the evolution of india's policy towards bangladesh in 1971

8/3/2019 The Evolution of India's Policy Towards Bangladesh in 1971

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The Evolution of India's Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971Author(s): Satish KumarReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 6 (Jun., 1975), pp. 488-498Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643261 .Accessed: 26/11/2011 07:21

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THE EVOLUTION OFINDIA'S POLICY TOWARDSBANGLADESH IN 1971Satish KumarTHE CRISIS THAT overtook South Asia in 1971 has oc-casioneda floodof literaturen the nherentontradictionsn Pakistan'sstructurendthevariousfactorshat ed totheeventual ecession f EastPakistan.ThatIndia was one oftheprimefactorsn the successfulmer-genceofBangladesh s an independenttate s notdisputed.What s notvery learly stablished,owever,s howfarback India's policywithre-

spect othe mergencefBangladeshs a separate tate anbe traced. omePakistanis ave maintainedhat ndiahad beenworkingowards hisgoalsince1947, n collusionwith nti-Pakistanlementsn East Pakistan.Thiswas,fornstance,hebasisfor heAgartalaConspiracy ase against heikhMujiburRahmanmanufacturedy PresidentAyubKhan of Pakistan n1968,whichwasmeant oserve hedoublepurpose fridiculing ationalistand democraticlementsn East Pakistan nd instigatingheEast Paki-stanis gainst ndia.Another iewwould iketo have t believed hatndiahas alwaysbeenneutral o Pakistan's nternal ontradictions,nd became nvolved n thecrisisonlywhen enmillion efugees looded nto ndia in thewakeof thePakistan rmy's epressionn East Pakistan.The truth eems o lie some-wherenbetween,or twouldbe givingessthandue credit o ndia if tissuggestedhat t wascompletelyblivious o tsnational nterests affectedbydevelopmentsn theneighborhood.imilarly,here s little ubstantiveevidence o indicate hat ndia consistentlyorked or Pakistan'sdisinte-gration ince1947. This articlewillbe concernedwith xaminingndia'sattitude owardsheEastPakistan uestion, articularlyhephasesthroughwhich ndia's policy towards heemergence f Bangladeshpassed afterMarch25, 1971.The existence f dissatisfactionnd dissidencen East Pakistanonaccount fthediscriminatoryndrepressive oliciesof thewestwinewasnot oston India.The student emonstrationsn Dacca in 1948 and 1952against he mpositionf Urduas thenational anguage erved s reaffirma-tionof India's belief n thefallacyof the"two-nation"heory. evelop-

488


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SATISH KUMAR 489mentsikethis lwaysgave a vicarious atisfactiono India and whettedhedesireofsome elementsn India to contributeo thesharpeningfPaki-stan'snternalontradictions.uch sentimentsccasionallyound xpressionin the Governmentf India's publicity.Officialmedia not infrequentlywould uccumb othe emptationfprojectingheessential ulturalffinitybetween eople of EastBengaland WestBengal, mphasizingheconflictof interests etween ast Pakistan nd West Pakistan.This could be re-garded s a manifestationfan Indianattitudenregard othe ecessionistpotentialitiesfEast Pakistan, venthought was a rather nstinctivendunconscious ttitude,nd is notnecessarilyvidence fan active ecession-ist policy. ndia had strongnhibitionsn followingucha policy,partlybecausethiswent gainst ndia's declaredpolicyofnoninterferencen theinternalffairsf other ountries, nd partly ecauseof extremelynade-quate resources orpursuingucha policy.However, hequestionwhetherndia shouldpursue n activeseces-sionist olicy owards astPakistanwas debated rom ime otime, artic-ularlywhenPakistan's olitical ystemwasunder evere trains. ne suchoccasionwas March 1969whenPresident yubKhanhad toresignn re-sponse oa massagitationgainsthim.On an occasion ikethis, ndia wasnaturallyeizedwith he problem f formulatingtsresponse.t is, there-fore, robable hat omesensitive overnmentepartmentsoncernedwithprocessingnd analyzingtrategicnformationxamined heextent fin-ternal ecay nPakistan's olitical ystemnd the ikely hape of things ocome.Obviously,uch nexamination ould nclude n analysis fwhetherEast Pakistan's iscontentasstrongnough o carrywithintself hegermsof secession, nd whethert was desirableor evenfeasibleforIndia tolend helping andto secessionist orces. nequallyrelevantubjectwouldhave been whetherrnotan independentast Pakistanwouldbe a viablestate.But udgingbyNewDelhi'sreactions o thevariousmeasures nder-takenbyPresident ahya Khan to erect democratic olitical ystem,tcan be safelynferred hat ndia did notpursue ts analysisofthe seces-sionistpotentialitiesf East Pakistanbeyondan examination tage. Infact, herewas ncreasingvidence fhope ngovernmentalnd intellectualcircles hatEast Pakistan ouldbe integratednto hepolitical tructurefPakistan ffree nd fairelectionswereheldbyYahya Khan. No one inIndia expected hatthe AwamiLeague headedby SheikhMujibur wouldget uchan overwhelming ajority fseats as it did in boththeNationalAssemblyf Pakistan nd theProvincialAssemblyfEast Pakistan.Whatwas regarded s fairlyertain, owever, as that heAwamiLeague wouldget comfortable ajorityn theProvincialAssembly,nd enough eats nthe NationalAssembly o form government iththe support f like-minded artiesuchas theNationalAwamiParty t thecenter.This hopewas strengthenedfter heelection esults ame out. TheAwamiLeaguesecured 88 of 300 general eats n theProvincialAssemblyand 160 of 300 general eats n theNationalAssembly.herewas, thus,nofurtherustificationorgiving nyseriousthoughto supporting seces-sionist olicy n East Pakistan. ndia watched hePakistani ituationwith


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490 INDIA'S BANGLADESHPOLICYa mixturefhopeandsuspicion. hehopewasthat heikhMujiburwouldbe allowed to becomethePrime Minister f Pakistan and wouldbringabout basic changen Pakistan's ttitude owards ndia. India's optimismon thiswas strengthenedy YahyaKhan's statementn Dacca on January14, 1971 thatMujiburRahmanwasgoingto be the future rimeMinisterof thecountry. ut thishope was always accompanied y thesuspicionthatWest Pakistanivested nterests ould not allowMujiburto becomethePrimeMinister. herewas also the fear that n this event nyresis-tance n East Pakistanwould be crushedby Yahya Khan leadingto thereestablishmentfmilitary ontrol.India for thefirst imeaccepted henecessity f having an activepolicywith espect o East Pakistanonly fterMarch25, 1971,whenthespontaneousesistance fthepeople of East Pakistan o therepression ythePakistani rmy adlastedfor t leasta week.As itturned ut, he firstphase ofresistance fthepeopleof East Pakistan ed bythe East BengalRegimentnd theEast PakistanArmedPolicecontinued p to theend ofApril.Fromhereonwards, he shaping f India'sresponse o the develop-ing situationn East Pakistanwent hrough arious tages.The firsttag-ewas markedby a general ense of solidarity n thepartof thepeopleofIndia with hevictims f the Pakistani rmy'sbru-talities, nd a vague realization y India that t had a long term ndfundamentaldentityf interests iththepeople of East Pakistan.Thissenseofsolidaritynd identityf nterestsound xpressionn the ndianParliament'snanimous esolution f March31, 1971 inwhich heParlia-ment ssured hepeopleofEast Pakistan hat heir trugglend sacrificeswouldreceive thewholeheartedympathynd support f thepeopleofIndia."' Therewas,however,onsiderable ishfulhinkingn the part ofIndia,reflectednexaggeratedtoriesnthe ndianpress boutthe chieve-ments f the"freedomighters"n East Pakistan.The next tage n theshapingof India's response asted fromApriltoJune 971.During hisperiod, ndia became ncreasinglywareoftheeconomic nd political mplicationsf the flood of refugees ouring nfrom ast Pakistan. he inflowfrefugees eached 00,000by themiddleofApril, nd assumed heproportionf60,000 perday bythebeginningofJune.While thegovernmentas grapplingwiththe refugeeproblem,somesortofcontingencylanningwas presumablytarted y the govern-ment uring hisperiod o meet situation fsustained onfrontatione-tweenhepeople fEastPakistan ndthePakistani rmy,with ts nevitablerepercussionsn India. At thebeginning f June, herefore,he attitudeoftheGovernmentf ndiabased onan assessmentfthe ocial,economic,political, nd securitymplicationsf a continuingnflux f refugees anbe described s follows:

(1) Pakistanhould e persuadedo behave nsuch way hat hemigra-tion frefugeesrom astPakistantopped;'Bangladesh Documents Volume , New Delhi: Ministry f External Affairs, 971,p. 672.


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SATISH KUMAR 491(2) conditionshouldbe created nEast Pakistanso thatrefugeeswhohadalreadycrossed nto ndia felt ecureenough o return o theirhomes;and(3) the refugeeswho had come to India shouldnot be regardedas thepermanent esponsibilityf India. As long as theywere n India, theresponsibilityortheirmaintenance houldbe sharedby the interna-tionalcommunity.The Foreign Minister of India undertooka tour of six foreigncoun-triesfromJune6-22 in an attempt o apprise the world of the prevailingsituation n East Pakistan and India's attitude hereto long the lines men-tioned above. The places visited by the Foreign Minister were Moscow,Bonn, Paris, Ottawa, New York, Washington,D.C., and London. Whilethis visit gave India an opportunity o explain its viewpoint and assessthe reactionof important oreignpowers, t also enabled India to crystallizeits attitudea littlemore precisely n the light of the viewpointsof variouscountries.The Foreign Ministerenunciated India's position at the end ofhis visit in thecourse of a statementmade in the Parliamenton June25,1971. India's position, as stated on this occasion, can be summed up asfollows. First, there could be no military solution to the East Pakistanproblem,and all militaryaction must immediately top. Second, the flowof refugees nto India fromEast Pakistan must immediatelystop. Third,conditionsmustbe created in East Pakistan enabling the refugees o returnto theirhomes in peace and security.Fourth,a political solution acceptableto the East Pakistanis was the onlyway of ensuringa return o normalcy.Finally,the presentsituationwas grave, and fraughtwithserious dangersfor the peace and securityof the region.It may be noted at this timeIndia was primarilyconcerned withthegrave implicationsof themassive inflowof refugeeson peace and securityin the region. So far, the thoughtthat India mighthave to defend itself

militarily gainsta Pakistani attack had notoccurredto India. The primaryquestion was how to stop military action, and find a political solution totheproblemso thatrefugeescould go home and East Pakistan could con-tinue to live happily as an integral part of Pakistan. The emergence ofBangladesh as a separate state as a consequence of the strugglegoing onat that timehad not yet been perceived as a serious possibility in India.This was to be the result of certain other developments n India's inter-national environmentwhich made India consider this possibility also.These developmentsand their effect on the shaping of India's re-sponse to the East Pakistan situation can be traced as follows.The first nchronologicalorder was the news whichoriginated n Washingtonon June22 that two Pakistani ships had left the U.S. with American arms andmilitaryequipmentfor Pakistan. Even thoughthe news was categoricallydenied by a spokesman of the U.S. Government, t seriously disturbedIndia's policy makers who thought t to be a deliberateeffort o influencethe South Asian situationin favorof Pakistan.

9Ibid., .697.


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492 INDIA'S BANGLADESHPOLICYThe nextimportant evelopment as PresidentYahya Khan's an.nouncementfhisconstitutionallanonJune 8. Under hisplan,YahyaKhan announced hata large number f East Pakistani egislatorswho

weremembersftheProvincialAssemblynd the NationalAssembly utwho had participatedn "anti-state"ctivitieswould be disqualified rommembershipn therespective ssemblies,nd thatby-electionsor theirseatswouldhe held.He also stated hat he onstitution-makingaskwouldno longer e left o the NationalAssembly ut wouldbe performedy agroupof experts.Meanwhile heLegal Framework rder, 1970, underwhich hegeneral lectionswereheld wouldbe duly amended, nd thenational ndprovincial overnmentsould ontinueo operate nderMar-tialLaw for n additional eriodoftime.Yahya's constitutionallan predictablyvoked a strong eaction nEast Pakistan.On July and7, over300 elected epresentativesrom astPakistan,ncludingmembers fthenational ndprovincialssemblies,metsomewheren East Pakistan nd reaffirmedheirdeterminationo carryon the iberationtruggle. heyruledout any political ompromise iththe PakistanGovernment,nd decidedto activizethe guerrilla truggleagainst hePakistaniArmy. heyalso appealedto the UN Secretary en-eralto make effortso stopthe"genocide" n East Pakistan nd seek therelease fSheikhMujibur.This decision f therepresentativesfthe peo-ple of East Pakistannot to compromise ith hePakistanGovernmentuttocarry orwardhe iberation truggle ad an inevitablempact n theat-titude ftheGovernmentf India.The other ignificantevelopment hich ookplace in the firstweekofJulywasthevisit o ndia of HenryKissinger, ational ecurity dviserto President ixon.Dr. Kissingerwas in New Delhi on July and laterwent oRawalpindi nd from here o Peking.Kissinger'sNew Delhi visitbecame heoccasionfor rather ensedialoguebetween he U.S. and India

on thequestionof thesupplyof arms to Pakistan.However,what entparticular ignificanceo Kissinger'svisit to the sub-continentas thatduringhisvisithe made a secret ash fromRawalpindi o Peking o com-mence heprocess f detente etween he U.S. and China. This was, ofcourse, crucial ndunexpected evelopmentn internationalolitics, ndonethatwas likely o have serious epercussionsn thepolitics f the ub-continent.t thereforeecame necessary or ndia to assess the emergingsituation or tself. considered tatementn this ubjectwas made by theForeignMinisternParliament n July 0 in thecourseof his reply o thedebateon budgetdemands. oreignMinister ardar Swaran Singh said:I sincerely opethatanySino-Americanetentewillnotbe at theex-pense f other ountries,articularlyn thisregion.However, e cannotat presentotally ule outsucha possibility.t can haverepercussionson the ituationnthis ub-continent,s wellas in thisregion.We have,therefore,or ome imebeenconsidering ays nd means f preventingsuch situationromrising,ndmeetingt f t should rise.In this,we arenot lone, nd therereotherountries,oth igandsmall,


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SATISH KUMAR 493who may be moreperturbed hanwe are. Weare n touchwith he coun-tries oncernednd shall see to it that nySino-Americanetente oesnot ffects or theother ountriesn this egion dversely.3This statementlearly ndicates hat India had started ormulatingitsresponsen consultation ithfriendlyountriesn theevent hattheSino-Americanetenteroving armfulo its nterestsn the ub-continent.Withthebenefit fhindsight,ne can speculatenow thatthe ndo-SovietTreatywhichwas signedon August , 1971 was then n themaking romtheForeignMinister's tatementhat ndia had been "consideringwaysand means ofpreventinguch a situation rom rising, nd meetingt ifit shouldarise,"and also that ndia was "not alone" in thisrespect. ne

can, therefore,nfer hat hevisit fHenryKissinger oPekingvia Rawal-pindi constitutedn itself n importanttage n theevolution nd formula-tion ofIndia's attitude n theEast Pakistanquestion, or thisvisitset nmotion series fsteps y ndia tostrengthents ecuritygainst possiblePakistani ttack, ither y itself r with heacquiescence ftheU.S. andChina. Oneof these tepswas thesigning f the ndo-Soviet reaty.WhileKissingerwasvisitinghe ub-continent,eports ffurtherup-plies of armsby the U.S. to Pakistankept pouring n. One such reportstatinghatfresh rmsworth 35 millionhad beendispatchedoPakistanoriginated ith enatorChurch n July . Moreover, hortlyfterKissin-ger'svisitto Pakistan,President ahya Khan gave furthervidenceofintransigencend arrogance n theEast Pakistanquestion.Talkingto acorrespondentf the FinancialTimesof London on July19, PresidentYahyaKhan said thathe would declarewaron India "if India madeanyattempto seize any partof East Pakistan.Anysuch attemptwouldbetreated s an attack n Pakistan. shalldeclarewar, et theworldnote."To thisYahya Khan added,"nor willPakistanbe alone." This showofarrogancendthe laim thatPakistanwas not alonewasbelieved n Indiatobe directlyttributableoKissinger's isit oRawalpindinthefirst eekofJuly.YahyaKhangavefurtherause ofprovocation o thepeople of EastPakistanwhenhe toldthe FinancialTimescorrespondentn July 0 thatSheikhMujibur,whowas then n a Pakistaniail, wouldshortlye triedfor treasonwhichwas punishable y death.The trialwouldbe held incamerabya Military ourt.This statementad thetwo-foldffect f in-citing hepeopleof East Pakistan o moredeterminedpposition o thePakistaniregime,ndscaring waytheEast Bengalis n greater umbersto India. By theend ofJuly, ,500,000refugees ad come to India fromEast Pakistan inceMay 20 whenYahyaKhanhad made a statementn-viting ll bonafide itizens of Pakistanto return. n otherwords, thepolitical ituationn East Pakistanwas worseningn every enseand wasmaking t incumbent n India to reconsider nd reformulatets attitude.The IndianForeignMinister's udget peechon July 0 in the ower

'Ibid.,p. 708 italics dded).


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494 INDIA'S BANGLADESHPOLICYhouse gave manyhintsof a reformulatedttitude n theEast Pakistanquestion. hiscouldperhaps e regarded s theconsequence f a reactionandresponseothedevelopmentsoted bove.Thevarious lementsfthereformulatedesponsean be summarizeds follows:(1) The ForeignMinister uton record hefactthattheactivitiesffreedomightersadnow ssumedangible roportionsysaying,itis thedeterminationnd theeffectivenessf thesefreedomighterswhich ppear ohaverattled resident ahyaKhan, ndhe is nowtryingofindxcuses ysayinghat fany reais liberated,hen ewoulddeclarewar. t is obvioushatnowthathe feels hepressureof the ctivitiesfthefreedomighters,e has tried o divertheat-tentionf the nternationalommunityn another irection."

(2) TheForeignMinister or hefirstime dmittedhat ndiawashelp-ingthefreedomightersn Bangladesh ysaying,this parliamenthasunanimouslydopted resolutionledgingympathyndsupport,andwearepursuinghat esolutionnthebestpossiblemanner,ndwe are doingeverythingossible o lend support o thefreedomfighters."(3) The ForeignMinisterategoricallyeclared hat ndiawasready odefendtself y his statementhat if theMuktiFauj succeedsn

liberatingheterritoryn Bangladesh,ndPakistan ses t as a pre-text or n attack nus, then mustmake t clear hatwearereadyto defend urselves."4These three lements aken ogetheronstituten advanceovertheIndian ttitudemontharlier, or tmeant hatndiawasno longer hink-ing of a purely olitical olution f theEastPakistan uestion utwasalsopreparing ora militaryesponsef thesituation emanded.A fewdayslater, heForeignMinister ave furtherxpression o India's readiness o

resort omilitaryction f t wasprovokedwhile ommentingn PresidentYahyaKhan's threat hatSheikhMujiburwould be courtmartialledndmight e executed. he IndianForeignMinisteraid, "Shouldanyharmbe causedtotheperson fSheikhMujiburRehman r his familynd col-leagues, hepresentituationnBangladeshwouldbe immeasurablyggra-vatedand thepresent akistanirulerswill be solelyresponsible ortheconsequences. . . We express ur condemnationf theproposed ctionandwarn heGovernmentfPakistan fitsserious onsequences."5It can be safelynferredrom heforegoingtatementshat he Gov-ernmentfIndia bythistimehad clearly tarted erceivinghepossibilityof an armed onflict ithPakistan ntheEast Pakistan uestion. uchanassessment as notunnaturalooking t thestiffesistance eingmetbythePakistaniArmy rom hepeopleofEastPakistan,he rrogant ulmina-tions fYahyaKhan, ndthe ndicationshat omegreat owersikeChina

'Ibid., pp.709-710 italics added).'ForeignMinister waranSingh's statementn Lok Sabha on August9, 1971, bid.,p. 712 (italics added).


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SATISH KUMAR 495and theU.S. werenot averseto thecontinuationf Pakistan'smilitaryaction n East Pakistan.Therefore,t is reasonable o assumethat ndiahad started hinkingf safeguards,nd the signingof the Indo-SovietTreaty fAugust , 1971was theresult. his is not to suggest hat ndiahad ruledout thepossibilityf a political olution f theEast Pakistanquestion, or ndia was stillworkingctively ora political olution, utonlythat ndia had started reparing ortheeventualityfa war if onewasthrustpon t.Going ythe tatementsf ndian pokesmenn New Delhiandabroad,one can deducethefollowinglements f India's diplomatic trategynthe middleofAugust.First, ndia was trying o putpressure n YahyaKhan through ariousfriendly overnmentso releaseSheikhMujibur,stopmilitaryction n East Pakistan, nd hold consultations ith theelected epresentativesrom ast Pakistan. econd, ndiawouldnothesitatein continuingo strengthenhe MuktiBahini "liberation orces."Third,whilestating ategoricallyhat ndia wanted o avoid war and that theEast Bengalirefugeeshouldreturno theirhomes, ndia was preparingitself or n all outwarwith akistanftheneedarose.Finally, ndia hadstarted ounding ut othergovernments,riendlynd not so friendly,stohowtheywouldreact fwarshould ome.A number f mportantevelopmentsookplacebetweenAugust ndNovemberwhichgradually onvinced ndia that war was unavoidable,andwhichmade tobligatory or ndia not to relax. For instance, n Au-gust5, YahyaKhanagainthreatenedo unleash war fanyattempt asmadeto takeaway East Pakistani erritory.n August7, he deprived 9membersftheAwamiLeagueoftheirmembershipntheNationalAssem-bly,whileonly88 AwamiLeague membersweredeclared ualified o re-tain their eats.On August10, in an interview ithCBS, Yahya Khanpointed ut, the wo ountriesIndia andPakistan)arevery lose towar.Let mewarnyou,for hedefence fmycountry willfight war."AndonSeptember,inan interview ith e Figaro,YahyaKhanleftno doubtabouthis intentions henhe said, "if theIndians magine hatthey antake a parcelof myterritoryithout rovoking war,theywillcommita great rror."Yahya Khan boastedof his army's trocities n Dacca inthewords, whenmy oldiers ill, hey illproperly." ahyaadded,"whathappenednDacca wasnot football ame.Whenonefightsnedoes notfling lowerstone another."In themidst fthese ndications fPakistan'sntentions,rimeMin-isterndira Gandhiof ndia undertook visittoMoscowtowards heendofSeptember.hiswas a crucialvisit n theevolution f IndianpolicyontheEast Bengal question.While thePrimeMinister riedto gauge thelatest ssessmentftheSoviet eaders n regard o theSouthAsian situa-tion, he left hemn no doubtthatshewas notat all satisfiedwiththeattitudefthebigpowers. peaking ta luncheonnMoscow nSeptember28, Mrs.Gandhisaid:

The internationalesponse as fallen hort f the scale which grim


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496 INDIA'S BANGLADESHPOLICYtragedy of this magnitude demands.... The growing agony of the peopleof East Bengal does notseem to have movedmanyGovernments.ur re-straint as been appreciatedonly n words.The basic issues involved, ndthereal threat o peace and stabilityn Asia are being largely gnored.eOn her return,Mrs. Gandhi found increasing evidence of a concen-trationof Pakistani troops on India's borders in both the Western andEastern sectors. In a last bid to avoid war with Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhiundertooka visit to some Westerncapitals to plead with the host govern-mentsto persuade Yahya Khan to see reason. From some ofher statementson the eve of her visit and during the visit abroad, one gets a very clearpicture of theworking of her mind at that time. She had almost lost hopethat Pakistan would be prepared to resolve the East Pakistan questionthroughpolitical means. In a broadcast to the nation on the eve of herdeparture on October 24, she said:It is a time for lertnessnotonlyofour defenceforcesbut ofall ourpeo-ple. In the last few months he world has witnessed he courage,dignityand self-restraintithwhichwe have facedthis challenge. am sure thatyou will meetall futuredangersin the same spirit. We need unity nddiscipline. sincerelyhope that political parties of all persuasionswillstandwith S.7During her visit to London, Mrs. Gandhi, in an address to the IndiaLeague on October31, gave vent to herdisgust with the advice being giventoherto showrestraint, nd herfrustration ith theeffortsf world eadersto prevailuponYahya Khan to resolve the problemthroughpeacefulmeans.She impliedthat India had long since exhausted its patience:Everybodyoday s busy tellingus thatwe must showrestraint. do notthinkany people or any Governmentould have showngreaterrestraintthanwehave in the face of such tremendous rovocationnd threat o oursafety nd to ourstability. ut wherehas therestraint aken us? With allourrestraintwe are not gettingny nearerto a solution.On the contrary,themilitary onfrontation,s the otherconfrontationshich mentioned,political, conomic, ocial, administrative,re steadilygettingworse. Peo-ple have asked me how long can India manage? Actuallythat date haslongsincepassed.I feel am sitting n thetop of a volcano and I honestlydo notknowwhen t is goingto erupt.8Mrs. Gandhi's disillusionmentwith the internationalcommunitywasfurtherxpressed in her replyto the October 21, 1971 letterof UN Secre-tary-GeneralU Thant. In her replyofNovember16, Mrs.. Gandhi triedtoexplain theroot cause of theproblemand said: "this is whatmustbe keptin mind, nstead of the presentattempt o save the militaryregime." Mrs.Gandhi told U Thant that she would welcome his efforts o bring about a

'IndiaSpeaks,New Delhi: Publication ivision, overnmentf ndia, 1971,p. 3.'Ibid.,p. 14.Ibid.,pp.49-50.


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SATISH KUMAR 497political ettlementn EastPakistan, ndsaid "ifyouareprepared oviewtheproblemnperspective,ouwillhaveoursupportn your nitiatives."India felt eftwithno option uttorespondwith ullvigor oa situa-tionwhichwasgradually eing reated or tbyPakistan nditsallies. nthe ast weekofNovember,uddendevelopmentsurtheronvinced ndiathat hehourofreckoning ad come and it might e calledupon at anymomento giveaccount f tscapabilityodefend tself. nNovember 9,theChineseRepresentativet theUN, Fu Hao, stated hatChina's sym-pathies n theEast PakistanproblemaywithPakistan.Withoutmention-ingNew Delhi by name,Fu Hao blamed ndia's alleged ntervention iPakistan's nternal ffairs ortheexisting ituation n thesub-continent.On November2, fourPakistani abreJetsntrudedhree ilometersinto ndian air space overtheBoyraregionof WestBengal.The IndianAir ForceGnats, n theprocess f chasingthem way,shot downthreejets and captured woPakistanipilots.President ahya Khan thengavesufficientndications fcoming vents y declaring stateof emergencythroughoutakistan n November3 onthegrounds hat a graveemer-gency xistsnwhich akistan s threatenedyaggression."OnNovember4,Mrs. ndiraGandhi old heparliamenthat 3 Paki-stani Chaffe anks had been destroyed n November 1 when Indianforces rossed heborders o repulse Pakistanioffensiven theMuktiBahini liberated rea aroundBoyra,duringwhich ndian territoryadbeenshelled. he Pakistangovernmentromulgatedn that ameday theDefenceofPakistanOrdinance, 971, and enforcedheDefence f Paki-stanRules.On November 5, while naugurating Chineseaided heavymachineryomplex t Taxila, President ahya Khan said thatPakistan'srelations ithndiawerenearing point f no return. e toldnewsmennRawalpindion that day that n tendays' timehe mightbe away fromRawalpindi, ightingwar.Finally, nDecember ,Pakistanaunched n air attack gainst ndiaon thewesternorders. hefact hat tthe ime fthe irattack hePrimeMinister s wellas theDefenceMinister f India wereoutsideDelhi andyetthe Indian armedforceshandledtheattackverycompetentlyouldsuggest hat ndiawasprepared or he ventuality.owever,hegatheringstorm f the ast fewweeks ndmonths ad broken nto thunderouson-frontationnd India was leftwithno option utto respondn a befittingmanner. ndia recognizedheRepublic fBangladesh n December , andacceded o itsrequest ormilitaryntervention.It isobvious romhe ccount fthe volutionf ndia'sattitudetatedabovethat venthough ndia might ave thoughtrom imeto timeof apolicy n respect o East Pakistan,t had neverbeen a policyplanned nadvance o achievePakistan's reakup hroughmilitaryupport otheEastBengalis. ndia'sresponseo theEastPakistan ituationn 1971 was in thenatureof a day-to-dayesponse o thedeveloping ituation. t could becharacterizeds an ad-hoc esponse. therwise,tneednothave takennine

'Bangladesh ocuments olumeI, NewDelhi:MinistryfExternal ffairs,972,p. 324.


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498 INDIA'S BANGLADESHPOLICYmonths o achieve heobjectives,f theobjective ad been clear n advanceand preparations or ts realization ad been made n advance.In fact, t would be fair to conjecture hat the resultswould havebeen quitedifferentf any of a number f events ad notoccurred hewaytheydid. For instance, he situationmighthave taken differenturn fthe Indo-Soviet reatyhad not been signed,whichmighthave been thecase ifKissinger ad notmade a secret ash to Peking nJuly 971. Simi-larly, f as a result f pressure romworld tatesmen,ahya Khan had re-leased Sheikh Mujibur,developmentsould have taken a differenturn.Therefore,ne would onclude hat ndia's policy n regard o East Pakistanwhichultimatelyed to the secession f East Pakistanfrom akistanwiththehelpof ndia's armed nterventionas notthe ulminationf anygranddesign by India against Pakistan,butwas the nevitable onsequence fa developing ituationn whichndia responded o variousevents s theyoccurred.ndia's first reference,s has been clearly rought ut, was fora political olution f theEast Pakistan uestionwithin he frameworkfa unitedPakistan. ndia's armed ntervention as the nevitable esponseofa nation hat elt bligedto defend tself gainstwhat tperceived o befirstemographic,nd thenmilitary,ggression y its neighbor.

SATISH KUMAR is AssociateProfessor fDiplomaticStudies at the School of Inter-nationalStudies, JawaharlalNehruUniversity, ew Delhi. During 1971,he was SeniorResearchOfficer,akistanDivision,Ministry f ExternalAffairs, overnment f India.