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3

THE DOMINATION COMPLAINT

PITI1,IP PETTIT

It is possible to conceptrialize political frcedo~li as the absence of dnniination, a r g ~ ~ i n g that a person is frer to the extent that others do not s t a ~ ~ d over 11ini or her, able to interfere at will and with i.c.lative inipunitv in his or her affairs. Arid this, furthermore, is how political freedom appears to have I ~ e e ~ i coiiccptualized in the long and broad rcpi~blican tradition: the tradition that stretches from republican Rome to revolntio~~ary America arid F~.aiice, en- colnpassillg figures as diverse as Cicero, Machiavelli. Harrington, Montesquie~l, Kousseau, and Madison. I have defended those two claims, respectively philosophical and historical, in earlier writ- ings, as indeed have a n l~mber of other authors.'

In addition to defending those two claims, however, I have also , argued that there is a good case for resuscitating the republican

viewpoint as a political philosophy, on the grounds that it has many advantages in comparison with contei~iporary alternatives. I concentrate in the present essay on this third claim, approaching it from a new arigle. The essay is in three sections. In the first, I consider the main constraints that we should expect any candidate for a central or supreme political ideal to satisfy, distinguishing between constraints of feasibility and constraints of desirability. And the11 in the second and third sections, I argue that the ideal of nondomination does remarkably well in satisfying those feasibility and desirability constraints. The argument in these sections is in- evitably soniewhar sketchy, since it often recapitulates points that I have elaborated elsewhere.

PHILIP PETTIT

1. CONSTRAINTS ON A P01.1'1 ICAI. IDEAL

Ideals and Complaints

Any political ideal that aspires to be a central or srlpl-eme political role has to ~~ rov ide a basis for assessing the way the polity is constituted and the way i t behaves withill the liinits set by that constit~l- tion. 'I'hc asscssnient of a polity turns in the last analysis o n how well i t serves its citizens or members, answering to interests they avow or are disposed to avow; I abstract from the assessment of the polity for its cff(:cts on nonnlembers. And this being so, we must therefore expect any woultl-be political ideal to try and articulate the i~nportance of' solnrthing in which peoplr clearly have an avowed or readily avowablr: interest: something whose absence i l l

their 1ivc.s will spo~ltalleo~~sly lead the111 to make complaint. This condition is satisfied by every half-plausible political ideal.

Take ideals s l~ch as those provided by the elinlination of poverty, thc achicvclllellt of'eclualit): the approximation ofj~lsticc, and the ~niriimization of i~lterference in people's lives or the maximization of' happiness. In every case we rnay expect people to be ready to complain about the absence of the condition recommended under the ideal: that is, to coinplain about povertv or inequality, injustice, interference, 01- unhappiness. And that is as i r should be. For were people not ready to complairi iri this way, then the ideal could hardly claim to reflect an interest that they were readily disposed to avow.

So rnuch for what 1 describe as the basic condition on any would- be candidate for the role of political ideal. With that condition spelled out, we can explore the forther constraints that we might want a political ideal to satisfy. 'These are all well cast as constraints on the sort of complaint that an attractive ideal ought to articulate and I distinguish them into two bunches. So far as the first bunch is satisfied by the complaint, the corresponding ideal will be a feasible ideal for the state to track; so far as the second bunch is satisfied, it will be an ideal that i t is also desirable that it should track.

The constraints of feasibility are, first, that the state or polity should be able to do something about relieving or remedying the corn-

Thlr 1L)omination Complaint 89

plaint in question; second, that it should be able to provide an e f fective remedy that does not introduce new problems in place of old; and third, that i t shor~ld be able to provide arl efficient as well as an effective remedy: that is, a rellledv that involves lower costs overall than any alternative strategy. In a phrase, the complaint must be politically remediable and remediable in an effective and efficient manner.

That the compla i~~t 111ust he I-emediable means that it must anlourlt to so~neth i~ lg more politically intclresting thall a complaint aborlt the constraints of' social life, or a complaint abuut the ( I T ~ ~ T I ~ ~ P or ~ l t ~ l u i of human existence, or a complaint about the in- eq~lalities of status that emerge alllong almost all groups of llulnall beiligs. T'her-e is little or nothing that govel-nlllents can d o about such matters, howcvcr sharply they may impinge on people's con- scio~~sness, and so there is no point in using them as a basis out of wlii(.ll to ( . O I ~ S C ~ I I C I a pulitical ideal.

But a complaint might be renlediabl(. wirllout tile state or polity being able to provide an effPcti\le renledy. I t ~iligllt be that state in- tervelitioll woultl be counterprodrlctive, for example, erlgrnder- ing on novel fronts precisely the sort of corriplaint that it is designed to relieve. Thl~s , it nligllt do more harm than good in its attcrnpt to reduce the net level of a certain evil-say, intel-ference or donlination-in the society: it might perpetrate more interference or donlination than i t prevents.

Finally, to tllrn to the third constraint, the fact that the state is able to remedy a co~rlplaint, and d o so eff'ectively, does not mean that it represents the most efficient way of dealing with it. There may be nonpolitical ways of relieving the complaint that achieve better results for the same or for lower costs. If the complaint is to underpin a feasible political ideal, then the state should be able to remedy the complaint efficiently as well as effectively.

Tbese three constraints are hard to resist, yet many proposed ideals seem to fail them. The first constraint would rule out t r y ing to construct a political ideal out of wholesale antipathy to power, fbr example, as sometimes appears to happen in the work of Michel Foucault.' In railing against the capillary power that runs through the smallest veins of the system, Foucault does sometimes direct attention to phenomena that we might hope to be able to rectify. But often he seems to be castigating a sort of

90 PHILIP PETTI'I'

irlflueilce that is as inescapable in the social world as gravity is in thp ~ l i ~ t ~ ~ r a l .

The second, effectiverlrss conslraint, raises serious questions about the liberiarian ideal of ensuring that certain allegedly natural rights are I-espccted i l l social life, i l l particular the right that people arc assunlctl to have agail~st the coercive restriction of' c11oic.e. For there is rlo way il l rvhich the state can aci so as to acl~ieve that idcal without itself' o fk~id ing agaillst i t by coercively I-eslricting thc clioiccs of' illdividuals. 'l'his is the probl r~n that Kobcrt No~ick ack~~owledges as a challeilgc for rights-basctl liber- [. '11 .. ~;i~l is~i i , goirlg 011 to niake all attcrnpt LO resolve i t thai is ingen-

ioi~s, if ' l~ot s~~c.c.essfi~l.:' IIc argues illai eve11 if'pcoplc were eniirely rc.spcctli~l o f ' o l~c a~loilier's rights, ratiolial selflinterest w o ~ l d leacl ihc~~i-witho~ll violatilig lhose rights-lo institute a stale: specifically, arl "ult~-ami~limaI" sVatia of' the kind close to that which he llin~sc~lf' favors.

1 ' 1 1 ~ tllird, effic.ic.iicy co~isirailii, rxplaills why most of' us agree that we shol~ld not rcq~lirc the slate to concerrl itself' with saving people's souls or elevatillg their minds-with their fidelity to ariy partic~ilar religioii 01- tlleir acllicvc.lneni of any personal ideal. Sev- enteellih- and eightcellth-centl~ry defenders of tolerance likeJohn 1.ocke made the I-elevanl poilit rvlleri lhey argued that the way to win people's souls to the practice of' arty rvorthwlrile religion is by free conseni, no1 state coe r~ io r i .~ There are betler ways-certainly morc efficient ways-to tackle a supposed problem of unbclicf than to have I-ccourse to the power of the polity.

The second bunch of constraints oil lhe sort of complaint that a plausible political idcal should reflect relate to the desirability of the stale's relieving lhe complaint, as distinct from the feasibility of its doing so. There are ihrec constraints that I distinguish in this calegory. The first is that the complaint be discursively adrrlissible: that is, acimissible as a relevant corisideration in any open discursive discilssiori of' how ihillgs are and shol~ld be organized in a society. The olher two constraints bear on ihe substantive character of the con~plaint ilself rather thari on such a slructural aspect. The second is h a t it be a significant complaint, that it is hard to dismiss

The Do~r~inatiwn Cwrr~plaint 9 1

or downplay. And the third is lhat it be a complaint that subsumes a variety of other significant complaints within it.

The first constraint would rule out of consideraliorl any conlplaint that is irreducibly relativized lo a particular group wilhin the society. Take a colllplaillt of the form, "this is bad for us," where the pllll-a1 refers to a particular group, not to the society as a whole. This niighl be jusl a way of drawing attention to a more general, nonsectional complaint, of course. The background as- slinlption might be that thc al-rangenlent lcavcs others no better off, so that rejectiilg it would be a Pareto i11lproveine11t: good for some-the complaining group-bad for none. Or the assu~nption might be that the respect in which the arrangement is bad fix the group is a rcspecl-say, that of' access to one's own cullure-oil which all can agree that no group ought to be disadvantaged.But suppose that the complaint, "this is bad for w," does not reduce to a more neutral fi)rm ofconiplaint. In that case, it would not be discursively adnlissible, lhougll il mighl be admissible in lhe context ol' mutual bargaining. The ordilla~v practice of' discourse or conversation would rule i t out as an irrelevant consideration to raisc in an unforced, cooperative discussion about how lhings 011ghl lo be polilically organized; it would represen1 a sort of special pleading and would be inconsistent with the assunlptions built into such a discussion." 'l'he response that the cornplaint would invite is: "That's not gel-mane; lhe poinl is lo discover what's best for all of us in the society, notjust what's best for your group in particular."

But a complaint can be discursively admissible without being particularly significant, and so without satisfying the second constraint of desirability. 11 may be that while almost any of 11s can understand why a certain complaint should be made, none of' us thinks that the cornplaint is of the greatest morneril. While believ- ing that someone has a.just complaint in some matter, for example, we may feel that the complainant is lucky to have nothing morc pressing to complain about. Clearly, any complaint out of which a plausible polilical ideal is to be conslrucled had beller not be a complaint of this kind. It should be what I shall describe as a significant complaint.

The third constraint I mentioned is [ha1 any cornplaint out of which a political ideal is lo be constructed should subsume a variety of other presumptively significant complaints within it. This

92 PHILIP PETTIT

constraint bears in particular on any ideal that aspires to a central or suprerne place in politics. What it is desig~ied to rule out is the sort of ideal whose satisfaction would still leave a variety of other presurilptivcly significant conlplaints unsatisfied. The ideal of rnax- i~nal ~ io~ i in t e r f e re~~cc fails rather dranlatically on this front, for ex- atnple, since a society night realize such all ideal and yet be one \vlier.e i~~cqr~ality, tlon~i~iation, ant1 poverty prevail. If a cornplaint is to ~>ro\ide the stuft'out of which a central or supreme political ideal is to he fashioned, t11e11 the nleasures taken fhr satisfying it sl~oulcl scbrvc as far as possible to satisfy such othc:r coniplaints as well. This co~~str.ai~it lnay t)e hart1 to lrleet but it clearly represerlts a plausible (lrsidrruturn. ?i) the extent that a complaint satisfies it, the correpo~lding ideal will have a c la i~r~ to a central and perhaps even suprc~iic place among political itleals.

T11e1.c are other clesidrrata that we might want a political ideal to satisfy, hr~t I shall stick with those-just rehearsed. 111 the next section I look at how far the republican ideal of nondonlir~at io~~ satisfies the feasibility constraints, and then in the final section I look at how far it answers to the co~isr~,air~ts of dcsirahility. While 1 shall have to make my points briskly and without ~rluch elaboration, 1 hope that the overview I provide will help to show,just ho\v attractive the itleal is.

The three questions to be asked about the coniplaint that republican theory privileges-the complaint, as I take it, about being dominated-are whether- this is something that the state can take steps to remedy; if so, whether the remedy it can offer is effective, not counterproductive; and if it is efiective, whether the I-emedy provided is efficient, conlparing well with alternative strategies.

Defining Dom.ination

Before tackling those questions, however, we rrilist first c o n d e r what domination involves. Here I must be brief, drawing on work done e l~ewhere .~ I say that individual or group agents dominate an individual to the extent that they are in a position to interfere ar-

bitrarily in the affairs of that person: to the extent, that is to say, that such arbitrary interference is accessible a r ~ d ~~ncostly.

My understanding of interference is narrow, so far as I take it to require intentionality or at least negligence-quasi-intentionality -on the part of the agent; it does not materialize just by way of brute arcitlent but is something for which the agent can be reason- aldy held respo~isible.~ My understanding ot'interference is broad, 011 [lie other hand, so far as I take it to i nc l~~de , notjust removir~g an option fioni the range of optior~s otherwise available in sonle choice to the persorl interftred with, but raising the costs of taking an op~ ion or even denying the person knowledge of the options available or o P the costs in prospect.Vhe intuition drivirlg the account is that intcrkrencc sl~ould t,e equated with any initiative that i~~te~~t ior la l ly worsens an individual's choice situation-and this, even if it is for the person's overall good-where contextual conventions and expectations rnay be irlvolved in deternlining whether a c~ r t a in act counLs as a way of worse~ling that situation. 'l'l~us, to illustrate the approach taken, an agent nlay interfere with someone's choice, not just by forcibly or mar~ipulatively riggir~g the options available, but also by tllreaterling her sincerely with a pcnalty if she takes a certain option or by actually penalizing her for taking it. And an agent may interf'ere in the person's affairs by misleading her, as in the insincere but credible threat of penalty or in the deliberate withholding of information."'

An agent is dominated, I said, to the extent that a group or individual is in a position to interfere arbitrarily in his or her affairs. What makes an act of interference arbitrary? Not the effect of that interference itself: not, for example, the fact that it is to the detri- nient of the victim involved. Rather, the fact that in choosing to interfere, the dominating agent is not forced to track the avowed interests of the individual interfered with-or the interests the victim is readily disposed to avow-but can interfere more or less as his or her own will or judgment dictates. An act of interference will be arbitrary to the extent that it is not controlled by the avowable interests of the victim but, as arbitrary interference usually will be, is controlled by the arbitrium of the interferer, where arbi- tnum may refer to will orjudbment. Thus, an act of interference may be done for the good of the victim, and may be successful in achieving that good, and yet be arbitrary. That it is arbitrary is

94 PHILIP PETTIT

fixed by the controls to which it is subject, not the ends that i t happens to effect.

There are three respects ill which domination, by this account, cornes in degrees. An agent may have a greater or lesser capacity to interfere arbitrarily in someone's affairs, for the o p t i o ~ ~ may he more or less accessible or uncostly. An agent may have a capacity to interfere more or less ai-bitrarily, for 11e ir~ay be more or less iln- burdeiled by co~~straints designed to Sorce hi111 to track tht. avowable i~~terests of the victim. h d an agent may have a capacity to interfrre arbitrarily in a larger or sillaller class of choices by the agelit, or in choicc:~ that are intuitively of greater or lesser significance to the age111.l' l)oii~ination, then, is not an on-or-off'cor~di- tion but one to which a persoil iriay be subject at a higher or lower degree of intensity. This should always be kept in mind, even when convenierlce of prcsentation requires 11s to describe it as if it were an on-or-off 1llattt.i..

Is the conlplaint about being dorninatcd by others one that the state is in a position, at least in pr.iiiciple, to do something about? Clearly, 1 think, yes. In the nature of things, the state clai~r~s a lno- nopoly of legitimate force i r ~ its comm~~nity-if other agencies ex- el-cise legitimate force that is through being allowed to do so by the state-and that clai~ll lnust be more or less effectively imple- mented within arly well-ordered polity. But if the state has access to the use of force, and to the threat of force-to coercion-then i t is in a position to reduce the degree to which people sutfi.r at least certain foriris of domination.

One way in which it might do this is by redistributing resources and powers of interference across the population in a society. Where X was previously able with impunity to interfere arbitrarily in Ys affairs, a 1-edistribution might ensure that Y is able to retali- ate, so that the expected cost of X's interference goes up and the doinillation X enjoys diminishes or- disappears. Call this the strategy of arinarrlent. Another way in which the state might reduce domination is by disarmanleiit: that is, by removing the extra resources and powers that enable some to dominate others. And yet

another is by protection-by putting defenses in place for those who might otherwise be dominated.

The armament, disarmament, and protection strategies might in turn be pursued by the state in a more or less direct or more or less indirect way. Those who are dominated may be armed or prcr tected by virtue of explicit legal and political nleasi~r-es. Or they may be armed or protected so far as the state Facilitates and spon- sors dcveloprrlents in civil society that senre suitable purposes. Thev lnay be armed or protected, ti)r clxample. so far as the state is able to encourage a civic culture of conde~r~nation tbr various forms of arbitrary interference and a culture of coming to the aid of those who suffer such interference. Again those who dorrli- nate might be disarmed by cxplicit statc action or by recourse to less fornlal methods. 'lhke the case where a monopoly firm in a company town tloir~inates those who depend on the firm for ern- ployment. This firm may be effectivelv disarmed if the state explicitly limits its power of disl~lissal, o r erlsilres relatively generous unemployinc.r~t t)ei~rfits, or provides incentives or facilities that attract other e~nployers into the labor market. -1'hc possibilities are legion.

Let i t be granted that the state call do something by way of remedying the complaint rnany people will have-whether or not they phrase it that way-of being dominated by others: the complaint is not one of those irremediable complaints that no one, or at least not the state, is able to do anything about. The next question is whether in seeking to provide a remedy for the complaint of donlination, the state is likely to do more harm than good. In particular, is it likely to represent a new force of domination at the very moment that it seeks to relieve people of domination? Is it likely to be counterprodi~ctive?

Consider, first, not the ideal of nondomination, but rather that of noninterference. It is conlmonly acknowledged among those who invoke this ideal-this conception of freedom-that as the state tries to reduce the interference that some agents practice in the lives of others, it will itself have to interfere in people's lives. In

96 PHILIP PETTIT

order to prevent violer~ce and coercion, it will itself have to coerce people into paying taxes and obeying the laws, arld it will have to practice penal violence against convicted offenders, whether in levying fines, imprisoning them, or even resorting to capital pun- ishnient. "As against the coerciorl applicable I>y iridi~idual to individual, no liberty call be given to orie man but in proportion as i t is taken away fi-om another. All coercive laws, therefore, and in particular all laws creative of liberty, are as far as they go abrogative of liberty."" 'I'his means that there is a risk of the state being an inef- f'ective agency for pro~noting noniriterferencc-it may do ~nol-c. l iar~n than good-though it does not Inearl that the state will necessarily be ineff'ective: there rriay be good grountls for hoping that the level of i~i tcrkrence it pe~.petratcs is less than the level of in- tcsrf(.rence it preverits.

FIow do things stand with the state as an agency fix promoting nondo~ni~lation, as distinct fro111 noniriterkrence? Tllcy stand cvtw better. For not o11ly is there bound to be a hope, if the state dominates people in sollie nieaslire, that i t will perpetrate less d o ~ n i n a t i o ~ ~ than it prevents. Tllcre is also a hope that while i t interferes in people's lives. it will still not dominate thern. or- will dominate them only i r ~ a relatively insignificarit degree.

The reason fbr this higher hope is that while the state has to interfere with people, if only by way of coercing them to pay taxes and obey the law, it need not interfere with them arbitrarily. It will not interfere arbitrarily, according to the account given earlier, if it is in the ready-to-be-avowed, overall interest of each to have a state that interferes i r l their lives, and controls their affairs, according to a certain brief. And it is plausible that this will be in the ready-to- be-avowed interest of each, provided that the interference allowed to the state is subject to a controlling brief that helps to ensure that on every issue it has to track the common, readily avowable interests of citizens, and only such interests. I conceive of common interests as those interests whose collective promotion is supported by considerations that people admit as discursively relevant, but others may wish to introduce a different conception at this point.'"hatever conception of common, readily avowable interests is adopted, however, the really telling question is whether there is any prospect of constraining the state, once established, so

The Ilorninalion Complaint 97

that it acts only for the fill-therance of such interests: in the tradi- tional phrase, only for- the pro~notion of the common good.'"

The republican tradition has given ellor-nlous. sometimes almost exclusive attention to this question in the long history thiit involves Cicero and Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Ro~~sseau, 11;1r- rington and Madison. The notion of the blended or iriixed constitution-thc sort of constitution that Polybius celebrated in Rome -was tleveloped, for example, ill the attempt to work out the sorts of' ~rraligements that wol~ld constrain the state suitably and effectively, fi)rc:ing i t to sellre the common good. And many other notions, some of them inlplicated in this master idea, were elaborated ant1 varicd with a view to finding the best institutional design. They include proposals for dividing up sovereignty both between the legislature, the executive, arid the judiciary and-as in bicameral arrangements-within the legislature; for requiring pliblic decisions to bc matters of proper legislation, and for legislation to conform to the rule of law: fbr ensuring that decisions are made according to agreed-lipon reasons and for establishing associated possibilities of appeal, review, and consultation; fix devising methods of election and appointment to public office that further the prospcct of common avowable interests-the common good -bcing tracked; and for constitutionally limiting the range of niatters over which government can have influence as well as for limiting the sorts of decisions it can make.

The most interesting challenge for republican thought today- that is, for the sort of thinking that is oriented around the ideal of nondomination-bears on how to design political arrangements so that, as far as possible, the state really is forced to track all and only the common, ready-to-be-avowed interests of the citizenry. The challenge is to see how far government may operate, so that while i t can have the reduction of nondomination as a central or- even prirlcipal aim, it need not itself represent an arbitrary and therefore dominating influence.'" do not say that any institutional design is going to remove domination fully and meet the challenge with complete success. But there is at least a hope that state dominatio~l may be reduced to a tolerable minimum: a level that is cle;lrly compensated for- bv the domination that the state prevents.

98 PHILIP PETTIT

That this hope is rational is enough for our purposes here; we tlo not have to d o any more by way of vir~dicating it. For the fact that i t is rational to hop? fbr an institi~tional design that will curb the dolriinatilig potential of the state lnealls that we cannot dismiss the complaint about dominatio~l as olle that no state coilld reniedy effectively. To dismiss i t in such a way woi~ld be to surrender pr-eenlptively to despair at ever finding the sort of institutional dc- sign rcquiretl.

'Ihe position adopted here is not one of' i~topiall itl(~alis~il. We may coliccdr. for cxa~nple, that even if the state does not in te r f re i l l an arbitrary ant1 do~~lirlatirlg way in people's lives, i t is still ho~lnd to do some harm to their e n j o y ~ n e ~ ~ t of nondominatetl clloice. It is hound to litnit the range over whicli people Itlay elljoy nondominaled clioic:~, just as n a t ~ ~ r a l obstacles limit that range. Like the nonintentional obstri~ctioll that the nati1r;ll world or the social system may inlpose, nonarbitra1-y but intelitional intrrkr- encr will cordition people's enjovnlent of noridonlinatioll. even it' i t does not co~npl.olrlise it: even if il does not itself represent a form of domination."' It will restrict the number of choices in which people may take advantage of their not bei~ig doliiinatcd.

The fact that the state is bound to condition people's erljoy- nlent of iond dominated choice irl this way does not mean that it will bc an ineffective agency for proniotirig noridomination. We nray tlisagree abollt how exactly to weight the two, hut the cornpro- mising of nondoniiriation that the state can prevent is intuitively more important than the conditioning of nondoniination that it is bound to impose. Still, there is an important lessol~ that fi)llows from the fact that even the nondominating state condiiions people's enjoyment of nondoniination. This is that, as between two forms of state that do equally well in reducing domination, where one i~ivolvcs deeper-running legislation and coercion than the other, we ought to prefer to have the one that interferes less.

Finally, we have an objection. If the state espouses nondomina- tiori as a goal, won't it find itself shackled to a project that will de- mand more and rnore in the way of resources and interference? Won't it be at the mercy of' an essentially insatiable goal? The range of matters that the state is allowed to take under its piiniew will increase dramatically, one may say, as the baseline of nondomination rises. And so it is ~ O L I I I ~ to give rise over time to counter-

The Do~~linntiot~ Cotnplnztlt

productive, dolni~lating effects that will leave people worse off in terms of nondomination than they would have been under. a more modest regime.

'This challenge articulates a danger, liowever-, not an inevitabil- ity. And the danger teaches 11s that if we are to devise a sct of policies f i ~ the state to espouse in the attempt to rcrlledy conlplaints of domination, then we shol~ld be on our- guard against the sort of power creep envisaged. Therc is ilridoubtedly a lot of roolii, start- ing fi-on1 the sort of socic.tv Itlost 01' 11s livc in todav, ti)r the st;~tc' to explore new policies. Imagine, then, that we introduce ttlosr initiatives irlcrernentallv, with a view to seeing how well they tlo overall ill coping with domillation. As we increase the initiatives explor-etl, thereby enlarging the reach of the state, we shoultl he alert to the likelihood of'there being a point where therv is n o net gain in eviclencr or in prospect. At that point, the stat(: itself will hegiri to condition people's erljoyment of undonlinated choice in s~ lch a measure, or will threaten to compromise people's ullclo~ninated status i r ~ such a degree that the lesso~l is: Stop! From that point on the certain damage dolie by state activity eve11 as it is as- sessed in the ledger hooks of ~lonclolllinatiol~, will be too great to compensate fi)r ally likely benefit it may achieve."

There will undoubtedly be differences among people oil the qi~estion of' whether at any point the state has done all that it can d o without becoming counterproductive; espousing the ideal of nondomination dors not mean having an automatic resolutiorl of those differences. The point to note here, however, is that no matter how great those differences are, it can be agreed on all sides that there is an elid at some point to what the state can produc- tively do. There \$dl he agreement that the cause of remedying complaints of domination does not threaten to legitimate ram- pant, i~ncritical recourse to the state. And that there is bound to be agreement on that point means that the complaint about being dominated does not hold out the specter of an insatiable political ideal.

Third finsibility Constmint

We turn finally to thc third question of kasibility. This is the issue of whether relying on the state promises to tlo better than ally

otht.1. likely strategy for redl~cing d o ~ u i n a t i o ~ ~ in a society; in par- ticnlar, whether relying on a state that is designed to track all and onlv the 1,eadily avowable, comnlorl interests of citizens ~>romises to /)eat alternatives. If it does not promise to d o better than other i~~s t r t~n~c~i ta l i t i es , the11 his is going to mean that i t cioc~ not represent :III e f f ic ic~~t agellcy o n this frolit.

The salie~it alternativr to introducing ;t state, and au~horizing it to ac.t aga i~~s t the tlomir~alion of' some by otl~ers, is to rely on the S ~ ~ O I I ~ ; I I I C ~ I I S liic~asures of e c o ~ ~ o ~ i ~ i c and civil socie~v to give rise to high levels of ~ iondomina t io~~ all a r o ~ ~ ~ l d . But tlicl-e is little or no p ~ . o s p t ~ t of spor~taneo~ls i~~tc.ractions and forniations supporting a r c ' g i ~ ~ ~ c of ' ~ ~ o ~ ~ d o n i i ~ l ; t t i o ~ l . T11c problem is that resources generally attl-act I I I ~ I . ~ resollrccs, power niorc. power: to them that have it shall he give~i. Thr~s, if social lilk is lefi LO evolvc without any political shaping, i t will tt-11t1 to allow the emergence of relatively few positions of' i ~~ f l l l e~ l ce ant1 to operl the way fhr he do~~ i i~ i a t i on of' the nlany hy t11c fkw who coni~l la~ld ~ l ~ o s e positions. This is a n~c l a~~cho ly observatio~~ ~ I I I one that is supported by comlnon selisr, historical e s p e ~ . i e ~ ~ c c , arid the testimony of Inany literary tladitiol~s.

A? the state pron~ises t o be an effective agency in acting against dorriination, then, it looks likely to represent the most rfficient in- strulnentality available. The state will bc able to achieve or~ly vely little, as the long republican tradition eniphasizes, if it canno1 rely 011 a fund of civic virtue and commitment for ensuring a regime of nondo~nination: "Just as good morals, if they are to be main- tained, have need of the laws, so the laws. if' they are to be ob- served, have need of good moral^."'^ But without the state as a guiding presence, as indeed Machiavelli takes for granted, there is no hope of such virtue and con i~~~ i tn~en t - s l~ch good niorals- achieving anything.

3. ~ O N I ) O M I N A T I O N A N D THE

DE:SIKABII.ITY CONSTRAINTS

The firgt conwaint of desirability on a poli~ical ideal is that the conlpla~nt ~t art~culates be one that can be raised as a relevant con-

sideration in discourse among people as to how their social and political affairs can be best organized. Does the complaint about domination come across as a consideration admissible in presumptively cooperative disci~ssion, and not,just as a complaint of the self-seeking kind that will I>e deemed irrelevant-a11 instance of special pleading-in such exchange? Does it present itself as a complaint that all Inllst collntenance and take into account? 1 believe that it docs pl.esrnt itself as a complaint of' that kind, and f 0 1 - the deepest of' rc;tsorls.

When ;I n11111t)rr. o l people engage iri discourse, their aim being to detennine what is so in some do~nain o r how i~ is best fi,r them to act as a whole, then they give exclusive privilege LO a particilla~. filrrn of in f l~~cncc that they may have on one another: that which occurs by virtue of producing reasons rele\iant to the outcome that is to he resolved. ' r h~ l s they eschew the ways in which people influence one another when they exercise violence, or coercion, or in- tilnidation, or anvthing of that kind. 'I'hey authorize one another as voices that ;Ire generally capable of providing reasons relevant by discl~rsive criteria and as ears that are generally capable of rec- ognizing s l~ch reasons when they are once produced. From the point of view of the discourse that they essay, only properly reason- mediated influence is legitir~~ate."

This being so. any party to discoul-se is certainly going to be able to complain admissibly about the existence of a form of influence that reduces their capacity to exercise or undergo discursive influence proper. It will be absolutely reasonable for anyone to com~la in , for example, about being pressured or coerced by others to go along with a certain line; those who attempt such pressure or coercion d o not honor the constitutive requirements of discourse: they are playing another game. But the existence of a relation of domination between one party and some other or others means that that party is subject to a form of influence that reduces their capacity to interact discursively-it reduces their capacity to influence and be influenced in a purely reason-mediated way-and so it is going to be perfectly admissible for someone to complain about domination of that kind.

Why is domination going to reduce a person's capacity to interact discursively with others? Because, as a long tradition of thought insists, the fact of being exposed to the possibility of arbitrary

PHILIP PETTIT

interference from another impacts in a serious way on the likelihood that a person will speak his mind." It will put in place a pow- erfill incentive to keep the dominating parties on side, however belieficent they may be: to keep the111 sweet both by positive measures of ingratiation and by negative nieasures of avoidance and selfcensorship. There is an old ideal, celebrated fix example in thr. Quaker tradition, of speaking truth to power. But speaking truth to power is all ideal, precisely because it is r-ecognized on all siclcs to be difficillt. The person who speaks truth to power, never flinching fi-om thc: most unpalatable forms of advice or rcbukc, or the most ~~nwelcome expressions of' opinion, is a saint or a hero, not someone of merely regulal- nerve.

Not only is domination likely to lead someone to warp his or tier voice, turiirig it to the expectations and tastes of' potentially dangerous potentates. This being a matter of common recogni- tion-as it always has been-domination will also lead others not to takr seriously the words uttered by anyone ill a positiori of s11b ordination and dependency. How can people trust the remarks of the vulilerable person, especially when they are tailored to fit with the opinions of' someone in relation to whonl they suffer wilnera- bility? They niav seek out their opinions, particularly when it is they who are in the position of power-it is always pleasing, after all, to have some reinfbrcernent of' one's own views-but they will have no reason to take the dominated person really seriously; they will have no reason to grant that person a real voice or- give him or her a genuine hearing.

I hope that these remarks will make it plausible that the complaint of being dominated is well suited in respect of discursive admissibility to underpin a central political ideal. But is the complaint a truly significant one, in particular a complaint fit to engage the attentions of the polity? That is the next question to be considered.

Second Desirnbilitjl Constmint

The feature that marks human beings off from other species is our capacity to enter discourse with each other, relying on a common language iri which we authorize one another as generally compe- tent speakers and listeners: as speakers who warrant and deserve a

The Domination C;ompLuint 103

hearing, and as listeners who can acknowledge our claim to a siini- lar hearing in turn. Let someone be denied full access to discourse with her fellows, or a full presence there, and she is denied full enjoyment of the treatment-the authorization or respect-that marks her off'as a person among persons.

The priniary reason why the complaint about being dominated is of the first significance is that domination almost invariably un- dermines a person's capacity to enjoy respect in this sense. Where one person dominates another, it is almost bound to be a matter of common awareness among the people involved, and among othcr relevant parties, that this domination exists. 'The question as to whether sonieone is dominated by another is one that will interest all those involved, after all, and the answer to that question will be obvious in most cases from the sorts of resources they control relative to that other. Thus we may expect most people to recognize domination when they see it, and this in turn being obvious, to recognize that others will recognize it too, thereby giving rise to the usual hierarchy of common awareness; each will believe that the persori is dominated, each will believe that each believes this, and so on." Once it is recognized as a matter of common awareness that someone is dominated, however, then that person will no longer be able to enjoy the basic respect that we think personhood entitles him to. He will no longer have the sort of voice that can be reliably forthright, or can be expected to be forthright. He will always be under suspicion of playing to the audience of the powerful and never having anything worthwhile to say in his own right.

Dominated subjects of this kind may not be ignored or dis- missed outright: they may be treated magnanimously to the t r a p pings of respect. But they will not command respect; they will receive it oiily in the manner of supplicants. They inay be treated as if they had the status of persons, so we might put it, but they will not really have that status. Being a person is inseparable from earning and receiving respect as of right-as of effective, not just formal right-and in their case there will be no question of earning or receiving as of right. What they receive, they will receive only as a gift-orlly by grace of the powerful.

'I'his line of thought is a familiar and recurrent one in republican thought. It is worth mentioning in connection with it that Kant, the great philosopher of respect and personhood, seems to

104 PHII.IP PETTIT

have shaped many of his ideas on that s~~b jec t in his reflections on Rousseau's Sorinl Contmrt, itself a book that belongs at least among the apocrypha of the republican tradition. The point is empha- sized by J. B. Schneewind, who qtlotes Kant as saying: "It is not all one under what title I get something. What properly belongs to rile mllst not be accortied to Ine nlerelv as solnething 1 ask for."" Scl~l~eewi~ltl co~n~nents : "If nothing is pl-(>pel-ly ]nine except what sonlcone graciously gives nle, I am fi)rever depvr~dent on how the donor feels toward me. My independence as an autonomous being is threatenetl. Only if1 can claim the others haup to give rlie what is n l i n ~ by right can this be ;~voitled."'"

Given the connection between crljoying respert as a person ant1 not being suljject to donlinat io~~, there is every reason to treat the complaint of being dominated as extremely significant. What more serious complaint co~lld there be than one that draws attention to a relationship ill virtue of which one's very standing as a person who can conlniand the attention and respect of others is put in,jeopardy? This is no Inere trifle to do with tlavi~~g one's llose put out ofjoint, or one's feathers rutfled. It is a complaint of the first moment. Let some people be dominated and to that extent they will be put out of any community that involves those who dominate. They may aspire to community with such others and their presence may even be tolerated among those others. But they will always cut somewhat sorry or comic figures, and will always invite only condescension or contempt. 'They will have no more standing, in a somewhat archaic image, than dogs that cower at their masters' feet or that snuggle up to their mistresses' skirts.

One word more on the significance of the complaint about being dominated. People don't reveal their minds only in the words they explicitly stand over in discursive settings. They also ex- press their discursive minds in the actions they choose to perform, because they routinely acknowledge that they may be held answer- able for their actions in discourse: they don't deny the relevance of discursive challenge as to the legitimacy of what they do. But if someone is dominated by another-and even if that other does not exercise the domination in attempts at pressure or coercion- then we may expect the relationship to warp the things they do as well as the things they say. We may expect people to take positive measures of self-ingratiation and negative measures of self-censor-

ship that would not appeal to them in the absence of the domination. And that being so, the deleterious impact of domination will be obvious, even short of actl~al interference by the dominating person, in the deeds as well as in tlie words of the klctim.

'This observation is worth adding, because i t shows that just as the dominated person cannot be taken to enjoy the freed0111 of' thought that is necessary if solneoue is to be worth hearing, they also cannot hc takcn to enjoy freedom of choice, either. Operating within the gravitational field that relationships of domination es- tablish, people are tleprived of a measure of discursive control tliat would otherwise be available. When they purport to speak t11cir niinds or to display their ~nintls in action, thercfi)re, there is a ro- bust possibility, 1n;irked in everyday expectatiorl, that they are not fillly their own nlasters; they are riot ~.eIlecting their own best opinion of what circun~starlces req11i1.e but rather tlie opinion that nla- terializes ~nost comlortably at their particular place i l l the field of dominating Force.

The significance of the co~nplaint ;lbollt bei~ig dolninated is borne out in the rich idioms associated with the: con~plai~i t a ~ ~ t l with the many changes that have bee11 rung, and that continue to be rung, on them. This is cast in ~nelancholy tones as a condition of servitude or subordination, sukjection or s~tbj~~gation-at the limit, a condition of slavery-in which one call do nothing but by the leave or permission of others, one lives under their thumb as those in the Koman circus lived under the thumb of the emperor, one has to fawn and toady and kowtow in their direction, one has to ingratiate oneself with them or at least placate and humor them, and one has to tug the forelock or tip the cap, acknowledg- ing them as one's superiors and betters. The condition in which the conlplaint has n o ground is cast, by contrast, as an ideal of being able to stand on one's own two feet, and to walk tall, having a standing or1 a pal with others; an ideal of being able to look others in the eye, not showing fear o r deference, and not seeking grace or favor; and an ideal of being one's own Inan or woman or master: an ideal i l l Ronlan ternis of being S U ~ , J I L ~ % ' S .

These phrases have often been b rnmd in relation to contexts that no longer obtain very colnmonly. But there are contexts aplenty in contemporary society where the message they convey- ultimately, the conlplaint they carry-still clearly applies. Think of

106 PHILIP PETTIT

the child of the en~otionally volatile parent; the wife of the occa- sionally violent husband; or the pupil of the teacher who forms arbitrary likes and dislikes. Think of the employee whose security requires keeping the boss or manager sweet; the debtor whose for- tunes depend on the caprice of moneylender or bank manager; or the small business owner whose viability depends on the attit~lde lake11 by a bigger co~npr:titor or a union boss. Tliink of the welfare recipient whose fb~-tunes tilrri or1 the mood of the counter clerk; thv immigrant o r intlige~ious person whose s t a r ~ d i ~ ~ g is vulnerable lo t l ~ c whirr~s that rule politics and talk-back radio; or. the public ernployee whose future depends, not on perti)rnla~lce. but on the political prolile that an ambitious u~i~iister. happcns to find elec- torally 111ost usefitl. Think of the older person who is \rulnerable to the culturally and institutionally u~lrestrainetl gang of youths in his o r her area. Or tliink ir~cleed of the yourlg o tknder whose level of punishmcnt depends on how far politicians or newspapers choose to whip up a (~111t11rc of 'v t~~~gc: i~~( .e .

In all of these cases, someone lives at the mercy ot'others. That person is domin;~ted by those others in the sense t l~at e\.crl if they don't intertkre in his o r her li te, they have a more or less arbitrar), power of doing so on a greater o r larger front and in a more or less s~~bstantive measure: there are few restraints or. costs to inhibit them. If the dominated person escapes ill treatrrient i r l s ~ ~ c h a situation, that is by the grace or favor of the powertill, or perhaps by dint of a native cunning and deception. The price of liberty in such a world is not eternal vigilance but rather, in a phrase once used by Gore Vidal. eternal discretion. The person lives in the power o r under the mastery of others: they occupy the position of a dominus in his or her life.

'I'hird I)e..rirr~bility Constraint

That the complaint about being dominated not only passes the feasibility corlstraints but is admissible and significant already goes a long way to establishing that it ought to have a serious place in politics-in effect, that the ideal of nondomination ought to be targeted by the state. But the complaint might be all of these things and not connect in any substaritial manner with other complaints that have traditionally been placed within the province of

The Domination Compln~nt 107

the polity's responsibility. We turn now to the questiorl as to whether that is how things stand with the complai~rt about being dominated. 1s it a more or less stand-alone complaint such that rectifjlng i t leaves many other putativelv relevant political complaints i~naddl-essed? Or is it a complaint such that if the state takes serious steps to put it right then it will at the same time take steps that put many other co~r~plaints right? Is i t a complaint that sl~hsurnes a range of other complaint? in that sense? 1 argue that it is a characteristically subsumptive c:ornplai~~t, not one of the stand- alone varie ty.

l 'he hest way to support this point, at least in thc short compass available. is to consitler how far the rectification of complaints about domination in a society would go to establishing ;I sample of other ideals. 1 shall include in 1ny sample liberty, equality, and comml~nity-thc three ideals of the French Kevo1utio11-as well as functioning capability, in Amarya Sen's phrase,'" arld ;I contl-ac:tll- alist concept io~~ ofj~~sticc*.

1 have argued elsewhere that liberty or freedom was lo r~g collcep- ti~alized precisely as the absence of domination: rlot being under the thumb of a If that construal is accepted, then i t tbl- lows that someone may be unfree in doing something, even though there is no natural obstacle that constrair~s the111 to d o it and no one forces or coerces them to do it. This will happen so far as the person is inhibited or intimidated by the presence of a power that has to be kept sweet. But if the construal is accepted, then another perhaps more surprising result also follows: this is that sorneone is not necessarily rendered unfree by the fact of a natural obstacle removing an option or raising the costs of takirlg it, o r by the fact of all irltentional agency interfering in her- affairs to a similar effect. The natural obstacle won't dominate the person so it can't make her unfree. And the interfering agency may not dominate the person-the agency may be forced to track the person's avowetl irlterests-in which case it won't rriake her unfree, either. How easy is it to live with this implication, while claiming that the relief of domination will advance the ideal of liberty?

It is quite easy, I suggest, to live with this conclusion so long as

108 PHILIP PETTIT

we recognize that without conlpromising the enjovnient of nondomination-withollt itself being dominating-a natural obstacle oi- an interlriorial agency lnav still have a negative effect on rhat en- ~oyment; it inay condition it, as we saw earlier, by restricting rhe rang' ovcr which-or indeed the ease with which-the person ex- txrcises iiiidolniiiated choice. Evcn if'liherty is taken to require the abse~lce ol' n;triii~al li~riitatioil 01. the abseiice of iriteiitio~ial inter- fereiicc:, theii, we can see that the systeillatic renledying of' the coinplairlt abolit domination is going to iiivolve, so far as possible, tlic i.educrion of' iloniiire~irioiid ol)stacles, ;uid of intc:nrional hut nondominaring ohstacles, to people's choices; we already 11ic11- tioriccl this poilir in thc sccond section.

If noildornination is l~sed to coricept~~alizc. liberty, therefore, i t leads 11s to distinguish benveen prinla~y and secondary restrictions oil liberty. 'I'he pi-iii~ary fi)rni of' restriction is donlination by an- otht.1- person or group: in this casc thc person or group has more or less ready access to lnorc or less arhitrarv intc-rf'crericc. across a iiiorc 01- lc-ss s11l)stanti;ll range of choicrs. The secondary f'oriii of' I-esti.ictioil is the limitation inlposcd by nonintentional forces ant1 the inrerf'erence practiced by illtelltiorla1 b11r rlonarhitrary agencies. It seeins right and intuitive to me that this distinction is iiladc between these two different grades of' restriction, since only the primary form is inirriical ro an agent's status as a person; one is not de-authorized or disrespected by nonintentioilal or nonarbitrary irifluences in one's lifk. Bur i t is important that even if people worry ahout rhe secondary form of restriction, rhey will see that a state committed to advancing the enjoyment of riondoinination will go a long way toward satisfying their concern."'

What now of the ideal of equality? There are many interpretations of that ideal, as there are notoriously many ways in which people may or may not be equal with one another. But from our point of view a very significant aspect of'the ideal is going to be equality of no~~domination: in effect, equality of rhe kind rhat is provided when people equally command the attention and the respect of others. An obvious question, then, is whether the attempt by a state to redress the complaint thar individilals may have about

The L)omination Complaint 109

being dominated is likely to push toward equality of nondonlination or whether it is likely to create or support large inequalities, with nondomination being inaximized at a point where there are such inequalities between people. It is often said that the rnaxi- mization of people's silbjective utility or happiiless may require that some are very uilhappy, and in particular much less happy than others; that is how the slims may come out. Is the same sort of thing likely with the maxin~ization of nondonlination? Or is there a closer tie hetweeri pro~noting this ideal overall and ensuring that the distribution across people tends toward equality?

As it turns out, there is indeed a close tie between rnaxirnizing and eq~ializing the enjoylnent of n ~ n d o m i n a t i o n . ~ ~ Whether a person is to en-joy a good measllre of nondo~nination in relation to others depends not on their absolute level of power-their power of interfering, retaliating, defending themselves, and so on-but on their level of power relative to the power of others. A level of' power that wo~ilcl give ine ahsolute supremacy in onc society rriay leave me relatively badly off in another; in the land of the blind, the oneeycd lriail is king. This means that if the power of some people is increasetl with a view to increasing the nondomination they enjoy, then by that very token the degree of rlondoinination enjoyed by others falls; any positive move 011 one front is at the same tiiile a negative move on another.

But not only is there going to be interaction between different fronts in this way. A second equally plausible observation suggests that it will always be better froin the point of view of maximizing the enjoyment of nondomination in a society to act on fronts that make for its equalization among members of that society. As we increase the relative powers of people with a view to increasing their nondomination, there will tend to be a better result available so far as we focus on relatively powerless rather than on relatively powerful individuals. The more powerful people are, the smaller will be the gain in making them more impregnable to others-the extra resources may be redundant-and the larger the loss in making others more vlllnerable to them: the extra resources will impact ever more significantly on the prospects of the weak.

If the level of people's nondomination is sensitive to their relative degrees of' power, and if this sensitivity is greater for the weaker than for the stronger, then any atteinpt to maximize

nondomination overall is bound to focus at every stage on improv- ing the lot of the weake~; and i t is bound thereby to push toward Inore and Inore equality. This represents a fundamental tie between the ideal of nondonlination and the ideal of equality, and one illdeed that was well recognized even in Roman tirnes.'%ny society where people's nondo~ninatio~l is at a ~naxilr~um will be a society in which pcoplr: enjoy a corresponding equality of status, with each d o i ~ ~ g as well as can be expected in commanding the re- s p ~ t of thrir f'ellows. This sort of equality docs not entail equalitv in every other dirnensio~l: i t is consistent, fix r.xa~nple, with in- eq~~ali ty in the s~~bjectivr. wrll-being that peoplr. enjoy and with at le;~st a certain degree of inequality in the objec-tivr: resources at their command: in their wealth. But it still represents a substantial kind of' ecl~~ality anti it should encourage egalitarians who night otl~erwise have balked at making nondornination into a cr:ntral, even SLI~I-erne, political ideal.

As there is a tie bctwer:11 valuing 1londonlinatio11 and valuing equ;tlity, in partic~~lar eq~~ali ty of status, so there is also a tie between valuing nondonli~lation and valuing co~nmu~lity. There arc. three points to make about this connection. 'I'he first is that IIOII- domination has been untferstood in the long republican tradition -and is understood here-in such a way that it cannot be enjoyed by the solitary individual. To enjoy nondomination it is necessary, first, to have other people around with who111 one interacts; and second, that one not be dominated by those people: that one enjoy standing in relation to them, being able to look them in the eye, commanding their attention and respect. It is not sufficient that there be no one in one's vicinity and so, nJortiori, that one not be do~ninated. One nus st enjoy the absence of' domination in a context where it is a real possibility, not enjoy it as a mere by-prod- uct of' total isolation. This condition already ensures a connection bctween nondomination and community, for i t means that the itleal of nondomination is an inherently social value, not an atom- istic one.

Thc second point to make in underscoring the tie to community is that if people are secured against domination by the opera-

The Domination (,'omplaint 111

tion of the institutional instrumentalities available for the state to deploy-the institutions of armament, disarmament, and protection-then the connection between being nondominated and those institutions is constit~ltive and not merely causal. 'Ib be nondominated is to be Inore or less i1nmu11e to the possibility of arbitrary i11te1-ference, and this immunity will come into being si- multarleously with the introd~lction of' measures that realize it, not as a ca11sa1 consequence of' those measures being in place: a consequence that might take time to realize. The connection between immunity to arbitrary interkrence and the presence of' those measures will be like the co111lection between i ~ r ~ ~ ~ l u ~ l i t y to a certain disease anti the presence of suitable antibodies in the blood. ' lhe physical i~nnlunity will not materialize as a contingent consequence of'the antibodies that takc a certain time to eventuate: it is present as sou11 as the antibodies are there, being realized by the ar~tibodies. And si~nilarly a person's imml~nity to arbitrary interkrence-a person's nondon~ination-will not n~ateri;~lize as a ca~~s;il result of the institutional rlleasures taken to realize it; rather, it will be constit~~ted by those nleasures, being present just as soon as they are prese~lt."'

The fBct that nondomination requires a community of individuals, and that a person's tlondomi~lation will be constituted by the institutio~lal measures that make him 01- her more or less secure against arbitrary interference by other members of' the community, means that for the state to work at pron~oting nondornination is just for the state to work at ensuring that people enjoy a certain sort of community: a sort of community that is bound to have the aspect of' an ideal. The third point 1 want to add further empha- sizes this co~l~lection between pro~noti~lg the two ideals.

The value of nondo~nination is tied up with its being a matter of common awareness that one is not dominated, as we saw earlier. That means that if we are to enjoy no~ldomination properly, we have to be more or less secure against arbitra~y interference, being personally protected, or having access to personal resources of' re- taliation. But it also means, we should notice, that others in any salient class to which we belong have got to be secure in the same way. Suppose that you are a black or a woman or an indigenous person in a society where people in those classes are generally do~r~ i r~a tcd i11 c e r t a i ~ ~ ways. The fact that you have purely personal

11 2 PHILIP PETTIT

resources against domination, say because of being very wealthy, will not ensure that yo11 enjoy nondomit~ation properly. For 1netn- t)ership in that vulnerability class will convey the message to many that you are cionlinated and will constantly put pressure on the discursive status that yo11 can enjoy; you will havc to vi~idicate your standing, (.as(% by case, time after time. Thus, if you are to achieve tile proper erlioyment of your nondomination, i t had better be thv case that all others in yotlr ~~ lnc rab i l i t y class escape cio~nination too. Yo11 cannot e ~ ~ j o y f r c c d o ~ ~ ~ as ~rontiomination without others ill evcly salient class to ~ ~ l ~ i c h you belong-incl~~ding, in the last analysis, others in the socirh as ii whole-c:njoying that sort of ti-r.edo111 ;u wcll.

I said that there are two other ideals, apart from those associated with freecioni, eq~~a l i t y and comrn~rnity that are s~~bsumcd ill thc: ideal of nonclominatiori. The first is fut~c:tioning capability ill

Atnartya Scn's sense, and the second isjustice in the contractualist sense associated with J o h n Rawls:"' ant1 7: M. Scanlon."

To enjoy functioning capability is to be in a position where the things one can do and be in one's society mean that by local criteria one functions perfectly well: intuitively speaking, one is not poor or deprived, even if one is not particularly rich. (lapability in this sense will require access to conditions such as being fed, being healthy, being housed, being linked with family o r friends, com- municating with others, following what happens in public lifk, and tracking the opportunities for work and related activities." There are two grounds for thinking that the ideal of nondonlination s u b surnes this ideal of functioning capability." The first is that to the extent that a person lacks such capability, to that extent he or she will be vulnerable to all sorts of arbitrary interference on the part of others. And the second is that even if someone's poverty or lack of capability does not expose him or her to further domination, it will still limit the range or ease with which he or she can enjoy nondomination, so that there is reason why a state that wants to advance such enjoyment should want, costs allowing, to put such lack of capability right, too.

7

Thp Domination Conzpluinl

~ o u g h l v speaking, an arrangement will be just in a contractualist sense so far as pcoplc calluot reject it on the g r o ~ ~ n d s that it \lo- lates an u~iobjectionable principle for regulating relatio~is he- tween m~~tua l ly resl~ectful indivitluals, in particular for regulating the111 politically; tliat the priuciple is u~lobjr:ctionat>le means that it wolll(1 attract no reasonable ol!jection: 110 ot?jection, as we Ilia? understand it here, that woultl survive discursive interrogation. Will a reginie in whit-11 ~ i o ~ ~ t i o ~ r i i ~ ~ a t i o ~ ~ is niaxiniizcd bc likely t o count as.just ill this s c ~ ~ s c ? I thi~ik so. 'The sort o1'pc:rsou who niay he expcctetl to complain about its injustice is onc who sufTr.1-s sonle redistriI>l~tion of I-eso111-ces tow>lrtl the poorer or sonic

clirninutior~ of ~iative advantages of power. But it is hard to ser. how the complaint made by such a person could stanti up ill the c.011- tt-actualist court.

'The person envisaget1 acquiesces in the need fix a regulatio~i of the relations between mutl~ally respectf~~l people; specifically, ill the need for a political regulation of those relations; and lnore specifically still, i11 the neetl for their regu1;ition by a state that is desigueci as well as possible to advauce all and only the readily avowable, conlmon intel-ests of citizens. There would be no issue to be considered, were this not so. The question, then, is whether this person co111d identify an unobjectionable principle on the basis of which to protest against the loss he or she suffers as a result of a redistribution of relative powers, even when the I-edistrib ution is necessary for increasing the nondoniination enjoyed by people i~ncier the polity: that is, is necessary for meeting the corn- plaints of various others a11o11t being tlominated.

The person cannot dismiss the complaints about being dominated as being unnecessary to heed in discourse about how the state should be org-anized; after all, i t is an admissible and significant sort of complaint, by the argument provided above. The only grounds on which the person can protest the redistribution, there- fol-e, nlust be that the pattern of benefits and burdens it imposes is deemed unfair. But those grounds are bound to look hollow. In seeking to reniedy complaints of doniinatio~i, the state is trying to aciva~ice a conl~l~orl i~~ t c r c s t that all are ready, so we may presume,

114 PHILIP PETTIT

to avow. The benefits to be gained for the interest of thc weaker are great and the costs to the person conlplaining are not compa- rable; the person does not lose out substantially in terms of nondomination, after atl, even if' he or she s~iffers some financial loss or some loss of privilege. And so it is hard to see how the person envisaged can identify any unobjectionable principle on the basis of which to protest the redistrib~ition. Any redistrib~~tion that ad- \r;uices the causc of' iioiidoiiiiiiatiot~ is ;~lso likely to arlvaiicc thc caIIse of,justice in the contract~ialist scnsc.

I hope that these brisk remarks will help to est;tblish the powerfi~l case that can bc made fiw p~itting thc complaint of' doniination right at the center of political cotlcerns and fix making the ideal 01' nontlomination one of the central ideals in politics, if not the supruiiv 1)olitic;il ideat. The state (.ail (lo so~neth i~ ig al1o11t this coiriplairit, soniethi~ig that provides I,ot11 at1 effkciive and effiicie~lt remedy. The colnplaint is ;idmissible in anv open discourse on the best form of the state ancl directs 11s to a significant and sitbsunip- tivr idcd. The performance of the complaiilt or1 thcse fronts gives it a serious claim 011 0111. aiie~ltioil it1 normative political thought ;~i ld , pl~es111~iptivel): as nlv passing coinmeilts have tried to indi- cate, ;l 1nor.c set-io~is claim than any of' its rivals.

I said earlier that there are othei dosidurtltci or consti.aints that we might expect a political ideal to satis@, apart from those we have considered. In conclusion, I might mention that one of' these is the d e , ~ i d ~ ~ ( d t % ~ ? n of being a measurable ideal, on which marly re- cell1 writers have focused."' The tneasurable ideal will enable us to determine how well individuals within a polity are doing in rela- tioli to that ideal and how well the polity does in conlparisons across time or with other regimes. The ideal of nondomitlation does not count as a highly measurable ideal. First of all, domination and nondomination come in degrees along at least three s e p arate dirlicnsions that are riot easily weighted against one another: it may illvolve more or less easy access to more or less arbitrary interference across a more or less substantive range. Second, there are two respects, also not easily weighted against each other, i11 which we will want the state to d o well by the ideal: one, by reduc-

ing domination itself-by reducing the influence of factors that compromise undoininated choice; and two, by recli~cing the presence of nondominating fjctors that cotidition such choice withot~t col~~promising it.

In biew of' thcse complexities, the ideal of nondomination is not going to leiid itself to ready measurement; there will always be issues ofweighting that need discussion in any instance wherc it is to he applicd. We might try to resolve those weighting issues at the abstract Icvel, but I see little prospect of doing so in a way that is going to win general support. Still, however, I don't think we should lose heart. 'The important thing with any political ideal is thai it be arnenal~le to disciplined arbitration in the course of ;i

conversation that involves all rclcvailt sides; it is not a vagiir and ~lebulous notion that allows everyone to think what they will. And in this respect iiondoinination promises to do quite well. While people may not easily come to agreciricilt o11 weiglitings to be as- sigricd in the al~sti-act t o the differeilt elciiicnts i t involves, it will usually be clear how these elements sho~ild be ~vcighted in the context of concrete issues. The ideal may not make the algorith- mic acljudicatiun of political arrailgernents possible, but it does represent a yardstick that will not easily bend to the grain of individual interest or I~ias.""

1 . SPP I'hilip Pettit, "Freedom a d 12ntipowe1;" Ethics 106 (1996): 576- 604; idrm . I<epuhlic.n~~isrn: A Theor-y of Frredorn nnd C;o.ovrn munl ( 0x1'01-d: Ox- ford U~liversity Press, 1997); idrrrl, '4 7%rory ofFrredonl: I;rorn the P~yc.holo,g to thv I'olitirs of .4gc9?fq (Cambridge and New Yor-k: Polity and Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2001 ): itlem. "Keepirig Rcpnblican Freedom Siniple: On a Difference with Ql1e11ti11 Ski~~ner-." Politic.c~l The0. t~ 30 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; Quentin Skinne~; Libmty bc/i~rr I,ibcmli.rm (C:a~nl,ridge: (lambridge University Press, 1998); a r ~ t l Ma~~rizio Viroli, il.lnrhicivc~lli (Oxford: 0x fo1 .d University Press, 1998).

2. See Michel Foucault, Pown/Kr~orul~dge: Srlected Irlteruiaus and Othm 12:~itingv, 1S72-1977 , rd. ant1 trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Palltheon Books. 1980).

3. Sre Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, nncl Utofiia (NewYork: Basic Books, 1974).

116 PHILIP PETTIT The Domination Complaint

4. See John I.ockc, '9 12rtt~:- Co:ir.(,rnirrg T o l ~ r r ~ f i o : ~ , ccl. James Tully (Indi- a~lapolis: Hackett, 1983).

5. Will Kylr~licka, 12lullir.ull11rcrt C:iti/e~isl~ip I1 (Oxfortl: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1995).

(i. See . J i i r g c ~ ~ Habrrnlas. '-1 7%oo:y o/ (:o::l::lul~lr.cllir,r Ar.lion, Vols. 1 alitl 2 ((:a~iibritlgr: I ' o l i ty I'ress, 1!4X4, l!)X!));,Io~i F:lstc.~; "The Market ;i11(1 t l ~ c Forum: 'I'hrer Lhrieties of Politir;~l 'I'hcor\," in I.brr~tdntio:r.~ q/ Soc.101 ( : l ~ o i r ~ 7%po:y, ed. ,1011 EIstc'~. a ~ i t l Ai i~ i i~~i t l I Iyll:111tl ((:an~l,ridgc: (:a~~ll)ritlgc t111i-

vcrsity 1'rc.s~. 1C)Xti): a ~ i t l I ' c . t~ i t , " l )cn~oc.~-;~c\ , P:lccro~-;~l ;uitl (:or~~c*st;~to~y," ,\!o::~os 42 (2000) : 105--14.

7. See l'ettit, Nc.l,ubliccoibn~, ant1 itlc111, "(:apal)ilit\ ;111(1 Frec(1o111: A 1)e- fc~ ls r of Sen," I<co~to::rrc.\ ( I I I ~ I'llilo.\oj)lly 17 ( 200 1 ): 1-20.

X , See k);~vi(l blil1(*1,, " ( : ~ I I S I ~ ; I ~ I I ~ S 011 FI.(YY~OIII." l~,'tl~ic,\ 94 ( 19x4): ti(;- X ( i , :11i(1 idc~111, ed., / . I / ) I ~ I . ~ J (Oxf01-(1: OxfOrcl lJ~~ivc~.>i t j , Press, l!)93),

9. I'(L~.PI kill('l Steilie~; A I L ~,..\.\(Lv 0 1 1 RigI~l.5 (0xli)rd: Blackwell, 1994), ant1 la11 (:;irter. '4 1Vfv11.\ rirv 01 Fr~v(lo:r~ ( Oxf01.tI: Oxfor(1 i 111ivcrsi ty l'rcss, I !)!)<I).

10. See Pl~ilip I'cttit. "Agency-li.cetlo111 ; I I I ~ O ~ ~ t i o ~ ~ - f r c ~ t l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , " , / o ~ ~ r : ~ ~ r l 01 77%~o:~lrcal I1olifrr.\ 15 (2009): 3x7-403.

I I . ( : l la~~l(~s 'I':iyfor, l ' l~ i lo . so j~ l~~ ~ 1 1 1 ~ 1 tlrc t l r r : : ~ ~ ~ : ~ .S~.~PII( .P\: l ' l t i lo ,~o /~ l~ i r .~~/ /'(I-

/)p::s 2 (<:;11111)1.iclg-e: (:;11111)ricIgc L'11iv~rsity Press. 1985). 12. .Jc.l-c~nly Rc~lthanl, "A~iarcllical Fallacies," in 771c fib,%..\ o/,/c~:cz:r~y BPI / -

l l ~ n : : ~ , cti. .Joh~i Howring (New b r k : K~~ssell ant1 Kiissrll, 1f)tiY). 13. Set. Pcttit, "Dc~~~oc.racy, Elcctor;~l ant1 (:o~itest;ito~?." 14. See I'liilip Pettit. "T11c C:o11111lon Good," in ju.sllc(, cl:rd 1)v::~or.rnq: Ih-

vrry.5,lor Hricl~l Bnr,:t', cd. Kcit11 l)owtling, Kohrl-t <;oodi~i, ant1 (:arolc I';~tt-- Inan (C:aml,ritlge: C:;ur~britlge U~iiversity Press. f o r t l i c o ~ ~ ~ i n g 2004).

15. See Pettit, "De~noc~-acy, Electoral ;ind con testa to^).," a ~ ~ d idem, A , . Ilzro,:y o j f i v d o : ~ ~ , chap. 7.

16. See l'rttit, I&/)~~blir.nni.srr~, chap. 2. 17. J o h n Rraithwaitc and Philip Pcttit, :Val j z r ~ l I)p,\rrfs: 11 K(,pzlblir.rcn

Il710ors of(~ri:ninal , /u. t l ir~ (New YOI-k: Oxford University Press, 1990). 18. Niccolo Machia\'c~lli, 771r O'o:r~,j)lvlr Work c~ncl Olhws, t l-a~~s. illall Gil-

l x r t (Durham, NC:: Duke University Press, 1'365), 241. 19. Scc Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, "Freedoln i l l Belief kind De-

sire,",/ournrcl (fI%ilo.\of)/~y 93 ( 1996), ant1 k'et l i t , "(:apahility a ~ i t l F~ .c r t lo~r~ ." 20. See Q ~ ~ e ~ i t i r i Skiririer, Lib~r ty b~fore Liberalism. 21. Scc Pcttit, Kvpublirnnis::~, chap. 2. 22. .J. B. Schneewincl, "Autononly, Ohliga~ion, ant1 Virtue: An 0ve1.-

view of Kant's Moral Pk~ilosophy," i r i 7 . h ~ Cnrnbridg~ I:o,mj)anion lo l innl , ed. Pal11 Guyer (Cambridge: Ca~l~hri t lgc U~liversity Press. I992), 31 1.

23. Ihid. 24. Scr Anlarrya S c ~ i , "(:apahility a ~ ~ t l Well-Bei~~g," i l l T ~ P Qualih of

L@, ed. Martha Nusshau~ri and Arnartya Sen (Oxfbrtl: Oxfortl University press, 1903).

25. See Pettit, I&j)ubliicl~~ism. 26. See Pettit, "Age~~cy-l'reedo111 and 0ptio11-frcrtlon~." 27. See Pettit, K r ~ ~ ~ b l i c . n r ~ i s r : ~ , r l ~ a p . 4, and Francis N. I.ovc,t~, "Do~nina-

tion: A P r r l i m i ~ ~ a ~ y ,blalysis." AlonislX4 (2001 ) : 98-1 12. 28. See Chaim Wirsz~~bski, I , i b ( ~ l a s 0.s a I 'o l i~ i~c~l Idvcll nl Homo (0xfi)rtl:

Oxft)rd University I'ress, lO(i8). 29. See l'rttit, Ruj)ubliic~ni.\r::, c l~ap . 4. 30. SeC . Joh~l Ki~wls. A 7'11vo1:~ ~ j , / ~ r s l i r . v (Oxlortl: Oxlorcl I!nivt.~'sity

press, 197 1 ) . 31. See T. M. S t a ~ ~ l o n , WIEcrt 11.',, Owv lo Rac.h Olhm (C:ar~il)ritlge, MA:

Harvartl l!nivcrsilv I'rcss, 1998). 32. See Martha N ~ ~ s s l ) a u ~ n , "H~uman Functioning iund Social .Justice."

Polifirnl Tl~vn:y 20 ( IY!j2): 202-46. ant1 Sell, "Capa1)ility a ~ ~ t l W.11-Being." 33. Scc also I'cttit, A 7'lr(~)ry (fI~rvvclorrr, c.l~ap. 7. 34. See Stci~icr, Arr k,~sss.vtry orr KigI~ls, ant1 (:artel; A Mvcc.\nrc.o/Frc.cdor~~. 35. This papcr was prcsc111t.tl at the University o r b l c ~ i r i a in,July 2001,

the P:uropc.an l inivc*rsity I n s t i t ~ ~ t e i l l Octol,cr 200 I , anti (:hil)a I!~~ivc*rsity March 2003. I an1 111os1 gratr l i~l for the vew hc.lpli~l comnlents that I rc.- reivecl during thosc discussions. 1 am also nlost gr;+tetill ti)r the linal cclit- ing assista~icc of ~ ; e ~ ~ e v i e \ ~ c . j o l l ~ ~ s o ~ ~ .

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