the governance of the press complaints commission: an independent review

8/9/2019 The governance of the Press Complaints Commission: an independent review

1/28

Te governance of

the Press ComplaintsCommission: anindependent review

July 2010


2/28

Contents

01 Preace

02 Summary

03 The PCC and sel-regulation

05 Clarity o purpose07 Eectiveness

10 Independence

15 Transparency

16 Accountability

18 Practical implications

19 Appendix one

20 Appendix two

21 Appendix three

25 Appendix our

26 Appendix fve


3/28Governance Review 01

Preace

In August 2009, Baroness Buscombe, Chairmano the Press Complaints Commission (PCC),announced an independent review into the governanceo the organisation. The aim o the initiative was:

To review matters relating to the governance othe Press Complaints Commission, and to makerecommendations in order urther to build publicconfdence in the administration o independentpress regulation in the UK.1

This is the frst such review in the history o the PCC,and has represented an opportunity to test and improvestructures and processes that have evolved rom theestablishment o the organisation in 1991. We haveborne in mind throughout the views o a wide range

o individuals and groups with a perspective on thePCC, including complainants, lawyers, politicians,journalists, academics and policymakers. We have alsoconsulted senior representatives rom other regulatoryand sel-regulatory bodies (see Appendix 1). We aregrateul to all those who have contributed to this review.

The Governance Review panel consists o theollowing members:

Vivien Hepworth, (Chairman o the Review Group),Executive Chairman o Grayling in the UK andIreland; and ormer member o the PressComplaints Commission;

Stephen Haddrill, Chie Executive o theFinancial Reporting Council;

Dr. Elizabeth Vallance, Chairman o the Instituteo Education; Member o the Committeeon Standards in Public Lie; and membero the PCC Appointments Commission;

Eddie Young, ormer Group Legal Advisero Associated Newspapers.

Our inquiry has taken place against the backdrop o theconsiderable technological and structural change in the

newspaper and magazine industry that has occurred inrecent years. More specifcally, it ollows a wide-rangingexamination o press standards by the Culture, Mediaand Sport Select Committee, which produced a reportin February 2010 endorsing sel-regulation, but raisingimportant questions about some aspects o the waythe PCC operates.

The PCC has always been and will always be theocus o legitimate scrutiny and challenge. Recently,there have been controversies surrounding thereporting o the disappearance o Madeleine McCann,

and the allegations o phone message hacking involvingNews International. The Governance Review has takenaccount o lessons learned wherever possible in itsconclusions.

We also called or submissions rom any interestedparty (and received 40, which can be accessed at:http://www.pccgovernancereview.org.uk/gr/received-submissions.html). We also held oral evidence sessions,and over fve months spoke to 29 individuals (seeAppendix 2 or the ull list).

In the course o its work, the Governance Review hearda very wide range o opinions, rom the highly criticalthrough to the strongly supportive. Our report cannot and does not seek to bridge the gap between someo the opinions expressed. Nor do we try to respond toall o the points that have been raised, many o whichell outside our remit. The challenge or the GovernanceReview was to see how the organisation, and those itserves, could beneft rom improvements to its overallgovernance. Our terms o reerence can be accessedat: http://www.pccgovernancereview.org.uk/gr/consultation.html.

1 The press release announcing the review can be read athttp://www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.html?article=NTg1MA==



Summary

Corporate governance is usually defned as thesystem under which an organisation is appointedand held to account. We have distilled this notioninto fve key tests o the quality o governance.

These comprise the fve main sections o thisreport: clarity o purpose; eectiveness;independence; transparency; and accountability.

The ollowing summarises our key conclusions,with specifc recommendations appearing inbold throughout the report. A summary o allrecommendations appears in Appendix 3.

Clarity of purposeA clear role or the CommissionThe PCC should publicly defne its purpose and the

range o its activities. This includes when it will actproactively and when it will wait or a complaint.There should be greater clarity about how complaintsare considered, and how rulings can be challenged.The Commission should also spell out what sanctionsit has available and how they are deployed.

EffectivenessTougher scrutiny rulesThe existing Business Sub-Committee should beabolished and replaced by an Audit Committee withwider terms o reerence to scrutinise the servicereceived by complainants, overall perormance, riskand fnancial management.

More industry engagement with the systemEditorial service on the Commission should becomemore widespread, and be regarded as a duty oeditors. PressBo should take active steps to encouragethis. Industry members should be encouraged to reerethical issues themselves to the PCC or consideration.

IndependenceA stronger BoardThe PCC should draw more heavily on the experienceo its Board, especially its lay (i.e. public) members.

This should be reected in the annual planning oactivities; the routine engagement o the Board inconsidering what steps should be taken to deal withissues o public concern; and the use o Boardworking groups to develop thinking in challengingareas o policy. A new role o Deputy Chairman shouldbe established to enhance the inuence o the laymajority and support an improved scrutiny unction.

A stronger lay voice on the content o the CodeNew rules are needed about consultation o theCommission by the Editors Code o Practice

Committee to ensure the lay voice is properlyrepresented prior to the annual review o the Code.

TransparencyGreater transparency about appointmentsThe existing Appointments Commission should beabolished and replaced by a Nominations Committeeoperating consistent rules or the appointment o bothlay and editorial Commissioners.

Greater openness about the systemThere should be an increase in inormation about howthe system is structured including the relationshipbetween the PCC, PressBo and the Code Committee and the publication o consistent, accessible datathat allows easier analysis and assessment o thePCCs work by the public.

AccountabilityMore rigorous examination o perormanceThe role o Independent Reviewer (ormerly theCharter Commissioner) should be expanded tohear challenges to decisions based on substanceas well as handling. The Board should establishannual objectives and publicly report whether it is

achieving them. The Commission should evaluateits own perormance, and that o its Chairman, onan annual basis.



The PCC and sel-regulation

1. The PCC is the major part o the press sel-regulatory system in the UK, but it does not standalone. Given that this report is concerned with notonly the structure o the PCC but its relationship

with other parts o the system, it is important brieyto set out the roles o each o the relevant bodiesthat unction together. A chart showing therelationship appears in Appendix 4.

The Press Complaints Commission (PCC)2. The primary role o the PCC is to handle

complaints, by administering and upholding aCode o Practice. Where possible, the PCC usesmediation to resolve complaints to the satisactiono the individual concerned. It exercises its powerso critical adjudication where this is either not

possible, or not appropriate. The Commissioncomprises 17 members: seven industryrepresentatives rom across a range o newspapersand magazines; and 10 lay members who aredrawn rom a variety o backgrounds not associatedwith the press. The Board o the Commission hasone permanent sub-committee which reports to it,the Business Sub-Committee, comprising the PCCChairman and three lay members, who togetherwith the PCC Director monitor PCC fnances andscrutinise the annual budget. The Commission issupported by a small Secretariat (o 15), who haveno background in journalism. The PCCs website iswww.pcc.org.uk.

The Editors Code of Practice Committee(the Code Committee)3. The PCC does not determine the wording o the

Code. That is the responsibility o the industry,via a committee o editors: the Editors Code oPractice Committee. The Code is reviewed on anannual basis using public consultation (via a call orsubmissions) in order to take account o changes inpublic attitudes. It also reects the experience o theCommission itsel, which is conveyed to the Code

Committee by the Chairman and Director. TheCode has been subject to numerous changessince it was frst drawn up in 1991. The CodeCommittees website is www.editorscode.org.uk.

Press Standards Board of Finance (PressBof)4. PressBo is the industry body which is responsible

or the unding o the PCC. The PCCs income iscollected via a levy on all subscribing newspapers

and magazines. By raising unds through an agreedsystem, PressBo ensures that the Commissiondoes not receive its income direct rom industrymembers, which protects its independence onindividual cases. PressBo also appoints the PCCChairman, and nominates the editorial memberso the Commission.

The Appointments Commission5. The Appointments Commission is ormally

responsible or appointing new members othe Commission, as well as the PCCs Charter

Commissioner and Charter Compliance Panel.(The Charter Commissioner currently deals withcomplainants who believe their complaint has beenmishandled; the Charter Compliance Panel carriesout spot audits and other checks as part o thePCCs quality control systems.) The AppointmentsCommission comprises: the Chairman o the PCC(who chairs the Appointments Commission); theChairman o PressBo; and three public members,who are appointed separately and are not memberso the PCC.

Brief history of the PCC6. The UK press has been subject to sel-regulation

or more than 50 years. From 1953 to 1990, therelevant authority was the Press Council, whichenorced no Code o Practice and issued rulingswithout receiving frst-party complaints. It alsoacted as a deender o the press.

7. The conict between issuing rulings against, anddeending, the press contributed to the PressCouncil losing the confdence o many people inthe industry as well as within Parliament. In 1990,the government appointed a committee under

David Calcutt QC to consider what measures(whether legislative or otherwise) are needed togive urther protection to individual privacy romthe activities o the press and improve recourseagainst the press or the individual citizen2. Itsmain recommendation was the establishmento a new organisation which assuming it couldprove its eectiveness would be kept ree romstatutory control.

2 Calcutt, D. et al, 1990. Report o the committee on privacy and related matters,Chairman David Calcutt QC, London: HMSO. (Cm. 1102). Note 1, para 1.1.



8. In response, the industry set up the PressComplaints Commission. PressBo (which wasestablished shortly ater the publication o theCalcutt report) took on a co-ordinating role or the

industry, establishing the Code Committee andtasking it with producing the industrys frst everCode o Practice. The Code bound all publicationsto a common, agreed set o principles.

9. As Calcutt (and others) believed that the Councilsrole deending the press at the same time asadjudicating against it could not be sustained,the PCC was constituted largely as a complaints-handling body (or a brie description o thecomplaints process, see Appendix 5). It wasounded on the principles that its services should

be ree and available to everyone.

The self-regulatory model10. The PCC is not a statutory regulator. It is part o

a sel-regulatory system that involves a largedegree o lay inuence, and has the ollowingcharacteristics:

it is unded at arms length by the industry,through PressBo;

it is led by a Chairman who is appointed byPressBo;

it has a Board combining lay and industryrepresentatives, with a built-in lay majority;

its work is implemented, under Boardsupervision, by a proessional Secretariat.

11. The Governance Review believes that the basicphilosophy o sel-regulation that it is ree romstate control, has industry involvement, butcontains a strong lay inuence is sound.Press involvement in the system is a strength.It guarantees the ollowing: fnancial supportrom the industry, which means that the service isree to the consumer; practical co-operation rom

members in the investigation o complaints abouttheir activity; and the organic development o theCode o Practice, which means that standards areagreed by the industry, beore being enorced bythe PCC.

12. The Governance Review received relatively ewcriticisms about the Code itsel. This suggests thatthe Code should be given more weight as one othe key assets o the sel-regulatory system. Weconsider that the Code Committee should giveurther thought to setting out more publicly how the

Code has brought about direct change to industrybehaviours and standards.

13. There is no question, however, that suspicion lingersover the notion o sel-regulation as a philosophy,with its implied corollary o industry sel-interest andcontrol. Accusations o sel-interest, whether

well-ounded or not, are important, as they canaect public confdence. The Commission muststrongly grip the need or this sel-regulatory systemconstantly to exert itsel to demonstrate goodevidence o its robustness and independence ojudgement.

Looking to the future14. The PCC has helped a substantial number o

people achieve redress against the press or nocost, and with a minimum o uss. Judging by thedoubling o the number o rulings over the last fve

years and the increase in the number o peoplecontacting the PCC, the public seems to value theservice it provides. However, the Commission hasnot examined careully the reasons or the increase,or example asking whether rising numbers ocomplaints reveal a all in industry standards, or arise in accessibility. More work on this needs to bedone.

15. High levels o complaints put more stress on thesystem. Mass complaints, such as the 25,000people who complained about the Jan Moir articlein the Daily Mailon the death o Stephen Gately,will particularly increase that strain, i repeated.So ar, the Commission has been able to absorbthis additional workload without missing itsoverall targets or responding to complaints3.The PCCs area o activity has also increased tocover more than just complaints handling, includingoering pre-publication advice and expanding itsoutreach and training work. The challenge, roma governance perspective, is to ensure theorganisation remains equipped to deal with suchadditional pressures, without compromising itsprimary purpose.

16. The report reects this challenge, and therecognition that the system needs to secureconfdence in a world where public trust isincreasingly hard to maintain. Support or sel-regulation in the uture will only be achieved isome o the criticisms levelled against it aretackled head-on.

The PCC and sel-regulationContinued

3 The PCC aims to deal with complaints in an average o 35 working days. In 2009, itdealt with substantive complaints (i.e. complaints which could be dealt with eitherthrough mediating a settlement, or where a ormal ruling could be made based onthe Editors Code o Practice) in an average o 18.4 working days. In 2008, thefgure was 25.7 working days.



17. When an institution has existed or nearly twodecades, and sought to develop in responseto changing circumstances, there is merit inexamining its original purpose.

18. The Memorandum o Association or thePCC states:

The objects o the Company (hereinater calledthe Commission) are to consider, adjudicate,conciliate and resolve or settle by reerence tothe Code o Practice promulgated by the PressStandards Board o Finance (registered in Englandand Wales with number 2554323) or the time beingin orce complaints rom the public o unjust orunair treatment by newspapers, periodicals or

magazines and o unwarranted inringements oprivacy through material published in newspapers,periodicals or magazines (other then advertisingplaced by third parties) or in connection with theobtaining o such material and to publish or procurethe publication o any fndings o its adjudication,or the purpose o ensuring that the Press o theUnited Kingdom maintains the highest proessionalstandards and having regard to generallyestablished reedoms including reedom oexpression and the publics right to know, anddeence o the press rom improper pressure.4

19. The Articles o Association also reer to the act thatthe Commission has responsibility to:

consider and pronounce on issues relating tothe Code o Practice which the Commission,in its absolute discretion considers to be in thepublic interest.5

20. This remit o the PCC is awarded to it by theindustry. The current organisational rameworkallows the PCC to do the ollowing:

issue rulings on complaints; publicly censure editors or breaches o

the Code; negotiate amicable settlements between

complainants and editors; issue advisory notes to editors to prevent

harassment; give pre-publication advice to editors; advocate on behal o individuals beore

publication to help prevent the appearanceo inaccurate or intrusive material;

issue ormal guidance to the industry

on important issues; instigate its own investigations in thepublic interest;

oer training to working journalists and students; liaise with other press councils internationally,

and share intelligence and experiences.

21. The Commission has not, in the past, beenclear and open about all o its unctions. TheCommission itsel should take responsibilityor setting out what its role entails (in reerence

to all o the above areas), and make clearthe areas o activity against which it shouldbe judged.

22. Otherwise, the Commission is not in a positionsatisactorily to answer the regularly-posed questionabout whether it is a regulator. In developing clarityabout its role, it will be able to explain that, whileits work incorporates regulatory unctions, it is notconstituted nor unded to produce ormaltop-down regulation. Nor is such regulationappropriate or an industry which has reedom o

expression at its centre. It should be clear aboutthis, and not apologise or it. Some criticism o theorganisation comes because it ails to manageexpectations about what it can and cannot do.It is a sel-regulatory body, which looks to enorcestandards by handling complaints and byproactively considering issues that relate to theCode o Practice. This should be made apparentin public statements.

23. In particular, the Governance Reviewrecommends that the Commission should makeplain how it considers standards issues. Therole o maintaining standards, under the Code,should cut across the organisation as a whole.However, there is no need, in our view, or oneposition (such as a Deputy Director) to becreated to deal with this unction. Nor shouldthe Commission change its name to reerspecifcally to standards. Its role in consideringstandards should be made apparent both interms o its public statements and actions inthe context o enorcing the Code. The PCChas good name recognition6 and a major re-brandwould be expensive without obvious reward.

Clarity of purpose

4 Press Complaints Commission Memorandum o Association, point 3.

5 Press Complaints Commission Ar ticles o Association, Article 53.1A.Available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/assets/111/PCC_Articles_o_Association.pd.6 81% o people have heard o the PCC, according to polling conducted by the

PCC in 2010. This bears comparison with other regulatory bodies. The ullresults can be seen at http://www.pcc.org.uk/assets/111/PCC_Survey_2010.pd ,while inormation about the polling methodology is available athttp://www.pcc.org.uk/externalrelations/research.htmlunder the headingPublic attitudes towards the PCC and sel-regulation research (2010).



Clarity o purposeContinued

28. The central recommendation o the GovernanceReview to improve clarity o purpose or thePCC is that the Commission itsel shouldproduce a document, published on its website,

covering all o its aims and duties, including thespecifc basis or how it works proactively.

29. A clear set o unctions means that theeectiveness o the organisation can be properlytested, that it is more transparent about how itworks, and that it can be held more accountableor its actions.

24. The other major issue that requires clarity is theextent to which the Commission should initiateinvestigation o its own volition: the notion oproactivity. The PCC regularly contacts individuals

at the centre o news stories to oer its services,which can then lead to complaints. However, i thecomplaint is not orthcoming, the PCC cannot act.

25. The Commission has released public polling thatshows that most people do not wish a regulatorybody to act on their behal without their consent 7.The Governance Review accepts that the PCCcannot orce its judgements upon those who not dowish to participate. Nor can the Commission reachreasonable judgements without the inormation andperspective o those involved in a case.

26. There are also other practical considerations. ThePCC cannot act in regard to every story, or indeedeven every major story, that preoccupies the press.The PCC should not pretend to be able to do so, orit will risk public criticism (and loss o confdence) oreach perceived ailure.

27. The Governance Review recommends thatthe PCC is more open about what it meansby and what it wants to achieve through proactivity. It should make public the areasin which it intends to do this.This might includethe ollowing, which could act as a blueprint orits activity:

contacting those at the centre o news storiesto oer its services, when it becomes aware either through intelligence rom individualCommissioners or the Secretariat, or ollowingcomplaints by third parties o issues opossible concern;

playing an active role in channelling prospectivecomplaints so that they can be eectivelyocused on appropriate issues;

initiating investigations relating to possiblebreaches o the Code o its own volition wherethere are no obvious frst parties who mightcomplain (or example in cases involvingpayments to witnesses or criminals);

issuing guidance on best practice in areasthat have caused public concern.

7 Only a quarter o the population supports the view that the PCC should publiciseits views about published stories without frst contacting the individual they eature.58% disagreed or strongly disagreed that such an approach would be proper.

The ull results which were also part o the 2010 public polling can be accessedvia http://www.pcc.org.uk/assets/111/PCC_Survey_2010.pd .



30. The PCC has increased its workload over thelast 10 years without signifcant increases inexpenditure. Its customer satisaction ratings areconsistently sound8. The system is not bogged

down by unwieldy bureaucracy; its modest scaleand relative inormality mean it can move efciently.

31. However, there is little ormal analysis oeectiveness by the Commission, and so the publiccannot be inormed o what it is doing well, andwhere it needs to improve. Also, the Commissionitsel is not sufciently aware o its own strengthsand weaknesses.

32. The Governance Review recommends:

the PCC should agree a list o perormanceobjectives every year and publicly reporton whether they were achieved, and, i not,why not;

statistics should be consistently presentedto enable year-on-year comparison. Wewelcome the initial work that has been doneon this. The Commission should considerresearch into complaints trends, in orderto establish whether there are any ailingswithin the industry that require redress andto allow or analysis o the consequencesin terms o resource and practice;

the Commission should institute a regularprogramme o polling public opinion onissues relating both to the PCC itsel andpress standards more generally;

the PCC should set up an Audit Committee,to be chaired by a senior lay Commissioner,in place o the Business Sub-Committeeand with wider terms o reerence. Its taskwill be to monitor and consider theperormance o the PCC and report to theCommission (see paragraph 33);

there should be an annual awayday or theBoard and the Secretariat to discuss plansor the next year and an agreed plan o workshould then be presented to the Board;

new Commissioners should be given aull induction, and be ormally mentoredby a colleague;

the Charter Commissioner (who is to berenamed the Independent Reviewer) shouldattend Commission meetings twice a year.

33. The Audit Committee should consist o threelay Commissioners. Its core unctions would beas ollows:

fnancial oversight. It should examine the budget

and expenditure o the PCC on a six monthlybasis, and meet with external auditors;

risk assessment. It should examine risk to theorganisation and report to the Commission;

perormance. It should have oversight o anewly-constructed Review Panel (replacing theCharter Compliance Panel, see paragraph 94).It should liaise with the panel in conductingaudits o complaints fles, and examining issueso concern. It should also review results ocustomer surveys.

34. At the moment, Commission members are activein considering standards issues when it comesto adjudicating complaints, but less so in theadditional work undertaken by the institution(the pre-publication advice, the anti-harassmentwork, the training). This is, in theory, correct:Commissioners have adjudication as a primaryrole. However, Commissioners should bebetter inormed about the other activitiesundertaken by the PCC, and have input intothem. The Commission should ensure that itis examining ongoing issues, and its role inthem, more eectively.

Eectiveness

8 On average over the past three years, 81% o people who used the PCCs servicesthought that their complaint had been dealt with thoroughly or very thoroughly.

An average o 74% over the same time period considered that the overall handlingo their complaint was very satisactory or satisactory. Anonymised surveyorms are sent to all complainants whose cases all under the terms o the Codeo Practice and can be considered ormally by the Commission.



EectivenessContinued


the PCC should seek to publicise asmany o its rulings as possible;

when a complaint is resolved, the summaryshould reer specifcally to the issues raisedunder the terms o the Code;

the Commission should make clear onits website where complaints have beenound to have merit including: cases whereit issues a critical ruling; cases where itfnds that sufcient remedial action hasbeen oered, but not accepted by thecomplainant; cases which are resolvedollowing remedial action;

the PCC should develop a secure site on

which all substantive complaints couldbe viewed and assessed by Commissionmembers, which would save time andmoney spent on mailing the weekly papersto members (see Appendix 5 or anexplanation o the current complaints process).

39. The Governance Review recognises that one o theperceived virtues o the existing system is that allsubstantive complaints are considered by the ullCommission through the circulation each week opapers which provide the details and the proposedrecommended course o action on each case.Commissioners must indicate their agreement or otherwise to the recommendations.

40. However, the Governance Review has examinedwhether in common with other regulatory bodies the PCC might devolve the responsibility orconsidering straightorward complaints to theSecretariat. This would mean that cases thatappear to raise no prima acie breach o theCode would be assessed by the PCC ofce,and a decision issued without recourse to theCommission. The ofce would make use o case

law and principles previously established by theCommission, and this would have the advantageo showing the consistency o the PCC approachin particular areas. Should a complainant objectto the ofces interpretation o the case, he orshe could raise concerns with the IndependentReviewer, the new title we recommend or theCharter Commissioner (see paragraph 90).The Independent Reviewer could then reer thecomplaint to the ull Commission.

35. Specifcally, the Governance Reviewrecommends that:

the Commission should be updated

on a weekly basis about any proactiveapproaches which have been made toindividuals. Commissioners can then oerinput about the need or urther action;

the Commission should be updated ona weekly basis with any advisory notescirculated to the industry;

the Commission should ensure that itdiscusses issues o major public concern,with a view to considering what actionit might wish to take. A record o thatdiscussion should be made public,

where appropriate; the Commission should set up working

groups to analyse and test importantpolicy issues (the prominence o apologies;convergence; privacy; and so on). To avoidover-burdening the Secretariat, there shouldbe no more than two unctioning at anytime. We welcome the act that the PCChas recently established a group toconsider online issues;

the Commission should use complaintstrends, or issues raised by workinggroups, to consider expanding its rangeo guidance to the industry on theapplication o the Code.

36. In 2009, the PCC made over 1600 rulings, andconducted over 1200 investigations into complaintsthat seemed to raise a possible breach o theCode. Not all o these cases were published, asthe PCC only currently makes available complaintsthat are adjudicated during ormal meetings, andresolved complaints.

37. For the PCC eectively to proceed with its role in

maintaining and improving standards, it should domore to make public the outcomes o its rulingsand the issues raised.



EectivenessContinued

negotiation o an agreed remedy (apology,published correction, amendment o records,removal o article);

publication o a critical adjudication;

public criticism o a title by the Chairman othe PCC;

a letter o admonishment rom the Chairmanto the editor;

disciplinary action against a journalist on theback o a PCC ruling that confrms a breacho the Code;

reerral by the PCC o the editor to the publisheror disciplinary action.

46. The Governance Review has discussed with somewitnesses the importance o prominence given to

apologies. More work needs to be done by theCommission to ensure both that apologies areprominently published, and that people areaware o this. A working group on this specifcissue would be a positive step.To urtherenhance public confdence in the system, theGovernance Review also recommends:

the PCC should publish a documentoutlining the potential outcomes andsanctions on its website;

the PCC should consider revealingpublicly when it has admonished aneditor via correspondence;

the PCC should engage in more directollow-up with editors, once a breach othe Code has been established and a rulingmade. This may mean: the Chairman orDirector meeting with the editor to discussthe problem; acting to ensure that practiceswithin a newsroom have changed; inquiring in very serious cases about whetherdisciplinary action has been enorced;

the PCC should make more o theact that the Code is written into

journalists contracts.

47. The public should have confdence that the PCCrequires the ull co-operation o contributing titlesinto its investigations and that sanctions will beapplied should such co-operation be lacking.This needs to be spelled out clearly.

48. The Governance Review recommends that theCommission and PressBo should considersetting up a joint working group urther toconsider sanctions. We believe there are a

range o creative ideas about how existingsanctions could be made more eective and be seen to be so and that these shouldbe investigated.

41. We have noted that, at present, there is littleappetite or such derogation o authority amongCommissioners. However, we believe that removingrom them the consideration o straightorward

complaints would enable the Commission toocus on more substantive cases and, given theincreasing number o complaints, may in the endprove to be necessary to streamline the process.

42. The Governance Review recommends that theCommission institutes a pilot over the next yearand keeps this option under review.

Exceptional cases43. I public concern is raised about exceptional issues

to do with press behaviour, Commissioners should

ask or the matter to be discussed at a meeting, atwhich the ollowing could be considered:

what scope there is or action by the PCC andwhat the purpose o that action should be;

whether relevant individuals, especially withinthe industry, should be asked to give evidenceto the Commission. Steps should be taken toensure that the Commission obtains ull co-operation rom all employees o publications;

whether individual lay Commissioners should beinvolved at an early stage in steering an inquiry.

44. The Commission must ensure that it is seenully to examine its role when serious mattersarise. It should be clear about what it is ableto do, and make the public aware o it. TheCommission already has the power to use oralhearings should it believe this would assist itsunction; it should be willing to deploy thispower in appropriately serious circumstancesand to make public that it is doing so.

Sanctions45. The Governance Review has heard criticism o

the PCC that it is toothless, because it doesnot impose fnes. While it is not within our remitdirectly to consider the issue o sanctions, wewish to make some observations. In our view,the introduction o fnes would not beneft thesystem (they could be budgeted or by majorpublications, but could cripple smaller titles; theywould introduce conrontation into a collaborativeapproach that generally works well). However,the PCC must do more to demonstrate theeectiveness o its current sanctions, andensure that they are properly exercised and

understood. It is notable that the various actionspossible by the PCC are not spelled out clearly.This ladder o sanctions includes:



Independence

54. The Governance Review believes that thelay majority should be more visible and theexperience o lay Commissioners moreeectively deployed:

the Chairman o the PCC should beencouraged to appoint a Deputy Chairmanrom among the lay members, who couldgive support to the Chairman during theterm o his or her chairmanship. This rolewould underline the strength o the laymajority; it would mean there was someoneavailable to take the chair in the absenceo the Chairman; it would provide a useulsounding board or the Chairman, butshould also be used as a conduit or

Commissioners to pass back constructiveeedback to the Chairman. We urtherrecommend that whoever holds this postwould normally be expected to take aspecifc interest in the audit unction o theBoard, to which we reerred in paragraph32. The Deputy Chairman role wouldlapse, unless the temporary role oActing Chairman was made by PressBo,with the departure o the Chairman;

an enhanced register, available on thePCC website, should declare not onlyrelevant outside interests o all servingCommissioners, as beore, but the rulesguiding serving editors on the Commissionwhen titles in their groups are the subjecto complaints (see paragraph 56);

the Board should make greater use oworking groups with lay majorities to ensurethat lay Commissioners contribute directlyto the strategic thinking o the PCC;

the Commission should consult moreregularly with external experts (about, saysocial networking or privacy law), so thatCommission members, together with the

Secretariat, continue to be at the oreronto relevant thinking.

49. From the evidence we have received, it is clear thatconcerns about the PCCs independence rest onthe ollowing areas:

the size and impact o the lay majority; the act that serving editors sit on the PCC; the act that the Code is written solely

by editors; the role and powers o PressBo; appointments.

The lay majority50. The PCC is a body o 17: 10 public members

(including the Chairman), and seven editors. This laymajority has increased since 1991 rom one tothree. No meeting can take place without a

quorum, and majority, o lay members.

51. The PCC has a greater lay majority than othersimilar bodies across Europe9. Members o theGovernance Review, who had not previouslywitnessed meetings, were struck by the degree towhich the discussion was wide-ranging, and did notollow the party lines o lay against editorial. Thishas not been properly visible to members o thepublic, and the Commission should do moreto reassure people about the conduct at itsmeetings. Publishing minutes o meetings willbe helpul in this regard.

52. The Commission is already a large body. Decision-making does not become correspondingly easierwith increased numbers; indeed the opposite ismore likely. While we note the suggestion madeby the Select Committee and others that thelay representation increase urther (rom 10 to 12),we do not believe that this would improve theindependence o the PCC in practical terms asit is already saeguarded.

53. Indeed, the Governance Review considers that

there might be merit in the Board being smaller,not larger. However, we recognise that a reductionin the size o the Board would not be practical at themoment: reducing overall numbers is likely to eitherlessen the lay majority or reduce the participationo dierent branches o the industry. At this pointin the development o the PCC, neither resultwould be satisactory. The Governance Reviewrecommends that the option to reduce overallnumbers while retaining the lay majority should be kept under review.

9 O the 25 European Press Councils or which inormation about membership is

publicly available, most have a majority o industry members. Only seven (includingthe UK PCC) have a public majority. The UK PCCs ratio o 10:7 public to industrymembers places the greatest emphasis on public representation o any membero the Alliance o Independent Press Councils o Europe. Barber, Ian andEvans, Lewis, Review o the New Zealand Press Council (2007), availableat http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/articles/press_council_review.pd). Moreinormation about the Alliance o Independent Press Councils o Europe can beound at www.aipce.net.



IndependenceContinued


greater transparency in the relationshipbetween the PCC and the Code Committee;

the Chairman and the Director o the PCCshould act as more than observers at CodeCommittee meetings; they should representthe views o the Commission at the table;

a ull report should be made by the PCCChairman to the Commission ollowingevery meeting;

beore every review o the Code by theCode Committee, the Commission perhaps through a devolved working group should consider recommending changes.The Code Committee should respond

ormally to the Commission explainingtheir response, including the reasonswhy any suggestions have been rejected;

the PCC should be consulted on anyproposed changes to the Code beoreit is asked to ratiy them.

We welcome the eorts that have been madeto clariy the separate roles o the PCC andthe Editors Code Committee, including theestablishment o the Code Committee websiteand mailing list and these eorts should continue.

Press Standards Board of Finance61. As with the Code Committee, the Governance

Review believes that greater clarity about the roleo PressBo in the public domain would help allparties.Accordingly, we recommend thatPressBo considers hosting its own websitein which the ollowing are explained:

the role o PressBo and who serves onthe organisation;

how the unding is calculated; and a listo publishers who subscribe;

how PressBo works with the Commission; the rules by which the independence o the

Commission is sustained and guaranteed.

62. One responsibility o PressBo is to guaranteethe continued unding o the PCC. Payment o alevy by industry members to PressBo is the mostvisible sign o voluntary adherence to the systemo sel-regulation. A ailure to continue undingthe PCC demonstrates a ailure to support thesystem. The Governance Review recognises thata publisher who persistently withholds unding or

the PCC should be considered outside the sel-regulatory process.

Serving Editors on the PCC55. Having representation rom the industry on the

Board is an acceptable eature o sel-regulation,provided that independence is saeguarded. Editors

bring with them current experience o an evolvingindustry and the weight o peer judgement againstthose who have breached the Code.

56. No conict o interest should arise rom editorsinvolvement on the Commission. The public shouldbe made aware that editors do not take part in anyconsideration o complaints against titles with whichthey are connected. The Governance Reviewrecommends that the Commission publishan improved register o interests relating toeditors conicts. This should make clear the

criteria on which they remove themselves romconsidering complaints. It should state thateditors do not consider complaints relating totitles over which they exercise editorial control,with which they have close links (e.g. sistertitles), and which are under the control o theirEditor-in-Chie. The Commission should alsopublish a ull list o the relevant titles.

The Editors Code of Practice Committee57. There is considerable criticism o the Editors Code

o Practice Committee or the act that it does notinclude lay representation. There is also conusionbetween the Code Committee and the PCC itsel it is not unusual to read that the Chairman o theCode Committee is Chairman o the PCC.

58. The Governance Review sees beneft in the actthat editors are responsible or the wording o theirown Code: the industry takes ownership o therules by which it should abide and then allows anindependent organisation to enorce them.

59. It is essential, however, to show there is an eectivelay contribution to the workings o the Code.

It is also necessary or the system to be clearlysignposted, so individuals can understandwho does what.



67. An eective working relationship between theChairman and the Director o the PCC is crucial.When a new Chairman is appointed, PressBoshould ensure there is an opportunity at the

earliest stage or the Chairman and Director todiscuss their respective roles.

Lay Commissioners68. The process o appointment or lay members o

the PCC has, in the past, not been sufciently clear,and has not been previously codifed to a properextent. For the last round o appointments o laymembers, the ollowing procedure was ollowed:

the post was openly advertised, ree o charge,by various titles (national, regional and specialist)

across the industry; the Director o the PCC made an initial

judgement about the merits o candidatesand submitted a long list;

lay Commissioners each examined theapplications o around 30 candidates, andput orward those they elt appropriate;

these candidates were interviewed by a panelconsisting o the PCC Chairman, a membero the Appointments Commission, and thePCC Director;

this panel made recommendations to theAppointments Commission, which then madethe appointment.

69. The Appointments Commission is a body o fveindividuals: the PCC Chairman; the Chairman oPressBo (the only industry member); and threepublic fgures. It is sel-selecting, with its Chairmanand the Chairman o PressBo nominating newmembers when vacancies occur.

70. Lay Commissioners are given three-year terms,which can be extended, and indeed have beenextended or several years. There is no ormal

process to monitor this.

71. The Governance Review recommends thatthis process be tightened and made moreaccountable. In our view, the current systemrelying on the Appointments Commission is notsustainable. The eect o it has been to disconnectthe system o appointments rom the needs othe Commission itsel. This has meant that duediligence about the merits o each appointmenthas been harder to achieve.

63. In these circumstances, it would be a matter orthe unding body to seek to restore relations withthe publisher. It should give every reasonableopportunity or payment to be restored. Should

this not happen, the Commission should beinormed o the position. Following consultationwith the Commission, and only as a last resort,PressBo could then make clear to the publisherthat deaulting on payment would mean it wasno longer part o the system. The Commissionwould as a result ormally decline to considercomplaints about the relevant titles, or oerguidance to their editors.

64. PressBo should also examine how it canencourage greater industry participation

in the system, in a way that does notcompromise the PCCs independence. Forexample, the industry could take on a moreactive role in working with the PCC to maintainor enhance proessional standards. This mightinclude greater engagement with the PCC inthe training o journalists, and a more publicrecognition o issues aecting the industryand causing public concern. Editors acrossthe industry should be encouraged to considerreerring specifc ethical issues to the PCC,and asking or its guidance.

AppointmentsChairman65. The Chairman o the PCC is appointed by PressBo.

While it is a eature o the sel-regulatory system thatan industry appointee heads the organisation, theindependence o the position may already be opento question.

66. To enhance independence, and the perceptiono it, the Governance Review recommends:

when a new appointment is being

made, PressBo should consult withCommissioners at an early stage o theprocess, to take into consideration theBoards perspective on the needs o thePCC, and the likely skills and attributeso a uture Chairman, as well as to receivesuggestions as to possible candidates;

the specifcs o the contract should beshared with the Board o the PCC, asrequired by the Companies Act (2006);

PressBo should consult Commissionersprior to appointing or otherwise the

Chairman or a second term.




75. It is also noticeable that, o the editors on theCommission, none is currently rom national dailynewspapers (although national dailies have beenrepresented in the recent past). There does not

appear to have been an editor o a daily broadsheetnewspaper or several years. Workload pressuresmay well be an issue, but wider participation romeditors is important or the uture o sel-regulation.

76. The Governance Review believes that editorialservice on the Commission should becomemore widespread, and be regarded as a dutyo editors. It calls upon PressBo to take activesteps to encourage this.This could include theadvertisement o the posts. For national editors(o which there are a small number) a rota system

could be established, to guarantee that all nationaleditors eventually serve on the PCC.

77. We make the ollowing specifcrecommendations about editorialappointments:

the Nominations Committee should reviewthe needs o the Board in advance o anyappointment, and provide inormation toPressBo. Eorts should be made to ensurethat the regions o the UK are properly andwidely represented. There should also bewide representation o publishers andtypes o publication;

PressBo should consider this inormationwhen it nominates editorial members. TheNominations Committee will then be askedto approve the nominations. In the eventthat approval is not granted, theNominations Committee should provideull reasons to PressBo and to theCommission;

there should be fxed terms or editorialappointments o three years, subject to

extension or a urther three years by theapproval o the Nominations Committee,in consultation with PressBo. However, theGovernance Review recognises that this isa uid industry and editors can change theirjobs. This would aect their position on theCommission. When the status o an editorialmember o the Commission changes, theNominations Committee should liaise withPressBo about the need or a replacement.


the Appointments Commission should bereplaced by a Nominations Committee o

the Commission; the Nominations Committee should consider

all appointments to the Commission; this sub-committee should consist o our

lay Commissioners, including the Chairmano the PCC, together with the Chairman oPressBo. It would be chaired by a layCommissioner, and not by the Chairmano the PCC;

the posts would still be openly advertised; the Nominations Committee would pay due

regard to the needs o the PCC as a whole,

including backgrounds and experienceo appointees;

the Nominations Committee would makeappointments through a properlyconstituted interview process, includingthe involvement in the recruitment processo an independent, external panel memberwith no connection to the PCC to ensurestandards are properly upheld;

the appointment o a lay memberwould be or a fxed three-year period,renewable once;

proper consideration o perormance overthe three-year period by the NominationsCommittee beore reappointment or asecond term.

Editorial Commissioners73. Industry members are currently nominated by their

respective trade bodies via PressBo. They are thenratifed by the Appointments Commission, beorethey join the Commission. There are no fxed termsor editors sitting on the PCC, as they are in eect unpaid volunteers.

74. The current system means that these appointmentsare eectively only rubber-stamped, as candidatesare placed beore the Appointments Commission,who have no clear understanding o the needs othe Board.




78. The Governance Review does not support the ideathat it should be journalists, rather than editors, whosit on the PCC. The Code has at its heart editorialresponsibility, and it is right that the industry

involvement is ormally confned to those whoare ultimately answerable to the Code.

79. This also means that the industry members shouldbe rom serving editors and not retired editors.In the current media landscape in whichtechnological change is ast-moving, and theindustry is being orced to develop all the time,the need or the involvement o those activelyengaged in the business is more pressing.

80. The Governance Review recognises the value o

liaison with journalists below editor level, whichtakes place on the PCCs training programme.However, the Commission should do more: Boardworking groups (as reerred to in paragraph 35)should consult journalists as part o increasingtheir understanding o press issues.

Termination81. For the PCC to be truly independent, it must retain

the right to remove a Board Member whethereditorial or lay in circumstances where the BoardMember is ailing properly to ulfl his/her duties andresponsibilities. This should be voted upon by theull Commission, and require a two-thirds majority.Such a resolution can only be passed i themember concerned has been given 14 daysnotice o the resolution and the reasons, plus theopportunity to oer a response.




82. The Commission as represented by its newChairman and Director has committed publiclyto improving its transparency. The PCC doesmake a lot o inormation about itsel available, but

it is not clear that people outside the organisationunderstand what the PCC does and how it doesit. We were struck by the evidence rom manywitnesses, including those connected to theindustry, who were misinormed about theCommission.

83. We welcome the act that the PCC has nowappointed a Director o Communications, withthe brie to increase awareness o PCC work, andhope that this will also represent a shit towardsuller disclosure by the organisation.

84. This should also include ull inormation about therelationships between the key bodies in the system:the Commission; the Code Committee; andPressBo. Although the latter two organisationsare outside o the scope o this report, we urge theindustry to work harder in making public how thesystem works.

85. The ollowing steps need to be taken by thePCC to increase transparency (some o whichhave begun prior to this report):

the PCC should publish the minutes oits meetings;

the PCC should improve its register ointerests to include inormation about therules guiding editorial members whencomplaints are made against their owntitles;

the PCC should ensure that statisticalinormation is consistent and clear;

PressBo should explore ways o clariyingthe unding system, making clear the basison which unding is calculated and which

publishers pay or the system; the PCC should seek approval that the

website satisfes Plain English requirements.Eorts should be made to establish aregular audit (involving inormed externalobservers, such as victim support groups)o how clear and usable the website is.

86. The Governance Review wishes to set down theduty o the Commission to be transparent and openwherever it is reasonably possible. It recommendsthat the Commission draws up a short protocol

on how it approaches this duty and whatmaterial in connection with the complaintshandling process it will make available onrequest. This will act as public commitment toopenness, and a set o principles against which itcan be tested.

87. The Governance Review does not consider thatthere are grounds or the PCC to be ormallysubject to the Freedom o Inormation Act, as itis not a publicly-unded body, and it deals withconfdential, personal inormation.

Transparency



88. Any complainant can currently challenge thehandling o a complaint by appealing to theCharter Commissioner (an independent lay fgure).He has the power to make recommendations

to the Commission that a complaint should bereconsidered. This has led to the outcomes ocomplaints being altered on several occasions.However, the Charter Commissioner can makeno judgement on the substance o a case, butcomment only on process.

89. The Governance Review recommends thatthis process o accountability should bestrengthened. However, we do not believe thatthe decision o 17 members should be allowed tobe overturned by one individual.

90. The value in the Charter Commissioner hasbeen his role as advocate or the rights o thecomplainant. He is a lay fgure, independent romthe Commission, and can examine impartiallywhether a case has been airly handled. This roleshould continue, and his title should becomethe Independent Reviewer, which would haveclearer meaning to the public. His unctionsshould be augmented to allow him to assessobjections about substance as well as process.I he eels that there are substantive reasonsor questioning a decision, he should reerthe complaint back to the Commission orreconsideration. The Commission would then eitheralter its decision, or give reasons or upholding it.

91. This new role will ensure that objections arerigorously answered beore a ruling is fnalised.This service should remain or complainants only.

92. The Governance Review, which believes thatappointments should not exceed a set periodin order to ensure independence, recommendsthat the next Independent Reviewer is oered a

single-term contract o no more than six years.

93. The Charter Compliance Panel (currently inabeyance pending the Governance Review) wasoriginally instituted to conduct an audit o randomfles, examining the handling o complaints. This

led to a series o recommendations about ofcepractice. The panel consisted o the CharterCommissioner and at least one other fgure(appointed by the Appointments Commission).One o the members could be connected to theindustry, but industry representation could notbe in the majority. The panel was so namedbecause it was asked to assess cases againstthe Complainants Charter10, a broad documentsetting out the rights o the complainant.

94. The Governance Review recommends that the

Charter Compliance Panel should be renamedthe Review Panel. It will report to the AuditCommittee. It will consist o the IndependentReviewer and no more than two other externalindividuals. Its role will be:

to conduct audits o randomly-selectedcomplaints fles to monitor perormance;

to consider complaints fles in specifc regardto issues o interest (such as the prominenceo apologies, concerns about headlines, casesinvolving children). The scope o such reviewsshould be decided by the panel, or ollow thesuggestion o the Audit Committee, and shouldlink where appropriate to any business o thePCCs working groups.

95. The Independent Reviewer and the ReviewPanel should be appointed by the NominationsCommittee. Members o the Review Panelshould be given three-year contracts,renewable once.

Accountability

10 This is available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/complaint/charter.html



AccountabilityContinued

The Chairman and Director96. It is important that there is a clear division o

responsibilities between the two fgures. In practicalterms, the Director is responsible or the running o

the Secretariat, and is accountable to the Chairmanwho is responsible or the Board.

97. The Governance Review believes that the currentChairman and Director have established a goodand defned working relationship. We commend theintroduction o an annual appraisal o the Director bythe Chairman, in which perormance and role canbe discussed.

The Chairman and the Board98. At present, there is no clear mechanism by which

the Chairman o the PCC is specifcally heldaccountable to the Commission. Nor is there aprocess or the Commission to assess its ownperormance. Increased accountability in thisarea will increase confdence in the organisation.

99. The Governance Review proposes that:

the Chairman should determine howindividual Board perormance is tobe assessed;

discussion o overall Board perormanceshould be led by the Chairman at theBoards annual awayday. This discussioncould ollow the circulation o aquestionnaire to members both layand editorial about their experienceover the year;

during this event in line with good Boardpractice the perormance o the Chairmanshould be discussed in his or her absence,in a session led by the Deputy Chairman,or a senior lay Commissioner;

every three years, consideration shouldbe given to using an external acilitator or

this process.



We discuss here briey the practical consequenceso our recommendations, which all into two areas.

Articles of Association

The Commission, in seeking to enact theGovernance Reviews recommendations, will needto ensure the Articles o Association are updated toaccommodate them.

Consideration will need to be given to changes in theollowing areas:

the appointment o the Chairman; the establishment o the Nominations Committee

in place o the Appointments Commission, andits role in appointments;

the length o the service o Commissioners andthe process o reappointment;

the removal o Board members; the modifed role o the Independent Reviewer

and the Review panel; the establishment o the Audit Committee.

ResourcesThe Governance Review is conscious o the resourceissues raised by its recommendations. It also takesnote o the wider fnancial context o structural changesin the industry (the shit to online publication, with itsrevenue implications) and a global recession, botho which have an impact on publishers resources.It is aware that, while the industry has provided aconsiderable amount o unding to the PCC over thelast 20 years, the budget has not increased signifcantlyin real terms over that time.

It is not the purpose o this review to turn theCommission into an unwieldy or bureaucratic body.It will be or the Commission and PressBo to ensurethat changes can be made appropriately and efciently.

We make the ollowing points in this area:

while we place greater responsibilities on theshoulders o the Commissioners, we do notconsider that they are signifcantly weightierthan equivalent roles on other Boards. Ourrecommendations should carry no implicationsin fnancial terms. Their annual honorarium o11.25k should remain as it is now, subject toperiodic review or ination;

we recommend the appointment o a layDeputy Chairman rom within the Board.

We recommend that this role carries with itno additional remuneration;

there is likely to be an increase in work or theSecretariat in supporting the Board. An increasein the number o published decisions, and thepossible consideration o cases by the Commissionon a secure website, will likely require additionalresource in terms o extra workload and the needor technological support. The PCC and PressBowill have to consider how this can be met.

Practical implications



Individuals consulted about the complaintsprocedures of other regulatory andself-regulatory bodies

1. Tony Close, Senior Standards Manager, Ocom2. Maria Donde, Fairness Case Manager, Ocom3. Keith Jones, Head o Communications and

Complaints, BBC Audience Services4. Alison Hastings, BBC Trustee or England;

PCC Consultant and a ormer publicCommission member

5. Fran OBrien, Head o Editorial Standards,BBC Trust

6. Joanne Poots, Head o Complaints, AdvertisingStandards Authority

7. Vena Raes, Head o Investigations, AdvertisingStandards Authority

8. Fraser Steel, Head o Editorial Complaints Unit, BBC

Appendix one



List of witnesses who gave evidence tothe Governance Review panel

1. Stephen Abell, Director, Press Complaints

Commission2. Matti Alderson, public Commission member3. Ian Beales, Secretary, Editors Code o

Practice Committee4. Sir David Bell, Chair, Board o Trustees, Media

Standards Trust5. Guy Black, Chairman, Press Standards Board

o Finance6. Baroness Buscombe, Chairman, Press Complaints

Commission7. Matthew Cain, Media Standards Trust8. Jonathan Coad, Head o Litigation, Swan Turton

9. Sir Brian Cubbon GCB, ormer public Commissionmember and ormer PCC Charter Commissioner

10. Proessor Chris Frost, Chair o the Ethics Council,National Union o Journalists

11. Mike Hall, ormer Member o Parliament or WeaverVale and ormer member o the Culture, Media andSport Select Committee

12. John Home Robertson, public Commission member13. Mike Jempson, Director, Mediawise14. Alan Keen, Member o Parliament or Feltham and

Heston and member o the Culture, Media andSport Select Committee

15. Anthony Longden, editorial Commission member16. Martin Moore, Director, Media Standards Trust17. David Newell, Director, Newspaper Publishers

Association; Director, Newspaper Society and

member o PressBo18. Julian Petley, Chair, Campaign or Press and

Broadcasting Freedom19. Proessor Robert Pinker CBE, PCC Consultant;

ormer Acting Chairman o the PCC and ormerpublic Commission member

20. Peter Preston, media commentator and ormerEditor oThe Guardian

21. Jim Raeburn OBE, Secretary and Treasurer,Press Standards Board o Finance

22. Esther Roberton, public Commission member23. Alan Rusbridger, Editor-in-chie, The Guardian

24. Eve Salomon, public Commission member25. Simon Sapper, public Commission member26. Lord Wakeham PC DL, ormer PCC Chairman27. John Whittingdale OBE, Member o Parliament or

Maldon and Chairman o the Culture, Media andSport Select Committee

28. Sir Michael Willcocks KCB CVO, PCC CharterCommissioner

29. Peter Wright, editorial Commission member

Appendix two



Summary of recommendations

Clarity o purpose

1. The Commission should take responsibility orsetting out what its role entails and make clearthe areas o activity against which it should bejudged (paragraph 21);

2. The Commission should make plain howit considers standards issues. The role omaintaining standards, under the Code,should cut across the organisation as awhole (paragraph 23);

3. The Commission should not change itsname to reer specifcally to standards. Itsrole in considering standards should be made

apparent both in terms o its public statementsand actions in the context o enorcing theCode (paragraph 23);

4. The PCC should be more open about whatit means by and what it wants to achievethrough proactivity. It should make publicthe areas in which it intends to do this(paragraph 27);

5. The Commission should produce a document,published on its website, covering all o itsaims and duties, including the specifc basisor how it works proactively (paragraph 28).

Eectiveness

General organisational recommendations

6. The PCC should agree a list o perormanceobjectives every year and publicly report onwhether they were achieved, and, i not, whynot (paragraph 32);

7. Statistics should be consistently presented toenable year-on-year comparison. The Commissionshould consider research into complaints trends,in order to establish whether there are any ailings

within the industry that require redress and toallow or analysis o the consequences in termso resource and practice (paragraph 32);

8. The Commission should institute a regularprogramme o polling public opinion on issuesrelating both to the PCC itsel and pressstandards more generally (paragraph 32);

9. The PCC should set up an Audit Committee, tobe chaired by a senior lay Commissioner, inplace o the Business Sub-Committee and withwider terms o reerence (paragraph 32);

10. There should be an annual awayday or the

Board and the Secretariat to discuss plans or thenext year and an agreed plan o work should thenbe presented to the Board (paragraph 32);

11. New Commissioners should be given a ullinduction, and be ormally mentored by a colleague(paragraph 32);

12. The Charter Commissioner (who is to be renamed

the Independent Reviewer) should attendCommission meetings twice a year (paragraph 32).

Role of Commissioners

13. Commissioners should be better inormed aboutactivities (such as the pre-publication advice,anti-harassment work and training) undertaken bythe PCC and have input into them (paragraph 34);

14. The Commission should ensure that it is examiningongoing issues, and its role in them, more eectively(paragraph 34);

15. The Commission should be updated on a weeklybasis about any proactive approaches which havebeen made to individuals (paragraph 35);

16. The Commission should be updated on a weeklybasis with any advisory notes circulated to theindustry (paragraph 35);

17. The Commission should ensure that it discussesissues o major public concern, with a view toconsidering what action it might wish to take.A record o that discussion should be madepublic, where appropriate (paragraph 35);

18. The Commission should set up working groupsto analyse and test important policy issues(paragraph 35);

19. The Commission should use complaints trends,or issues raised by working groups, to considerexpanding its range o guidance to the industryon the application o the Code (paragraph 35).

Complaints

20. The PCC should seek to publicise as many oits rulings as possible (paragraph 38);

21. When a complaint is resolved, the summaryshould reer specifcally to the issues raised

under the terms o the Code (paragraph 38);22. The Commission should make clear on its website

where complaints have been ound to have meritincluding: cases where it issues a critical ruling;cases where it fnds that sufcient remedial actionhas been oered, but not accepted by thecomplainant; cases which are resolved ollowingremedial action (paragraph 38);

23. The PCC should develop a secure site on whichall substantive complaints could be viewed andassessed by Commission members. A pilot shouldbe instituted over the next year and kept under

review (paragraphs 38 and 42).

Appendix three



Appendix threeContinued

35. The Chairman o the PCC should be encouraged toappoint a Deputy Chairman rom among the laymembers, who could give support to the Chairmanduring the term o his or her chairmanship

(paragraph 54);36. An enhanced register, available on the PCC

website, should declare not only relevant outsideinterests o all serving Commissioners, as beore,but the rules guiding serving editors on theCommission when titles in their groups are thesubject o complaints (paragraph 54);

37. The Board should make greater use o workinggroups with lay majorities to ensure that layCommissioners contribute directly to the strategicthinking o the PCC (paragraph 54);

38. The Commission should consult more regularly with

external experts so that Commission members,together with the Secretariat, continue to be at theoreront o relevant thinking (paragraph 54).

Serving editors on the PCC

39. The Commission should publish an improvedregister o interests relating to editors conicts. Thisshould make clear the criteria on which they removethemselves rom considering complaints. It shouldstate that editors do not consider complaintsrelating to titles over which they exercise editorialcontrol, with which they have close links (e.g. sistertitles), and which are under the control o theirEditor-in-Chie. The Commission should alsopublish a ull list o the relevant titles (paragraph 56).

The Editors Code of Practice Committee

40. There should be greater transparency in therelationship between the PCC and the CodeCommittee (paragraph 60);

41. The Chairman and the Director o the PCC shouldact as more than observers at Code Committeemeetings; they should represent the views o the

Commission at the table (paragraph 60);42. A ull report should be made by the PCC Chairman

to the Commission ollowing every meeting(paragraph 60);

43. Beore every review o the Code by the CodeCommittee, the Commission perhaps through adevolved working group should considerrecommending changes. The Code Committeeshould respond ormally to the Commissionexplaining their response, including the reasons whyany suggestions have been rejected (paragraph 60);

44. The PCC should be consulted on any proposed

changes to the Code beore it is asked to ratiythem (paragraph 60).

Exceptional cases

24. The Commission must ensure that it is seen ullyto examine its role when serious matters arise. It

should be clear about what it is able to do, andmake the public aware o it. The Commissionalready has the power to use oral hearings shouldit believe this would assist its unction; it should bewilling to deploy this power in appropriately seriouscircumstances and make public that it is doing so(paragraph 44).

Sanctions

25. The PCC must do more to demonstrate theeectiveness o its current sanctions, and ensure

that they are properly exercised and understood(paragraph 45);

26. The Commission needs to do more work to ensureboth that apologies are prominently published, andthat people are aware o this. A working group onthis specifc issue would be a positive step(paragraph 46);

27. The PCC should publish a document outlining thepotential outcomes and sanctions on its website(paragraph 46);

28. The PCC should consider revealing publicly whenit has admonished an editor via correspondence(paragraph 46);

29. The PCC should engage in more direct ollow-upwith editors, once a breach o the Code has beenestablished and a ruling made (paragraph 46);

30. The PCC should make more o the act thatthe Code is written into journalists contracts(paragraph 46);

31. The Commission and PressBo should considersetting up a joint working group urther to considersanctions. We believe there are a range o creativeideas about how existing sanctions could be mademore eective and be seen to be so and thatthese should be investigated (paragraph 48).

Independence

The lay majority

32. The Commission should do more to reassurepeople about the conduct o its meetings(paragraph 51);

33. The option to reduce the overall numbers o theBoard while retaining the lay majority should bekept under review (paragraph 53);

34. The lay majority should be more visible and the

experience o lay Commissioners more eectivelydeployed (paragraph 54);




54. An independent, external panel member withno connection to the PCC should be involvedin the recruitment process to ensure standardsare properly upheld (paragraph 72);

55. The appointment o a lay member should be ora fxed three-year period, renewable once(paragraph 72).

Appointments: Editorial Commissioners

56. Editorial service on the Commission should becomemore widespread, and be regarded as a duty oeditors. PressBo should take active steps toachieve this (paragraph 76);

57. The Nominations Committee should review theneeds o the Board in advance o any appointment,

and provide inormation to PressBo. Eorts shouldbe made to ensure that the regions o the UK areproperly and widely represented. There should alsobe wide representation o publishers and types opublication (paragraph 77);

58. PressBo should consider this inormation when itnominates editorial members. The NominationsCommittee will then be asked to approve thenominations. In the event that approval is notgranted, the Nominations Committee shouldprovide ull reasons to PressBo and to theCommission (paragraph 77);

59. There should be fxed terms or editorialappointments o three years, subject to extensionor a urther three years by the approval o theNominations Committee, in consultation withPressBo. When the status o an editorial membero the Commission changes, the NominationsCommittee should liaise with PressBo about theneed or a replacement (paragraph 77);

60. Board working groups should consult journalistsas part o increasing their understanding o pressissues (paragraph 80).

Press Standards Board of Finance

45. PressBo should consider hosting its own websitein which the ollowing are explained: the role o

PressBo and who serves on the organisation; howthe unding is calculated; and a list o publisherswho subscribe; how PressBo works with theCommission; the rules by which the independenceo the Commission is sustained and guaranteed(paragraph 61);

46. PressBo should examine how it can encouragegreater industry participation in the system,in a way that does not compromise the PCCsindependence (paragraph 64);

47. Editors across the industry should be encouragedto consider raising specifc ethical issues with the

PCC, and asking or its guidance (paragraph 64).

Appointments: PCC Chairman

48. When a new appointment is being made, PressBoshould consult with Commissioners at an earlystage o the process, to take into consideration theBoards perspective on the needs o the PCC, andthe likely skills and attributes o a uture Chairman,as well as to receive suggestions as to possiblecandidates (paragraph 66);

49. The specifcs o the contract should be shared withBoard o the PCC, as required by the CompaniesAct 2006 (paragraph 66);

50. PressBo should consult Commissioners prior toappointing or otherwise the Chairman or a secondterm (paragraph 66);

51. When a new Chairman is appointed, PressBoshould ensure there is an opportunity at the earlieststage or the Chairman and Director to discuss theirrespective roles (paragraph 67) .

Appointments: Lay Commissioners

52. The appointments process or appointing lay

Commissioners should be tightened and mademore accountable (paragraph 71);

53. The Appointments Commission should be replacedby a Nominations Committee o the Commissionwhich should consider all appointments to theCommission (paragraph 72);




The Chairman and the Board

72. The Chairman should determine how individualBoard perormance is to be assessed

(paragraph 99);73. Discussion o overall Board perormance should

be led by the Chairman at the Boards annualawayday (paragraph 99);

74. During this event in line with good Board practice the perormance o the Chairman should bediscussed in his or her absence, in a session led bythe Deputy Chairman, or a senior lay Commissioner(paragraph 99);

75. Every three years, consideration should be givento using an external acilitator or this process(paragraph 99).

Transparency

61. The PCC should publish the minutes o its meetings(paragraph 85);

62. The PCC should improve its register o interests toinclude inormation about the rules guiding editorialmembers when complaints are made against theirown titles (paragraph 85);

63. The PCC should ensure that statistical inormationis consistent and clear (paragraph 85);

64. PressBo should explore ways o clariying theunding system, making clear the basis on whichunding is calculated and which publishers pay orthe system (paragraph 85);

65. The PCC should seek approval that the websitesatisfes Plain English requirements. Eorts should

be made to establish a regular audit (involvinginormed external observers, such as victim supportgroups) o how clear and useable the websiteis (paragraph 85);

66. The Commission should draw up a shortprotocol on how it approaches its duty otransparency, setting out what material inconnection with the complaints handling process it will make available on request (paragraph 86).

Accountability

The Charter Commissioner and CharterCompliance Panel

67. The process o accountability as currentlyembodied in the role o the Charter Commissionershould be strengthened (paragraph 89);

68. The role o the Charter Commissioner shouldcontinue, and his title should become theIndependent Reviewer, which would have clearermeaning to the public. His unctions should beaugmented to allow him to assess objections aboutsubstance as well as process (paragraph 90);

69. The next Independent Reviewer should be oered

a single-term contract o no more than six years(paragraph 92);

70. The Charter Compliance Panel should berenamed the Review Panel (paragraph 94);

71. The Independent Reviewer and the ReviewPanel should be appointed by the NominationsCommittee. Members o the Review Panel shouldbe given three-year contracts, renewable once(paragraph 95).



Chairman o PCC is Chairman othe Appointments Commission

Diagram of the press self-regulatory system

Appendix our

Press Standards Boardof Finance(PressBof)Industry-acing

Oversees the industrys ownsel-regulation

AppointmentsCommission

Responsible or appointing newmembers o the Commission, and

the Charter Commissioner andCharter Compliance Panel

Chairman oPressBo is onAppointmentsCommission

Provides unding Appoints the Chairman

o the PCC Via the trade associations,

puts orward editorial

members

Writes the Code or thePCC to uphold

Secretary o the CodeCommittee attends PCCmeetings as necessary (orexample, to explain proposedchanges to the Code)

Commission ormallyratifes the Code

PCC Chairman and Director

attend Code Committeemeetings in an ex-ofciocapacity

PCC provides suggestions aspart o annual review process

Editors Code of PracticeCommittee

(Code Committee)

Industry and public-acing

The Code Committee is a standingcommittee o national, regional andmagazine editors to whom PressBo

has delegated responsibility orreviewing the Code

Press ComplaintsCommission

(PCC)Public-acing

Handles complaints about theeditorial content o newspapers

and magazines (and theirwebsites) by administering andenorcing a Code o Practice


28/28

The current complaints-handling process

1. When a complaint comes into the PCC, it isassessed usually within 24 hours to see

whether it raises a possible issue under the termso the Code. Complaints sta will work with thecomplainant to help establish this.

2. I the complaint alls under the terms o the Code,it is considered in one o two categories: thecomplaint appears to raise no prima acie breach othe Code, and the Commission is asked to considerthe matter ormally; the complaint appears to raise aprima acie breach o the Code and the complaint isinvestigated. I the complaint alls outside the termso the Code, the complaints ofce will explain the

reasons and suggest alternative courses o action.For example, i a complaint is about an advert, thePCC will write to the Advertising StandardsAuthority on behal o the complainant.

3. When there appears to be no prima acie breacho the Code, the Commission is presented witha ull summary o the case and a recommendeddecision. Commissioners then consider thecomplaint. I they all endorse the recommendation,the decision is sent out to the complainant andeditor. I Commission members do not agree,either an amended decision is ormulated, or thecomplaint is investigated.

4. During an investigation, a complaints ofcer seeksto establish the acts o the case and whereappropriate to mediate a settlement on behalo the complainant. One important role or acomplaints ofcer is to advocate on behal othe complainant, and seek to obtain desiredremedial action. I the complaint is resolved tothe complainants satisaction, the PCC publishesa summary o the resolution.

5. Sometimes the editor makes an oer, which isnot accepted by the complainant. Sometimes,the editor deends publication and argues thatthe Code has not been breached. The complaints

ofcer then ensures that all o the relevantinormation on the case has been obtained,and the investigation conducted ully. When therehas been a likely outstanding breach o the Code,the complaint is taken to the next Commissionmeeting or discussion. I the case raises animportant point o principle, it will also beconsidered at a meeting.

6. The remaining cases are circulated viacorrespondence, with a recommended decision(either that a breach o the Code has been

remedied, or that there has been no breach othe Code). Commissioners either agree or amendthe decision, or can ask or it to be brought ordiscussion at the meeting. The majority o casesare considered on a weekly basis, rather thanat meetings.

7. When the Commission fnds an unresolved breacho the Code, it issues a critical adjudication. This hasto be carried in ull and with due prominence by theoending newspaper, as required by the Code oPractice10. The PCC also publicises the decision onits website, and will talk publicly about what wentwrong and what lessons can be learned in uture.

Appendix fve

10 The Preamble to the Editors Code o Practice states: Any publicationj d d t h b h d th C d t i t th dj di ti i ll

the governance of the press complaints commission: an independent review

Documents