the eu in a global perspective and the demographic challenges associated with the second demographic...
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The EU in a Global Perspective and the Demographic Challenges The EU in a Global Perspective and the Demographic Challenges associated with the “Second Demographic Transition”associated with the “Second Demographic Transition”
Ron LesthaegheRon Lesthaeghe
Gastner-Newman cartogram – proportional to total population size
Part 1: The formal demographic core.
• The 2 mechanisms of ageing.
• Population growth (shrink) momentum.
• Replacement migration.
Survivors per 100 000 births with varying life expectancies at birth : From a “neutral” mortality decline to squaring off and pure aging effect
The stationary population view: from a neutral mortality decline to pure aging
Stable population age structures with constant e0= 80 years, but varying total fertility rates. (1.58 to 2.20)
TFR
Negative Growth Momentum : Italy
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
Year
Siz
e
2016
2031
2046
2061
never
Year TFR reaches 2.06 again i.e. Replacement level
TFR back to 2.06Children (from 1.25)
FemalePopulationSize
X
X
X
X
X = about stationaryIn closed populations that have grown very old as a result of sustained
sub-replacement fertility, there will be a CONTINUED shrinkage for 50 years AFTER the restoration of exact replacement fertility
The Negative Growth Momentum
Aging bulge: unavoidableAfter a long period of
subreplacement fertility, there is an unavoidable aging bulge even if fertility returns to replacement level
Percent 65+ Italian women if TFR is restored to replacement level at various dates
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2001
2011
2021
2031
2041
2051
2061
2071
2081
2091
2101
2111
2121
2131
2141
Year
Pct 65+
2.06 in 2016
2.06 in 2031
2.06 in 2046
2.06 in 2061
never
The “Second Demographic Transition” view
Primary determinants of below replacement fertility:•Economic : Elevated standard of living & high consumption aspirations, need for double income, high opportunity cost globalization world economy.•Cultural : Higher order needs accentuated (self-actualization, expressive values, individual autonomy, freedom of choice, open future,”postmaterialist” political aspirations …)(cf. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs)•TOGETHER Second Demographic Transition (SDT)
Demographic characteristics of the SDT:•Postponement of marriage and parenthood, use of efficient contraception.•But : varying degrees of catching up of fertility at later ages (main source of difference between TFRs above and below 1.5)•Hence structural, not temporary, sub-replacement fertility, but at varying levels !•Rise of alternative living arrangements : longer periods living with parents, living alone, in cohabitation, procreation within cohabitation, post-marital cohabitation, LAT relations, etc.
Caveat : Intermediate phase between First DT and Second DT : Sexual revolution, but no transition to efficient contraception = recipe for high teenage fertility, shotgun marriage, young age divorce, early single motherhood, compromised life chances. US is typical example. One of the main reasons for US TFR being = 2.0. Also major danger for 1st generation immigrant youths from non-patriarchal societies.
1.The Fertility Story
• Careful with period measures !!• Postponement & Recuperation in
Cohort Fertility• The Spanish Cohorts
a positive association between SDT and period total fertility : classic case of split correlation
Bulgaria
P oland
GreeceSlovakia
Luxembourg
The NetherlandsUnited Kingdom Finland
Denmark
France
Sweden
Lithuania
Latvia
Spain
ItalyHungary
Austria
EstoniaCzech Rep.
P ortugal
Germany
RussiaCroatia
Ukraine
Romania
Ireland
Iceland
Slovenia
Belarus
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00 2.20TFR
SD
T In
dex
Figure 8a: SDT Index and TFR in 2004 (r=0.71)
All stronger recuperation countries
No or weak recup & late starters
Source of plot : Tomas Sobotka, 2008. Interpretation : Ron Lesthaeghe 2008.
1.50
A strong SDT – fertility postponement link
LithuaniaRussia
Belarus
BulgariaEstonia
Slovakia
RomaniaLatvia
Poland
IrelandCzech Republic
HungaryPortugal
AustriaSlovenia
CroatiaGreeceItaly
Spain
France
United Kingdom
Denmark
Germany
The Netherlands
Finland
Sw eden
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year when mean age at first birth increased by 2 years
SD
T2
Ind
ex
SDT vanguard
SDT tail
Source: T. Sobotka 2008.
Deficits CCFR Netherlands
-1000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
<20 <20-24 <20-30 <20-34 <20-39 <20-44 <20-45+
Age Brackets and Baseline (1940-44)
Defic
ets,
Tho
usan
ds o
f Birt
hs
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
Deficits CCFR Portugal
-900-800-700-600-500-400-300-200-100
0100200
<20 <20-24 <20-30 <20-34 <20-39 <20-44 <20-45+
Age Brackets and Baseline (1940-44)
Defic
ets,
Tho
usan
ds o
f Birt
hs
1945-1949
1950-1954
1955-1959
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
TROUGH RECUP
PTFR(t+30) = A + B1*BaseCTFR(t=0) + B2*TROUGH(t) + B3*RECUP(t) + e
Trough = deficit in cumulated CASFR at age 30 compared to baseRecup = part of trough recuperated by age 40Sample= all never communist European countries, baseline = cohort born 1940-44, predicting PTFRs in period 1960-2005.
RESULT : baseCTFR only Rsq. = .505, baseCTFR + Trough Rsq= .673, all 3 including Recup then Rsq= .793. Hence : RECUP IS ESSENTIAL.
ONLY countries dip below a TFR below 1.5 that have no or weak recuperation.The “Bongaarts’ babies” have remained in his cupboard in a large number of countries, and will stay there for as long as there is no recuperation of fertility after age 30.
-1.60
-1.40
-1.20
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
15 20 25 30 35 40Age
Cum
ula
ted d
iffere
nce fro
m t
he b
ench
ma
rk c
ohort
….. ..
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Benchmark CTFR (1940 cohort): 2.93
-1.60
-1.40
-1.20
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
15 20 25 30 35 40Age
Cum
ula
ted
diff
ere
nc
e fro
m th
e b
en
chm
ark
co
hort
…
..
..
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Benchmark CTFR (1955 cohort): 1.90
-0.50
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
15 20 25 30 35 40Age
Cum
ula
ted
diff
ere
nce
fro
m th
e b
enc
hm
ark
coho
rt
…
..
..
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Benchmark CTFR1 (1955 cohort): 0.896
-0.50
-0.40
-0.30
-0.20
-0.10
0.00
0.10
15 20 25 30 35 40Age
Cu
mu
late
d d
iffe
ren
ce
fro
m t
he
be
nc
hm
ark
co
ho
rt
…..
.
.
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Benchmark CTFR3+ (1955 cohort): 0.334
Cohort Fertility Postponement & Recuperation, Spain. (benchmarks coh40, coh55)
SDT and TFRs : inconsistent or double effect ?
Self-actualisation, keeping open future.
Emancipation: gender equity & better division
of labour in family.
Organisation & policy aspects re independence of young adults and reduction opportunity costs (child care facilities, schooling, allowances & benefits), housing opportunities.
SDT
Postponement
Recuperation
Overall fertility
+
+
_
+
Social & Economic constraints: longer education, deregulation labour market etc
FAC1_1: SDT – Postponement of Marriage, Parenthood and Overall Fertility, 1995-2001
D ata colum n: FAC 1_1
-1.91 - -0 .86
-0.86 - -0 .41
-0.41 - 0 .16
0.16 - 0 .97
0.97 - 2 .03
D ata co lum n: FAC 1_1
-1.91 - -0.86
-0.86 - -0.41
-0.41 - 0 .16
0.16 - 0 .97
0.97 - 2 .03
FAC5_1: SDT – Non-conformist Family Formation (Cohabitation, out-of wedlock fertility, single parent household, abortion), 1995-2002
D ata colum n: FAC 5_1
-1.93 - -0 .84
-0.84 - -0 .12
-0.12 - 0 .16
0.16 - 0 .79
0.79 - 3 .15
D ata co lum n: FAC 5_1
-1.93 - -0.84
-0.84 - -0.12
-0.12 - 0.16
0.16 - 0 .79
0.79 - 3 .15
The Migration IssueResults of a simulation excercise for the EU-12, 1995 to 2060
Population 65+ in EU 15 in 3 Scenarios
PERCENT 65+
IF NO IMMIGRAT.
IF CT POP SIZE MIGR.
IF CT SIZE 15-64 MIGR
IF CT RATIO 15-64/64 Migr
2000 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 2025 23.4 22.5 21.5 15.4 2050 29.7 26.3 24.7 15.2 Perc. Points Change +13.2 +9.8 +8.2 -1.3
UN Population Divn.
Scenario with constant dependency ratio leads to irrealistic growth and growth waves. xxxxxNote : UN assumes instantaneous drop immigrant fertility level to that of host country – too strong !
EU-12 aging if e0=80 and TFR=1.64.1985 =>2060
growth of immigrantpopulation EU-12 , stockin 1985 + Descendants+400 000 newcomers p.a., fertility drops from 4 to 1.64 in 2010
EU-12 Female Pop.
Migrant extra female population.
15
9
3
0
3
2
1
EU12 nationals + descendants
Descendents of foreign mothers but born in EC12 after 1.1.85
Foreign stock of 1985 ( old survivors) and all foreign born after 1.1.85
SCENARIO: everyone e0=80; immigration=400.000 pa.;TFR nationals=1.64, TFR immigrants drops from 4.0 to 1.64 by 2010
Disaggregated projection for EU12 women, 1985-2060
TFR of native and foreign populations - selected European countries 1975 - 2001. Sources: SOPEMI, national statistical offices.
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.519
75
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
E&W New Commonwealth
France all women
France all foreign
Sweden all foreigners
Dutch
Turks in the Netherlands
Swedes
England and Wales all birthplaces
Source : D. Coleman
Dark blue: active CatholicLight blue : Non-active Cath.
Green: Islam-SunniBlack: Islam-Sharia
Purple: Protestant + otherRed : Agnostic
(Read outward)
Age & Religion Composition, IIASA projections for Spain. 2009, 2019, 2029.
Source : Katja Sherbov, Dec 2010
Long term SDT – views :
• Sustained below-replacement fertility, caused by postponement and very little progression beyond 2 children. Rise childlessness among couples.
• But very different TFR levels (say from 1.0 to 2.0), depending on degree of fertility recuperation at later ages (30+)
• Negative population growth momentum set in motion : population becomes so old that decline will not stop when TFR reaches replacement again. Decline continues for another 50 years. Unavoidable major aging bulge too.
• Need for replacement immigration, but mainly useful for maintaining absolute sizes of total population or of total active population. Less useful for reducing aging ( but not useless !)
• Replacement migration = family migration or family reunification, not just temporary guest workers.
• But once TFRs remain below 1.5 : no adequate solutions anymore.• Hence strong connection between SDT and international migration.• And also : SDT leads to multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual
societies, which can have very different degrees or patterns of integration.• SDT = no convenient equilibrium !
Part 2. Various measures compared
BUT !!!
ONLY the DENOMINATOR CONSIDERED HERE, I.E. THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
NOT THE NUMERATOR: DEPENDENT PENSIONERS.
3 MEASURES COMPARED•Increase in fertility•Increase in Labour Force participation rates ( activity rates)•Increase in immigration
MacDonald-Kippen Total Labour Force Projection Scenarios
• Effect of TFRs returning to 1.80 children in next 15 yrs ( starting +- in 2000)
• Effect of Rises in Labour Force Participation rates : Males : after age 30 rising to levels of 1970; Females : rising to Swedish levels at all ages ; change over next 30 yrs.
• Effect of Increasing Net Migration to 0.5 pct of Total Pop. Size : D=200.000pa =>408.000, F & UK= 35.000 => 290.000, US= 760.000 => 1.369.000 pa.
BAU
BAU= Business as usual
ALL CURRENT TFR, MIGR, LF Particip.
CURRENT TFR, LF particip, NO MIGR
TFR to 1.8
MIGR = 0.5% paLF partic to high levels
Optimistic Combination
BAU
BAU
BAU
Homework for entire EU
• Favor gender symmetry in housework & earnings;
• Maintain & increase female employment rates, but reduce opportunity costs (child-care !!!)
• Do not reduce immigration, but try to manage it with respect to education and favorable adjustment characteristics.
• Increase labor force participation rates, esp. after age 55.
Can the SDT spread to non-western populations ?
• Overall answer : spread of SDT already occurring in other societies, but not necessarily according to a western sequence.
• Lowest-Low fertility in Japan, S. Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, now also caused by massive postponement..
• Sub-replacement fertility in Caribbean area (from Cuba to Trinidad ), in 2 Indian states and several Indian metropolitan areas, and even in several Muslim populations (Tunisia, Iran). Sub-replacement fertility widespread in most Chinese provinces.
• Take off of premarital cohabitation documented in Japan and Taiwan. “Cohabitation boom” in Latin America.
• In Japan, Korea, Singapore : postponement of parenthood equally linked to expressive and individualistic value orientations at the micro level ( but not or less strongly to religion/secularism).
• But : many of these societies have no experience with multi-culturalism (e.g Japan, S. Korea versus Singapore)
Future of migration as seen through the SDT perspective.
* Migration will continue to gain importance.* Many populations still have high TFRs, and large countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico …will still produce a positive population growth momentum for several decades to come.* Several African populations ( lower on AIDS) have very high fertility and are also exhibiting a major growth momentum.* No shortage of areas with high population pressure in the next half century, but older and more typical recruitment areas may have reduced capacities for sending migrants. * Hence : geographical/cultural shifts are likely with respect to areas of origin.* Caveat : migrations can also occur even if sending country has very low fertility ( e.g. Polish, Eastern European migration to EU).
Conclusions
• No way to stop ageing via replacement migration alone : numbers completely irrealistic (unless “deportation”)
• Replacement migration is only a partial measure which works best if immigrants are in families, sex-balanced, with fertility at or above replacement level. Single sex labour migration is not demographically sound.
• Replacement migration leads to “multicultural” societies, but it takes several generations to get to a decisive shift with respect to “ancestral origins”. Question : are the third and fourth generations “integrated”?
• Short term imperatives for D,NL,B : increase labour force participation after age 50 !
• Overall : increase productivity via technological innovation and sound capital investment. And reduce public debt !!
Health care expenditure
Greenhouse gases emissions.
Child mortality
IS THERE ENOUGH TO GO AROUND ?
In millions, UN Medium projections, 2006 revisions.
Total Pop 2005 2050 Increase
Europe ( incl Eur. Russia) 731.1 664.1 - 67.0
Turkey 73.0 98.9 +25.9Philippines 84.6 140.5 +55.9
Bangladesh 135.2 254.1 +118.9India 1134.4 1658.3 +523.9Pakistan 158.1 292.2 +134.1
Indian subcontinent +776.9
PR China 1313.0 1408.8 +95.8
Can the SDT spread to non-western populations ?
• Overall answer : spread of SDT already occurring in other societies, but not necessarily according to a western sequence.
• Lowest-Low fertility in Japan, S. Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, now also caused by massive postponement..
• Sub-replacement fertility in Caribbean area (from Cuba to Trinidad ), in 2 Indian states and several Indian metropolitan areas, and even in several Muslim populations (Tunisia, Iran). Sub-replacement fertility widespread in most Chinese provinces.
• Take off of premarital cohabitation documented in Japan and Taiwan.• In Japan, Korea, Singapore : postponement of parenthood equally linked to
expressive and individualistic value orientations at the micro level ( but not or less strongly to religion/secularism).
• But : many of these societies have no experience with multi-culturalism (e.g Japan, S. Korea versus Singapore)
Number of items with effects on postponement of parenthood in
World Values Studies, Women aged 18-45.
expected direction (net effects after controls for age, education, job status)
Japan South Korea Singapore
1995, 2000 1994, 2001 2002
a.Family and gender items
15 of 16
15 of 16
13 of 16
b.Socialization traits 7 of 9 9 of 9 7 of 9
c.Work characteristics 5 of 5 na9 of 10
d.Political orientations19 of 20
17 of 19 7 of 9
e. Ethics and morality issues 8 of 10 7 of 9 9 of 9
d.Religion 4 of 10 2 of 3 8of 10
Total58 of 70
50 of 56
53 of 63
total % 82.9 89.384.10
%
Postponmt + weak or no recuperation
Postponement + stronger recuperation
Less postponement but quantum drop