the education of statesmen in cicero's de republica

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The Education of Statesmen in Cicero's "De Republica" Author(s): J. Jackson Barlow Source: Polity, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Spring, 1987), pp. 353-374Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234794Accessed: 29-07-2015 14:14 UTC

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The Education of Statesmen in Cicero's De Republica

J. Jackson Barlow Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution

In De Republica, Cicero presents Scipio as the ideal moderator rei publicae, a statesman who is capable of teaching legislators. Scipio instructs the young men of his circle in the art of preserving good laws and changing bad laws for the better. His first task, however, and the crucial stage in the young men 's education, is to recover the philosophic treatment of politics. In Cicero's time, philosophy had aban- doned its concern with the city, preferring instead to study non-human nature. In De Republica, Scipio attempts to correct this understanding of philosophy, and thus make it once again useful to the city. In attempting thus to call philosophy back to earth, Cicero has been misunderstood by later scholarship. This article reassesses Cicero's political thought.

J. Jackson Barlow holds a Ph.D. from the Claremont Graduate School and is co-editor and contributing author of a forthcoming volume, The American Founding: Essays on the Formation of the Constitution. He is presently on the staff of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.

Civic education-education in citizenship and for citizenship-is a prominent theme in the philosophic writings of Cicero. The best citizen is the one who is capable of managing the city's affairs well, and thus the most important subject in civic education is the political skill of the statesman. The very prominence of this theme, however, has led to a depreciation of Cicero as a philosopher, for Cicero's writings portray the statesman-philosopher as the best citizen. This combination is seen by many of Cicero's critics as standing in the way of that relentless and uncompromising pursuit of the truth which is the characteristic of the genuine philosopher. Yet Cicero may have thought more carefully about this theme than his critics believe, as a reassessment of De Republica indicates. In De Republica the problem of civic education, or more particularly the limits of political philosophy as a part of civic education,



354 Education of Statesmen in De Republica

emerges as a specific theme. It is also there, in the first of his mature philosophic works, that Cicero confronts the question, whether philosophy is the one thing needful.

The prevailing scholarly view of Cicero's teaching holds that his philosophic works are primarily derivative from several of the schools of Greek philosophy current in his day. They are regarded as valuable chiefly for the insights they provide into the teachings of others, as for example the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, whose own works are now lost. Cicero's achievement consists in the arrangement and presentation of the thought of others, not in his originality as a philosopher.' The intention of the works is to be patriotic and morally uplifting, and to give intel- lectual support to the fading Roman aristocracy.2 Cicero failed in this immediate project, and was himself a victim of the tyranny he had worked to prevent. Yet his long-term influence was profound: every educated man in the centuries after Cicero had at least some acquain- tance with his works. Above all, Cicero has been the West's most influ- ential teacher of the art of rhetoric. But, according to the prevailing opinion, this influence has on the whole been harmful, because the ideal of the orator-statesman, most prominently put forward in De Oratore,

1. A recent discussion that contains a valuable review of recent literature on Cicero is J. C. Davies, "The Originality of Cicero's Philosophical Works," Latomus 30 (1971): 105-119. This essay is scarcely calculated to encourage serious reconsideration of Cicero the philosopher: Davies concludes that Cicero's greatest claim to originality lies in his crea- tion of a new genre of literature (pp. 118-119). This argument seems to discount the place of the dialogues of Aristotle, and also furthers the prevailing notion that Cicero wrote

dialogues that were intended to be merely patriotic and morally uplifting. While Davies

appreciates the importance of the settings of Cicero's dialogues more than most, it is chiefly for their encouragement of "a quietly self-critical attitude" (p. 118).

For a reassessment of the view that Cicero is simple-minded, see Walter Nicgorski, "Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy," Political Science Reviewer 8 (1978): 73ff.

On Cicero's sources, see also: L. K. Born, "Animate Law in the Republic and Laws of

Cicero," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 64 (1933): 128-137; W. W. How, "Cicero's Ideal in his De Republica, " Journal of Roman Studies 20 (1930): 24-42; A. E. Douglas, "Cicero the Philosopher" in Cicero, ed. T. A.

Dorey (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 136ff; H. A. K. Hunt, The Humanism of Cicero (Melbourne, 1954), esp. pp. 196-197, considers Cicero's philosophic writings to be almost wholly composed of borrowings. Cf. Margaret E. Reesor, "The Indifferents in the Old and Middle Stoa," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 82 (1951): 102-110, especially pp. 105-106; G. M. A. Grube, "Educational, Rhetorical and Literary Theory in Cicero," Phoenix 16/4 (1962): 257, and Richard A.

Horsley, "The Law of Nature in Cicero and Philo," Harvard Theological Review 71

(1978): 35. 2. S. E. Smethurst, "Politics and Morality in Cicero," The Phoenix 9 (1955): 117-118.



J. Jackson Barlow 355

amounts to a depreciation of philosophy and of the life of the mind in favor of rhetoric and the life of action. As Charles N. Cochrane writes:

In this [educational] programme Cicero claims that the combination of literature and philosophy is peculiarly Roman, i.e., his own contribution to educational theory. Whether or not this was the case, the deliberate substitution of literature for mathematics in what had been the characteristically Platonic combination marks a distinct departure from the spirit and purpose of the Academic dis- cipline, and its historical significance can hardly be exaggerated. For, by imparting to Classicism precisely that 'literary and aesthetic bias' which Plato had so earnestly deprecated, it modified the whole complexion of Western culture, giving to it a rhetorical cast from which it was hardly to free itself even under the powerful stimulus of modern mathematical and physical science.3 The charge against Cicero may be summarized as follows. In Cicero's

works, philosophy appears as one of the tools used by an orator- statesman as he guides his city toward good or rational ends. Philosophy is thus "the handmaid of rhetoric": Cicero subordinates what is higher to that which is lower." Moreover, in his works, philosophy strays from its origins in the investigation of nature, e.g., mathematics. Mathematics is the clearest example of unchanging nature, that is, of things which cannot be other than they are. But politics exemplifies the mutability of human affairs and the apparent futility of the quest for knowledge concerning human affairs.' There can be no science of politics, as there is of mathematics. The truths uncovered by mathematics are not matters of dispute, while political questions are inherently matters of dispute. Mathematics is the same, always and everywhere, while the ideas of what is just and noble differ from place to place and time to time. The achievement of the Greek philosophers was to bring philosophy down from the heavens and into the cities; the appearance of political philosophy brought the unity of, and the tension between, nature and law to the forefront of philosophic reflection. Cicero's substitution of rhetoric for

3. Charles N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 146. This view contrasts in part with that of G. M. A. Grube, who claims that Cicero "has some claim to be called the father of classical humanism," but adds that Cicero "failed, and the divorce between rhetoric and philosophy continued" (p. 240; cf. p. 257). Cf. also Nicgorski, p. 78.

4. S. E. Smethurst, "Cicero and Isocrates," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 84 (1953): 282.

5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1141a-b.




mathematics in his educational scheme deflects the attention of those who- might be philosophically inclined away from understanding that tension between nature and law which is fundamental to philosophy. The education which he presents in his works is therefore defective, for it dis- places nature with politics as the theme of philosophy.

A closer reading of Cicero, however, calls this conclusion into question, for the tension between nature and law can be shown to retain its full significance for Cicero.6 Against his critics, ancient and modern, Cicero holds that a science of politics is not only possible but necessary, and this science is the basis of civic education. In De Republica, Cicero presents the great Roman soldier-statesman Scipio Aemilianus discussing the city with his friend Laelius and with several younger men. Like the Republic of Plato, the work is a dialogue peopled with interlocutors who represent various views and various characters. The usual way of reading Cicero's dialogues is to decide which of the characters represents Cicero's own beliefs and to treat his pronouncements as presenting Cicero's true views. The remainder is embellishment.' Yet this manner of reading involves difficulties of its own. It leads, for example, to a reading of Laelius's famous statement of the natural law (De Republica III, 33)8 as Cicero's own view, when in fact Laelius does not always agree with Cicero's views or with those of Cicero's other "spokesman," Scipio. We must therefore remain open to the possibility that the characters are not simply repeating Cicero's views and that the structure and arrangement of the dialogue may reveal the questions Cicero sought to address.

De Republica has come down to us in a fragmentary state. This poses a problem at the outset, for the two books that apparently set forth the education and character of the citizens, Books IV and V, are almost wholly lost. But an important education occurs within the dialogue itself, Scipio's teaching of the young men, and the preserved portions give us some insights into the character of this education. By its title, De Republica reminds us of Plato's Republic: res publica is a near Latin equivalent of politeia. At the beginning of the preserved portion of the work, Cicero introduces the question of whether politics or philosophy is

6. Thomas G. West, "Cicero's Teaching on Natural Law," The St. John's Review 32

(Summer, 1981): 75. 7. Smethurst, "Politics and Morality," p. 115; Hunt, p. 9; Davies, pp. 115 ff. 8. References in the text not otherwise identified are to De Republica. Exemplary of the

assumption that Cicero's own view is expressed by Laelius is Edward S. Corwin, The

"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 9-10; cf. Cochrane, p. 42. James Holton, "Marcus Tullius Cicero," in

History of Political Philosophy, 2nd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 132-133.




the better guide to life. De Republica opens with an attack, in Cicero's own name, on the Epicureans and their depreciation of the active life. The Epicureans, according to Cicero, believe that no wise man will engage in politics, because political activity is unpleasant. Among its other pains, politics does not leave sufficient leisure for the pursuit of philosophy, and it is also usually practiced by worthless men "with whom it is degrading (sordidum) to be compared" (I, 4, 4-6, 9).

Cicero rejects the Epicurean identification of the good with the pleasant. Yet his argument is directed not only against the Epicureans, but also against those who teach the virtues in the stricter sense (I, 1-2). We are reminded of Cicero's critique of the Stoics in the fourth book of De Finibus. Cicero charges the Stoics with making the standard for virtue a disembodied wisdom which is unpolitical, if not antipolitical, and ultimately unnatural.9 Moreover, in De Finibus Cicero criticizes both Stoics and Epicureans for their inability to translate the principles of their philosophy into principles of public right.'0 Both the Stoics and the Epicureans, in common with other philosophers, understand that there is a distinction between a good man and a good citizen. In addition, and according to Cicero more dangerously, they are unconcerned with the condition in which the two are united, i.e., the best regime. The questions of the best regime and the best way of life have lost their connection for the two schools. Philosophy, as the Stoics and Epicureans pursue it, is unconcerned with politics, and thus cannot form part of a civic education or of an education in statesmanship. For the Epicureans in particular, the city and the attachment to the city are things to be rejected, for they cover over the true ugliness of the human situation, the true homelessness of man, from which only Epicurean philosophy provides a relief." The Stoics, who are more concerned with the city and with justice than are the Epicureans, still argue that the political life of the city is indifferent to the happiness of the wise man.12 A wise and virtuous man, according to both Stoics and Epicureans, devotes his efforts and his attention to the eternal truth, which is truly lovable and worthy of devotion, as opposed to the city, which is changeable, always in flux, and therefore unlovable. Thus the two most prominent schools of philosophy in Rome-the two which have taught most of the young men of Cicero's day-denigrate any concern with politics, and constitute the great

9. De Finibus IV, 26-27. 10. De Finibus IV, 21-23; cf. II, 74. 11. James H. Nichols, Jr., Epicurean Political Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-

sity Press, 1976): 23, 166-167; Lucretius, De Rerum Natura I, 146ff. 12. De Finibus IV, 26.




obstacle to a civic education informed and elevated by political philosophy.

To the philosophers' depreciation of politics, Cicero responds with a political depreciation of philosophy. The highest and noblest use of virtue is in the government of a city. Virtue depends on the exercise of the virtues; one cannot be just, for example, without seeing to it that his fellow-citizens suffer no harm. Philosophers, who merely talk about virtue "in their corners," do not exhibit the highest or noblest virtue." The true teachers of the virtues, indeed the teachers of mankind, are statesmen, and above all the great legislators. At best, a philosopher can be a kind of legislator by teaching his students "to do of their own accord what they are compelled to do by the law.""' This depreciation of philosophy appears as the counterpoison to the philosophers' depreciation of politics. Yet the defense of the city seems to take place on the ground chosen by philosophy. The burden of proof is on politics to prove its compatibility with philosophy. Thus while right action is the proof of virtue, right action in context means acting upon the principles uncovered by the philosophers. More importantly, right action means doing freely and without compulsion those things which are right and noble, simply because they are right and noble (cf. I, 27). Perhaps the best statesman will be the one who, like the philosophers, relies least upon compulsion. Thus Cicero's depreciation of philosophy does not appear whole-hearted, for it contains an important reservation in favor of the philosophers. Unlike philosophers, statesmen are limited by circumstances and must sometimes resort to compulsion, but philosophers can, if they will, serve as guides for those who would themselves be legislators. Philosophers can teach the teachers of the virtues.

It is the claim of philosophy that it promotes the happiness of those who pursue it, and that in this pursuit their souls will become as good as possible. In this respect the claims of law and philosophy are identical. Yet, as philosophy was taught in the schools of Cicero's day, the two seemed incompatible or even antagonistic pursuits. The attack on philosophy by Cicero emphasizes his belief that political philosophy had aban- doned its starting point, a concern with the happiness of men in cities, and replaced it with a concern for individual happiness regardless of city. This concern is irresponsible and even self-defeating if the best and hap- piest life requires certain political conditions for its fulfillment. Human life is necessarily social and political; the action which demonstrates the possession of virtue takes place in a city and among one's fellow citizens.

13. Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 485d-e. Callicles is the speaker. 14. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 20, who attributes this saying to Aristotle.




The best life will of necessity be impinged upon by politics, and thus philosophic reflection must be concerned with the best regime, which will form the foundation of civic education.

Unlike philosophers, who educate through speeches and admonitions, statesmen educate through speeches, deeds, and especially through laws. Civic education follows from the laws, which form the character of the citizens. This is the most important task of a statesman, but it presents a difficulty. How can a statesman know what kind of character is to be formed or preserved without knowing the different kinds of characters and which character is most desirable? A statesman must learn about many kinds of characters, while the character his laws intend to form must be one.'" His own education is therefore critical, for he must know what is best and how to achieve its approximation in the citizens of his city. He must both stand apart from the horizon of the citizen and yet remain within it. What kind of education can prepare him for this? More particularly, of what value is political philosophy to a statesman? Cicero devotes the dialogue of Scipio and the young men to this question.

To the authority of the philosophic schools of his day, Cicero opposes men "who were at a certain period the most eminent and wisest in our city" (I, 13). He turns from Roman life in its present state of decay and looks back to an age when philosophy was new to Rome, and when the decline of Roman morals was not far advanced (cf. V, 1-2). Yet the return to the age of Scipio is at the same time an acknowledgment that Scipio had failed to stem Rome's decline. Cicero is aware that Scipio missed a crucial opportunity (cf. I, 71). His victories had brought Rome an unprecedented security, and removed the necessity of constant war- fare. But the Romans had always been a fighting race and had cultivated the virtues of a fighting race. For Scipio's victories to be complete, the Romans had to learn the virtues of peacetime.'6 Scipio's failure to encourage this transition is evident at the beginning of the dialogue: it is already as if the city were divided in two (I, 31). The introduction of Greek philosophy into Rome could have taken place in such a manner that it would foster the peacetime virtues, and particularly the virtue of moderation. Instead, the new learning produced effete intellectuals who, led by the philosophers, cared nothing for the city, which left the city prey to ambitious politicians who cared nothing for the best. The situation in Cicero's time was merely an advanced state of the same disease

15. Cf. Farabi, The Attainment of Happiness, 56. 16. Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and

their Decline, trans. David Lowenthal (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 94, 98; cf. Aristotle, Politics 1324b, 1333b.




(V, 2). The action of De Republica, Cicero's return to the origins of philosophy in Rome, suggests a new beginning, in which the defects of those origins will be set right.

The dialogue is set in the year 129 B.C., the last year of Scipio Africanus's life and a year of Gracchan unrest in Rome. In contrast to the Republic of Plato, the dialogue takes place on the most ancient of Rome's secular holidays. There is no hint of an introduction of new ways and new gods; Scipio will restore and confirm the laws. The Latin holiday commemorated the first expansion of Rome into Latin lands, and thus what the holiday and Scipio respectively bring to mind is the beginning and the fulfillment of Roman imperialism. Scipio uses the leisure provided by the holiday to praise his ancestors for the human activity which is closest to the activity of the gods, i.e., the founding of new cities or the preservation of those already established (I, 12; cf. III, 4-5). To the extent that he is a founder, Scipio acts the divine part within the dialogue. As one who preserves the laws, he is immune from a charge of impiety.'7 More importantly, the city as he describes it is open to philosophy in such a way that the problem of impiety does not arise.

The substitution of Scipio for Socrates attracts our attention. Scipio is not a philosopher, as Socrates was, but a statesman and a general. He cannot devote his entire time to the Socratic enterprise of attempting to replace ignorance with knowledge. For Scipio philosophy is an avoca- tion, something he pursues in his moments of leisure from public affairs.'" Yet the life of thought has a great attraction for Scipio; he longs to escape from the cares of public life and to fix his thoughts on eternity. At the end of the dialogue, he presents a picture of his true home, the universe, from the perspective of which Rome is very small (VI, 20ff). Unlike Socrates, Scipio is torn between the life of thought and the life of action; each exerts its claim to be the noblest and best way of life.19 The instruction of Tubero and the other young men is informed by this tension, and completes Scipio's action to improve the soul of Rome, even as his destruction of Carthage and Numantia secured the city's physical well-being.

Quintus Tubero is a young man who is eager to learn, and he wishes to pursue his learning in company with others. His eagerness is emphasized by the fact that he is first to arrive. He and "many" wish to spend their leisure in discussion with Scipio (I, 14). Tubero reminds Scipio of the

17. Cf. De Legibus I, 39; West, "Cicero's Teaching on Natural Law," p. 78. 18. Cf. Plato, Apology 21 a ff; Xenophon, Oeconomicus, II, 1-4, 10; VI, 12-VII, 3. 19. Cf. III, 7, and Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1977), p. 29.




political unrest that plagues Rome; he implies that their discussion will have the effect of distracting Scipio from his cares. If politics is to be among the "instructive topics" they will discuss, it will not be the present political crisis. Indeed, politics is not on Tubero's mind, for he wants to inquire into the facts surrounding the reported second sun (I, 15). Tubero is interested in the natural phenomenon to the exclusion of the political, even though the political realm is actually out of order and the natural is only reported to be (I, 32). Yet the problem is a grave one. The heavenly bodies and their motions are eternal and perfect. How could anything new arise in the heavens without portending important, perhaps disastrous, consequences for human life (cf. I, 19)? How can the heavens be truly objects of knowledge if they, like the human things, are mutable? Tubero's question may be most important, but what disturbs Scipio is his attitude of detachment: political questions are as abstract to him as questions about the celestial motions.

Scipio suggests in his reply that perhaps Tubero is not paying attention to the most important things. He wishes, he says, that Panaetius were present, for Panaetius is accustomed to investigating such celestial phenomena. Like Tubero, Panaetius is a Stoic and a student of nature, i.e., of the causes of such things as the heavenly bodies and their motions. Unlike Tubero, Panaetius is a foreigner and thus someone with whom it is appropriate to have such a discussion.20 But Scipio has reser- vations about this study in general, and particularly about Panaetius's claims of knowledge:

But, Tubero, for I will speak to you openly of what I think, I do not too much approve of our friend's habit in all matters of this2' kind; with respect to things of whose qualities we are scarcely able to have a suspicion by conjecture, he makes assertions as positively as if he could see them with his own eyes or touch them with his hands (I, 15).

Panaetius divides things according to their qualities or their kinds, but the qualities of the heavenly things are hidden from us. The study of the heavens, of the eternal things, is exposed to skeptical doubt of its claims to knowledge. The account of the whole given by Panaetius is as conjec-

20. Sabine and Smith, p. 6; R. F. Hathaway, "Cicero, De Re Publica II, and His Socratic View of History," Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (Jan.-Mar., 1968): 6; cf. De Republica III, 5.

21. Cicero uses here the pronoun "isto," which has both a pejorative meaning and a second-person meaning. The sentence could read "all matter of your kind," that is, of the kind of investigation pursued by Tubero.




tural as the account that Scipio himself will give in Book VI. But Scipio's account is given in the guise of a dream; he is aware of the provisional or even fabulous nature of his account. Unlike Panaetius, his primary concern is that his account be politically salutary. Panaetius is primarily concerned with the truth. He is certain that the nature of all things can be uncovered by human reasoning (cf. I, 56).

Socrates, Scipio says, showed greater wisdom than Panaetius by con- fining his studies to human affairs. The problems of nature, according to Scipio, were thought by Socrates either too great for the human mind or of no importance for human life.22 Tubero objects that in Plato's works Socrates is frequently portrayed discoursing on "arithmetic, geometry, and harmony," even "in the midst of his discussions of morals, of the virtues, and even of the republic" (I, 16). Scipio replies that Plato's account is not entirely to be trusted, for after Socrates's death Plato studied the teachings of the Pythagoreans. Later, when he wrote his Socratic dialogues, because of his love of Socrates and his desire "to give him credit for everything," he wove into Socrates's teaching the "subtle and obscure" teachings of the Pythagoreans (I, 16). Socrates, Scipio says, changed the direction of philosophy radically when he began to investigate human things.23 Political philosophy may differ from natural philosophy in its purposes and methods. The model for political philosophy is the pre-Platonic Socrates. The Platonic Socrates, he implies, is a less political and more abstract Socrates, one that young men can imitate without shocking their elders.24 Yet Scipio does not say what Socrates- his or Plato's-actually taught, and he is silent on the standards which Socrates applied to the city. It was Socrates's "charm and subtlety," precisely the qualities that so annoyed the Athenians, that Plato interwove with the Pythagorean teaching. Perhaps Plato combined Socrates's methods with the teaching of the Pythagoreans in order to make his teaching less shocking or in order to preserve it. But the question remains, what was the teaching that Plato wished to preserve?

The question of whether Socrates was more concerned with the things of nature, or more concerned with politics and laws, is not settled by Scipio and Tubero: the character of Socratic philosophy remains a question. Yet the argument has drawn our attention to a difference in intention and procedure between Scipio and Socrates. In Plato's Republic

22. I, 15; cf. I, 32 and Xenophon, Memorabilia I, 1. 23. Plato, Phaedo 96a, ff. 24. Cf. Plato, Second Letter, 314c, and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V, 11: Cicero

there says that Plato "immortalized" Socrates in his writings. The word consecrata means both "immortalized" and "deified."




Socrates had as one of his purposes to draw Glaucon away from his spirited attachment to political life. Scipio, in contrast, attempts to lead the theoretical Tubero away from the study of nature and toward a concern with politics.25 We wonder whether Scipio has deliberately distorted Socrates's teaching, in particular that part of his teaching which emphasizes the philosopher's concern for what is eternal rather than for what is merely human.26 Yet perhaps Scipio intends only to persuade Tubero to return to Socrates's starting point, i.e., to the one part of the whole of which we have first-hand knowledge, the opinions of men.27 The unqualified rejection of the city or the cave in the manner of Tubero only puts one, so to speak, into a deeper hole. Scipio indicates that the question of the best way of life, which is the question of the city, is central to philosophy. The tradition of philosophy on which Tubero relies does not seem to frame the most important questions for philosophy here and now, and therefore may give inadequate guidance to inquiries concerning virtue. Scipio's correction of Tubero is a necessary preparation for his education, for only when the authority of Plato, or rather of Tubero's understanding of Plato, is limited can politics reclaim that center stage in philosophy from which, Scipio implies, Plato himself banished it.

The discussion is interrupted, first by the arrival of Philus and then by the arrival of Laelius. Laelius assumes the place in the center, the place of the father. Unlike Plato's Republic in which the discussion begins in earnest only after the father leaves, here the discussion turns to the best regime only after Laelius arrives. Laelius is the representative of the city, and his arrival changes the character of the conversation: from this point on, the city is the center of the discussion. Laelius's arrival has made Scipio's task twofold. In the first place, he must describe the best regime, urged on by the down-to-earth Laelius (I, 34, 38ff). In the second, he must give an account of politics that will appeal to men of science like Tubero and Philus (I, 26-29; II, 64; VI). In this endeavor Scipio investi- gates not an imaginary city but a real city. He must first describe political science in the narrow sense as the art of ruling. This science of politics does not reveal itself through detached or theoretical inquiry, but through the study of history.28 Political science, to be useful for a statesman, must prepare him for many contingencies. The study of the regime

25. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia III, 6, and Plato, Republic 357a-358d; Strauss, The City and Man, p. 65.

26. Plato, Republic 485a ff, 508d-e, 517c-e. 27. Plato, Republic 508d-e; Apology, 21a ff. 28. Cf. IV, 3; V, 7; De Legibus I, 4-5, 18-19, 25, 27, 42, 58. On Cicero's use of history,

see Hathaway, p. 6, and compare Smethurst, "Politics and Morality," p. 115.




which is always the best does not prepare one for the mutable character of all actual regimes; the best regime is to that extent not true to the phenomena. The young men may be surprised at this procedure, but they give it their assent.29

Scipio seems to rehabilitate the study of nature once the arrival of Laelius has given the discussion a more political character (I, 23). Scipio shows that the study of nature and its causes may be useful for politics by relating the story of Gaius Gallus, who had once used his knowledge of celestial motions to quiet the apprehensions of Scipio's soldiers following an eclipse. Earlier, following Socrates, Scipio had argued that the causes of celestial motions are hidden from us and therefore of no importance for living our lives. But the knowledge of such causes may sometimes be useful for a statesman, as in public speech or speech before the ignorant when one must speak with assurance about things that are in fact hidden (cf. I, 26). A statesman determines his manner of speaking by his audi- ence and his purposes; a statesman may use knowledge of natural philosophy for the good of the city, but it is the art of statesmanship that governs its use. Statesmanship therefore appears to be a more compre- hensive kind of knowledge than natural philosophy. Scipio implies that public speech differs from speech before the wise. Since Tubero and the rest profess their ignorance about the things having to do with the city, Scipio himself must to some extent engage in popular speech.

The discussion of politics grows out of a discussion between Laelius, Philus, and Tubero on the value of natural philosophy. Laelius, who is suspicious of philosophy, questions its worth on the ground that we do not yet have sufficient knowledge of what concerns us most closely (I, 19). The things most worthy of investigation are the things "before our own eyes" (I, 31). Thus the task of discussing "those arts which can make us useful to the state" is imposed on Scipio by the representative of the city (I, 33, 55, 70). The political science that Scipio outlines, then, is knowledge possessed by one who can manage the affairs of the city well. But first, he must persuade the young men, in a more satisfactory way than Laelius has been able to do, that the city is most worthy of investigation.

In Book I, Scipio treats statesmanship as a science based on the knowledge of differences among regimes. This scientific preface to the study of politics is not, however, offered in the spirit of science, i.e., of detached inquiry.3" It is rather the account of a well-educated Roman who has

29. I, 34; cf. II, 1 and Mucius's question to Laelius at I, 33; it is clear from I, 37 that Philus expects a "scientific" treatment; cf. I, 36 and II, 64.

30. Compare I, 38, with Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094b.




learned more of politics from experience than from books (I, 36). Still, Scipio's account of the three good and the three bad types of regimes is the same account offered by many of the "Greek wise men." Indeed, we are told that Scipio often discussed the best regime with Panaetius and Polybius (I, 34). Each of the three good types-monarchy, aristocracy, and "polity"--has a corresponding bad type-tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Regimes come about because of men's agreements as to what is just, that is, they rest upon opinions (I, 39). Political science is thus, first, knowledge about the various opinions of different peoples or of different classes concerning what is just. Like Panaetius, Scipio begins by classifying things according to their kinds (cf. I, 38). Of these unmixed or "pure" regimes, Scipio recommends monarchy as best, though only reluctantly. The regime that is superior to all the others, Scipio says, is the one that is a combination of all three good types. This mixed regime (which was itself recommended by some of the Greeks, among them Polybius) corresponds to the Roman regime."

Scipio's hesitation to recommend any of the unmixed constitutions stems from the practical consideration that there is only a thin line separating each of the good forms from a bad one. For every good king, one can find a cruel tyrant, and for every moderate aristocracy there is a vicious oligarchy (I, 44). This resemblance between good and bad regimes is not the same as the cause of revolutions within a regime: monarchy and aristocracy especially can change from good to bad without any alteration in forms of government."2 Scipio has reluctantly endorsed monarchy on the ground that the best man has the strongest claim to rule.33 But the differences in the rank of the claims do not appear decisive. The best regime by nature, i.e., monarchy, does not seem to offer an adequate pattern for imitation in practice, or give the best instruction in the art of ruling. The best regime, to be best, must create the conditions for the best life and be the most nearly changeless,

31. Smethurst's comment is revealing of his approach to Cicero as a whole: "The term mixed constitution, of course, is a misnomer. His state is an oligarchy." "Politics and Morality," p. 117. Polybius puts forth his doctrine of the mixed regime in Book VI of his Histories.

32. Cf. I, 48ff, 69; II, 43, 48, 51; and Aristotle, Politics V, 1301a ff. 33. This is the only place in the argument where Scipio appeals to the authority of the

gods; but he is quick to dismiss the stories about the gods as mere likely tales. But he goes on to appeal to the philosophers. Reversing the formula in I, 15, he calls them "those who, as we may say, have seen with their own eyes things of which we hardly get an inkling through our ears" (I, 56). But before Scipio can elaborate on this there is a gap in the manuscript. Could Scipio intend to imply that the abstract commonwealths of the philosophers are no different from the fables told about the gods?




if it is true that only what is lasting is best. A mixed regime, comprehend- ing the competing claims of the one, the few, and many, is more stable and less mutable than any of the other kinds of good regime (I, 65). In addition, it is the regime in which statesmanship emerges in its fullest form. The mixed regime of Rome thus becomes the theme of the discussion, at Laelius's request (I, 55, 70).

Scipio has succeeded in setting the young men "on fire with eagerness to hear him," for he has shown that the best political order is not simply a reflection of the natural order of rank, and he promises to show how the best reveals itself in an actual city. The best regime simply or by nature is an absolute monarchy of the one man who is wisest and most virtuous. It is just that the most excellent man should rule; this is the dictate of right reason (I, 54ff, 61). But if he does not rule, nature and law would appear to be at odds. How then can one design a regime that will consistently put the best man or men in power? The difficulty with a monarchy is its dependence on the character of the monarch. In practical terms the best regime, i.e., the one which encourages and fosters excel- lence and which will last the longest, is a mixed regime in which the aristocracy holds the balance of power. It is from this class that statesmen will arise.34' This regime is most congenial to the best way of life, because it is the regime that will most often put men of good character into political office. More importantly, perhaps, the mixed regime is most open to political philosophy.

In the second book, Scipio offers an account of Roman history, in which he says, "I will fit to it, if I can, all I have to say about the best city" (I, 70). Scipio begins his historical account by quoting Cato the Elder as saying that the Roman constitution is superior because it is the work of many men (II, 1-2). There is some irony in quoting Rome's most famous "conservative" as praising repeated changes in the laws, but it underscores the openness of Rome to political change. Cato praises the changes in the laws because no man possesses a mind of such capacity that he can think of everything and because changes in conditions over time often require modifications in the laws. Not every statesman can fully understand-not to mention bring about-the best regime, but many together can approximate it. The best practical regime is then one that will not always be the same, for it will change from time to time as circumstances dictate and as opportunities for improvement arise. But

34. Note, however, that Cicero himself was not a member of the Roman aristocracy; the mixed regime holds out the possibility that "new men" may rise to positions of power. Cf. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 142-143.




this appears to violate the notion of a best regime, which requires a single form. The quotation from Cato points to the limitations of "founding." A legislator must make laws with a view both to what is best and to particular circumstances, and only in the rarest of circumstances can the best be achieved at one stroke. All actual regimes fall short of the best, and nature and law will thus, to some degree, remain in tension. The true teachers of mankind are therefore limited in a way that philosophers are not. A legislator requires statesmen in succeeding generations to preserve and perfect his legislation.

Scipio's historical account is given for the purpose of focusing the attention of Tubero and Philus on particular circumstances, and on how the study of particular circumstances can advance, rather than impede, the understanding of the nature of politics (I, 70; II, 51-52). This is an education in the art of ruling, and it shows the young men the general principles behind the apparent diversity of human affairs. His aim is to teach them how to preserve the laws if they are good, or to change them if they are bad (II, 45; cf. I, 45). It is therefore necessarily an account of how laws come into being and pass away. This account provides for a virtually continuous process of re-founding. But it is not yet clear that the standards to be applied in this process have any foundation, and without some foundation a continuous revision of the laws raises the dangers of injustice, instability, and civil war (I, 55). Without an understanding of ends, of justice, one has no guidance in preserving or changing the laws.

The art of ruling therefore leads to questions which are no longer part of political science in the narrow sense. At the end of the preserved part of Book II, Tubero calls Scipio's attention to this problem. What is lack- ing, he says, is a description of the education, training, customs and laws that will preserve the regime Scipio has described (II, 64, 70). Tubero is dissatisfied with Scipio's discourse. Yet he is only repeating a request of Laelius's: by the end of the second book Tubero is interested in the question of how to preserve the laws (II, 64; cf. I, 55). His education is more than halfway complete. It has been necessary to prove to Tubero, what no one in Plato's Republic doubted, that the question of justice is one that serious men take seriously. Scipio reminds him that in fact he has already spoken of the different kinds of regimes. But Tubero wants to be assured that justice is not simply conventional. He wants to push further, from the art of ruling to the good itself, to the ultimate standard of justice and injustice. Scipio admits that they can make no further prog- ress until they have done so, and they end their first day's conversation.

Justice, the subject of Plato's Republic, emerges as the theme of De Republica only after this lengthy introduction. The practical discussion




of the art of ruling appears as the preface to the consideration of justice. In his discussion of the art of ruling, Scipio made use of philosophic language in speaking of different kinds of regimes. He defended the art of ruling, as the most important of the practical arts, against the opinion that political science is of no philosophic importance. By using the language of philosophy, he has shown that the art of ruling is the practical art that is open to philosophy, and which indeed leads to philosophy. Much of the rest of De Republica is now lost, and conclusions about the argument of the last four books must be tentative. We can observe, however, that once the argument concerning the nature of justice becomes the theme of the discussion, Scipio temporarily ceases to take a leading part. Instead, the challenge to justice is made by Philus, a representative of philosophy (I, 19), while it is defended by Laelius, the representative of the city. This is a direct reversal from Plato's Republic. In Plato's dialogue Thrasymachus, speaking for the city, challenges conventional views of justice, which are defended by Socrates.

Philus presents the radically skeptical arguments of the Greek philosopher Carneades, arguments which he himself admits are harmful to the city (III, 8). Perhaps one cannot retain the perspective of a citizen and a philosopher simultaneously; philosophy, which is open to the possibility that justice is conventional, seems to be harmful to the opinion that the laws are just. Philosophy undermines the city, for it calls into question the city's fundamental claim that the laws are immutably just-and that their justice is based on a universal standard, whether the gods or nature. Using Carneades's arguments, Philus maintains that justice cannot be a natural principle, because if it were it would be the same everywhere. To be natural, justice would have to be like "heat and cold, or bitter and sweet," or like the numbers, which are also the same to all men (III, 13; cf. III, 3). But laws are things which differ from place to place, especially those laws which have to do with religion (III, 14-15). Moreover, notions of justice change from time to time even within the same city. A good man might be reduced to perplexity as he tries to decide which of the many kinds of laws to obey. Such an inquiry might end with the reflection that "laws are imposed upon us by fear of punishment, not by our sense of justice" (III, 18). If Philus's arguments are correct, political philosophy as Cicero conceives it is impossible. Political philosophy or science requires that it be possible to gain genuine knowledge of justice, even if that knowledge proves elusive. For Philus, the diversity of political phenomena proves that there can be no science of politics, as there can be a science of the constant motions of the heavens. Nature and law are completely separate.

The task of putting nature and law back together falls to Laelius. He




wishes to defend the city against the arguments of Philus, because they might be used against the city by men who do not share Philus's reluc- tance to attack the laws. To Laelius, the justice of the city appears unproblematic. He knows that the laws are just, and is particularly concerned to defend justice as something natural, hence eternal, and therefore as a permanent guarantee of the justice of Roman law. Unfor- tunately, we have no more than a few fragments of his discussion preserved beyond his classic statement of what is usually called the natural law:

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. .... And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchange- able law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge (III, 33).

The strength of Laelius's assertions of the natural law's eternal character distracts us from the standard which he proposes: natural law is "right reason in agreement with nature." In De Legibus, Cicero puts this standard more clearly: the standard of justice and injustice is "the mind and reasoning of the prudent man."" The prudent man is one who combines the art of ruling with knowledge of nature. Despite the strength of Laelius's asseverations, one cannot infer from this that the natural law speaks unqualifiedly of right actions which are independent of circumstances. The commands of the natural law may instead vary from time to time and from place to place. The man who possesses right reason guides his actions by a natural and eternal standard and gauges them according to the circumstances. The unchanging standard gives rise to manifestly changeable results.3" Justice is natural, but it is natural in a different way than "heat and cold or bitter and sweet."

Laelius presents the natural law as helpful to the city. It is natural right in its political guise; it shows how a concern for the eternal and a concern for politics in the present might be reconciled. It shows how philosophy might be useful to a statesman, for the natural law, like politics, requires that one look to the natural standards as well as to circumstances. The natural law completes the science of politics by satisfying the desire of

35. De Legibus I, 18-19. 36. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1134b.




political science for an account of justice, and yet it takes it only so far in the direction of philosophy. Laelius does not trust philosophy-especially as it is taught by men like Carneades-and his concern is to check its dangerous tendencies. Philosophy is safe in the hands of a prudent statesman; natural law will help make philosophy safe for the city. Natural law is a combination or hybrid of natural right and opinion and, as such, it necessarily preserves the tension between nature and law although in a muted form. It is a political presentation of the natural foundation of the laws, recognizing that in politics it is sometimes necessary to speak with assurance about things that are hidden (I, 23).

Scipio praises Laelius's defense of justice, and it forms the basis of the fuller explanation of the different kinds of regimes, which apparently was the subject of the rest of the Third Book, and of the discussion of the best regime and the best statesman in Books Four and Five (III, 42, 45-48; IV, 3; V, 7). The natural law provides the standards to be applied in political life. It is the best practical guide to the search for these standards, for it avoids the twin dangers of denying nature as a standard altogether, or of maintaining nature as a standard unattainable by actual political communities and thus of no importance. That which succeeds and completes education in the art of ruling is knowledge of the natural law, a knowledge which, like Laelius himself, remains somewhat suspicious of philosophy and its subversive effects. This is persuasive to the young men, especially to a Stoic like Tubero, because it speaks of truths which are unchanging, even while it is silent on the dilution of natural right by a lower principle-as for example the need on occasion to resort to force and fraud. The young men are led to see that they can at once love the city, which is transitory and changeable, and nature, which is permanent and immutable, because the changeable comes to sight as an effect of the permanent. Political science in its fullest form is the science of the permanent standards which underlie and guide the changes within a regime. This is satisfactory politically, because it provides standards by which to guide Roman politics: it will for example moderate the Romans' bellicosity (III, 34-35). It is satisfactory philosophically, because it returns to the Socratic starting point: the opinions of decent men which provide the most important access to the truth about political things." The natural law provides the foundation for the art of ruling and preserves the openness of that art to the study of nature.

The final part of the education of Tubero and the young men is the teaching on the immortality of the soul in Book VI. Cicero indicates at

37. II, 52; Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 123-125.




the end of De Republica that while the Laelian doctrine of the natural law may be satisfactory for most purposes, it does not give a fully satisfactory account, for it too points beyond itself. For Laelius, justice is unproblematic; the natural law gives a sufficient account of justice for all practical political purposes. "Scipio's Dream," the concluding section of De Republica and counterpart to Plato's Myth of Er, suggests that for Scipio, and thus for the teacher of legislators, the quest for the knowledge of the best things, of goodness and justice, remains unfinished. In "Scipio's Dream," Scipio, who has been the teacher throughout the dialogue, is himself taught by his grandfather, the elder Africanus. Africanus shows him the greatness of the universe compared with the smallness of the earth and with the even smaller portion of the earth that comprises Rome and its dominions (VI, 20-22). He tells Scipio that even the greatest of political actions cannot gain eternal glory for a man so long as that glory is measured by the memories of men. True glory is the product of virtue, and virtue is able to lead men to glory "by her own charms" (VI, 25). Virtue is shown in action, for the way to eternal glory is open to those who have served their country well.

But the care of one's own soul is not identical to care for the city. Car- ing for one's soul seems to lead away from the city. Those who would fix their gaze upon eternity must take care that their souls be ordered aright, and the right ordering of souls, at least in the first instance, is the work of the city and ultimately the lawgiver. But the city cannot guarantee the goodness of its citizens; politics is limited by the material with which it must work (VI, 25). It is the task of the statesman to bring about the best he can achieve from the resources at his command. Good citizenship would be sufficient if the city were prior to the soul, but in fact the soul is prior to the city. The city exists for the purpose of making the soul as good as possible. The final step in the education of statesmen is thus the consideration of eternity; at the end of the dialogue the city is almost left behind. The art of ruling and the natural law are completed by Scipio's teaching on the immortality of the soul. The science of politics leads to the consideration of the nature of the soul. The soul is the highest theme of politics; it is immortal, and like the heavenly motions or the numbers is unchanging. Yet it is one's duty to make the city as good as possible, because the best life, the life which makes the soul as good as possible, depends upon having a regime in which that life is possible. The city exists for the sake of the best way of life, for virtue is not of and for the city as such, but is measured by man's true and eternal home.

Cicero was the first writer of books of political philosophy, in what is now the traditional canon, to write after political philosophy became




routinized into conflicting schools of thought, each with its own set of dogmas."3 Philosophy became accepted among the Romans, but with that acceptance came the abandonment of any political influence by philosophers and their students. The result was "politicians unformed by philosophy and philosophers disdainful of politics.""39 The philosophic schools-especially the Epicureans, but also the Stoics-by abandoning political philosophy, laid the foundation for the rule, not of the best but of the worst men in Rome. In this situation, Cicero began to question whether philosophy was necessary to, or even useful for, political life. If philosophy was to be useful, it was necessary to find a way to persuade the young men who were enamored of philosophy to take part in politics, to take political concerns seriously, and to care for the city. They had to be persuaded that virtue comes first to sight as political virtue, and that by taking seriously the possibility that political virtue is virtue one begins to understand that higher kind of virtue possessed by philosophers. If, on the other hand, philosophy was not useful, then its partisans should refrain from making exaggerated claims about its usefulness (I, 10-11).

Scipio demonstrates to the young men, first, that the investigation of human affairs is an inquiry of equal, if not superior, dignity to the study of non-human nature. But the science of politics is something different from the study of mathematics. Political science necessarily leads to a consideration of the changing fortunes of politics, for a statesman must know how to handle any situation that might arise. A study of history is valuable as a tool for teaching potential statesmen about changes within a city and how they come about. But knowing this alone is insufficient, for the statesman must have a guide as he attempts to preserve good laws and change bad ones. Thus the second step in Scipio's education, and the foundation for the fuller account of the regimes, is the natural law. The right reason which is the natural law is the reason of one whose education is complete; it is political science in the best sense. It combines an understanding of the eternal principles with an understanding of the fluctuat- ing course of human affairs.

Political philosophy, according to Cicero, is the city's best guide. But to serve as a guide, it must become public-spirited or patriotic. That its patriotism is not a narrow one is shown by "Scipio's Dream." A civic education informed by political philosophy will teach that the city is not the soul's true home, but is the way to the soul's true home. Politics, far from covering over man's homelessness, reveals the way from the city to eternity. Philosophy is necessary for civic education because its account

38. West, "Cicero's Teaching on Natural Law," p. 75. 39. Ibid.




of the virtues provides a natural and rational foundation. But this requires that the city be open to philosophy and to the teachings of the philosophers. This cannot be guaranteed, and it may be no more than a happy accident when it does happen, as it did in Rome. When this hap- pens, according to Cicero, it is irresponsible of philosophers to abandon a concern with politics. Civic education of the kind Cicero describes is therefore necessary to philosophy, for it preserves the city's openness to philosophy. The best life depends on the proper political conditions for its support (V, 7; IV, 3). Philosophy thus must become patriotic and must acquire rhetorical skills if it is to preserve itself and its beneficial influence upon the city. Rhetoric must become the handmaiden of philosophy.

Scipio more than fulfills the philosopher's boast that he teaches his students "to do of their own accord what they are compelled to do by the laws" (I, 3). Not only does he teach Tubero and the rest the true reason and motivation for obeying the laws, i.e., a concern for their own souls, he teaches them how to make good laws. But a great work of recovery is needed to persuade these young men of the importance of making good laws. It is this work of recovery which accounts for the differences between Plato's Republic and Cicero's, despite the similarity of their goals (II, 52). This recovery takes the form of an initial reversal of the direction of philosophy away from the heavens and toward the city, culminating in the argument between the subversive denial of natural right and the public-spirited doctrine of natural law. This argument serves as the foundation for the teaching about the best statesman and the best regime. Finally, the dialogue returns in Scipio's Dream to the transcendent sphere which is not tainted by that which is corruptible.40

It was Socrates, according to Cicero, who first brought philosophy down from the heavens and into the city.4' He did this by raising within the city a question which is not, in its philosophic form, a question that is part of political life, but which nevertheless reveals itself as the most important political question. That question is, what is the best way of life? Socrates's tentative answer to that question is that the life devoted to the investigation of the question of the best way of life is the best way of life.42 Cicero's effort to re-found political philosophy in Rome, or his effort to improve upon Scipio, centers upon this question. The best way of life, from the perspective of De Republica, is not that of a philoso-

40. Cf. Macrobius, "Commentary on the Dream of Scipio," I, 21-22. 41. Tusculan Disputations, V, 10. 42. Thomas G. West, "Defending Socrates, Defending Politics," Interpretation vol. 11

no. 3 (1983), pp. 391-392.




pher, but that of a statesman who is a teacher of legislators. Yet, as we have seen, that answer too is tentative, for the statesman's concern for the city emerges as part of his concern for what is truly or eternally noble and beautiful. Philosophic statesmanship combines the care of the soul taught by philosophy with that taught by the laws. It is the truly com- prehensive skill, for it can make use of all other forms of knowledge for the good of the city. The statesman must therefore know how to use such things as mathematics, but these kinds of knowledge are subordinate to his most important end, which is the good of the city and its citizens. The philosophic statesman is the highest kind of teacher. This is why philosophy must learn rhetoric, for the best lawgiver is the one who persuades, rather than compels.

The civic education of De Republica has as its primary purpose to persuade the young men that political activity is worthy. Philosophy, as it has been taught in the Rome of Cicero's day, cannot persuade them of this, because it cannot take the city with sufficient seriousness. Yet civic education requires political philosophy. It requires a demonstration that the laws are justly founded. The city must somehow justify itself before those young men who are most capable of ruling it wisely and well. Philosophy, wrongly understood, comes to sight as the great obstacle to a civic education, for it leads the young men to reject their city as unlovable. Rightly understood, statesmanship fulfills the desires of the best young men for an understanding of eternal principles, and gives them a concern to make their city as good as possible. The life of action is the life of a man whose soul is in the best condition; it is a preparation for and a way towards man's true home, in which he dwells eternally with the gods in the spheres of the blessed.



the education of statesmen in cicero's de republica

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