The Future of International Migration:

A Scenario Approach

14 September 2011 1

International Migration InstituteOxford Department of International DevelopmentOxford Martin SchoolUniversity of Oxford

Simona VezzoliSimona.vezzoli@qeh.ox.ac.uk

International migration in the present

• Despite being a “top issue”, debates and policies on migrationo Tend to be short-term and reactive to political concerns

and perceived ‘migration crises’o Reveal a limited understanding of the complex drivers of

migration processes

• Symptom: Potentially unintended and perverse effects of migration policies.

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International migration in the future

• We cannot just assume continuation of current trends (e.g., forecasting)

• Future social, economic and political change will fundamentally affect global migration, but how?

• Both research and policy are ill-prepared

• Overall lack of long-term vision and imagination on how the future of migration might look like

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Global Migration Futures project

• Aims:

o To gain insights in possible future (regional and global) migration trends and their effects on receiving, transit and sending countries...

o ... through the elaboration of scenarios, taking into account future social, economic, political, demographic, technological and environmental change that might affect migration

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Studying the future

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Reliance on data and statistical analysis

Models helps us understand the ‘chaos’ that surrounds us

A model which has been tested in the past is extended to predict the future

Using forecasting models: an example

• Dustmann et al. (2003), a report commissioned by the Home Office to forecast net immigration from the AC10 to the UK after the enlargement of the EU:

o Estimations were based on rather high population growth rates in the AC10

o Net immigration to the UK from the AC10 will be ‘relatively small at between 5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per year up to 2010.’

• Two baseline projections: baseline model 1 = 4,872; baseline model 2 = 12,568

o The UK opened its labour markets to the AC10 countries on May 1, 2004

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Flows estimates to September 2009

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Baseline Model 1 Baseline Model 2 Current Estimate

Migration from A10

Even with a relatively sound estimation they missed the actual number dramatically

Why can a sound model deliver poor estimates?

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• Five main reasons:

o The same structure is applied across countries

o The same structure is applied across time

o Explanatory variables must themselves be forecasted

o Complex levels of impacts and feedback

o Even when data are not a problem, there are uncertainties, which models are unable to incorporate

Structures across countries

• In many cases the data don’t exist and the parameters of the model must be estimated using historical migration data for other countries

• This implies the assumption that we can apply the same structure across countries

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Country A

Country B

Structures across time

• We assume that the structure of our model remains the same across time. However, will the relationship between migration and its main determinants be the same in the future?

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Country A

Country A20101960 2050

Explanatory variables in sending and receiving countries

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• Models require explanatory variables, which are not always available

• When available, these variables must be forecasted for the entire prediction period

Complex levels of impacts and feedback

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ContextualEnvironment

(‘external factors’)

Demographics

Macroeconomic policies of the host countries

Global economy

Oil prices

Social values

Technology

Geo-political trendsEnvironmental change

Local policies

Development

Migrationflows

‘internal factors’

Interest groupsMedia

Migration policies

Two major uncertainties:

Migration = f (yhost, yhome, networks, policy, natural disasters…)

Model uncertainties, which are comprised of the insufficient understanding of the mechanisms that operate in the migration process.

Contextual uncertainties, which are found in the constantly changing environment in which migration occurs.

Even with certain data, when we look at the future we have uncertainties

Uncertainties

Known facts

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• Forecasting assumes that it is possible to predict the future

• Yet, data are limited, severely constraining the usefulness of models

• Model uncertainties are numerouso What are the determinants of migration today? What

will they be in the future?• Non-migration (contextual) uncertainties abound

o What will the world look like in the future? How will the determinants of migration change in the future?

The power of numbers

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AcutalProjectionScenario 1Scenario 2Scenario 3Scenario 4

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Diverging ScenariosConverging

Scenarios

Scenarios: what are they NOT?

• A forecast or projection of today into the future

• An alternative specification of the forecasting model

• RATHER, THEY ARE visualisations of possible futures that we do not necessarily expect to come true

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Scenarios’ characteristics

• Stories created using multiple perspectives on:o What has happened in the pasto What we know todayo What could possibly develop in the future

• The stories must be:o Plausible o Coherento Challenging our expectations

• Scenarios neither represent a perfect world, nor an apocalyptic world – they are a mix of positive and negative events and outcomes that do not simply reproduce the status quo

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Benefits of scenarios

• Scenarios offer techniques to develop a better understanding of migration processeso Intuitive method that encourages the ‘break down of mental

barriers’ and promotes a stimulating and creative processo Identification of the ‘germs of change’ or ‘weak signals’

• Key role of multiple stakeholderso Awareness that knowledge of migration is available in many

segments of societyo Multiple stakeholders bring various experiences and perspectives

from different sectors (i.e. business, government, academia and civil society), disciplines and backgrounds

• The process is as important as the outcome

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Creating a new framework

• Uncover assumptions that shape our way of thinking (mental maps)

• RELATIVE CERTAINTIESo Factors that we strongly believe will not change and be

relevant in our scenarios• E.g. French will be the official language in France in 2020; Mexico

and the US will share a border in 2035

• RELATIVE UNCERTAINTIESo Factors for which we have more than one possible outcome

and which are relevant to our scenarios• E.g. The EU will have a common immigration policy in 2025; in

2035 Spain and Morocco will share a land border (Ceuta and Melilla)

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Overview of scenario production framework

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Time

Present situationof the context

Past events & forcesshaping the present

Plausiblescenarios

Slide’s author: Rafael Ramirez

Scenarios and feedback processes

• Evolution of the story over time

• Forces and events influence each other

• Using logic and intuition, scenarios are tested for coherence and consistency

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Increased mobility within North Africa and from Sub-Saharan Africa

Xenophobia increases

Introduction of point-system immigration policy

Investment in various economic sectors, need for high-skilled workers

High economic grown in North Africa (oil resources) is accompanied with high political instability

North Africa is a destination of highly-skilled

+

Increased inequality in society

Continuing emigration to Europe and the Gulf