[footnoteRef:1] [1: http://messiahsmandate.org/was-peter-a-palestinian/]

The Elusiveness of PalestineThe evolution of Palestinian identity and the future of a two-state solution and the peace process

By Gregory PearlmanPAF 9190, Prof. Carla Robbins

Table of Contents

Executive Summary: pg. 3Introduction: pg. 5Historical Context: pg. 7Literature Review: pg. 15Methodology and Research Method: pg. 22My Findings: pg. 23Conclusion: Policy Recommendation: pg. 35Bibliography: pg. 37

Executive SummaryPalestinian identity is one of the most unique identities in the world today. The reason for the uniqueness of Palestinian identity can be seen going back to the post World War I (WWI) period. It is during this time that the British and French were dividing up the territories that were previously part of the Ottoman Empire. What is important in our case is that the territory known as Palestine fell into British control and would become the British Mandate of Palestine. It was during this period of mandate control that these former Ottoman territories would be under British and French control. However, Arab leaders were under the impression that this mandate period would only be temporary and would eventually lead to Arab independence within Palestine (and other territories). This was in part based on the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. In short, this correspondence asked Arab communities and leadership to rebel against the Ottoman Empire and, in turn, the British would support Arab independence within the territories. When it came to Palestine, this was pushed aside for the rise of another nationalism, Jewish nationalism, personified by the movement called Zionism. It is within this ignorance of the British towards the Palestinian population and the international community that the roots of Palestinian identity take shape. While Palestinians can say they are a nation, they cannot say that they have ever been in control over their territory on a national level. The history of this land can be described as ever changing, from Jewish control at the start of the Common Era to under British control. There has never been an independent entity that has ever been under control by the local Palestinian (Arab Christian or Muslim) population. It is because this dynamic makes Palestinian identity unique and worth exploring further.Over time, while there have been various sociological and philosophical disputes within Palestinian identity. It has been constantly changing. Today, Palestinian identity can be divided into two mindsets: a secular fundamentalist approach, which emphasizes a historical and joint relationship for Palestinians to Palestine (led by the Palestinian Authority, currently under control by Fatah), and a religious fundamentalist approach, which emphasizes a religious connection to the land of Palestine and as being part of the larger Islamic Middle East (led by Hamas). For within both of these mindsets, we can see how they each differ currently on the three big issues related to the peace process and obstacles to a two-state solution: borders, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Right of Return. My research will explore the roots of these two different definitions of Palestinian identity, how Hamas and the Palestinian Authority has defined Palestinian identity, how it affects the internal struggle within Palestinian society and how the evolution of Palestinian identity has and will play a role in any peace process. By exploring various polling data, historical documents, speeches, and academic literature, we will weave together all the information to present an analysis that shows how Palestinian identity has changed over time and how it effects the peace process and the possibility of a two-state solution.

Introduction

The borders of Palestine. Depending on who you say these words to, one would think it means the green line, where the battle that began in the 1948 war ended with the 1949 armistice agreement. This area is, in a sense, Israel minus the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. For others, the borders of Palestine encompass modern day Israel. The history of this one word, this one idea, Palestine, has led to much argument, discussion and even loss of life. The conceptualization of a state of Palestine, has led to terrorism and war; it is definitely a destabilizing force in world politics. This division of what Palestine should be has also made it difficult for even the most committed Israeli government to peace to put forward a proposal for a peace that Palestinian leadership would find acceptable. This division of Palestinian identity, which ranges from negotiations for a two state solution, to the liberation of Palestine goes to the core of Palestinian identity and how it has shaped both Palestinian leaderships and the constituencies they represent. This division goes to my hypothesis: that because of these various definitions of Palestinian identity within Palestinian society make it too difficult for Israel and the United States to make an acceptable offer for peace. My goal in this capstone is, by exploring various literature sources, primary sources, statements and various polling data, is to answer the following questions, which will provide information about whether my hypothesis is right:1. How has the definition of Palestinian identity changed over time?2. How do Hamas and the Palestinians differ in their definition of Palestinian identity?3. How does that relate to their position on the three key issues of the peace process: borders, right of return and Jerusalem?4. How important is that identity and those positions for the two leaderships retention of power?5. Does the Palestinian public, in the West Bank and Gaza share those definitions and how has that changed over time?6. Is there room in any definition of these definitions for acceptance of a two-state solution?To answer these questions, we need to understand how Palestinians understand their history and how this history has shaped the mindset of a people that has led to both the Palestinian Authority (in the West Bank) and Hamas (in the Gaza Strip) holding power positions. With this understanding, we will delve deeper into how each of these organizations understands themselves within Palestinian society and within the peace process. Next, we will explore Palestinian identity and see what its tenants are and how it affects Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the peace process. Finally, we will explore whether, within each of these understandings of Palestinian identity, it is possible to have end to the conflict that leads to the creation of an independent Palestinian state and one that is acceptable to all Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza Strip within the context of a two-state solution. To begin, we will explore the historical underpinnings of Palestinian identity, Palestinian history.

Historical Context: Palestinian history (key moments)In the grand scheme of the history of nationalism and all different types of nations and nationalities, it would seem that Palestinian identity would not be any less important than say, the American identity. However, what makes Palestinian identity more unique than a lot of other nationalisms and what makes it important and merit further study is twofold: First, because Palestinian identity is connected with Palestine/Israel, a land important to all Christians, Muslims and Jews, the identities that spring forth from this area will always be important. In this case, the Jewish identity, manifested in a Jewish nationalistic movement called Zionism, and a Palestinian identity for those who lived in the territory known as Palestine then the British Mandate of Palestine. Second that it has been only since the beginning of the Oslo process that Palestinian identity became internationally accepted and recognized through the Palestinian Authority. With the acknowledgement of Palestinian identity as a legitimate national identity to the region, and the additional component of the importance of the territory to the three major monotheistic religions, Palestinian identity moves to one of importance to understand and study. To understand the basics of Palestinian identity, one needs to understand Palestinian history. In this section, we will explore two areas of Palestinian identity that play an important role in this analysis (and to Palestinian identity in general): the history of Palestine pre-1948 and the time from the Oslo Accords and forward to the present day.History of Palestine until 1948 WarThe Arab population of Palestine has lived in Palestine for a long time (after first coming from the Arabian peninsula approximately 1200-1500 years ago). The land of Palestine is described as follows: Scattered throughout the 10,000 square miles of Palestine are ancient towns and villages, organized over the centuries into traditional allegiances and rivalries, with large towns forming regional capital and centres of trade and culture for the surrounding villages (Sabbagh[footnoteRef:2] 13). In terms of the population of Palestine, Karl Sabbagh notes that many different people have lived in Palestine over the centuries but notes that there is no accurate way to determine from historical texts and excavations the precise connection of a people to the land[footnoteRef:3]. Sabbagh though does speed his way through many centuries of rule from other empires to go to the Ottoman period[footnoteRef:4] because only in the years after 1516, when the Ottoman Turks conquered Syria and Palestine, that we begin to find evidence of a particular identification of different groups within the empire with territories in which they live (22-23). In the early Ottoman Empire census, five of them in [the first] fifty years [of Ottoman rule], Palestine had about 300,000 inhabitants, 90 per cent of them Muslim Arabs. The other 10 per cent were either mainly Christians (who were also principally Arab) or Jews. By the time the Ottoman rule ended, and the British mandate of Palestine came about, there were 670,000 Palestinians who formed nine-tenths of the population (117). Finally, two years before the end of the British mandate, and during the time when the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was conducting an investigation into the future of governance of Palestine, there were 1.85 million people in Palestine, with approximately 1.2 million of these individuals noted as Palestinian[footnoteRef:5]. As we can see, Palestinians before Israel see the land as predominantly those as part of the entirety of Palestine (today as modern day Israel). [2: Sabbagh, K. (2007).Palestine: History of a Lost Nation. New York: Grove Press.] [3: This is because, as he notes, over time due to a combination of intermarriage, religious conversion and adoption of foreign customs and styles may mean some groups with different names were ethnically identified.] [4: Some of the history Mr. Sabbagh highlights is that five thousand years ago, a succession of population groups migrated north from the Arabian peninsula into areas of the Middle East (14). These groups were organized into tribes and founded civilizations in territories that stretched into a broad band across the Middle East. He notes that one of these groups left the Arabian peninsula, arrived in Egypt then, two thousand years after the Canaanites [a group that left the Arabian peninsula and settled in Palestine], traveled to Palestine, where they became known as Hebrews.] [5: OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SUPPLEMENT No. 11: UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE: REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Volume 1. (1947, September 3). Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3]

Starting in the post WWI period and the beginning of the British mandate of Palestine[footnoteRef:6], Palestinians felt a sense of injustice and being ignored by the international community. The first sense of injustice was Britains Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Declaration states the following: [6: As a result of World War I, two world powers, Britain and France, would be placed in charge of certain Arab countries as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. One of these territories, Palestine, was placed under the control of Britain.]

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet."His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country[footnoteRef:7]." [7: Rosenberg, J. (n.d.). The Balfour Declaration, 1917 (History and Full Text). Retrieved April 12, 2015, from http://history1900s.about.com/cs/holocaust/p/balfourdeclare.htm]

One component of this sense of injustice here is that Palestinian Arabs, the majority of the population in the mandate of Palestine, are referred to here as the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. Second, that Palestinian Arabs, who are the majority of the occupants of Palestine, are being denied the opportunity to determine their own destiny. This was further extended by the mandate of Palestine, which used the Balfour Decleration as part of the basis of the mandate in the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. The language in the mandate[footnoteRef:8] mirrors the language of the Balfour Declaration. Furthermore, the Balfour Declaration allowed for increased immigration of Jews from around the world, but those primarily from Eastern Europe[footnoteRef:9]. This increase of immigration, the denial of a community within Palestine to determine its future within the land that they became so close with, along with being brushed aside for another nationalism, which they felt would make a minority the leader of a land where they, the Palestinian Arab, were the majority that something that all contributed towards this sense of injustice. [8: Mandate for Palestine - League of Nations (12 August 1922). (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2015, from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/2FCA2C68106F11AB05256BCF007BF3CB] [9: Fleeing the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe and then Nazism.]

While this sense of injustice, along with the rise of Zionism was something that Palestinians used to unite them in nationalism, it was the al-Nakba that seared Palestinians into a people. The al-Nakba, as we will further explore later on, is the events of the 1948 war that led to the expulsion or exodus of approximately half to 83 percent of the 1.4 million Palestinian people who lived in current day Israel[footnoteRef:10] [footnoteRef:11] to various locations around the globe, but primarily to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The al-Nakba changed [Palestinian] life beyond recognition[footnoteRef:12]. It is a Palestinian event and a site of Palestinian collective memory; it connects all Palestinians to a specific point in time that has become for them an eternal present[footnoteRef:13]. [10: Khalidi pg 21] [11: In Sadis article, Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity, he states that between 77 and 83 percent of Palestinians who lived in the part of Palestine that later became Israel i.e., 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine were turned into refugees (175). It is important to note that, as of this writing, there is no clear answer as to the numbers of Palestinian refugees that left as a result of the 1948 war.] [12: Sadi pg 175] [13: Sadi pg 177]

Key symbolism found in Palestinian Identity: The Right of Return, the al-Nakba and the 1967 Six Day WarThe al-Nakba is the exodus of Palestinians, either by expulsion or flight as a result of the 1948 war with Israel[footnoteRef:14]. Approximately 750,000 Palestinians became refugees as a result of the 1948 war[footnoteRef:15]. The hope for Palestinians was that they would be able to return to their homes once the fighting stopped. When this did not happen, these refugees took on new meaning to the al-Nakba which to them represents, among many other things, the loss of the homeland, the disintegration of society, the frustration of national aspirations, and the beginning of a hasty process of destruction of their culture (Sadi[footnoteRef:16] 175). However, this event is something that has united Palestinians in a way perhaps no other event has. Palestinians, even today, have a visible reminder of this event by retaining the keys and deeds to their homes that they were forced to flee from[footnoteRef:17]. Another example of this is the popular cartoon character Handala[footnoteRef:18], created by Naji Al-Ali, a Palestinian refugee. The character is meant to represent a 10 year old Palestinian refugee who left his home when he was 10 and will forever remain 10 until he returns to his home in Palestine (see the image to the right). His back is always facing the reader and his hands clasped together behind his back as a sign of rejection at a time when solutions are presented to us the American way. [14: Tristam, P. (n.d.). What Is al-Naqba, or al-Nakba - The Catastrophe? Retrieved March 3, 2015, from http://middleeast.about.com/od/israelandpalestine/f/me080511.htm] [15: Black, I. (2014, May 2). Remembering the Nakba: Israeli group puts 1948 Palestine back on the map.The Guardian. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/02/nakba-israel-palestine-zochrot-history] [16: Sa'di, A. (2002). Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity.Israel Studies,7(2), 175-198. Retrieved February 15, 2015, from http://in.bgu.ac.il/humsos/politics/Documents/Staff_Publications/Ahmad_Saadi/Ahmad Sa'di, Catastrophe, Memory and Identity - Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity.pdf] [17: Sharp, H. (2004, April 15). Right of return: Palestinian dream. Retrieved March 4, 2015, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3629923.stm] [18: Handala.org: Who is Handala? (n.d.). Retrieved March 4, 2015, from http://www.handala.org/handala/index.html]

Based in part on the event of the 1948 war that led to the al-Nakba, the United Nations passed Resolution 194. The key to this resolution[footnoteRef:19] is Article 11, which states that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. This component is now commonly known as the Palestinian right of return. With the al-Nakba being so integral to Palestinian national identity, it became a rallying point for Palestinians to right the wrongs of the al-Nakba and to return home. [19: A/RES/194 (III) of 11 December 1948. (1948, December 11). Retrieved February 22, 2015, from http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/c758572b78d1cd0085256bcf0077e51a?OpenDocument]

This desire to return home after the al-Nakba was further complicated by the results of the 1967 Six-Day War. After the 1948 war, Egypt and Jordan each took control of the above mentioned sections of territory. For Jordan, they annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1950 and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian military administration[footnoteRef:20]. Then, after the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel captured East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip[footnoteRef:21], inheriting also a local Palestinian population that does not want to be a part of Israel. Furthermore, the desire for a homeland of their own grew. The height of this desire and hope peaked in 1993 and 1994 with the signing of the Oslo Accords; however, by the year 2000, those hopes were dashed. [20: http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/d/ContentDetails/i/2966] [21: It should also be noted that the Golan Heights (captured from Syria) and the Sinai Peninsula (captured from Egypt) were also captured and under Israeli control as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War.]

Hope turns to despair: The 2000 Camp David AccordsAt times, the dynamic between Israel, the United States, and the Palestinian Authority has been difficult. While as of this writing, the relationship between Israel and the United States is strained, a common phrase that is heard when it comes to Palestinian leadership that they never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.[footnoteRef:22] [footnoteRef:23] An example of a moment such as missing an opportunity is the 2000 Camp David summit. At the Camp David talks, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered to Palestinian Authority President Yassir Arafat offered the following proposal: establish a sovereign Palestinian state encompassing the Gaza Strip, 92 percent of the West Bank, and some parts of Arab East Jerusalem. In return, it proposed the annexation of Jewish neighborhoods (settlements) in East Jerusalem. Israel also asked for several security measures, including early warning stations in the West Bank and an Israeli presence at Palestinian border crossings. In addition, it would accept no more than a token return of Palestinian refugees under a family reunification program.[footnoteRef:24] President Arafat walked away from Camp David without making a counter offer. [22: http://www.factsofisrael.com/blog/archives/000491.html] [23: This quote is attributed primarily to Arab leadership as a whole; however, it can often be heard being attributed to Palestinian leadership from Israel and Pro-Israel supporters.] [24: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/pressman.pdf]

Later that year, in an attempt to finalize a deal before the end of his term, President Clinton offered his parameters for peace: 97% of the West Bank, all of Gaza, Palestinian refugees being allowed into Palestine (with Israel taking on some refugees under Israeli law and admitting wrongdoing to Palestinian refugees). With these, and others, the Israelis accepted this plan, while the Palestinians gave no answer. In the aftermath of this, many Israeli and American officials put the blame on President Abbas for saying no, and seemingly to this day, despite the many summits and meetings (and assumingly backdoor talks), we are no longer as close to a two-state solution. But to further explore the overarching question of whether Palestinian identity would accept a two state solution, we need to explore the available literature.

Literature Review

Palestinian identity can be divided into two mindsets: Palestinian identity before the al-Nakba, or the great catastrophe[footnoteRef:25], that leads to a secular nationalistic perspective of Palestinian identity. Second, that of after the al-Nakba, to hold onto the memory of the al-Nakba in the hopes of righting a historical but religious wrong, which leads to the religious fundamentalist perspective of Palestinian identity. These two mindsets run concurrently within Palestinian society and within the literature that was reviewed to understand Palestinian identity. How these mindsets have been understood and interpreted is shown by the different leaderships for those who represent the Palestinian population today. The two entities who act as representatives of Palestinian interests are the Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah, in the West Bank, and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. Both of these organizations have different definitions of what it means to be a Palestinian and how they hold onto power in representing Palestinians. However, the ultimate goals of these organizations are different, and it is within this difference that we see why both of these organizations maintain power within the territories. Given the divisions between these two parties and the inconsistency of Palestinian identity, the literature will show why it has been difficult to achieve a two-state solution with Israel. [25: This term is meant to describe the events of the 1948 war that resulted in both the creation of Israel and the Palestinian refugees who were either expelled or forced to flee their homes in Palestine to nearby Arab countries.]

Palestinian IdentityThe seminal work on this topic is Rashid Khalidis Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. In the work, Khalidi gives us a history of the evolution of Palestinian identity. At the core of his work, he describes Palestinian identity as being fully understood only in the context of a sequence of other histories, a sequence of other narratives (9) and that this narrative is always changing. He quotes Edward Said, another Palestinian academic who, when thinking about Palestinian identity, writes that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another, different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity involves the construction of opposites and other whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from us (10). The reason that Palestinians have struggled with attaining a sense of national identity is because Palestinians have never achieved any form of national independence in their own homeland. As a result, Palestinians who live within Palestine and in other lands have always had a sense of competing national ideas on Palestinian identity, which have changed over time. In the post-World War I period Arab nationalism spread throughout the Middle East and resulted in the creation of various Arab or Muslim states that were supported by the governments that gave substance to their national narratives and propagated them domestically and internationally in an authoritative fashion (20). When it came to the Palestinian people, they found that the support for their national identity was non-existent from all parties after WWI. This lack of support created a vacuum of leadership and organization for Palestinians that would set them back in establishing any type of self-governance. This vacuum would be filled by two organizations, the Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah, and Hamas.HamasThe organization Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement)[footnoteRef:26], or Hamas, was originally an outpost for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (and still remains affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood). Officially founded in December 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas has three arms: a military, political and social functions. These are managed on the ground by various leadership bodies. General policy comes from its overarching consultative body, often referred to as the politiburo, which operates in exile. The de-facto prime minister is Ismail Haniyeh who served as PA prime minister during the brief period between the 2006 legislative elections and his dismissal by Palestinian [Authority] [P]resident Mahmoud Abbas the following year[footnoteRef:27]. Currently, Hamas bases its operations in the Gaza Strip, which acts as the de-facto representative of Gazas 1.7 million Palestinians. [26: Laub, Z. (2014, August 1). Hamas. Retrieved March 12, 2015, from http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968] [27: In 2006, Hamas won the election with the most seats to form a government with the Palestinian Authority. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes It may have earned votes as a protest movement and for the social services it provided, but the win was likely more a rejection of the incumbent Fatah, which was widely perceived as having grown corrupt at the helm of the PLO and delivering little to Palestinians with its program of negotiation.]

In a review of Hamas charter, we get a better understanding of what they believe and how they understand Palestinian identity. Hamas charter[footnoteRef:28], ratified on August 18, 1988, clarifies its picture, reveals its identity, outlines its stand, explains its aims, speaks about its hopes, and calls for its support, adoption and joining its ranks. Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. Hamas, as they state in Article Three, states that it consists of Moslems who have given their allegiance to Allah whom they truly worship, [] who know their duty towards themselves, their families and country. In all that, they fear Allah and raise the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they would rid the land and the people of their uncleanliness, vileness and evils. They note also in Article Six, that this movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned. They note throughout the charter that the goal of the movement is the liberation of Palestine through Jihad. That any attempts to make peace are inconsistent to with the teachings of Islam and that these outsiders have no right to Islamic lands and it is the duty of every Palestinian to liberate Palestine[footnoteRef:29]. [28: Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement. (1988, August 18). Retrieved March 17, 2015, from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp] [29: Article Fourteen of Hamas Charter.]

For Hamas, the ultimate goal is the liberation of all of Palestine, which to them means what is today modern day Israel. For Hamas, as their charter states, is for all believers in Allah (Muslims) and that Palestine would be under an Islamic rule with borders defined as being comprised of modern day Israel. There is literature that does quote Hamas officials as saying they are open to negotiations[footnoteRef:30] and even reports of agreeing to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and Jerusalem as Palestines capitol[footnoteRef:31]; however, based on the literature, actions and comments of Hamas[footnoteRef:32], it would seem that anything less than all of Palestine and the complete right of return[footnoteRef:33] for all Palestinian refugees would be unacceptable. This is because Hamas sees Palestine and Palestinian identity as purely a Muslim identity and a nationalistic identity to each other, as a group, and to Muslims and non-Muslims who are or were in Palestine. However, one piece of literature does point to a dynamic that while Hamas feels strongly in the religious components of their movement, that the peace process is wrong, not because of its seeking a two-state solution, but because it does not have popular mandate and thus lacks authority.[footnoteRef:34] This is important because to Hamas, while Islam is the most important, if the Palestinian population decided that it wants to live in peace with Israel, it would support the idea of a two state solution. [30: In Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence by Jereon Gunning, he quotes a statement from 1994 from the Political Bureau of Hamas which argued that Hamas does not oppose the principle of peace. However, the peace that the government of the enemy offers is not peace but a consolidation of occupation and inequity against our people (203).] [31: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.614309] [32: Hamas rejects Abbas 'right of return' remarks. (2012, November 3). Retrieved March 12, 2015, from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/2012113141235546948.html] [33: This is a term that is used to describe the right of Palestinians who were either forced out or fled their villages and homes as a result of the 1948 war that have the right to return to their homes or be compensated for their loss, as expounded upon in United Nations Resolution 194 Article 11.] [34: Gunning 204]

While they note in their charter that Hamas is guided by Islamic tolerance[footnoteRef:35], towards people of other religions and faiths, the main focus for the movement is for Islam and Muslims. They also note that they respect the Palestinian Liberation Organization[footnoteRef:36] (PLO), they also note that they disagree with them because they feel that the PLO believes in a more secular Palestinian state, as opposed to Hamas, which believes in a more religious viewpoint of a Palestinian state. [35: Article Thirty One] [36: The Palestinian Liberation Organization, or the PLO was the predecessor to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. ]

The Palestinian Authority and FatahThe Palestinian Authority (PA), established in 1994 as a result of the Oslo Accords[footnoteRef:37] [footnoteRef:38], is the sole governing authority on behalf of Palestinians in the West Bank and, until the collapse of the unity government in 2006, the Gaza Strip[footnoteRef:39]. Currently, the party in charge of this governing body is Fatah. Fatah, an inverted acronym ofarakat al-Tarr al-Waan al-Filasn (Palestine National Liberation Movement[footnoteRef:40]), was created in the late 1950s by[Yasser Arafat] and[Khalil al-Wazir] to wage war on Israel using guerilla warfare. Before the Oslo Accords, in Fatahs charter, there was mention of waging war against Zionists and the Israeli existence in Palestine[footnoteRef:41]. After the Oslo Accords, these sections were removed; however, they kept the key components about the liberation of Palestine[footnoteRef:42]. Membership into Fatah is the right of every Palestinian or Arab who possesses the necessary requirements, believes in the liberation of Palestine, and fully adheres to the movement's internal charter, political program, and all its regulations and political and organizational decisions[footnoteRef:43]. Friends of the movement can also become members if they are determined to be so by the Fatah Central Committee. It important to note that to be a Palestinian is not tied into being a Muslim, but is tied to returning to the land, that the land is occupied and needs liberation, which promotes a more historical argument and less religious argument to being a Palestinian. [37: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/439781/Palestinian-Authority-PA] [38: As part of the agreement reached in the Oslo Accords, that Israel would formally be recognized as a country and that the PA would reject violence (this comes from the Letters of Mutual Recognition of August 1993).] [39: The 2006 collapse of the Palestinian Authority was a result of Hamas and Fatah being unable to reach an agreement for a unity government. The climax of this disagreement was PA President Mahmoud Abbas dissolving the government and declaring a state of emergency after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip. ] [40: Fatah | Palestinian political organization. (2014, April 6). Retrieved March 12, 2015, from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/202423/Fatah] [41: Fatah's Constitution (English Translation). (2007, August 25). Retrieved March 12, 2015, from http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=68&x_article=1704#The_Movement's_Essential] [42: Fatah: Revised Charter. (2009, October 19). Retrieved March 18, 2015, from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/FatahCharter2009.html] [43: Chapter Two, Article 7, Section A of Fatahs Charter (Revised 2009).]

In terms of Fatah and the peace process, they have been the organization that has taken the lead in negotiations with Israel and the United States (and other parties that have been intermediaries between the Palestinians and Israel). This is because of the Oslo Accords that make the Palestinian Authority the official governing authority on behalf of the Palestinians. In the past 5 years, President Abbas has made preconditions the subject of any attempt at a peace negotiation. Three such preconditions from 2010[footnoteRef:44] and 2013[footnoteRef:45] all request assurances that settlement building in the West Bank stop, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and that the borders of a Palestinian state be based on the green line.[footnoteRef:46] While some of these conditions were met and some negotiation took place in 2010, no meaningful progress was made and no negotiations are taking place[footnoteRef:47]. While previous actions demonstrate a willingness to negotiate a peace deal, the stagnant progress has played a role in general Palestinian feelings towards the peace process and a willingness to share the land. [44: Karon, T. (2010, July 30). Palestinians Hold to Peace-Talk Preconditions. Retrieved March 16, 2015, from http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2007604,00.html] [45: Ravid, B. (2013, June 25). Under pressure from Kerry, Mahmoud Abbas softens preconditions for peace talks - Diplomacy & Defense. Retrieved March 14, 2015, from http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.531999] [46: The Green line are the 1949 armistice lines where the 1948 war ended between Israel and its neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). These lines put East Jerusalem and the West Bank in Jordanian control and Gaza under Egyptian control.] [47: Or, at minimum, no public discussions are being done between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.]

Palestinian identity and the Peace ProcessThere is a plethora of literature on Palestinians, Palestinian identity and the peace process. All are separate, unique and provide many different perspectives. For the purpose of this section, the literature that was relevant towards this topic, the peace process and the two state solution was reviewed. Over twenty two years ago, Yasser Arafat, President of the new Palestinian Authority, and Yitzchak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, signed agreements in what became known as the Oslo process[footnoteRef:48], giving tremendous hope to both Israelis and Palestinians. For Israel, there was hope for peace and security for Israel and Palestinians having the right of self-determination. This confidence was reflected in polling data that showed 61% of Palestinians and 54% of Israelis were hopeful when these accords were signed[footnoteRef:49]. However, twenty two years later and still no real progress have left Palestinians feeling hopeless and turning away from a possible two state solution and more towards liberating all of Palestine, as polling data from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy showed in a June 2014 survey[footnoteRef:50] (60.3% of Palestinians from both the West Bank and Gaza Strip support this view). While the option for a two state solution is possible, today that opinion is now in the minority. [48: The Oslo I Accords (http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/oslo_eng.htm) were signed on September 13, 1993 and the Oslo II Accords (http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/heskemb_eng.htm) on September 28, 1995] [49: http://b.3cdn.net/aai/07676c3ba3bc9b3363_iim6b5ytq.pdf] [50: (2014, June 25). Retrieved February 22, 2015, from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/PalestinianPollingReport_June2014.pdf]

Methodology and Research MethodWhile I understood that my research would primarily be a qualitative analysis, with some quantitative information conveying primarily Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process (and any other related information). I that my research by doing my best to keep to one rule: that a majority of the research, whether it was scholarly or whether it was a new report or a blog, unless no other option would present itself, would all have to come from either Arab or Palestinian source. For my analysis on the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, I would rely on a variety of resources, primarily historical documents and statements from leadership, articles, and any available literature as it related to my research.

My Findings

How has the definition of Palestinian Identity Changed over Time?

At the outset of my research, part of my hypothesis was that Palestinian identity would have too many schools of thought on what it means to be Palestinian, which has hampered the peace process. This was based on an assumption that despite many different offers, some of which would seemingly answer the three major issues to be (Right of Return, Borders and Jerusalem). However, upon further review of the literature, it turned out it was partially true that there were many details as to what Palestinian identity is, but all of these teaching would fall into two schools of thought: a secular nationalistic approach and a religious fundamentalist approach, both of which began during the rise of a Palestinian identity during the British Mandate of Palestine. These two approaches to Palestinian identity and how they approach the land is completely different and unique and each stresses different points in Palestinian identity today: For the secular nationalist, the belief is deeply rooted in the history of Palestinians in the land of Palestine and that they have the right to determine its history. For the religious fundamentalist approach stress a strong religious (Islamic) identity to Palestine. While outsiders (non-Islamic people) can be a part of the community in Palestine, they would be subject to Islamic law. However, the reason for these two schools of thought arising as the main focal point of identity is because within the Palestinian community, whether it was pre-Nakba or post-Nakba, and even those Palestinians today who live in refugee camps around Israel, the Palestinian territories, there was no concept of a unique Palestinian identity until the early part of the 20th century. In Khalidis work on this issue Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, he specifies 1917-1923 as the key moment of the formation of Palestinian identity. It is also during this time that we see the rise of one of these two schools of thought, the religious fundamentalist approach. For the followers of this approach, it was and is a rebellion against the outsiders, which was initially led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini during this time[footnoteRef:51]. Appointed Mufti in 1921, after having a 10 year prison sentence given amnesty by Hebert Samuel, the first high commissioner, who also appointed him, Mr. al-Husseini used his position to attack Jewish communities in Palestine, primarily in 1929 and 1936[footnoteRef:52]. With the rise of Zionism and increased Jewish immigration in the land, it created an identity that, as we mentioned, is that Palestinian narrative can be considered only in terms of the [other][footnoteRef:53]. In this case, the other is one of the most potent narratives in existence, Israel and the Jewish people[footnoteRef:54]. As a result, Palestinian identity is then not something that has always existed, but something that was constructed[footnoteRef:55], which started with a religious fundamentalist approach. However, it should be pointed out that Palestinian identity is not something that was solely as a result of Zionism, but it is important to note that it did play a role. As Manuel Hassassian stated that Zionism was one of the catalysts that instigated Palestinian nationalism but never contributed to its creation. It provided the Palestinians with a centralized focus for their national struggle[footnoteRef:56]. This struggle would be the contributing factor to the rise of the religious fundamentalist approach, which led to the modern day representative of this, Hamas. [51: A quote that can be attributed to al-Husseini to display this, from Alan Dershowitzs The Case For Israel, is Arise, o sons of Arabia. Fight for your sacred rights. Slaughter Jews wherever you find them. Their spilled blood pleases Allah, our history and religion. That will save our honor. (Dershowitz 55)] [52: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/mufti.html] [53: Khalidi pg. 146] [54: Ibid] [55: The Struggle for Palestinian Nationhood: Identity, Independence, History (1997). (2015, January 20). Retrieved April 12, 2015, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7u4ZiCcWmyU] [56: Hassassian, M. (2002). Historical Dynamics Shaping Palestinian National Identity.Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture,9(1). Retrieved April 8, 2012, from http://pij.org/details.php?id=793]

The secular nationalistic approach is represented today by the Palestinian Authority. The roots of this secular nationalistic approach to Palestinian identity comes from the current Palestinian Authority, formerly the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO was first created in 1964 to to centralize the leadership of various Palestinian groups that previously had operated as clandestine resistance movements[footnoteRef:57]. When they became the Palestinian Authority after the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1994, it crystalized the secular nationalistic approach. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, President Abbas stated that it is right of our people to self-determination and to the independence of our State[footnoteRef:58], a theme that was repeated throughout this speech. This is also shown by the actions of then President Arafat who was willing to even negotiate with Israel and seemingly refute the famous Three Nos in the Khartoum Resolution, which called for no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it[footnoteRef:59]. In both cases, we will discuss in more depth in the next question about Hamas and Fatah and [57: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/439725/Palestine-Liberation-Organization-PLO] [58: http://english.wafa.ps/index.php?action=detail&id=17480] [59: http://www.cfr.org/world/khartoum-resolution/p14841?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dessential_document%26page%3D69]

To conclude, we can identify Palestinian identity as consisting of the following components:1. The al-Nakba that occurred as a result of the 1948 war is at the core of Palestinian identity, regardless as to whether they are a Palestinian refugee within the Gaza Strip, West Bank, or at any Palestinian refugee camps. One of the symbols of this is of a key, which represents the keys to their homes in Palestine before the al-Nakba.2. The current Palestinian mindset of feeling ignored by the international community has its roots in the post WWI period aka the British Mandate of Palestine.

3. Palestinian identity can be divided into two schools of thought: A religious fundamentalist approach, led by Hamas: This idea puts forward the notion that Palestinian identity is at its core a religious struggle because of the religious (Islam) connection to the Palestine and the desire to keep it in Palestinian/Islamic hands. The early stages of this approach began during the post-WWI period, primarily during the initial years of the British Mandate. A secular nationalistic approach: This idea puts forward the notion that Palestinian identity is based on a shared historical connection to the land that goes back to before the Nakba and that Palestinians should unite around its shared history, language, and culture. This approach does not exclude a religious connection to Palestine; however, it is not the primary reason for nationalistic feeling within Palestine.

How do Hamas and the Palestinian Authority differ in their definition of Palestinian identity? How does that relate to their position on the three key issues of the peace process: borders, right of return and Jerusalem? How important is that identity and those positions for the Leaderships retention of Power (from both the PA and Hamas perspective)?Hamas is the primary proponent of the religious fundamentalist perspective of Palestinian Identity, as shown in the literature review section. This is also shown from statements from leadership. Two such examples come from Ismail Haniyeh, the former prime minister of the Palestinian Authority[footnoteRef:60], who said The Hamas movement will lead Intifada after Intifada until we liberate Palestine all of Palestine, Allah willing[footnoteRef:61]. Another example of this is when Mr. Haniyeh said The resistance will continue until all Palestinian land, including al-Quds (Jerusalem), has been liberated and all the refugees have returned[footnoteRef:62]. The continued use of religious rhetoric, such as al-Quds, or that, Allah willing, they will liberate all of Palestine are just some of the examples of this religious fundamentalist notion of Palestinian Identity. As we have seen, Hamas, while it can be swayed by public opinion, has no desire to discuss any potential peace prospects with Israel. Hamas has been able to use this religious fundamentalist perspective to unite Palestinians to believe that there is a connection to Palestine, but that it is a strong connection via Islam[footnoteRef:63], as we have seen by the previously mentioned statements and literature. The belief in Hamas ideological understanding of Palestinian identity can be shown in polling data from a June 2014 survey, which shows a near two-thirds of Palestinians desiring to reclaim all historic Palestine in both Gaza and the West Bank (60.3% total, 68.4% in Gaza and 55.4% in the West Bank), using resistance to reclaim their homeland (64% total, 63.2% in the West Bank and 65.3% in Gaza), and supporting negotiations only to be used as part of a program of stages to reclaim all of Palestine (65.2% total, 62.5% in the West Bank, 69.8% Gaza)[footnoteRef:64]. Additionally, this can be seen by the fact that President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority remains in power despite the fact that elections in 2006 gave Hamas the leadership position within the PA and Fatah not able to find common ground to keep a unity government in power. [60: As of this writing, he no longer holds that position after being dismissed from his position by President Abbas in June 2007. ] [61: http://www.idfblog.com/hamas/2014/02/19/8-years-8-quotes-hamas-leader-ismail-haniyeh/] [62: Ibid] [63: As Khalidi (148) would point out, perhaps Hamas would even be willing to say that Palestine should be part of the larger Islamic umma a word which can mean community, or people, or nation in different context-into warring nations, a position that goes against the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad.] [64: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/PalestinianPollingReport_June2014.pdf] Hamas; Logo. Notice the land of Palestine at the top of the symbol, which includes modern day Israel. (Source: http://www.idfblog.com/hamas/2012/01/21/hamas-history-ideology/hamas-logo/)

For the nationalistic approach, the primary proponent is the Palestinian Authority (whose coat of arms[footnoteRef:65] is shown in the image to the right), led by Fatah. The Palestinian Authority[footnoteRef:66] and the organizations, along with Fatah which share this secular nationalistic view in the territories, have probably represented the views of a majority of Palestinians since some time in the mid- or late 1960s, which argues that Palestinian nationalism has deep historic roots[footnoteRef:67]. The reason that the Palestinian Authority has been the popular movement for nearly 40 years is that it utilizes the roots of Palestinian identity, in that it was the post-WWI period as a source of frustration for being ignored by the international community when it came to Palestine and promoting a historical connection of the local Arab population as the inhabitants of Palestine. However, as mentioned above, Hamas popularity has helped it decrease the PAs power and puts the Palestinian Authority in jeopardy (which is why there have been no elections since 2006, when Hamas won the majority of seats in the elections that year). This is primarily because Hamas has been able to deliver on both their implementation of resistance against Israel, and also in delivering various social and welfare programs, which have an annual budget between $50-70 million[footnoteRef:68]. However, whomever may end up controlling the destiny of the Palestinian people could all come down to an issue not related to Palestinian identity. According to March 2015 poll from the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion[footnoteRef:69] conducted by Mr. Elias Kukali, 64.3% of Palestinians say that the economic situation is bad. Furthermore, jobs (27%), security (32.4%) were the top two concerns of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza. What works towards both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and how both stay in power, is that the Palestinian public in general is somehow discontent with their lives. However, when it comes to the peace process and the big three issues, the differences, as noted in this section and discussed in the literature review section, show distinct opinions, as shown on the table on the next page. [65: http://english.palinfo.com/site/pages/details.aspx?itemid=70515] [66: Formerly the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or PLO until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1994.] [67: Khalidi pg 149] [68: http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/08/08/terrorism-and-charity-defining-hamas] [69: http://www.pcpo.org/index.php/polls/121-poll-no-197]

HamasFatah/Palestinian Authority

JerusalemThe city of Jerusalem, in its entirety, should be under Islamic rule.[footnoteRef:70] [70: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp]

East Jerusalem should be the capitol of the new Palestinian state.[footnoteRef:71] [71: http://www.timesofisrael.com/hard-line-speech-from-abbas-marks-turn-from-position-in-talks/]

Right of ReturnAll Palestinians, both within the territories and the diaspora have the right to return to their home.[footnoteRef:72] [72: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/2012113141235546948.html]

President Abbas has stated that at this point, he is willing to give up the notion of a complete Right of Return[footnoteRef:73]. [73: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304899704579387291076711848]

BordersHamas historically, both in its comments and in their charter specify that all of Palestine (including modern day Israel) is to be under Islamic control, they also believe in the Palestinian people determining their own destiny (and have been open to the idea of a long term truce with Israel).Willing to accept borders based on the 1967 borders (the 1949 Armistice lines aka the Green Line).

Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have utilized social and economic programs to help the communities they represent: Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. As we have seen, both believe in the idea of Palestinian identity; however, their understanding and utilization of it has been different, whether a religious fundamentalist approach, or the nationalistic approach. For Hamas, retaining their power through Palestinian identity runs through its belief that Palestine is Islamic land and should not be under control of an outside power. They achieve this today through their social and welfare programs they operate within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The other component that gives them support is their firing of rockets into Israel, which is their resistance. For the Palestinian Authority, their retention of power is based on two factors: that they believe that Palestinians has always been a nationalistic identity and that they should have the right to determine what should happen in their homeland of Palestine. While the 2006 election gave Hamas control of the Palestinian Authority, if elections were held today, polling would suggest that there would be no clear winner. According to polling data from the An-Najah National UniversitysCenter for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies polling in between March 26-28 2015[footnoteRef:74], 67.1% of those polled in the West Bank and Gaza Strip say both Hamas and Fatah are to blame for not being able to create a unity government. [74: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=66857]

Does the Palestinian Public in the West Bank and Gaza share those definitions? And how has that changed over time?

The nature of polling data has morphed from easily being able to find the numbers one needs with a simple sample from both West Bank and Gaza under a unified Palestinian Authority. Now, because Hamas is the de-facto government of the Gaza and the Palestinian Authority assuming leadership over the West Bank, we are left with a unique situation. In our case, we can see the effects of the definition of Palestinian identity on the populations in each territory. When it comes to Hamas rule in Gaza, according to a study found by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research published in January 2015[footnoteRef:75], found that Hamass constituency seems to agree with respect to at least some of those offices, relating to how Palestinians, both Christians and Muslims, would take part in the governing of Gaza. In another study by the same agency found that, in a poll conducted in August 2014[footnoteRef:76], that if elections were held, a Hamas President would win with 61% of the total vote (53% in the Gaza, 66% in the West Bank) and 46% of the electorate would vote for Hamas (44% in Gaza, 47% in the West Bank). However, in the same study, residents of Gaza state that those who have a positive perception of Gaza stands at 20%, with also 20% of Gaza residents stating that they feel safe and secure (which is down from 64% two months prior). [75: http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Can%20Hamas%20moderateJan2015.pdf] [76: http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/489]

Regarding the West Bank, 27% of the electorate in the West Bank would vote for Fatah, while 36% in Gaza would vote Fatah. In terms of safety and security, 47% of West Bank residents respond as feeling safe and secure. In both cases, we see the Residents of the West Bank feeling more secure and at ease, while those in Gaza are less so (as a result of the blockade around Gaza by Egypt and Israel). When it comes to Palestinian identity and its effect on the two state solutions, we see from above that, despite feeling less secure, Hamas would still win the presidency and control of the Palestinian Authority. This is antithetical to general Palestinian feeling towards the two state solution. In the August 2014 poll, they state that 49% of Palestinians support the two-state solutions, while 50% oppose it (two months prior, 54% supported a two-state solution, 46% opposed it). This is a radical change from when the Oslo Accords were signed, when 61% of Palestinians were hopeful at the outset of those talks[footnoteRef:77]. This shift from supporting the Oslo Accords (and the two-state solution) to a divided public can be seen by the rise of Hamas. As shown previously, despite the seemingly poor poll numbers, Hamas would do well in another election, both presidential and for general control of the Palestinians Authority. This can only be understood as a shift in the understanding of Palestinian identity from a secular nationalistic approach with a plurality of support for it, to a religious fundamentalist approach and the rise and support of Hamas by the Palestinian public in the territories. [77: http://b.3cdn.net/aai/07676c3ba3bc9b3363_iim6b5ytq.pdf]

Is there room in any definition of these definitions for acceptance of a two-state solution?

With our understanding of Palestinian identity and the two organizations, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and how they each understand and utilize Palestinian identity, we see that the answer to the overarching question of this research is that it depends on the national mood of Palestinians at a particular moment, as shown in the swing from the Palestinian Authority support to a strong support for Hamas, at least according to the recent polling data. However, at the core of Palestinian identity and what drives Palestinian identity, it would seem that it would be possible to have a two-state solution. This can be shown in the initial support the Palestinian public had for the Oslo Accords and empowering the Palestinian Authority (led by Fatah) to represent them (and their vision of Palestinian identity) on a global scale (showing support for the secular nationalistic approach. However, with a variety of issues that have presented themselves on a local level in the territories, such as worsening economic conditions, the rise of the religious fundamentalist nationalistic approach, along with the social and economic programs they provide, have given Hamas more power, as shown in the previous polling data supporting Hamas in a potential future election. This is not a positive development for Israel, the United States, or any individual, organization, or country that is attempting to help facilitate a two state solution.

Conclusion: Policy RecommendationThere have been many attempts to make different recommendations for how to kick start the peace process. Whether it has been incentives (from the United States) or preconditions (that Israel has been expected to accept), nothing seems to have worked. With our understanding of Palestinian identitys evolution and understand on how the leaderships understand Palestinian, we can make some unique recommendations. First, that the United States need to apply pressure on the Palestinian Authority to either establish a unity government with Hamas or to hold elections. It would be true that the United States would be asking the Palestinian Authority to negotiate with Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist organization. Such an action would indeed make an already delicate situation with relations between the United States and Israel being strained worse. In this case, it would require putting pressure on the Palestinian Authority to bring a unity government/pressure for elections while assuring Israel of its security concerns. However, as we have seen with the two approaches to identity that run concurrently within Palestinian society, it would seem you cannot have a Palestinian Authority without Hamas. Otherwise, there might not be a Palestinian Authority to exist if Hamas was barred/denied.Second, assuming a unity government is formed, the three major issues towards peace should be addressed first: borders for a Palestinian state, right of return and Jerusalem. In terms of what to offer the Palestinian Authority, the Clinton parameters[footnoteRef:78] is the best option. The Clinton parameters are as follows: 100% of Gaza, 94-96% of the West Bank with mutually agreed upon land swaps, that Palestinian refugees either go to Palestine, Israel or to other territory within the Middle East and Jerusalem to be divided: Jewish communities and holy sites within the old city of Jeruslaem to be under Israel control and Islamic holy sites and communities to be under Palestinian control. The reason this is the best option is that Palestinian leadership can say they got what they want (a state) which will show the Palestinian public that they can deliver a state and lead, which would boost support for the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. [78: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook13/pages/226%20%20the%20clinton%20peace%20plan-%2023%20december%202000.aspx]

In terms of the Palestinian people and whether this would be accept, it would seem the answer would be more difficult. According to the polling data that was review, it would appear that the Palestinian people no longer believe as strongly as previously in a two-state solution. However, as we have seen that Palestinians original support for the Olso Accords, it could be that the reason for this lack of support is based on the seemingly deteriorating of the progress of the peace process. If a two-state solution was reached soon, it would certainly take time to gain support on the ground, but Palestinians would support the measure, especially if it easy access to the West Bank (which would unite families and connect to job opportunities in the West Bank) and for job opportunities in Israel. With this proposal, we can begin to at least begin working towards a better future for the Palestinian people.

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