the evacuation 187 - marines.mil. marines in... · space, control and safety became...

THE EVACUATION

the MAG-36 medium and light helicopters, nowmembers ofProvMAG-39 and in position on the decksof the other ships in the task force. These helicopters,CH-46s, UH-lEs, and AH-1Js (Cobras) were an integralpart of the pre-L-Hour preparations and could not bepushed aside or relocated to other deck space. Theyhad to fit into the flow pattern because each one hada support or rescue role in the overall operation. Theirmissions included everything from sea and air rescueto carrying 15-man, quick-reaction "Sparrow Hawk"teams of Marines from Company A, 1st Battalion, 9thMarines.26

The 9th MAB planned to use two Sparrow Hawkteams, with each one on board a CH-46. These twoCH-46s would then orbit along the evacuation route,positioned to assist any helicopter in distress. In theevent that the NVA shot down a helicopter or amechanical malfunction forced one to make an emergency landing in enemy-held territory, a Sparrow Hawkteam stood ready to land and provide security. Itsdefensive perimeter would then enable a sea and airrescue (SAR) helicopter to pick up the crew. Besides

187

this support, two CH-46s would provide medicalevacuation capabilities while the Cobras would flycover for the transport helicopters and, if possible, foranyone else who requested it. In addition, the Cobrascould serve as Tactical Air Coordinators (Airborne) orForward Air Controllers (Airborne). Another criticalmeans of support would be provided by the UH-lEs,a command and control platform for General Carey,Colonel Gray, and Colonel Frank G. McLenon, theProvMAG-39 commander. Thus, crossdecking for theinitial transport waves would have to integrate themedium and light helicopters into the overall flow pattern, adding one more factor to the already complicated process.27

With all these helicopters in a relatively small airspace, control and safety became paramount considerations. The demanding and important task of safelycontrolling the skies over South Vietnam had to beshared by two Services, the Navy and the Air Force.Admiral Whitmire retained responsibility for air control over the water, or "feet wet," while General Burnsas USSAG/Seventh Air Force commander (call sign

A 9th MAB "intel"picture numbers LZs 34 and 35 in the Annex and 36-38 in the Alamo. Alamo LZ 39 is outside the photo, top left; Air America terminalLZ 40 was not used

Marine Corps Historical Collection

188 THE BlUER END

"Blue Chip") controlled all aircraft "feet dry," overland. The on-scene, local control rested with the air-borne mission commander (AMC). For the first sixhours of the operation, Colonel John J. Roosma, Jr.,USAF, served as the AMC. Located in an airborneC-130 designated the Airborne Battlefield Commandand Control Center (ABCCC), he answered to the ra-dio call sign of "Cricket."28

The commanding officer of ProvMAG 39, ColonelMcLenon, exercised control of his Marine aircraftthrough the Tactical Air Coordination Center (TACC)on board the Blue Ridge. The Helicopter DirectionCenter, on board the Okinawa, maintained aircraftspacing and routing. It also passed directions to air-craft outbound ftom Saigon, informing them whichdeck space was available for unloading and refuelingand relaying any other pertinent landing data. In ad-dition, Admiral Whitmire designated the Okinawa asthe primary control for over-water helo operations,with Hancock as backup should the Okinawa sufferdamage or equipment failure.29

The primary difference between TACC and HDCwas that TACC controlled the tactical disposition ofthe helicopters and HDC controlled the helicoptersas long as they were in the Navy's airspace. These areasof responsibility often overlapped and at times evenmerged. Under the conditions existing on the morn-ing of 29 April 1975, the difference in control respon-sibilities of TACC and HDC at best seemed blurred,at worst redundant.

To address flight safety, the 9th MAB staffprescribed altitudes, routes, and checkpoints for theoperation. To avert mid-air collisions, the plannerschose altitudes which would not only provide separa-tion of traffic but also a capability to see and avoidthe enemy's SAM and SA-7 missile threat (6,500 feetfor flights inbound to Saigon and 5,500 feet for thoseoutbound from Saigon to the Navy ships). In addi-tion, these altitudes were high enough to avoid smallarms and artillery fire. To further reduce the missilethreat, HMH-462 painted its helicopters with infraredpaint. HMH-463 had already painted its helicopters,but HMH-462 did not have an opportunity to modi-fy its CH-53s until after the evacuation of Phnom Penh(reports had indicated an absence of SAMs in Cam-bodia). Despite all the concern over these obviousthreats, the weather still remained the gravest danger.

At the beginning of the operation, pilots in the firstwave reported the weather as 2,000 feet scattered,20,000 feet overcast with 15 miles visibility, except inhaze over Saigon, where visibility decreased to one


This is one of the briefing maps used for OperationFrequent W/ind Along these routes were stationed twoairborne CH-46s, each with a 15-man, quick-reactionforce on board designated a "Sparrow Hawk" team.

mile. This meant that scattered clouds existed belowtheir flight path while a solid layer of clouds more thantwo miles above their heads obscured the sun. Addi-tionally, the curtain of haze, suspended over Saigon,so altered the diminished daylight that line of sightvisibility was only a mile. The weather conditionswould deteriorate as the operation continued. Cap-tain EdwardJ. "Jim" Ritchie, flying a MAG-36 CH-46from the Hancock, recalled his first sortie into Saigonat approximately 1830: "The sky was completely over-cast, meeting the ground in the distance with thelights of the city and the burning buildings reflect-ing off it, giving one the sensation that you were see-ing a strange movie about the Apocalypse."3°

Although all these factors, including the enemy'sproximity to Saigon, had to be considered, GeneralCarey never hesitated in making his decision to inserta battalion of Marines into the DAO Compound.Despite the unknown variables of size of crowds, num-bers of refugees, degree of crowd control, and SouthVietnamese military reaction, General Carey believedthis was the appropriate show of force. With the sizeof the security contingent decided and his prepara-tions complete, General Carey boarded a UH-1E

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helicopter and at 1315 departed the Blue Ridge forthe landing zone.3'

At 1350, a section of Huey helicopters landed at theDAO Compound and discharged its passengers,General Carey and Colonel Gray. During their ap-proach to the compound, they experienced a first-hand view of the enemy's firepower. The NVA wasshelling nearby Tan Son Nhut Airport with ground,rocket, and artillery fire. Upon touching down afteran uneventful but exciting flight, General Carey ex-ited the lead helicopter followed by Colonel Gray fromthe second Huey. They quickly established an austerecommand post in preparation for the arrival of the Ma-rine CH-53s and the ground security force.32

Proceeding by way of Point Hope, the initial check-point and the spot where the Peoria positioned itselfto pick up any downed pilots, the first wave checkedin with Air Force control. Upon contact with Cricket,the flight radioed its next checkpoint, Keyhole, andits destination, the DAO Compound. Just prior topassing Keyhole, Cricket directed Lieutenant ColonelBolton and his squadron to switch to the landing zone

controller's frequency. After an initial radio check, Bol-ton requested and obtained clearance into the zonefor his flight, and the first wave started landing at1506. At that moment, it was 0306 in Washington,the same day, 29 April 1975, and 2106, 28 April, atthe CinCPac Command Center in Honolulu, Hawaii.

Greeted by the cheers of a crowd of American andSouth Vietnamese evacuees, the Marines of BLT 2/4rushed to their assigned positions in the sector. Theywasted no time in establishing a security zone to pro-tect the 679 people in the compound who were wait-ing to board the helicopters. (The evacuees in thecompound at 1500 represented only those who hadbeen pre-staged for the initial lift. Subsequent refu-gees were organized as they arrived.) Years later, theDefense Attache, General Smith, described the crowd'smood: "The Vietnamese were undeniably sad and evenapprehensive but throughout it all very calm. TheAmericans were also sad but perhaps for differentreasons."33

After loading the first group of evacuees, the 12

THE EVACUATION 189

Photo courtesy of LtCol William R. Melton, USMC

The first section of CH-53s approaches the DAO landing zones. At 1506 the first helicoptersof HMH-462 touched down at the Alamo, officially beginning Operation Frequent Wind

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190 THE BlUER END

Photo courtesy of Capt Russell R. Thurman, USMC (Ret)

First evacuees from the DAO compound are seen al:hting from an HMH-463 Sea Stallion.HMH-463 helicopters made up the second wave of security forces to enter the compound

Marines of BLT 2/4 guard the perimeter of the DAO Annex landing zones during thefirst hours of the evacuation of Saigon. LZs 34 and 35 were located here and all opera-tions from the Annex were completed before sunset, which occurredat 1847 on 29 April.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A150965

HMH-462 CH-53Ds left the compound and flew out-bound via Newport Pier to the task force. In doingso, they attempted to maintain a visual separation of1,000 feet from the inbound second wave. When thefirst wave reported "feet wet" at Point Mercy to theHDC controller on the Okinawa, its helicopter pilotsreceived vectors to ships with enough deck space toaccommodate them. Landing on these ships at 1540,they unloaded the first refugees delivered by Opera-tion Frequent Wind.

As the second wave loaded the next group ofevacuees in the DAO Compound, Lieutenant ColonelSlade reinforced his positions with the newly arrivedMarines from the second increment. The DAO Corn-

pound lent itself to easy access by air, but its configu-ration made security difficult. Slade's scheme ofmaneuver called for deployment of his "Alpha" com-mand group, two rifle companies, and his 81mm mor-tar platoon around the DAO headquarters building(the Alamo) and its adjacent landing zones. The "Bra-vo" command group led by the BLT 2/4 executiveofficer, Major Thornton L. "Luke" Youngman, consist-ed of two rifle companies and the 106mm recoillessrifle platoon. It assumed responsibility for security ofthe DAO Annex and its adjoining landing zones.

Using an east-west axis which bisected the Alamodefensive perimeter, Lieutenant Colonel Slade hadCaptain Matthew F. Broderick deploy his Company

THE EVACUATION 191

9th MAB Frequent Wind Post-Operational SummaryA map produced by the 9th MAB staff illustrates the layout of the DAO compound andthe landing zones. Note locations of Air America terminal, Annex, and Alamo.

TAN SON NHUT

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DAO /AIR AMERICA COMPLEX

LEGEND

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192 THE BITTER END

E Marines to the northern half of the zone while Cap-tain Thomas A. Keene's Company F occupied thesouthern section. At the Annex, Captain William R.Melton moved his Company G Marines into theeastern section of a perimeter using a north-south axis.At the same time, Captain Steven R. Bland's Compa-ny H assumed control of the western sector.35

As the number of refugees decreased, so did thesize of the zone. Despite continuous adjustments inthe perimeter resulting from the reconsolidations, BLT2/4 attempted to incorporate the existing defensivefeatures of the compound, including the bunkers andbarbed wire entanglements.36

Originally, General Carey had intended to deploya command group and a company from BLT 1/9 tothe Air America Compound as additional landingzone security. However, after assessing the relative secu-

rity of the two areas in the DAO Compound and con-sulting with Colonel Gray on the apparent success ofthe South Vietnamese defensive stand at Tan Son NhutAirport, he decided to cancel the BLT 1/9 security mis-sion. To insure effective command and control, Gener-al Carey remained in the compound.

The evacuation of the DAO Compound continuedlike clockwork. When a helicopter arrived, the guidesmoved the evacuees from the staging areas directly tothe ramps. Bending down as they approached theswirling rotor blades, the refugees then climbed onboard the waiting CH-53 as the guides returned tothe assembly area.

Aircraft loads varied in size depending upon thetype of helicopter used. Besides those flown by theMarine Corps, the Air Force (USAF had eight CH-53Csand two I-IH-53s deployed on the Midway) supplied10 from its nearby bases in Thailand. Each model'sload capacity (a factor of its internal configuration),adjusted for fuel, determined the number of evacueesthat a particular helicopter could carry on that sortie.The landing zone marshals had to keep these factorsuppermost in their minds as they prepared each load.Once a decision as to the number of passengers hadbeen made, the marshals would then communicatethat information to the guides. When loads exceed-ed the planned limit of 50, signals between guidesand marshals became especially critical. Complicat-ing everyone's ability to communicate was the helicop-ters' deafening rotor blade noise and their electronicinterference with hand-held radios. This interferenceseverely limited the marshals' ability to relay such im-portant information as the size of the evacuee popu-

lation. This particular data provided the landing zonecontrollers and the guides a general idea of how manymore flights would be required to move the remain-ing evacuees. To be certain that the correct numbersreached the intended party, the marshals and the land-ing zone controllers used a colored signal paddle sys-tem to communicate. In addition, the controllers(Alamo controllers handled landing zones 36, 37, 38,and 39 while the Annex controller covered LZs 34 and35) advised the marshals of the number of inboundhelicopters and their estimated time of arrival. Theyalso used this link to pass information about troopmovements including the status of the Sparrow Hawkteams as well as the progress of the evacuation. Thenews of more flights headed toward the compound,when relayed to the refugees, significantly loweredtheir anxiety levels. Oftentimes, these people thoughtthey had already witnessed the departure of the lasthelicopter. The calming effect this reassuring news hadon the refugees definitely aided the Marines in main-taining order and control in the staging area.

Unfortunately, coordination and control of the over-all embarkation operation suffered from more seriouscommunication problems. Direct communicationswith Admiral Whitmire and 9th MAB Rear weresporadic, at best, requiring a continuous relay by theABCCC (airborne C-130 equipped with several typesof radios). Added to the already heavy traffic, theserelays served to create confusion on the radios. Oneof the first instances of using the ABCCC to pass in-formation from the DAO Compound (9th MAB) to9th MAB Rear occurred when the ABCCC (Cricket)radioed that General Carey had reported at 1350 thathe was ashore and in radio contact with his prospec-tive operational commander, General Burns.* Aboutan hour before, the Annex and Alamo landing zonecontrollers had used the ABCCC to communicate theirstatus, the weather, enemy activity, and landing zoneconditions. Later in the operation, the controllerswould have to repeat this unusual procedure in orderto ensure that important data reached the com-manders. The ABCCC eventually relayed to the task

*General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., FMFPac commander during Oper-ation Frequent Wind, later remembered his concerns over the com-mand relationship in USSAG's theater of operations. According toGeneral Wilson, There was no clear passage of command ashore,therefore the naval chain of command continued to act as thoughthey were still in operational control. General Carey failed to offi-cially report ashore or chop' to General Burns and a Marine hasthe responsibility once he has established his command post ashoreto make a hard copy, reporting for operational control to his newcommander." Wilson Comments.

THE EVACUATION 193

Landing Zone 38 received some of the first CH-53s Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A150960

29 April. The accompanying picture is a view from Marine Corps Historical Collection

the Alamo of the same landing zone, taken whileTan Son Nhut Air Base burned in the background

force the following types of information: the arrivalof the security force, the number of evacuees extract-ed, the number remaining, and the status of theevacuation helicopters. Fortunately for all concerned,contact with the ABCCC remained satisfactorythroughout the operation, with two nets always func-tioning.38

Despite the additional communication workload,Cricket and the landing zone controllers still per-formed their functions and deftly controlled air oper-ations over South Vietnam. The ABCCC would pickup control of inbound aircraft as soon as they reachedlandfall, and then at checkpoint Keyhole, hand themoff to the Alamo and Annex controllers. They in turnwould direct the flight leaders to the first availablezone. If no sites were available, the helicopters wouldorbit near Keyhole, though instances of holding wererare during daylight hours. With nightfall approach-ing and the security force consolidating its position,that changed. As the pilots and controllers adjustedto the darkness and the shrinking number of landingzones, holding became routine, normally lasting nolonger than five minutes.

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194 THE BITTER END


BLT2/4 Marine sleeps on hangar deck of USS Okina-wa prior to the word to execute Operation FrequentW"ind JVell into the evacuation at 2205, control ofoperationa/phases at the DAO compound shifted toBLT 2/4 as the landing zone control teams departed

Both during the day and at night, upon initial ra-dio contact, the Alamo and Annex controllers wouldprovide the inbound pilots with the latest winds andlanding zone conditions including enemy fire and anyunusual activitity along their intended route of flight.Soon, even with the threat of deadly SAM missiles,darkness became the most important consideration,especially during the approach to the zone. The pi-lots could no longer see the landing area, and evenworse, they had no way to distinguish nearby obstruc-tions from the surrounding darkness.

Existing lighting in LZs 36 and 37 at the Alamo,augmented by automobile headlights and portablelighting equipment, was enough to at least keep thesetwo zones illuminated. For guidance into the zone thecontrollers initially used a strobe light, but its effec-tiveness was limited by the large number of fires andthe flashes of tracer rounds and antiaircraft fire nearthe DAO Compound. Worse, the strobe light poseda threat to some of the Marines on the ground. MajorDavid E. Cox and his team of controllers shared therooftop of a DAO building with the strobe light, fur-ther exposing a position already highly vulnerable to

attack. While the strobe flashed its welcoming bea-con to inbound pilots, it also sent an invitation tosnipers and enemy small arms. Consequently, the ra-dio soon replaced the strobe as the method for termi-nal guidance. As a means of identification, flightleaders would turn on their landing lights in a set se-quence of short flashes, to which Major Cox and thecontrollers would respond with radio-transmitted vec-tots to the landing zone. Major John F. Guilmartin,Jr., the senior Air Force pilot on the Midway, relatedhis impressions of this process: "Major Cox and hispeople were very cool and professional. Their landingprocedure worked like a champ."°

After arriving, and during the process of loading,the pilots would request clearance to depart. Unlesscrowded skies made it more judicious to hold on theground, the helicopters were immediately granted per-mission to takeoff. Once clear of the zone, the pilotswould switch to Cricket for vectors and the passing ofextraction totals to General Carey. The ABCCC relayedthe same totals to General Burns as well.* Each flightrepeated this cycle while Major Cox and his controllerswatched from their "box seats," atop the DAObuilding.

Throughout the period they controlled the air trafficat the compound, Major Cox and his team observedextensive enemy fire throughout Saigon including theartillery and rocket fire impacting at nearby Tan SonNhut. Numerous South Vietnamese pilots attempt-ed to escape by flying their aircraft off the Tan SonNhut runway for a one-way flight to either Thailandor the sea and the waiting American fleet. Adding tothe excitement of this spectacular show was the occa-sional round which would hit near the DAO Com-pound, but not close enough to damage thecompound's buildings.** Numerous blazes, so intense

*Major Guilmartin offered his recollections of this phase of theoperation: "This part of the system had broken down by dark andwe were not even bothering to pass totals on to 'Cricket.' I can testi-fy from personal observation that 'Cricket' had no evident commandof the tactical situation." Guilmartin Comments.

**Captain Wood recalled years later the consequences of the shell-ing of the DAO Compound: "When I returned to the DAO thatafternoon (29 April) with the last convoy, I discovered that my quart-ers (a trailer) had taken a direct hit and everything had burned.All I had left were the clothes on my back." Wood Comments. MajorGuilmartin noted: "When we began our initial descent into theDAO Compound at around 1530 hours local, our radar homingand warning device was indicating the presence of three SA-2 bat-teries to the north and northeast of Tan Son Nhut, all of them with-in range. In commenting on the hostile fire I would note that

I and my crew saw a fair amount of fire and returnedit Guilmartin Comments.

THE EVACUATION 195

that an hour's heavy rain did not diminish them, keptthe controllers alert and aware of the ever-presentdanger of the advancing NVA. At 2205, one minuteshy of seven hours after the first extraction helicopterhad arrived, the controllers received word that theirmission was complete.* At that point, they vacated therooftop and proceeded to the DAO theater for extrac-tion. Control of the remaining operation at the com-pound shifted to BLT 2I4.'

All during this operation and for the duration ofFrequent Wind, BLT 3/9 stood ready to back up BLT2/4, serving as the MAB and RLT 4 battalion in reserve.On board the USS Denver (LPD 9), LieutenantColonel Robert E. Loehe and his battalion were pre-pared for any contingency, even an amphibious land-ing on Vung Tau Peninsula. In addition to planningfor an amphibious assault on the beaches of Vung Tau,BLT 3/9 also provided two platoons for Sparrow Hawkmissions. Although not used or inserted ashore inSouth Vietnam, BLT 3/9's presence as a ready reserveprovided General Carey and his staff with the all im-portant reassurance that they had a guaranteed sourceof reinforcements.42

Another group of Marines who contributed, but didnot see direct action were the EA-6 pilots of MarineComposite Reconnaissance Squadron One (VMCJ-1).To provide electronic countermeasure capabilities, thecommanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel William A.'Art" Bloomer, temporarily assigned two aircraft andthree crews from the Midway to the Coral Sea forOperation Frequent Wind. Lieutenant ColonelBloomer stated: "I sent three pilots, two ECM opera-tors, and 14 support personnel to Coral Sea. From thetime the operation commenced on 29 April at about1500 hours until 0600 on the morning of 30 April thissmall group of Marines kept jamming radar signalsidentified with the Firecan radar that controlled the37mm air defense weapons of the NVA. Major MartyBrush [Major Martin C. Brush] led this small contin-gent to the Coral Sea . . . [and] . . . their round-the-

*General Smith, the Defense Attache, remembered: "1 depart-ed with my staff shortly after 2000 hours. I recall that there wereno evacuees subsequent to then." Smith Comments. At the otherend of his trip on Air Force helicopters, General Smith was wel-comed on board the Midway by Lieutenant Colonel William A."Art" Bloomer, commanding officer of VMCJ-1. Lieutenant ColonelBloomer related: "The Defense Attache in Saigon, Major GeneralHomer D. Smith, Jr., USA, and his last remaining staff officers,including Lieutenant Colonels Anthony Lukeman and WilliamMcKinstry, were evacuated by Air Force helicopters to Midway wheremyself and the Marines of VMCJ-l made them feel at home withthe few remaining amenities." Bloomer Comments.

clock effort flying from an unfamiliar carrier deck."Their support typified the unsung contributions of thethousands of American military men who togethermade the evacuation of the DAO Compound and theAmerican Embassy possible.3

The Embassy

Soon after BLT 2/4 arrived at the DAO Compound,the American Embassy notified General Carey thatover 2,000 people needed to be evacuated from theEmbassy. This came as a complete surprise since noone had planned for a major evacuation from this lo-cation. With a landing zone that could only accom-modate one CH-53 and a rooftop that would hold onlyone CH-46 on its landing pad, General Carey orderedan immediate adjustment in the helicopters' assignedpriorities. Cricket, the ABCCC, immediately starteddirecting helicopter traffic to either the compound orthe Embassy, depending on the helicopter's size andthe space available at the Embassy. Many of the Han-cock's 46s started launching approximately one hourbefore sunset to remove the ever growing crowd of Viet-namese refugees. This was to be the most demandingand time-consuming part of the entire operation.

To provide additional security and assistance to theMarines already guarding the Embassy, General Careyremoved three platoons (130 men) of BLT 2/4 fromthe DAO Compound and inserted them into the Em-bassy Compound between 1900 and 2100. These Ma-rines assisted the Embassy guards in controlling themultiplying Vietnamese crowd. First Lieutenant JohnJ. Martinoli, Jr., a forward air controller (FAC) from

This is an aerial view of the American Embassy in Sai-gon. The Embassy was never considereda primary heli-copter evacuation site because it had a rooftop zonewhich could handle nothing bigger than a CH-46.


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BLT 1/9, joined them with his landing zone controlteam, bringing the total Marine complement at theEmbassy to 171.

This team assisted in the landing and loading ofthe CH-46s, the first of which touched down in thezone at about 1700. Additionally, CH-53s began land-ing in the small and very confined Embassy parkinglot. Late that afternoon, Ambassador Martin hadauthorized the removal of a large tree which had beenobstructing helicopter access to that area of thecompound.*

*Opinions vary on the conduct at the Embassy on 29 April con-cerning preparations of the landing zone. General Smith offeredhis thoughts: "I wonder if the Ambassador was the authority forcutting down the Baobab tree in the Embassy courtyard. I believeit was otherwise and the tree was cut down in the morning or earlyafternoon and not necessarily by Marines." Smith Comments. Ad.miral Steele remembered it somewhat differently: Ambassador Mar.tin's unrealistic attitude towards the evacuation is exemplified inthe delay in his personal authorization to cut down the tree in theEmbassy compound that prevented helicopter access. Having failedto initiate the evacuation in a timely way so that the majority ofevacuees could be taken from Tan Son Nhut Airfield as the planenvisioned, the Ambassador still was not caking those actions largeand small necessary to facilitate matters. " The Seventh Fleet com-mander added that he "had been urgently recommending that theevacuation occur two days earlier than it did because of the approachof North Vietnamese forces, and on the 27th the forecast of badweather which could obstruct or prevent flight operations." SteeleComments.

The landing situation at the Embassy gradually de-teriorated as daylight receded. The groups of Viet-namese in and around the Embassy grew in size andaggressiveness as their chances for escape diminished.Restricted deck space to load passengers, small land-ing zones, hostile fire, poor communications, anddarkness did nothing to make the Marines' job anyeasier.46

Exactly the opposite situation existed at Tan SonNhut. With the evacuation at the DAO Compoundproceeding swiftly and flawlessly, General Carey decid-ed at about 1730 to extract the 3d Platoon, CompanyC of BLT 1/9. Inserted on 25 April to assist the Ma-rine Security Guard at the compound in maintainingsecurity and control, the 3d Platoon, led by First Lieu-tenant Bruce P. Thompson-Bowers, had borne thebrunt of the rocket and artillery fire directed at thecompound on the evening of the 28th and the earlymorning of the 29th.7 Yet despite the intensity of theattack Lieutenant Thompson-Bowers' platoon hadsuffered no casualties.

Mindful of the inherent dangers and the politicaland military implications of augmenting the Ameri-can security force with additional Marines, the MABhad sought higher approval. As a consequence, theJoint Chiefs of Staff, with the Ambassador's expressedagreement, authorized the insertion of a platoon of

196 THE BlUER END


Members of Company G, 2dBattalion, 4th Marines return from Saigon to USS Vancouveron 30 April. They had reinforced security at the Embassy during Operation Frequent W/ind

Marines. Its safe evacuation on the evening of 29 Aprilsuccessfully concluded the effort to bolster DAOsecurity.48

Shortly thereafter, General Carey directed that theremaining elements guarding the Annex be with-drawn (at 1930) to the Alamo where the last of theevacuees would await their flight. Once completed,the new defensive perimeter encompassed LZ 36 andthe Alamo. Less than an hour later, the Marines at theDAO loaded their last group of evacuees, bringing thetotal evacuated to 395 Americans and 4,475 Viet-namese and third-country nationals. LieutenantColonel Jim Bolton said it went so smoothly that hisonly concern was not enemy fire, but running intoanother helicopter.* He said, "I told all of my pilotsto turn on their lights to help avoid a mid-air colli-510fl."50

At 2250, with the evacuation of the landing con-trol teams from the Annex and Alamo completed,General Carey ordered the withdrawal of the groundsecurity forces from the DAO Compound. Just aftermidnight (0030) on 30 April, thermite grenades, hav-ing been previously placed in selected buildings, ig-nited as two CH-53s left the DAO parking lot. Thesehelicopters carried the last elements of BLT 2/4, in-cluding Captain McManus and Master Sergeant East,

*Major Guilmartin, the Air Force HH-53 pilot on Midway,recalled: "I saw numerous 53s' running blacked-out and in orderto be seen, I had my wingman, Captain Vernon Sheffield (the onlyother HH-53 helicopter commander involved in Frequent Wind),turn on, as I had, his top anti-collision lights while leaving the lowerlights off so as to avoid an SA-7 lock-on." Guilmarun Comments.

the EOD Marines.** Between the time of their depar-ture and the Marines' arrival on Okinawa (at 0046),enemy fire directed at the DAO buildings more thandoubled. The evacuation of personnel from the com-pound had lasted nine hours and involved over 50 Ma-rine Corps and Air Force helicopters.'

Prior to leaving the DAO, General Carey talked onthe phone with Ambassador Martin and learned that,for unknown reasons, the flow of helicopter traffic hadebbed. The general attempted, through various chan-nels, to ascertain the reason for what amounted to onlya trickle of helicopters arriving at the Embassy. Be-fore relinquishing command of the compound forcesto Colonel Gray, General Carey determined that if theflow of helicopters was reestablished, the evacuationcould be completed in a relatively short time. To in-sure security at the Embassy until the conclusion ofthe evacuation, General Carey decided to use platoonsfrom BLT 1/9 as ground security forces in reserve. Attimes, they were even sent aloft as heliteams with ord-ers to reinforce the ground security force at the Em-bassy, but each time, at the last possible moment, theyreceived word to return to the ship. (The last such in-cident occurred at 0530 on the 3Oth.)52

**These Marines along with Major Sabater and Captain Petryspent many of their last hours in the DAO compound burning someof the 13 million dollars that had arrived earlier that month. ColonelTaylor said, "The EOD duo with the Advance Command Elementalso destroyed three barrels of money at the DAO Compound." TaylorComments. Captain Wood recalled: "When I returned from Sai-gon with the last convoy around 1800, Major Sabater and CaptainPetry were burning money as fast as they could shovel it onto thefire." Wood Comments.

THE EVACUATION 197


Vietnamese board CH-53s in LZ 39, a parking lot. The 9th MAB extracted395 Americansand 4,475 Vietnamese and third-country nationals, evacuating the last shortly after 2000.

4.

198 THE BlUER END

With the Embassy's security high on his list of pri-orities and very much on his mind, General Careydeparted the compound at 2250, leaving Colonel Grayin command of the withdrawal of the ground securi-ty force. When he arrived on the Blue Ridge, havingmade an intermediate stop on the Midway, GeneralCarey wasted no time in attempting to discover whythe sortie rate had decreased. Admiral Whitmire (CTF76), out of concern for flight safety, had halted allflights to the Embassy. (The only flights arriving thereduring this period were ones which had been divert-ed from the DAO Compound for lack of passengers.)Pilots had been flying for over 12 hours, weather con-ditions had deteriorated, and lighting in the zone hadbecome either poor or nonexistent. To make mattersworse, there were reports that the Embassy was on fire.In fact, Embassy personnel were burning Americanmoney in a barrel next to the landing pad on top ofthe building. Additionally, navigation to Saigon hadbecome even more difficult as a line of thunderstormsstood astride the flight path, and upon arrival, the pi-lots would often have to use their instruments to land.Considering all these factors, the commander of TaskForce 76 thought a halt to flight operations was war-ranted, even though he had not consulted with Gener-al Carey.*sa

With the Cobra helicopters acting as pathfinders,the pilots had been able to navigate under adverse con-ditions with success. Knowing this, General Carey be-lieved that the flights could be continued safely.Captain Ritchie remembered the same thoughts, 'Wehad flown so many sorties over the same route alreadythat the weather was less a factor than finding a placeto land once we got to the Embassy."54

Learning that serious consideration was being givento discontinuing all flights until first light, GeneralCarey, a Marine aviator confident in the skills of hisfellow pilots, felt that Saigon would be in the handsof the North Vietnamese by dawn. He knew that hehad to press for immediate resumption of all helicop-ter flights to speed up the lift from the Embassy. He

*The post-operational JCS investigation, conducted to determinewhy L-Hour was postponed and why there was a two-hour gap inflight operations (from 0100 to 0300 Saigon time on 30 April), con-firmed that Admiral Whitmire made an independent decision tohalt flight operations. The report stated: "Following the extractionof the GSF from the DAO Compound at 1612Z [0012 Saigon time]all H-53 helicopters were directed by CTF 76 to return to base foraircraft servicing and crew rest. Although instructions were givento continue evacuation of the Embassy with CH-46s, CTF 76 decidedit was necessary to shut down for required maintenance checks whichtook the better part of an hour to complete." Cleland Report.

convincingly argued in favor of continuing flight oper-ations and when Admiral Whitmire agreed, hepromptly ordered the launch of Marine Corps CH-53sand additional CH-46s. In General Carey's words, "Iwas damned angry at his stopping my helos, and Imade this point in no uncertain terms. Had I not hadto return to the Blue Ridge it was my intention to goto the Embassy to straighten that mess out." The 9thMAB commander learned later that at approximatelythe same time he was having his discussion with Ad-miral Whitmire, Lieutenant General Louis H. Wilson,Jr., FMF Pacific commander, was addressing the sameproblem (halt in flight operations) in the CinCPaccommand center where he spent the evening of 28-29April (Hawaii time) with Admiral Gayler, CinCPac.55

The command center had a landline hookup withAdmiral Steele's immediate commander, AdmiralMaurice F. Weisner (CinCPacFlt), located down thestreet in Pearl Harbor, and radio communications withAdmiral Steele, the Seventh Fleet commander. It wasfrom Admiral Steele that General Wilson learned thatflight operations had been terminated for adminis-trative restrictions on the maximium number of flighthours allowed in one 24-hour period. General Wil-

Evacuees ride a Marine CH-53 to another shzj in theformation. Because of the tempo of operations andthe number of refugees, most of them had to be re-positionedfrom a tactical shzp to a non-tactical vessel.


THE EVACUATION 199


Last members of the ground security force arrive on board the Okinawa after midnighton 30 April. BLT2/4 Marines providedperimeter security at the DAO until the bitter end

son said, "I learned from the Seventh Fleet commanderthat the Marines had flown their maximum numberof hours and therefore he was stopping flight opera-tions." Upon receiving this word which essentiallymeant that the Marines in Saigon would not be reco-vered, at least until first light, General Wilson tookimmediate action. He informed Admirals Gayler andWeisner that he would prefer charges against anyofficer who ordered his Marine pilots to stop flyingso long as there were Marines still on the ground inSaigon. General Wilson recalled, "If General Careywas damn angry, I was out of my mind. I told Ad-miral Gayler and Admiral Weisner on the phone, thatthere was no such thing as Marines not evacuating Ma-rines. We do not understand that."56

The Air Force, also over their crew day (i.e. havingflown in excess of the 12 hours allowed in one day),did not resume the airlift. Their eight CH-53s andtwo HH-53s shut down after the final sortie from theDAO Compound and did not launch again. Theresumption of flight operations caught many of theMarine CH-53 pilots by surprise. As LieutenantColonel Bolton said, "I was on my way to my quarters

when I received word to standby for the possiblelaunch of my squadron's aircraft."

By 0215, one CH-46 and one CH-53 were landingat the Embassy every 10 minutes. The Embassy at thispoint indicated that 19 more lifts would complete theevacuation.* As this number approached, GeneralCarey notified Captain Gerald L. "Gerry" Berry, aHMM-165 pilot, that his CH-46 would extract Am-bassador Martin. His instructions included the orderto remain atop the Embassy building as long as neces-sary to load him. At 0458 on 30 April 1975 CaptainBerry, in "Lady Ace 09," departed the Embassy helipad,

*Admiral Steele offered his recollections of the nearly endless sup-ply of evacuees at the Embassy: 'One thing not generally knownis that Ambassador Martin was attempting to get large numbersof Vietnamese evacuated from the Embassy. It appeared to be abottomless pit, and as our men and machines began to tire I be-gan pressuring the Embassy to get all Americans and the Ambas-sador out. I did not want him captured. The number three manin the Embassy arrived on board the Blue Ridge and reported theAmbassador to be ill and exhausted. Through loyalty to our Viet-namese colleagues, he was going to keep that evacuation going in-definitely, and in my opinion, force it to keep going by not comingout himself." Steele Comments.

200 THE BITTER END

and Ambassador Martin bid farewell to South Viet-nam. The American Embassy had officially closed itsdoors. Unofficially, a handful of American Marines stillremained at the Embassy, waiting for their ride to free-dom 58

Actually, the Ambassador's departure reflected morethan the completion of the 19 lifts predicted neces-sary to finish the evacuation. It represented the resultsof a presidential order to Ambassador Martin, passedvia a Marine CH-53 flown by Captain Jon M. Walters.At 0327, President Ford ordered that no more than19 additional lifts would be flown and that Ambas-sador Martin would be on the last one. At 0430,General Carey received word that the 19-lift limit hadbeen exceeded and he immediately relayed to his air-craft commanders, via the ABCCC, the order to ex-tract all remaining Americans, and directed the Marinesecurity force to take up positions on the rooftop,awaiting evacuation.59

After Berry's helicopter departed, the only thingthat remained was to extract the Marines still guard-ing the Embassy. Major James H. Kean, the Officer-in-Charge of the Marine Security Guard, had with hima small contingent of Embassy and 9th MAB Marines.Within the next hour this force shrank to 11 Marines.

Upon Ambassador Martin's departure, Major Keanmoved his Marines inside the embassy, barricaded thedoors, and then moved up through the building un-til they occupied only the top floor. From this loca-tion, he had easy access to the helo landing pad.

Dodging small arms fire and using riot control agentsagainst people attempting to force their way to therooftop, he and his 10 Marines boarded "Swift 2-2,"a HMM-164 CH-46, the last American helicopter toleave South Vietnam. Checking his watch, Major Keannoted that it was seven minutes until eight, only 23hours since the NCOIC of Marine Security Guard,Manila, had called him to relay a message from hiswife in Hong Kong that she was pregnant. Only 32minutes later on that unforgettable day, 30 April 1975,the 11 Marines exited "Swift 2-2" onto the deck of theOkinawa where Gunnery Sergeant Russell R. Thur-man captured their weary faces on camera. Disembark-ing, many on board the Okinawa, Gunnery SergeantThurman included, wondered why so much time hadelapsed between the arrival of the Ambassador's flightand Swift 2-2, well over two hours. Had someone for-gotten these Marines were still at the Embassy? Theanswer is no. The intention was to remove the Am-bassador while some security still remained at the Em-bassy, and then have other helicopters pick up theremaining Marines, but it appears that when CaptainBerry's aircraft transmitted "Tiger is out," thosehelicopters still flying, including Captain Walters whowas orbiting the Embassy at the time the Ambassadorleft, thought the mission was complete. This particu-lar transmission had been the preplanned code to in-dicate when the Ambassador was on board a helicopteroutbound to the task force. Having waited so long forhis departure, this transmission caused some to con-clude that he had departed as part of the last group

A CH-53 departs LZ 39 after depositing its security force. After the withdrawal of thelast ground forces at 0030, 30 April, flight operations ceased for nearly two hours.


piTh

I

THE EVACUATION 201

to leave the Embassy. Captain Berry later explainedthat radio message: " Tiger—Tiger—Tiger' was the callto be made when the Ambassador was on board andon his way out of Saigon. It had absolutely nothingto do with the cessation of the operation. We hadoriginally planned to bring the Ambassador out onthe afternoon of the 29th."60

At this juncture, thinking the mission complete andthe Ambassador safe, Captain Walters headed backto the Okinawa. Subsequent to his landing at approx-imately 0700, the command realized that CaptainWalters did not have the remaining Marines on board.*Due to a misunderstanding and miscommunication,they were still at the Embassy. General Carey immedi-ately recycled a CH-46, but by this time due to theships' offshore movement, the time required to reachthe Embassy exceeded 40 minutes.61

To the Marines waiting in Saigon, attempts by theSouth Vietnamese to reach the roof kept them busyand as a consequence, they did not notice the extend-ed gap between the flights. Major Kean later statedthat he and his Marines did not become alarmed be-cause they knew that another CH-46 would arrive: "Wenever had a doubt that our fellow Marines wouldreturn and pick us up. They had been doing it allnight long."62

For the immense size and complexity of this opera-tion, there were few mistakes. Besides the nearly 5,000people evacuated from the DAO compound, 978 U.S.and 1,120 third-country nationals were lifted from theEmbassy.63 Despite numerous phone calls and exten-sive efforts to ensure that all Americans, even deceasedones, were extracted, the bodies of Corporal McMa-hon and Lance Corporal Judge were left behind. In-explicably, they had been left at the Seventh DayAdventist Hospital, nearby Tan Son Nhut. (In phonecalls to the hospital on the afternoon of 29 April, thefew remaining members of its staff reported that thedeceased Marines' bodies had already been delivered

*Captain Berry recalled the incident somewhat differently. Hestated, "When Lady Ace 09 brought the Ambassador out there wereonly two CH-46s still flying (Lady Ace 09 and wingman). This wasbecause there was much confusion over flight time. When I land-ed on board the Blue Ridge and informed General Carey of thelack of aircraft he took immediate action with HDC on board theOkznawa—Lady Ace 09 and flight then returned to the Embassyand extracted most of the remaining Marines—as we were depart-ing Swift 2-2 was approaching the Embassy for the final pick-up.The reason for the long delay between the Ambassador and theMarine pick-up is easy to figure out—only two aircraft flying fromthe 28 CH-46s and 30 plus CH-53s (CH-53s could not land on theroof.)" Berry Comments.

to the task force. Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Mas-sachusetts through diplomatic channels recoveredthem the following year.)64 In addition, the MarineCorps suffered the loss of two aircraft. One of the twowas an AH-1J Cobra, whose pilots, Captain John W.Bowman, Jr., and First Lieutenant David L. An-droskaut, successfully made a night water ditching af-ter the Cobra's engines flamed out from fuelstarvation. Shortly after overflying the USS Kirk (DE1087) while in search of the Okinawa, Captain Bow-man noted that his altimeter read 900 feet and hisfuel gauge 200 pounds. In the next instant, he foundhimself groping with an emergency autorotation toa dark, empty sea. Many agonizing moments after im-pact, Captain Bowman finally managed to unfastenhis seat belt on the third attempt while his sinkinghelicopter filled with water. He recalled, "As I exitedthe helicopter in the dark, I had no idea which waywas up, but I remembered that the helicopter mustbe sinking toward the bottom, so I swam in the op-posite direction and just when I was about to doubtmy decision, a sliver of moonlight bounced off thedangling legs of my co-pilot, suspended just above myhead."65 Soon after Bowman and his copilot linked up,a boat, launched from the Kirk after its officer of theday heard the helicopter's engines quit, picked themup.

The other aircraft's pilots were not as fortunate. ACH-46F from the Hancock flown by Captain WilliamC. Nystul and First Lieutenant MichaelJ. Shea crashedinto the sea on its approach to the ship after havingflown a long and exhausting night sea and air rescuemission (SAR). Amazingly, the two enlisted crewmem-bers survived, but the bodies of the pilots were notrecovered. The cause of the crash was never deter-mined, but crew inexperience and unfamiliarity withthe mission may have been factors.** Normally, shipscarrying helicopters do not use a SAR helicopter. In-stead they assume that all airborne helicopters arepotential SAR aircraft during helicopter flight opera-tions. The Hancock, accustomed to fixed-wing flightoperations where an airborne SAR helicopter is man-datory, did not modify its procedures. However for anoperation of this size, a designated rescue helicopterprovided the task force with the capability of respond-

**Captain Berry recently related the flying backgrounds of thiscrew. He said, "Captain Nystul had just returned from Pensacolafixed-wing instructor duty and had about 20 hours of refamiliari-zation in the '46.' His co-pilot was First Lieutenant Shea, a CH-53pilot, who had gotten approximately 25 CH-46 hours with us inFutema before deploying." Berry Comments.

202 THE BITFER END

Photos courtesy of Capt Russell R. Thurman, USMC (Ret)

Five of the last 11 Marines to leave South Vietnam ar-rive on board the USS Okinawa prior to 0830 on 30April. Seen exiting the helicopter are Sgt TerryJ. Ben-nington followed by Cpl Stephen Q. Bauer (above);Sgt Phil:], A. Babel (above right); and SSgt MichaelK. Sullivan and Sgt Steven T Schuller (at right).

ing instantly to any airborne emergency and thus ex-tended its options.66

Despite these losses, Operation Frequent Wind ac-complished its purpose, the safe evacuation of Ameri-can, Vietnamese, and third-country citizens fromSouth Vietnam. It stands as the largest helicopterevacuation in history*. For the Marine Corps it meant1,054 flight hours and 682 sorties, 34 of which be-

*Major General Norman W. Gourley, commanding general ofthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, later recounted his assessment of theoperation. "I spent 36 years in the Marine Corps; fought \W'' IIin Corsairs; the Korean War as a night fighter pilot flying F-7Fs andF-3Ds; and the Vietnam War flying F-4 Phantoms. I have seen andheard of combat air operations which required all the talent, guts,and nerve available. Never in the annals of flying, and I am in-cluding all U.S. combat air operations of any war, have a group ofpilots performed so magnificently as the helicopter pilots who ex-tracted those folks out of Saigon in late April, 1975. The term 'dis-tinguished flying' fits each and every one. These young helicoptertigers did it all—long hours in the cockpit, night operations, terri-ble visibility and weather, being shot at—the bottom line being'mission completed,' they did their job. It is indeed unfortunatethat more recognition was not forthcoming to this group of Ma-rine aviators." Gourley Comments. Colonel Edward Pelosky, USA,a member of the DAO staff evacuated to the Vancouver, offeredhis appraisal of the operation: 'My hat is off to those individualplanners and participants who got us out of Saigon. It was a deliber-ate exercise pulled off with precision, confidence, and the great skillof the aviators—a textbook version." Pelosky Comments.

longed to Captain Gerry Berry. He logged the mosthours, 183, in a 20 hour period, which reflected theoperation's intensity and complexity. For its effort,HMH-463 received the Marine Corps Aviation Associ-ation's (MCAA) General Keith B. McCutcheon Awardas the 1975 Helicopter Squadron of the Year. In ad-dition, the MCAA chose Lieutenant Colonel James L.Bolton (HMH-462's commanding officer) as the 1975Aviator of the Year and recipient of the Alfred A. Cun-ningham Award. Captain John B. Heffernan, one ofBolton's pilots, recently recalled his thoughts at theconclusion of the operation: "I will never forget oneminute of this incredible flying experience. I was luckyto be here." Surely, the 1,373 Americans and 5,595non-American evacuees agreed that they too werelucky to be there, on American ships.67

THE EVACUATION 203


Two Marine pilots were rescued from the sea at night after their Cobra crashed CaptJohn W' Bowman, Jr., right, piloted the AH-1J, and lstLt DavidL. Androskaut was co-pilot.

CHAPTER 12

Refugee OperationsA Link to Freedom.' The Exodus and a New Beginning — JVay Stations — Preparations: 1st Battalion,

4th Marines and the Task Force — Evacuation and Passage: Frequent W"ind and the AESF's Final ChapterA Vietnamese City in Guam —The Final Link: Camp Pendleton

"Operation New Arrivals will commence Phasedownincrementally when directed about 15 September (75).As presently planned, refugees at Camp Pendleton,California will be reduced to approximately 6800 onor about 30 September 1975." With those wordsBrigadier General Paul G. Graham published his finalorder in the final chapter of the Marine Corps' officialinvolvement in the South Vietnamese refugee opera-tion. He concluded this assignment by submitting anafter action report to the Commandant of the MarineCorps in November 1975. It marked the completion ofmore than six months of refugee operations for theMarine Corps which began in March with Staff Ser-geant Walter W. Sparks and his detachment assistingevacuees in Da Nang Harbor. Those 200 days con-sumed the lion's share of the daily lives of the Ma-rines participating in the rescue and resettlement ofVietnamese refugees.

Sandwiched between the initial security force (theAmphibious Evacuation RVN Support Group) andGeneral Graham's Refugee Receiving Center were theefforts of the Marine Security Guard Detachments inSouth Vietnam; the Amphibious Evacuation SecurityForce; 1st Battalion, 4th Marines; Marine BarracksGuam; MCAS El Toro; and Marines from various com-mands, primarily units located on the West Coast.Highly publicized, very visible, and extremely sensi-tive, this undertaking represented an event as com-plex, complicated, and expensive as a major battle,and in essence had many of the trappings of warfare.To say it was disruptive and changed America beliesthe magnitude of the event. The refugee story, espe-cially the story of their resettlement, is the VietnamWar's living legacy. In effect, it symbolized the Ma-rine Corps' final Vietnam battle; the bitter end to abitter struggle, but as in the case of a bitter end ofa rope, that same end can also be a beginning, a rescueline, and a link to freedom.

A Link to Freedom: The Exodus anda New Beginning

Admiral Steele's Seventh Fleet, including AdmiralWhitmire's Task Force 76 and General Carey's 9thMAB, extracted more than 7,000 fleeing South Viet-namese, providing them a new beginning. In addi-

204

tion, Colonel Frank G. McLenon's Provisional MarineAircraft Group 39's helicopters removed 395 U.S.citizens and 4,475 refugees from the DAO compoundand 978 Americans and 1,120 evacuees from theAmerican Embassy.* These numbers did not includethe American security force or Embassy Marines. Us-ing 34 CH-53s, 29 CH-46s, 8 AH-lJs, and 6 UH-lEs,the ProvMAG flew 682 sorties (360 at night) and 560hours [CH-53, 314; CH-46, 206; AH-1J, 34; UH-1E, 6],while the 10 Military Sealift Command ships con-tinued, along with some 45 Navy ships, to pick uprefugees escaping from Vietnam in everything fromhelicopters to sampans. The count for this four-dayperiod put the total at over 40,000 evacuated with afinal estimate for the month of April of approximately130,000.2

In applauding the success of this mission, theCommander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Noel Gayler,said, "This was a tough one. The job was uncertain,unprecedented, dangerous beyond measure. It de-manded the last ounce of endurance and fortitude andsavvy, and you gave it that and more . . . The rescuewas a tremendous and joint enterprise, under the mostdifficult conditions. Performance of all hands superb.Well Done."3

A successful rescue does not always mean a happyending. Those rescued on 30 April and the thousandsof others who left South Vietnam during April had tofirst reach safe haven before they could even thinkabout freedom. The first link in this chain to freedom,the rescue, had to be joined to the next link, passage.For the majority of the Vietnamese evacuees, who had

*Evacuation numbers vary somewhat from those depicted by the9th MAB Command Chronology. ProvMAG-39 reported: "1.ater inthe day evacuation began at the U.S. Embassy. An estimated 1150American citizens and over 6,000 Vietnamese and Third CountryNationals were evacuated." ProvMAG-39 ComdC. The)CS investi-gation of Operation Frequent Wind stated: 'At approximately 1700,the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy began. During the period 18CH-53 and 54 CH-46 sorties evacuated 2379 passengers of which978 were U.S. citizens, 1228 were foreign nationals and 173 USMCpersonnel." In addition it provided slightly different figures for theDAO: "A total of 122 sorties were flown during the evacuation ofthe DAO with 6416 passengers lifted from that location. This totalincludes 395 U.S. citizens, 5205 foreign nationals, and 816 GSF per-sonnel." Cleland Report.

been at sea for several days, survival had become theirsole concern. Water, sustenance, and survival were lesspressing matters for the South Vietnamese citizensevacuated by helicopter, but they represented only 10percent of the 26-30 April refugee flotilla, later called'boat people." To them the ships of Task Force 76represented a haven of hope and safety, and above allelse a ticket to freedom. For those Vietnamese who hadbeen evacuated earlier in April and by 30 April werealready in Guam or the Philippines the means of ex-odus may have been different, but the results wouldbe the same; most South Vietnamese evacuees' finalstop would be a processing center stateside awaitingsponsorship by an American family or organization.

Many of the "boat people" as well as all of the refu-gees in the 29-30 April air evacuation ended their in-itial journey from South Vietnam on an Americannaval vessel. In order to place these refugees with thoseforces best prepared to handle them, the Navy trans-ferred the majority of them to MSC ships. Purposelykept empty just prior to the beginning of FrequentWind, these ships stood ready to receive the maximumnumber of evacuees. In fact, a post operation sum-

mary of MSC shipping revealed that just prior to thestart of the major evacuation of Saigon, eight of the12 MSC ships were empty while waiting with TaskForce 76 ships in international waters off the coast ofSouth Vietnam. The only other empty ship, the GreenForest, awaited its human cargo while at anchor offCon Son Island. On the evening of 30 April, thedeluge began. Thousands of desperate South Viet-namese engulfed the MSC ships. To the AmphibiousEvacuation Security Force Marines guarding theseships, the waves of approaching refugees meant thewaiting was over. Their job had begun.

On 30 April, Major Quinlan, the AmphibiousEvacuation Security Force commander, would reportthe following distribution of forces: Detachment Fox-trot and Captain Richard R. Page on the USNS Green-ville Victory; Detachment India and Captain Cyril V.Moyher on Pioneer Commander, Detachment Novem-ber and Captain Michael T. Mallick on the SS Ameri-can Challenger, Detachment Papa and CaptainRichard M. Jessie, Jr., on the SS Green Port; Detach-ment Sierra and Captain Edward R. Palmquist, Jr., onthe USNS Sergeant Andrew Miller, Detachment Tango

REFUGEE OPERATIONS 205

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 7717775

Capt Robert D. Amos, Jr., commander of Detachment Tango (HqBn, 3dMarDiv), AESF,offers assistance to a Vietnamese Navy dependent as she boards the SS Green Forest.

—-

A

—, 44

—,,

'4.

206 THE BITFER END

and Captain Robert D. Amos, Jr., on the Green Forest;Detachment Victor and Captain David A. Garcia onthe Pioneer Contender; and Detachment Echo andCaptain Richard L. Reuter on the USNS Sergeant Tru-man Kimbro (she already had 150 Vietnamese onboard, delivered by a Navy ship on the 29th).4 With-in 24 hours, these largely empty ships would be en-route to Subic Bay with 39,824 refugees embarked.Within the next few days, the SS Transcolorado andthe American Racer began embarking refugees. Ini-tially without Marines, each ship, upon arrival in Su-bic, received a complement of security forces.Detachment Hotel and Captain William H. Hackett,Jr., transferred from the Dubuque on 4 May to theTranscolorado, and the next day, Detachment Mikeand First Lieutenant Carl W. Fredericksen left the Du-buque and embarked in the American Racer. Anothership involved in the care and especially the feedingof the evacuees was the SS Green Wve, a cargo ship.At 0800 on 5 May, Detachment Uniform and Cap-tain Steven A. Shepherd joined the Green Wave. Onceloaded to capacity with refugees and with its Marines

fully prepared for their security role, these three ships(Transcolorado, American Racer, and Green Wave) leftSubic, bound for Guam.

One of the reasons for such a quick transfer of refu-gees and Marines in Subic was due to Filipino sensi-tivity and the arrival of a flotilla of Vietnamese Navyvessels fully loaded with thousands of refugees. Literal-ly, there was no more room in Subic for them, anddiplomatically, the Philippines Government had nomore time for unprocessed aliens. During the periodfrom 21-28 April, the United States had evacuated byairplane 42,910 people. Although the 170 Air ForceC-130 and 134 C-141 sorties took some of these refu-gees to Guam, the majority landed and disembarkedat Clark Air Force Base. The numbers of undocument-ed and therefore illegal immigrants so alarmed Presi-dent Ferdinand Marcos (the U.S. had promised himthat all transiting South Vietnamese would have pass-ports and required documentation) that the Philip-pines Government informed the American Embassyin Manila that refugees could not remain in the Philip-pines any longer than 72 hours and that no armed

Capt EdwardR. Palm quist, fr, commander of Detachment Sierra, shouts to his men on theUSNS Sergeant Andrew Miller. Within 24 hours MSC shzjt's loaded nearly 40,000 refugees.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 7714875

the evacuation 187 - marines.mil. marines in... · space, control and safety became...

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