the idea of a value free social science

95

THE IDEA OF A VALUE FREE SOCIAL SCIENCE

RODNEY ALLEN

I

Very many contemporary social scientists aspire to a certain "condition of methodological grace ''1 called value freedom. The achievement of value- freedom is widely held to be a necessary condition of the social sciences be- coming, strictly speaking, empirical sciences which successfully discover and explain social and historical facts; rather than being merely exercises in the prejudiced distortion of social and historical facts, masquerading as science.

Now, there are several separate interpretations which might reasonably be given of the claim that the social sciences are, ideally, value-free. I propose to discuss two such interpretations. The first of these I shall call the thesis of the evaluative neutrality of the social sciences. According to this view, social and historical facts are in themselves neutral or indifferent as between different evaluations of these facts, or different evaluative standpoints with respect to these facts. The idea is that social and historical truths never logically imply particular value judgements. Nor do they in any way by themselves provide reasons justifying particular value judgements. That is to say: no social o r historical truth by itself can clearly provide a good reason for a particular evaluation, irrespective of the personal psychology and decisions of the individual "valuer" concerned. Or: social and historical truths cannot stand in an objectively justificatory relationship to certain evaluations, and thus are always in themselves neutral as far as the justification of evaluations is concerned.

The second view which I propose to consider (relatively briefly) I shall call the thesis of factual autonomy in the social sciences. This idea is that social and historical facts can be described and explained as social and historical facts, independently of evaluative assessment; that in the social studies truth can be conceptually separated out from goodness and badness; that there is a realm of "pure" social and historical facts which is prior to, and conceptually separable from, the realm of values. A denial of this thesis of factual autonomy would involve maintaining that evaluation is a necessary condition of an adequate understanding of at least some social and historical facts; that evaluation is sometimes necessarily bound up with adequate explanation in the social studies; that the adoption of an evaluative standpoint by a social scientist does not inevitably lead to a distortion of the facts by personal bias, but rather is sometimes a necessary condition of the intelligibility and adequate explanation of the facts. Here it is important to realize that the thesis of factual autonomy is a conceptual thesis, to the effect that facts are conceptually separable from values in the social studies. So, the denial of this

Wolff, R. P. ThePoverty of Liberalism Beacon Press 1968 p. 94,

96 The Journal of Value Inquiry

thesis should not be confused with the idea that it is, as a matter of psycholo- gical fact, very difficult or even impossible for a social scientist to escape the distorting influence of his personal values on his account of social and historical facts. Nor should such a denial be confused with the idea that it is true, as a matter of fact, that social theorists in class societies will serve up "ideological" theories, in the sense of theories which distort social reality in the service of, and by way of rationalization of, certain material class interests. To deny the thesis of factual autonomy is to deny that the influence of values on a social investigation would always distort the facts being investi- gated, and to claim that in the social studies, adequate factual understanding is at least sometimes conceptually bound up with adequate evaluative assessment. It is to claim that, even in principle, social and historical facts are not always pure and evaluatively uncontaminated.

Now, the two theses of evaluative neutrality and factual autonomy are, up to a point, logically independent of one another. I say "up to a point" because (as will become clearer later on) one cannot consistently deny the thesis of factual autonomy and affirm that of evaluative neutrality. However, one can, of course, consistently affirm both theses conjointly, and consistently deny both theses conjointly. And furthermore, one can consistently affirm the thesis of factual autonomy and deny that of evaluative neutrality. To adopt this position would presumably be to maintain that the relation between social science and ethics, or evaluation in general, is something like the relation between (on the one hand) physiology and anatomy, and (on the other hand) the norms and prescriptions of surgical practice. Physiological and anatomical facts are not neutral as between which norms of surgical practice are appropriate or justified and which are not; but one can engage in physiology and anatomy without engaging in surgery, and without laying down or utilizing any norms of surgical practice. A theorist who adopted this position could naturally say something like the following: "The social sciences are ideally value free in the sense that factual discovery and explanation can and should proceed independently of evaluation; but they are not evaluatively neutral, because their factual results may, and often do, have important evaluative implications. Therefore, the social scientist qua social scientist should deal exclusively with facts rather than values, but as a human being, he should be concerned to draw out the evaluative implications of his work. Not to do so would be to abrogate his responsibility as a rational human being, because it would be a matter of gratuitously refusing to draw evaluative conclusions from premises which clearly justify those conclusions, and which are at his disposal." Now in general, this position differs from the one of accepting both evaluative neutrality and factual autonomy, in that the former position, unlike the latter, involves the idea that certain evaluations may be objectively justified by reference to certain social and historical facts. And the position of accepting factual autonomy while denying evaluative neutrality differs from that of denying both in that the former, unlike the latter, involves the idea that adequate social and historical explanations can be achieved independently o f evaluative assessment.

The Idea of a Value Free Social Science 97

But anyway, it is my contention that both the thesis of evaluative neutrality and that of factual autonomy are false, or at any rate seriously misleading. And I propose to discuss firstly (and primarily) whether or not the thesis of evaluative neutrality is true. Clearly, this is a big question. It inevitably raises very general and fundamental questions in the philosophy of value, such as: What is the logical status of value judgements? Are value judgements objectively justifiable claims, which are either true or false, or at least justified or unjustified? Can particular value judgements be rationally grounded in facts alone?

II

In fact, the thesis of the evaluative neutrality of the social sciences is really a special application to the social sciences of a more general thesis in the philosophy of value. This is (to give it an unoriginal name) "the thesis of the fact/value dichotomy." This idea is widely held to incorporate all the following points, which of course may be (and have been) modified or elaborated in various ways, without destroying their basic import. (a) That there is an irreducible logical gap between statement of fact and value judgements, such that no value judgement can be validly deduced nor in any way soundly inferred from any set of factual statements alone. (b) That no factual truth can by itself, in virtue only of a priori considerations, provide a justifying reason for a single particular evaluation. (c) That no combination of a factual statement with a value judgement can be analytically true, or in any way a priori true or reasonable, in virtue essentially of the meaning of the value judgement qua value judgement. (d) That general logical and conceptual considerations do not determine any criteria of application for such evaluative terms as "good," except perhaps in some severely minimal form. (e) That, with respect to any one factual truth alone, any one evaluation of that fact would be as equally well justified as any other, in the light of that truth and all conceptual or a priori truths.

Now, it is very difficult to see precisely what, in relatively clear and con- crete terms, the general idea of the fact/value dichotomy amounts to. Be- cause: Precisely what sorts of statements count as factual statements as opposed to value judgements? Are statements to the effect that some thing or person is black, seven feet tall, circular, hot, intelligent, corrupt, a hero, courageous, efficient, useful, honest, reliable, cruel, friendly, generous, hand- some, charming, comfortable, pleasant, true or reasonable, all statements of fact? Or must some of them be analysed into two logically distinct types of statement, one descriptive and the other evaluative? And if so, which ones, according to what criteria are they to be chosen, and according to what criteria are they to be analysed? And by what right can we assume that an evaluation is never simply one sort of factual statement. For it is obviously just as proper in English to say "As a matter of fact Joe is eating the best oyster on the table" as it is to say "As a matter of fact Joe is eating the shell as well as the oyster."


However, leaving these uncertainties aside, I shall simply assume that any judgement explicitly of the form "X is good (bad/better/worse etc.)" is a value judgement; and that any statement which is fairly obviously a statement of fact is a statement of fact. So I shall take it that such a statement as, for example, "Jack is causing Jill pain for the sake of his own pleasure" is a factual statement. And I shall take it that the general thesis of the fact/value dichotomy involves maintaining that from this factual statement alone, or any other, one cannot validly deduce that Jack is doing something bad, or any other value judgement. And: that on the basis of this factual statement by itself (i.e. independently of the individual valuer's own feelings or decisions) it would be equally well justified to claim either that Jack is doing something bad or that he is doing something good or that he is doing something indifferent.

Now, fairly obviously, such a blunt idea as this is only plausible on the basis of a certain general type of subjectivist theory of value; specifically, a type of theory which could be labelled as a "non-naturalist subjectivist" theory of value. By this label I mean any theory according to which value judgements are essentially and primarily expressions of individual attitudes or feelings, and/or attempts to re-direct or reinforce other people's attitudes or feelings, and/or expressions of individual decisions or commitments to act in a certain way, and/or commands or prescriptions to other people to act in a certain sort of way. Theories of this type have been developed by, for example, C. L. Stevenson (Ethics and Language) and R. M. Hare (The Lan- guage of Morals and Freedom and Reason). The basic idea of non-naturalist subjectivism is that to assent to a value judgement is essentially and primarily either to decide upon a principle of action, or else to express an attitude which will somehow issue forth in action; and that whatever descriptive meanings evaluative terms from time to time have, these are dependent functions of their prescriptive or expressive force. And in fact, in the general field of moral philosophy this century, we find that those philosophers who have upheld some form of the fact/value dichotomy (intuitionists aside) have mostly appealed for justification to the idea that factual statements have no action-guiding aspect, whereas to assent to a value judgement is primarily to commit oneself to a course or principle of action, or to express an attitude which will somehow issue forth in action, and it is often held that the basic idea of non-naturalist subjectivism explains why it is that the alleged fact/ value dichotomy holds good. In general: the two ideas of non-naturalist subjectivism and the fact/value dichotomy have for the most part been locked together in mutual support.

So, I want to say that the full-fledged thesis of the evaluative neutrality of the social sciences, as it has actually been held by many social scientists and social philosophers, involves two interlocking general ideas. Firstly, there is the idea of the fact/value dichotomy, which is that there is an irreducible logical gap between statements of fact and value judgements, such that no objective justificatory relation can hold between any statement of fact alone and any particular value judgement. And secondly, there is the theory of


non-naturalist subjectivism concerning value, which is that value judgements as such (unlike factual statements) are essentially expressions of attitude or generalized decisions or commitments to act.

These two elements can clearly be seen at work in the writings of many social scientists and social philosophers. For example, David Easton (The Political System) writes "Facts and values are logically heterogeneous. The factual aspect of a proposition refers to a part of reality; hence it can be tested by reference to the facts. In this way, we check its truth. The moral aspect of a proposition, however, expresses only the emotional response of an individual to a state of real or presumed facts. It indicates whether and the extent to which an individual desires a particular state-of-affairs to exist. Al- though we can say that the aspect of a proposition referring to a fact can be true or false, it is meaningless to characterize the value aspect of a proposition in this way. ' '2

Now Max Weber (The Methodology of the Social Sciences) concedes that the social sciences can answer such questions as: Are certain highly evaluated states-of-affairs attainable at all? Are they compatible with other highly evaluated states-of-affairs? What would be the further consequences of their realization? But when it comes to the question whether certain states-of-affairs are valuable, and whether they ought to be realized, then Weber says that we are confronted with "irreducible evaluations . . . the making of a decision, which is not the task which science can undertake; it is rather the task of the active, willing person . . . The act of choice itself is his own responsibility . . . It involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge." He goes on to say "Even such simple questions as the extent to which an end should sanction unavoidable means, or the extent to which undesired repercussions should be taken into consideration, or how conflicts between several conflicting ends are to be arbitrated, are entirely matters of choice and com- promise. There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure which can provide us with a decision here." He continues " I t is simply naive to believe that it is possible to establish and to demonstrate as scientifically valid a principle for practical social science from which the norms for the solution of practical problems can be unambiguously derived. ' '3

Karl Popper, who has written quite extensively on social philosophy, says (The Open Society and its Enemies VI):

"The breakdown of magic tribalism is closely connected with the realization that taboos are different in various tribes, that they are imposed and enforced by man, and that they may be broken without unpleasant repercussions if one can only escape the sanctions imposed by one's fellow men. . . These experiences may lead to a conscious differentiation between the man enforced normative laws or conventions, and the natural regularities which are beyond his power. In spite of the fact that this position was reached a long time ago by the Sophist Protagoras... it is still so little understood

z Easton, D. The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 1953 p. 221.

3 Weber, M. The Methodology of the Social Sciences tr. and ed. Shils, E. and Finch, H. Free Press, 1949 p. 18-56.


that it seems necessary to explain it in some detail . . . It is we who impose our standards upon nature, and who introduce morals in this way into the natural world . . . It is important for the understanding of this attitude to realize that decisions can never be derived from facts (or statements of fact) although they pertain to facts. The decision, for instance, to oppose slavery does not depend upon the fact that all men are born free and equal, and no man is born in chains . . . even if they were born in chains, many of us might demand the removal of these chains. The making of a decision, the adoption of a standard, is a fact. But the norm which has been adopted is not. That most people agree with the norm "Thou shalt not steal' is a sociological fact. But the norm 'Thou shalt not steal' is not itself a fact; and it can never be inferred from sentences describing facts. It is impossible to derive a sentence stating a norm or decision from a sentence stating a fact ; this is only another way of saying that it is impossible to derive norms or decisions from facts. ''4

These passages fairly clearly display the two interlocking ideas involved in the thesis o f the evaluative neutrali ty of the social sciences - namely, the idea of the fact/value d ichotomy and the theory of non-natural is t subjectivism. In trying to deal with these ideas in a relatively br ief space, I shall~ first o f all, t ry to display the implausibili ty and indeed the unintelligibility, o f non-naturalist subjectivism abou t value; and secondly, I shall t ry to show tha t par- t icular value judgements may be soundly derived f rom factual s tatements; and thirdly, I shall t ry to indicate (very briefly and roughly for the scale of the p rob lem involved) what I think are the basic presupposi t ions of coherent evaluative discourse, and thus what I think are the basic conceptual principles of evaluative reasoning.

But firstly, a prel iminary point. One point that Max Weber and other proponents of evaluative neutrali ty are perfectly prepared to concede is tha t the social sciences can come up with factual discoveries tha t are relevant to already assumed value judgements. These truths would be relevant to assumed evaluations by way of being descriptions of effective means to the realization of these assumed values; or by way of describing the factual consequences of the realization of these assumed values; or by way of describing states-of-affairs tha t are compat ible with the realization of these assumed values. So a p roponen t of evaluative neutrali ty could say: "Obviously , the factual discoveries of the social sciences are not utterly neutral with respect to all types of value judgement ; they are not neutral between judgements about good and bad ways of achieving certain set purposes. So, the thesis o f evaluative neutrali ty would be more accurately described as the thesis o f ethical neutral i ty." Well, I don ' t think it would be more helpful to describe the thesis o f evaluative neutrali ty as the thesis o f ethical neutrality; because I don ' t know of any very clear and precise way of distinguishing between mora l and non-mora l value. But in any case, the qualification that factual truths may be relevant to values by way of being descriptions of the means or consequences of realizing assumed values is no significant qualification of the thesis of evaluative neutral i ty; because, according to

4 Popper K. The Open Society and its Enemies Vol. I, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957 p. 50-53.


this thesis so qualified, it would none-the-less remain true that facts can be relevant to values only in the light of prior, assumed evaluations.

III

Now let's consider one of the most simple forms that non-naturalist subjectivism can take; the idea that value judgements are essentially nothing more than expressions of favourable or unfavourable attitudes, and that in consequence of this no logical or objective justificatory relation can hold between factual statements and value judgements. From this idea, a number of intuitively absurd consequences follow. Firstly, given this proposal, a person who argued "p so q," with p standing for a factual statement and q for an evaluation, could not be said to be reasoning, because ex hypothesi there is no such thing as a sound inference from p to q. Thus there could be no such thing as evaluative reasoning. There could only be a widespread practice of adducing facts as a basis for one's evaluations; what one might call "non-rational evaluative reasoning." And now; What would be the point of this widespread practice of "non-rational evaluative reasoning?" People who engaged in it could only be discovering other attitudes which they happen to have, or else be indulging in persuasive propaganda. But they couldn't be doing what many people now think they can do - namely form evaluations and attitudes which are correct, justified or reasonable in the light of factual knowledge.

Secondly, on the simple idea we are considering, any factual consideration whatever can, equally as properly or legitimately as any other, be adduced as a reason for a particular value judgement. As C. L. Stevenson has explicitly said: "Any statement about any matter of f a c t . . , can be adduced as a reason for or against an ethical judgement. ''5 It follows, therefore, that we may quite properly commend people for such (in normal circumstances) ob- scure reasons as that they spit every hour, or juggle beach balls while con- versing, or invariably eat rubber for breakfast, and so on. It further follows that we may, equally as properly as not, base our actions upon similarly ob- scure evaluations, and thus that the actions we undertake because of the evaluations we make can have no reasoned support. It further follows that an individual may properly be seemingly inconsistent in his evaluations, in that either or both (1) he concurrently maintains two opposed evaluations on the same factual bases, and (2) he concurrently maintains two similarly favourable evaluations on inconsistent factual bases. In short, evaluation is completely divorced from any possible conception of reasoned justification.

Thirdly, on the suggestion we are considering, a person may quite properly refuse to draw an evaluative conclusion from any factual premises, whatever they be. For example, a person may quite properly refuse to pass a value judgement on the fact that Jack is deliberately maiming Jill for fun. The point is not the trivial one that anyone can just refuse to do anything. It is rather

5 Stevenson, C. Ethics and Language, Yale University Press 1944 p. 114.


that a person may have a quite general a priori reason for not drawing an evaluative conclusion in any particular context, whatever the facts of the matter be. This reason would be that acknowledging certain facts is not the same as caring about them or being interested in them; that evaluations commit one in an entirely different way from factual assertions; that the evaluative commitment is to attitudes, which cannot be necessitated by any mere acceptance of the facts. Hence it would seem that, whatever one's ex- ternal circumstances are, one could in principle be justified in refusing to evaluate them. However, we would naturally think that people's evaluations of situations, and their attitudes towards them, could be correctly or justifiably influenced by their knowledge of the facts of these situations, and that from certain factual beliefs certain evaluations and attitudes follow as proper or correct.

Fourth: it would seem that if we accept the theory that value judgements only express attitudes to which no factual truths stand in a justificatory relation, then we cannot with justification in view of the facts say that this theory of value is better than any alternative. Once we accept it we must find that it is only a non-rational attitude, not a reason strictly so-called, that leads us to claim that it is a good theory, or that people ought to accept it. Once we accept it, we deprive ourselves of any justification for accepting it.

I think that these considerations provide good reason for supposing that the simple subjectivist idea we have been considering is radically mistaken. Certainly it is mistaken if it is proposed as an analysis of the concept of evaluation that most people now employ; because that concept clearly involves a necessary connection between the notion of a particular evaluation and that of justification in the light of the facts, such that each particular evaluation is to some extent either justified or unjustified by the facts of the situation concerned. Of course, it is possible to claim that our everyday evaluative concepts are confused and incoherent, and need to be revised. However, it seems to me that any simple subjectivist idea, if proposed as the basis of such a revision, would have the effect of rendering our entire practical relationship to the world unintelligible and incomprehensible to us. In this sense, I want to say that general subjectivism about value is an unintelligible and incoherent viewpoint. It would leave us in a position that I think was once adopted by J. P. Sartre - the position of claiming that life is inherently absurd because (on the one hand) we must make choices, and (on the other hand) there are no correct or justifiable choices to be made.

And I don't think that any more complicated version of non-naturalist subjectivism would allow us to escape from this impasse. Consider, for example, R. M. Hate's theory of "universal prescriptivism," put forward in his books The Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason. According to Hare, each proper particular evaluation must be justified by subsumption under some general, substantial evaluative principle. These principles are "decisions of principle" on the part of valuers. For each proper particular evaluation, there must be some general principle under which it is subsumed, and which is such that the individual valuer concerned has committed him-


self to acting upon each of its (the principle's) implications for himself, and indeed, has committed himself to prescribing and accepting each of this principle's implications for other people. Thus, these general evaluative principles are supposed to be "universal imperatives." Hare claims that logical relations may hold between general evaluative principles, and between such principles and particular value judgements or choices (i.e. within evaluative discourse) but that, since all evaluations are prescriptive, they cannot be either true or false, nor can they be justified by or soundly inferred from any truths alone. That is to say: in the justification of any particular evaluation, there is a large irreducible element of individual decision or choice. In essen- ce, Hate's view is that evaluation is primarily and essentially a matter of individual commitment to some generally applicable principle of action. So, according to "universal prescriptivism," a person is justified by the facts in assenting to a particular evaluation if and only if: (1) his particular evaluation may be validly deduced from some general substantial evaluative principle to which he has prescriptively committed himself, together with an account of the facts of the situation concerned; and (2) this general principle is consistent with other principles he has prescriptively adopted, and in turn with other particular value judgements he has made.

Now it seems to me that this position is open to much the same objections that I've already mentioned. If Hare maintains that no general evaluation or "universal prescription" stands in need of further justification, then he has the problem of explaining how it is that mere generality of commitment is a sufficient condition of evaluative justification. If, alternatively, he maintains that all "universal prescriptions" stand equally in need of further justification, then he is involved in a vicious regress since the process of justifying any evaluation must involve reference to yet another substantial, more general evaluation, and so on until we get to a point where the whole "house of cards" collapses for want of needed support. And he can't consistently maintain that some possible "universal prescriptions" are somehow self-justifying while others are not, since they are all (on his view) equally substantial. On either of the two courses open to him, he is committed to maintaining that any single evaluation which is not already inconsistent in virtue of the meaning of its non-evaluative terms could be as equally well justified as any other, in the light of all or any factual and conceptual truths; that no such single evaluation could be ruled out as unreasonable in the light of any factual and conceptual truths. This is so because "universal prescriptivism" allows that any single evaluation which is not already inconsistent in virtue of the meaning of its non-evaluative terms, may feature as an element in a consistent, deductively arranged set; and moreover, it maintains that such deductive arrangement is precisely what constitutes evaluative justification. Therefore, "universal prescriptivism" maintains that (questions concerning the con- sistency and deductive arrangement of a particular set of evaluations apart) any single evaluation may be as equally well justified as any other, and any consideration of fact and any general principle may, equally as properly as others, enter into the justification of particular evaluations. Thus, within in-


significant formal limits, "universal prescriptivism" allows each individual a free choice not only of what evaluations to accept, but also of what to count as reasons for evaluation. The "universalizability" requirement as specified by the theory of "universal prescriptivism" sets almost no limit to the range of evaluations that could possibly be justifiably maintained by individuals. It allows, of course, even inconsistent evaluations on the part of different individuals to be each justified at the highest possible level of justification.

Certainly "universal prescriptivism" does allow evaluations to be the conclusions of valid deductions. Certainly, too, the premises of a valid description provide, if true, the very best of reasons for accepting the conclusion. But the qualification "if true" is essential, because validity is not the same as proof. Clearly, the premises of a valid deduction provide a reason justifying acceptance of the conclusion only if they themselves are true or in some way justified. However, the satisfaction of this condition is precisely what is ruled out by "universal prescriptivism."

And there are a couple of further points which can be made specifically about "universal prescriptivism." One is that we may well wonder what point there is in deductively arranging our more and less general evaluations, and keeping our evaluations consistent with one another, if our original evaluations, our starting points, cannot be justified. The point of going in for valid prescriptive reasoning cannot be that it is truth or "reasonableness" preserving, because there is no truth or reasonableness to be preserved.

Also: "universal prescriptivism" maintains that the function of particular evaluations is to guide our decisions to act, and also that the general evaluative principles which allegedly support these particular evaluations are themselves matters for decision. Here the argument is clearly going round in a circle, and a vicious circle, since at no point in it do we find any guidance for decisions except another decision.

So, generally, I don't see that the fairly complicated story told by "universal prescriptivism" renders a general subjectivism about value any more intelligible than does a relatively simple story. It still seems to be the case that, if we accept "universal prescriptivism" as a general theory of value, we must find that we can no longer be justified by any mere truths in claiming that it is a good theory rather than a bad theory, or that people ought to accept it rather than reject it.

IV

Anyway, leaving aside the general question of subjectivism about value, I want now to turn to a more explicit consideration of the thesis of the fact/ value dichotomy. The general problem in the context of which this idea arises is: In what ways, and under what conditions, if any, can factual statements be reasons justifying evaluations? One of the central claims about this problem made by proponents of the idea of the fact/value dichotomy, both by way of argument for and elucidation of their position, is that there is a "deduction gap" between facts and values, such that in principle there is no possibility of valid inference from a factual statement to an evaluation.


Now, (for one thing) I want to claim that certain possible inferences, from what are clearly factual statements to what are clearly evaluations, are immediately valid in much the same way as is the inference "This is red, so it is coloured"; or at any rate, that there is no generally available good reason for supposing that this is not so. Of course, to claim this is to claim that there is no such thing as a logical fact/value dichotomy of the kind postulated by the thesis of evaluative neutrality; not simply that mistaken implications have been drawn from the existence of such a dichotomy.

Now, I think that the following examples have a very reasonable claim to be considered examples of immediately valid arguments from facts to values. Some of these are clearly in the area of morality.

1. The Emperor Romanus deliberately killed and inflicted physical harm upon his subjects indiscriminately, and purely for the sake of his own pleasure; so he was a morally bad (or evil) person.

2. Governor Cracker ordered that a certain negro be hanged; he knew that this negro was innocent of the crimes of which he was accused; he did not regard this negro as specifically blameworthy in any way; his action was intended to serve, and in fact served, no other purpose than the gaining of a few more votes by means of appeasing the feelings of white electors; so this was an act of injustice and in this sense morally bad.

3. Dr. Smith has spent most of his life, and sacrificed his chance to make a lot of money, helping very poor people receive the medical attention they need; so in this respect he has done some good during his life.

4. This cable car is safe; and therefore it is in this sense good. 5. All the people at my dinner party last night enjoyed themselves; there-

fore in this sense my dinner party was good. Now: Is there any compelling reason why it should be supposed that such

arguments are not valid in much the same way as is the argument "This is red, so it is coloured"? Well, firstly, it might be said that my use of such expressions as "in this sense" reveal my underhand intention to have you take the conclusions of these arguments as mere stipulatively tautological repetitions of the premises. However, this is not my intention. I intend my use of the expression "in this sense" to point up my belief that a judgement to the effect simply that something is good, is logically incomplete: it requires ex- pansion into either "is good in some particular way" or "is at least more of a good than a bad thing in terms of some of the applicable ways" or "is more of a good than a bad thing in terms of all the applicable ways" or in other words "is overridingly good." To these different levels of evaluation we can give the labels, respectively, "simple value judgements . . . . complex value judgements" and "overriding value judgements." Thus, I think that the term "good" has a variety of determinate meanings, none of which is reducible to identity with any other, but all of which are related logically in a more complex manner; and also that "good" has a number of different levels of use. So my use of the expression "in this sense" in my examples is intended to convey (1) my belief that whatever is good is good in some particular way or ways, and (2) that the conclusions of my sample arguments should be taken


to be simple value judgements, rather than complex or overriding value judgements. None of this has any tendency to show that these conclusions are not value judgements strictly-so-called because they are merely stipulatively tautological repetitions of the premises. We can also note that the expression "in this sense" may be inserted with much the same force as I have used it, into the argument "This is red, so it is coloured." Whatever is red is clearly coloured; but equally clearly, whatever is red is not coloured in the sense, way, manner or mode of, for instance, being blue. But this of course does not mean that the conclusion of the argument "This is red, so it is coloured" is a stipulatively tautological repetition of the premise.

Secondly, it might be objected that my view offends against G. E. Moore's famous "open question" argument against ethical naturalism; and thus that I commit what Moore called the "Naturalistic Fallacy. ''6 Moore claimed that whatever properties of things in the world are said to be equivalent to goodness, it remains meaningful and is never senseless to ask whether they themselves are good. "Good" cannot be defined as, say, "pleasure" because it makes sense to ask whether pleasure is good; whereas if the proposed definition were correct, this question would be just as senseless as asking whether goodness is good. Therefore (he concluded) "good" cannot be analytically defined, and hence it cannot be defined in factual terms. This argument may be put more formally, as follows: Let X stand for any suggested analytic definition of "good." Ask these questions: (1)) Is goodness good? (2) is X good? And it will be seen that a negative answer to (2) is not merely a verbal mistake as would be a negative answer to (1). Therefore X is not the correct definition of "good" and in general it is a mistake to attempt the analytic definition of "good."

Now I think that there are four points which can be made in reply to the objection that the idea that evaluations may be deduced from factual statements involves a genuine "Naturalistic Fallacy" along the lines indicated by G. E. Moore. (a) There is the point that Moore's argument is directed specifically against attempts to give an explicit definition of the term "good"; and that it seems to be consistent to maintain both that there is no explicit definition of "good" and that there may be valid deductions from factual statements to value judgements. One could plausibly maintain that there are no explicit definitions (i.e. definitions of the sort "A Father is a male parent") of such terms as philosophy, game, number, community, accident, power, harm, mall., animal, and even red and coloured. However, one could hardly plausibly maintain that such terms cannot feature essentially in the conclusions of immediately valid arguments. Is the argument "this is red, so it is coloured" valid in virtue of any possible explicit definition of "red" or "coloured?" What follows from the admission that the term "good" is not susceptible of explicit definition in factual terms? Simply that there can be no such thing as an analytic truth essentially linking the evaluative term "good" with a factual term, which is such that this truth is reducible by means of

6 See: Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica Cambridge University Press 1959 p. 10-17.


logical laws and explicit definitions only, to a substitution instance of a logical truth. But (as far as ! can see) even the necessary truth "Red things are coloured" does not fulfil this condition of being reducible, by means of logical laws and explicit definitions only, to a substitution instance of a logical truth. All that seems to be necessary for there to be valid inferences from facts to values is that the meaning of evaluative terms be explicable in factual terms in such a way that some factual statements specify logically sufficient conditions for the application of these evaluative terms; not that evaluative terms be explicitly definable in factual terms.

b. Moore's "open question" argument does not demonstrate a formal fallacy in proposed analytic definitions of "good" per se, and thus does not prove that no correct definition of "good" can in principle be given. By itself, the "open question" argument could only be said to outline a test to which proposed definitions of "good" must be submitted. This is so because the argument does not treat of any essential features of analytic definitions of "good" which renders them such that the question "Is X good?" is non- trivial for any X that is offered as s~ch a definition.

c. The force of the "open question" argument is far too dependent upon immediate, straight-off, straightforward logical intuitions. However, the correctness of a philosophical elucidation is not just a matter of offering statements which accerd with our "straight-off" logical intuitions. It is more importantly a matter of developing coherent, intelligible, comprehensive, useful and applicable conceptual structures, which also relate coherently to the rest of our conceptual system and established body of substantial knowledge. Therefore, the correctness of a philosophical elucidation, and the soundness of the inferences it allows, must final!y turn upon the latent possibilities for coherent, intelligible and applicable conceptual development, and not simply upon "straight-off" logical intuitions. However, the "open question" argument does propose to dismiss all proposed analyses of "good" simply because of our "straight-off" logical intuitions.

d. The "open question" argument is completely impotent against theories concerning the meaning of evaluative terms which admit that such terms have diverse meanings. If it is said that "good" has diverse or various meanings, then it has already been admitted that no one statement of the form "X is good" will be an obvious tautology such that the question "Is X good?" will have the same logic as the question "Is goodness good?" For the question "Is X good?" may mean "Is X good in some other way than X?" Thus it becomes obvious why the question "Is pleasure good?" may be taken to be a sensible question. A person who asks it may be asking whether pleasant things are good in some other way. For instance: Are they safe? Healthy? Is pleasure seeking morally good? Therefore, the "open question" argument is powerless against any theory to the effect that "good" has various meanings, none of which is reducible to identity with any other, even though they may be connected logically in a more complex manner.

Thirdly: it might be objected that my view offends against the following anti-naturalist argument used by R. M. Hare in support of his view that


values cannot be deduced from facts. This argument is: " I f 'P is a good picture' is held to mean 'P is a picture and P is C' then it will become impossible to commend pictures for being C; it will be possible to say only that they are C. ''7 Hare goes on to say "Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in other terms which do not themselves perform this function. ''8 Thus, his argument is this: we cannot define "good" as, say, "pleasure," because if we did, we could not perform the act of commending pleasure, but only utter the triviality "pleasure is pleasure." This argument is important because it relies on the undoubtedly correct idea that evaluative terms are used characteristically to commend or condemn; that evaluations have a performative force over and above that of statements of fact. Thus many philosophers (Hare included) have come to believe that evaluations primarily commit one in an entirely different dimension from descriptive statements, perhaps to the prescription of actions or perhaps to attitudes or preferences, but in any case, commitments which cannot be guaranteed by the acceptance of any facts, and which can be undertaken in the light of any facts.

I want to make two points about this argument. (a) I certainly do not want to deny that "good" is a word used to commend. After all, the Dictionary says that it is. However, it does not seem to follow from this fact alone that there is a sharp logical distinction between facts and values, such that valid inference from the former to the latter is an impossibility. Consider the term "danger." This is a term which is characteristically used to warn, and warning, too, is a speech act distinct from describing. But does this mean that we must accept a sharp "threat/fact" distinction such that the meaning of "danger" when it is used to warn, cannot be explained in determinate factual terms, and such that it is never possible to make a valid deductive inference from the facts of a certain situation to the conclusion that it is dangerous, when that conclusion is used as a warning? Such an idea would certainly be paradoxical. We would normally and (as far as I can see) correctly think that the conclusion that a certain situation is dangerous may be validly inferred from certain factual truths about it, regardless of whether or not, in saying that it is dangerous, we are warning somebody. Thus, the relation between evaluation and certain facts may be the same as that between warning and certain facts; and this latter relation seems to be in an internal relation which permits valid inference from certain factual statements to "danger" statements which, insofar as they figure in speech acts, are characteristically warnings.

(b) Hare's argument is not to the effect that evaluations have criteria of application over and above those of certain factual statements; it is rather to the effect that evaluations have a performative force over and above that of any factual statement. Now the simple idea that evaluating is a type of performance distinct from stating does not by itself establish that evaluative terms do not have determinate descriptive meanings. Therefore, acceptance

v Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals Oxford University Press 1952 p. 85. s [bid. p. 91.


of the idea that the term "good" has a commendatory force is consistent with claiming that a certain value judgement (V) may be completely justified by a certain factual truth (F) in that criteria of application for V are completely included in those for F. This seems to me to be no different from claiming that it is possible to make an immediately valid inference from F to V. I think that resistance to speaking of validity once this point is reached stems from the idea that no statement of fact entails an act of evaluation. Certainly, this is correct. Entailment is not a relation which holds between acts. Logical compulsion is not a sort of conveyor belt bearing us inevitably through a series of acts. And since this is so, it is equally true that no statement of fact entails any other act of stating. Stating, too, is a performative speech act, and not just a content with a truth value. Thus, insofar as Hate's argument relies on the fact that evaluating is a performative speech act and not just that which has truth value, then it proves too much, namely that statements of fact cannot be validly deduced from statements of fact. And insofar as it relies on the fact that evaluating has a performative force over and above the performance of stating, it still does not by itself show that considerations of performative force are any more relevant to the question of deducing evaluations from statements of fact than they are to deducing statements of fact from statements of fact.

Now, having said all this in defense of the idea that there is no "deduction gap" between facts and values, i want to go on to suggest that there may be sound non-deductive inferences from factual statements to evaluations which depend for their soundness primarily on the conceptual relations of evaluative terms. It is in general possible for there to be sound non-deductive inferences which depend for their soundness primarily on conceptual relations. Consider, for example, the inference "Gertrude intends to visit me tonight, so she will visit me tonight." It might be said that this inference depends for its soundness on simply a rough empirical generalization to the effect that most intentions are carried out. However, in the words of Peter Geach, "Even if not all A's are B's, the statement that A's are normally B's may belong to the ratio of an A. Most chess moves are valid; most statements are veracious; most intentions are carried out; none of these statements is just a rough generalization, for if we tried to describe how it would be for most chess moves to be invalid, most intentions not to be carried out, most statements to be lies, we should soon find ourselves talking nonsense. ''9 Now I want to suggest that much of our evaluative reasoning is in accordance with conceptual principles of this form. Many of our evaluations are such that we take them to be justified in the light of the facts at our disposal only i f other things are equal.

We should also realize that it is characteristic of much evaluative reasoning (especially where what I have called complex and overriding value judgements are concerned) to take the form of weighing or balancing considerations for and against certain judgements. There are parallels to this outside of eval-

9 Geach, P. "Good and Evil."~In Analysis Dec. 1956 vol. 17.


uative reasoning. Suppose, for example, two people know all there is to know about plant and animal life on this planet, but cannot agree about whether a sea anemone is a plant or an animal. This disagreement is not hopeless. Both might present arguments for their respective conclusions, and one might convince the other by argument, by showing that considerations on one side outweigh those on the other side. This situation calls for the exercise of "judgement," the weighing or balancing of considerations for and against, in the light of complex and loose conceptual considerations. The sort of reasoning that would be involved could be neither deductive nor inductive; but it is none-the-less reasoning, not simply arbitrary or random choice.

V

Now so far I have not tried to say what I think are the basic conceptual principles of evaluative reasoning; that is, what sorts of factual considerations can provide reasons justifying evaluations. I have said only that I think there are a number of different values, or ways in which things might be good or bad. Among these I would include efficiency, skill, usefulness, health, safety, knowledge, truth, intelligence, honesty, courage, freedom, co-operation, benevolence, justice, beneficiality, pleas are, enjoyment, friendship and creative activity. Now: In virtue of what are all these concepts evaluative concepts? What is it for something to be a value? Are all the values or forms of goodness only accidentally related to each other as values, just as football matches and boxes of matches are only accidentally related to each other as matches? If we said that the term "good" was simply ambiguous, it would be impossible to see why the various evaluative criteria are criteria for commen- dation and not simply for description.

I think that the key to the solution of this problem lies in the conception of "the satisfaction of the interests of human beings." I would suggest that all the various values are related to each other as values in virtue of all being logical conditions of the satisfaction of the interests of human beings. By this I mean that if any one of these evaluative concepts were not applicable to the world, then the satisfaction of human interests logically could not occur to the same extent as it otherwise could. For example, health, safety, knowledge and skill are necessary conditions of people having theability or opportunity to satisfy very many of their interests. Benevolence and justice are, from the point of view of the agent, necessary conditions of satisfying some of the interests of other people. Friendship and creative activity are involved in our conception of a developed and flourishing human being, of human well-being, and are in this way conditions of the satisfaction of human interests. Moreover, these particular evaluative concepts clearly have a determinate descriptive content. Not anything and everything can be counted as healthy, or safe, or skilful, or pleasant, or cooperative, and so on. For example, a situation in which one is likely to get one's arm chopped off cannot be deemed "safe."

So, in general, I would suggest that the most fundamental conceptual principle of evaluative discourse is simply this: the satisfaction of human in-


terests as such is good, and the frustration of human interests as such is bad. In this connection it is worth repeating some cormnents of Kurt Baler in his book The Moral Point o f View.

"The criteria for the best course of action are liaked with the criteria for the good life. In evaluating a life, one of the criteria of merit which we use is how much satisfaction and how little frustration there is in that life. Our very purpose in playing the reasoning game is to maximize satisfactions and minimize frustrations. Deliberately to frus- trate ourselves and to minimize satisfactions would certainly be counter to the very purpose for which we deliberate pros and cons. These criteria are therefore necessarily linked with the very purpose of the activity of reasoning. ''1~

So, I would say that any simple value judgement of the form "X is good" means, in general terms, that X fulfils one of the general logical conditions of the satisfaction of human interests (e.g. health, skill, safety, truth, beneficiality, co-operation, justice, and so on). Consequently, to say of something that it serves a human interest, or that it fulfils some general condition of the satisfaction of human interests, constitutes a justifying reason for evaluation.

Of course, simply to say this is not to offer an outline of a solution to all the important philosophical problems about evaluation, i t is not to say anything about how possible conflicts between various evaluative criteria ought to be resolved; nor about the differences between, and the relevant impor- tance of, moral and non-moral value; nor is it to say anything by way of de- tailed elucidation of the particular evaluative concepts, or of the various ways in which they are related to the concept of the "satisfaction of human interests." Nevertheless I think it is fundamentally important to accept the idea that evaluation is primarily a matter of linking the object of evaluation with one or some of the general logical conditions of the satisfaction of human interests. This idea shows the general form which evaluative justifica- tions must take. It shows the general lines along which we can distinguish between (on the one hand) justified evaluative beliefs and rational actions, and (on the other hand) unjustified evaluative beliefs, mere expressions of feeling, and arbitrary or capricious actions. I would suggest, by way of argument for my position, that it accounts for the connection between evaluation, reasoned justification and action; that it outlines a necessary condition of there being any such thing as rational action, and of any fact having a rational bearing upon action; and consequently, that it outlines a necessary condition of rendering our practical relation to the world and each other intelligible to us.

V1

From all this I think we can draw two conclusions concerning the thesis of the evaluative neutrality of the social sciences. Firstly, substantial value

lo Baier, K. The MoralPoint of View Random House 1965 p. 301. 11 (a) Weber, M. The Methodology of the Social Sciences op. eit. p. 22-25.

(b) Marmheim, K. Ideology and Utopia Routledge 1966 p. 165-171.


judgements are objective claims which may or may not be justified in the light of the facts, and consequently, the social sciences may discover information which is useful in terms of realizing or preserving the conditions postulated by substantially justified value judgements and by the logical conditions of the satisfaction of human interests. This conclusion involves accepting the points made by (even) Weber and Mannheim 11 to the effect that it is impossible to divorce completely social theory from moral evaluation; that social theory begins in the desire of theorists to bring about certain goals; that only with such goals in mind does the theorist have any reason for se- lecting some facts as significant and worthy of study. However, my conclusion goes beyond the point reached by Weber and Mannheim; for they both maintain that substantial value choices other than "usefulness" judgements are essentially non-rational, that they are merely expressions of non- rational choice or feeling or decision or personal commitment. I wish to maintain, on the contrary, that substantial value judgements may be rationally grounded in considerations of fact; that the justification of such judgements consists in showing that their subjects are somehow linked to the general logical conditions of the satisfaction of human interests; and consequently that the social sciences may uncover information which is useful in terms of realizing such substantial value choices. Now this point does not necessarily mean that the social sciences are any-the-less evaluatively neutral than any other science. Most sciences uncover information which could be useful in achieving what are, in the light of some further considerations, substantially justified value choices. It is true of course that some sciences (medical science, for example) are essentially directed at the realization of a certain evaluative standard (in the case of medical science, health). Thus, medical science as such is directed at the discovery of what are substantially justified value choices in the light of the value of health; it is essentially value structured. However, I do not think that the social sciences in general are "value structured" in this way.

Nevertheless - and secondly - I think we can also conclude that the social sciences in general are more directly and extensively "value relevant" than are the natural sciences. I think that social and historical facts can by themselves provide reasons for a wide variety of evaluative assessments of social and historical situations, both actual and possible. This is so because social and historical phenomena consist, in the most general terms, in human action, in the nature, social circumstances and social consequences, of human action and in the possibilities for its development and variation. And it is to human action, its nature, circumstances, consequences and possibilities for variation that the widest range of evaluative principles apply. It is primarily facts about the nature, circumstances and consequences of human actions that provide reasons for evaluative assessment. This is so because there is a fundamental conceptual connection between the idea of evaluation and the idea of rational action, via the notion of the satisfaction and frustration of human interests.

Thus, social investigation can help us make substantially justified value


choices. For example, a description of a certain society may reveal the fact that a large section of its members go without medical care because of certain social arrangements, and that certain possible variations in these arrangements would result in their receiving more needed medical care. Surely this provides a reason for an adverse evaluation of that situation. Of course, this doesn't mean that there is no room for further intelligible evaluative argument about the situation. A person could intelligibly offer a number of different considerations as candidates for the position of an evaluatively overriding consideration in this context - for example, that it is necessary for human survival that population growth be curbed by means of denying medical care to large numbers of people. However, if a person said that an improvement in the provision of medical care would be bad because (say) it would mean an increase in the number of people rushing around with white coats on, and refused to say anything else about the matter, then this would not be an intelligible observation to offer in an evaluative context. Why not? Because it does not carry on its face any intelligible connections with the conditions of the satisfaction of human interests, and its proponent has not offered any tracing out of such a connection, however spurious.

In general, then, I would say that social scientists who eschew the making of evaluative assessments of social and historical situations, and the various possibilities for their development, are neglecting an important dimension of social and historical facts, namely their rational bearing upon evaluation, attitude and action. They are not, as the thesis of evaluative neutrality would have it, behaving as purely rational men by refusing to indulge in essentially non-rational propaganda.

VII

Now finally, I want to turn to what I called at the beginning of this paper, the thesis of factual autonomy in the social sciences. You may recall that this thesis claims that at least the explanation of social and historical phenomena can proceed independently of evaluation, even if some evaluations can be justified by reference to social and historical facts; that at least there is a realm of "pure" social facts which are prior to and conceptually separable from evaluation, even if particular evaluations are not separable from factual considerations. I want (very roughly) to outline a line of argument which, as far as I can see, tends very strongly to show that this thesis of factual autonomy is mistaken as far as a very basic and general aspect of social investigation is concerned.

The starting point for this line of argument is that the social sciences in general are concerned with human action; with the nature, social circumstances, social consequences, and possibilities for development of human action. Now Max Weber (in his "Basic Concepts of Sociology") claims that social science is concerned with social behaviour only insofar as the agent or agents associate a subjective sense to it. a2 He goes on to develop a conception

12 Weber, M. Basic Concepts in Sociology tr. Secker, H. Citadel Press 1963 p. 29.


of sociological understanding which he takes to be an indispensable aspect of adequate social theorizing. This sociological or interpretative understanding, according to Weber, amounts to being able to see human behaviour as meaningful, in terms of the sense or point which the agents themselves confer on it; that is, in terms of the agent's own reasons and purposes in acting. He then goes on to develop a conception of a sociological law as a statistical regularity which corresponds to an intelligible intended meaning. 13

A more contemporary writer who has developed to some extent similar ideas is Peter Winch in his book The Idea of a Social Science. He claims that all adequate explanations in the social sciences must involve at least in part the understanding or explanation of human action in terms of reasons and purposes, concepts and ideas. He claims that the fundamental point of difference between the natural and the social sciences is that in the case of the social sciences, the basic objects of study, people and their actions, are such that the people concerned have their own ideas about and conceptual per- spectives upon their actions, their own reasons and purposes in acting. And (he claims) it is agents' own ideas about what they are doing which give meaning to their actions as actions, which make their actions what they are rather than something else. He says that economic exchange, for example, is not just a matter of bits of metal changing hands; that the processes of buy- ing and selling have to be meant, or thought of, as such processes in order to be such processes. Therefore (he concludes) all explanations in the social sciences at least presuppose the understanding of human actions in terms of reasons and purposes, even where a social science concentrates on the un- intended results of action and where it uses in its explanations highly technical concepts which the agents who are objects of study don't understand. He says "For example, liquidity preference is a technical concept of econom- ics: it is not generally used by businessmen in the conduct of their affairs, but by the economist who wishes to explain the nature and consequences of certain kinds of business behaviour. But it is logically tied to certain concepts which do enter into business activity, for its use by the economist presuppo- poses his understanding of what it is to conduct a business, which in turn involves an understanding of such concepts as money, profit, cost, risk, etc. ''~4

Now these ideas, as far as they have been taken at the moment, seem to me basically correct. They should not as they stand be confused with the further idea that the explanation of human action in terms of agents' reasons and purposes must be some mysterious kind of non-causal explanation, which is not even ultimately susceptible of a causal interpretation. Winch, and a number of other writers, do suggest that this further idea is correct. How- ever, Donald Davidson, in his paper "Actions, Reasons and Causes" op- poses the idea that the explanation of human action in terms of reasons cannot in the end be given a causal interpretation; but he nevertheless says "When we ask why someone acted as he did, we want to be provided with an interpretation. His behaviour seems strange, alien, pointless, out of charac-

13 Ibid, p. 36-38.

14 Winch, P. The Idea o f a Social Science Routledge 1958 p. 89.

The Idea o f a Value Free Social Science 115

ter, disconnected; or perhaps we cannot even recognize an action in it. When we learn his reason, we have an interpretation, a new description of what he did that fits into a familiar picture. The picture certainly includes some of the agent's beliefs and attitudes - perhaps also, goals, ends, principles, general character traits, virtues or vices and so on. Beyond this, the redescription of an action afforded by a reason may place the action in a wider social, economic, linguistic or evaluative context. To learn, through learning the reason, that the agent conceived of his action as a lie, a repayment of a debt, an in- sult, the fulfilment of an avuncular obligation, or a knight's gambit, is to grasp the point of the action in its setting of rules, practices, conventions and expecta t ions . . . And there is no denying that this is true: when we explain an action by giving the reason, we do redescribe the action; redescribing the action gives the action a place in a pattern and in this way the action is explained. Here it is tempting to draw a conclusion that does not follow. We can't infer from the fact that giving reasons merely redescribes the action and that causes are separate from effects, that therefore reasons are not causes. Reasons, being beliefs and attitudes, are certainly not identical with actions - but more importantly, events are sometimes redescribed in terms of their causes. (Suppose someone was injured. We could redescribe this event in terms of a cause by saying he was burned). 15

So: to say that explaining human actions in terms of reasons essentially involves seeing via the reason an intelligible meaning in that action, is consistent with maintaining that such explanations can at least ultimately be given a causal interpretation. And: to say that explanations in the social sciences essentially involve understanding via reasons an intelligible point in human actions, is consistent with maintaining that adequate explanations in the social sciences must fit the basic pattern of subsuming the explanandum concerned under general laws, either causal or probabilistic.

However, if the explanation of human action in terms of reasons involves understanding via the reasons an intelligible meaning in the action whereas the explanation of natural events such as claps of thunder does not, then it seems that there must be some qualitative difference between the adequate explanation of natural events and of social events. And we must face the questions: In what does this qualitative difference consist? What is this different mode of intelligibility? What is the difference between a causal antecedent of action which is not a reason, and a reason?

Here it is very plausible to make the following suggestions. To claim a certain antecedent of an action is a reason for that action is to claim that the reason provides some elements of evaluative justification for that action; that the reason is linked by way of justification as well as by way of explanation to the action. To explain a human action in terms of reasons is to ex- hibit a rationale for the action in the sense of elements of evaluative justification in it, and not only to reveal an underlying mechanism by means of which the action came about. For a human action to be intelligible as an action, as

15 Davidson, D. Actions, Reasons and Causes in Journal of Philosophy 1963 vol. 60.


a piece of behaviour informed by reasons (i.e. for it to be rationally intelligible) is for it to have some elements of evaluative justification by way of reasons�9 In other words, the explanation of action in terms of reasons involves evaluative assessment. If I explain why a man opened a certain window by reference to his knowledge that the room was stuffy and his desire for fresh air, then this clearly shows some element of justification for his behaviour, as well as how it came about. But if I explain his behaviour by reference to the fact that he was under post-hypnotic suggestion to open the window when he did, then I have no doubt explained his behaviour, and probably also shown an excuse for it, but I have not shown any element of evaluative justification for it, not any reason why it might have been a good thing to do.

Thus, William Dray (in his book Laws and Explanation in History) makes the following comment about what he calls "rational explanation"; i.e. the explanation of action in terms of agents' reasons. He says "The goal of such explanations is to show that what was done was the thing to have done for the reasons given, rather than merely the thing that is done on such occasions, perhaps in accordance with certain laws, loose or otherwise�9 The phrase "thing to have done" betrays a crucially important feature of explanations in terms of agent calculations . . . For the infinitive " to do" here functions as a value term. Therefore there is an element of appraisal of what was done in such explanations; what we want to know when we ask to have the action explained is in what ways it was appropriate . . . A demand for explanation is often recognized to be at the same time a challenge to the agent to produce either justification or excuse for what was done. In history, too,

� 9 it will often be found impossible to bring out the point of what is offered as explanation unless the overlapping of these notions, when it is human actions we are interested in, is explicitly recognized. ''16

In general, I would say that the understanding of human action in terms of reasons - which is surely a matter of understanding facts - involves an understanding of the elements of justification in actions; specifically, an understanding of how the agent's reasons link his action with one or some of the conditions of the satisfaction of human interests. And there is more to it than this. As William Dray points out, it is not the case that "anything that is explained on the rational model is thereby certified without qualification as being the right or proper or intelligent thing to have done. ''17 Agents may be mistaken about or ignorant of certain relevant facts; actions may have some justification in some particular way while at the same time they may be unjustified in the light of different, more complex or overriding considerations; and the circumstances in which the agent acts, the constraints they place on him, may be open to evaluative assessment in various ways. Thus, a relatively full understanding of an action involves an understanding of the extent to which and the ways in which this action is unjustified. Hence it involves a wide range of evaluative assessments of the agent's beliefs and circumstances,

16 Dray, W. Laws and Explanation in History Oxford University Press 1957 p. 124. 17 Ibid. p. 124.


and of the general nature and consequences of his action - in short, a complex network of evaluation. It is not simply a matter of outlining the particular way in which an agent's reasons would, if true, justify his action; it is also a matter of bringing in and assessing conflicting considerations, and considerations left out of account by the agent.

Moreover, granted that evaluative assessment is a matter of determining how things are linked with the conditions of the satisfaction of human interests, it is not even a minimally sufficient condition of rendering an action rationally intelligible that we can show, along the lines indicated by David Hume, that the action is an effective means of achieving some purpose or want that the agent happens to have, however weird or peculiar that may be. Contrary to what William Dray says, we cannot show that an action is rationally intelligible by showing that it is "in accordance with the agent's principles - no matter what we might think of these. ''18 For example (to adapt an example used by Kurt Baier) ~9 suppose that a man explains his action of fetching a bucket of kerosene by saying that he did it in order to soak his arm in it, so that when he sets his arm alight it will be burnt off; and further suppose he claims that this is the ultimate purpose of his action, that he just adheres to the principle "Everyone ought to burn his arms off." This behaviour is not rationally intelligible at all, precisely because it is not connected with the fulfilling of any of the conditions of the satisfaction of human interests, not even with the agent's own pleasure or enjoyment. The outline of the reasons for that behaviour cannot make rationally intelligible what was before weird or pointless or meaningless; it can only shift the burden of that problem on to the agent's purpose. For an action to be rationally intelligible, it must be linked as an action, in terms of the purposes or principles it involves, to the fulfilling of some logical condition of the satisfaction of human interests - to self-interest or enjoyment, or to freedom, knowledge, safety, skill, friendship or some other general condition of human well-being, or specifically to the satisfaction of the interests of other people, and so on.

Thus, I think that the rational intelligibility of human action - a fundamentally important dimension of the facts of social life - cannot be adequate- ly described or explained, in the particular forms it takes, independently of wide-ranging evaluative assessment.

Flinders University

is Ibid. p. 125.

19 Baier, K. The Mora l Point o f View op. cit. p. 265.

the idea of a value free social science

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