the june 22 2009 track wreck

8/13/2019 The June 22 2009 Track Wreck

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The June 22, 2009 Train WreckPosted on December 19, 2010 by washingtondcmetro

On June 22, 2009, near the Fort Totten Metro Station, 9 people (the train op

and scores more were injured unnecessarily in a horrific wreck on Metro’s R

and should never have happened.

Incidentally, because Metro carries Workers’ Comp (WC) insurance, the fam

McMillan, cannot sue Metro. Everyone else can sue but Ms. McMillan’s fami

relation to what the passengers and/or their dependents will receive. A passe

wreck (for example) will almost certainly receive a much larger settlement th

grossly unfair and needs to change. Employees (anywhere) should not be for

condition of employment.

Most of the details about the worst accident in Metro’s history have been rep

in me repeating them here.

However, there is something that to the best of my knowledge was not menti

or PMI we performed to check the track circuits. The “Track Circuit Data Sh

working for Metro in 1983 had two (2) columns for the verification procedur

We ATC technicians had been specifically instructed to only use one of the tof the two procedures because that’s how the PMI was written and it’s how w

performing the second half of the verification all of those people would almo

celebrating the holidays with their family and friends as I write this.

That’s really all you need to know. For those who are interested in some brie

If you’ve got coffee, drink it now!

Washington D.C. Metro From the Inside Out 27 years with WMATA, the 51st State

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Seriously, if you’re at all interested in how subway trains can move automati

interesting. If not, well, read at your own risk.

This photo should be helpful in visualizing what I am referring to below. Th

‘impedance bond’. The small cable carries the train detection and speed co

yellow sign is a ‘chain marker’. A ‘chain’ is 100 feet. This is 71,700 feet from

track#1. This is just north of the Twinbrook Station. The tracks on the othe

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~~~~~

The railroad tracks are divided into sections, aka “track circuits”. Like city bl

length from less than 100 feet to maybe 1,300 feet or more.

In order to detect the location of the trains, a signal is fed through the rails fr

other. It is an audio frequency signal which you can actually hear in some pl

conduct the signal. Where the signal enters the rails is called the transmitter

the receiver (Rx) end.

Normally, with no train in the circuit, the signal goes out to the tracks throu

the rails to the receive end and back to the TCR. As long as the signal makes

assumed to be vacant (no train). Any approaching train should get unrestrict

of the posted speed limit on a public road).

When a train enters the circuit, its steel wheels and steel axles form a short c

which prevents the signal from making it to the receiver end. When the sign

track circuit is assumed to be occupied by a train.

It is done this way for safety. Anything that causes the signal to not complete

(a cracked rail, a blown fuse, a broken rail clamp, etc) will be interpreted as

supposed to be a “fail-safe” system, and it is – unless Metro “engineers” start

with old equipment from another mfr. More on that later.

A ‘track circuit verification’ is vital but pretty basic. We would use a ‘shunt st

short across the rails – to simulate a train – and confirm that our equipment

occupied. We called this ‘dropping’ the circuit (causing it to show occupancy

Above I said we only did half of the procedure. The data sheet had columns f

asking my supervisor back in 1983 or ’84 why we never did the verification a

necessary and clearly wasn’t interested in talking about it any further.

In fairness, what he said made sense intuitively – if the signal could be short

strongest, verifying the Rx end would be an unnecessary waste of time. To mFollow





this over the years – not even the most intelligent and conscientious technici

are _real_ engineers).

We continued verifying the transmitter end only, until after the wreck in Jun

After the wreck, what we found was that contrary to what our training and c

actually more difficult to ‘drop’ most track circuits at the Rx end. What that

would be possible for a train to be in a track circuit and not be detected – for

disappear!

That’s exactly what happened the day of the accident. An inbound train was

for the train ahead of it to clear the platform. It happened to be sitting close t

not detected. Therefore, the train approaching from behind on the same trac

commands. The operator of that train, Ms. McMillan, saw the stationary trai

emergency brake (or “mushroom”, named for its mushroom shape) but it wa

the rear of the stationary train causing catastrophic damage to the first two c

instantly.

Early warning:

Prior to the accident, ATC technicians had been instructed to install new ‘im

couples/transfers the train detection and speed command signals to and fro

they were told to install were made by a different mfr than the rest of the equ

the techs questioned the wisdom of this but they were blown off, as per usual

circuits weren’t adjusting properly and reported this but were told to “crank

idea from a safety standpoint. If the signal is too strong the circuit might not

A particular circuit (the one the struck train was in) began picking and drop

then vacant – days before the accident. This was confirmed by the system lo

published in a local paper. A ‘work order’ was opened for a ‘bobbing track ci

indicating occupied then vacant – ‘train/no train/train/no train’). It was tha

would be obvious on the huge display at Central Control (OCC) downtown at

In fact, that’s almost certainly why the work order was opened! After the acci

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letter issued by the mfr of the bonds clearly warning against mixing them wi

NTSB hearing the “engineer” claimed that he “never saw the letter” (althoug

WMATA claimed that they “never knew” about the track circuit problems be

clear paper trail showing they absolutely did know. Was anyone fired or dem

subsequent blatant lies? Was anyone prosecuted for manslaughter? Hell no

Heads will roll. We’re on top of this…”. OK, back to sleep now…

And in a nutshell, THAT’s what’s wrong with Metro. There is absolutely ZER

at OCC when my two coworkers were killed this past January is guilty of vol

any consequences? No way. Can my coworkers’ widows sue them? Sorry, W

WMATA, they can’t sue any Metro employee acting in his/her ‘official capaci

husband/wife; sister/brother; mother/father. Go away now, you’re bringing

people…”.

The “engineer” responsible for instructing us to install the mismatched equi

engineer, he doesn’t even have a high school diploma! He has a GED, that’s i

“engineers” are the subjects of a recent newspaper article which I linked to i

accident but now works as a “safety consultant” for Metro!!

This is so outrageous it would almost be funny if people weren’t injured and

Hopefully this accident will forever prove to be the nadir of the history of Me

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This entry was posted in Inadequate Training, Management Follies, Safety Incidents, The Metro Hall of Shame and tagmoney. Bookmark the permalink.

2 Responses to The June 22, 2009 Train Wreck

Ted K. says:

April 3, 2011 at 4:07 AM

Cranking up the power is a no-no in other fields :

1) As a data comm. tech. I’m well aware that the telephone company has a hard m

2) The FCC has published limits for equipment like citizen’s band radios; and

3) Aircraft engines are de-rated for safety and service life reasons.

By the way, that supervisor’s instruction to boost the power could be considered a

interference in nearby radio gear. It’s against the law to jam somebody else’s radi

Reply

washingtondcmetro says:

April 3, 2011 at 4:47 AM

Metro doesn’t concern itself with petty details like FCC regulations — they don

This accident should never have happened. Even though I wasn’t involved I fee

primary cause was ATC equipment. There are always ‘what if’s’ after an accide

pressed harder about why we were only verifying track circuits at the transmitt

The only thing worse than an accident in which people are hurt and/or killed i

Reply

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