TheHardProblemofConsciousness(Dr.RobertPrentner,guestlecture,Oct12,2017)

Whatexactlyisthehardproblem?Whatdoesitruleout,whatdoesitsay?

TheHardProblemofConsciousness• “Whyisallthisinformation-processingaccompaniedbyanexperiencedinnerlife?Ifanyproblemqualifiesastheproblemofconsciousness,itisthisone”(DavidChalmers)

• Thehardproblemaimsatphysicalism- theideathateverythingthatexistsispurelyphysicalandthatallfactsarephysicalfacts.Accordingtophysicalism,consciousnesswerephysicalandeveryfactaboutconsciousnessisaphysicalfact.Theproblemofconsciousnesswouldreducetotheproblemoffindingaphysicalmechanism.

TheHardProblemofConsciousness• Contrastthistothe“easyproblems”:

1. Theabilitytodiscriminate,categorize,andreacttoenvironmentalstimuli

2. Theintegrationofinformationbyacognitivesystem3. Thereportability ofmentalstates4. Theabilityofasystemtoaccessitsowninternalstates5. Directingattentiontosomething6. Thedeliberatecontrolofbehavior7. Thedifferencebetweenwakefulnessandsleep

• Doyoufindanypatternorasystematicdistinctionbetweeneasy/hardproblems?

Thefunctional/phenomenaldistinction

• Example1:Havingaccesstoinformation• Example2:Bindingofsensoryinformation

• Thereisan“explanatorygap”(Levine1983)betweenstoriesaboutbrainfunctionandaboutthecorrespondingphenomenology

Somerelatedquestions

1) Whyisitthatsomebrainstatesgiverisetoexperiencesatall?• Wewantatheorytoanswerthewhy-question.

2) Whyisitthatthisbrainstategivesrisetothatexperienceinsteadofanotherone?

• Wewantatheoryofconsciousnesstobespecific.

3) Howdoesthebraincreateconsciousness?• Thisquestionsuggeststhatsomeinformationbecomesconscious/phenomenal.“Andthen,whathappens?”(DanielDennett)

4) Whatistheorigin ofconsciousness?Whatisitgoodfor?• Thisissuggestanevolutionaryapproach.Doesevolutionplayanimportantrolewrt toconsciousness? Why/whynot?

5) Howcouldqualiaexistinthephysicalworld?Howistheexistenceofqualiaconsistentwithphysicalism?

• Thisisametaphysical question.Ifeverythingthatexistsisphysical,howcantherebethingslikequalia?• Eitherqualiaarephysical,and we would be wrong to think otherwise…• Or physicalism is wrong.

BUT:Canwe be wrong about the nature of qualia (cf.later parts of lecture)?Dowe have any clear sensewhat phyicalism is allabout (i.e.what is matterandpanpsychism)?Is this alljustnonsense,and did we make some conceptual erroralong the way?

HowtoarguefortheHardProblem?

1. TheZombieargument• Zombiesareconceivable.Therefore,Zombiesarepossible.Therefore,physicalismiswrong.

• Zombie=perfectphysicalduplicateofusbutwithoutconsciousness.IfZ.arepossible,thereneedtobesomethinginaddition tothephysicalstates.“Godneededtodosomethingmoreafterheconceivedthephysicalworld”(e.g.heneededtocreate“souls”)

• ButonecoulddoubtthatZombiesareconceivableORthatconceivabilityentailspossibility.

Conceivabilityvs.Imaginability vs.Possibility(1)

• Therearevarioussensesofconceivability.• ConceivabilityintheZombie-argument:Toconceiveofst. meanstohaveacoherentconceptofit.• Example:Wecouldconceiveofinfinityeventhoughwecouldnotimagineinfinity

• Andsimilarlyforpossibility:Somethingmightnotbepossibleintherealworld;butitcouldbepossibleinprinciple• Example:Napoleoncouldhavewonthewar• Somethingscouldbeimpossibleeveninthissense,butstilltheyarelogicallypossible.Logically,theworldcouldhavecome into existence suchthat...

Conceivabilityvs.Imaginability vs.Possibility

• Arethesethingsconceivable/imaginable/possible?Inwhichsense?Whyorwhynot?

• Roundsquares• Countableinfinities• Infinitesums(e.g.∑ 1/𝑛^2�

( )• Applesfallingupward• Timerunningbackwards• Aperpetuum mobile• Themoonismadeoutofcheese

Conceivabilityvs.Imaginabilty vs.Possibility(2)

• ConceivabilityintheZombie-argument:Theconcept of aZombieislogically coherent and notcontradictive initself.• PossibilityintheZombie-argument:Therecouldexista(verydifferent)universeinwhichZombiesarepossible• Importantly:NeitherthefactsthatZombiesarenotimaginablenorpossibleintheactualworldareenoughtorejecttheZombie-argumentagainstphysicalism.

ButareZombiesreallyconceivable?

• Isconceivabilitycontingentonourhavingacertaintheory/worldview?• “TypeAmaterialists”:Therereallyarenotsuchthingsas(unphysical)qualia,thusweareallZombiesbutact(andthink!)asifwewerenot.• Apparentconceivabilitycouldbe“explainedaway,”givencertaintheories.Butisthisreallythecase?• Trytoarguethatconsciousnessisanillusion.Compareconsciousnessto“other”illusionsorfalsebeliefs.Whatisdifferent?

• “Panpsychists”:Allmatterisconscious,thusZombiesarenotconceivable.

ButareZombiesreallyconceivable?(2)

• Isconceivabilityhistoricallyrelative?• Conceivabilitydependsonourconceptualfaculties.Conceptualfacultiesarenotfixed;theyevolvebiologicallyandculturally.

• Isitafactofthematterwhethersomethingisconceivableornot?

HowtoarguefortheHardProblem?

2. Theknowledgeargument:Marytheneuroscientist• Maryisabrilliantneuroscientist;sheknowseverythingshecouldknowaboutcolorvisionintermsofphysics.ButMarylivesinablack/whiteroomandshehasn’teverexperiencedcolorsherself.• IfwefreeMaryfromherblack/whiteroom,shewillexperiencecolors.Hasshetherebylearntanythingnew?

• Ifyes,doesthismeanthatthereare“unphysicalfacts”?• Ifno,whatexactlyisdifferent?

Somepossiblereactions• Therearenoadditionalfacts.Seeingcolorsandknowingaboutcolorsaredifferentkindsofthings(similarto“knowhow”vs.“knowthat”)• experienceasabilityvs.experienceasknowledge

• Thereareadditionalfactsaboutqualia;thus,qualiaexist.• Qualiaareunphysical(seepremise)butepiphenomenal(becauseofthe”causalclosure”ofphysics).

• Experiencingcolorsmeanstoactualizeadifferentkindofrelationtothephysicalworld.• Thewayitisliketoexperiencecoloristhewayaphysicalproperty(e.g.surfacereflectance)isrepresentedbyasystem(NB:thephenomenology ofsomethingisnecessarilytiedtothefunction ofrepresentingittoMary!)

ProssurfürPhilosophie

Representing the world as qualitative• „Qualia are nothing butthe properties things inthe physical world arerepresented as having“(FredDretske)

• Why are suchrepresentations useful?• They have the function of pointing to properties inthe environment• That is,they provide the organism with information about the environment

• Butcould this idea make senseof qualia?• Only if it could be shown how qualia underly the future behavior of aphysical system ORif it could be shown that qualia are „spandrels.“

• What are these „physical properties“that get represented anyway?• Thecontents of experience are (most likely)very differentfrom thephysical properties of things inthe world.

• Could you think of areply to the Zombieargument?

Organism

carries information

signals Objective state inthe world

Representation;qualia

Ascienceofconsciousness?

• Doesthehardproblemimplythatascienceofconsciousnessisimpossible?Why/whynot.

• Issubjectivityanobstacle?Why/whynot

Correlationvs.Causation

• Neuroscienceofconsciousnessisaboutfindingcorrelatesbetweenconsciousnessandbrainstates• But“neuralcorrelates”ofconsciousnessarenotidenticalto“neuralcauses”ofconsciousness

• Couldtherebesystematiclinksbetweenconsciousnessandbrainstates?Whatwouldthisimply?Whatneededtobedone?

What-is-it-likeness– apseudo-problem?

• Whatisitliketobeabat?Whatarethecontentsandstructureofabatsinnerlife?

vs

• Isitsomethingliketobeabat?Howisconsciousnessdistributedintheworld?

Subjectivityvs.objectivity

• Isconsciousnesstoo“airy-fairyandtouchy-feely”forscientificstudy?(JohnSearle)• Epistemological/ontologicaldistinction• Brainstates:ontologicallyandepistemologicallyobjective• Artandvalues:ontologicallyandepistemologicallysubjective• Money:Ontologicallysubjective andepistemologicallyobjective• Consciousness:ontologicallysubjectivebutepistemologicallyobjective?• God:ontologicallyobjectivebutepistemologicallysubjective?

Literature• Somephilosophical“classics”

• Chalmers,David(1996):Theconsciousmind,Oxford:UniversityPress• Dennett,Daniel(1991):Consciousnessexplained,NewYork:Little,Brown&Company.• Nagel,Thomas(1974):Whatisitliketobeabat?,Phil.Rev.83:435– 450.• Jackson,Frank(1982):Epiphenomenalqualia,PhilQuat.32:127-136.• Levine,Joseph(1983):Materialismandqualia:Theexplanatorygap,PacificPhil.Quat.64:354- 361• Dretske,Fred(1995):Naturalizingthemind,Cambridge:MITpress.• Searle,John(2000):Mind.Oxford:UniversityPress.

• Formasochistsonly (!)• Kripke,Saul(1980):Namingandnecessity(chapter5),Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.• Chalmers,David(2009):Thetwo-dimensionalargumentagainstmaterialism

• Scientificmodelsofconsciousness• Crick,Francis&Koch,Christof(2003):Aframeworkforconsciousness,Nature6(2):119-126.• Baars,Bernard(1988):ACognitiveTheoryofConsciousness,Cambridge:UniversityPress;Dehaene,Stanislas etal.(1998):Aneuronalmodelofaglobalworkspaceineffortfulcognitivetasks,PNAS95(24):14529

• Tononi (2004):AnInformationintegrationtheoryofconsciousness,BMCNeurosci,5:42.