the inter-ethnic relationship between serbs and albanians1283613/fulltext01.pdf · the inter-ethnic...
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Bachelor thesis, 15 hp
Programme for International Crisis and Conflict Management, 180 hp
Spring term 2018
The inter-ethnic relationship between Serbs
and Albanians
A field study in Kosovo
Alex Johansson
Acknowledgement
Without the financial support from SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency) and their scholarship Minor Field Studies, this study would not have been possible.
Equally vital was my interpreter and contact person in field, Dritan Neziri. I would like to
thank him for his networking and involvement prior to and, during this study.
I would also like to thank Maja Edfast at the Embassy of Sweden in Pristina, for contributing
with helpful contacts. Additional acknowledgments go to my tutor Elisabeth Olivius and
associate professor Dzenan Sahovic for their guidance.
Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to the 12 respondents who took their
time contributing to this study. My best wishes to all the inspiring people I got to know
during my six months of field study in Kosovo.
Alex Johansson
2018-08-22
2
Abbreviations
EU - European Union
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army (Alb. UCK)
MPs - Member of Parliaments
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - Non-governmental organization
OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UN - United Nations
UNMIK - United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
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Abstract
The inter-ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have persisted since the
war in Kosovo in 1999, even though it has been improved in recent years. A friendly
relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is vital for the future of Kosovo, and
for the security in the Balkan region.
The aim with this study is to explain how the relationship between Serbs and Albanians has
changed since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. Interviews have been
conducted with six Serbs and six Albanians living in Kosovo. The interviews were mainly
based on three key moments which were considered to have had an influence on the inter-
ethnic relationship.
The results from the interviews showed that these three key moments have resulted in
antagonism between, but also within the two ethnic groups. However, the growth of
antagonism seems to have been a consequence of how politicians and media on both sides
in Kosovo have handled these key moments, rather than as a consequence of the key
moments per se.
Key words: Inter-ethnic relations, Kosovo, Serbs, Albanians, Brussels agreement,
Ahtisaari plan, Serbia-Kosovo train, Reconciliation, Conflict resolution
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM ................................................................................................................................ 5 1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................................................................................ 5 1.3 OUTLINE ............................................................................................................................................... 6
2. THEORY .................................................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM................................................................................................................... 6 2.1.1 PATH DEPENDENCE .......................................................................................................................... 8 2.1.2 OPERATIONALIZATION ....................................................................................................................... 9 2.2 GALTUNG’S CONFLICT TRIANGLE ............................................................................................................... 10 2.2.1 ACTOR CONFLICT AND STRUCTURAL CONFLICT ....................................................................................... 10 2.2.2 USE OF VIOLENCE ........................................................................................................................... 11 2.2.3 OPERATIONALIZATION ..................................................................................................................... 12 2.3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH .............................................................................................................................. 12
3. METHOD................................................................................................................................................. 13
3.1 DESIGN ............................................................................................................................................... 13 3.1.1 SELECTION OF KEY MOMENTS ............................................................................................................ 14 3.2 DATA COLLECTION ................................................................................................................................. 16 3.2.1 INTERVIEWS .................................................................................................................................. 16 3.2.2 SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS ............................................................................................................ 17 3.2.3 ETHICS ......................................................................................................................................... 18 3.3 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS ...................................................................................................................... 19
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................. 19
4.1 KEY MOMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 19 4.1.1 TRAIN INCIDENT ............................................................................................................................. 19 4.1.2 BRUSSELS AGREEMENT .................................................................................................................... 23 4.1.3 AHTISAARI PLAN............................................................................................................................. 27
5. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 31
5.1 FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................................................................................... 33
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................... 34
APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW GUIDE ............................................................................................................... 36
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1. Introduction Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the relationship between Serbs and Albanians
have constantly shifted between hostile and peaceful. Various incidents since year 2000
have had different kinds of influence on inter-ethnic relations. The First Agreement of
Principles governing Normalizations of Relations signed by Serbia and Kosovo in year
2013 was, according to EU, UN, NATO and OSCE, “a historic break-through for Kosovo-
Serbia relations and stabilization processes in the rest of Western Balkans”1. An incident
with a negative outcome was when Serbian authorities attempted to operate a direct train to
Mitrovica (Kosovo) from Belgrade with nationalist slogans which provoked the Albanians
in Kosovo.2. It was considered as one of the most hostile exchanges since the war in 1999
between Serbia and Kosovo. Violence, distrust, segregation, nationalism and claims of
territory are examples of crucial factors that affects the relationship between the two ethnic
groups.
1.1 Research problem Several studies regarding the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo exists, but not as
much involving the relationship between the two ethnic groups, Serbs and Albanians. A lot
of tension exists between Serbia and Kosovo, Serbia has for example not recognized Kosovo
as an independent state, which is considered to be hampering the possibility for negotiations
and agreements, not to mention peace amongst the two ethnic groups. The study of how and
why the relationship between Serbs and Albanians changes is vital, in order to identify
factors that contributes to a hostile relationship. This study will hopefully contribute to the
reconciliation process between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.
1.2 Purpose of the study and research questions The purpose with this study is to analyze how the relationship3 between Serbs and Albanians
in Kosovo has changed over time and why these changes have occurred. The aim is to
explain which factors influence the relationship, in a positive or negative way.
• Which key moments influencing the Serb-Albanian relationship can be identified
during the period 2008 to 2018?
• How have these key moments influenced the Serbian-Albanian relationship?
• In which way has the relationship between Serbs and Albanians changed since the
declaration of independence in 2008 until 2018?
1 Demjaha, Agon. Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. SEEU Review. Vol. 12 no 1. (2017): 191. DOI: 10.1515/seeur-2017-0013 2 Ibid 3 Relationship is defined in this study as: ”The way in which two or more people or groups regard and behave towards each other”. Cambridge Dictionary.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/relationship (Accessed 2018-08-20)
6
1.3 Outline The theoretical framework for this study is described and discussed in chapter (2). How this
study was conducted regarding selecting key moments and respondents is presented in
chapter (3), together with the data analysis methods. Chapter (4) presents the empirical
material and the analysis. Lastly, the conclusion will be presented in chapter (5).
2. Theory I will attempt to use the following theories to explain why certain factors influence the
relationship between Serbs and Albanians; resulting either in hostile or friendly outcomes.
Formal rules and organizations, and informal rules and norms are common key themes for
historical institutionalism. Why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome
occurred are questions that historical institutionalists wants the answers to.4 Since
institutions are products of history, you need to understand the historical process in order to
understand the institution.5 The inter-ethnic relationship is one institution itself but there are
also other institutions involved in this study as the governments of both sides. Historical
institutionalism will be used to explain how institutions has changed over time.
Another useful theory is Johan Galtung’s conflict triangle, which is a model that describes
the dynamics and incentives of conflicts. The triangle consists of three components, A
(attitude and assumptions), B (behavior) and C (contradictions). A fully articulated conflict
can only exist if A, B and C are present, according to Galtung. Attitude, behavior and
contradictions do constantly change and influence each other, making the conflict dynamic.
Galtung’s triangle can be used to make a distinction between ‘structural conflicts’ and ‘actor
conflicts’. Galtung argue that three types of violence (manifest, cultural and structural) are
influencing and legitimizing each other and that they can enter a conflict at different times.6
This theory will be used to understand the conflict between the two inter-ethnic groups.
2.1 Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism (HI) is an approach used to study politics, it is neither a particular
theory or a specific method. It focuses on the real-world empirical questions, how
institutions structure and shape political behavior and outcomes.7 According to historical
4 Porta Della, Donatella & Keating Michael (eds.). Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008. 159, 161-162. 5 Bucheli, Marcelo and Wadhwani, R. Daniel. Organizations in Time: History, Theory, Methods. Oxford University Press Scholarship Online. 2013. 112. E-
book. 6 Demmers, Jolle. Theories of violent conflict: An introduction. 2nd. ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. 60-61, 63. 7 Porta Della, Donatella & Keating Michael (eds.). Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008. 150.
7
institutionalists there are three important ways in which history matters. The first one is that
consequences of political decisions may differ depending on the historical context. For
example, depending on when a political decision is made, it affects how the decision is
accomplished. The second one is that historical institutionalists focus on the historical
moment and the context where decisions are made. Attitudes, behavior and strategic choices
take place inside economic, political, social and cultural contexts. Actors and agents can
learn from previous experiences, meaning that political actions differ regarding place, time
or context. It is therefore possible to give a more detailed explanation of a specific event by
deepening and developing an understanding of the actors and the historical moment they
are within. The final way which history matters is that previous outcomes influence future
behavior and decision-making. An example is the U.S. achievements in conflicts like the
second world war and the victory against Communism, which gave them confidence to
overrule countries with dictatorship and establish democracy and capitalism. Then the
massive criticism of how the U.S. handled the war in Iraq shaped the American foreign
policy again. Historical institutionalists argue that history is not a chain of independent
events, instead, variables tends to shape one another.8
Whether institutions are formal/non-formal or a norm, they are difficult to change. An
institution is often rooted within a larger set of institutions, changing a specific institution
could therefore affect the others. When several institutions begin to change there will be a
significant resistance, particularly if actors are benefiting from one or more institutions.
Even institutions that are not optimal can be difficult to change due to expectations that are
established by norms and/or institutions. The long-term effects by changing certain rules
are difficult to foresee and actors will therefore not prefer any adjustments, even if the
existing rules are not optimal. People have invested in learning the existing norms and
institutions, which explains why there can be resistance in changing these. It is possible for
people to prefer norms and institutions only because they are used to them - i.e. their
preferences and behavior are shaped and affected by institutions.9
Historical institutionalists are using theory as a guide to empirical exploration rather than
creating a general covering model. Key periods or phases of change can be identified by
applying theories in complex processes of institutional evolution and transformation.
Theoretically informed historical narrative can be accomplished by having a dialogue
between theory and evidence, which is a common process amongst institutionalist and
8 Porta Della, Donatella & Keating Michael (eds.). Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008. 164-166. 9 Ibid, 167-168.
8
constructivist. Instead of providing abstract and generic explanations, which is common for
rationalists and behaviorists, historical institutionalists prefer using historical narratives
which emphasize sequence and timing in a specific context. They use process-tracing and
process-elucidation to identify and trace causal processes over time, and theories that can
explain these processes.10 Historical institutionalists believes that present political processes
and institutions are affected by historical legacies. To understand the present, it is necessary
to understand the past, and trace the legacies of that evolution. History matters, in the sense
that structures, institutions, processes, practices and behaviors are describing the present.
They are fluid, dynamic and ever-changing which means that they are not transmitted from
the past and bequeathed to the future.11
Historical institutionalists have in the recent years encouraged diachronic analysis as an
approach. A diachronic analysis highlights the process of change over time, which relates
to the institutionalists process-tracing method. The analysis proceeds historically, treating
developmental path and the pace of change as a matter for empirical investigation. A
diachronic approach makes it possible to advance theoretical statements inductively and
empirically about the temporal aspects (temporality, the time and timing) of the process of
change, or deductively test theoretical hypothesis about that process of change.12
2.1.1 Path Dependence
James Mahoney argues that path dependence is characterized by institutional patterns or
event chains with deterministic properties, that are set into motion by historical sequences.
There are two dominant types of path-dependent analysis, self-reinforcing sequences and
reactive sequences, whereas this paper will focus on the first one. By analyzing self-
reinforcing sequences, there is a focus on long-term reproduction and formation of a specific
institutional pattern, sometimes called increasing returns. Increasing returns refers to
adopted institutional patterns that over time becomes difficult to change due to the
increasing benefits that follows continued adoption. The longer an institutional pattern has
existed, the more challenging it is to choose options that previously were available and
perhaps more ideal.13 Critical junctures arise when an institutional pattern is adopted from
two or more alternatives. When an actor chooses a specific option, it becomes over time
difficult to return to the initial stages where multiple options were still available, making
10 Hay, Collin. Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave, 2002. 47-48. 11 Ibid, 142–143. 12 Ibid, 148–149. 13 Mahoney, James. Path dependence in historical sociology. Theory and Society. Vol. 29 no. 4 (2000): 507-508.
9
junctures “critical”. Counterfactual analysis identifies alternative options that would result
in different outcomes, which is often necessary to determine the critical junctures.14
Figure 1 is an illustration of a self-reinforcing sequence where a chosen alternative is
reproduced over time, making it difficult to go back to the initial stage of multiple
alternatives. The first box contains three different available options (A, B and C). When
option B (in this case) is selected it becomes a critical juncture. Theory is unable to predict
or explain if option A, B or C is going to be adopted, which makes it a contingent event. In
the third box option B is being reproduced over time due to the benefits that follows,
hampering the possibility to return to the first box with multiple options. When theory
cannot explain a specific event, it is often considered to be contingent.15
Figure 1. Illustration of contingency in self-reinforcing sequence.
2.1.2 Operationalization
The purpose with this study is to analyze how the relationship between Serbs and Albanians
have changed over time, by identifying key moments (incidents/events) influencing their
relationship. HI emphasizes on how institutions can shape political behavior and thereby
affect decisions and outcomes. As mentioned earlier, when a political decision is made may
affect how a decision is implemented and therefore influencing an outcome. The Serbian-
Albanian relationship changes over time, which makes it necessary to analyze key moments
involving, for example, political decisions. Decisions made when the Serbian-Albanian
relationship was hostile may have resulted in different outcomes compared to if decisions
were made when the relationship were stable or positive. The context is also an important
factor for when a key moment is occurring, affecting the inter-ethnic relationship in a
positive or negative way. The economic, social and political context in Kosovo during a
specific timeframe can result in different outcomes. Actors can learn from previous
experiences, which means that previous outcomes can influence future behavior and
decisions.
By analyzing the context and the institutions at the time of a key moment, it may help
explaining why the outcome was negative or positive for the inter-ethnic relationship.
14 Mahoney, James. Path dependence in historical sociology. Theory and Society. Vol. 29 no. 4 (2000): 513. 15 Ibid, 13-14.
A
B
C
B B, B, B
10
A (attitude & assumptions)
C (contradiction)
B (behavior)
Institutions, structures, behavior and practices at the time of a key moment may not have
been the same then compared to a couple of months or years before/after. HI and path
dependence emphasize that history matters, it matters in the sense that it influences present
decision-making. By using HI and path dependence it may be possible to explain why
previous decisions and moments have affected the inter-ethnic relationship, but also
Kosovo’s existing institutions and norms. Path dependence and self-reinforcing sequence
analysis might explain how specific institutions in Kosovo have emerged and developed.
2.2 Galtung’s conflict triangle
As mentioned before, Galtung’s conflict triangle consists of three components A, B and C.
A (attitude and assumptions) contains underlying factors that are theoretical, such as fear
and prejudice. B (behavior) contains empirical and observable factors: violence and
discrimination. C (contradiction) is also latent involving a goal or something wanted.
Figure 2 illustrates how A, B and C affect each other and that a conflict is possible to arise
from any component.16 For example, Serbia’s goal (C) might be to prevent Kosovo from
being recognized by all the member states of the UN, which might produce assumptions (A)
about Serbs living in Kosovo which may result in discrimination or violence (B) against
them from perhaps Albanians. Conflicts are therefore dynamic processes in the sense that
attitudes, behavior and contradictions are constantly changing and influencing one
another.17
Figure 2. Illustration of Galtung's conflict triangle.
2.2.1 Actor conflict and structural conflict
According to Johan Galtung there are two types of conflicts, actor conflicts and structural
conflicts. In an actor conflict, the actor is fully aware of the underlying contradiction (C)
and conscious of his/her cognition, emotion and volition (attitudes and assumptions) (A).
16 Demmers, Jolle. Theories of violent conflict: An introduction. 2nd. ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. 61. 17 Ibid.
11
When (C) and (A) are obvious for the actor, he or she has therefore the possibility to act (B)
purposefully. In other words, a conflict can only be resolved if the actors are fully aware of
the real incompatibility underlying the conflict (C). However, most conflicts are not
conscious where actors have an accurate image of (C). When actors are not aware of (A)
and (C) it is a structural conflict. In structural conflicts, actors can be exposed of repression
and exploitation although they are not fully aware of it. Actors can feel frustrated and act
upon the frustration (B) because (A) and (C) exist in their subconscious. However, their acts
do not fulfill any purposes in the sense that they are not conscious about the structure of the
social system. The actors are not aware of the contradiction preventing them from reaching
their potential levels of needs satisfaction. “Top dogs” do usually benefit by exploiting
structural conflicts, while the “underdogs” are trapped. With other words, structural conflict
is when actors are failing to see the larger picture.18
2.2.2 Use of violence
Galtung claims that there are two problems within violence studies: the use of violence and
the legitimation of that use. Quoting Galtung: “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere
of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science
and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or
structural violence”.19 Cultural violence can make people believe that repression and
exploitation is something normal. Both structural- and manifest violence can become
legitimized and acceptable in a society, which explains why some actors are failing to see
the larger picture. The arise of a hegemonic culture is possible when people are getting lost
in their daily routines and worries. The values of a dominant class can become common for
all the people through cultural hegemony where actors are incapable of perceiving the socio-
economic exploitation.20
Manifest-, structural- and cultural violence are constantly legitimizing and influencing each
other. The fact of structural violence and the act of manifest violence can be legitimized by
cultural violence. For example, cultural violence can label victims of structural violence as
“evil” if they are using manifest violence in order to get out of the structural violence.
Manifest-, structural- and cultural violence enters at different times. Cultural violence is
permanent, it transforms very slowly and therefore remains the same for long periods of
time. Structural violence is a process with ups and downs, and manifest violence is an event.
18 Demmers, Jolle. Theories of violent conflict: An introduction. 2nd. ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. 61-62. 19 Ibid, 63. 20 Ibid.
12
Violence is structured by cultural codes and norms, and rules and regulations. The
underlying organization of society which is shaping and preserving violent conflict should
therefore be analyzed, rather than violent agents such as victims and perpetrators.21
2.2.3 Operationalization
Galtung’s conflict triangle can contribute in understanding key moments that have
influenced the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The components A, B
and C can provide an understanding on why certain key moments have had a positive or
negative effect. If Kosovo is dominated by structural conflict it is expected that actors
(Serbs and Albanians) are not fully aware of the real contradictions that are hampering
reconciliation and unification. The war in Kosovo (1999) may have contributed to attitudes
and assumptions between Serbs and Albanians that no longer must be true. Perhaps there is
a ‘false’ contradiction between the two ethnic groups, a contradiction that even might not
exist? A conflict can, however, start from either A, B or C. If a key moment is provocative
enough, it might result in a conflict, as long as A and C exist. Because the inter-ethnic
relationship is changing over time between positive and negative, the components A, B and
C should also be changing. If the relationship had been stable for a period of time, it should
have been an actor conflict in the sense that actors are fully aware of the contradictions and
their emotions, which would have resulted in a solution.
It would also be of interest to analyze if factors like language and art, empirical science and
formal science, religion and ideology have been used to justify or legitimize direct or
structural violence (from both Serbs and Albanians). If, for example, politicians or other
elites are trying to justify structural violence based on ‘false’ contradictions, it might help
to understand the outcomes of the selected key moments.
2.3 Previous research
Agon Demjaha’s article Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo analyzes inter-ethnic relations
between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, since the declaration of independence year 2008.22
Demjaha analyze a few incidents that have had an influence on the relationship between
Serbs and Albanians, e.g. the Normalization Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, and
the attempt to operate a train with nationalist slogans from Belgrade to Mitrovica, as
mentioned in the introduction. Demjaha concludes that history has a vital role regarding
how incidents influence the relationship between the two ethnic groups. Politicians agenda
and the overall relationship between Belgrade and Prishtina do also affect future relations
21 Demmers, Jolle. Theories of violent conflict: An introduction. 2nd. ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. 63-65. 22 Demjaha, Agon. Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. SEEU Review. Vol. 12 no 1. (2017): 181.
13
between Serbs and Albanians.23 The data regarding the outcomes of the chosen incidents
have mainly been collected from various news articles, but not from citizens in forms of
surveys or interviews. Demjaha’s article have been used in this study in order to identify
key moments (incidents) that might have had a positive or negative outcome. This study has
deepened the knowledge of the outcomes of these key moments by conducting interviews
with Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.
Annika Björkdahl and Ivan Gusic examines in their article The divided city – a space for
frictional peacebuilding, how liberal peacebuilding is accommodated in two divided cities,
Mostar (Bosnia) and Mitrovica (Kosovo). Björkdahl and Gusic refers to liberal
peacebuilding theory where friction can, for example, arise when international actors
implement liberal peacebuilding that connects with, and engage social conditions and local
material. 24 Björkdahl and Gusic argue that clashes are not only a result of a confrontation
between liberal democracy and local practices. It is rather unstable, uncertain and
unexpected processes where existing and new ideas merge, which creates new actors,
structures and messy dynamics.25 Björkdahl and Gusic mentions how UNMIK, after the war
in Kosovo 1999, tried to establish new democratic institutions in Mitrovica that included
both Serbs and Albanians. However, Serbs in North Mitrovica rejected the integration into
new institutions, resulting in parallel systems/institutions.26 This study has tried to examine
why Serbs in Kosovo (especially) dislikes the idea of integrating into Kosovo institutions,
as a result of Ahtisaari plan. The information gathered showed how complex the integration
is when it comes to everyday life for Serbs who are “trapped” between two institutions
(Serbian and Kosovo).
3. Method
3.1 Design The aim with this study is to understand what factors influence the relationship between
Serbs and Albanians. Quantitative data often consists of numbers and statistically material
such as the calculations of height, weight and age. However, in order to gather and
understand data such as an event, feelings, intentions, and decision-making, it is preferable
to use qualitative methods. Observations and interviews are two examples of how
qualitative data can be gathered.27 To acquire knowledge about how and why certain key
23 Demjaha, Agon. Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. SEEU Review. Vol. 12 no 1. (2017): 190–193. 24 Björkdahl, Annika & Gusic, Ivan. The divided city – a space for frictional peacebuilding. Peacebuilding. Vol. 1 no 3. (2013): 317. DOI:
10.1080/21647259.2013.813172 25 Ibid, 322. 26 Ibid, 324. 27 Ahrne, Göran & Svensson, Peter. (eds.). Handbok i kvalitativa metoder. Stockholm: Liber AB, 2015. 10.
14
moments have had an influence on the Serb-Albanian relationship, it is necessary to conduct
interviews with both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Qualitative data is often required to
explain historical processes and discover mechanisms within the social life, which in this
study is necessary in order to identify key moments. Qualitative methods do also provide
the opportunity to understand other perspectives and backgrounds, which can be
accomplished by conducting interviews.28 Interviews, but also other qualitative methods,
are beneficial for the researcher in the sense that you get closer and more familiar with the
people and the context that you are studying. The distance between analyzing empirical
material and conducting interviews are relatively short within qualitative research, which
makes it possible to adjust the research-design depending on the results from the
fieldwork.29 Qualitative methods were therefore preferred in this study due to the need of
interviews, but also the need of observing and understanding the context that Serbs and
Albanians encounters in Kosovo.
3.1.1 Selection of key moments
The timeframe 2008 to 2018 have been chosen due to Kosovo’s declaration of
independence, and because of the overwhelming events that occurred prior to the
independence. A wider timeframe would very likely consist of more events, which would
make the selection process more difficult considering the limited time for this study. Events
that have occurred recently can also be problematic to study, in the sense that consequences
and reactions can change over time.
Several moments were explored in order to find the “key” ones, which in interaction with
the theories could have had an influence on the inter-ethnic relationship. Due to the chosen
period of time that this study focused on (2008-2018), and the given time frame for this
study, three key moments were selected:
1) The train incident was chosen as a key moment due to its evident and serious reactions
in social media such as Twitter and Facebook, but also in news agencies such as Balkan
Insight and Prishtina Insight. It was obvious that this incident sparked tension between
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, and especially between Serbian and Kosovo politicians.30
This incident was even seen as an “act of war”31, which might have been one of the most
28 Ahrne, Göran & Svensson, Peter. (eds.). Handbok i kvalitativa metoder. Stockholm: Liber AB, 2015. 12. 29 Ibid, 15. 30 BIRN Team. Serbia Accused of Provoking Kosovo Over Train. Balkan Insight. 2017-01-16. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-accused-of-
provoking-kosovo-over-train-01-16-2017 (Accessed 2018-07-30) 31 Kentish, Benjamin. Kosovo stops Serbian train crossing border in move declared ‘act of war’. The Independent. 2017-01-15. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kosovo-stops-serbia-train-crossing-border-belgrade-war-isa-mustafa-aleksandar-vucic-a7528361.html (Accessed 2018-08-19)
15
critical moments between Serbs and Albanians since the unrest in Kosovo in 2004.32 This
incident was a critical juncture/key moment in the sense that when the train was ordered to
operate from Belgrade to Mitrovica, with as media reports it “provocative slogans”, the
Serbian authorities could not “back down”. Due to the hostile discourse that exist between
Serbia and Kosovo, it’s not likely that politicians on both sides would admit eventual
wrongdoings.
2) Brussels agreement was chosen as a key moment because it was considered as a historical
moment between Serbia and Kosovo.33 A new institutional pattern with continuous
talks/negotiations between the two countries could be seen as a critical juncture/key
moment. Brussels agreement also meant that it would become difficult for Serbia and
Kosovo to return to the initial stage of multiple alternatives, especially when both countries
are attempting to join the EU.34 If the actors, Serbia and Kosovo, had chosen another
alternative than Brussels agreement, the outcome might not have been as “diplomatic” and
“peaceful” as it was with the Brussels agreement. The agreement can be seen as a new
beginning for Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo to integrate and live together. The outcomes
with this agreement might have been more positive than without an agreement.
3) When Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in year 2008, they also made a
commitment to implement UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal
for the Kosovo Status Settlement, better known as “the Ahtisaari plan”.35 The
implementation of Ahtisaari plan into Kosovo’s constitution was chosen as a key moment
because it was obvious that it would be difficult to return to the initial stage with multiple
alternatives. There is also a connection to HI and its theory about increasing returns where
an adopted institutional pattern becomes over time difficult to change due to the benefits
that follows. With ten seats reserved for the Serbian community in Kosovo,36 it is likely that
Serbian politicians and their communities are considered to be of benefit. The International
Crisis Group report on Ahtisaari plan concludes that there is “No good alternatives to the
Ahtisaari plan”37, which means that the choosing of Ahtisaari plan in front of other
alternatives makes it a critical juncture/key moment.
32 Traynor, Ian. Fourteen dead as ethnic violence sweeps Kosovo. The Guardian. 2004-03-18. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/18/balkans (Accessed 2018-08-20) 33 Smolar, Piotr. Serbia and Kosovo sign historic agreement. The Guardian. 2013-04-30.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels (Accessed 2018-08-20) 34 Ibid. 35 Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Summary of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. 2008. https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm (Accessed 2018-08-20) 36 UNSC; 2007; Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement; S/2007/168/Add.1; New York. 37 The International Crisis Group. Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan. 2007.
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/kosovo-no-good-alternatives-ahtisaari-plan (Accessed 2018-08-20)
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3.2 Data collection Local media in Kosovo and existing research articles about Kosovo was the primary source
to identify key moments that have influenced the relationship between Serbs and Albanians
in Kosovo. News and debate articles in foremost local media provided information
regarding topics and issues that were in some way sensitive for the two ethnic groups.
Events or decisions that have, for example, provoked either Serbs or Albanians, and were
discussed in local or international media, were useful to identify the produced outcomes.
Research articles concerning the relations between Pristina and Belgrade, but also Serbs and
Albanians, provided knowledge about previous incidents and their outcomes. Examples of
news agencies that were useful were Prishtina Insight, Balkan Insight and BBC. Social
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were also valuable due to agencies,
politicians, key individuals, and others that post and/or share thoughts, articles, and reports
regarding the situation in Kosovo.
3.2.1 Interviews
Interviews can be either structured or unstructured. Qualitative interviews are beneficial for
the researcher if he/she wants to understand complex phenomenon and events. Qualitative
interviews enable deep conversations with the respondents resulting in a better
understanding regarding a particular outcome for example. Quantitative interviews such as
standardized questionnaires do not have the same ability to seize a respondent’s thoughts
about an incident, compared to qualitative interviews. However, results from qualitative
interviews cannot be generalized due to the limit of respondents.38 The purpose of this study
was not, however, to be representative, but instead trying to understand and explain which
outcomes and factors influence the relationship between Serbs and Albanians. Qualitative
interviews were preferable in the sense that respondents could be more flexible and freer
regarding their emotions and thoughts about key moments. Standardized questionnaires are
suitable when comparing answers amongst the respondents, however, they cannot get hold
of detailed data such as emotions and thoughts.
Semi-structured interviews were the primary method for this study due to its flexibility and
structure. This form of interviews allows flexibility in the sense that the respondents can go
beyond fixed answers, resulting in more detailed and deeper answers. When conducting
semi-structured interviews, all the respondents should be given the same questions which
enables comparison between the respondents’ answers. When performing unstructured
interviews, it is more difficult to improvise and adapt in order to achieve good quality data.
38 Hjerm, Nilsson, Lindgren, Simon and Nilsson, Marco. Introduktion till samhällsvetenskaplig analys. 2nd ed. Malmö: Gleerups Utbildning AB, 2014. 149–
150.
17
Unstructured interviews require more experience and preparations by the researcher,
compared to semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were used in this study
because they are best suited for researchers who wants a high degree of validity, and they
provide more detailed information from the respondents compared to quantitative forms of
interviews.39 The interview guide can be found under Appendix 1, on the last page.
However, when conducting semi-structured interviews, it’s important to have the reliability
in mind. Would the results of this study be the same if it was conducted by another
researcher and/or in another time? Depending on if open or closed questions are used, and
how the dialogue between the researcher and the respondent are shaped, the results can
differ.
3.2.2 Selection of respondents
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo were the two targeted groups for this study and for the
interviews, due to the purpose of studying the relationship between the two ethnic groups.
Snowball sampling has been the primary method to select respondents. The snowball
sampling technique can be used via a first respondent or perhaps a contact person. After the
first interview is conducted the respondent may recommend people with interesting
experiences or information (in this case Serbs and Albanians), which he/she can help you
get in touch with. A contact person can also be a part of the snowball sampling by knowing
people of interest who also may be interested in participating in an interview. Snowball
sampling is useful when you want to study an event/incident. However, it can also be a
disadvantage using the snowball sampling, in the sense that the respondents and their
acquaintances may have the same experiences and thoughts.40 This technique was, after all,
best suited for this study, mainly because of its effective approach to locate respondents.
The snowball sampling technique was useful in finding Serbs and Albanians who would
like to participate in this study and be interviewed. Because Serbs are a minority in Kosovo
and deeply segregated, the snowball sampling might be the only alternative to get in contact
with Serbs.
Six Serbs and six Albanians were chosen to participate in the interviews, whereas half of
the Serbs and Albanians were intended to be elites/politicians. The idea of interviewing
three elites/politicians, and three ordinary citizens per ethnic group had to be dismissed, due
to difficulties in finding Serbian and Albanian elites/politicians who were willing to
participate. English speaking Serbs and Albanians have been prioritized in order to avoid
39 Hjerm, Nilsson, Lindgren, Simon and Nilsson, Marco. Introduktion till samhällsvetenskaplig analys. 2nd ed. Malmö: Gleerups Utbildning AB, 2014. 150-151. 40 Ahrne, Göran & Svensson, Peter. (eds.). Handbok i kvalitativa metoder. Stockholm: Liber AB, 2015. 10.
18
using an interpreter which can result in misunderstandings where certain information won’t
have the same meaning when translated. The demand for English speaking respondents
would possibly mean that the majority would be elites, well-educated, students, and teachers
for example. This was not a crucial issue because this study was not intended to be
representative, but rather gather as much information as possible to understand what factors
influence the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The selected
respondents had an acceptable variety of age, sex, profession, and residence, which made it
possible to compare how different or similar opinions are within the ethnic groups. The
majority of the respondents were men, only two out of 12 respondents were females (one
Serbian, and one Albanian). It would have been desirable to have an equal amount of men
and women as respondents, but due to the present gender roles in Kosovo, it was a bit
problematic. A strong patriarchal culture is present in Kosovo which makes it sensitive and
risky (due to rumors) to have a one-on-one meeting with women in Kosovo. The number of
declines to participate in an interview were higher amongst women than men.
3.2.3 Ethics
During the interviews, the four principles of research ethics were followed: Information,
approval, confidentiality and use of information.
Before or during the interviews, the respondents were informed about their participation
being voluntarily. They were not forced to do something they did not want to, and they
could abort the interview whenever they wanted to. The respondents were informed about
their part in this study and were given material required to determine whether they want to
contribute or not.
The respondents acknowledged their consents before the interviews were conducted. By
informing the respondents beforehand regarding this study and the interview questions, they
had enough information to decide whether they wanted to participate or not. The
respondents had the right to abort the interview whenever they liked, and without any
pressure or consequences.
All of the respondents are anonymous due to the request of some respondents. The
respondent’s personal information will not be used for commercial or other non-scholarly
purposes. The respondents have been noticed that this study will be published, and they will
also be offered a copy of this study when it’s finished.41
41 Vetenskapsrådet. Forskningsetiska principer, inom humanistisk-samhällsvetenskaplig forskning. 2002. http://www.gu.se/digitalAssets/1268/1268494_forskningsetiska_principer_2002.pdf (Accessed 2018-08-22)
19
3.3 Data Analysis Methods Each interview has been recorded and transcribed. The transcribed interviews were
separated into two different groups, one with Serbian respondents and one with Albanian
respondents. Answers from every key moment were compared within its group, but also
with the other group. For example, a comparison was made with only Albanian respondents,
and the same with Serbian respondents. This was made in order to detect similarities and
differences within, but also between the two ethnic groups. A comprehensive understanding
was acquired regarding key moments and topics which were sensitive for the respondents.
The theoretical framework was then applied in order to understand why certain key
moments and topics had or didn’t had a negative/positive affect on the respondents.
All information from the interviews could, of obvious reasons, not be mentioned in this
study, and a delimitation has therefore been done. Answers from the interviews, that
together with the theoretical framework were considered relevant in order to fulfil the
purpose of this study, have been presented in the empirical analysis. Quotes presented in
this study are not only representing the individual respondent, they are also representing (in
some cases) the common thoughts among Serbs and/or Albanians.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Key moments
4.1.1 Train incident
On 14th of January 2017, a train painted with Serbian flags, and slogans such as “Kosovo is
Serbia” written in 21 different languages, was headed to Mitrovica but stopped near the
border to Kosovo. The government of Kosovo was accused, by the then existing Serbian
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, for sending special forces to stop the train and to blow
up the railway. These accusations resulted in Serbian authorities forcing the train to stop
south of Serbia. The dispute continued to escalate when Kosovo government denied any
involvement of special forces trying to blow up the train. The then existing Serbian
President Nikolic responded that if any Serbs are being killed in Kosovo, Serbian forces are
ready to enter Kosovo. Albanian politicians, Serbian opposition and experts criticized
Serbia, claiming that they sent the train to achieve political points. The Albanian Prime
Minister Edi Rama said: “These games are political maneuvers for political gains”.42
Except the paintings and the slogans, the train was decorated inside with famous Serbian
Orthodox religious icons and images from monasteries in Kosovo. Marko Djuric, head of
42 BIRN Team. Serbia Accused of Provoking Kosovo Over Train. Balkan Insight. 2017-01-16. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-accused-of-
provoking-kosovo-over-train-01-16-2017 (Accessed 2018-07-30)
20
the Serbian government’s office in Kosovo, didn’t see this train as a provocation, he said:
“This is like a mobile exhibition presenting our cultural heritage”. Mr. Vucic accused
Kosovo for overreacting, he said that they “[…] Sent a train, not a tank”, and that they only
stopped the train to not escalate the situation.43
The train incident resulted in different reactions among the respondents. Most of the
respondents, both Serbs and Albanians, condemned Serbia for sending the train. Kosovo
and Serbian politicians were criticized for overreacting and trying to shift focus from the
real problems in the society. One Albanian male said: “In media it was overreacted by
politicians, because the train itself wouldn’t be a big deal coming in here [Kosovo], even
with these symbols”.44 Adding to this, an Albanian respondent said: “[…] it could be a
simple trick of the Serbian government, just to interrupt the political calmness that is
here”.45 One Serbian reacted similar to previously respondents, “[…] it’s food for the
Albanian and Serbian politicians, in order to create problems, and to make the people forget
about the miseries in their daily lives”.46
There have been no problems with operating a train between Belgrade (Serbia) and
Mitrovica (Kosovo) before this moment. The paintings and the slogans outside and inside
the train provoked both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, creating a negative outcome. These
paintings and slogans resulted in reactions by Kosovo government where special forces
were sent near the border to Serbia, which produced reactions in media. Citizens in Kosovo,
who otherwise focused on their daily routines and worries, had now shifted their focus to
the ongoing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo.47 This can therefore be seen as a
“historical moment”. It is also suggested that the train happened in a calm context and that
moments like this has happened before to interrupt the ongoing situation, which implies that
these moments follow a pattern.
Galtung argues that by being able determine what the people should focus on, it is possible
to produce a hegemonic culture where you can influence the behavior of others, which
seems to be the case here. Cultural violence has also an ability to make people believe that
repression and exploitation are something normal. However, it doesn’t seem to be true in
this case, most of the respondents are well-aware of the on-going repression from both sides.
A Serbian female living in North Mitrovica, where the outcomes of the train incident have
43 BBC. Serbian train sparks escalation in tensions with Kosovo. BBC. 2017-01-14. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38625872 (Accessed 2018-
07-30) 44 Respondent 1; Albanian male; 37 years old; Works for an international organization; Interview 2018-03-27. 45 Respondent 6; Albanian male; 40 years old; Unemployed; Interview 2018-05-03. 46 Respondent 7; Serbian male, 45 years old; Paramedic; Interview 2018-05-08. 47 Respondent 5; Albanian female; 40 years old; Works for an international organization; Interview 2018-05-02.
21
been very noticeable, said: “[…] we have basically been used as a tool by both governments,
to realize their goals, and it’s very dangerous because we can get hurt in this.”48 Another
Serbian male living in North Mitrovica said: “I didn’t like it at all, nobody liked it […]
because it’s a really bad trick from Serbian government to escalate the situation, and to put
away the light from what was really going on.”49 He continues: “You wake up and face
everyday life, and on top of that you have these tensions that are going on. This is why, I
think, many people want to leave this place.”50
These respondents seem to be aware of the components in Galtung’s ABC-theory which he
argues avoids a structural conflict; they are talking both about A (attitudes and assumptions)
and C (a goal/something wanted, or the underlying problem). The respondents are, however,
experiencing repression and exploitation by politicians from both sides (Serbian, and
Albanian). The politicians are seen as “top dogs” who are benefiting from this kind of
incidents, where Serbs and Albanians are mistrusting each other, which reinforces the “us
versus them”-mentality. All the respondents are giving the impression that they are fully
aware of the underlying problem (C), which defines an “actor conflict”. Even though the
respondents might, according to themselves, know what the underlying problem is, the
answer can, and do differ between the respondents. Because the actors are fully aware of
the underlying problem (C), it is possible to resolve the conflict according to Galtung’s
theory. Nonetheless, what determines what the “real” underlying problem is? It seems to be
the politicians, as the respondents describes it, who might not be aware of A and C or at
least do not address them, which makes it difficult to resolve the conflict.
“Considering that the economy is really bad, that people are really poor, they cannot find
a job, and they are struggling every day. On top of that you have this stuff, and of course
people are getting tired of it”51, this means the context that people are living in are the core
problem, but that that moments like this make people react. A Serbian paramedic said: “[…]
and people forget that their salaries decreases, that they don’t have money for electricity,
because the train incident is the main problem now.”52 This implies that the behavior
changed because of the train accident.
Another Serbian male said: “Why would I care if I work with an Albanian or a Serb? As
long as I have good income, and good prospects for the future. Why would I care if my boss
48 Respondent 8; Serbian female; 27 years old; Freelancer; Interview 2018-05-16. 49 Respondent 9; Serbian male; 29 years old; Working for an NGO; Interview 2018-05-16. 50 Ibid. 51 Respondent 9; Serbian male; 29 years old; Working for an NGO. 52 Respondent 7; Serbian male; 45 years old; Paramedic.
22
has an Albanian or a Serbian name? As long as he/she provides me and my family with a
good salary.”53 This statement together with the previous two supports the HI-theory of
how economic, social, and politic context during a specific timeframe can result in different
outcomes. When people have a stable economy, it seems less likely that incidents and
statements from politicians and/or media can influence the inter-ethnic relationship. The
same goes with political stability, if a country has an unstable political environment
combined with a poor economic growth, it seems to be easier to blame each other. One
Serbian male reflected on the inter-ethnic relationship between Serbs and Albanians in the
past, when there a higher number of job opportunities compared to today “[…] the older
generations have had the chance in the past to interact, and they remember the golden age
of Yugoslavia, when Trepca54 mine was at its peak. It was providing jobs and good salaries;
Serbs and Albanians were working together. They remember this life, they spoke both
languages, they worked together, they had good salaries.”55
The reconciliation-process, and the relationship between Serbs and Albanians are not
improving, but instead worsen due to how the politicians handle incidents. It seems that it’s
not necessary incidents per se that are worsening the inter-ethnic relationship, but rather the
exaggerations of them, by media and politicians. An operating train from Serbia to Kosovo
was not the problem, all respondents agreed that it was normal.56 However, there were
different opinions regarding the symbols and slogans outside and inside the train. One
Albanian female said: “They are using this event to become a bit more popular, to like
him/her [politician] a bit more and maybe gets some votes.”57, which also supports the
theory that ‘top dogs’ are benefiting from exploiting inter-ethnic incidents. At the same
time, a former Albanian commander within KLA said: “When it comes to Kosovo politicians
in relationship with Serbian politics, they cannot really play with Kosovo people […] but
for their own benefits they use things internally in Kosovo. […] because then they will be
declared as traitors, people would riot as in history (where people got killed).”58 ‘Exploit’
in this sense, seems to be understood as the politicians are using incidents to build up ties
between the countries, perhaps to re-start a negotiation, but they would then face aggression.
Instead they exploit incidents for their own political careers.
53 Respondent 11; Serbian male; 33 years old; Working for an NGO. Interview 2018-05-17. 54 Trepca mine is located outside Mitrovica. 55 Respondent 11; Serbian male; 33 years old; Working for an NGO. 56 Respondents 1-12. 57 Respondent 5; Albanian female; 40 years old; Works for an international organization. 58 Respondent 3; Albanian male; 46 years old; Former KLA-commander. Interview 2018-04-15.
23
Regarding violence as an outcome, an Albanian female said that her reaction of the train
incident was: “We are a state, we decide who comes in, and who doesn’t […] we are an
independent state, if you're coming here to offend us, or insult us in any way, we can stop
you like any other state would do.”59 Moreover, one Serbian male said: “Thank god that it
was stopped […] because that train could lead to some other incidents on the bridge60, like
when there were barricades.”61 Fortunately it did not lead to manifest violence however it
might be seen as structural violence that was legitimized as mentioned earlier as a “mobile
exhibition presenting our cultural heritage”.
4.1.2 Brussels Agreement
The First Agreement of Principles governing Normalization of Relations, more knows as
the “Brussels agreement”, is a 15-point agreement signed by Serbia and Kosovo. The
dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo are under the auspices of the EU. The aim with this
15-point agreement was to integrate Serb majority municipalities such as (North Mitrovica,
Zubin Potok, Leposavic, and Zvecan) into Kosovo’s legal and constitutional system. The
agreement also concludes that there shall only be one Kosovo Police Force, meaning that
Serbian security structures in Kosovo, especially in the north of Kosovo, will have to
integrate into the existing Kosovo Police. In order to achieve the 15-points agreement within
the Brussel agreement, an Association of Serb majority municipalities shall be established.
This association should have “full overview of the areas of economic development,
education, health, urban and rural planning”.62 The association of Serb majority
municipalities will have the opportunity to provide a list of Serbs for the position as Police
Regional Commander, which the Kosovo Ministry of Internal Affairs will choose from. The
Police Regional Commander will be responsible for the four northern Serb majority
municipalities, (Leposavic, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica).63
The signing of the Brussels agreement, and its implementation resulted in different reactions
and opinions among the respondents. One Albanian professor said: “Yes, I supported it from
the beginning […] it has its own historically role which was supported also by the
international community”64, and when asked if the agreement is positive for the inter-ethnic
relationship, he said: “Yes, sure. Because this is kind of living together, tolerance in between
59 Respondent 5; Albanian female; 40 years old; Works for an international organization. 60 Ibar bridge – one of the most famous and controversial bridge between North and South Mitrovica. 61 Respondent 10; Serbian male; 33 years old; Working for an NGO. Interview 2018-05-17. 62 Demjaha, Agon. Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. SEEU Review. Vol. 12 no 1. (2017): 191. DOI: 10.1515/seeur-2017-0013 63 The Prime Minister Office. First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations. Pristina, 2013. http://kryeministri-ks.net/wp-
content/uploads/docs/First_agreement_of_principles_governing_the_normalization_of_relations_April_19,_2013_Brussels_en.pdf 64 Respondent 2; Albanian male; 63 years old; Professor of Public Governance; Interview 2018-04-14.
24
different religions and cultures”65. Another Albanian said: “I believe that some parts within
the Brussels agreement are in function of finding solutions to everyday problems, in between
Albanians and Serbs”66. When asked if this agreement is positive for the inter-ethnic
relationship, he said: “Yes. It is in function for improving their [Serbs] daily life in Kosovo,
or the integration into the normal life”67.
When asking the Serbian respondents, the same questions, they did not really feel the same
optimism as most of the Albanian respondents did. One Serb living in North Mitrovica
reacted to the agreement: “I took it pretty hard […] I understood that it meant the end of
Serbian institutions. Until 2013, the community in the North did really believe at one point
it would just officially become a part of Serbia. With this agreement it’s not going to happen,
we will have to become a part of Kosovo’s systems”68. According to HI, changing
institutions is likely to result in resistance from the society, even institutions that are not
optimal can be difficult to change. Serbs (especially in the North of Kosovo) who have been
using Serbian institutions in Kosovo, are feeling forced to integrate with Kosovo structures.
“For the majority of the people [Serbs] this meant going from a system that was not perfect,
into a system that was even worse. […] in general people were not happy to integrate. They
felt that they are being made to integrate into a system that had worse quality systems than
the Serbian systems”69. The reactions of this decision to, over time, abandon the parallel
structures and encourage the Serbian community to integrate with Kosovo institutions, are
dependent on the current economic, social, and political context. Changing institutions is
known to cause resistance, but the resistance among the Serbian community in Kosovo is
greater when they know it will be difficult, almost impossible, to return to how it was before.
When asked if it’s possible to not integrate with Kosovo institutions, a Serbian female said:
“It was possible because we lived with it, but it wasn’t sustainable, and it’s not going to be.
[…] it will not be possible any longer, for the simple reason that Serbia is not interested in
keeping these institutions. Because now you cannot do a simple thing without Kosovo
institutions”70. The signing of Brussels agreement characterizes a critical juncture (key
moment), where it has become difficult to return to the initial stage with multiple options.
When abandoning the Serbian parallel structures, it will not become easier to officially be
a part of Serbia when they no longer have the same institutions. With other words, an
65 Respondent 2; Albanian male; 63 years old; Professor of Public Governance; Interview 2018-04-14. 66 Respondent 4; Albanian male; 38 years old; Traffic engineer; Interview 2018-04-19. 67 Ibid. 68 Respondent 8; Serbian female; 27 years old; Freelancer. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid.
25
institutional pattern has been adopted. In the longer run, the agreement might be one step
closer to a reunification of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, where tolerance between the
two ethnic groups can be established, as the Albanian professor mentioned. Hopefully it
will create a new pattern where positive outcomes follow each other.
Many respondents agree that Brussels agreement was somewhat positive, at least from the
beginning, but they think it has failed it purpose due to poor implementation. The
respondents have been complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the content of
the agreement. They feel that their opinions and voices are being ignored during negotiation-
and implementation processes. One Serbian said: “They [politicians] are basically lying to
people, and they don’t really come forward with what has been agreed in Brussels. […]
people feel sometimes pressure from the system, that they need to integrate, while their
rights are not really respected by Kosovo government”71 It’s not the integration per se that
is the problem, it’s the definition of integration, and what it brings: “The language, the
freedom of movement, and all the basics you need to have to integrate into a community are
not respected”72. He continues: “I don’t think that Kosovo government is really showing
Serbs that they are welcomed to integrate in this system, this is the problem”73. Most of the
respondents are expressing that the implementation of the Brussels agreement is being
forced, and that Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo haven’t been counseled within the
implementation process. “[…] because of the Brussels agreement people are integrated in
some institutions, people communicate only when they need to. Even though you see
politicians from the Serbian community [in Kosovo] taking part in the government, and
participating in different events, it’s only because they need to go, and not because they
think it’s good for the inter-ethnic relationship”74. The changing of institutions has
apparently not satisfied the people in Kosovo, especially Serbs living in North Mitrovica
where the effects of the agreement are most noticeable. “We [Serbs] expected the Brussels
agreement to improve, not only the inter-ethnic relationship, but also the living conditions,
the freedom of movement. Agreements that are in benefit of ordinary citizens are not
implemented. For me, Brussels agreement is a completely failure”75.
There is an indication of an on-going structural conflict where the top-dogs (politicians) are
benefiting from the Brussels agreement, while the citizens of Kosovo are being ignored.
“[…] there is no real will for Brussels agreement to succeed. Only the things that are strictly
71 Respondent 9; Serbian male; 29 years old; Working for an NGO. 72 Respondent 9; Serbian male; 29 years old; Working for an NGO. 73 Ibid. 74 Respondent 10; Serbian male; 33 years old; Working for an NGO. 75 Ibid.
26
connected to the politicians, or for their benefits, will be implemented”76 One Albanian
thinks positive about the agreement, but is disappointed with the implementation “[…] from
all the agreements that we have signed, only Serbs didn’t keep their part of the deal. […]
It’s the Serbian government that is not letting this thing go further.”77 One Albanian believes
that an integration of Serbs into Kosovo institutions is something they are entitled to “We
live in the same country, and I believe that they should have the same rights as us, they
should be integrated into Kosovo institutions. As long as they work for the best interest of
Kosovo, of course they should be integrated, there should be Serbs in every institution”78.
Another Albanian thinks that Kosovo made a mistake when signing the Brussels agreement.
“I think that when they [Kosovo & Serbia] started the negotiations, they did a mistake, at
least Kosovo did a mistake”79. He would rather see that not only Serbs in Kosovo, but also
Albanians in Serbia would be granted the same competences and benefits as the Serbs in
Kosovo. “Why do they want all these competences for Serbs in Kosovo? They don’t give it
to Albanians in Serbia, especially when there are more Albanians in Serbia than Serbs in
Kosovo. It should be both ways, and that’s a win-win situation”80. One Serb thought that
Serbian majority municipalities in Kosovo were already integrated into Kosovo
institutions/systems, “They are already integrated. They are integrated because they have
assemblies that acts according to Kosovo law, they have Kosovo emblem and flag. We
cannot speak about them trying to integrate, because they are already integrated.”81 When
asked if the agreement was positive or negative for the inter-ethnic relationship, he said
“For me it’s negative, for Albanians it’s positive because it just adds note to Kosovo
independence”82
Regarding the Brussels agreement, it seems that both Albanians and Serbs wants (in most
cases) the same thing. However, the tensions between them lays in differences of how they
can achieve a society where the rights of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo are respected.
Most of the respondents wants the Brussels agreement, or at least liked the idea of it, but it
came to soon, they are not ready yet. Historic institutionalism stresses that the timing is
vital, that when affect how. Historical institutionalism also emphasizes that it is difficult to
change institutions, to change something that people are used to. As a result of the Brussels
76 Respondent 10; Serbian male; 33 years old; Working for an NGO. 77 Respondent 6; Albanian male; 40 years old; Unemployed. 78 Respondent 5; Albanian female; 40 years old; Works for an international organization. 79 Respondent 1; Albanian male; 37 years old; Works for an international organization. 80 Ibid. 81 Respondent 12; Serbian male; 50 years old; Unemployed; Interview 2018-05-29. 82 Ibid.
27
agreement, which aims to abolish the Serbian parallel structures, resistance from especially
Serbs, but also Albanians can therefore be expected.
The agreement was supposed to create some kind of unification with shared institutions,
where both Serbs and Albanians are equally treated. According to the respondents, the
Brussels agreement seemed to have had a reversed effect. Serbs and Albanians might be
using the same institutions and services, but the inter-ethnic communication is based on
fake reasons. Serbs and Albanians are interacting with each other only because they need
to, not necessarily because they want to. The agreement has yet not resulted in a more
sincere, and kinder friendship between the two ethnic groups. It is noticeable that Serbs in
Northern Kosovo focus more on what the agreement has done concretely in their
municipality, while Albanians are a bit more distanced from the outcomes of the agreement.
Due to the lack of transparency, and politicians who only implement particular points from
the agreement, the structural conflict is reinforced. By not knowing or understanding what
the agreement really means for Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, it can produce assumptions
about each other that necessarily don’t have to be true. These assumptions (A), and unknown
goals (C) can, as part of Galtung’s conflict-triangle, be the cause for further violence and
conflicts. With other words, inter-ethnic violence can occur based on false assumptions
about each other.
4.1.3 Ahtisaari plan
Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari was appointed by the UNSC as a Special Envoy
to Kosovo, where he would lead the negotiation process regarding the status of Kosovo. In
March 2007, there had been over 15 rounds of negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo,
and all of them had failed. Ahtisaari prepared a Comprehensive Proposal which stressed
that an independence is the only viable option for Kosovo. However, Kosovo had at the
time being, according to Ahtisaari, not the sufficient capacity to become an independent
state without the involvement of the international community. Protection of minorities,
economic growth, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and sustainable development of democratic
institutions were vital areas that Kosovo lacked capacity of accomplishing alone. Ahtisaari
proposed therefore an independent Kosovo where military and international civilian
authorities will supervise and support Kosovo. The international community would have
the mandate to “correct actions, that is, to veto local government decisions that would
28
contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in which they were
crafted”.83
Article 3, Annex 1 (Constitutional Provisions), paragraph 3.2 in the Comprehensive
Proposal For the Kosovo Settlement, declares that “[…] the Assembly of Kosovo shall have
twenty (20) seats reserved for representation of Communities that are not in the majority in
Kosovo”.84 Ten of those seats are allocated for communities such as Roma, Ashkali,
Egyptian, et al. However, ten seats are reserved for the Serbian community only, meaning
that even though they achieve less mandates, they are still guaranteed ten seats in the
Kosovo Assembly.85
The respondents have mixed feelings whether the reserved/guaranteed seats were and/or are
necessary today for the Serbian minority in Kosovo. One Albanian thought that the reason
for reserving seats for Serbs in Kosovo was understandable, but not fair today “[…] in the
beginning Serbs were not able to work and walk freely… and since the number of
participants [Serbs] in the voting system were really low, that is why they decided to give
them reserved seats. […] nowadays the movement is free, they [Serbs] can go wherever
they want, and they are able to vote. If they are able to vote, why not give them as many
seats as they deserve, according to the proportional percentage? Why discriminate them
positively? Why? If you want equal rights, let them have equal rights”86. This summarizes
what many of the respondents, both Serbs and Albanians, thinks about Ahtisaari plan in
terms of reserved seats.
Ahtisaari plan can be considered as a self-reinforcing sequence, which means that it has
been a long-term reproduction. The increasing returns that have followed the continued
adoption of Ahtisaari plan and its reserved seats for Serbs, have made it even more difficult
to change. The longer an institutional pattern has existed, the more challenging it is to
choose options that previously were available, and perhaps more ideal. This theory has been
supported by the answers of the respondents. Most of the respondents were fine with the
introduction of reserved seats for Serbs due to poor voter turnout. Ten years later from when
Ahtisaari plan was instated, when the safety and rights of Serbs have improved, people are
starting to question whether it’s necessary with those seats. The new institutional pattern
from 2008 (Ahtisaari plan) could have had benefits for the Serbian MPs, and the Serbian
community, which creates a resistance for changing or abandoning the institution. It is also
83 Demjaha, Agon. Inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. SEEU Review. Vol. 12 no 1. (2017): 186. DOI: 10.1515/seeur-2017-0013 84 UNSC; 2007; Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement; S/2007/168/Add.1; New York. 85 Ibid. 86 Respondent 1; Albanian male; 37 years old; Works for an international organization
29
difficult to choose options that were available before the Ahtisaari plan. In order to change
the constitution, which is based on the Ahtisaari plan, the majority of the assembly
(including the minorities with reserved seats), needs to vote in favor for. The Serbian
freelancer said: “[…] there are several laws called “laws of vital interests” in the Kosovo
constitution, which cannot be changed without a double majority, meaning a majority of all
the 120 MPs, and the majority of the non-majority MPs [10 seats belonging to Serbs]. […]
a law cannot be changed without the consensus of Serbs. I think it's an important
mechanism, a mechanism that Kosovo Assembly has tried to circumvent in the past, that
shows that it is necessary”87.
Some of the respondents thinks that the reserved seats have encouraged Serbs in Kosovo to
integrate with Kosovo institutions, and become a part of the society. The Albanian professor
replied when asked if reserved seats were necessary: “For the time, when the constitution
was created and approved, it was more than necessary. Because with this, you kind of
motivated the minorities, the communities, to be integrated into Kosovo institutions”88. One
Albanian responded to the same question: “In the beginning it was to show that Kosovo,
and Kosovo people have the will to improve relations with Serbs in here, and even with the
Serbian government. As a gesture of goodwill, they did that.”89 He continues: “[…] there
was not one suggestion that EU or UN regarding the Kosovo-Serbia relationship, that
Kosovo didn’t fulfil. We did fulfil all of them, because we want to finish this, we want to
leave it behind, join the EU, and move forward. Improve the quality of our lives, better
paychecks, better everything. If not for us, at least for the younger generation that will
come”90.
One Albanian thinks that the number of reserved seats is too many, and that it might be
discriminating for other minority groups in Kosovo, which is shared by a few other
respondents: “[…] the number is quite high, it could be less. If Serbs have reserved seats,
what about the rest? In my opinion, they are not less important than Serbs. They are Kosovo
citizens as well, so why are you offering all these benefits to one group of people?”91. She
also concludes that both Serbs and Albanians belongs to Kosovo, and that they have to learn
to live together: “I’m not saying we like them, I am not saying we hate them, it’s just that
they live here. We live here, and we have to live together, that’s it. I mean it’s reasonable,
87 Respondent 8; Serbian female; 27 years old; Freelancer. 88 Respondent 2; Albanian male; 63 years old; Professor of Public Governance. 89 Respondent 6; Albanian male; 40 years old; Unemployed. 90 Ibid. 91 Respondent 5; Albanian female; 40 years old; Works for an international organization.
30
[…] probably most of them have been born and raised in here. So, it’s their country too,
they deserve to be here”92.
There are also some respondents who thinks that the reserved seats never should have been
implemented, due to its positive discrimination of Serbs in Kosovo, and its undemocratic
order. One Albanian said: “This is the most unlawful and undemocratic thing that happened
to Kosovo. […] they [Serbian MPs] don’t represent anyone because they didn’t get votes
from no one. Those people who have reserved seats are not elected by people, they are just
placed there, they are misused in order to destabilize Kosovo and to keep their own
interests”93. Another Albanian said: “Serbs which are members of the Kosovo Assembly,
they should represent the interest of local Serbs in Kosovo, not the interest of the Serbian
state, as they are doing now. That is why they are elected”94. However, he emphasizes that
it's important that Serbs are being represented in Kosovo, as long as it’s achieved by
democratic means. “The Serbian participation in the Kosovo assembly is not a bad thing,
it’s the opposite actually. It’s necessary for them to be represented, but the elected ones
should represent the interest of the voters, and not the state of Serbia”95. One Serb agrees
that the reserved seats were necessary then, but not necessarily today: “We didn’t have Serbs
that were represented/present in the daily political life. Now it's totally different, even
though we are a minority, we have more [representatives] than we really need. We have
positive discrimination, this is true”96.
All of the respondents share the opinion that both Serbs and Albanians should be heard and
represented in the civil society, and the assembly. What might be seen as surprising is that
Albanians are more positive to having reserved seats for Serbs in Kosovo (at least for a
while), than what might have been expected. Albanians do want Serbs to be integrated with
Kosovo institutions, and to be a part of Kosovo. However, there are differences among both
Serbs and Albanians if reserved seats are the most optimal solution. As earlier mentioned,
a conflict can arise from component A (assumptions), B (behavior) or C (a goal/something
wanted) within Galtung’s conflict-triangle. When actors are fully aware of A and C, a
conflict can be resolved and/or there is a less possibility for a conflict to arise. All of the
respondents are showing a will for co-existence between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo,
which should mean that there is a consent regarding (C), the goal. If Serbs and Albanians
in Kosovo have the same goal, to co-exist and to be a part of common institutions, and there
92 Respondent 5; Albanian female; 40 years old; Works for an international organization. 93 Respondent 3; Albanian male; 46 years old; Former KLA-commander. 94 Respondent 4; Albanian male; 38 years old; Traffic engineer. 95 Ibid. 96 Respondent 7; Serbian male; 45 years old; Paramedic.
31
is no negative assumptions (A) about each other, there is only one component that might
cause trouble, and which the summarizes of the respondents have shown they disagree
about, is component B (behavior). Controversial behavior can according to Galtung’s
conflict-triangle trigger a new conflict, but the possibility should be small as long as the two
ethnic groups are fully aware of component (A) and (C).
There is an obvious difference between the respondents regarding if it's still necessary to
have reserved seats for Serbs, but also if the elected Serbian MPs are working for the interest
of Serbs in Kosovo, or for the Serbian state. Reserved seats affect the people in the sense
that Serbian authorities are accused (by both Serbian and Albanian respondents) of
directing/deciding how the Serbian MPs in Kosovo should vote in the assembly. People feel
powerless because there is nothing they can do to change the constitution and regulate the
reserved seats. An absolute majority is necessary to change the constitution, and thereby the
number of reserved seats. This cannot be achieved if the Serbian MPs are voting against it.
Citizens who tries to get out of the structural violence run a risk of being labelled as “evil”
by the top-dogs who are benefiting from the system. One Serbian mentions how Serbs in
Kosovo were encouraged not to vote in Kosovo elections, “In the past we were strongly
advised from our local leaders not to participate in any elections, or not to join the
parliament, even before the declaration of independence”97. When politicians and others
who were against this isolation from participating in Kosovo institutions and politics, they
were marked as traitors, “At this time, some Serbs were considered as traitors, and
threatened or physically attacked. It was a sign to everyone to keep their mouths shut”98.
This shows that the behavior is creating a negative outcome.
5. Conclusion The relationship between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is today generally better than it
was ten years ago in 2008. However, their relationship has during this ten-year period been
going up and down (mostly down) because of reoccurring incidents. The majority of the
respondents feels that when the inter-ethnic relationship reaches a quite stable, and
sometimes positive level, it often becomes hostile (due to particular incidents) and then back
to normal after a few weeks. The attitudes of the Serbian and Albanian respondents towards
each other were more sympathetic and gentler than expected. The respondents gave the
impression that they don’t really have any particular conflicts with each other, but rather
97 Respondent 11; Serbian male; 33 years old; Working for an NGO. 98 Ibid.
32
with the politicians. With other words, the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in
Kosovo has improved during the period 2008-2018, but it’s not going fast enough as the
respondents would hope it would.
Another conclusion is that the inter-ethnic relationship between Serbs and Albanians is a
reproduction of a pattern of ups- and downs, affected by incidents caused by other than
regular citizens which are interrupting their everyday life. The relationships between the
two groups might be reinforced by politicians, media or by the citizens, because institutional
patterns are difficult to change.
Three key moments that were considered to have influenced the relationship between Serbs
and Albanians in Kosovo were identified: Train incident, Brussels agreement and Ahtisaari
plan. These key moments have had both direct, and indirect effects on the inter-ethnic
relationship. For example, the train incident affected the relationship between Serbs and
Albanians in Kosovo indirect. The incident was mainly handled through Belgrade (Serbia)
and Pristina (Kosovo), and the actions of their political leaders led to insecurity and
nervousness among Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Serbs and Albanians were not really a
part of this incident but got instead unwillingly affected by it. Brussels agreement and
Ahtisaari plan had a more direct effect on the relationship between Serbs and Albanians,
both through the reserved seats for Serbs (which was described as positive discrimination),
and the integration of Serbian institutions into Kosovo institutions (which the Serbian
community was not ready for). Negative attitudes, proactive behavior and contradictions
about goals leads to conflicts, and hampers the way forward for a sustainable solution.
Another conclusion from this study is that it was difficult to generalize and find particular
patterns depending on ethnicity. You cannot see Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo as a
hegemonic group who acts and thinks the same, just because they have the same ethnicity.
In several cases, both Serbian and Albanian respondents had the same thoughts and
comments. Sometimes they were even more critical for the actions of their own community
and/or politicians, than the other ethnic group. Many of the comments from the respondents
have not been mentioned or discussed in Kosovo media. Serbs and Albanians have much
more in common than what is represented in the media. Assumptions have however resulted
in mistrust between Serbs and Albanian which has caused a tense relationship. When both
actors are not fully aware of their assumptions, and what is actually wanted, it can easily
result in disputes, which these three key moments have shown. It is not the moments per se
that are the reasons of non-friendly relationship, but the established institutions.
33
A more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Serbs and Albanians in
Kosovo has been achieved. Both Serbs and Albanians do want to live a normal life where
inter-ethnic difficulties can be set aside. After conducting interviews with 12 respondents,
six Serbs and six Albanians, it was obvious that they both respected each other and the idea
of living together. Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo have more in common than what they
might think, which hopefully this study has revealed.
5.1 Further research Further research can use this study as a foundation for understanding how and why certain
incidents affects the inter-ethnic relationship. In order to discover general patterns between,
and among Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, it would be preferable to conduct a quantitative
study. It was possible to see some patterns regarding where the respondents lived, for
example what they thought about certain issues. However, the number of respondents were
not enough to generalize, and to actually determine a patter. Further research should conduct
a quantitative study on bigger groups of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, in order generalize
how the inter-ethnic relationship is affected by particular key moments.
34
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Appendix 1 – Interview guide
How would you describe the present situation between Serbs and Albanians?
• Is it worse/better now than 5 or 10 years ago?
How would you describe the relationship between Serbs and Albanians since the
independency (year 2008)?
Who/what do you see responsible for the current situation between Serbs and Albanians?
(Why is the situation as you describe?)
On 14th of January 2017, a train painted with Serbian flags and the words “Kosovo is
Serbia” written in 20 languages, was headed to Mitrovica, but stopped near the border
to Kosovo.
• What was your reaction?
• Would you say that this event got to exaggerated? (E.g. politicians and media)
• Do you feel that politicians, elites and/or media exploit these events for the purpose
of their own agenda?
The First International Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of
Relations between Kosovo and Serbia was signed year 2013. Two examples of the 15-
point agreement aims at integrating Serb majority municipalities of northern Kosovo
(Northern Mitrovica, Leposiviq, Zvecan etc), and also to guarantee integration of all
Serbian security structures in the North into Kosovo institutions (e.g. one Kosovo
Police Force).
• What was your reaction of this agreement? (Is this positive for the Serb-Albanian
relationship?
• What do you think of the idea that Serbs should integrate with Kosovo institutions?
• What are your thoughts of EU’s involvement regarding the dialogue between Serbia
and Kosovo? (is a third-part necessary for the Serb-Albanian relationship?)
37
As a part of the Ahtisaari Plan, Kosovo has since year (2008) 20 seats guaranteed for
minority communities, whereas 10 are reserved for Serbs.
• What is your opinion about reserving seats for a minority?
• How important is it that Serbs are represented in e.g. the parliament for the Serb-
Albanian relationship? (other alternatives?)
• There have been accusations that Serb MP’s are being “controlled” by Belgrade.
What is your opinion about these accusations? In what way have this affected the
relationship between Serbs and Albanians? (e.g. mistrust, assumptions, illegitimate).
What would you say is the greatest obstacle for a friendly relationship between Serbs and
Albanians?
Is there anything you would like to add?