ttumb, 37703 4333

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the 2<?th of AUGUST, 1946

/tittyorftyRegistered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 28 AUGUST, 1946

The War Office,August; 1946

DESPATCH ON THE PERSIA AND IRAQ COMMAND .COVERINGTHE PERIOD 2iST AUGUST, 1942, TO 17x11 FEBRUARY, 1943.

The following Despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on 8th April,1943, by GENERAL SIR H. MAITLANDWILSON, G.B.E., K.C.B.,. D.S.O., Com-mander-in-Chief, Persia and Iraq Command.

FORMATION OF PERSIA AND IRAQ; COMMAND.i. The initial successes gained by the

Germans during the summer of 1942 in their$outh Russian offensive made it necessary totake account of the possibility that they mightsucceed in occupying the whole of Caucasia,and later of undertaking an invasion of Persia;

Simultaneously their advance into Egypt notonly denied to the Commander-in-Chief Mid-east, for the time, the freedom to move forcesrapidly from Egypt to Persia—the basis ofprevious plans for the defence of the lattercountry—but led also to the withdrawal fromTenth Army of troops, equipment and trans-port to reinforce the Eighth Army in Egypt.

Early in August, 1942, it was estimated, bythe War Office and by General HeadquartersMiddle East, that in the circumstances mostfavourable to them the Germans might succeedin reaching the River Araxes in North Persiaby late October. Unless therefore immediatesteps had been taken to strengthen the defenceof Persia, the enemy might have been allowedan opportunity to follow up success in theCaucasus by striking at the oil fields and in-stallations at the head of the Persian Gulf; andon the security of these the Allied war effort inthe Middle East, India and the Far East largelydepended.

Routes for delivery of material aid to Russiato assist her to withstand the German advancein South .Russia were already in operation butwere capable of considerable development.

The decision to create, in Persia and Iraq,a separate Command directly under the War

Office was made in August, 1942, during thevisit to the Middle East of the Prime Ministerand Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Itook up my appointment as Commander-in-Chief on 2ist August; General Headquartersopened in Baghdad on I5th September, 1942.

My tasks, in order of priority, were asfollows:—

First: To secure at all costs from land andair attack the oil fields and oil installationsin Persia and Iraq.

Second: To ensure the transport from thePersian Gulf ports of supplies to Russia tothe maximum extent possible withoutprejudicing my primary task.

In carrying out my first task it wouldobviously have been preferable for Britishforces—Army and Royal Air Force—to havegiven direct assistance to the Russian defencein the Caucasus. However, for administrativereasons, due to great distances and lack of com-munications, the strength of the forces whichcould have been utilized in this way wouldhave been insufficient to have any appreciableinfluence upon the course of operations.Furthermore the unwillingness of the Russiansto accept this form of assistance rendered sucha course impracticable"

Operations to carry out my primary taskcould not therefore become necessary, unlessthe Russian defence in the Caucasus failed.My •primary and secondary tasks were thussomewhat in conflict; the former called forintensive administrative preparation of thePersian lines of communication, which couldonly be carried out at the cost of curtailingdeliveries to the Russians of supplies sourgently needed to s'ustain their defensive •campaign.

4334 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946

REORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND2. Prior to the formation of the new Com-

mand, an administrative reorganization hadbeen introduced by General HeadquartersMiddle East, with the object of freeing Com-mander Tenth Army from the administrationof the bases and lines of communication inPersia and Iraq so that he could concentrate onhis operational task. By this measure, whichcame into effect on isth August, 1942, thecontrol of the general administration of theports, depots and communications behind theTenth Army was vested in a senior Staff Officerof General Headquarters Mideast, designatedthe Inspector General of Communications(I.G.C.); while there was created an areaCommand, known as Pibase, to deal with theinternal security and local administration of theBase and Lines of Communication area. Atthe same time the zone of responsibility of theCommander Tenth Army was to have beenfurther reduced by transferring Northern Iraqfrom the Tenth to the Ninth Army.

The formation of a separate new Commandunder the War Office necessitated some modi-fications to this lay-out. With a GeneralHeadquarters on the spot, the decentralizationof general administrative control was neithernecessary nor desirable, and the InspectorGeneral of Communications and his staff weretherefore merged into General Headquarters.Owing however to the length of the divergentlines of communication leading from the PersianGulf, and the extent of development stillneeded in the ports, base depots and means ofcommunication, I considered that closer andmore^ continuous supervision was requiredthroughout the bases and lines of communi-cation than could be exercised from GeneralHeadquarters. I decided, therefore, as a tem-porary measure, to include in my staff for thispurpose a D.Q.M.G. Bases and Lines of Com-munication, with a small staff, located atBasra. This appointment was filled by MajorGeneral C. R. C. Lane, C.B., M.C., LA.,whose administrative experience and know-ledge of the country and conditions wellqualified him for this responsibility.

I decided, also, that the responsibility forlocal administration and internal security overthe whole of the Base and Lines of Communica-tion areas of Iraq and Persia was more thanone Commander could deal with satisfactorily;I therefore divided the Pibase area into twoarea commands, covering respectively the Baseand Lines of Communication areas of Iraq andPersia.

POSITION IN SEPTEMBER 1942.

3. The only troops immediately available inPersia and Iraq to meet a German invasionwere two Indian 'Divisions and one IndianArmoured Division. Of ttiese, the former hadeach only two infantry brigades and were ibelowestablishment and deficient in artillery,engineers and signals, and the latter had nomedium tanks; both were short of transport.

Many other deficiencies remained to befilled (before this small force could become abalanced fighting organization. Corps artilleryunits, Anti-Aircraft artillery, engineer units,signals and administrative units were -eithershort of requirements or lacking altogether.The network of signals to ensure the controland maintenance of operations over so large

an area, although planned and started by Head-quarters Tenth Army, was still not yetcomplete.

The Polish personnel, who, with the 3rdCarpathian Division already in the Middle East,were to form the Polish Army in the East,were in process of assembling at Khaniqin aftertheir evacuation from Russia; they lackedorganization, equipment and training, andmany of them were still suffering in health froma long period of hardship.

Decisions had already -been made by the WarOffice to strengthen and complete the forcesin Persia and Iraq. Two British Divisions (5thand 56th) had already ibeen diverted to theCommand, and the former was commencing toarrive. These were to be followed by 7thBritish Armoured Brigade from India and the5th Indian and 3rd' Carpathian Polish Divi-sions from the Middle East. Additional unitsand resources of all kinds were being provided.Naturally these measures took time to complete.

One of my first tasks, therefore, was tocomplete the organization, equipment and train-ing of the forces; in this every week's delayimposed by the Russian defence was of inestim-able value.

4. In the administrative sphere much re-mained to toe done before I could feel confidentthat operations in North Persia could be ade-quately maintained. I refer to this later.

One aspect of administration, however,limited all my operational planning. This wasshortage of motor vehicles of all types, and inparticular of Royal Army Service Corps trans-port in tooth 2nd and 3rd line; further, manyof the vehicles were old and worn. In Egyptthe demand was incessant for vehicles to main-tain operations in progress, and for the time Ihad little prospect of aid from that direction;the flow of lease lend vehicles into Persia andIraq had scarcely begun. Thus my capacityto maintain sufficient forces in North Persia wasthe limiting factor, rather than the availabilityof forces in the Command.

PLANS FOR DEFENCE OF NORTH PERSIA.5. An advance iby the Germans as far South

into Persia as Teheran or 'Ramadan would en-able them to sustain air attacks on our oilinstallations in Persia and Iraq, heavy enoughat least to reduce the oil output, possibly tostop it altogether for .a considerable time. Myplans had therefore to aim at stopping anyGerman advance from the North towards theseareas; and with the limited fighting strengthwhich I could deploy and maintain for thispurpose it would be necessary to exploit fullyany advantages of ground astride the variousavenues of approach.

The Russian authorities -in North Persia wereaverse from the concerted planning and com-prehensive reconnaissance was impossible.From the information available, however, itwas clear that good defensive facilities were toibe found in the mountain passes of Chalus andManjil (leading from the Caspian coast respec-tively to Teheran and Kasvin) and in themountainous country about Mianeh astride theTabriz-Teheran road. If the enemy avoidedthese routes, or extended hisj advance stillfurther west, the mountains south of Senna,and the passes leading from Lake Urmia toNorthern Iraq should also afford opportunitiesfor a strong defence. Further to the South

SUPPLEMENT TO. THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946 4335

and West' a final line of defence had beenselected by General Sir E. P. Quinan and pre-pared by troops of Tenth Army.

6. North Persia is a mountainous country,with few localities where airfields, can be de-veloped rapidly. Between the open countryabout Kasvin-Teheran-Haonadan on the South,and the (River Araxes on the North, the onlyareas offering reasonable facilities for airfieldslie in the valley between Ardebil and Tabrizand about Lenkoran on the Caspian coast.

Possession of this area was extremely im-portant. As .long as I could hold it, the RoyalAir Force would be able to provide fightercover for troops in action against the enemyand for bombers attacking his communications;if I lost it these advantages would be trans-ferred to the enemy, and the Royal Air Force,forced on to the defensive, would have to dis-perse its efforts to provide fighter protectionfor the vulnerable oil installations, ports andcommunications.

I had reluctantly to come to the conclusionthat the forces I could maintain north of thisimportant area were not strong enough "to fighta successful battle if the Germans attacked inStrength. 'I determined, however, to hold it aslong as I. could, and it was therefore my in-tention to send forward to the River Araxeswhatever mobile forces I could maintain, todelay any German advance for as long aspossible.

7. By the end of September, 1942, I had hadsufficient opportunity to consider the situationand to discuss it with General Sir E. P. Quinan,Commander Tenth Army, who had been study-ing- the problem 'for some time and had -beenable to visit North Persia and see somethingof the country. By this time the likelihoodof a winter -campaign in (North Persia was re-ceding, the earliest date by which it was esti-mated the Germans could reach the RiverAraxes having already been put back toI5th November.

I had at this time only one Indian MotorBrigade and two Infantry Divisions fit toundertake operations and could not have main-tained more than this force in North Persiawithout substantial administrative reinforce-ments, which even if they were available fromthe Middle East, could not reach Persia forsome weeks.

At this time the troops in Persia and IraqCommand were located mainly in the PersianHighlands about Hamadan and Kermanshah,where the winter climate is very severe. Itwas desirable to move them for the winter tomilder areas and this move could not be longdelayed. It was my intention to bring all thetroops back to the railways for the winter,in order to reduce the strain on- the transportavailable and afford it opportunity for refittingbefore the Spring. I intended also to cut downto the minimum the force in Persia, whosemaintenance requirements had to be moved upthe Persian line of communications in diminu-tion of the flow of aid to Russia. •

•My first proposal was to locate twodivisions, which force I could expect to main-tain 'in North- Persia if. operations took placeduring the winter, in the area of Kasvin; butas this was in the Russia zone the concurrenceof the Russian Government 'had' first to beobtained.. As the time was not considered exrpedient for an approach 'in this sense to the

Russian Government, I had to modify my plan;this involved little or no risk, as the sustainedRussian defence at Stalingrad and in the NorthCaucasus continued to postpone the date bywhich German intervention in North Persiamight, be expected. I therefore reduced th.eforce in Persia to one division and one motorbrigade, located in the British zone at Qumand Andimishk respectively; the remainder ofthe troops being brought back to winter tram-ing locations on the Iraq railway.

8. By November, 1942, .the course of thecampaign in Russia and the opening of theAllied offensive in North Africa had rendereda German threat to North Persia during tihewinter almost-impossible; the earliest date forpossible operations was estimated to beI5th April, 1943, five or six divisions beingconsidered the maximum force the Germanswere likely to deploy on or south of the RiverAraxes.

The troops in Persia and Iraq had mean-while completed their moves to winter locations,and arrivals from other theatres had increasedthe strength available. I had now at my dis-posal two British divisions and one BritishArmoured brigade; three Indian divisions (twowith three Infantry brigades each and onewith two); one Indian Armoured division (withsome light tanks and trucks in place of mediumtanks); and one Polish division reasonably pre-pared for operations. The remainder of thePolish Army was in process of organization,equipment and training, and for some monthsto come could not be'counted on for operations.The flow of equipment into the Command wasincreasing and some improvement had beeneffected in the'transport position. - "'' " • - ' • • *

To achieve a balanced fighting force for pos-sible operations in the Spring of 1943, I formedthe British and Indian "Infantry divisions intotwo Corps (3rd and 2ist Indian) each of oneBritish and one Indian division. Both Corps,together with 31 Indian Armoured Divisionand 10 Indian Motor Brigade, were placedunder command of Tenth Army for operationsin North Persia. I intended to retain direct com-mand of the Polish Corps and to hold the re-maining Indian Infantry division (of two Infan-try brigades) in general reserve, and with thisin view incorporated with' it as an integral partTtfa British Armoured Brigade.

My general plan to meet a German offensivein the Spring remained substantially as before,thougjh I now had at iny disposal a force morenearly adequate to its task.

I was still not in a position to maintainsufficient forces far enough forward to makesure of stopping the enemy before he reachedthe Northern group of. airfields about Ardebiland Tabriz; my intention remained, therefore,to secure these areas for as long as possible andsubsequently to defeat the enemy South andSouth West of Mianeh if he should succeed inadvancing so far.

The defence of Northern Iraq against anattack from Lake Urmia I proposed to entrustto the Polish Army in the East, assisted bytroops of the Iraqi Army. (My outline planwas submitted to the War Office on lythNovember, 1942.)

One aspect in. the situation which gave causefor some anxiety was the time required to getthe forces in position and ready to meet theGerman thrust if-it should come.

4336 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946

To ensure the greatest possible flow of aidto Russia, not only had the bulk of TenthArmy been withdrawn some 500 miles from itsdeployment area, but -the preparation of thelines of communication on which it would de-pend had been retarded. Furthermore thedecision to curtail or suspend the supply ofmaterial aid to Russia, to permit of my forcesbeing maintained in their forward operationalareas, would have been fraught with manydifficulties, both political and military; clearlyit had to be deferred . to the last pos-sible moment and would have called for verycareful timing.

THE IRAQI ARMY.9. By agreement with the Government of

Iraq, it was arranged that, in the event of aGerman threat to that country, the Iraqi Armywould resist aggression and for this purposewould deploy two divisions for the defence ofthe minor passes leading from the direction ofLake Urmia into North Iraq.

Plans were prepared for the co-operationof this force with the Polish Army, to whomthe defence of this region was to be entrusted.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTACK THROUGHTURKEY.

10. Although preparation for operations inNorth Persia was the dominating considerationhi Persia and Iraq throughout the autumn of1942, the possibility of a German threatthrough Anatolia in the Spring of 1943 couldnot be dismissed altogether.

Plans previously made by the Commander-uvChief Mideast to meet this case, which in-volved the employment of Tenth Army inNorth Iraq, remained unaltered and were keptunder review.

INTERNAL SECURITY.11. Iraq has remained quiet and no threats

to internal security have occurred, nor havethere been any indications of attempted sabot-age. Precautions in this country therefore havebeen limited to the provision of military guardsover installations and depots, as a deterrent tothe theft and organized robbery of militarystores which have everywhere been prevalent.

In Persia, on the other hand, the problemof .internal security has been constantly to thefore. There is a wide distribution of armsthroughout the country. The natural pro-pensity of the tribes to attack anything likelyto yield food or clothing has been intensified byAxis propaganda and by economic distress.

Threats to the security of our communica-tions through Persia have arisen mainly in thehill sector of the railway about Durud, and onthat portion of the Bushire-Isfahan road whichpasses through Qashgai territory. In both theseareas minor incidents have been frequent. Inthe former it has been necessary to locatevarious garrison defence units along the rail-way; in the latter I have been mainly con-cerned to secure the tranquillity of the tribeswithout (the necessity for using military force—a commitment, once undertaken, almost cer-tain to remain and increase. In November,after consultation with Sir Readier Bullard, theBritish Minister in Teheran, I ordered militaryreconnaissance of the Bushire-Isfahan road andsubsequently arranged to lend some assistanceto the Persian Military Governor, in an. effort

to achieve security of the roads by means ofthe Persian Army and Gendarmerie.

Teheran has also 'been a centre of trouble. InOctober, 1942, a political crisis occurred in con-nection with the provision of paper currency forallied use; arrangements were made, in con-sultation "with the British Minister in Teheran,for a force of one British Brigade to be pre-pared to move to Teheran at short notice. Thiscrisis was eventually averted without recourseto the use of troops. In December, shortagesof food in the capital led to trouble, whichculminated in rioting between the 8th and lothDecember. The rioting subsided on the arrivalof a British Infantry Battalion at Teheran, with-out the necessity for military action; someminor accidental casualties were sustained.

12. Investigations over a considerable periodculminated in the discovery of an extensiveplot, instigated by the German agent Meyerand others, to organize Fifth Column activitiesin Persia in preparation for the expectedGerman invasion. This plot involved a PersianCabinet Minister, three Members of Parliament,eleven Generals and many other senior officersof the army, as well as the Qashgai tribes.Early in December General Zahidi; who wasimplicated, was arrested in Isfahan, and thishad a steadying effect.

As several German agents, including Meyer,are known still to be operating in South EastPersia, I sent a small independent detachmentof Kalpacks on an extensive mission through-out this area, the results of which are not yetavailable.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATION OF THECOMMAND.

13. Administrative preparation for possibleoperations has formed a major part of theactivity of this Command. Following on theBritish entry into Iraq and Persia, an extensiveprogramme of administrative development be-came necessary. Port capacities have had tobe increased by developing existing ports andconstructing new ones; railway communicationsextended and improved; a comprehensive pro-gramme of road construction and improvementcarried through; hospital accommodation,workshops and storage facilities of all kindsto be provided at the cost of a great deal ofengineer construction. In addition it was neces-sary to prepare groups of aerodromes, all-weather and dry weather, for the Squadronsand Base installations of the Royal Air Force,and to provide accommodation for repair andservicing, fuel and explosives.

'By the time the Persia and Iraq Commandcame into being most of the work had alreadybeen planned by General (Headquarters MiddleEast and by Headquarters Tenth Army. Muchhad been completed, and much was 'in courseof construction.

Prior to 1942, planning and developmentwere directed primarily to meeting a Germanthreat through Anatolia, when North Iraqrather than Persia would have been the theatreof operations. Preparations were thus moreadvanced in Iraq than in Persia; by September,1942, the existing port of Basra had beendeveloped and construction of an additionalport begun at Um Qasr; base depots and theconnected establishments had been developedat Shaiba; and an advanced base at Mussayibwas nearing completion. The development of

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946 4337

rail communications was well forward and anextensive fleet of inland water craft had beencollected and organized. The preparation ofaerodromes and Royal Air Force installationsin -Iraq had already reached an advanced stage.

The situation in Persia'was less favourable.Means of communication were less developedto begin with, and a later start had been madeto improve them. Construction of the portsof Khorramshahr and Bandar Shahpur wasstill far from complete; essential railway im-provements were in hand but the fleet of locomo-tives and rolling stock was still much' belowrequirements; the development of base facili-ties for the Army and the construction of aero-dromes for the Royal Air Force were onlybeginning. Action to remedy this state ofaffairs had already been initiated, but storesarrived slowly and many delays and set-backshave been experienced.

14. The retarded progress of administrativepreparations in Persia and the growing pos-sibility of a German success in South Russiamade it clear that' an intensive administrativeeffort was required to ensure that operationsin North Persia could, in fact, be maintained.I fixed 3ist March, 1943, as the target date bywhich the base and lines of communicationwere to be ready to take the strain of opera-tions. This decision necessitated a review ofall plans, if the most economical use was to bemade of the available resources; any projectsnot clearly essential had to be dropped, andlong-term constructional works reconsidered toensure that their continuance justified the effortinvolved. Some curtailment was thus effected.

In one respect, however, I decided to in-crease construction over previous planning.The base areas in Iraq and South Persia liein one of the hottest regions of the world, andit was not to be expected that troops locatedthere could sustain the intensive effort whichoperations must entail, unless provided with areasonable scale of accommodation and ameni-ties. I therefore authorised the constructionof full-scale hutted accommodation through-out these areas.

15. The construction and stocking of basedepots on the Persian line of communicationscould only have been completed in time at thecost' of a considerable reduction in supply toRussia, which was already falling below ex-pectations. The alternative to this was to relyupon the base depots in Iraq to maintain opera-tions in North Persia, at least during the open-ing phases. This involved a very real risk;supplies for the Tenth Army and for theadministrative and defence troops behind it, tothe extent .of some 2,000 tons daily, wouldhave to be passed by barge across the Shatt-el-Arab, re-loaded to rail-in the Persian ports andmoved thence up the long and vulnerable Per-sian railway. In the circumstances, this riskhad to be accepted. Such a contingency hadbeen foreseen by the Commander-in-Chief,Middle East, who had ordered the constructionat Tanuma, opposite Basra, of a lighter quaylinked to the Persian railway; and had arrangedf.or the provision from India of materials for abridge of boats across the Shatt-el-Arab. WhenI. assumed . command, construction • of thelighter quay was already.well advanced, but itseemed doubtful whether the materials for' thebridge of boats would arrive in time, or whether

the bridge would prove sufficient. I there-fore authorised the construction of a woodenpile bridge across the Shatt-el-Arab, whichwould afford both rail and road access fromthe Depots in Iraq to the Persian Railwaysystem.

The insecurity of the Persian railway was afurther cause of anxiety especially over themountainous section between Andimishk andSultanabad, and I felt it was necessary to havean advanced base beyond this section to affordsome insurance aigainstt railway interruptionthrough sabotage or bad weather. My first in-tention was to locate this advanced base atTeheran, but the only practicable site was foundto be within the Russian zone of railway con-trol. An alternative site was ultimately foundnear Sultanabad, and so far. as could be donewithout interference to the forwarding of Rus-sian supplies, preparations were made so thatthe various depots could be completed andstocked rapidly should the need arise.

16. Other .preparations to ensure the main-tenance of operations in North Persia had tobe deferred to avoid cutting down supplies toRussia. The length of the rail communicationsfrom the base to the area of possible opera-tions, as well as the extreme climatic con-ditions, called for the establishment forwardon the line of communications of advancedworkshops for the repair of tanks, guns andvehicles, hospitals and convalescent depots,reinforcement camps, etc.; in the circumstancesall had to be held back in Iraq, ready to movetheir positions as soon as it became clear thatBritish defensive measures must have priorityin transportation over supplies for Russia. Myfirst estimate was that I should need not lessthan three weeks for essential administrativepreparations before I could expect to main-tain Tenth Army in North Persia; subsequentmore detailed examination indicated that thisestimate was too short.

17. Considerable development and organiza-tion were needed in other administrativeaspects. I was concerned at the paucity ofresources for the repair of vehicles and weaponsof all types. It will be appreciated that coun-tries such as Persia and Iraq, deficient as theyare of almost all forms of industrial develop-ment, offer few facilities in the shape of fac-tories, plant, and resources of skilled labourcapable of adaptation to the maintenance of amodern army. Workshop buildings had to beconstructed, plant and materials imported, andskilled labour provided from Army resources or

• trained locally. The extent of this problemmay be gauged from the fact that over oneand a quarter million square feet of workshopspace had to be included in 'the constructionprogramme; and after exploiting all availablelocal resources the supply of skilled labour fellshort by 15,000 of the army's full require-ments. Great progress has been made in theprovision of workshops, and in training to semi-skilled standards large numbers of IndianPioneer troops and local civilians; but shouldthe problem arise again, the mechanicalupkeep of the army will remain a majorproblem.

18. Differences hi -the organization and work-ing of administrative services of the Britishand Indian Armies presented another problem.Originally the Expeditionary Force to Persiaand Iraq was drawn from India and the.force

4338 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946

remained predominantly Indian in characterand organization when its command was trans-ferred to General Headquarters Middle East.As the force increased in size and administra-tive units of the British Army arrived, it soonbecame apparent that both organizations couldnot work efficiently side by side. After carefulconsideration I came to the conclusion that theBritish Army establishments were more suitedto the requirements of this Command; and withthe concurrence of the Cx>mmander-dn-Ghief inIndia I therefore carried out a reorganization ofthe R.I.A.S.C. and I.A.C.C. elements of theBase and L. of C. troops.

19. Extremes of climate and distance, lackof transport, materials and skilled personnelhave greatly hampered the administrative pre-paration of this theatre. This preparation isstill incomplete; but credit is due to the staffsand administrative services in Persia and Iraqboth before and during the period of my com-mand for the great deal that has been accom-plished. In particular, credit is due to theworks services of the Royal Engineers. Theirtask has been both difficult and heavy, andgreat resource and ingenuity have been shownin improvising methods of using local resourcesto speed up construction and reduce demandson shipping for the import of materials of allkinds.

AID TO RUSSIA20. Development of communications to facili-

tate supply to Russia through Persia began inthe autumn of 1941. As I have already in-dicated, this development involved a heavyprogramme of port construction and railwayand road extension and improvement;.the col-lection from places as far afield as the UnitedKingdom, North America, India and Australiaof locomotives and rolling stock; and the or-ganization of whatever civil transport could beobtained, and the importation of Lease Lendvehicles to build up a road transport service.

The whole of this effort has been carried outin the face of great difficulties. The extremesof climate met with in Persia have reactedstrongly on the mechanical efficiency andsmooth working of the railway. Mechanical set-backs have been frequent; locomotives designedfor temperate climates and easy grades havedeveloped mechanical failures due to excessiveheat and the heavy grades of a mountain rail-way; resources sufficient for the mechanical up-keep of the small pre-war fleet of locomotives,though supplemented by British personnel, have .proved inadequate to deal with these unex-pected failures; large numbers of new railwaywagons have arrived with couplings too weakto stand the strains imposed on a mountain rail-way, and new couplings have had to be manu-factured in India to replace them and have notyet arrived. The Persian railway had been inoperation only five years when this new demand•had to be met; its staff of operating personnelwas small and had not yet reached the standardsof efficiency to be expected hi a long establishedrailway, and this in turn has increased thestrain on already deficient workshop capacity.Although plans were made to deal with thesevarious difficulties, delay in the arrival of loco-motives, wagons, /plant and stores has post-poned the achievement of the railway targetsand has made reliable planning difficult.

The situation in the ports has been equallydifficult. Construction has been delayed throughthe late arrival of stores from India which couldnot be replaced iby local improvisation. It hasbeen necessary to operate the ports to the maxi-mum capacity possible whilst they were stillunder construction, and this is always difficult.Acute shortage of cranes of all types has beena serious limiting factor, and supplies from over-seas have been slow in arriving.

The number of personnel available toorganize, control and operate the transportationfacilities has been very small—only enough toprovide a thin British veneer over the Persianorganization.

It will be realised that o!f the total tonnagelanded at the ports, a considerable proportionhas been required for purposes other than directdelivery to the Russians; in .particular, thenecessity to increase the numbers of locomotivesand rolling stock for the railway to more thanthree times the initial figures has absorbed agreat deal of the port capacity available.Another serious difficulty -has been the high pro-portion of heavy and difficult stores includedin the cargoes; such items as locomotives, rail-way wagons, heavy steel rails and pipes, sheetsteel and so on, have proved difficult and slowto handle with the limited lifting appliancesavailable. These are the main reasons why,prior to and during my tenure of command,the volume of goods moved forward from thePersian Gulf ports to Russia has consistentlyfallen short of expectation.

21. The organization of the road transportservice to supplement the railway has also pre-sented considerable difficulties. Units andpersonnel from the British and Indian armieswere available to provide a nucleus for im-proving the ports and railway, but none wereavailable for road transport. This responsi-bility was therefore undertaken by the UnitedKingdom Commercial Corporation, who werealso the consignees in Persia of all " Aid toRussia " stores. A beginning was made byorganizing a road transport service from Persiancivil motor lorries obtained by contract. Thiswas subsequently increased by .the arrival fromNorth America of Lease Lend vehicles, whichagain have been operated by the United King-dom Commercial Corporation through civilagencies.

The whole road transport effort has beenhandicapped throughout by lack of sufficientpersonnel to supervise the working of Persiancivilian employees and contractors, by the lowstandard of commercial morality prevalent inPersia (which has led employees of the Corpora-tion to exploit the absence of supervision), andby lack of resources for the mechanical upkeepof the fleet of vehicles.

At the time I assumed command, the short-age of personnel to check malpractices in theroad transport service had become acute, andthe United Kingdom Commercial Coijporationwas attempting to obtain additional personnelby release from military service. The wholeposition seemed to me to be so unsatisfactory .that a conference was held early in Novemberat my Headquarters, attended by senior officialsof the United Kingdom Commercial Corpora-tion and of the Minister of State's Office, theCommanding General United States PersianGulf Service Command, and others concerned.At this conference decisions were reached that

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946

my General Headquarters should assume thegeneral direction of the road transport activi-ties of the United Kingdom Commercial Cor-poration; and that it should -become responsiblefor maintaining its fleet of vehicles, and shouldtake over and hold the large stocks of motortyres which had already arrived for the UnitedKingdom Commercial Corporation or were onthe water. I was then able to make available acertain number of experienced transport officersto assist the United Kingdom Commercial Cor-poration officials, and to organize a system ofmilitary check posts along the Persian routes toassist dn supervising the working of the service.Later, at the request of the Russian authorities,certain military transport units were allocatedto carrying Russian stores, to ensure that am-munition and certain other types of storesremained in military charge throughout. Theresults of these measures are not yet fullyapparent, but a gradual improvement is beingmade in the working of the road transport ser-vice in Persia.

22. In the operation of the transport of storesto Russia a serious hold-up of shipping occurredin the Persian Gulf. This was already the casewhen J assumed command and has been a causeof anxiety throughout. It has been broughtabout by various factors. In estimating .thecapacity of the ports 'to receive stores, and therail and road transport to clear them, insuffi-cient allowance was made originally for thevarious difficulties in operation which I havementioned; the tonnages despatched to PersianGulf ports have been dn excess of the alreadyoptimistic estimates of what could be accepted;and the high proportion of difficult cargoes,cdmbiried" with the "slow" development of portconstruction and the slow arrival of liftingappliances, have accentuated the delays.Another factor, though in other respects a for-tunate one, has been that sinkings en routehave fallen below what was anticipated andallowed for in loadings. Improved performancein tonnages landed, combined with a temporaryscaling down of loadings, are now rapidly re-ducing the congestion of shipping which shouldshortly disappear.

4339

23. It was obvious during the summer of 1942that the British personnel available for trans-portation duties in Persia were quite inadequateto deal with the scale of development plannedand in progress, and that their numbers couldnot be materially increased. In August, 1942,therefore, information was received from theWar Office that the United States Army was totake over the operation of the ports and railwaydn Persia, and in addition provide a fleet ofmotor vehicles to supplement the road transportservice. Major General Donald H. Connollywas appointed Commanding General, UnitedStates (Persian Gulf Service Command, andarrived in Persia in October, 1942, with advanceelements of his staff. The first United StatesArmy troops landed in December, 1942.

The process of handing over is still going on,and. although minor set-backs and difficultieshave naturally been encountered, as a result'of willing co-operation on both sides the processof changing from British "to United States Armyadministration and control is progressing,smoothly. Witlrthe much larger resources inpersonnel and plant, which the CommandingGeneral United States Persian Gulf ServiceCommand will have-at his disposal, a rapid im-provement is to be expected in the output df thetransportation services and a correspondingincrease in the tonnage which can be deliveredto the Russian Army. Although the full re-sources of the United States Persian Gulf-Service Command are not yet deployed, andthe transfer of operations is still .incomplete,an improvement is already apparent; thoughin fairness to the personnel of the British, Army.I wish to place on record that the arrival ofUnited States .Army troops to relieve them hascome at a time when much of the heavy work"of preparation and development is at an endand about to show results.

24. The following figures show the tonnageswhich have been landed for Aid to Russia andcarried forward by various agencies during theperiod of my command:—

Tonnage landedCased MT landedTonnage forwarded by railTonnage forwarded by roadTotal tonnage forwarded ...

(Sept.

30.0005,000

24,000 •11,00035»ooo

19

Oct.

50,0004,000

23,00016,00039,000

42

Nov.

•35,0004,000

20,00016,00036,000

Dec.)

•37,0008,000

23,00016,00039,000

19

(Jan.

s^.ooo8,000

24,00021,00045,000

43

Feb.)

83,00011,000 •33,00018,00051,000

25. The fact that deliveries so far have failedto reach expectations does not lessen the valueof the work performed by the very inadequatenumber of British personnel which it has beenpossible to allot to this duty. Great credit isdue to the personnel concerned in this work,who have carried through their task with un-failing energy in spite of many obstacles anddisappointments they have encountered.

THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF TROOPS.26. During the period under review, the

health of the troops in the Command has beensatisfactory. During September and October,1942, the rate of admissions to hospital wascomparatively high, mainly owing to the effects

of the 'hot summer, the prevalence of malariain certain parts of the country, and hi the caseof the Polish troops to. .the. after effects of theirrecent privations. Throughout the winter thetroops have been very- healthy and theirstandard of physical fitness for war is high.

Much valuable- work-, has been done by theMedical Services, especially in the preventionof malaria.

A great deal has also been done for the wel-fare of the troops. .The civil communities inIraq and in Persia, the clergy, the philanthropicbodies and the NAAFI/EFI have all madevaluable contributions to this essential work,which is more than ever necessary hi a countrywhere so few natural amenities exist.

4340 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 28 AUGUST, 1946

THREAT OF INVASION REMOVED.

. 27. The sustained series of victories in SouthRussia and the successful operations in NorthAfrica 'both render a German threat to NorthPersia in 1943 progressively more and moreunlikely. The initiative now lies with the AlliedNations and it is our duty to -retain that initia-tive and bring the maximum force to bear onthe German war machine from as many direc-tions as possible. It was to be expected, there-fore, that the forces an my iCommand would bereduced and that the status of the Commandwould require revision.

In January I received orders to despatch the5 British Division to the Middle East Com-mand and finally on 23rd January I was sum-moned to a conference with the Prime Ministerin Cairo. On loth February the 56 (London)Division was also ordered to the Middle EastCommand. I decided therefore to re-groupthe remaining formations within the Commandand issued orders for their location in thegeneral area Mosul-Kirkuk.

On 17th February I left for Cairo to take upmy new duties.

28. In concluding my despatch I wish tobring to notice the hard work and continualeffort of the staff and signals on my Headquar-ters in building up the Command into a fightingorganization in so short a time.

The Commanders Tenth Army, 3 and 21Corps and their subordinate Commanders havegiven wholehearted co-operation in the trainingand equipment of their formations and in over-coming difficulties inherent hi their -re-organiza-tion.

The Commanders oif the L of C Areas andSub-Areas in carrying out their tasks deservecredit for what they have accomplished underconditions of 'great distances, bad weather andcommunications.

In General Anders, Commanding the PolishArmy in the East, I have found a most willingcollaborator who carries great prestige with histroops and who has worked tirelessly to get histroops into line with British methods.

General Connolly of the United States Per-sian Gulf Service Command has shown willingco-operation and understanding in the takingover of the Persian L of C by the Americanforces on their recent arrival.

I found in Air Vice Marshal H. de Crespigny,Royal Air Force, a willing co-operator in thepreparation of the plans jfor the defence ofNorth Persia and am much indebted to himfor his sound advice on all matters affectingour two services.

Commodore C. F. Hamill, Royal Navy,Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf, renderedmost valuable service not only in the controland allotment of shipping between the variousPersian Gulf ports but also by the ready mannerin which he met emergency demands for seatransport.

•I am also much indebted to Mr. J. A. de C.Hamilton of the Minister of State's BranchOffice in Baghdad for his help and advice on•many subjects for which civil and militaryresponsibilities overlap.

Throughout my period in the command thewilling co-operation of His Majesty's Embassyin Baghdad and the Legation in Teheran havebeen of the greatest assistance.

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