the eu as a security regime

8/12/2019 The EU as a Security Regime

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European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 517-5 33, 2005. 2005 Kluwer Law International

The EU as a Security RegimeFREDERIC CHARILLON*

I Introd uction The Specificity of the Europ ean Security Deba teThe EU was o riginally established w ith the aim of bringing peace and securityto a war-ravished Europe, by creating an economic community to lock in theformer warring countries into a peaceful co-existence, and in the process tofoster a seeurity community. This article reviews the processes by whiehthe security community was constructed, and considers how the EuropeanUnion sees its role in the evolving international security architecture andthe eontemporary eoncerns with security. It will consider the capacity of theEuropean Union as a security actor in the international arena, and assess therelevance of this model for other parts of the world where the establishmentof a security relationship through cooperation on the basis of mutual benefitand mutual trust is an important part of taking the path towards deepercooperation.

The reeent divergence of views between the European Union and theUnited States over the meaning of security, how to both interpret the eonceptand ensure its implementation, has triggered new discussions on the allegedEuropean incapacity to develop any real and effective seeurity policy. In thewake of the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York, the dispute reacheda peak during the 2002-2003 Iraqi crisis. Europe, it is thought in someAmerican intelleetual spheres, is living in a strange post-sovereign and threat-free d ayd ream , forgetful of the fact that it can do so only becau se US militarypower has provided concrete military proteetion in the past. Moreover, it isoften added, the same American power is now enforcing peace and security inthe world in the face of European criticism and even ingratitude. The counterargument from the European side is that, blinded by its neoconservativepundits, the USA is dramatically underestimating the forees that currentlyaffect the nature of security. The powerlessness of military power today


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518 CHARILLONshould oblige us all to imagine new security regimes, which is precisely whatthe European Union is striving for.^

Is the EU succeeding in this task of building new security patterns thatcould stand as a frame of reference in international affairs? Five preliminaryremarks are worth being made here. First, the EU is engaged in a highlyambitious endeavour the goal of which is to achieve peace and securityfor itself and for the world through a collective and multi-layered processthat involves actors at different levels, including the national and Europeanlevel. This complex endeavour is emerging through initiatives that addressseveral aspects of external action: mainly foreign policy (through the CFSP,the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and defence (with the ESDP,the European Security and Defence Policy), but also additional aspects areconsidered if necessary, environment for instance. Second, the relevance ofthis collective process cannot be taken for granted. The classical approachto security, foreign policy and defence has shown that these fields remainnational processes, policies and perceptions, rather than collective, a fortiorisupranational ones. Third, the concept of common security building hasproved very arduous to comprehend so far, for the student or reader isleft with two unsatisfying options, either the mere paraphrasing of the EUCouncil's final statements (with its formal but vain promises), or the radicaland quick dismissal of the European efforts in that field (probably too radicalin its neglect of many important achievements and developments). Ratherthan simply depicting or dismissing the European collective building ofnew security patterns, what is needed is the dissection of their meaning andconsequences, both in terms of public policy implementation and intellectualdebate over the nature of security. Fourth, new questions must be addressed,that have just been touched upon until now, including 'whose security?' (thestate, the citizens, and/or the territory?) For security is a concept that is farfrom being taken for granted and the EU contributes both to its definitionand to its blurring.^ Fifth, the question of the security regime would normallyimply a clear-cut definition of what a regime is supposed to be. Among themany definitions of an international or non-international regime (Krasner'sbeing among the most cited), none can be literally applied to the very originalsituation of the EU.

Still, we consider that there is a specific European history in terms ofsecurity issues and this is outlined briefly in the next section. Moreover,historical experience and deepening political cooperation has led theEu ropean s to adopt a collective p rocess in order to deal with security, even w ith


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TH E EU AS A SECURITY REG IME 519

in section II testifies. In section III, the argument points to the emergence of aspecific European approach to security, which can be seen as a regime in thesense that it includes specific actors, rules and norms in a working process,but also as a pattern in the sense that it represents an original vision that canbe shared by other countries on the international stage (section IV).

II From the European Chessboard to a New Collective ActornessThe conceptual framework in which the notion of security has developedin Europe has changed dramatically throughout the recent years. It is worthremembering here the importance of the initial framework (i.e. the cold war),and to be aware of the originality of the current sec urity co ntext (w ar on terror),and the opportunities it presents for a European conception of security.

1. The End of the Cold WarThere are a few key elements to highlight when addressing the issue of apossible European security regime. First, Europe has long been a prominentgeopolitical theatre of operations as far as international relations, diplomacyand war were concerned. Second, when the cold war split the continent inthe wake of World War II, the Europeans found themselves, for the first timein their history, subjects more than actors. The building of the Iron Curtainand the fight between two superpowers left the west Europeans with noother choice than to pass from imperial influence (national rivalries on thecontinent, colonial adventure outside) to adopt a generally passive and tamerole on the international stage. Third, it was the USA that insisted WesternEurope should organize its own security. And it was the Europeans, especiallyFrance, who dismissed the most important project at the time, namely theEuropean Defence Community (the EDC was rejected by the French NationalAssembly in 1954). During nearly half a century, the European security wasthus defined, organized and handled by external superpowers (the USA in theWest, and the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe). Throughout thisperiod, the security of Europe was mainly thought of in terms of militarystructures (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and in a very classical (realist) way;a balance of power, the arms race and alliances were the key concepts to befound at the heart of security co nsid eratio ns. For most of this time, the setback


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CHARILLONissues, instead focusing upon economic integration and stressing prosperitythrough the market, leaving security in external hands.

From the early 1990s, the charaeteristics of the European seeurity debatechanged dramatically. A series of largely unanticipated events, ineluding theend of the cold war, the outbreak of war in the Balka ns, the 11 Sep tem ber 2001attacks in the USA and the American decision to wage an international waragainst terror, as well as a new American unilateralism (of neoconservativeinspiration), led to a new situation in which w e are witnessing the aw akeningof the European Union as a security actor. Let us start with the end of the coldwar and its meaning.

The end of bipolarity, as it oecurred with the collapse of the Berlin Wallin 1989 and the dem ise of the Sov iet Union in 1 99 1, was at the sam e tim ethe end of the division of Europe, the end of a North-North conflict, and theend of a common diplomatic code shared by the West (i.e. Western Europeand the USA) and the Socialist bloc. The new situation implied by thesedevelopments had several key consequences. For one thing, the seeurityregime imposed upon the continent since 1947, and based on the blo e th eory(no autonomous security policies within a bloc), no longer had a place orrelevance in this new order. A new, and unified Europe was about to emerge,with a new set of question s: how to work with the ot he r Europe (formerlysocialist) in the neighbourhood of the new Russia? The key question w as howto re-define European needs in terms of security. And, most of all, was therestill an enemy rem aining, or was there an enduring ally? The balance of pow eramong the west European countries themselves was changing, but no newefficient doctrine could be found.

The once powerful France appeared as a weakened state compared to thenew Germany, with a foreign policy strategy that consisted largely of keepingthe Am ericans in, the Russians out and the German s d ow n . G ermany toohad its difficulties in coming to terms with the unaccustomed political rolesimplied by the cou ntry s new po sition, while Britain was striving to re-inventthe special relationship with the USA in the changed international system.Finally, the European construction eould not avoid a deep aggiornamentotowards a more political entity, and the dilemma, onee suggested by ValeryGiseard d Esta ing between 'Europe espace' and 'Europe puissance , had tobe addressed and settled onee and for all. The end of the cold war also meantthe end of a North-North confiict, in which both sides (East and West) hadshared the same language, in a kind of chess game where the rules and theetiquette had been understood and largely accepted by all of the players. After


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 521set of conceptual tools for reflection and action, for itself and for the rest ofthe world. The era when European security was synonymous with NATO hadgone.

2 After the BalkansCoinciding with the end of the cold war, the European intention to rethinksecurity and its own role in the world was confronted with a challenge too bigto handle that soon. The intricate wars that broke out in the Balkans on thethreshold of the European Union posed severe challenges that would exceedEuropean political and diplomatic capabilities. Several lessons can be drawnform this episode. First, Europe discovered that it needed a security regimeof its own. The tragic events that took place in former Yugoslavia could notbe ignored in Brussels, Paris, London or Berlin. Because of its geographicproximity, Bosnia was no Kuwait. Second, the American ally (at least inthe first months of the conflict) had separate interests and was reluctant tointervene, showing clearly that the Euro-American security community hadnew limits in a post-cold war world. When America eventually did, it wasunder its own conditions, with its military strategy and its very specificconception of burden sharing: air strikes by Am erica, with ground troops to beprovided by Eu rope. Third, the Yugoslavian crisis was also a moral challengefor the EU, because of the nature of the crimes that had been committedand because of the reaction of public opinion. Reports of ethnic cleansing,the large-scale deportation of minority communities, and the subsequentdiscoveries of mass graves marked the return of ultra-nationalism to Europe,all the while presenting dramatic reminders of the persistence of hard securityimperatives, and clear evidence of the need to take a stronger stance on themoral issues in European international relations.^ Not only had Europe todevelop diplomatic and military tools to deal with its own security, but also tothink about the specific European political message the community wanted toconvey to the world.

The EU was still muddling through the complexities of these political anddiplomatic challenges from Kosovo to Chechnya, when the US territory wasstricken by attacks of a new kind in September 2001. By then, Europe hadalready gone so far as to develop new tools and had even expressed reneweddetermination as far as defence and security were concerned, without havingreal opportunities to implement them. The Franco-British joint statement


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522 CHARILLONstart, paving the way for a more efficient European Security and DefencePolicy. But the challenge brought to the fore by global terrorism after the 11September attacks required yet new k inds of responses . And parad oxically, theEuropean Union, whatever its weakness in the field of security, had severalassets in this new configuration. The civilian nature of the attacks, the socialroots of the terrorist problem, the cultural rhetoric of the new enemy and themilitary response brought to this fait social by the Am erican neoconservative-oriented administration, provided Europe with new room to manoeuvre.From Afghanistan to Iraq, from one US military intervention to another,the doctrinal debate continues to drag on, with the European Union addingits voice to what has become a sometimes heated exchange of views. Thecold war had deprived Europe of an autonomous strategic voice. The Balkanwars served to unveil EU military and political limitations. But war on terrorneeds a specific European answer to a new security question, namely how tofight terrorism efficiently. While the USA increasingly is getting caught upin military operations in Iraq, the European sensibilities in security issuescan be heard again: whatever Kagan's (and others') criticism, concepts suchas civilian power, normative power or grass root diplomacy cannot be sweptaway.

3. Updating the Security ConceptThe very nature of security is thus changing, with new dimensions such as softsecurity, hum an security, and com preh ensiv e security.* All those term s referto one new trend, expressed in the reality that the actors in the security gameare now pursuing 'milieu goals' instead of 'possession goals' . ' In a worldcharacterized by interdependence and exchange, the building of a secureregional milieu in a safe international system has become more importantthan the control of new territories and reso urce s.' This implies more thanjust military capabilities, even if these remain highly relevant. Such acontext brings Europe back in as a security actor. If we consider security asa matter of dialogue, exchange, trust building and civilian action more thanmilitary superiority, then the EU has a role to play. The recent trends in theUS administration reflected in the avowed preference for radical solutions,open the way for other countries to consider and reflect upon alternative

* H. Sjursen, 'Security and Defence' in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White,


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 523visions of security - collective security v. unilateralism, international lawV. prev entive war, eonfidence build ing v. clash of civilizatio ns, and socialtreatment of terrorism v. military action only. As Helen Sjtirsen has stated, itis increasingly argued and accepted that security is something other than, orsom ething in addition to, m ilitary force. Th e poor record of the US action inAfghanistan and Iraq made it clear that the social realities of the world stageare complex, and the choice is not between US efficiency and realist politicalclear-headedness on the one hand, and European inefficient indecisiveness onthe o ther hand.

After World War II, Eu rope w as turned into a me re geopo litical the atre. Afterthe end of bipolarity, European countries tried hard to revive the eollectivestatus as a serious security aetor. But the limitations of the US response to thenew global terrorist threat now call for alternative visions of seeurity. Thismight be the ho ur of E uro pe . But the very nature of the Europ ean resp onse,betting on a collective process of a new kind, raises several questions onthe security regime that may emerge from such an experience. A collectiveseeurity process, one may consider in Brussels, is the right response to theehallenges of an interdependent and complex world, where dialogue and theinterest of m ilie u prevail. Oth ers, more particularly in W ashington, see moreconstraints than advantages in dealing collectively w ith today s th reats.

I ll dvan tages and Co nstraints of a Collective Security ProcessIf the Europeanization process brings about so many doubts and questions,why do eountries wish to be part of it? What is it that motivates the MemberStates to seek a collective definition of seeurity with their neighbours, and toaim towards the establishment of common guidelines? The question seemseven more puzzling when w e recall that Europ ean capa bilities remain mo dest,as the sceptics enjoy pointing out, and the operational results are less thanimpressive - small-scale military operations (in Macedonia or Congo in2003 , for instance), a relative absence from important confiicts (in Iraq), anda confirmed dependence on the US ally. Nonetheless, there is a consensusamong the European countries regarding the advantages of having a collectivesecurity arrangement. The reasons for this consensus must be analysed bothfrom the viewpoint of the group (the EU as a security community), and fromthe viewpoint of each Member State taken individually.


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524 CHARILLON1. The Case for Co llective SecurityThere are several advantages connected to a collective security arrangementthat appear beneficial to all the members of the group. First, there is theallocation of new tools and means among the EU members. Even though itwill take a while to reach a capability level comparable with the military andother security resources available to the USA, the fact of adding up severaldeployable capacities obliges the partners to push for greater coherence, theharmonization of the different defence systems, and the reform of existingarrangem ents. From a more intellectual point of view, the necessity to rethinksecurity needs involves a new range of considerations concerning the goals ofa collective security arrangemen t. The question 'Eu rop e, how many d ivisi on s?'necessarily involves another question: 'what do the Europeans want to be inthe world?' At the present time, the answers to both of these questions arefar from clear, but significant steps have been achieved. In recent years, suchinitiatives as the Franco-British Saint Malo summit in 1998, the conclusionsof the Helsinki council in 1999,' ' ' and the EU Security Strategy presented bythe EU High Representative, Javier So lana, in December 2003 ,mark a degreeof progress that would have been unthinkable even a few short years earlier.

Second, the current process of deepening European integration seems tobe another advantage that serves to make Europe more credible as a securityactor. The inten sity of the debate on the ESDP, and the interest of the E urop eanpublic in defence and intervention issues, most notably during the Iraq war,shows that these matters are of concern to the citizens of Europe, regardlessof how the broader processes of European integration may be viewed. Eventhough there may remain som e diversity of opinion am ong political elites andEuropean citizens over the longer-term direction of integration, the searchfor a collective security arrangement is dependent upon this integration.The political will of recent years and more positive views of how Europeancountries can work together on security show clearly that the repercussionsof the EDC setback are far away. Instead, new lessons have been learnt: 'thelessons of Sa rajevo .' On the other hand, the risk is that where the political willevaporates, and European integration fails to manifest values that the citizenswish to see upheld, or if the European Union is permitted to flout these valueson its doorstep, then it can lose its political meaning and even its very raisond etre.

Third, there is the requisite legitimacy to conduct external security actionswhere these are considered to be a collective security initiative rather than


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 525troops by one state brings dissent, or even resistance (against the USA in Iraq,against France in Ivory Coast), and thus vulnerability, the collective labellingof EU initiatives and multilateral treatment of security issues may offer waysof addressing new security challenges. '^ Where the European Union can actcollectively, it does not expose any particular Member State to accusationsconcerning its image, its reputation or its past (for instance as a formercolonial, or occupying power). Though perhaps not impressive in militaryterms,the EU operations in M acedonia (Concordia in 200 3), Ituri (Artemis, in2003),and Bosnia (the EUFOR operation, Althea, in 2005), were accepted bythe local population in the respective regions. Such small-scale operations aretoo limited to be compared to the large US initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq.But their existence, and the absence of major local resistance to them, doessuggest that we cannot dismiss these efforts to develop a specific EU securityregime or security doctrine.

The above arguments show that collective security can bring commonadvantages to the group as a whole. But the Member States can also takeindividual benefit from the Europeanization of security policies. At leastthree elements can be mentioned, which are here described respectively asmultiplication, normalization and socialization.Multiplication refers to the situation where a Member State can have itspower and visibility improved by the EU label, when carrying out securityinitiatives. Acting within a European framework, or as the spokesperson/representative for Europe, provides more political clout. France as alead nation, and Belgium as a military partner, found some advantage inparticipating in the Artemis operation in Ituri.No rmalization enables a state to appear as a normal and legitimate securityactor, where it may have been constrained by its history to otherwise followa reduced room for manoeuvre. The Europeanization of foreign policy and

defence, for instance, allowed Germany to propose initiatives in Easternrelations or in the Balkans, in spite of painful past memories held on bothsides. Under the same EU label, France, as a former colonial power in Africa,could be accepted as a peace broker in Congo, more easily than in IvoryCoast simply under its national colours. In a different context, redefiningsecurity through a dialogue between political elites, military officers and civilsociety, might be easier for former communist countries (including the formerYugoslavian states) in an EU framework.'*


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526 CHARILLONFinally, socialization is the process that enables small states to have asay in international issues, decision-making or negotiations as part of theiridentity as EU members. For Luxembourg, international security initiatives

may be neither feasible nor conceivable, nor is the participation of Belgium(through Artemis), Austria, Finland or Greece (in the C oncordia o peration) ina major m ilitary operation, outside of the European framew ork. Furtherm ore,for small states such participation means the learning of a common workingculture, information sharing and the acquisition of common know -how, evenin spite of limited diplomatic resources.

2.Risks and onstraints of Europeanizing SecurityThese and similar considerations do not mean that the Europeanization ofsecurity is free from obstacles and pitfalls. As it creates opportunities, aeollective security arrangement brings about new difficulties. Once again, itis necessary to analyse these difficulties from the collective point of view, aswell as from the angle of the individual EU Member State.

The definition of a common security policy for Europe implies dealingwith new questions that did not exist at the national level. The standardpublic policy chain that we normally expect to use in analysing policy-making in the national context - analysis of the situation, decision-making,implementation - requires new processes of consultation. How to agree, whohas more significance, in which context, and how to get organized? Beyondthese expected questions, more pernicious problems loom. One of them is thedilemma between real eoUectiveness and operational efficiency: addressingsecurity issues with only a few partners is more comfortable and efficient, butthis does not necessarily permit the use of the European label. Symbolically,the gathering of all the Member States behind one seeurity option constitutesa display of strength and unity. But it will not be easily implemented on thebattlefield should it beco me neeessary . If the particip ation of sm al l statesin the European debate over seeurity remains politieally fruitful, does it notcomplicate the system? Some military officers in Brussels, for instance,express the view privately that an increasing operational awkwardness on theground is the price to be paid for the symbolic building of a political Europe.

A second difficulty is poised to emerge along with yet another new trend,the denationalization of war. The events of 11 September 2001, and thesubsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, have reintrodueed


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 527with the 'Kagan argument': Europe does not want to fight anymore, and thisis the reason why it is striving to establish common ground on security issues,and to think of security challenges in terms of remote and abstract problemsfor a vague entity. This vision is of course simplistic. But one must admit thatreal difficulties appear when dealing concretely with security in the Europeancontext. Defining security together risks triggering a 'politically correct'process whereby the more voluntarist options will be tamed. The more 'hard-security orien ted' the issue, the more uncomfortable Europe finds itself If theEU can easily set out many preventive patterns for future security frameworksin certain areas of soft security, such as the Stability Pact for Central andEastern Europe in 1993-1994, the Euromed process launched in Barcelonain 1995, it is much less active when it comes to coping with already existingconflicts in the Balkans, or addressing the deteriorating peace process in theMiddle-East.

Finally, the approach towards security adopted by the European Unionsince the end of the cold war, despite the regular announcement of newsecurity tools after almost each European Council, is increasing the risk ofwhat Christopher Hill once termed the 'capability-expectations gap'. ' ' ' Herightly observed that the European Union gives rise to great expectationsabout outside action and security, while the means to satisfy them remaininsufficient. Hill's hypotheses, coined in the early 1990s, have been confirmedin spite of good in tentio ns, new tools and real pro gre ss. The frustration fromthe public opinions was confirmed ( 'why are not we able to intervene?'),and the capability-expectations gap remains as an important lacuna in theapproach to European security.

In addition to the difficulties listed above, other problems must becomprehended at the individual level of each Member State. Some concernsaffect mainly the large states. The political consultation imposed by theEuropean rules reduces the room for manoeuvre by diplomatic or militarynational systems that were hitherto unaccustomed to the degree of dialoguenormally required at the supranational level. There is also the strong riskof being perceived as a ' loser ' by the Union if one's conception of securityis not shared by a majority of the partners, or if another country takes thelead in the handling of a key international security issue after an initiativehad been introduced and promoted by a neighbour (France and Britain arefamiliar with this kind of competition). As for smaller states, the risk existsof losing their room to manoeuvre in the definition and preservation of aspecific national approach to security, in the case of some countries (such as


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528 CHARILLONin a collective process. Precisely b ecause a series of common rules and no rmsis emerging, individual postures are hard to maintain. And, precisely becausea specific European history has forged a common path, a national Sonderwegis hard to preserve as far as security is concerned.'^

IV Building a European Security Reg ime An achronism or Vanguard?Two questions emerge from this discussion. To what extent is there a specificEU security regime? And, can the European conception of security serve as amodel to address the future security challenges on the international stage? Onthe first question, three distinct queries need to be addressed: first, is there aspecific European decision process whereby security is addressed and handledin the EU?; second, are there specific values and tenets that form a Europeanmessage or vision on security?; and, third, are these values and tenets reallyshared by a sufficient number of Member States to be deemed European ordeserve the EU label? On the second question, two considerations arise - therelevance of the EU security regime as a frame of reference in internationalrelations; and, its possible application to different parts of the world.

1 The Nature of Security a l 'europeenneThe emergence of a specific decision process, with its own actors, proceduresand rules of coordination, can indeed be identified, which leads us toconclude that the existence of a real EU security regime is a reality. Whilewe can acknowledge its poor capacity to intervene with hard security tools,the EU has a security regime that frames its action. As far as foreign policyand defence are concerned, many academic observers have tried to definethe characteristics of such a regime, and locate most of its originality in thecoordination processes at work. Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius, forinstance, insist on procedural style, decision-m aking dynam ics and m otivationsfor unit adherence to comm on po sit ion s. W hile stressing the same adoptionof a 'coordination reflex', others authors, without explicitly taking it forgranted that an overall security regime exists, are interested in the specificityof the EU extemai public policies. The Common Foreign and Security Policy,for instance, with its bureaucratic structure, substantive policy, decision-making capacity, and the adherence to common rules of work is considered


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 529a regime.^ The existence of new kinds of aetors handling security issues(EU special envoys, permanent representatives, the EU Foreign Minister ass/he was envisaged in the draft eonstitution), the processes of interaction,coordination and hierarchy between them, and their common acceptance of theEU system, make it possible to accept such an idea. This interaction betweendifferent spheres of activity (foreign policy, defence, preventive diplomacy),handled by interdependent actors, also finds its originality in the coexistencebetween national and European levels: what is proposed is not to replacenational security actors (foreign or defenee ministries for instance) by onesupranational deeision centre, but rather to make the two levels work together,reinventing almost on a daily basis the terms, methods and practical detailsof their coordination. This unique situation makes it possible to speak of anEU regime, even when it poses great eomplexity for the actors tasked withthe responsibility to manage it, and makes it very difficult to the academies tostudy and understand it.

More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that sueh a regime is based on aset of values, whereby the EU conceives of its own role as a normative andcivilian power (as Manners pointed out in 2002). It is even expected that, inproviding security through the strengthening of the international society, civilsociety and common good, the EU can at the same time promote its values.^'Defining the EU identity as the promoter of soft and collective security, asUlrich Sedelmeier does,^^ is far from the proposal once made by Hedley Bullfor Europe to become a more self-suffieient actor in defence.^' Rather, theEU vision for security definition, promotion and implementation, is basedon core norms that form a soft-power oriented normative basis, underlinedby such pillars as the eentrality of peace, liberty, democracy, human rightsand the rule of law, plus other concepts sueh as social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.^ All of these

^ Ben Tonra, 'Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of aCognitive Approach' (2003) 41/4Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 731-56.

^' See for instance Romano Prodi stating in 2000 that the EU had to become 'a global civilpower at the service of sustainable global development', and added that 'only by ensuringsustainable development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security'. See R. Prodi,'Shaping the New Europe', speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000,Speech 00 41

Ulrich Sedelmeier, 'Collective identity' in Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, note 8 above. Bull issued seven suggestions: a) the provision of nuclear deterrent forces; b) the

improvement of conventional forces; c) a greater role played by West Germany; d) moreinvolvement on the part of France; e) a change of policy in Britain; f) careful coexistence


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530 CHARILLONpillars are mainly promoted and diffused through the highlighting of non-military instruments that can be applied in preventive diplomacy but also inthe aftermath of a confiict, for instance in state-rebuilding actions.-^^ One ofthe arguments used to criticize this EU posture is based upon the accusationthat this is no security regime, but mere wishful thinking emanating from aweak informal actor (Kagan, again). The ongoing debate here really revolvesaround the provocative question - is a civilian and normative power a truepower? The debate over Europe as a civilian power is of course not really anew o ne, and was already the subject of much refiection in the 1970s, * buthas lost most of its originality and rationale since the European Union is nowstriving to develop new military tools. More central today is the diseussionover the EU as a normative power in the sense used by Ian Manners, becauseof the questio ns it trigge rs about the efficieney of sueh an appro ach in a wo rlddominated by US military power. Before developing the point about the realeffieieney, applicability and transferability of the European security posture,it is necessary to bear in mind that the notion of Europe as a normative poweris shared by much of the European Union citizenry, and that a consensus isemerging on it among the governments of the Member States.

Such a specific and normativ e con ception of security is high in the mind s ofthe European general public across the eontinent. The demand for individual(or humanj security, rather than classical (and cold war-dated) territorial andstate security is strong, and could be witn essed for instanee in the opinion pollsduring the Bosnia or Kosovo tragedies. In that perspeetive, the EU SecurityStrategy document issued in December 2003 by Javier Solana, with its stressupon human security, is in tune with the European public's wavelength.Human and societal security has to be provided for the European citizens, aswell as for the others (the neighbours and even the rest of the world), by theEU acting as security provider and as a stability-exporting entity. As seen inthe Balkans, the public debate on seeurity and defence brings about ethicalrequirements that encourage the EU to intervene at least in its near abroad (ifnot everywh ere in the world ). This demand takes into aecount the reeent g lobaltrends towards increased interdep endenc e, turns the page on a Europe dividedby the cold war, signifies the end of the 'Nation State/territory/security'equation, and requires the definition of the 'we' under construction. In thisrespect, the European security regime is shared by a majority of EU MemberStates, for several reasons: a) the new unipolar world, led by the USA, and the

In the Ba lkans, the European Union Police Mission (EUP M) in Bosnia, the Civilian


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 531European ambitions to reach a decent level of actorness place demands uponthe EU to clarify its Weltanschauung and stress the significance of Europeancountries to collectively hold firm to a set of norms and values, ranging frominternational law to human rights; b) all the Member States basically agreeon the fact that a normative Europe does not mean a civilian Europe anymore,hence the recent progress in the building up of EU military tools;^* c)whatever way the debate over the substantive nature of EU-USA relationsmight go, most of the Member States recognize that the European Union willnever become a military competitor to America, and should instead re-inventinfluence on its own terms.

From EU Regime to EU Pattern?Finally, the combination of public demand, an EU set of norms and specific,if somewhat narrow, room to manoeuvre on the international stage, has pavedthe way since the end of the cold war for a specific EU approach to securitythat can be deemed a regime indeed. Is it a regime of a unique and Utopiankind, marked by lip service more than by efficiency? We shall first argue thatthe way the EU envisages security has achieved some successful results inthe recent past, or at least accomplished valuable efforts. If Europe has notbeen a first-rank hard security actor in major international conflicts, the fieldof action can be kept in mind as European successful strategies. Whateverits military and diplomatic limitations, the EU has proved able to developpreventive security diplomacy, as the already mentioned example of the1993-1994 stability pact in Central Europe has shown. As could be seen in theBalkans,but also in Palestine in the mid-1990s (with the support given to thePalestinian Authority), the EU soft-security posture can be used as a relevanttool in post-conflict state/society building. In a more pro-active althoughnot immediately visible way, the EU also proved efficient in improvingits long-term security by shaping or re-shaping its near abroad throughvarious tools and modalities, making it resemble the liberal-democraticsocietal environment that corresponds to the EU model itself This capacity,demonstrated in the deep transformation of Central and Eastern communistEurope throughout the enlargement process, shows a certain ability to makeup for its lack of hard power, and to use non-military tools such as the pre-

For instance, at the Helsinki Council in 1999: a Standing Political and Security Committee


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532 CHARILLONaccession strategy,^' the accession process, the Agenda 2000, or the politicsof conditionality^ set out in the Copenhagen criteria as conditions for theaccession countries to meet.^' It would thus be erroneous to dismiss this kindof external action as real security policy; by its will and capacity to shape itsnear abroad and turn it into a friendly 'milieu' , the EU has proved able to be apro-active security actor,^^ and to act in a relevant interest-based (rather thanonly naive or idealist) approach.

Can such an approach be attractive enough to be implemented in otherparts of the world? Several reasons lead us to believe that if the recent trendsin regionalization of security are anything to go by, the EU security regime,as it is developing now, is at least to be taken seriously. First, it must beremembered that the hard security vision, as it is put into practice in differentparts of the world, from Iraq (by the USA) to Palestine (by Israel) or Chechnya(by Russia), is not producing satisfactory results, by most yardsticks ofsuccessful operation. Without necessarily speaking in terms of Europeansensibility versus the 'Nato-ization of security',^'' an alternative patternmust be thought out, taking into account the public demand for dialogue andinternational law.

Second, because Bin Laden is no Brezhnev, the new challenges tointernational security require original methods that cannot be based onthe confrontation between monolithic actors leading ah hoc (and moving)military coalitions, but rather on a social consensus underlying commonand value-based security policies. In this respect, the sometimes arduous butearnest European endeavour to build consensual responses to internationaljolts cannot be simply dismissed.

The pre-accession strategy was endorsed by the Essen European Council in December1994 and fostered initiatives in several key areas: creating the legal environment for integration;improving trade opportunities; promoting cooperations in several sectors (energy, transport,environment); assistance for reform through financial aid (PHARE) and loans.

'Conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceivedbenefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions), to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions', Karen E. Smith, The Making of EU oreignPolicy: The Case of EasternEurope (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999), p. 198.

Those conditions were defined for potential Eastern European recipients to be grantedsupport, with membership rather than assistance in mind. The candidates states were asked tointegrate theacquis communautaire by establishing stable institutions guaranteeing democracy,the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; to possess a functioning marketeconomy; to endorse the objectives of political, economic and monetary union; and to be able


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THE EU AS A SECURITY REGIME 533Third, the regionalization of security issues is a growing trend, wherebya state or society is necessarily affected by the events taking place in itsneighbourhood, probably faces the same challenges, and is led to provide the

same kind of response to it, in coordination with its geographical partners.In South-East Asia, Central Asia, South America, the Gulf States and WestAfrica, political leaders had to admit these constraints, in spite of initialpreferences to develop national and specific approaches to security challengesor insecurity contagion. In this perspective the European pattern can providefor new insights on the regionalization of security arrangements.

V onclusionM ost actors and observers are keen to point out what must be improved in theEuropean security regime - decision-making rules, external representation,financing, com mo n political will, dem ocratic o versig ht, to nam e but a few.Some insist on new tracks to be explored in order to rethink external actionthat might form part of the European experiment, such as techno-diplomacy(the use of new technologies in political dialogue), grassroots action (in favourof small groups of citizens) as preventive security, multilateral and mission-oriented diplomacy, public diplomacy, catalytic diplomacy (symbiosisbetween states and non-state actors in the quest for security).^^ But whateverits past shortcomings, the merits of the EU security regime probably lie fornow in its long-drawn-out effort to re-politicize security.


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