and 28 February 1794.

503




plantation , where British soldiers quickly disarmed them. “Thus w as the end o f the

association which they had already destroyed among themselves,” Rochambeau wrote.

“The force evaporated with the same ease with which they were formed and recruited.”

Bellegarde and Pelauque surrendered nearly 300 of their Chasseurs to the British.

General Grey made them prisoners o f war and sent them to British prison ships, but in

accordance with their earlier agreement, he paroled Bellegarde and Pelauque. The next

day, the two m en sailed for Boston on the recently-captured American schooner Ann.u

As soon as he learned of the desertion, Rocham beau reorganized the four loyal

companies as the 1st Chasseur Battalion, and sent Commandant Naverres, to Bellegarde’s

city quarters to retrieve the battalion colors. At a small, hastily-arranged ceremony,

Rochambeau presented the colors to Captain Lacroix, a former slave who was the oldest

o f the company commanders. Immediately afterward, he ordered Lacroix and his men to

man one o f the demilunes in Fort-de-la-Convention. Captain Octavius and his company


for 26 and 28 February 1794; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.

By 2 March, the Committee o f Public Safety received clearer details regarding the

defection of the Chasseurs. According to reliable reports, Bellegarde and Pelauque had

met Soudon-Longbois some days earlier at the Dillon plantation. When Bellegarde

queried Soudon about the British allowing those o f his men who wanted to defect to cross

unmolested into enemy lines, Soudon promised that he had spoken with Rocham beau

about opening up free passage into the countryside, but that Rochambeau kept all o f the

roads well guarded. Even so, Soudon told Bellegarde, the British knew everything that

went on in the forts and in the city. Thus, he knew that Rocham beau planned to arrest the

Chasseurs to satisfy his vengeance, and that they would all be safe if they came over tothe enemy. Bailleul , Report {Seconde Partie), 167-168. Several months later, Bellegarde

was recognized in Boston, Massachusetts by the crew o f a French ship that happened to

be in port. When the crewmen threatened, literally, to tear him to pieces, Bellegarde was

saved only by being placed under the protective custody of the French Consul. Daney,

Histoire de la M artinique, 232.

504




reinforced Fort-de-la-Republique, while the fourth company, under Captain Pelage,

remained in lunette Bouille, where they had been posted since the Chasseur defeat at

Mome le Brun. The nature of Pelage’s mission speaks volumes for the confidence that

Rochambeau placed in him. He commanded a lunette that protected Fort-de-la-

Convention from the north, and blocked the road leading into Republique-ville from

Mom e le Brun and Surirey. Like Leonidas at Thermopylae, Pelage and his men were all

that stood between the invaders and the capital. If he failed, the battle for Martinique was

lost.19

Because approximately ha lf of his former command remained loyal, Bellegarde’s

sensational defection had less impact on Republican military manpow er than it did on the

defenders’ morale, which was weakening steadily as the result of British propaganda and

the Royalists’collaboration with them ,20 British and emigre propaganda was fairly

19 Every French account, military and civilian, praises Captain Pelage and his

actions during the defense of Republique-ville. Rochambeau often cites his bravery in his journa l o f the siege, while Committee o f Public Safety member Bailleul says that the

Chasseur captain “defended his post against repeated British onslaughts with the skill o f a

thirty-year veteran - a skill which the proud Britons never suspected.” Indeed, Pelage’s

reputation was so exemplary that even Royalists eulogized him forty years later, saying

that because o f his noteworthy conduct he was deservedly promoted to high rank by the

Republic. After Captain Lacrosse was expelled from Guadeloupe in 1801, Colonel

Magloire Pelage headed the island’s interim government until 1802, when he assisted

General Antoine Richepanse reassert metropolitan control over the colony. Pelage retired

from military service until 1808, when he was ordered to service in Spain. He died in

Spain on 7 April 1810. Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 169; Daney, Histoire de la

Martinique, 235.

20 It appears tha t a large number o f the troops that Bellegarde surrendered to the

British included the newer, less-experienced recruits. Other former Chasseurs appear to

have avoided capture by fleeing into the countryside to become renegade outlaws.

Willyams, Expedit ion, 61-62.

505




effective. General Grey habitually exaggerated the numbers o f British troops either on

hand or en route to the colony, and his letters to Rochambeau and to the co lony’s civil

authorities encouraged surrender based both upon simple military logic “to end the

senseless effusion o f blood.”21

Instead of appealing to rational judgm ent, M artiniquais emigres targeted other

fears that were weighing heavily on their counterparts’ minds:

Friends, you are foolish to bear such dangers. Are you thrashing

yourselves for the Negroes and mulattoes who want to cut your

throats? If your resistance is based upon the hope of seeing the

French fleet appear, forget it. France cannot keep her colonies

safe. You are beaten already when you must sustain this siege by

telling yourselves that the French fleet is coming.22

The emigres did not target their fellow whites exclusively. In an effort to inflame

the colony’s blacks, they used a different approach, warning that “ [f]ranee is crushed!

The counterrevolution is assured! The Convention has decided to abandon the colonies,

so you had better reconcile with your former owners and beg for their protection if you

want to avoid being sent back to Africa as the English have announced.” While more

sophisticated readers dismissed these arguments as babble, such misinformation had a

dramatic impact on more impressionable Republicans.23

21 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 27 February 1794. Once his

investment o f Republique-ville was complete, Grey also described the capabilities o f his

current positions, and the fatal consequences o f any future Republican operations to

Rochambeau. By the end of February, even Rochambeau had to admit that “[Grey]knows better than we do the destitution of our situation.”


23 Ibid.

506




Another problem faced by Rochambeau was dissension being sown within his

organization. He deftly obstructed a surrender petition from his National Guard by

announcing that only the “Conseil Superieur” was allowed to determine when the

Republicans were beaten. The unwillingness of the National Guard to fight was among

the least o f his worries, but racial divisiveness was overtaking the defenders of

Republique-ville. On 4 March, Rochambeau arrested Jean-Louis Gentil, the mulatto

escapee from Sainte-Lucie who had been sent to work among the slave labor parties, for

attempting to have Rochambeau arrested, ostensibly by order o f General Ricard.24

What a sad situation it is to be abandoned by France and to be left

with insufficient means to fight exterior enemies and agitators

within. I want to warn the Executive Council of the Republic that

greater dangers exist in this colony than the expulsion o f the

British from this island. The men o f color have abused their rights

and have displayed exaggerated pretensions. They have been

abusive when they should have used sobriety, and the whites hate

them mortally. Once these two classes are victorious over the

British they will tear each other apart unless the forces promised by

the metropole are sent to establish a counterweight sufficient to

main tain public order.25

24 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entries for 25 February and 1 March 1794;

Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 170. Gentil had agitated among mulattoes and slaves

in Republique-ville for several days. To the mulattoes, he argued that if they killed the

whites and then pillaged and burned the capital, the British would look upon them more

favorably when the surrender finally came; Gentil promised slaves that if they joined the

rebellion, they would be emancipated by the British victors. In fact, Bellegarde and

Pelauque orchestrated Gentil’s activities. It was when his call to rebel did not succeed

that Gentil publicly branded Rochambeau a traitor and ordered his arrest. Though

Rochambeau was empowered to have Gentil immediately executed as a traitor, he instead

had the fugitive put in irons in Fort-de-la-Republique until he could be extradited toSainte-Lucie. General Ricard and the Colonial Assembly of Sainte-Lucie, Rochambeau

claimed were the only proper authorities to judge Gentil for the crimes that he had

committed in Sainte-Lucie and Martinique. Gentil’s ultimate fate remains unknown.

25 Ibid., entry for 4 March 1794.

507




Meanwhile, the British bombardm ent continued, and the prospect o f a Republican

victory became more remote. On the bluffs to the west o f the city, Gordon’s batteries

kept at least twelve howitzers constantly in action, while in the north, Presco tt’s men dug

siege trenches facing lunette Bouille. The Republicans fought bravely through the torrent

o f exploding shot, but to little avail. By the beginning of March, Rochambeau observed

in his diary that:

The British are advancing their works masterfully. They know the

advantages that a defender has in a siege and are therefore taking

their time to com pletely disorganize the French garrisons who

really do not understand what is happening, but who have

confidence in me. I will not beat down their hopes. Another

reason that I am holding to the last is that the men well know that it

is I alone who can conclude a peace with the enemy that will obtain

advantageous conditions for them.”26

With limited manpower and ammunition, Rochambeau could do little more than

observe the British success. When word reached him on 3 March that Grey was pressing

his attack due to intelligence he had received concerning the arrival of a French fleet.

Rochambeau only mused that “this is good news if it is true. Nevertheless, I will never

let those rascals into the forts.” That same day, Captain Lacroix’ Chasseur company

received orders to defend the covered road leading into Fort-de-la-Convention.27

By the middle i f the first week of March 1794, the British land and sea attacks

against Republique-ville had proved highly successful. The British deliberately avoided

firing on civilian structures in the city, but the soldiers in Forts de-la-Republique and de-

26 Ibid., entries for 2 and 3 March 1794.

27 Ibid.

508




la-Convention were forced to withstand incessant pounding. Sailors, Chasseurs and

National Guard in both forts took ins truction from the few available trained artillerymen

and did what they could to postpone their inevitable defeat. The men in Fort-de-la-

Convention, which was now the focus o f British forces north of the city, managed to

destroy several enemy batteries on the Surirey Heights. However, more experienced

soldiers observed that the British were secretly constructing new positions on Mom e

Tartanson (a hill mass immediately east o f Republique-ville located near the Dillon

plantation); Grey would unmask these new batteries, the men predicted, when they could

all fire in unison.28

Artillerymen in Fort-de-la-Republique repositioned what cannons they could to

engage the enemy on M ome Tartanson, but on 4 March, British naval forces intensified

their bombardm ent.29 In addition to the enemy gun boats that battered the older fortress at

nearly point-blank range, the larger warships of the fleet had joined the bombardment.

There was a b rief respite in the attack, when Jervis ordered his ships to suspend their

assault long enough for all vessels to fire a salute welcoming His Royal Highness, Major

General Prince Edward Augustus o f Hanover to the theater of operations. Once he was

put ashore at Case-Navire, the Prince immediately took command of Gordon’s brigade,

28 Ibid., entries for 4 and 6 March 1794; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO,

CO, 318.14, 33.

29 Rocham beau surmised that Jervis ordered the gun boats to double their fire at

Fort-de-la-Republique as revenge against French “imbeciles” who had fired on the Dillon

plantation earlier in the day. At the time, only wom en were believed to be in the house,

including Madame Dillon and Madame de Tully. Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry

for 4 March 1794.

509




The Naval Blockade of Republique-ville

Figure 55. The Naval Blockade of Republique-ville

510




and began to direct fire against Fort-de-la-Convention from one of the batteries at the

Lacoste camp. Apparently, the bombardment did not have enough effect to please His

Royal Highness, so he decided to set Republique-ville ablaze that evening. Prince

Edward had already ordered his artillerymen to prepare the incendiary rounds when an

emigre in his camp persuaded him to stop, suggesting that his fellow Royalists in the

colony could more quickly establish a pro-British government on the island if he allowed

Republique-ville to stand.30

On 7 March 1794, Grey launched his main assault. The hidden batteries on

Mome Tartanson were engaged at dawn, and British artillery opened fire on both forts

from nearly every direction. The torrent of projectiles against Fort-de-la-Convention fell

so intensely that by mid-morning an interior wall in the fort completely broke apart,

killing or wounding nearly fifty men. Even Rochambeau, who was helping direct the

guns at Fort-de-la-Republique, sustained wounds from mortar round fragments. When

the fire slackened during the night, he set out on horseback to inspect the city defenses

and to reinforce units that had taken the highest losses. His inspection revealed extensive

damage to both forts, but Rochambeau directed his companies to repair the damages as

30 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entries for 4 and 6 March 1794; Bailleul,

Report (Seconde Partie), 171; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33.;

Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 234. Lieutenant Colonel Saint-Fremont, the artillerycommander at Fort-de-la-Republique, and Lieutenant Lepelletier, who commanded the

Bienvenue (28), combined their efforts on the night o f the 6th to destroy the gun boats that

surrounded the fort. Despite concentrating their fire for several hours against the enemy

vessels, the attempt failed. Jervis’ gun boats were simply too difficult to hit, especially at

night.

511




best they could. Repairing the soldiers’ crippled morale p roved more difficult .31

As the enemy bombardment continued, its effects became increasingly

devastating. By late afternoon on 8 March, every free-standing building in the two forts

was destroyed; the canals and gutters that carried water to the cisterns of both forts were

demolished. Before daybreak on the 9th, a mortar round exploded inside Fort-de-la-

Republique and ignited a barrel o f powder, which in turn set o ff another thirty bombs.

Several sailors manning the guns nearby were killed instantly, while others present

sustained horrible wounds, including the commander of the Union, Captain Mary, who

suffered bum s to over fifty per-cent o f his body.32

For days the barrage continued unabated; ultimately, the fury o f the enemy

offensive became more than some could bear. National Guard from le Vauclin, who had

manned a dem ilune at Fort-de-la-Convention for over twelve days, left their post and

came into the city, maintaining that they could not continue to hold their position.

Rochambeau ordered the municipal authorities to either persuade or force the men back to

their post, but in the end, only a few of the le Vauclin company returned. Conversely, the

courage displayed by the regular troops, Rochambeau wrote in his diary, was “something

to behold.” “The sailors and the volunteers of the former Marechal de Turenne

Regiment, and the few artillerymen were outstanding. I only wish that the National

Guard could follow their example.” The resolve displayed by the citizens of Republique-

ville was also impressive. When sailors working in the forts needed new clothing,

31 Ibid., entries for 7 and 8 March 1794.

32 Ibid.

512




women in the capital made the items. Local carpenters offered their services to the

military at no cost, and soon, they too were braving the hail o f artillery rounds to repair

damaged sections o f Fort-de-la-Republique.33

On the morning o f 12 March, Grey sent another offer to the authorities in

Republique-ville to surrender, allowing them only four hours to respond.

The Forts Bourbon and Saint-Louis being now complettly [sic]

invested and the latter with the Town o f Fort-Royal [sic] at our

mercy; the town filled with inhabitants and sick and wounded, the

dictates o f humanity impel us once more to require you to

surrender on reasonable terms. We regret the sad necessity! [sic]

but in your refusal the tow n and Fort-Saint-Louis must inevitably

be reduced to ashes. It behoves [sic] you therefore to provide for

the helpless sick and wounded, the women and the children. For

wich [sic] purpose we give you this final notice admonishing you

at the same time that this dreadful calamity will rest with you

alone. You well know Fort Bourbon m ust fall.34

“I listened attentively to General Grey’s envoy,” Rochambeau reported, “but used

the time during this armistice to repair our batteries and to provision our artillery. I

responded that I would defend in a manner that would merit the esteem o f the English

generals and their troops.” In fact, few in the capital believed that they could withstand

the British siege for much longer; only pride sustained the Republicans’ resistance.

I have one-sixth o f my regular troops out o f combat and another

one-sixth sick with dysentery, thus the num ber o f troops defending

the forts has been reduced by a third. In spite of that, when the

celebrated surrender comes we will have shown the greater merit

by prolonging our defense. Thus, I am going to work for history’s

33 Ibid., entries for 9 and 10 March 1794; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 173-

174.

34 Bailleul , Report {Seconde Partie ), 179.

513




sake.35

No amount o f pride could not protect the citizens of Republique-ville from the enemy’s

incendiary and exploding shot, and at exactly 11:00 a.m., Grey redoubled his

bombardment. That day, Rochambeau los t another twenty men, including some of his

best cannoneers.36

By mid-March, British artillery rounds fell incessantly on Forts de-la-Republique

and de-la-Convention. Every day enemy mortars and cannon lobbed an average of 200

exploding shells and 2,000 solid balls into the forts, with the result that the Republicans

lost at least twenty men every twenty-four hours. The Republicans began the defense

with only 16,000 bombs and 30,000 cannon balls; with ammunition conservation

measures, the French were able to fire one ball to every six British. By 16 March, the

returns of killed and wounded on both sides was equally disproportionate. On that day,

Grey reported seventy-one men killed, including one army colonel and one navy captain,

193 men wounded, and three men missing. Conversely, a member of Rochambeau’s staff

officers recorded that of a total force of eighty regular infantry and artillerymen, and

about 600 National Guard, nearly three hundred men were killed or wounded. British

advance batteries were within 500 yards o f Fort-de-la-Convention, and the general

35 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 12 March 1794.

36 Ibid. To ensure the loyalty of the remaining citizens, Republicans in the capital

threatened to kill anyone who even mentioned surrender. Bailleul, Report {Seconde

Partie), 175.

514




expected to open his second siege parallel (only 400 yards from the fort) by 20 March.37

Outwardly, the French appeared to accept the carnage brought upon them by the

British siege as jus t a matter o f course. In private, however, no man could discount the

horrific scenes that he witnessed daily. For Rochambeau and his aide, Lieutenant Marlet,

the death of Artillery Commandant Le Mestre was particularly gruesome. On the

morning o f 14 March, the three men stood talking on one o f Fort-de-la-Convention’s

bastions when Le Mestre’s head was taken off by a British cannon ball. Rochambeau was

instantly covered in Le Mestre’s blood and was wounded in the heel, while M arlet had his

kidney pierced by a fragment from Le M estre’s skull.38

As he had with his friend, Colonel Rivecourt, Rochambeau grieved the loss o f his

long-time commander o f artillery. Indeed, the retinue o f regular officers most loyal to

37 Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 12, 13, and 15;

Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 13 March 1794; Grey to Dundas, 16 March

1794. PRO, CO, 318.14, 33; Willyams, Expedit ion, 63. On 14 March, Rocham beau

himself reported 201 m en wounded, and another 100 men hospitalized with dysentery.

38 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 14 March 1794; Bailleul, Report

(Seconde Partie), 179-180. Bailleul, who had harshly criticized Le Mestre earlier, wrote

that the loss of “Mestre-Causant” was a dear one, and m erited a public eulogy from

Rochambeau. “He was known as one o f the colony’s best patriots,” Bailleul now said,

“who had served unusually bravely while long surviving grievous fire upon Fort-de-la-

Convention.” The text of Rochambeau’s eulogy for Le Mestre has not survived. In his

diary, however, he wrote that “ [tjhis officer was one o f the greatest merit and his loss is

irreparable. Day and night he was on the ramparts. His work was of the greatest use to

me during the siege, where he simultaneously worked as director of the artillery, captain

of the works, spotter, and bombardier. He leaves a wife and two children. The Republicshould take care o f them and provide them a pension as this officer’s only fortune was his

talent, his courage, and his virtue.” That same day, Rochambeau relinquished command

of Fort-de-la-Republique to Lieutenant Colonel Saint-Fremont, and gave overall

command o f both forts to Colonel Daucourt. As the result, he was free to supervise the

overall defense of Republique-ville.

515




him was diminishing rapidly, and the losses among his officer corps deeply affected

Rochambeau. It is noteworthy that he was also compelled to write in his journal

mourning the deaths o f his enlisted men:

After M. Lucas, a cannoneer aboard the Bienvenue, had hisshoulder taken o ff by a cannon ball, this brave man sought me out

to tell me that he wanted for all of his comrades to do their duty as

well as he had (he had never left his battery day or night), and that

he would die content knowing that we had been successful. The

young mulatto, Roch, a child o f sixteen or seventeen years o f age,

lost both of his arms to a bomb’s explosion. Bellegarde had taken

him along when he turned his post and his battalion over to the

British. Roch followed his commander not knowing of his perfidy,

but when he found out, he ran away to rejoin us, asking specially

that he be allowed to use his sword against the enemies o f the state.

Men like Lucas and Roch are invincible.”39

Sadly, Rochambeau’s men were not invincible, but many in Republique-ville

began to believe that he migh t be. At least two sources, one Royalist and one Republican,

report that every day he left Fort-de-la-Republique on his horse to visit and comfort the

wounded in the hospital, and to inspect and encourage the troops in all o f the posts

around the city. Throughout his journeys, he was constantly under fire. When British

artillerymen realized the identity o f the solitary figure on horseback, they normally

doubled their fire against him. On one o f these visits, a mulatto named Lagrenade, who

earlier had been sternly reprimanded by Rochambeau for failing to follow orders, fired

two pistol shots at him at close range, but missed. Like Gentil, Lagrenade was soon

executed at Fort-de-la-Convention, but the w onderment surrounding Rocham beau only

increased. “In an enlightened century, he was regarded as a sorcerer,” the Royalists said,


516




“at least he was extraordinary in that he was never hit.”40

Though the military continued to resist the British probes against Republique-

ville, there was little that could be done to alleviate the city’s lack of food. When

officials o f the Commune o f Republique-ville heard a rumor that the Committee o f Public

Safety was hoarding supplies, they pleaded with them to take some sort of preventative

measures against the famine that was threatening to set in. Similarly, the Committee

heard a rumor that the army magazines had enough flour to feed 6,000 people for more

than six months. Within hours the comm issaires wrote to Rochambeau detailing the

city’s needs and asking that he devise a plan to distribute flour to the most needy based

upon age and sex. According to the committee members, Rochambeau made no response

except to send them a letter criticizing some earlier actions by the magistrate that had not

met with h is approval.41

In fact, Rochambeau was taking dangerous measures to try to feed his troops. On

13 March, for instance, he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Saint-Fremont to lead a group of

volunteers across Republique-ville Bay in two small boats to try to collect any livestock

that they could find at the Destourelles plantation. Unfortunately for the Republicans,

Saint-Fremont’s group never got past the English fleet, and lost several men in the

process.42

40 Anonymous (aide-de-camp to Rochambeau), “Precis du Siege,” 15; Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 234.


42 Ibid.; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 13 March 1794.

517




It was already problematic for the Republicans that Rochambeau and the

Committee had not worked harmoniously for weeks. Once the siege o f the capital began,

their lack of cooperation caused men to die unnecessarily. The Committee, who believed

that they had the right and competence to direct military affairs, ordered poorly-conceived

operations which ended in disaster. In one instance, troops stationed at the hospital

battery followed Committee orders to conduct a raid against Prince Edward’s

headquarters at the Lacoste plantation. After a bitter skirmish, the British pursued their

attackers, who soon discovered that no artillery support was forthcoming from nearby

Fort-de-la-Convention. Rochambeau witnessed the retreat, but realizing that the action

was the ridiculous result o f a sortie ordered by either the Committee o f Public Safety or

the commune, he ordered his artillerymen not to fire on the British, not because o f the

stupidity of the order, but because of their close proximity to the hospital.43

Similarly, Captain Dupris, a company commander o f the 32d Line, became irate

over the construction of a gun battery at Pointe des Carrieres with no interference from

Fort-de-la-Republique. Before the enemy could begin firing on the fort, Dupris sought

permission from Lieutenant Colonel Saint-Fremont to lead an expedit ion to put the

enemy guns out of commission. Saint-Fremont demurred, saying that he could not

approve the mission without Rochambeau’s assent. In fact, Saint-Fremont saw little

chance for success in the venture, and chose not to mention it to the general. After

waiting for at least twenty-four hours, Dupris received permission from one o f the

43 Ibid., 172; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 8 March 1794;

Willyams, Expedition, 62.

518




View of Fort-de-la-Republique from Positions at Pointe des Carrieres

British View Across the Cove from Pointe des Carrieres

The View Today

Figure 56. View o f Fort-de-la-Republique from Positions at Pointe des Carrieres

519


C o u r t e s y

N a t i o n a l

M

a r i

t i m e

M

u s e u m



committee members who happened to be visiting the fort. He collected the fifteen men

remaining in his ba ttalion (along with twelve Chasseurs and another eighteen volunteers),

stole a sufficient number o f small boats, and made his way across the cove to Pointe des

Carrieres.44

Dupris and his party had not even neared the shore when the over-zealous captain

and several others jumped into the water and waded noisily toward the enemy battery.

Almost immediately, British infantry appeared on the dunes and fired on the Republicans

who were struggling to get ashore. Minutes later, they shifted their fire against those who

remained in the boats. Dupris ordered a retreat; they had nearly reached their boats when

the battalion sergeant major received a wound which caused him to stumble. When he

tried to rescue the man, Dupris himself was shot in the neck and collapsed into the water.

No one tried to help either the captain or the sergeant major - in the end, fourteen other

men died as the result o f the misguided affair, while a greater number returned to Fort-de-

la-Republique wounded.45

Thus far, the attacks against Fort-de-la-Republique had been conducted primarily

by B ritish naval forces. Between 16 and 17 March, the enemy “unmasked” three new

land batteries at Pointe des Carrieres, and a lethal array of 24-pounder cannons and five-

inch mortars began a constant shelling of the fort and the city from the east. British

gunners behind the eight 24-pounders in the Pointe des Carrieres batteries also enjoyed an

unobstructed line o f fire across the 200-yard wide cove, while the two batteries on M ome

44 Ibid., 177-179.

45 Ibid.

520




Tartanson and at the d ’Estreuse plantation continued to reduce the earthen redoubt

protecting the gates o f Fort-de-la-Republique. With most o f the regular art illerymen in

the fort either killed or wounded, the Republicans inside could do little in response.46

Exploding shells from the enemy howitzers were already ravaging Republique-

ville, but Prince Edward eventually prevailed upon the British command to replace this

conventional ammunition with incendiary rounds. Once fired, many o f the fire bombs hit

the ground and extinguished themselves, but just as many others ignited scores o f houses

in the city, causing absolute pandemonium among the civilian populace. When

Rochambeau took the majority o f the men in Fort-de-la-Republique into town to fight the

fires, Jervis seized the opportunity to attempt a naval assault against the fort.47

Thus far, British naval forces had not yet attacked the few remaining French

vessels in the cove. This changed when rumors spread that the French had British

46 Willyams, Expedition, 64; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 19 March

1794. Encouraged by the weak response from both Fort-de-la-Republique and Fort-de-la-Convention, the British moved two field pieces and a howitzer onto the Case-Navire

road. Within minutes, English artillerymen were firing at the hospital, mercilessly killing

wounded troops inside and giving new wounds to others. Clearly, the English officer

who commanded the guns knew Rochambeau by sight. The general regularly crossed a

nearby bridge over the Riviere Ribodeau to dine with his friend M. Steinbrenner; every

time he appeared, the enemy cannoneers doubled their fire; they missed every time.

Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 182-183.

47 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 184. When the British began their attack

against Fort-de-la-Republique with field artillery, it was inevitable that rounds would pass

over the fort and then fall in the city. At approximately 7:00 p.m. on the 16th, anexploding shell landed inside the city jail, where Rochambeau kept nearly 300 Royalists

that he had transferred from the Bienvenue (until the invasion, the ship served as a prison

barge). The explosion was so strong that it created a large crack in the wall of the jail,

and caused part of the floor to collapse. Miraculously, no one inside was hurt. Bailleul,

Report (Seconde Partie), 181.

521




prisoners aboard the Bienvenue, thus exposing them to fire from the British batteries. As

the result, Lieutenant Bowen, a jun ior officer aboard the Boyne, received permission from

Admiral Jervis to try to set them free. At ten o ’clock in the morning on the 17th, Bowen

left Pointe des Carrieres with fifteen armed rowboats, moving toward Fort-de-la-

Republique. Halfway across the cove, however, ten o f the boats deceptively changed

course, and the sailors rowed furiously toward the Bienvenue. The surprised French

aboard the ship managed to fire several cannon at the rapidly approaching British, but

they were overwhelmed by the fire from the longboats. Within minutes, scores of British

sailors boarded the Bienvenue and captured the ship’s wounded commander, L ieutenant

Pelletier; most o f the sailors on deck escaped capture by jumping overboard.48

The attack by Lieutenant Bowen a ttack did not proceed unnoticed by the

defenders o f Fort-de-la-Republique. “Aux armes” sounded throughout the fort soon after

the British longboats rounded Pointe des Carrieres, and the handful o f National Guard

and Chasseurs (Octavius), not fighting fires, lined the walls o f the fort and fired a steady

fusillade o f musket and grape shot at the enemy longboats. Nevertheless, Bow en seized

the Bienvenue, B ritish artillerymen opened fire against the fort with the guns aboard the

48 Ibid., 184; Willyams, Expedition , 65. According to Republican sources, the

one sentry left to watch the cove from Fort-de-la-Republique was derelict in his duties

and provided no warning to anyone in the fort or aboard the ships.

After Captain Lacrosse’s “criminal desertion” of Martinique, Rochambeau named

Lieutenant Lepelletier commander o f French naval forces in the W indward Islands.Lepelletier was gravely wounded during the attack, but unlike his crew, he remained at

his post throughout the fight. Rochambeau was so impressed by the lieutenan t’s bravery,

that he later recomm ended that the National Convention promote him to the grade o f

Captain. Lepelletier’s ultimate fate remains unknown. Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,”

entry for 17 March 1794.

522




captured ship. The British veered sharply. Despite their most strenuous efforts, Bowen

and his sailors could not maneuver the Bienvenue out of the cove. Republicans onshore

were doubly encouraged when a British sailor climbed the mizzen mast and could not

strike the Tricolor. After more than two hours, Lieutenant Bowen and his men retreated

in their rowboats, taking Lieutenant Pelletier and his crewmen with them. Bowen never

found any British prisoners, but Jervis considered the mission a complete success.

Considering the results o f this latest “reconnaissance by fire,” Jervis surmised that his

either his sailors or his marines could overwhelm Fort-de-la-Republique if it were

attacked directly. He immediately ordered his men to begin lashing together bamboo

ladders so they could scale the th irty foot walls o f the fort.49

With the absolute minimum o f resources, Rochambeau and his defenders had held

Republique-ville throughout three weeks o f intensive enemy siege operations. By mid-

March 1794, the British were astonished and dismayed by the French resolve; the

attackers were, themselves, running short of supplies and ammunition. The resilient

defense of Republique-ville had proceeded far beyond what, at the time, was considered

reasonable or practical. Worse, Grey received daily reports concerning the status of

magazines in Forts de-la-Republique and de-la-Convention; he believed Rochambeau’s

continued defense was impossible. Indeed, Republican military resistance seemed to defy

logic; it appeared that Rochambeau and his soldiers were quite prepared to defend their

own graves. For General Grey, the only promise for a timely victory lay in exploiting the

49 Willyams, Expedit ion, 65. The Bienvenue, which was actually an armed stores

ship, was renamed the Undaunted and put into British service.

523




steadily-suffering citizens o f Martinique.

524




Chapter XVII

“We Can Only Hope That They Treat Us Favorably....”

18 March - July 1794

By 18 March, with Republique-ville under constant bombardment by the British

artillery that now completely ringed the city for three weeks, a majority o f the citizens felt

that they had suffered enough. Almost everyone had read Grey’s surrender summons that

was posted in the city two days earlier, and a mob of angry protesters gathered at the

Hotel de Ville demanding that the Commune support a surrender petition addressed to

Rochambeau. When the mayor refused to sign the document, the mob dragged him into

the street and beat him. Following an emergency session, the Commune and the

Committee o f Public Safety sent a report to Rocham beau recognizing that support was

not forthcoming from France, and asking that he conclude an honorable surrender. “I

made no response to any demands o f this nature,” Rochambeau wrote, “as I still counted

on the ministry’s promise; instead I was cheated.” When a group calling themselves

“Sans Culottes” threatened to “box the ears” of anyone who spoke o f surrender, the

protestors dropped their demands the next day.1

1 Mssrs. Marlet, Tascher and Grandmaison Sainte-Rose, the same men who

warned committee member Lamaury o f Bellegarde’s treachery earlier in the month, led

the protest after reaching a separate agreement with the enemy. Bailleul, Report (Seconde

525




Nevertheless, troops throughout the city deserted as rumors of a surrender spread,

and soon Lieutenant Colonel Saint-Fremont appeared before the municipal offices with

the news that Fort-de-la-Republique was nearly abandoned. The Commune issued an

order that all men stationed at Fort-de-la-Republique immediately return to their posts,

but in the middle of this new est crisis, those who supported a surrender faction demanded

another audience with the city authorities. At a meeting called by the General Council of

the Commune, protestors demanded that the colony’s authorities surrender. The Council,

in turn, petitioned the Committee o f Public Safety to make a decision.2

In fact, there was nothing that the Committee could do. According to the Law of

25 July 1792, neither they nor any other civil authority could require a military

commander to surrender a besieged town. Those advocating capitulation jeered the

Committee for their impotence, but were soundly denounced as perjurers and Royalists.

“We may choose between being slaves in the service o f Great Britain, or enjoying the

blessings o f liberty o f the Republic,” Commissaire Grandmaison announced, “we will be

shamed if we are beaten.” Such patriotic sidestepping only angered the agitators more.

Their treasonous leaders were already conspiring with the British; they secured British

promises of favorable terms to the civilians if they could persuade the Republican

authorities to sue for peace. They might become “slaves in the service o f Great Britain,”

some of the protestors reasoned, but at least the Crown o f England would grant them

Partie), 188-190; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entry for 18 March 1794.

2 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 191-193.

526




semi-autonomy, and would allow them to keep their slaves.3

As the argument continued, the sound o f gunshots nearby left no doubt that the

enemy would soon enter the city. The Committee meeting deteriorated into panicked

chaos, and protestors threatened to kill the comm issaires i f they did not end the carnage.

Still, the committee members remained firm, heralding that “[a]fter our brothers in

Europe have won on all fronts, they will then come to us for an accounting o f our actions.

Then they will find the accounts o f the colony’s death and our own justifications.”

Preferring to consider their more immediate future, the protestors demanded that the

minutes o f the meeting be officially recorded, so that when the British finally entered the

city, they would be on record as having tried to surrender.4

Just as Grey planned, the incessant bombardment had crushed the resolve o f the

citizens o f Republique-ville. Several quarters o f the city remained engulfed in flames,

and as the British troops closed in, the ir artillery rounds found their targets with ever-

increasing accuracy. “Fort-de-la-Republique is consumed by the fire of the enemy from

the batteries surrounding it,” Rochambeau wrote, “the enemy’s rounds fall [so rapidly]

that the cannoneers are suffering considerably and can hardly hold.”5

His daily inspection on 19 March revealed that the military situation in the capital

was equally disheartening. The battery near the military hospital was abandoned,

Rochambeau lamented. “This is the hundredth time that I have witnessed the weakness

3 Ibid., 193.

4 Ibid., 194-195.

5 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege”, entry for 19 March 1794.

527




of the mulattoes,” he wrote, “[they] are much different here than they are in Saint-

Domingue.” After reaching Fort-de-la-Convention, he became even more dispirited.

Everywhere, artillery pieces lay either completely destroyed or collapsed onto broken gun

carriages, and National Guard under Captain Joseph Leau had evacuated the fo rt’s

easternmost demilune. Rochambeau ordered the National Guard company from le Robert

to occupy the abandoned position, bu t discovered that since that morning, their numbers

had been reduced from seventy to twelve.6

Notwithstanding the stoicism o f the Republican leadership, by the afternoon of 19

March, it was clear to the British that a French surrender was imminent. Recently-

captured prisoners from Fort-de-la-Convention painted a grim picture o f the appalling

conditions in that fortress - perilously short o f water, no fresh food for days, and nearly

every remaining round o f ammunition spent from the fort’s one functioning heavy

cannon. In some cases, the relentless pounding o f heavy artillery had literally shaken the

Republican works to their foundations. The interior walls o f both forts were smashed,

while the exterior walls of lunette Bouille were so destroyed that Pelage and his men were

fighting from behind great piles of stone rubble. In fact, only a series o f mines buried in

their path prevented the British from simply bypassing Pelage’s position and m arching

straight through Republique-ville’s northeastern gate. The British did not move

prematurely. For several days, Grey and Jervis refined their plan for the final assault, and

a second parallel completed jus t several hundred meters north o f lunette Bouille, the two

6 Ibid.

528




men concluded that the time had come to de liver the coup de grace to Republique-ville.7

Grey could easily have overwhelmed Rochambeau by combining supporting

attacks from the west o f the city with simultaneous assaults against Fort-de-la-

Convention. With Martinique being the first objective o f a potentially long British

campaign in the W est Indies, however, it was imperative that the British Commander-in-

Chief conserve his limited manpower. Unlike Rochambeau, Grey maintained a full range

of options at his disposal, and instead of giving the Republicans the final battle that they

expected, he and Jervis arranged that beginning on 20 March, the main efforts o f their

combined forces would attack from south and the west. While British artillerymen

continued their deadly work throughout the night o f 19-20 March, British infantrymen,

marines and sailors repositioned themselves for the “grand a ttack.”8

For more than a week, several hundred sailors and Royal Marines had been

encamped at Pointe des Negres. At the appointed time, these men were to march to the

Republique-ville/Case-Navire road, and then rendezvous with detachments o f Prince

Edward’s brigade arriving from Case-Navire and the Lacoste plantation. This combined

force would storm the capital city from the west.

In the north, Prescott’s troops were to open fire from the parallel in front of

7 Willyams, Expedition, 63; Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entries for 15 and

17 March 1794. Without engineers, Rochambeau and a civilian engineer from Sainte-

Lucie, M. Peyre, planned and executed a limited mine and countermine operation around

the capital city. As the result, Fort-de-la-Convention and the eastern approaches toRepublique-ville were fairly well covered. Rochambeau was also aware that the British

threatened the western entrance to the city as well; but the area was no t covered by mines,

probably the result of the shortage o f time, materiel and laborers.

8 Ibid., 66.

529




lunette Bouille and continue to bombard Fort-de-la-Convention. In the middle o f the

night, a battalion o f British grenadiers, accompanied by a second battalion o f regular

infantry, descended unnoticed from the Surirey Heights with two field pieces, and pass

along the road underneath Fort-de-la-Convention . By early morning, these troops

controlled the road leading from Republique-ville to Fort-de-la-Convention. Republican

headquarters did not know that communication between the capital and its largest fortress

was impossible.

The main attack would come as a complete surprise to the French. To surprise the

French, Grey rallied nearly 900 sailors, marines and infantrymen behind the hill mass at

Pointe des Carrieres and embarked them in rowboats. Republicans at Fort-de-la-

Republique had no idea that they were soon to be overrun from the sea.

The concept behind Jervis’ and Grey’s main attack was simple - naval forces

were to move as close as possible to Republique-ville, and then support a seaborne

infantry assault directed against Fort-de-la-Republique. The precise timings required for

the operation was extremely difficult. Once his gun boats and mortar ships had fully

engaged the Republicans, Jervis sent the sloop Zebra (16), leading the frigate Asia (64),

straight into the mouth of the cove, before sailing as close to the fort as possible.

Shielded from enemy cannon fire, ground troops in the rowboats would advance from

their hiding positions behind Pointe de Carrieres, row across the cove, and use bamboo

ladders to storm the fort’s walls.9

Just before dawn on 20 M arch 1794, the fiercest artillery barrage o f the campaign

9 Ibid.

530




signaled the British sailors and infantry to begin their movement. For nearly five hours,

exploding shells and incendiary rounds ravaged Fort-de-la-Republique, but at precisely

10:00 a.m., the fleet shifted their fire to the center o f town - the Zebra and the As ia got

underway. Almost immediately, the Zebra came under heavy fire, but Captain Robert

Faulknor drove his ship directly toward Fort-de-la-Republique. When the As ia came

within grape shot range o f the fort, less than 300 yards, Captain John Browne ordered his

crewmen to bring the ship about. Those watching aboard the British ships in the bay

were stunned. Admiral Jervis ordered the captain of the Boyne to prepare to take over the

mission, but the As ia again came about and attempted to sail into the cove. Once again,

she turned away from the fight - Captain Faulknor was abandoned. By 11:00 a.m. the

Zebra was the only British vessel in the cove, and the gunners manning her eight port-

side cannons were bearing the full brunt o f Republican fire from Fort-de-la-Republique.10

It was never part o f the plan, but the success o f the attack now depended upon

Robert Faulknor. Fortunately for the British, he was wholly up to the task. Faulknor ran

the Zebra aground as close to Fort-de-la-Republique as possible; he could only employ

his eight port-side guns against Fort-de-la-Republique, but he shielded the forty unarmed

rowboats that were now halfway across the cove. The crewman o f the Zebra were

already the heroes o f the day, but Faulknor had jus t begun his fight. When the infantry

rowboats reached the Zebra , Faulknor abandoned his crippled ship, jumped into one o f

10 Ibid., 66-67. According to Willyams, “Monsieur de Tourelles, a former

lieutenant of the fort, either through fear, ignorance, or treachery, refused to lead the ship,

claiming shoals.” Why, or if, Captain Browne took counsel from de Tourelles remains

unknown.

531




Captain Robert Faulknor’s Attack

on Fort-de-la-Republique

View of the Ramparts Today

Figure 57. Captain Robert Faulknor’s Attack on Fort-de-la-Republique

532


C o u r t e s y

N a t i o n a l

M

a r i t i m e

M

u s e u m



the attack boats, and was the first officer to climb the bamboo ladders into Fort-de-la-

Republique. The Republicans were quickly driven from the outer positions, into the

burning interior of Fort-de-la-Republique. After a short, hand-to-hand skirmish, these

last Frenchmen evacuated the fort, allowing the British to cut down the Tricolor and then

raise their own nationa l colors.11

The Chasseurs and National Guard who actually escaped the British would have

done better to surrender before they left Fort-de-la-Republique. Many were killed or

severely wounded by artillery fire from Mome Tartanson as they tried to exit the fort’s

main gate. Those who were not killed continued to Fort-de-la-Convention, only to run

headlong into the fire o f the two British infantry battalions that covered the bridge leading

to the other fo rt.12

Soon after Fort-de-la-Republique fell, cries of “the fort is abandoned!” were

replaced by public signals that British troops were entering Republique-ville. The alarms

had no effect. Colonel Richard Symes, who led the western assault into the city, met no

resistance - French defenses in that quarter were abandoned. Panicked citizens whose

11 In 1848, a medal commem orating the attack was struck for the few Zebra

crewmen who were still living.

12 Willyams, Expedition, 67; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 196; Grey to

Dundas, 25 March 1794. Reprinted in “Intelligence from the London Gazettes.” The

Gentleman’s M agazine 64 (April 1794): 375. When Faulknor and his men raised the

British flag over Fort-de-la-Republique, the crewmen aboard Jervis’ raised three cheersthat could be heard all the way to the Surirey Heights. The British captured sixty-eight

cannon and fifty-five mortars and howitzers in the attack, and Fort-de-la-Republique was

immediately renam ed Fort Edward. Jervis to the Admiralty Office (Mr. Stephens), 25

March 1794. Reprinted in “Intelligence from the London Gazettes.” The Gentlema n’s

Magazine 64 (April 1794): 375.

533




home lay in the path of the enemy crowded the streets, but members o f the Committee o f

Public Safety and the Commune o f Republique-ville remained ensconced in the Hotel de

Ville, drafting a final request to Rochambeau that he surrender the city.13

Just minutes after the message was sent to Fort-de-la-Convention, enemy troops

surrounded the Hotel de Ville and Colonel Symes stormed through the front door o f the

building. When he came upon the assembled members of both the Comm une of

Republique-ville and the Committee of Public Safety, the untutored Colonel Symes

demanded to know the whereabouts o f the municipal officers, all the while screaming

insults against Martinique’s Republican administration. “It is a good government,” the

Mayor o f Republique-ville remarked acidly, “that takes care o f its business and its people

in this place .” Symes did not realize that he was addressing the colony’s civil

government; he continued to insult the prisoners, and demanded to know where the

members o f the Committee of Public Safety were hiding. O f course, the very men he

sought were right in front o f him, but the captives offered no further information. As the

result, Symes arrested the only man present in uniform (the city’s National Guard

commander), placed the building under a twenty-five man guard, and then ordered his

men to confine the remaining citizens in the city churches.14

Rochambeau, who had reestablished his headquarters in Fort-de-la-Convention,

13 Ibid.; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 196-197.

14 Ibid.; Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 196-197. The Municipal officers did

offer one other piece o f information. When Symes ordered that they produce all of their

official papers, he was told that all of the colonial records had been sent to the depot in

Brest. In fact, they remained with Rochambeau in Fort-de-la-Convention.

534




received Grey’s newest surrender summons a short time later. He again read the enemy

comm ander’s letter to the defenders o f Fort-de-la-Convention. This time, the soldiers

agreed that further defense was useless; they asked him to send an envoy to Grey to

request favorable terms. He sent Major Naverres, who returned with the message that the

enemy accepted his proposal to send three envoys to the Dillon plantation in order to

discuss terms o f capitulation. That evening, Grey accepted Colonel Daucourt, Captain

Dupriret, and the senior remaining National Guard officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gaschet-

Dumaine, as the French representatives mediating the surrender treaty. Throughout the

night of 19 March, the three men met with the Governor General to list their terms. “We

can only hope,” Rochambeau wrote in his journal, “that they treat us favorably.”15

During the two days that the French representatives debated the articles o f

capitulation with the British, Rochambeau and his men held Fort-de-la-Convention. The

British, meanwhile, consolidated their gains in the city. On 22 March, enemy sentries

forced the prisoners in the Hotel de Ville to leave the building “without even being

allowed to kiss their wives goodbye,” and took them to the docks in the cove. Now

completely segregated from their military counterparts, Martinique’s remaining civilian

authorities spent the night on the docks waiting to board prison ships. Their fate, and that

o f all o f those taken prisoner by the British, now depended upon General Rochambeau

15 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entries for 20 and 21 March 1794. Originally

named “La Plantation de Girardin,” the Dillon plantation was renamed “la Dillon” when

Arthur Dillon married the plantation owner, Marie Fran^oise Laure de Girardin de

Montgeralde. When General Dillon was executed in 1792, Madame Dillon returned to

the family home with her daughter Fanny. In 1815, Fanny (Dillon) Bertrand,

accompanied her husband and Napoleon I into exile at Saint Helena. See appendix for

Articles of Capitulation o f Fort Bourbon.

535




Images of Republique-ville(Fort-de-F ranee)

Fort-de-France in the early part of the 19thCentury

The Dillon Plantation today -

site of the surrender negotiations

The Hotel de Ville Today The Old Military Hospital

Figure 58. Images of Republique-ville

536




and whatever beneficent treatment his representatives could negotiate with General Grey.

That the Tricolor continued to fly over Fort-de-la-Convention during the capitulation

proceedings encouraged the Republicans, “ [with the flag still flying] it seemed to

everyone that there was always some hope to be had as long as the enemy was not their

master,” Bailleul wrote. It would not be until the 24th that the flag o f Great Britain, “that

object o f eternal hatred,” would fly over Fort-de-la-Convention.16

On the evening o f 22 March 1794, the members o f the French military delegation

made a final ride to Fort-de-la-Convention, this time accompanied by Grey’s

representative, Captain John Conyngham. Rochambeau read and accepted the terms o f

the surrender. The British and French Commanders in Chief officially signed the

document the following day, and Rochambeau was to lead his remaining troops from

Fort-de-la-Convention on the 24th.17

At the suspension of hostilities, British casualties amounted to seventy-four men

16 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 198-200. British officers attempted to

discredit Rochambeau by telling the prisoners that immediately after Fort-de-la-

Republique had fallen, Rochambeau had sent a negotiator to the British seeking terms of

surrender. Interestingly, Bailleul made very clear in his report to the national Committee

o f Public Safety that “[n]o one....believed it. Rochambeau never came to discuss

surrender.” The Republicans were further heartened when, on 23 March, the British

loaded (without distinction of color) more than 600 French military and civilian captives

onto prison transports. This action ran counter to a 1 January 1794 British proclamation

mandating that all blacks would be repatriated to Africa. By the 27th, however, the

prisoners were segregated by color. O f the 1,000-1,200 prisoners eventually confined on

various British transports in Barbados, the majority of white and mulatto Frenchmen weretaken to Saint-Malo, while blacks were taken to Mexico.

17 Rochambeau, “Journal du siege,” entries for 22 and 23 March 1794.

Rochambeau could not estimate the numbers o f National Guard still in the capital - he

guessed that perhaps 100 remained scattered throughout the city.

537




killed and jus t over two-hundred men wounded. In Republique-ville alone, French

casualties included at least 300 dead and wounded. In his report to the national

government, Rochambeau made pointedly clear that he and his men not only sustained a

blockade o f seventy days, but also a forty-eight-day land attack against the colony, with

siege trenches opened against the capital for more than a month. While the number o f

civilian casualties on Martinique was never recorded, official French and British reports

state that disease and combat loss had reduced the original Republican military force in

the capital from 1,200 to less than 900 men. In Rochambeau’s own estimation, by 23

March, the troops tha t remained alive in the garrison at Fort-de-la-Convention included

one-hundred men of the 37th Line, eighteen o f the Sarre Regiment, twenty-one o f the

Bassigny Regiment, approximately three-hundred naval and regular artillerymen, and

between three and four-hundred National Guard.18

On the afternoon o f 24 March 1794, British infantrymen, marines and sailors lined

the road to Fort-de-la-Convention to honor M artinique’s last defenders as they marched

to the prison ships that awaited them in the cove. To their surprise, there were few

Republican soldiers to salute. Approximately 900 defenders, including wounded soldiers

and civilian volunteers exited Fort-de-la-Convention to lay down arms before their

incredulous captors. Even General Grey was skeptical. When Rochambeau offered him

his sword at the surrender ceremony, Grey pointedly asked where he was keeping the

remainder of his garrison. Rochambeau could only respond that all o f his command were

present, except for those that he had left inside the fort because they were either too ill or


538




too wounded to be carried to the surrender field. For a moment, a wave o f indignation

overcame the British ranks when they realized that they were rendering full military

honors to so feeble a garrison, but it was not long before such emotions progressed

through awe, respect, and finally, to pity.19

Once the surrender ceremony was complete, Prince Edward and his troops took

possession of Fort-de-la-Convention, cut down the Tricolor, and renamed the ruins “Fort

George.” Grey wrote to the home government that he had achieved a complete victory,

but he was careful to add that “the gallant defense made by General Rochambeau and his

garrison was strongly manifested upon entering Fort [de la Convention], as there was

scarce an inch o f ground untouched by our shot and shells; and it is but justice to say that

it does them the highest honor.” Given such circumstances, the British were even more

surprised to find that Rochambeau and the remnants of his garrisons ensured that those

same fortresses remained functional. “Everything in the forts is as tranquil and well

regulated as could be given the time,” Grey wrote to Secretary Dundas. Within days,

Grey’s men had inched their way through the craters and unexploded ordnance and were

well on their way to restoring Forts de-la-Republique and de-la-Convention to fully

serviceable condition.20

19 Daney, His toire de la Martinique, 237; Leti, Fort-de-France, 82; Grey to

Dundas, 25 March 1794. Reprinted in “Intelligence from the London Gazettes.” The

Gentleman’s Magazine 64 (April 1794): 375; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Milita ires, II, 62.

20 Grey to Dundas, 25 March 1794. Reprinted in “Intelligence from the London

Gazettes.” The Gentleman’s Magazine 64 (April 1794): 375; Willyams, Expedition, 68-

69.

539




Grey appended his report with five stands of French colors (two from Fort-de-la-

Convention), which were brought to England by his own son, Major John Grey. Th oug h.

the flags were intended as a personal gift to King George III, Dundas ensured that he and

his ministry pressed every possible ounce o f political capital from the success. At

Dundas’ suggestion, the King personally presided over the ceremony at which the French

standards were hung in Saint Paul’s Cathedral. The victory-starved Englishm en were

delighted.21

When the activity surrounding the official surrender ended, the senior leadership

of the two sides met to decide the fate of the vanquished. Following custom,

Rochambeau and his aides dined first with General Grey and his s taff at the Dillon

plantation, and the following day they were taken aboard the H.M.S. Vengeance to dine

with Admiral Jervis. In Rochambeau’s case, the established practice of paroling general

officers until they could be exchanged in kind was modified. Both Grey and Jervis were

quite familiar with the excesses o f France’s National Convention, and were thus well

aware o f what possibly lay in store for Rochambeau and his senior officers if they were

forcibly returned to their homeland. Grey offered, and Rochambeau accepted the

proposal, that he and his officers be permitted to spend their parole in America.

Naturally, Rochambeau was grateful; he and the majority of his staf f accepted the offer,

but Rochambeau had an additional request. Included in his military entourage was a

civilian, committee member Grandmaison. Since the British planned to return the

21 Daney, Histoire de la Martinique, 237; Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794;

“Historical Chronicle.” The Gentlema n’s Magazine 64 (June 1794): 573.

540




colony’s Royalists to power, it was obvious that they planned to purge Martinique o f their

Republican enemies in a reign of terror. As a former member o f the Representative

Assembly o f Martinique and the Committee of Public Safety of Republique-ville,

Grandmaison was well-known as an ardent Republican - certainly the Royalists would

execute him at the first opportunity. Despite their earlier disagreements, Rochambeau

saved Grandmaison by breveting him a general officer o f the artillery, allowing him to

travel to A merica on parole as a military prisoner o f war.22

With Martinique, the keystone of the French Windward Island defense now

controlled by the British, Grey consolidated his hold on the island, leaving a garrison of

nearly 4,000 men under Lieutenant General Robert Prescott as Governor. In turn,

Prescott deputed Martinique’s pre-eminent Royalist, Louis-Franfjois, chevalier Dubuc, as

his Intendant. As expected, former Republicans on the island were hounded and their

properties were repossessed, but, by far, the greatest tragedy of the English occupation

befell the blacks o f the colony. In what ranks among their most notable achievem ents,

the National Convention declared the general emancipation of all French slaves on 4

February 1794, but inherently slow communications coupled with the British blockade

ensured that the national emancipation policy never reached Martinique and the other

22 Bailleul, Report (Seconde Partie), 200; Daney, Histoire de la M artinique, 236.

When writing his multi-volume Histoire de la Martinique, Sidney Daney de Marcillac

relied heavily on actual witnesses to the events that transpired during Rocham beau’s

tenure as Governor General. Though he probably never read the report by the Committeeof Public Safety o f Republique-ville, Daney points out that Republicans frequently

accused Rochambeau o f having Royalist sympathies. To the Royalists who were actually

involved in the events, such accusations made no sense. After all that he had done in

Martinique, Daney asserts, Rochambeau would certainly have been killed by the

Royalists had he been taken into custody.

541




Windward Colonies. Had the order been put into effect prior to arrival of Grey and

Jervis, it hardly would have mattered. The English refused outright to recognize the

liberty of any French slaves, including those who Rochambeau personally manum itted for

their distinguished military service. Under English rules, colonial blacks who could not

prove the ir free status prior to 1792 were returned to their masters to support the

agricultural revitalization o f His M ajesty’s newest Caribbean possessions.

The British reduction o f Martinique ensured that Grey would have less trouble

forcing the surrender of Sainte-Lucie and Guadeloupe. Throughout spring 1794, he

continued his own campaign against the remaining French Windward Islands, ensuring

that they too would enjoy the full benefits o f King George’s rule. Unfortunately for the

Republic, few citizens in the other French Windward Island colonies possessed the

stamina displayed by Rochambeau and the defenders o f Martinique.

The battle for Martinique was certainly no secret to Republicans in Sainte-Lucie.

Regular traffic with Saint-Pierre continued until the city’s capitulation, and for weeks the

echoes o f the relentless British cannonade against Republique-ville reverberated across

the channel separating the two islands. General Ricard knew that his colony was the next

target of the enemy’s operation. As if on cue, Grey and Jervis arrived off the coast of

Sainte-Lucie on 31 March and sent a messenger to offer terms of surrender to the

government. Ricard had only one battalion of regular troops at his disposal, but honor

dictated they resist the British invasion for as long as possible; Republicans held key

defenses around Felicite-ville for several hours, but were eventually overwhelmed by one

of Grey’s brigades. Fortunately for Ricard and his officers, they received similar terms as

542




those afforded to Rochambeau. After sending the remaining men of the 3 1st Line to

prison ships in Barbados, Colonel Gordon became His Majesty’s Governor of Sainte-

Lucie.23

With the conquest of two o f the French W indward Island colonies, the British

armada set out on 8 April 1794 to seize Guadeloupe. Unfortunately for the Republicans

there, General Collot had dispersed his forces throughout island; when the British fleet

arrived before Pointe-a-Pitre, he could muster only 120 regular troops, most o f whom

were sick with various tropical illnesses. National Guard failed to take their appointed

defensive positions when Collot gave the necessary orders, leaving only a handful o f

troops to defend the forts around les Saintes. These men were overwhelmed, taken

prisoner, and then shot by the British. However, the battle for Guadeloupe w as not over.

On 15 April, 1,000 British troops landed at Trois Rivieres; by the 17th, they had taken

positions in the hills around Basse-Terre. When Admiral Jervis and his fleet appeared in

the harbor later that morning, he battered the city defenses from the sea, while Grey’s

artillerymen rained shot on the city from the surrounding hills.24

Collot, could not maintain the same degree of calm in Guadeloupe that

Rochambeau and the civil authorities had in Martinique. Pandemonium gripped Basse-

Terre, and unrestrained riots and looting throughout the city streets forced Collot to use

more o f his troops against the city’s citizens than against the British. On the evening o f

21 April, Governor Collot convened his last council of war, and the decision was reached

23 Saintoyant, La Colonisation Frangaise, 234.

24 Ibid., 234-237.

543




that he would send a parliamentarian to the British. Again, Grey offered the same terms

of surrender to Collot that he had accorded Generals Rochambeau and Ricard; Collot

accepted at mid-morning on 22 April 1794. With this capitualtion, the French Windward

Island colonies ceased to exist.25

By early May, the number o f prisoners resulting from Grey’s conquest o f France’s

Windward Islands numbered several thousand. Many were not combatants, but rather

defeated Republicans who sought to escape anticipated Royalist reprisals. In Martinique

alone, enough Republicans volunteered to be repatriated to France to fill eleven British

transports, while prisoners from the other colonies filled just as many other ships.

However, the captive Frenchmen had barely left Barbados when they began to suspect

that they were being sent to England. On nearly every one of the British transport vessels,

the prisoners revolted and took control from their captors. Some steered their prizes

toward New Orleans or Charleston, while others managed to join a French-escorted

American convoy carrying grain to France.26

25 Ibid. For once, slow communications between the France and the colonies

actually worked to the benefit of the French, and resulted in Sainte-Lucie’s and

Guadeloupe’s remaining in British hands for less than two months. The Paris

government had been completely consumed with the war on the Continent throughout the

Year II, but select members o f the National Convention learned of the fall o f Martinique,

a fact that the national Committee o f Public Safety tried to keep secret, soon after the

event. Unaware that Grey and Jervis had also captured Guadeloupe and Sainte-Lucie, the

French government sent reinforcements to these two colonies. Under the spirited

leadership o f the Civil Commissioner Victor Hugues, both colonies returned to French

control for the duration o f the war.

26 Daney, Histoire de la M artinique , 237. The Republicans almost failed in their

attempt to escape. After the convoy of American grain, which was being escorted by

Admirals Vanstabel and Joseph-Marie Nielly, rendezvoused with a fleet commanded by

Admiral Louis Thomas Villaret-Joyeuse, the group was attacked 430 miles west of

544




Rochambeau and h is sta ff fared far better in their captivity than their subordinates;

at the invitation of President George W ashington, Rochambeau traveled first to

Philadelphia, where he arrived racked with scurvy and barely recovering from yet another

bout o f Yellow Fever. He was “enter tained and cared for by friends and former allies” of

his father Marshal Rochambeau, and quickly recovered from his illnesses. Nevertheless,

there is no evidence that the scores of high-ranking emigre French aristocrats, many of

whom had served under the marshal during the American Revolution, made contact with

Rochambeau in Philadelphia.27

It seems more likely that despite his heroism in Martinique, unreconstructed

Royalists in America would have regarded Donatien Rochambeau as a dangerous

Jacobin. Donatien Rocham beau and his officers only remained in Philadelphia for a short

time - just long enough for him to convey his initial correspondence to Paris (dated 6

April) in the care of his adjutant, Commandant Naverres. Similarly, Rochambeau himself

may have felt that he had no time to cavort with recognized traitors who had abandoned

their country in its greatest crisis. Thus, the “friends” mentioned by Marshal

Ushant by a British fleet under the command o f sixty-eight-year-old Admiral Richard

Howe. Though the British claimed a decisive victory in what would come to be known in

British naval annals as “The Glorious 1st o f June,” Villaret-Joyeuse ultimately succeeded

in his mission by safely escorting the grain convoy (and the Windward Island prisoners)

to France.

27 Jean Baptis te Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires, II, 62. From 1792 to 1795,

wealthy French aristocrats sought refuge in Am erica, and speculated in the ill-fated

Pennsylvania real estate venture known as “Asylum.” A sizeable parcel of land near

Philadelphia was designated as a refuge for French emigres, but financial corruption by

the company’s principal managers, which included Napoleon’s future Foreign Minister,

Charles Maurice Talleyrand de Perigord, doomed the venture.

545




Rochambeau may all have been Americans.28 Soon afterward, he and his entourage

established residence in Newport, Rhode Island.29

Throughout his sojourn in America, Rochambeau made no secret of his ambition

to continue the fight in the Caribbean. In the dispatches that Naverres carried to the

28 Marshal Rochambeau penned his autobiography during the height o f the First

Empire, when many o f France’s former emigres were reestablished in positions o f

prominence.

29 According to the reports o f the Thermidorean Committee of Public Safety,

Rochambeau was b rought aboard the Vengeance on 18 March and then was taken aboard

the Britannia to America, where he arrived in Newport, Rhode Island on 15 April 1794.

Though the 18 March date is clearly incorrect, the date o f his arrival in Newport and the

names o f the ships may be accurate. M. de Fermont, “Rapport au Comite de Salut

Publique, Fructidor,” reprinted in Daney, Documents, 196-197. Among the entourage

that Rochambeau brought to America, those persons that actually comprised his suite, as

well as their subsequent activities, remain largely unknown. Undoubtedly, many

eventually returned to France or the Caribbean, while others dispersed throughout the

eastern United States to begin new lives as American citizens. For instance, Bernard

Charles Despalieres, a former deputy to the Colonial Assembly at le Cap, who became an

aide-de-camp to Rochambeau, gained recognition in New York teaching French and

music. Gabriel Debien, Refugies de Saint-Domingue aux Etats-Unis (Port-au-Prince,

Haiti, 1950), 15-16.

Indications are that the general’s mistress, M me de Tully, did accompany him to

Philadelphia. When Rochambeau returned to Saint-Domingue in 1796 with the colony’s

Third Civil Commission, he eventually was denounced, relieved o f his position and

returned to France. In an official letter to the Directory, Comm issioner Georges Pierre

LeBlanc included among his accusations against the general a condemnation o f

Rochambeau’s behavior during the defense o f Martinique. According to LeBlanc, “Mme

de Tully arrived in America with plenty of furniture, mirrors, furnishings, etc.” This,

LeBlanc offered, “was p roof of Rocham beau’s mistress’ good conduct in the eyes o f the

British for remaining loyal to him.” In fact, LeBlanc’s “information” against

Rochambeau was nothing more than simple parroting o f the same accusations made by

Bailleul two years before. The Directory had already exonerated Rochambeau o f these

accusations. Le Blanc’s observation regarding Mme de Tully, however, was not in theofficial report to the Committee of Public Safety in Paris, and at best, is second-hand

information. Georges Pierre LeBlanc, “Rapport fait par Georges Pierre LeBlanc a la

Commission Deleguee par la Gouvemment Franqais aux Isles sous le Vent,” no date,

Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, unnumbered item,

15.

546




government, and in those carried to France several weeks later by another adjutant,

Lieutenant Colonel Penaut, Rochambeau provided useful intelligence on the attitudes and

dispositions o f the Americans toward the French Republic, as well suggestions for

military operations against the British and Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. He

continued to request orders, but as the months passed, he received no correspondence

whatsoever from France. His isolation from France ensured that he had little, if any, idea

of the true state of affairs in the chambers o f the national government. From the safety o f

Newport, he ventured strong criticism of his superiors’ failures, going so far as to

admonish them to “read to your remorse, Citizens, and reflect on the enormous crime that

you have committed by abandoning your loyal citizens.”30

With the Windward Islands lost to the British, the letters and reports that

Rochambeau sent from America to Paris between 1794 and 1795 received even less

attention than his dispatches from Martinique in 1792 and 1793, when the war effort on

the Continent had made it impossible for the Minister of Marine and the Colonies to act

upon Rocham beau’s requests. In fact, the paucity o f references to the W est Indies in the

records o f the journals and debates o f the National Convention clearly indicate the

Convention’s neglect o f the area. As far as most politicians in Paris were concerned, any

fighting there amounted to less than even a minor theater of war operations. This is

understandable since French frontiers were threatened by the armies o f most o f Europe.

30 Donatien Rochambeau to Marshal Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, 19 and 20 May

1794, Donatien Rochambeau to Lahoussaye, 20 May 1794, AN DXXV/50/477, items 19,

20, and 21; M. de Fermont, “Rapport au Comite de Salut Publique, Fructidor”, and

“Rochambeau to the Committee o f Public Safety (Paris)”, reprinted in Daney,

Documents, 183, 193-197.

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As the result, when the Committee o f Public Safety abandoned the Caribbean colonies in

their time of most dire need, it remained a closely guarded secret. When Naverres arrived

at Brest in late May, he was immediately imprisoned by Robespierre’s personal order.

Lieutenant Colonel Penaut met the same fate the following month. All correspondence

from Rochambeau, including personal letters to his family, was confiscated and hidden

with thte documents o f the Committee o f Public Safety. Worse, when the Republican

captives from the Windward Islands arrived in France, they too were labeled “suspect”

and arrested - “one sure means,” Marshal Rochambeau wrote sarcastically, “o f shutting

someone’s mouth.” It was not until after Robespierre was guillotined following the coup

of 9 Thermidor II (27 July 1794) that Citizen Breard, one of a handful o f politicians who

knew the truth about events at Martinique, proposed to the National Convention that the

defenders o f Martinique be freed and recognized for their service to the patrie. Breard’s

proposal passed the subsequent vote without debate, but Rochambeau’s status rem ained

indefinite.31

For nearly a year after he arrived in Newport, Rochambeau waited for orders from

Paris. O f course, he was accustomed to being isolated in Martinique, but there was no

British blockade o f the United States. Though the opportunity for him to lead an attack

31 Rochambeau to the Committee o f Public Safety (Paris), quoted in Daney,

Documents , 183. Donatien Rochambeau planned that Lieutenant Colonel Penaut (who

had served under both father and son in the Army o f the North), and one o f General

Ricard’s aides-de-camp, Captain Moreau, would visit Marshal Rochambeau soon afterthey reported to the Committee o f Public Safety, to give him a complete account o f what

had taken place in the French Caribbean colonies. As the result of their arrest, Marshal

Rochambeau did not receive any direct word from his son until he returned from America

the following year. Donatien Rochambeau to Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, 19 May 1794,

AN DXXV/50/477, item 19; Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires, II, 62-63.

548




against the enemy’s Caribbean possessions was long past, it did not make sense that the

new government would not recall Rochambeau to account for his actions. Whatever the

situation in Paris, Donatien Rochambeau would not allow himself to be forgotten. In late

March 1794, he sent Lieutenant Colonel Panisse, another of his aides-de-camp, to France.

Unlike his predecessors, Naverres and Penaut, Panisse was allowed to go directly to the

Committee o f Public Safety with the general’s letters, and then to M arshal Rochambeau.

After three years, the distressed father finally received word o f his son.32

In fact, the confusion that reigned during the “White Terror” of 1794 ensured that

had he returned to France, Donatien Rochambeau would have found few friends in Paris.

By fall 1794, many of his enemies, both Royalist and Republican, had made their way

back to the capital; both groups had their reasons to destroy the reputation of

Martinique’s former Governor General. Rumors spread in the highest circles that he had

sold the colony to the British, although official reports of Grey and Jervis to Whitehall

and the Admiralty reaffirmed the defiant va lor o f the Republicans on Martinique.33

For Donatien Rochambeau to be repatriated to France, he needed an influential

patron. As it happened, his most energetic support came from the one man who held him

in the highest esteem - his father. Then entering his seventies, Jean-Baptiste

Rochambeau had suffered tremendously in the final months of the Terror. His homes

32 M. de Fermont, “Rapport au Comite de Salut Publique, Fructidor,” reprinted in

Daney, Documents , 197. Soon afterward, Donatien Rochambeau likewise received hisfirst news in three years from his father in a letter detailing the latter’s stay in prison and

near-execution.

33 In fact, these reports were reprinted months before in such widely-circulated

journa ls as The Gentlem en’s Magazine.

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were ransacked by Robespierre’s police at the time of his arrest, and he escaped h is 29

July 1794 appearance before the guillotine only by Robespierre’s unscheduled execution

the day prior. By 1795, however, his honor and his estates were fully restored, and he

turned his energy to rehabilitating the reputation of his son.

By allowing his adversary to slip into timely anonymity in the United States,

General Grey saved Donatien Rocham beau’s career and perhaps his life. Had he served

somewhere other than the remote French Windward Islands, political machinations

against him in Paris would certainly have led him to the Conciergerie to await execution.

With the Terror ended, Marshal Rochambeau lobbied the government to review his son’s

case, and to exchange his son for an English prisoner of equal rank, thus allowing him to

return to France to account for his actions on Martinique.

When the Thermidorean Committee o f Public Safety conducted an initial review

of the Rochambeau case, they uncovered a wealth of conflicting testimony. The

prejudicial account written by the Committee of Public Safety o f Republique-ville in no

way corresponded with Rochambeau’s perfunctory reports. To add to the confusion, the

Thermidorean Convention inherited a list o f colonial emigres dating back to October

1793, which included someone calling himself “Rochambeau.” Owing largely to the

administrative mayhem that resulted from the government shakeup, it was not until

August 1795 that the national government could positively conclude that this person was

not Donatien Rocham beau.34

34 “Extrait du Registre des Arretes du Comite de Salut-Public de la Convention

Nationale, 26 August 1795,” Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general

no. 1299, item 61.

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Indeed, the loss of institutional knowledge concerning Martinique that followed in

the wake o f the coup o f 9 Thermidor, made reaching consensus on the Rochambeau issue

very complex and difficult. The new ministers and their staffs in Paris knew little o f the

general, and their confusion o f the father and son was common. When queried by the

Commission of Organization and Movement of the Land Army, even the Commissary of

the Marine and Colonies, M. Joseph Nivou, referred to Lieutenant General Rochambeau

as General de Brigade, and replied that he could say little about him except that he was

currently residing in America.35

The Thermidorean Committee o f Public Safety was aided, however, by the non-

aligned observations of several key eye-witnesses to the events on Martinique. When the

National Convention called for elections in 1795, the island’s Royalist government sent

their allotment o f elected deputies to Paris. Among this group was Rochambeau’s former

Special Reciever of the Republic, Volny-Aristide Foumiols. Called upon in August to

testify regarding the events on Martinique, Foumiols’ deposition completely validated

Rochambeau’s narrative, adding that “[General Rochambeau] desires nothing more than

to return to France to account for his conduct and to submit himself to the most severe

examination.” Fortunately for Rochambeau, Foumiols sent a copy of his letter to another

Martiniquais, Joseph-Jacques Defermon, who happened to be the Secretary o f the

Committee o f Public Safety. Defermon, who had also personally witnessed the siege o f

Martinique, composed his own testimony which echoed Foumiols’ sentiments. Orders

35 N ivou to Commission o f Organization and Movement o f the Land Army, 22

September 1795, Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299,

item 64.

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recalling Rochambeau to France to delive r his own testimony soon followed.36

On 7 September 1795, agents o f Britain’s Comm ission for Taking Care of Sick

and Wounded Seamen and Exchanging Prisoners o f War issued a brief that, pursuant to

the orders of the Lords Commissioners o f the Admiralty, Lieutenant General

Rochambeau was to be exchanged for an English officer o f the same grade. It was pure

irony, or as Marshal Rochambeau wrote ula roue de fortu ne ,” that the English officer

exchanged was a man with whom both Rochambeau’s had become well-acquainted at

Yorktown, Lord Cornw allis’ second-in-command, Lieutenant General Charles O ’Hara.37

In early December 1795, Donatien Rochambeau finally arrived at le Havre aboard

a neutral American ship, having spent eighteen months paroled in the United States. He

did not present his testimony before those who had ordered his return, because the

Directory Government had come to power.38 The Directors reviewed with “great

reflection” Rochambeau’s journals and the testimony of the colonists and members of his

administration, as well as the remaining docum ents that the National Convention had

36 Foumiols to the Comite de Salut Public, 11 August 1795, and M. de Fermont,

“Rapport au Comite de Salut Publique, Fructidor,” reprinted in Daney, Documents, 193-

197; “Extrait du Registre des Arretes du Comite de Salut-Public de la Convention

Nationale, 26 August 1795,” Service historique, Carton Yb381; dossier lieutenant-general

no. 1299, item 61. At the time, de Fermont signed his name “Defermon.”

37 O’Hara was captured by the French at the siege of Toulon. During the

processing o f the transfer, the English committee order was sen t to America by the

secretary of Bureau des Colonies Occidentales of the Ministry of the Marine and the

Colonies, M. Safir, who subsequently requested that the French Minister Plenipotentiaryto the United States personally guarantee Rochambeau’s safe conduct France. The actual

exchange was handled by these two offices as well. Service historique, Carton Yb 381;

dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, items 63, 64, 65, 66.

38 26 October 1795.

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accumulated in the restricted carton', they concluded that the general “merits no reproach

whatsoever.” Indeed, it is from the Directors’ comments in their 23 Pluviose IV (11

February 1796) arrete that Rochambeau’s service in Martinique can be succinctly

summarized. “Before the appearance of the English,” the statement reads, “he cherished

his administration and maintained a rigid and philanthropic adherence to the law, all the

while fighting prejudices against the African color.39

Although Rochambeau was discredited by the same government that failed to

support him, his defense o f Martinique remains a credit to France. It merits more than a

footnote in history that while hundreds of thousands o f Frenchmen saved the Republic on

the Continent, less than 3,000 attempted to preserve the Revolution in the Windward

Islands. Unfortunately for France, victory eluded these Republican faithful, and the

remaining French Caribbean islands fell one after the other under the yoke o f British

occupation. Nevertheless, Rochambeau and the 900 black, white and mulatto soldiers

that emerged from lunette Bouille on 24 March 1794 ensured the sanctity of the nation ’s

honor.

39 “Extrai t du Registre des Deliberations du Directoire Executif, 11 February

1796,” Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant-general no. 1299, item 67;

Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires Militaires, II, 75-76. Since the Directors believed

that the national government owed Rochambeau a debt of honor, they sought to remedy

the injustices of their predecessors by naming him Governor General o f the Spanish

Portion o f Hispanio la in 1796.

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Chapter XVIII

Patriotism, Power and Elusive Glory

1755-1813

Throughout each of the letters that Donatien Rochambeau sent from Newport to

Paris, one cannot help but notice an underlying tone of proud indignation. Indeed,

Rochambeau had earned the right to remain indignant. He had served his state to the full

extent of his ability, but his state had abandoned him. Though his defense o f Martinique

merited the highest honor, the succession of governments in Paris never satisfied

Rochambeau with positive recognition for his service during the French Revolution.

From the viewpoint o f an officer of the French ancien regime, however, his professional

career to 1794 remained unblemished. He had served nearly twenty-five years, and in

every action in which he participated, he had brought credit upon him self and France.

From the outset, Rochambeau’s military career was determined by extraordinary

circumstances. He not only graduated at the top of his class at Brienne. After receiving

one of the best military educations then available anywhere in the world, he also received

intimate instruction from one of the best tutors then on active service in the French Army,

his father Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau; moreover few senior officers were more innovative

or placed more emphasis on combined arms. Thus, Donatien Rochambeau not only

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received the finest military education available in school, but his subsequent postings in

the infantry, the artillery, and then in the Artois Dragoons reinforced his practical

education. Indeed, by the time he rose to the rank o f captain, the younger Rochambeau

was among the most qualified junior officers then active in the French Army. He was

well prepared for a conventional military career, which for him, began w ith the war in

America.

Rochambeau clearly contributed more than any individual colonel to the French

campaign in America, especially since his father placed him in circumstances specifically

chosen to merit the attention o f military superiors in Paris. His mission to the war

ministry at Versailles had a direct impact upon the Comte de Grasse’s decision to leave

the Caribbean to assist the combined Franco-American army in Virginia. Furthermore,

the younger Rochambeau was personally responsibly for capturing the first enemy

redoubt at Yorktown, thus enabling the French to construct the first parallels against

Cornwallis’ main defenses. These individual achievements contributed to France’s and

America’s eventual victoiy over the British, but more important to Colonel Rochambeau,

his service as an aide to his father and as second-in-command o f one o f France’s premier

infantry regiments provided him the unusual opportunity to learn the art o f war at the

tactical, operational and strategic levels. Had his career continued on a traditional path,

the operational and strategic insight that he gained during the American Revolution

would have proven invaluable.

Unfortunately for Rochambeau, the units o f volunteers and veterans who invaded

the Austrian Netherlands in early 1792 had undergone too much internal turmoil to

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display the same sort o f cohesion or decisive action that Rochambeau had seen the

Americans and French demonstrate in America. Regardless o f how much Rochambeau

garnered support from pro-revolution patriots o f Brabant or prepared his own soldiers for

the coming invasion, the fact remained that French troops were com pletely unprepared to

face the disciplined ranks of the Austrians. He led his forces as well as he could, but at

the conclusion of the failed invasion, his reward was to be ridiculed and then blacklisted

by the Jacobins in Paris, the very politicians whose favor he sought to gain.

In his next post in the Caribbean, Rochambeau enjoyed considerably more success

since he controlled military operations himself. After being rebuffed by the Royalists at

Martinique, Rochambeau arrived in Saint-Domingue with a sizeable contingent o f French

regular and National Guard troops, confident that he could sweep the island’s Northern

Plain and crush the ongoing slave rebellion. In fact, this effort was at least a temporary

success, even though yellow fever had stricken nearly half of his European troops and

Sonthonax had compelled him to augment his remaining regulars with mulatto colonial

militia and National Guard. When he left the island in early 1793, Rochambeau

recognized that he had failed to end the rebellion completely, but had prevented the

annihilation of the whites and mulattoes in le Cap and contributed to the firm

establishment of the French Republic.

Rochambeau succeeded militarily in Saint-Domingue largely as the result o f the

slaves’ attempts to conduct their battles according to European conventions. It is thus

ironic that his white Royalist enemies in Martinique, many o f whom were also trained in

the military academies o f France or had seen combat during the American Revolution,

556




forced him to resort to a style of warfare that was more particular to the Caribbean. In

most cases, Henri de Percin and other Royalist leaders operated as raiders and guerrillas,

using darkness and the jungle as their cover. To his credit, Rochambeau adjusted quickly

to this style o f warfare after his initial defeats, and successfully employed such tactics to

his own advantage for the remainder of his time on the island. Nevertheless, no amount

o f adaptability on his part could have compensated for his limited resources.

One might argue, as Martinique’s radicals did, that Rocham beau’s partiality

toward his regular troops cost him opportunities in the Windward Islands. Had he been

more eager and methodical in organizing and training his Martiniquais volunteers, he

might have carried the war beyond his own island. In truth, it was France that lost the

opportunities. Rocham beau could do nothing meaningful without the support o f the

national government, a government so overwhelmed by the pressures of war at home that

the Caribbean theater became a secondary arena. That Republican forces withstood the

British siege o f Republique-ville for as long as they did is only due to the resoluteness

and stamina o f Rochambeau and his few loyal forces.

Following his defeat at Martinique and his subsequent exile in the United States,

an exonerated Donatien Rocham beau twice returned to the Caribbean, each time to Saint-

Domingue. When Spain ceded their portion of Hispaniola to France following the Treaty

of Basel in July 1795, the Directory Government named him Governor General o f the

Spanish side o f the island, with the miss ion o f overseeing the transfer o f Spanish

equipment and facilities to France. In April 1796, he left France accompanied by

Sonthonax, whose own power was reinforced by 3,000 regular troops and four other

557




Commissioners. Instead of dealing with the affairs of the Spanish side of the island,

however, Rochambeau toured French Saint Domingue, and sent his own appraisals o f the

state o f the colony to the Minister o f Marine and the Colonies, General Laurent Truguet.

His candid reports to Truguet, coupled with public pronouncements against Sonthonax’

leadership so strained his relations with the Third Civil Commission that within a month

the Commissioners had him arrested and returned to France.1

Rochambeau languished for more than three years in Paris, pleading his case for

reinstitution in the army. It was not until January 1800 that his requests for reinstatement

came before a new French government. In his capacity as First Consul, Napoleon

Bonaparte personally reviewed both the Rocham beau’s and the Commissioners’

testimony and found the accusations of the government officials insufficient for his

continued censure. Immediately, Bonaparte restored the general into service in his former

grade. His rank and privileges thus restored on 1 February 1800, Rochambeau received

orders nine days later to assume command o f a unit in General Louis-Gabriel Suchet’s

division o f Andre Massena’s Army o f Italy.2

1 Jean-Baptiste Rochambeau, Memoires M ilitaires, II, 75-76; Rochambeau to

Truguet, 18 May 1796. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant general no.

1299, unnumbered folio, 1. Rochambeau appears not to have realized that the new

Minister of the Navy and Colonies, Laurent Truguet, had a previous association with

Sonthonax. During an attempted overthrow of Sonthonax’ government by Governor

General Fran9ois-Thomas Galbaud-Dufort in June 1793, Captain Truguet o f the Fine was

the only of the ship’s captains then at le Cap to remain loyal to Sonthonax. By November

1795, he had risen to the office o f Minister o f Navy and Colonies, and was personallyresponsible for naming Sonthonax to head the Third Civil Commission. Stein,

Sonthonax, 129-30.

2 Service orders relative to Donatien Rochambeau, Service historique, Carton Yb

381; dossier lieutenant general no. 1299, items 92, 94, 95, 96, 99,102, 104.

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The subsequent campaign on the Var received little attention in its supporting role

to Bonaparte’s Marengo Campaign, but it included a crucial battle leading to French

victories in Italy in 1800 and 1801. While Bonaparte and General Alexandre Berthier

moved France’s newly-formed Army o f the Reserve through the Swiss Alps, General

Massena, assisted by Suchet, detained 50,000 Austrian troops under General Michael

Melas in Liguria and Piedmont. In May 1800 the campaign finally culminated on the

banks o f the Var River itself, where Rochambeau and 1,200 men held the key position on

France’s final defensive line.3

Simultaneous w ith Bonaparte’s subsequent successes in Italy, tensions between

Portugal and France resulted in the First Consul concentrating an army at Bordeaux under

the command o f his brother-in-law Captain-General Victor Emmanuel Leclerc; Donatien

Rochambeau commanded a division in this army. Bonaparte planned to use Leclerc’s

army to support his demand that Portugal join Spain and France and exclude British

shipping from the Tagus; when the court at Lisbon rejected the demand, the K ing of

Spain issued a declaration of war against Portugal. Soon, 15,000 Spanish troops and the

French army under Leclerc and Rochambeau were marching toward the Portuguese

frontier. Despite British financial aid, the Portuguese quickly realized that their army

could never halt the combined armies o f Spain and France. As the result, Portugal

ratified a peace treaty with Spain on 26 July 1801. The so-called “War of Oranges” was

over before it began, but it left the French army available to Bonaparte. Once France and

3 Bonaparte to Massena, 9 April 1800, Napo leon Bonaparte, Correspondance de

Napoleon I erpubliee pa r ordre de VEmpereur Napoleon II I (Paris, 1861), No. 4711, VI,

215.

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Britain concluded the preliminary articles of the Treaty of Amiens in October 1801,

Bonaparte decided to use this army against a revolt in Saint-Domingue.

The First Consul considered the issue for more than a year, and then decided to

intervene in Saint-Domingue. In fact, Toussaint made the decision for the First Consul.

When Bonaparte learned that Toussaint’s constitution was already in effect on the island,

he had no choice other than to remove the self-styled “Governor for Life” from power.

The secret instructions that Bonaparte gave to his brother-in-law, Captain-General

Leclerc, detailed the subjugation of Saint-Domingue in three stages. With 14,000 men

and nearly seventy warships, an invasion force left France on 14 December 1801, arriving

at Samana Bay on 29 January 1802. Rochambeau, the second-in-comm and of the

expedition, was to lead the first assault.4

4 Napoleon Bonaparte, “The Rebellion o f Toussaint Louverture,” reprinted in

Somerset de Chair, Napoleon on Napoleon (London, 1992), 175-76; M. Lemonnier-

Delafosse, Seconde Campagne de Saint-Domingue (Havre, France, 1846), vii-viii;

Edwards, History o f the British Colonies in the West Indies, V, 232; Rochambeau to

Truguet, 18 May 1796, Service historique, Carton Yb 381; doss ier lieutenant general no.

1299, unnumbered folio, 4; Martin Ros, Night o f Fire; The B lack Napoleon and the

Battle fo r Haiti (New York, 1994), 91-98. Following a bloodless coup on 16 August

1797 in which he compelled Sonthonax to return to France as a “duly-elected”

representative of the new government, Toussaint emerged as the dominant power in the

colony. Once he had consolidated this success by driving the British from the island,

Toussaint established a military dictatorship that became famous for its even-handed

treatment o f all citizens of the colony, regardless of race. Agriculture and international

commerce flourished under his direction, though the mulattos of the South refused to

accept the benefits o f Toussaint’s administration.

While the allied Spanish and French armies threatened Portugal in 1800, in Saint-

Domingue, Toussaint Louverture chose to invade and annex the Spanish side o f

Hispaniola in the name o f the French Republic. Not only did this action run counter to

the First Consul’s arrangements with his Spanish ally, in mid-1801, Toussaint framed and

then sent to Bonaparte a new constitution for the colony establishing him self as an

authority virtually independent o f France. Since Bonaparte had assumed power in 1800,

various parties representing the interests o f the colony’s disenfranchised planter class

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Leclerc expected the various black leaders in Saint-Domingue to reject

Bonaparte’s proclamation promising the blacks permanent freedom after they had

submitted immediately to the French troops, so he divided his force into four “grand

divisions.” In the North, the most critical and hotly contested area, the first division of

Rochambeau was to capture Fort Dauphin in the eastern portion o f the district, while the

second division o f Leclerc advanced upon le Cap, and General Jean Boudet’s unit

occupied Port-au-Prince in the southern portion of the West district. The fourth division,

under General Fra ncis -M arie Kerverseau, was to occupy key points in Santo Domingo.5

France never issued a declaration of war against Toussaint, but on 2 February,

Rochambeau landed 1,900 men at the harbor fortress guarding the city of Fort Dauphin,

and forced the city to surrender the next day.6 Simultaneously, General Henri

Christophe’s troops moved against le Cap. Following initial resistance to his landings in

Leogane and Port-au-Prince, General Boudet succeeded in driving Toussaint’s principal

lieutenant, General Jean-Jacques Dessalines, from Port au Prince into entrenchments at

nearby Croix des Bouquets. Leclerc began his campaign on 17 February, and while

French advances in the North continued roughly according to plan, success was elusive or

inundated Bonaparte with schemes to restore production and commerce on the island, in

most cases by the reinstitution o f slavery.

5 Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593, 51-52.

6 Ibid., 54. The prizes from this first battle were considerable, and included

eighty cannon, ammunition, food, flags, a variety of small arms, and most important,

Toussaint Louverture’s battle plans. Especially pertinent in captured papers were details

on the provisioning o f three French warships that the insurgents had captured, the

locations of rebel hideouts in the northern mountains, and personal orders from Toussaint

to execute any whites in the colony who refused to join forces with the blacks.

561




extremely hard won. During this spring campaign, Rochambeau won the only signal

victory on 24 February, when his division inadvertently marched into an ambush at

Ravine a Couleuvres. Toussaint personally commanded in this action against the French

troops, but Rochambeau repulsed his forces. They disappeared into the surrounding

mountains, bu t left over 800 men dead on the jungle floor.7

Unfortunately for the French, Leclerc never succeeded in engineering the decisive

battle tha t he wanted. He and Rochambeau succeeded in overpowering Dessalines’

forces at the fortress of Crete a Pierrot in mid-March, but despite their apparent success,

the French Army of Saint-Domingue was on the verge of collapse. By the beginning of

April 1802, the 14,000-man contingent that Leclerc brought with him to Saint-Domingue

was reduced by nearly one-half. Nearly 3,000 troops had been either killed or wounded

in the fighting, and more than 5,000 others lay sick or dying from a virulent combination

o f malaria and yellow fever. With less than 7,000 European soldiers remaining, it was

impossible for Leclerc to continue his offensive.8

In fact, French losses were so extensive that by late April Leclerc sought to end

the war by any means. He issued a new proclamation on 25 April stating that he would

7 Ibid., 54-55. Leclerc to Bonaparte, 19 February 1802 and Leclerc to Admiral

Denis Deeres, Minister o f Marine, 27 February 1802, reprinted in Paul Roussier, Lettres

du G eneral Leclerc, Commandant en Che f de I ’Armee de Saint-Domingue [hereafter

Lettres du General Leclerc] (Paris, 1937), 101-106; Sir James Barskett, History o f the

Island o f St. Domingo, From Its First D iscovery by Columbus to the Present Period

(Westport, Connecticut, 1971), 145-46.

8 Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593, 65-66;

Pamphile de Lacroix, La Revolution de Haiti (Paris, 1995), pp. 326-327, 333-35, 343;

Leclerc to Bonaparte, 1 April 1802, Le ttres du General Leclerc, 120; Barskett, History o f

the Island o f St. Domingo, 149-52.

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convene a consultative body, and one by one Toussaint’s leaders laid down their swords

in return for amnesty and the promise o f being allowed to retire with their rank and

privileges intact. On 1 May 1802, Toussaint capitulated under the same agreement and

was allowed to retire to his plantation near Gonai'ves. However, On 7 June, French troops

took him from his home and sent him to France to die imprisoned in Fort Joux, deep in

the Jura Mountains. The kidnapping sparked the blacks to revolt once again, with the

result that as the rebellion grew, both sides increased the level of violence, and atrocities

became commonplace.9

Greater problems than the black rebels plagued the Army o f Saint-Domingue.

The army continued to suffer an unusually high mortality rate from fever that showed no

signs of abating. Reinforcements were wiped out almost as soon as they arrived; by the

end of 1802, as many as 40,000 Frenchmen had died in the colony, the majority from

disease rather than from combat. Leclerc died from the fever on 1 November, and

Rochambeau assumed command o f the Army o f Saint-Domingue; there was little he

could do to salvage the army’s desperate situation. For the most part, Rochambeau and

his surviving soldiers remained entombed in and around their fortifications awaiting

reinforcements.10

9 Leclerc to Bonaparte, 1 April 1802, Lettres du General Leclerc, 132-33;

Barskett, History o f the Island o f St. Domingo, 157; Rochambeau, “Troubles des

Colonies,” Service historique, M R 593, 72-74; Pamphile de Lacroix, La Revolution de

Haiti, pp. 360-63; Barskett, History o f the Is land o f St. Domingo, 162-65; “Abstract of

Foreign Occurrences- America, the W est Indies and the Bay of Honduras.” The

Gentlem an’s Magazine,73 (January 1803): 77.

10 Leclerc to Bonaparte, 7 October 1802, Let tres du General Leclerc, 254;

Rochambeau, “Troubles des Colonies,” Service historique, MR 593, 105-108; Barskett,

563




Figure 59. Lieutenant General Donatien Rochambeau

in Saint-Domingue ca. 1803

564




With Britain’s declaration of war against France in May 1803, yet another

complication wad added to Rochambeau’s plight. Aware that he and his men could never

escape the enemy, Rochambeau concluded a second agreement with Captain John Bligh,

the senior British officer then on station at le Cap. Unfortunately for Rochambeau and

his men, Bligh’s immediate superior, Commodore John Loring, refused to honor their

agreement. Loring took Rochambeau and his men first to Jamaica, and then to England

as prisoners o f war. Rochambeau was taken to the British prison camp at Norm an Cross,

Cambridgeshire, where he remained until March 1806 when he was paroled to the nearby

village of Wincanton. Here Rochambeau remained until he was exchanged on 6

December 1811, but it was not until 7 January 1813 that he was recalled to active duty,

ju st in time to help bolster the rem nants o f Napoleon’s army following their retreat from

Russia.11

In early 1813, the Ministry of War raised new units composed o f partially-trained

conscripts, National Guard, and draft dodgers. Owing to France’s tremendous shortage of

senior officers, on 18 January, Rochambeau was named commander o f the 4th Division o f

the Corps of Observation of the Elbe under General Jacques-Alexandre-Bemard

History o f the Island o fSt. Domingo, 157.

11 Ibid., 108-109; Rochambeau to Deeres, 6 and 21 December 1803, Carton

Colonies CC9A35; Evacuation du Cap; Lettres du Rochambeau au M inistre, texte de la

capitulation, note sur la violation des accords, rapport sur la prise d ’un navire anglais pardes prisonniers fran9ais; Ships Log o f the Bellerophon 1 July 1801-15 April 1805,

Wednesday 30 Novem ber 1803. PRO, CO 53/189; Register o f Norman Cross Prisoners

1803-1806. PRO, CO 103/258, 109; Letters to Agents for Prisoners on Parole, 14 March

1806, PRO, CO 98/194, item 40, 136; French Parole Prisoners at Wincanton. PRO, CO

103/610, 15.

565




Lauriston. Napo leon soon reorganized his forces in preparation for imminent hostilities

against the allied Russian and Prussian armies, with the result that Lauriston’s Corps o f

Observation became the 5th Corps of the Grande Armee. Rocham beau’s 4th Div ision was

redesignated the 19th Infantry Division on 31 March. Lauriston’s 5th Corps comprised

forty-eight battalions, divided into twelve cohort regiments, which were then organized

into three divisions. General Nicolas-Joseph Maison commanded the 16th Division with

eight battalions (two regiments), while General Joseph Lagrange’s 18th Division and

General Rocham beau’s 19th Division each received twelve bat talions (three regiments).

Eight squadrons o f cavalry and corps artillery complemented Lauriston’s maneuver

forces.12

Between late March and early April 1813, it appeared that Prince Eugene de

Beauhamais would give Rochambeau his first opportunity to lead the 19th Division

against allied attempts to cross the Elbe River. Slow communications from Napoleon in

Paris, and his concern over having his lines o f communication in Magdeburg severed,

prompted Eugene to respond to perceived allied threats by sending units o f Lauriston’s

corps back and forth across the Elbe. When Field Marshal Ludwig Ad olf von

Wittgenstein actually threatened to cross the Elbe at the beginning o f April, Eugene

ordered Lauriston to move two o f his divisions to positions on the eastern side o f the river

12 Six, Dictionnaire Biographique , 378. General Nicolas Charles Oudinot asked

that Rochambeau be em ployed in the 2d Corps d’Observation de l’Elbe in March 1812,

bu t M inister of War Henri Clarke did not receive an answer concerning Rocham beau’s

reinstatement until January 1813. Report to Minister o f War Henri Clarke, 8 March

1812. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant general no. 1299, item 135;

Franz Ludwig Meerheimb, Die Schlachten bei Bautzen am 20 und 21 May 1813, (Berlin,

1843), 20; Jaisohn d’Osia, Le Campagne de 1813, (Paris, 1912), 10.

566




to block the allied advance. Throughout the fighting that followed around Mockem on 3,

4, and 5 April 1813, Rochambeau formed the backbone o f Eugene’s defense by anchoring

his division at Wolte rsdorf astride the eastern approach to Magdeburg. Ultimately,

however, the battle envisioned by Wittgenstein and Eugene never transpired. Forward

elements o f the French and allied armies skirmished in villages several kilometers ahead

of Rochambeau’s positions, but when Eugene received an erroneous report that the allies

had crosses the Elbe further south, he w ithdrew the the 5th Corps from the eastern side o f

the river.13

At their meeting at Trachenberg, the allies agreed upon a strategy that would

prevent Napoleon from concentrating his forces against any single allied army. The result

was that beginning in spring and lasting until late fall 1813, the French Army in Saxony

fought a series of engagements that would culminate in Leipzig at what would come to be

known as the Battle of Nations. As a division commander in Lauriston’s 5th Corps,

Rochambeau participated in many o f these actions, beginning with the Battle of Liltzen

on 13 May.

After Eugene ordered him to move his corps to Leipzig on the 12th, Lauriston

made initial contact near Ltitzen with General Friedrich von Kleist’s 2d Prussian Corps.

Maison and Lagrange maneuvered against the Prussians while Rochambeau, who had

only two o f his three regiments, was held in reserve. Von Kleist soon saw that he was

outnumbered and withdrew, but Eugene ordered Lauriston to halt his pursuit o f the

13 F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany, (London, 1912), 45;

George Nafzinger, Lutzen and Bautzen: Napo leon’s Spring Campaign o f 1813, (Chicago,

1992), 74-79.

567




Prussians, lest he encounter a larger formation of General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly’s

army. When Napoleon arrived near Ltitzen a short time later, he advanced Marshal

Michel Ney’s 11th Corps and Marshal Joachim M urat’s 1st Cavalry Corps against the

allied army, and ordered the 5th Corps to secure Ney’s and Murat’s flanks. As the result,

Rochambeau saw limited action at Liitzen, but during the pursuit that followed the French

victory, he was wounded on 19 May during a skirmish near the village o f Eichberg.14

Two days later, Rochambeau participated in Battle of Bautzen (21-22 M ay 1813)

by holding down the lead elements of Barclay’s combined army as they continued to

force Napoleon to a battle at the place o f their choosing. The 19th Division did not serve

on the main battlefield at Bautzen. Instead, Lauriston gave Rochambeau ha lf of his

cavalry and artillery, and ordered him to anchor his forces in the 5th Corps’ former

positions at Groditz to occupy Barclay’s forward elements. Lauriston, meanwhile, moved

his 16th and 18th Divisions northw ard to Cannewitz to support a counterattack by Ney’s

into Blticher’s northern flank. Rochambeau defended Groditz with such vigor that he

thwarted any plans that Barclay had to maneuver his forces to properly support Blucher’s

Prussians. Largely as the result of efforts at Groditz, Napoleon recognized Rochambeau’s

five months of active duty by naming him Officer o f the Legion of Honor on 4 June, and

14 Prior to the battle at Ltitzen, Eugene ordered that Rochambeau leave one o f his

division’s three regiments (four battalions of the 135th Line) to guard Halle. When

Prussian General Friedrich Wilhelm von Btilow attacked Halle, this regiment became be

the only of Rochambeau’s units to be engaged in prolonged fighting during the Battle o f

Ltitzen. Nafzinger, Ltitzen and Bautzen, 148-149; Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, 378.

568




then Baron of the Empire on 18 June 1813.15

Napoleon concluded an arm istice with the allies on 2 June, bu t on 14 August

hostilities recommenced. Following an inconclusive engagement at Siebenecken on 19

August, Lauriston received orders on 21 and 22 A ugust to cross the Bober River to

pursue General Gebhard von Blucher’s Prussians eastward. As the result o f this order,

Rochambeau displayed particular heroism on the 23rd while leading his division in

repeated attacks against the Prussians as they attempted to make a stand near the village

of G oldberg.16

In early October, Napoleon chose to draw the allied armies into a decisive battle at

Leipzig. By the 14th, Lauriston’s corps, supported by 8,000 of Mura t’s cavalry under

General Edouard-Jean-Baptiste Milhaud, held one o f the main southern approaches to

Leipzig at the village o f Liebertwolkwitz, and formed the center o f the Grande Arm ee’s

primary southeastern defensive ring. Rochambeau’s 19th division, which straddled the

Leipzig-Liebertwolkwitz road, comprised the heart o f Lauriston’s defensive line. On 16

October, General Johann Klenau’s 4th Austr ian Corps and General Prince Andreas

Gorchakov’s 8th Russian Division attacked at Liebertwolkwitz. Throughout the battle,

Lauriston’s infantry and artillery held o ff repeated attacks by Russian and A ustrian

15 Meerheimb, Die Schlachten bei Bautzen am 20 und 21 May 1813, 40-41; Petre,

Napo leon’s Las t Campaign in Germany, 132; Order naming Rochambeau Chevalier de

la Legion d’honneur, Ministere de la G uerre, Extrait des Minutes de la Secretaire d ’etat, 4June 1813. Service historique, Carton Yb 381; dossier lieutenant general no. 1299, item

139.

16 Alexandre Berthier, Registre d ’Ordres du M arechal Berthier Pendant la

Campagne de 1813 (Paris, 1909), II, pp. 69, 71.

569




divisions; when Milhaud attacked with the cavalry, the allies withdrew, allowing

Rochambeau and Maison to pursue the withdrawing allied divisions as far as the village

of Gulden-Gossa, five kilometers south.17

Lauriston blocked the attempted penetration o f Napoleon’s forward lines on 16

October, but the allies soon reorganized for another concerted effort. Accordingly,

Napoleon tightened his defensive lines around Leipzig, with the result tha t on the 17th,

Lauriston moved his corps four kilometers north along the same Leipzig-Liebertwolkwitz

road to close ranks with Marshal Claude Perrin V ictor’s 2nd Corps around the village o f

Probstheida. After augmenting his division’s complement o f artillery and cavalry,

Lauriston placed Rochambeau in forward positions to the southeast o f Probstheida, and

then took his two remaining divisions into reserve, two kilometers northward, around the

village of Stotteritz. Rochambeau’s service to France was soon to come to an end .18

On the morning o f 18 October, Victor’s and Lauriston’s defenses around

Probstheida were attacked by the 2nd Prussian Corps under General Friedrich von Kleist,

the 2nd Russian Infantry Corps under Prince Eugen of Wurttemberg, and Barclay’s cavalry

commanded by General Count Peter Pahlen. Prussians regiments charged various points

of the walled village throughout the morning, but each time they were repulsed. After

discovering a gap in the wall, however, the Prussians concentrated their efforts against the

17 Friedrich R udolf von Rothenburg, Die Schlacht bei Leipzig im Jahre 1813, (Leipzig, 1842), 18-19, and map insert; George Nafzinger, Napoleon at Leipzig,

(Chicago, 1996), pp. 102-105, 127.

18 Ibid.; Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany, 363-364; Aloys Schulte,

Die Schlacht bei Leipzig, (Bonn, 1913), map insert.

570




forces stationed there - Rochambeau’s 19th Division. While the King o f Prussia and the

Czar o f Russia watched, a series o f Prussian and Russian infantry divisions failed in

successive attempts to break Rochambeau’s defensive line, and by mid-afternoon, the

carnage had become so terrible that the two monarchs cancelled any further infantry or

cavalry assaults against the French positions at Probstheida. The battle was to become an

artillery due l.19

O f the fifty pieces of heavy artillery which surrounded Probstheida, Rochambeau

commanded fifteen. In fact, counter-battery fire between the French, the Prussians and

the Russians became so furious that Napoleon, who was observing the battle from a

hilltop several kilometers to the northwest, rode to Probstheida to direct the artillery

himself. Unfortunately, the Em peror was unable to save the lives of his division

commander Rochambeau and the majority o f his staff. That evening, Donatien

Rochambeau was mortally wounded by enemy artillery fire while inspecting his own

artillery positions; he died the following day in a military hospital in the city of Leipzig.

Just as at Martinique, it is a testament to Rochambeau’s tenacity that when von Kleist’s

troops occupied Probstheida the following morning, they found thirty o f the fifty guns

that had defended the town either destroyed or d isabled.20

19 Ibid.; Petre, Napoleon’s Las t Campaign in Germany, 363-364; Nafzinger,

Napoleon a t Leipzig, 204.

20 Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany, 363-364; Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, 378. Similar to the date of his birth, confusion exists over the date of

Rochambeau’s death. In 1843, his son, Philippe, wrote to the War Ministry for a copy of

his father’s death notice from 19 October, 1813. The ministry replied that the certificate

in their possession stated that the general died on 20 October. In fact, Philippe remains

the best source. On 18 October 1813, Colonel Philippe de Rochambeau commanded a

571




At the time of his death at age fifty-eight, Donatien Rochambeau had given forty-

four years of service to his country. Yet, during the twenty-two years that he spent as a

general officer, glory had eluded the marshal’s son. Timing and circumstance never

favored Rochambeau until 1813, when his military fortunes improved under the close

watch of his emperor. Napoleon immediately recognized and honored Rochambeau’s

battle field talents. According to the commander of a cavalry regim ent that fought with

Rochambeau at Liebertwolkwitz, jus t days before the great battle at Leipzig, Napoleon

bestowed upon Rochambeau the na tion’s highest honor, naming him Marshal o f France.

In October 1813, Rocham beau appeared to be destined for greatness, but once again,

timing and circumstance conspired to ensure that glory would not be his; he died before

Napoleon’s nomination ever reached Paris .21

Whether in revolutionary America or revolutionary France, the mainland or the

islands, in every combat action in which he participated, Donatien Rochambeau

demonstrated a strength o f will and a tenacity in battle that ranked among the finest

displayed by the military leadership o f Revolutionary France. Indeed, it is no small

measure o f his military worth that his gallant defense o f Martinique, conducted under the

most unenviable cond itions, earned him the highest praise of his British enemy.

Unfortunately for the nation, Rochambeau’s service as Governor General o f the French

regiment o f Murat’s cavalry at Leipzig, and undoubtedly attended to his father as he lay

dying in Leipzig. Philippe de Rochambeau to Ministry of War, 18 May 1843 andMinistry of War to Philippe de Rochambeau 24 May 1843. Service historique, Carton Yb

381; dossier lieutenant general no. 1299, item 158.

21 Jean-Baptiste Marbot, Memoires du General Baron de Marbot (Paris, 1891),

318.

572




Windward Islands represented a high water mark o f his military service. Just as in

Martinique, later years saw Rochambeau placed in a variety of truly insurmountable

circumstances. The difficulties that he faced in Saint-Domingue between 1802 and 1803,

a campaign that I will explore in the future, were so insoluble as to destroy his reputation

and his army; by the time that his extraordinary talent was rediscovered in 1813, it was

too late. Regardless of the conditions, Rochambeau remained unswervingly loyal to his

country and his profession, and especially to his v ision o f the ultimate glory of France.

Though he regularly suffered, dared, and achieved in support of that elusive national

ideal, today, Donatien Rochambeau’s own glory remains at Leipzig, buried with his

remains in the officers’ square of the dead o f France’s 5th Corps. Yet, his name is

honored on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in immortal recognition of his life and death in

the service o f his country.

573




Appendix Material

Appendix A - Appendices to Chapters

Appendix to Chapter III

Item 1. Secret Dispatch Memorized by Colonel Donatien Rochambeau and

Delivered to the Court at Versailles.

Reprinted from Donatien Rochambeau, Journal (The War in America), First Published in

Jean-Edmond Wheelen, Rochambeau Father and Son; A Life o f Marechal de

Rochambeau and the Journal o f the Vicomte de Rochambeau [hitherto unpublished],

(New York, 1926), pp. 214-216.

On the Necessity fo r an Increase in Sea and Land Forces in the

United States

The attack upon Rhode Island has two objectives:

1. To destroy the warships and to bum the convoy ships.

2. To defeat or capture the body of troops who are garrisoned there.

The naval men consider the first impossible since they regard as unattackable [sic] ships

anchored broadside in such a channel as that at Rhode Island with its sides so well

protected. As for the convoy ships, they can always be placed in a safe posit ion by taking

them up to Providence.

The second seems to offer some possibility to the enemy. But it seems to me impossible

under the present circumstances. The way in which I believe the English would

undertake this would be to bring their transport ships loaded with landing forces into the

mainland and Conan icut Island. They would go around the position held by the French

vessels and proceed to make a landing at Studerhouse, which could still be protected by afew ships o f the line. They would be obliged in addition to lay siege to the entrenched

camp at Newport which would be occupied by the army. This would require great efforts

and a quantity of troops very much larger than those on which we can count for the

defense of the island, which w ould always be as many as seven or eight thousand men,

for the State militia being called could come in five days to reenforce [sic] the French

troops. This has already happened when, shortly after our arrival, Admiral Arbuthnot

574




appeared.

The American militia puts up quite a good defense when it fights behind trenches and

before the ir ow n doorways; but they must not be taken too far away n or counted upon too

much in a close fighting. The unfortunate campaign of General Gates in Carolina proves

this. The Northern militia is incomparably better than that of the South.

I am thoroughly convinced that General Clinton will never attempt this attack except with

forces greatly superior to ours. It seems probable that he will abandon the plan for this

year for fear that a disgarrisoning [sic] of New York would leave it open to an attack by

Washington —whose army numbered from ten to twelve thousand men at the time o f my

departure —as soon as he him self was occupied in besieging us.

There are two other landing points, at Brenton's Point and Black Point in the Seakonnet

channel. But I do not believe that they would ever attempt to descend on these points,

one place being very narrow and the navigation o f the second one be ing difficult and also

near the fort at Howland's Ferry, which keeps open our contact with the mainland.

All that part o f Rhode Island which faces Narragansett Bay bristles with rocks and

breakwaters in such a m anner that it is impossible to land there -- at least according to the

affirmations of Captain Gardiner who has done the fleet and the army great service and

who merits the notice o f the government.

The plan o f campaign wh ich the English have adopted seems quite dangerous for the

American cause. They no longer make any efforts to bring the Northern colonies into

obedience. It is against those o f the South that all o f their attention is turned, and it is

believed tha t they plan to take the North River as their limit. The taking o f Charleston,

the way in which Lord Cornwallis moved into the interior of the country, the detachment

which has just been sent from New Y ork and which is believed to have left for Virginia,

as well as the fort at W est Point which Arnold was obliged to surrender, all support this

opinion quite well.

I imagine that they have determined upon this because the colonies of the South are more

fertile, richer, and as a result more valuable to England's trade. They are made up o f great

land holdings which have a great number o f black slaves to cultivate the plantations, who

—drawn by a hope of freedom would rise against their masters or become part o f the

English army as it advanced into the interior. The Northern colonies on the contrary are

full of small proprietors who are not very rich and o f whom the greater part has seen armyservice during the course of the war. Besides these colonies are nearer to Boston, the

chief point o f enthusiasm which so easily communicated itse lf to men who were made

discontented through long injustice and recent cruelty.

The ways o f preventing these misfortunes are described in my father's dispatches which I

have turned over to the government and which can no t too soon be carried into execution.

575




Item 2. Route of march of the French army from Providence, Rhode Island to New

York.

Reprinted from Donatien Rochambeau, Journal (The War in America), First Published in

J.E., Wheelen, Rochambeau Father and Son; A Life o f Marechal de Rochambeau and the

Journal o f the Vicomte de Rochambeau [hitherto unpublished], (New York, 1926), 220.

[From Providence].... they set out on their march by regiments, at an interval o f a

day....and they were at W aterman's Tavern on the eighteenth of June after having done

.................................................................................. 15 miles

June 19th to Plainfield ......................................................................... 15 “

June 20th to W indham ........................................................................ 15 “

June 21 st to Bolton ............................................................................. 16 “

June 22nd to Hartford (a stop)............................................................ 12.5 “

June 25th to Farmington .......................................................... 12.5 “

June 26th to Baron's Tavern ............................................................... 13 “

June 27th to Breakn eck ....................................................................... 13 “June28th to New T ow n ......................................................................... 15 “

The army [then] marched by brigades

July 1st to Ridgebury.............................................................................. 15 “

July 2nd to B ed fo rd ............................................................................... 19 “

Total 161miles

Lauzun's legion separated from the first brigade in order to move against Morrisania to try

to surprise the Brigadier de Lancey's corps, while General Lincoln at the head o f 1,200

Americans was to try to surprise King's Bridge. These two plans failed.

On the previous m arc h ........................................................................ 161 miles

July 3rd to North C as tle ..................

The army [then] marched as a unit.

July 6th to Ph ilipsburg.....................

Total ........................ 183 miles

17 “

5 “

576




Appendix to Chapter XII

Return of Ordnance Captured at Tobago -1 8 April 1793 PRO, CO, 318.12, piece

211.

Iron Guns:19 ea............... 18-pounders

9 ea................. 9-pounders

20 ea . 6-pounders

2 e a................. 4-pounders

11 ea............... swivel guns

Brass Ordnance:

2 ea................. 6-pounders

1 ea ................. 10-ton mortar

2 ea................. 91/2-ton mortars

1 ea ................. howitzer

Guns on Carriages on Battery

14 ea............... 18-pounders

5 ea..................9-pounders

5 ea..................6 -pounders

1 ea ..................91/2-ton mortar

577




Appendix to Chapter XIII

Rochambeau’s report of British forces besieging Republique-ville in February 1794.

Reprinted from Donatien Rochambeau, “Journal du siege de la Martinique par les anglais,

soutenu par le General Rochambeau du 4 Fevrier 1794,” appended item, unnumbered page. AN Collection M oreau Saint-Mery, Microfilm F3 40, item 7.

State of the British batteries surrounding the forts of Martinique.

Cannons

1. Grand battery at the front o f the attack 11 o f 241b.

2. Baumiers battery

3. Battery at Tully Planta tion

4. New battery at the front of the attack 3

5. Rear battery in front o f Lacoste plantation 5

6. Rear battery near the Lalapy redoute -7. Battery in front of Larcher plantation -

8. Mome Tartanson battery 3

9. Destourelles battery 3

10. Destreuse battery 4

11. Mome Petate battery 4

12. Campaign guns on the Case-Navire road 2

13. Pointe Destourelles battery 1

14. Battery at Duom ot plantation 5

15. Gun Boats 7

16. Tw obom bardes -

17. Campaign guns at Laborde plantation 2 o f 41b.

50

Howitzers

3

2

5

1

3

3

4

1

Mortars

6

23 16

Armament of British Ships Involved

Boyne 98 Roebuck 44 Winchelsea 32

Irresistable 74 Drom edary 44 Ceres 32

Vengeance 74 Beaulieu 40 Rose 28

As ia 64 Ste. Margaretta 36 Mayflower 18

Veteran 64 Blonde 32 Vesuvius (Bomb) 8

Experience 50 Quebec 32 Ae tna (Bomb) 8Ulysses 44 White 32 7 Gun Boats 7

Assurance 44 Terpiscore 32

Troops7,000 troops chosen to come from Europe aboard suitable transports; flank companiesand a detachment from the garrisons of the O ccidental Indes; three to four thousandarmed sailors in regiments; and a regular corps o f armed blacks.

578




Appendix to Chapter XVII

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION OF FORT BOURBON

Reprinted from Rev. Cooper Willyams, Expedition Against The French West India

Islands. (London, 1796), 70-74.

On the 21st of March, 1794, by order o f their Excellencies Sir Charles Grey, K.B. Generaland Com mander in Ch ief of his Britannic Majesty’s forces in the West Indies, etc., etc.,etc. and Vice Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B. com manding his Majesty’s fleet, etc., etc.Commodore C. Thompson, Colonel R. Symes, and Captain J. Conyngham, met atDillon’s house to receive proposals o f capitulation for Fort Bourbon, from Coloneld”Aucourt, Captain Dupriret, and Gaschet Dumanie, jun. nominated Commissioners forthat purpose by General Rochambeau.

The follow ing ARTICLES were proposed^ discussed, and modified, at a second conference held at Fort Royal on the 22n o f March, 1794.

Article I. The garrison, composed o f troops o f the line, artillery, gunners of the marine,and national guard, shall march out with colours flying, thirty rounds a man. - A n s w e r . The colony o f Martinique, already reduced by the arms of his Britannic Majesty, and theforts and towns of St. Pierre and Fort Royal taken with sword in hand, GeneralRochambeau can only capitulate for Fort Bourbon, and what it contains. - Granted. Butthey are to lay down their arms a t a place appointed, and not to serve against his BritannicMajesty, or his allies, during the presen t war.

II. Three months pay to be allowed to the troops of the line. - An swer . No pay will begiven. All their effects will be allowed them; and they will be provided with whatevermay be necessary for their voyage to France.

III. The thirty-seventh regiment, formerly Marshal Turenne’s, shall keep their colours

and arms. - An swer . Refused, being contrary to all customs o f war. The officers maykeep their swords.

IV. They shall be furnished with ships to carry them to France. - An swer . Granted.

V. The emigrants, who have returned to Martinique, shall not be present where thegarrison lay down their arms or embark. - An swer . Granted.

VI. Such persons of the national guard, who can give proofs of their property, shall be permitted to remain in the island, giving that property as security for the ir conduct. -An swer . Those o f the national guard in Fort Bourbon who have affairs to settle, andwhose sojourn may no t be deemed dangerous to the colony, may remain according to thedeclaration of the General, dated January 1,1794 . Such as wish to go to France shall beallowed, leaving their agents here.

VII. Persons not included in the above article, who are compelled to return to France, shall be allowed a certain time to settle their affairs. - A n sw er . A proper time shall be allowed: fifteen days at least.

VIII. Persons belonging to the garrison of Fort Convention, possessing no landed property, but who exercised some profession or trade previous to the present capitulation,shall be allowed to continue their trade or calling; nor sent to France, provided their

579




future conduct should not make such a measure necessary. - A n sw er . They are regarded in the sam e predicament with those in Article VI.

IX. The legal regulations o f the constituted authorities shall be confirmed. - A n sw er . Refused.

X. The code o f civil judicature in force through the island shall be continued for thespace of two years. - An swer . Granted, till his Britannic Majesty’s pleasure be known.

XI. The property of owners and captains of ships shall be secured to them on board andon shore. - An swer . Granted, as to the ir property in Fort Bourbon.

XII. The inhabitants of St. Pierre, embarked on English ships, shall be set at liberty, andtheir property, under seal, secured to them. - An swer . This article cannot come withinthe present capitulation. The claimants may apply to the commanders o f the fleet andarmy.

XIII. The ordonateur and officers of administration shall have permission and time toregulate their accounts, and to take with them the papers relative to that end. - A n s w e r . Granted.

XIV. There shall be an entire and absolute oblivion o f the past, and an end to allanimosities. - An swer . Granted, according to the proclamations.

XV. The rights of free citizens inrolled [sic] in the national guard shall be preserved. -An swer . Refused.

XVI. The liberty of individuals composing the companies of l’Enclume, d ’Octavius, dela Croire, and de Pontouur, shall be confirmed. - An swer . Refused. The slaves must berestored to their owners.

XVII. A period shall be fixed for the taking possession of the fort, and the necessary timeallowed for the garrison to take out their effects. - An swer . The two gates o f FortBourbon to be delivered up to the troops o f his Britannic Majesty immediately after theexchange o f the present articles. The garrison will march out at the great gate, and beconducted to the place appointed for each corps, by the commissioners who havemanaged the present capitulation, and w ill lay down their arms at the place of theirembarkation. Three days will be allowed for the evacuation of the fort, and thecommissaries o f artillery and stores will remain in the forts to take inventories of all themagazines.

XVIII. The greatest attention shall be paid to the sick and wounded; and they shall befurnished with ships to carry them to France as they recover. - An swer . Granted, but atthe expence [sic] o f the French government, and to be attended by their own surgeons; ifnot sufficient for the purpose, surgeons shall be furnished.

XIX. General Rochambeau, imm ediately upon the surrender of the fort, shall be at liberty

to take his measures for his return to France. A frigate to be furnished him, his aides decamp, secretaries and suite. - An swer . A commodious vessel shall be allowed toGeneral Rochambeau, with necessary passports for his safe return to France.

XX. The effects, trunks, chests, private papers, and all that General Rochambeau shalldeclare to belong to him self and his suite, shall be put under the protection o f an Englishguard, when the troops o f that nation shall have taken possession of Fort Convention, andshall be embarked with him. - An swer . Granted.

580




XXI. The civil ordonateur, or intendant of the colony, shall have liberty also, with theofficers o f administration, comptroller and treasurer, with those employed in the publicoffices at St. Pierre and Fort Royal, to return to France. - An swer . Granted.

XXII. The same demands made by General Rochambeau in Art. XX. Shall be granted tothe intendant and those under him. - ANSWER. Granted.

XXIII. All papers o f accounts in the forts or town shall be carefully collected by the principals o f each departm ent to which they belong, and embarked in the same ship w iththe ordonateur. - An swer . All papers, not essential to be left in the colony, shall begiven, and free access to take authentic copies o f such as it might be thought necessary toretain.

XXIV. Captains and officers of merchant ships, who have not settled their affairs, shall be allowed time to do so. The former the space o f four months, the later o f two months,under the protection o f the comm ander o f his Britannic Majesty’s forces, that they mayrecover their debts; after which they will procure the readiest passage to whatever placemay be expedient for their affairs, with passports from the English commanders. -An swer . Granted.

Additional Article. Fort Bourbon to be delivered up to his Britannic Majesty in its presentstate, with no deterioration of its batteries, mines, magazines o f artillery or provisions,and every thing it contains which is not the private property o f the garrison.

Fort Royal, March 22, 1794.

Signed.

D ’Aucourt . Gaschet , F il s. Dupriret.

C. Thompson. R ic h . Syme s .

Joh n Conyngham .

Approved by me,DTE. Rochambeau, Commander in ChiefOf the French W est India Islands

Approved by us,C h a r l e s G r e y. John Jervis.

581




Appendix B - Copyright Permission

582




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583




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