AUTHOR : SUSAN GOODRICH LEHMANN, Columbia Universit y

TITLE : ISLAM AND ETHNICITY IN THE REPUBLICS OF RUSSI A

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1 The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the Nationa lCouncil for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U . S. Department of State under TitleVIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis andinterpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s) .

CONTENTS

Abstract 1

Introduction 2

The 1993 Russian Election Study 4

The Role of Sufism 7

Variation in Religiosity Across Ethnic Groups 1 1

Demographic Characteristics of Religious Practitioners 1 3

Alternative Explanations for Religious Variation 1 5

Implications for Economic and Political Beliefs 1 9

Conclusion 20

Bibliography 22

Tables 25

ISLAM AND ETHNICITY IN THE REPUBLICS O F RUSSIA1

SUSAN GOODRICH LEHMANNAssistant Professor of Sociolog y

Columbia University '

Abstract

This paper concerns the state of Islam in the 5 Muslim Autonomous Republics i n

Russia at the end of the Soviet era . Based on survey data collected by the author in 1993 .

it is clear that the strength of Islam both as a religious and social institution varied

regionally despite the shared experience of Soviet anti-religious policies . Muslims i n

Chechnia and Dagestan were much more likely to report that they actively practice d

Islam than Muslims living in Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan . and Bashkortostan .

Most importantly religious practice in Russia in 1993 was high among non-

traditional groups of Chechens and Dagestani . The young, the urban migrants, the highl y

educated, and men reported high levels of active worship . In Bashkortostan, Tatarstan ,

and Kabardino-Balkaria in contrast, active religiosity was primarily confined to old rura l

women with low levels of education . These differences, I hypothesize, are linked to th e

Sufi Islam tradition present in Chechnia and Dagestan but absent in the other Musli m

regions .

From a strategic point of view these data suggest that Islam is less likely t o

facilitate Russian/minority conflict in those regions where it is weak, but very likely to

facilitate such conflict in Chechnia and Dagestan were it is strong and widespread amon g

young urban males . Sufism in Russia contains a strong nationalistic element . which

causes Sufi Muslims to view issues of national identification in a less compromisin g

manner than non-Sufi Muslims . According to the data, Sufism is less relevant i n

determining attitudes toward economic reform which show greater consistency across th e

Muslim Republics . '

This article was written with support from National Council for Soviet and East European Research Gran t808-14, National Science Foundation Grants SBR-94-12051 and SBR-94-02548, the Carnegie Foundation, th eMacArthur Foundation, and the Harvard Russian Research Center .

2 Mailing Address : 420 Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York, N .Y . 100273These findings and those of a follow-up study of religious knowledge and practice and ethnic toleranc e

sponsored by the U .S . Department of State and conducted in the summer and fall of 1995 in Tatarstan .Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria are the subject of ongoing research .

1

Introductio n

Becoming modern normally means moving to the city and assimilating to a complex of urba n

behavior and values ranging from smaller family size and attenuation of extended family ties, t o

increasing commitment to education, to linguistic assimilation to the dominant ethnic group, to mor e

participatory political attitudes . Often this process of urbanization is viewed as a rational response t o

objective, primarily economic, stimuli . ' With the focus on economic factors the role of cultura l

values, especially ethnic and religious values, tends to be inadequately incorporated into analyses o f

the modernization process . Among the important features of modernization among Christian nations

has been the tendency towards secularization of religious attitudes . It is understood that newcomer s

to the city sometimes adopt fundamentalist attitudes, but in the long run religiosity declines as a

population becomes more urban . '

Some have argued that the phenomenon of religious assimilation may differ for Musli m

nations . Braibanti observed ,

The reemergence of Islamic national identity is part of a larger global trend o fdeveloping nations turning to indigenous modes of development . Disenchantment wit hforeign models and growing self-confidence in a national identity encourage suc h"endogeneity ." This search for roots leads inevitably to a reconsideration of Islam .6

Both the survival of religious values during the transition from rural to urban society and th e

role of religion in Russian/minority relations have been under-analyzed in Soviet studies . ' More

attention has been given to Islam than Orthodoxy . Even then religion is usually viewed only as a

component of nationality . ' Silver does note that Islamic regions lag behind Christian regions in th e

degree of Russian language assimilation, but variation within the Muslim republics is assumed to b e

insignificant or non-existent .' The numerous sovietologists who expressed concern in the seventie s

about the Muslim threat to the Union likewise failed to distinguish among the Muslim republics . This

'See, for example, Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago : University o fChicago Press, 1976) .

'Welch, Michael and John Baltzell, " Geographic Mobility, Social Integration and Church Attendance ,Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol . 23 (1984) : 75-91 ; Robert Wuthnow, "Recent Patterns o fSecularization : A Problem of Generations?" American Sociological Review, vol . 41 (1976) : 850-867 .

"Ralph Braibanti, "Recovery of Islamic Identity in Global Perspective," in The Rose and the Rock, ed .

Bruce B . Lawrence (Durham: Duke University Programs in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia, 1979) : 185 .

'For an exception see Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies," in The NationalitiesFactor in Soviet Politics and Society, ed. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (Boulder : Westview Press ,1990) .

'Robert A . Lewis, "The Mixing of Russians and Soviet Nationalities and its Demographic Impact," i nSoviet Nationality Problems (New York : Columbia University Press, 1971) .

'Brian Silver, " Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities, in Sovie tNationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy Azrael, (New York: Praeger, 1978) .

2

assumption of Islam's unvarying nature is peculiar given Bennigsen's detailed scholarship on th e

distinctive character of Sufism in the Northern Caucasus of Russia . 1 0

One reason for the lack of differentiation in the analysis of religion in the former Soviet Unio n

is that Westerners could not engage in opinion polling until the late 1980s . Even then the size o f

samples was usually too small for fine-tuned analysis . A very large scale study of the 1993 Russia n

election allows us to do such analysis for the first time . As part of the sample, 1,000 respondent s

each were selected from 16 former autonomous republics of Russia. Five of these republics have a n

Islamic religious tradition : Tatarstan, Bashkortostan . Chechnia . Dagestan . Kabardino-Balkaria .

It turns out that the level of religiosity varies enormously among these Muslim people . This

study will make the case that while the transition to urban life generally produces a decline i n

religiosity, the character of the dominant type of Islam in a region has a great impact on the rate o f

secularization. Bennigsen's hypothesis that Sufi Islam, found in Chechnia and Dagestan . was

peculiarly successful in surviving communist attempts at secularization is confirmed . This is in

contrast to Jadidist Islam, followed by Tatars and Bashkirs, which was peculiarly weak in staving of f

decline in religious observance . In our study 65% of Chechens/Dagestani both believe and practic e

Islam compared to 18% of Kabardians/Balkars and 19% of Tatars/Bashkirs .

The data demonstrate that at the end of the Soviet period Islam was a widespread and activ e

religion which cut a broad swath through the social strata only in those regions dominated b y

Sufism . It is particularly noteworthy that in Sufi dominated areas Islam continued to draw activ e

support among young men. Among the Kabardians/Balkars . which are influenced neither by Jadidis m

or Sufism, the level of religious practice was low while religious belief remained strong . In Tatarsta n

and Bashkortostan Jadidism coupled with urbanization led to substantial decline in both religiou s

belief and religious practice by the end of the Soviet era .

Religious and national identity are often intertwined. Studies of the rate of ethnic assimilatio n

in the former Soviet Union have assigned causal significance to the date of Russian conquest, th e

experience of deportation, the presence/absence of native language schooling, and variation in level s

of inter-ethnic marriage. For that reason these factors will be addressed as alternative explanation s

for regional variation in religiosity . The analysis will show that the divisions within the Musli m

population based on the date of Russian conquest or the deportation experience do not correspond

well to patterns of religious practice . As to the other two factors, the results demonstrate that eve n

when controlling for variation in rates of inter-ethnic marriage and native language use, hug e

differences in levels of active religiosity remain between the Sufi and non-Sufi Muslim populations .

10 Alexandre Bennigsen, "Modernization and Conservatism in Soviet Islam," in Religion and Modernizatio nin the Soviet Union, ed . Dennis J . Dunn (Boulder : Westview Press, 1977) ; Alexandres Bennigsen, "Musli mConservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime : The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus, "in Sovie tNationality Policies and Practices, ed . Jeremy Azrael, (New York : Praeger, 1978) .

3

In the autonomous republics in particular . the importance of religiosity as it influences both the

pace of development and the character of infer-ethnic relations with the Russian colonial powe r

should not be underestimated . Religious observance and expressions of ethnic nationalism in thes e

regions are often synonymous, making religiosity a particularly important component o f

Russian/minority relations . Attitudes toward Russians are much more negative in areas dominated b y

Sufi Islam . When asked in 1993, for example, whether the Russians greatly helped the developmen t

of other peoples of the former Soviet Union, 9% of Chechens/Dagestani responded affirmativel y

compared to 40% of the Kabardians/Balkars and 33% of the Tatars/Bashkirs . This in part explain s

why the situation is so explosive in the Caucasus and why it is imprudent to generalize fro m

Chechnia to other autonomous republics like Bashkortostan and Tatarstan .

PART I : The 1993 Russian Election Stud y

The tables presented in this paper were computed using a sub-sample of the 16 .000 interviews

conducted in the Autonomous Republics of Russia as part of the Hough . Colton . Lehmann 199 3

Russian Election Project ." The local social scientists were instructed on sampling methodology

and interview techniques at a three day workshop held in Moscow in earl' November of 1993 . The

training portion of that workshop was organized by Michael Swafford, then the America n

Sociological Association's representative on the Soviet Union, using a training program which he ha d

developed for the World Bank. The survey was conducted under the combined supervision of Dr .

Mikhail Guboglo, the deputy director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russia n

Academy of Sciences and the American scholars . '

Respondents were randomly selected from voting lists . All respondents were interviewe d

between mid-November and December 9, 1993 . Approximately 1,000 interviews were conducted in

each of 16 Autonomous Republics . In each autonomous republic local social scientists conducte d

interviews in the capital city and outlying cities and villages in proportion to their share in th e

population .

The data for this paper were not collected to study religious variation within Russia . so the

best proxy which can be devised is an ethnic/regional division . The Autonomous Republics o f

Chuvashia, Karelia, Komi, Mordova, North Oscetia, and Udmurtia are Christian . Maria and Yakuti a

are Christian/Shaminist . Buriatia, Kalmykia, and Tuva are Buddhist . Bashkortostan, Chechnia ,

"The Autonomous Republics are homelands for non-Russian ethnic minorities and are located within th eboundaries of Russia . They are not to be confused with the 15 former Soviet Republics which have no wbecome independent countries .

'The Russian Election study was conducted in 35 Russian oblasts as well as the 16 autonomous republics .The 35,000 interviews in the oblasts were supervised by Dr . Sergei Tumanov, director of the Sociolog yLaboratory of Moscow University, and the American scholars .

4

Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Tatarstan are Muslim .' This paper will deal only with th e

Muslim republics . Fundamentalist Sufi influence which is very strong in Chechnia and Dagestan ha s

practically disappeared . to the extent that it was ever present, in Kabardino-Balkaria . Tatarstan . and

Bashkortostan .

Though our sample was large in each republic, some of these ethnic groups are relatively

small, particularly the Balkars, Kabardians . Bashkirs, and peoples of Dagestan . To increase the size

of the ethnic sub-samples to allow for more detailed analysis and retain the maximum degree o f

variation across key indicators, three larger groups with the following ethnic composition wer e

created: 1) Chechens/Dagestani (Avartsi, Darghins, Kumyk), 14 2) Kabardians/Balkars, 3) Volga

Tatars/Bashkirs . Table 1 (page 25) presents data on variation in the history and nature of Isla m

within the six ethnic groups studied.

Data for the Chechens and the Peoples of Dagestan were combined because their version o f

Islam is known to be heavily influenced by fundamentalist Sufism . Their people are located i n

neighboring autonomous republics . The Chechens, as can be seen from Table 2 (page 26), ar e

somewhat more actively religious than the Kumyks and Darghins of Dagestan but both the Chechen s

and the three major ethnic groups in Dagestan show a substantially higher degree of active religiosit y

than any of the other Muslim groups .

The peoples of Dagestan (hereafter Dagestani) were converted to Islam by the Arabs first i n

the 7th century and again in the 16th century . They in turn brought Islam to Chechnia . Both the

Chechens and the Dagestani frequently use Arabic in religious worship . Both populations have

actively fought Russian domination throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, often in collaboratio n

with each other, by rallying around religious/nationalist leaders .

The Volga Tatar/Bashkir group was formed because both peoples are Turkic Muslims, as are

75% of Muslims in the former Soviet Union . 15 Eminent geographer Chauncy Harris . noting the

rich natural resources in this region, has called Tatarstan and Bashkortostan "by far the mos t

powerful areas of Islamic tradition within Russia ." 16 The Tatars are the "largest national minorit y

13 Chechnia belonged to Chechen-Inguishetia during the soviet period . In 1991'?, when Chechnia declared it sindependence, this autonomous republic split into Chechnia and Inguishetia . The small size of Inguishetia ,financial constraints, and lack of a local contact person meant that no survey was conducted in Inguishetia eventhough it is also Muslim .

14The Lezhgis, the fourth most numerous ethnic group in Dagestan were left out of the analysis because alarge proportion of them are Shi'te . Sufism is a variant of Sunni Islam . (Ira Lapidus, A Historv of Islami cSocieties, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) : 183, 257 ; Bruce Lawrence, Defenders of God, (SanFrancisco : Harper and Row, 1989) : 125) .

"Alexandre Bennigsen, "Islamic or Local Consciousness Among Soviet Nationalities'?" in Soviet Nationalit vProblems, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) : 168 .

16 Chauncy D . Harris, "A Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethni c

Homelands," Post-Soviet Geography, vol . 34, no . 9 (1993) : 587 .

5

in the Russian Federation with 5 .52 million in 1989 . "

Both the Volga Tatars and Bashkir s

became part of the Russian Empire in the 16th century . Both converted to Islam in the very distan f

past. The levels of religiosity among the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs are similar . There is a hig h

degree of intermarriage between the two ethnic groups, and the Volga Tatars have a large presenc e

in Bashkortostan (Tatars comprise 28% of the population of Bashkortostan . Bashkirs 22%) making i t

plausible to combine these two populations . Bennigsen has also argued that the ethnic distinctio n

between the Bashkirs and Volga Tatars is largely Soviet-made .18 At the turn of the century Tatars

and Bashkirs were heavily influenced by the Jadidist movement in Islam which in many ways run s

counter to the Sufist movement, as will be discussed later .

The Kabardian/Balkar group provide an excellent test population to see whether factors relate d

to assimilation or type of Islam provide the best explanation for differences in religiosity . The

Kabardians and the Balkars share the same republic and both were converted to Islam by th e

Crimean Tatars much more recently than the Volga Tatars and the Bashkirs . Their autonomou s

republic is located next to Dagestan and Chechnia and their peoples entered definitive Russia n

control in the late 18th and early 19th century -- much later than the Volga Tatars and Bashkirs an d

closer to the time the Dagestani/Chechens entered Russian control . The Kabardians are Caucasian as

are the Chechens, the Avartsi, and the Darghins . The Balkars are Turkic as are the Kumyk of

Dagestan . The Balkars and the Chechens were deported after World War II and returned fro m

deportation in 1957 . As with the Chechens, the deportation experience has served to foster a sense o f

Balkar national identity . 1 9

By most indicators, with the important exception of religious tradition, the Kabardians/Balkar s

are most similar to the Chechens/Dagestani . As with the Tatars and Bashkirs . there is no significan t

Sufist presence in Kabardino-Balkaria . It might well be hypothesized then that Kabardians/Balkars

would be similar to the Chechens/Dagestani in religiosity . In :act their level of religious practic e

(although not belief) is closer to that of the Tatars/Bashkirs .

The simplest explanation for ethnic variation in religiosity is regional variation in the length o f

adherence to Islam. Clearly to the extent that one assumes that the date of conversion influences th e

strength of Islam, one would expect Islam to be less firmly established among more recent converts .

If anything the opposite is true . The Chechens/Dagestani, who are the most actively religious ,

chronologically were converted to Islam after the Tatars/Bashkirs and before the Kabardians/Balkars .

Further the date of conversion for the Chechens/Dagestani is similar to that of th e

Kabardians/Balkars but the level of religiosity is a great deal higher for the Chechens/Dagestani .

"Ibid.18Bennigsen, "Islamic or Local Consciousness Among Soviet Nationalities?" 179 .19Janet Ormrod, " North Caucasus : fragmentation or federation'?" in Nation and Politics in the Sovie t

Successor States, ed . Ian Bremmer and Ray Tams, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 1993) : 460 .

6

Thus there is little correspondence between date of conversion to Islam and level of religiou s

practice .

PART II : The Role of Sufism

The explanation which corresponds more closely to variation in religiosity found in these data

is based on the type of Islamic tradition practiced in a region . Alexandre Bennigsen and S . Ender s

Wimbush argue that there are at least two variants of Islam present in the former Soviet Union : 1 )

the largely Soviet controlled modernist tradition centered around the official hierarchy of Isla m

located in the four Muslim Spiritual Directorates '° and 2) fundamentalist Sufism or " parallel Islam "

which combines the mystical practices and highly structured organization and apprenticeship syste m

of the populist Sufi brotherhoods with the fundamentalist intellectual Islamic tradition ." The two

types of Islam, official Islam and Sufi Islam, differ with respect to regional location of believers ,

organization, training, and literar y language.22The official Islamic establishment in Russia was undergoing modernist theological change s

(jadidism) at the time of the Russian Revolution . Jadidism originated in the late 19th century ,

primarily among intellectuals in the Crimea, Azerbaidjan, and the Volga region .23 The Tatars were

among the leaders of jadidism worldwide . The intellectual leaders of the movement were ofte n

trained in Russian and European institutions and frequently well traveled .24

Jadidism developed as a response to the perception that the Islamic world was being taken ove r

by the more technologically advanced Christian world. Though originally intended to revitalize Isla m

in Russia, the Jadidist movement narrowed the scope of religious authority and marginalized Isla m

by stressing that Islam spoke to spiritual matters alone, whereas rational thinking was to guide dail y

living . Crimean Tatar Gasprinskii, believed that a key feature of jadidism was t o

reform education so as to create an awakened and critical spirit in people with which i tforges a new society free from otherworldly concerns save in matters of personal ethics .

20These are located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Ufa, Bashkortostan, Makhachkala, Dagestan, and Baku ,Azerbaidzhan (Alexandre Bennigsen and S . Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars : Sufism in the Sovie tUnion, (London : Hurst, 1985)) .

21See also L.I . Klimovich, "Bor'ba ortodoksov i modernistov v Islame" in Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma, no .2 (1966) .

22Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, (Boston : Kegan Paul International, 1983) ; Bennigsenand Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, (1985) . All of the Muslim groups in this study are Sunni Muslims ; al lbelong to the Hanatife school except for the Dagestani who belong to the Shatite school (Bennigsen, "Islamic o rLocal Consciousness Among Soviet Nationalities'?" (1971) : 168) .

'Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (1983) ; Bennigsen, "Modernization and Conservatism i nSoviet Islam," (1977) ; Edward J . Lazzerini, "Beyond Renewal : The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change i nthe Modern Age," in Muslims in Central Asia, ed . Jo-Ann Gross, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992) .

24 Lazzerini, "Beyond Renewal," 151 .

7

' Rational ' explanations of social behavior would lay the foundation for a calculable futur eundreamed of by forme r generations.25

The Soviet government was able to build upon the declining scope of Islamic authorit y

precipitated by the Jadidist Movement . To further weaken Islam's ability to unify diverse peoples .

the government divided the previously undivided Soviet Muslims into 4 Spiritual Directorates and

instituted the use of local languages, as opposed to Arabic, for worship . The intent and affect was to

"hamper the unification of the Muslim world by preserving social and cultural differences between

different regions . " 26 Spiritual Directorates were controlled by the Council of Ministers of th e

USSR . Under communist rule most mosques were destroyed and most clergy either co-opted to the

side of the Soviet government or infiltrated by non-believers . 27 One of the four Spiritua l

Directorates was in Ufa, Bashkortostan and this directorate had charge of Muslims of the Europea n

USSR and Siberia . This directorate was typically inactive during the Soviet period having produce d

only one religious publication in 4 0 years.28

The other variant of Islam found in Russia is Sufism . The current centers of Sufism in th e

former Soviet Union are Chechnia and Dagestan in the Northern Caucasus . Kirghizia, Turkmenistan ,

and parts of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan . Though Sufism was introduced into Tata r

country in the twelfth century, the Sufi brotherhoods there did not actively oppose the Russians an d

there is little evidence that Sufism survived in Tatar country or the northwest Caucasu s [Kabardino-Balkaria].29

Sufism is a more mystical variant of Islam than Jadidism . It is characterized by a

mentor/apprentice type relationship, the principle ceremony called the "zikr," and in some cases

ecstatic dances . 30 Sufism is a clan based form of Islam in which religious leadership, tradition an d

custom are passed from one generation to the next . Sufi brotherhoods usually operate in secret an d

within closed communities - making them very difficult to infiltrate .31 Sufi communities are highly

organized, which may in part explain the resilience of Islam in Chechnia and Dagestan during th e

25Lazzerini, "Beyond Renewal," 161.'Bennigsen, "Islamic or Local Consciousness Among Soviet Nationalities'?" 178 .

27Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (1983).'Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, 68 .

29Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, 14.30 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 109 .

31In that sense they parallel the True Orthodox Christians, an informal, underground sect of the Russia nOrthodox Church whose "informal structure made them almost impervious to state pressure ." This sect arose i nresponse to the co-opting of Orthodox religious rituals surrounding birth, death, marriage, and schooling by th eSoviet state . As the role of the official church became more circumscribed, the role of the True Orthodo xChristians grew (William Fletcher "The Soviet Bible Belt : World War II's Effects on Religion," in The Impac tof World War II on the Soviet Union, ed . Susan J . Linz, (Totowa, N .J . : Rowman & Allanheld, 1985) : 97-99) .

8

Soviet period . Superior Sufi organization has been credited with the survival of Chechens during th e

deportation period. 3 2

Sufism was able to exist and thrive during the Soviet era because training and worship ar e

conducted largely in local communities or at holy places and are therefore less dependent on th e

presence of mosques than Jadidist Islam . Holy places, being locations rather than mosques . are

virtually impossible to destroy . These holy places are typically the shrines of religious martyrs wh o

have died in wars of national independence against the Russians . Tombs of saints are thought to be

" repositories of the divine presence " because a Sufi mystic "was considered a healer, a magician, a

worker of miracles, and a pillar of the universe . "33 Organizationally, the holy places serve multipl e

functions for the promotion of Sufism, acting as

meeting places for adepts, where the latter perform the zikr and are taught prayer, th eKoran, the Arabic language, and the rudiments of Islamic theology . They are the subjec tof pilgrimages for simple believers as well : surrogates for the impossible hujj toMecca. 34

Language also played an important role in Sufism's survival . The same logic which th e

communists applied in the creation of the four Spiritual Directorates was applied to the issue o f

language . The Darghins and Avars of Dagestan and the Chechens were in the process of shiftin g

over to Kumyk as the "lingua franca for all eastern North Caucasians" before the Soviet governmen t

actively interceded and encouraged the use of distinct local languages . It was anticipated that loca l

language use among less numerous ethnic groups would divide the Muslim peoples and enhance th e

chances for assimilation to Russian . 35 Though the natural process of shifting to Kumyk as a

common language was hampered by Soviet officialdom, fundamentalist Sufism in the Norther n

Caucasus was able to continue to flourish because of its reliance on Arabic as a language of worshi p

both in the spiritual directorate in Dagestan and in the local brotherhoods . 36 Unlike the othe r

Muslim groups in this study, the Chechens and the Dagestani used Arabic as their literary languag e

into the early 20th century . Sufi adepts in this region still use Arabic for worship and educated thei r

apprentices in this language during the Soviet era mainly through a large network of undergroun d

schools . A 1960s study of believers conducted in Dagestan found that 8 .6% knew Arabic . 37 B y

32Klimovich, "Bor'ba ortodoksov is modernistov v Islame," 85 ; Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago(1975): 420-24 pages are for Russian edition) .

"Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 114-15 .34Bennigsen "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime : The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Nort h

Caucasus,'' 342 .35Ronald Wixman, The Peoples of the USSR : An Ethnographic Handbook, (Armonk : M .E. Sharpe, 1984) :

116 .36Bennigsen "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Nort h

Caucasus," 335; Ormrod, " North Caucasus: fragmentation or federation? " in Nation and Politics in the Sovie tSuccessor States, 451 .

37 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, 55 .

9

using Arabic, Sufi adepts circumvented Soviet censorship of religious material, a problem whic h

hampered institutional Islam .' It also allowed adepts to keep their scholarship relevant by usin g

smuggled religious tracts from Arab speaking countries .

One of the features of Sufism is its community based organizational structure . This both

encourages the formation of religious/nationalist organizations and presents a formidable obstacle to

any manifestations of ethnic assimilation . In the Northern Caucasus nations of Dagestan an d

Chechnia in particular, Sufi leaders have served as leaders of national resistance movements for ove r

a century . Before the Bolshevik Revolution it was estimated that the professional clerics in th e

Northeast Caucasus represented an enormous 5% of the Muslim population .

In the areas where it thrives, Sufism has been characterized as the vanguard of bot h

fundamentalist Islam and ethnic nationalism . The two movements reinforce each other .

The uninterrupted Sufi message to the larger Muslim population is distinguished by it sstrongly anti-Communist and anti-Russian character ; moreover . Soviet specialists lamentthat the Sufis are successful in bringing this message to both the intellectuals and th emasses . Sufis are denounced for encouraging Muslims . . .to isolate themselves from theRussians, to refuse to learn Russian . and to avoid all Soviet organizations dominated b ythe Russians . 3 9

According to renowned Islamicist Ira Lapidus, Sufi communities tend to flourish on th e

periphery of Islamic expansion in part due to the order's historical link to holy wars and missionar y

work . 40 It is not surprising then that Sufism thrives in Dagestan and Chechnia which are both o n

the periphery of the Islamic world and the site of several holy wars against the Russians . I n

Dagestan the Islamic Democratic Party and the Muslim Society, both Islamic inter-ethnic politica l

movements, have emerged in recent years . Since 1991 numerous religious protests have taken place

in Dagestan over such diverse issues as the Persian Gulf War and the price of airline tickets t o

Mecca. 4t This creates difficulties both for Chechens and Dagestani who are trying to assimilate t o

the dominant culture, and Russians who are trying to integrate into the local culture . As of 199 1

there had been a large out-migration of Russians from Chechnia in part in response to the increasin g

presence of Islamic political groups .

1 0

'Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, 128-9 ; Wixman, The Peoples of the USSR : AnEthnographicHandbook, 44, 126 .

39 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars, 104 ."Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 171 .41 Ormrod, "North Caucasus : fragmentation or federation'?" in Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successo r

States, 464 .

PART III : Variation in Religiosity Across Ethnic Group s

As with ethnicity, there are three main components of religion - basic identity, intensity of

belief, and level of religious practice . Though we would expect that urbanization would not effec t

basic religious identity significantly except by creating more opportunities for religious inter -

marriage, we would expect the urbanization process to diminish first the incidence of religiou s

practice and then religious belief . In communist Russia we find that this process was enhanced o r

retarded depending on the religious tradition . The Dagestani and Chechens who live in lands

dominated by Sufism exhibited a significant ability to stave off religious decline in both belief and

practice . This was true across classifications of gender . age, education, and urban/rural background .

Because this paper focuses on the significance of variation within Islam, only those respondent s

who reported that they belonged to the dominant religion of the autonomous republic - Islam - or n o

religion at all were included in the analysis . The few respondents who believed in Judaism ,

Buddhism . Krishnaism . Hinduism, in their own god . or other were excluded . To make this stud y

more generalizable for those interested in Christian religiosity in the former Soviet Union I hav e

included results throughout for Russians living in the autonomous republics . The Russians are

predominantly Orthodox Christians . A decision was made to retain all Russians adhering to any

Christian religion, but to exclude the few Russians who listed themselves as following their ow n

god . Little discussion will be made of the Russians . their results are primarily included in the table s

for reference . 4 2

The first thing to note about the distribution of religious affiliation is how fe w

Chechens/Dagestani in this sample classified themselves as non-believers, 6%, compared to 49% for

Tatars/Bashkirs . (See Table 3, page 27). Respondents were offered a choice among the following

answers : 1) Orthodoxy, 2) Catholicism, 3) Protestantism, 4) Simply Christianity, 5) Islam, 6 )

Judaism, 7) Buddhism (Lamaism), 8) Krishnaism . 9) Hinduism, 10) You believe in God . but do not

adhere to a particular religion, 11) You believe in your own god, 12) other . 13) refuses . The Sufi

region as represented by the Chechens/Dagestani shows almost no people who do not classif y

themselves as followers of Islam .

The same point emerges when respondents were asked about their level of religiosity . (See

Table 4, page 27) . Respondents chose one of the following evaluations : 1) You are a believer an d

you observe religious ceremonies, 2) You are a believer, but do not observe religious ceremonies, 3 )

You waver, 4) It is all the same to you, 5) You are not a believer, but you respect the feelings o f

those who believe, 6 ) You think it is necessary to struggle against religion, 7) Hard to say, 8 )

42Results were also run for the Chuvash although they are not presented here in order to simplify the tables .

The Chuvash are a Turkic group which was Islamic before converting quite thoroughly to Christianity in th e

18th and 19th century . Most follow Eastern Orthodoxy but some follow other forms of Christianity . Theresults for Chuvash were very similar to the results for Russians .

1 1

Refuses . This table provides the clearest indication that there is a great deal of variation amon g

Muslims . 34% of Tatars/Bashkirs classify themselves as atheists as opposed to about 6% o f

Kabardians/Balkars and 4% of ChechensiDagestani . The Tatars/Bashkirs are also much more likel y

to classify themselves as wavering about their religious belief at a rate of 15% .43

The most important indicator of the effect of Sufism, however, is the enormous difference i n

the numbers of respondents who both believe and practice their religion . Among Chechens/Dagestan i

65% of the sample responded that they both believe and practice Islam . This more than three time s

the number of believers and practitioners among Kabardians/Balkars and the Tatars/Bashkirs . As

already indicated, the results among the Kabardians/Balkars are particularly striking . Due to thei r

similarity to the Chechens/Dagestani in terms of geography, date of Russian conquest, and severa l

other factors previous scholarship had led us to expect results more like those found among th e

Chechens and Dagestani .

Though the Russian Election Study, as its name suggests, had a limited number of religiou s

indicators, we were able to construct a second indicator of religiosity using data on first names . We

asked respondents to tell us their first name (imya) and the first name of each of their parents an d

their oldest child . Alexandra Superanskaya of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia's premie r

expert on the etymology of names, constructed the classification scheme for our project . One of the

classification schemes was based on the religious affiliation of the name . Names were classified as

Christian. Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish . multi-religious . non-religious, and unclassifiable .44 We too k

the regional incidence of non-Muslim first names as an indicator of the declining influence of Isla m

in the everyday lives of our respondents .

The data clearly show that both Chechens and the people of Dagestan are much more incline d

to choose Islamic names for their children . (See Table 5 . page 28 . showing the incidence of use o f

non-Muslim names by age group and ethnicity) .

Between the Chechens and Dagestani there is little growth in the popularity of non-Islamic firs t

names over this century. Beginning in the 1930s the Kabardians/Balkars show a growing tendency t o

choose non-Muslim names for their children . Use of non-Muslim names began later, in the pos t

World War II period, for the Tatars/Bashkirs . The Kabardians/Balkars and Tatars/Bashkirs ar e

currently about three times more likely to use non-Muslim names as the Chechens/Dagestani . This i s

the same ratio of difference as that found among ethnic groups in rates of belief and practice o f

Islam shown in Table 3 .

43Options 3 "You waver" and 4 "It is all the same to you" were combined to achieve this figure .In discussion with Superanskaya it became evident that the majority of "unclassifiable" names wer e

uncommon names belonging to local ethnic groups . For that reason, as part of our National Science Foundatio ngrant to clean the Russian Election Study data, we have asked local specialists in the five Autonomous Republic sto attempt to classify the "unclassifiable" names . Until that has been completed the name results should b econsidered preliminary .

1 2

PART IV: Demographic Characteristics of Religious Practitioner s

Considerable information is available on religiosity among Russians . We know fhat stron g

religious beliefs are found among women, the elderly, the poorly educated, and the rural . Our data

on Russians fit the expected pattern . This seems to be the typical profile of religious holdouts to th e

secularizing influences of modernization ." Our data also show a similar demographic profile fo r

the religiously observant among the Tatars/Bashkirs and Kabardians/Balkars .

Soviet scholars, however, have observed that the Sufi brotherhoods are better at retaining men ,

young people, and intellectuals among the active religious population than official Islam ." Our

data reflect this phenomenon . Only the Chechens/Dagestani have rates of religious observance whic h

are equally high among both women and men . In all other ethnic groups the religious practitioners

are far more likely to be female . For the Kabardians/Balkars and the Tatars/Bashkirs the ratio i s

more than 2 to 1 in favor of women being the most observant . (See Table 6, page 29) .

The same pattern is found when people of different ages are examined . (See Table 7, page 29) .

Again we see signs that only among the Chechens/Dagestani do we have reports of active religiou s

observance among the young. Chechen and Dagestani young do not report practicing religion as

much as the older respondents, but the level of religious observance is quite strong within all age

groups . Among the Chechens/Dagestani 53% of the 18-25 year olds, 57% of the 26-35 year olds .

68% of the 36-45 year olds, 76% of the 46-55 year olds, and 83% of the 56-70 year olds classif y

themselves as both believers and practitioners of Islam .

Among the other Muslim and Christian peoples only the oldest age groups express high level s

of religious practice, particularly those aged 56-70 . Active religious observance is particularly weak

among the 18 to 45 year olds, those most likely to be currently raising children . Among the

Kabardians/Balkars only the 56-70 year olds boast 50% of their age group classifying themselve s

among the most active category . Among the younger respondents, only between 4% and 20 %

classify themselves among the most observant . The rates are almost identical for the Tatars/Bashkirs .

The same is true of education . (See Table 8, page 30) . Though religiosity declines as educatio n

increases among all ethnic groups, among the Chechens/Dagestani active devotion to Islam is not the

exclusive province of the uneducated . 45% of the most educated Chechens/Dagestani report that the y

both believe and practice Islam. Among Kabardians/Balkars and Tatars/Bashkirs such rates o f

45 Andrew Greeley, "A Religious Revival in Russia?" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1994, 3 3

(3), pp. 253-272 ; Christel Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union, (London : Allen & Unwin, 1978) ;Philip Walters, "A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy," in Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, ed . SabrinaPetra Ramet, (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp . 3-30 .

"Cited in Bennigsen "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime : The Sufi Brotherhoods in th eNorth Caucasus," 342 . Again there is a parallel with Russian Orthodoxy . Those areas that had active cells o fthe unofficial True Orthodox Christians were able to attract much greater numbers of young people and men t othe Russian Orthodox faith than those areas only served by the official church (Fletcher, "The Soviet Bibl eBelt," 103) .

1 3

religious practice are found only among those who have primary education or less . This agai n

indicates that observance of Islamic ritual, outside of Chechenia/Dagestan, is found only among th e

least progressive elements of society .

Presentation of urban/rural differences in religiosity is tricky because the six ethnic group s

vary widely in the extent to which they are urbanized . As a group, the Tatars/Bashkirs are the mos t

urban and the Chechens/Dagestani are the most rural . In order to make sure that ethnic distinction s

are not simply proxies for level of urbanization, Table 9 (page 31) presents data in a manner whic h

compares people of comparable urban/rural background .

Most analyses which examine the differences between rural and urban dwellers use either th e

question "Where were you born? " or some classification of the interview site based on populatio n

figures . I constructed my classification scheme using a combination of those two questions and tw o

additional questions : "Where did you spend the majority of your childhood" and If you were bor n

in a rural place, at what age did you move to the city? "

All those labeled as "Rural/Rural " and "Rural to Urban Migrant" were born in either a "rural

place" or a " settlement of an urban type" (poselok gorodskovo typa) . Those labeled "Rural/Rura l

responded that they had never moved to a city and at time of the survey they were living in a tow n

of 10,000 or fewer inhabitants . Those labeled "Rural to Urban Migrant" moved from a rural local e

to a city of at least 50,000 people by age 30, 47 Those labeled 'Urban/Urban' were Dorn in places

the Soviet government classified as small cities up to a capital of a republic . All "Urban/Urban "

people were living in cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants when interviewed .

Once we have controlled for the more urban nature of the Tatar/Bashkir group relative to th e

others, we would expect to see uniform levels of religious practice within categories of urban/rura l

background if differences in religiosity are primarily ca : d by variation in urbanization . The

incidence of devout respondents decreases for all groups when one moves from the rural populatio n

to the migrant population and then on to those of exclusively urban origins . The level of active

devotion of the Chechens/Dagestani, however, is still 43% among the most urban members of thei r

society, far ahead of the rates for the Kabardians/Balkars and the Tatars/Bashkirs . Originally base d

in the countryside, Sufi brotherhoods have migrated to the cities during the Soviet era as th e

Chechens and Dagestani have become more urban . 48 Among the most rural 75% of

Chechens/Dagestani classify themselves as actively devout, only 20% of rural Kabardians/Balkar s

and 25% of rural Tatars/Bashkirs so classify themselves . These results indicate that ethnicity is no t

simply a proxy for urbanization level .

1 4

47To include the effect of rural to urban migration in the measure, the results presented in this table are onl y

for respondents aged 30 and older .

48 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Mvstics and Commissars, 7, 14 .

Tables 6 through 9 show graphically that active Muslims in Chechenia/Dagestan can be found

to an equal degree among men and women . Though the typical pattern of decline in religious activit y

started to manifest itself even among the Chechens/Dagestani, large numbers of men, young people .

the highly educated, and the urban continue to actively practice Islam . As everywhere, religiou s

practitioners are less common in urban areas of Chechnia and Dagestan, but they still make up ove r

40% of the most cosmopolitan elements of society . It means that with the fall of communism any

religious revival can draw support from a broad and diverse community of believers . The retentio n

of such high levels of self-identified practitioners of Islam among those segments of the populatio n

most susceptible to secularization should be encouraging to Sufi Muslim leaders .

In Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan however a very different picture i s

evident . Among those ethnic groups, by the end of the Soviet era the devout are to be foun d

overwhelmingly among the older women with low levels of education and rural lifestyles . This doe s

not describe the ideal following for an active religion. It also means that Islamic revival among th e

Kabardians, Balkars, Tatars, and Bashkirs will have to grow from a narrow base of support . In

addition, the decline in active Islam in these regions would be expected to make assimilation t o

Russian much easier to the extent that Muslim religion is a barrier to Russification .

So far the explanatory focus for variation in levels of religious observance has been th e

presence/absence of Sufism . The literature on ethnic assimilation suggests some other possibl e

explanations . These will be explored in the next section .

PART V: Alternative Explanations for Religious Variatio n

Of the two key cultural factors influencing the modernization process, ethnicity has receive d

much more analysis than religion . In their work on assimilation within Russia, scholars have foun d

that four factors help to explain variation in rates of linguistic assimilation : 1) date of conquest by

the Russians, 2) deportation for alleged World War I1 collaboration with the Nazis, 3) availability o f

native language schooling, and 4) regional differences in sex ratios and hence inter-ethnic marriage

rates in the post World War II period . 49 Briefly, those who came under Russian rule earliest

49 See Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D . Silver, "Demographic Consequences of World War II on the Non -Russian Nationalities of the USSR, " in The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union, ed . Susan J . Linz ,(Totowa, N .J . : Rowman & Allanheld, 1985) ; Barbara A . Anderson and Brian D . Silver, "Some Factors in theLinguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities : Is Everyone Becoming Russian'?" ed . Lubomyr Hajdaand Mark Beissinger, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1990) ; Lubomyr Hadja and Mark Beissinger, The Nationalitie s

Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1990) ; Lewis, "The Mixing of Russians an dSoviet Nationalities and its Demographic Impact," (1971) ; Ormrod, "North Caucasus : fragmentation o r

federation? " (1993) ; Jonathan Pool, "Soviet Language Planning : Goals, Results, Options . " in Soviet NationalityPolicies and Practices, ed . Jeremy Azrael, (New York : Praeger, 1978) ; Brian Silver, "The Status of Nationa lMinority Languages in Soviet Education : An Assessment of Recent Changes," in Soviet Studies, (26 1974) : 28 -

41 .

1 5

should be the farthest along in the assimilation process . Deported peoples are more cohesive as a n

ethnic group and more hostile to Russians due to their shared experience of exile . Native medium of

instruction schooling is said to retard assimilation because children are not forced to become fluent i n

Russian . 50 Populations which rarely inter-marry with Russians assimilate to Russian much mor e

slowly than those which commonly inter-marry with Russians .

The date of Russian conquest is weakly related to level of religious practice . The

Chechens/Dagestani, who are the most active Muslims, were the last to fall under Russian conques t

and hence Christian influence . However exposure to Russian Orthodoxy did not come much earlie r

for the Kabardians/Balkars, yet their level of religious practice is almost the same as that among th e

Tatars/Bashkirs who fell under Russian conquest substantially earlier . Length of exposure to Russia n

Orthodoxy is a better predictor of level of religiosity if one combines those who practice Islam wit h

those who believe Islam . In that case religiosity is inversely related to length of exposure to Russia n

culture .

The incidence of deportation shows no correspondence between deported peoples an d

religiosity . Referring back to Table 2, though the Chechens are the most active believers in Islam .

the Balkars are the least . Both groups suffered deportation under the communists . The Dagestani .

who were not deported, are approximately four times more actively religious than the Balkars .

The presence of native language medium of instruction schooling works in exactly the opposit e

manner than the literature would lead us to predict . Native language instruction would be expected t o

convey the importance of preserving native culture and values over those of the Russians . If anything

it did the opposite . The only ethnic groups to have native ethnic language medium of instruction

available in grades 1-10 in 1972, the most recent date for which we have data, were the Tatars an d

Bashkirs . And given that Muslim worship was in the local language in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan ,

as was school instruction, one would expect greater ease of transmission of Islamic religious value s

and customs . Yet Tatars/Bashkirs are the least likely to practice Islam and the most likely to classif y

themselves as atheist . A problem with research which has used native language instruction as a facto r

leading to either ethnic assimilation or secularization is that there are no data showing the actua l

prevalence of native language schooling in those republics where we know it was offered . It is

possible that few Tatars and Bashkirs actually received native language instruction in school . (For a

data summary see Table 10, page 32 . )

We do know that rates of native language use in the home are lower among the Tatars and

Bashkirs . (See Table 11, page 33) .

50 One problem with Silver's analysis is that his data on textbooks only allow him to assess the presence o rabsence of native medium of instruction schools in a republic . He has no reliable way of assessing how popula ror readily available such instruction is relative to Russian medium of instruction .

1 6

Table 11 classifies respondents according to which language, that of the local ethnic group o r

Russian, they spoke as their first language and secondly, with their spouse . Those respondents wh o

spoke their native language in both instances were classified as "all native" . Those speaking thei r

native language first and Russian with their spouse are in row 2 . Those speaking Russian first and a

local language with their spouse are in row 3 . Those speaking Russian on both occasions are in ro w

4.

Clearly more Chechens/Dagestani (93%) than Tatars/Bashkirs (65%) speak their nativ e

language at home, but Chechens/Dagestani are not very different from Kabardians/Balkars amon g

whom 87 percent speak their native language at home . 51 The Kabardians/Balkars do not show a

great deal of Russification, certainly not enough to explain the huge differences in religious practic e

between their group and the Chechens/Dagestani . The data presented in Table 11 still allow for th e

possibility that it is the lower incidence of native language use in the home, as opposed to the greate r

availability of native language use in school, which accounts for a lower level of religious activit y

among the Tatars/Bashkirs .

To control for different rates of linguistic assimilation across populations . the religiosity o f

native language speakers only was calculated separately and are presented in Table 12 (page 33) .

Here we see almost the same results as were presented in Table 4 for all respondents, regardless o f

degree of linguistic assimilation . The gulf in religious belief and practice which sets th e

Chechens/Dagestani apart remains . These data indicate that Islamic leaders among th e

Kabardians/Balkars and Tatars/Bashkirs lost their easiest audience - the native language speakers - a s

well as the more linguistically assimilated . In table include columns for non-native languag e

speakers .

The last issue to consider from the literature on assimilation is the role of inter-ethni c

marriage . Anderson and Silver have shown that World War II differentially affected the male/female

ratio of ethnic groups . They point out that those populations with the poorest male/female ratio afte r

the war were the most likely to intermarry with Russians . Intermarriage facilitates linguistic an d

cultural Russification . 52 This raises the question as to whether ethnic intermarriage also facilitate s

secularization among Muslims . The higher levels of active religious observance among th e

51This result is not surprising . As of 1970, "On the average . . .94 percent of the Soviet population had acorrespondence between declared nationality and mother tongue" (Pool, "Soviet Language Planning : Goals ,Results . Options," 223) . According to 1989 census data 99% of Chechens, 98% of Avars, Darghins . Kumyks ,and Kabardians, and 95% of Balkars spoke the language of their ethnic group as their mother tongue . I ncontrast, only 86% of Tatars and 73 % of Bashkirs listed the language of their ethnic group as their mothertongue (Harris, "A Geographic Analysis of Non-Russian Minorities in Russia and Its Ethnic Homelands ." 56) .

52Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Consequences of World War II on the Non-Russian Nationalities o fthe USSR," (1985) .

1 7

Chechens/Dagestani might be a result of low levels of ethnic intermarriage as much as an effect of

Sufism.

Both our data and census data indicate that among the groups in this study Chechens and th e

Dagestani have the lowest rate of ethnically mixed marriages with Russians . (See Table 13 . page

34). According to our data, only the Tatars/Bashkirs experienced much of an increase in inter-ethni c

marriage in the wake of World War II . The rise in inter-ethnic marriage among th e

Kabardians/Balkars took place only with those born after the war when the sex ratio should hav e

returned to normal . 5 3

Leaving aside the causal explanation for inter-ethnic marriage, if inter-ethnic marriage is th e

main mechanism by which religious and ethnic decline infiltrate a population, then those in ethnicall y

homogeneous marriages should show approximately equal levels of religious observance acros s

ethnic groups . Likewise, those in mixed marriages, particularly marriages involving a Russian o r

anyone from a non-Muslim religious tradition, should be less likely to practice Islam . The differen t

levels of religious observance in our data could be attributed to different rates of inter-ethni c

marriage across ethnic groups . But once having entered into an inter-ethnic marriage, religiou s

practice would be expected to decline regardless of ethnic group or religious tradition .

The data, however, do not support the hypothesis that inter-ethnic marriage is the primar y

explanation for the decline in religious observance . Table 14A (page 35) presents the data for thos e

respondents who were a product of an ethnically homogeneous marriage . It shows the incidence of

the religious practitioners by age group and ethnicity . By eliminating those respondents who cam e

from mixed marriages we would expect to see roughly uniform levels of religious practice. The

ethnic divide between Chechens/Dagestani and the other groups continues to be present . Among the

Chechens/Dagestani there are so many more religious practitioners among all ages that it is clear tha t

inter-ethnic marriage in the parents' generation is not the explanation for religious decline . The

incidence of Muslim practitioners by age and ethnic group for those respondents in an ethnicall y

homogeneous marriage repeats the pattern of the parent's generation . (See Table 14B . page 35) .

Table 14C (page 36) gives the incidence of religious practitioners by age and ethnic group fo r

respondents who are in ethnically mixed marriages .' If intermarriage encourages secularization a s

it encourages linguistic assimilation, we would expect to find much lower levels of religiosity amon g

all ethnic groups represented in Table 14C as compared to respondents in Table 14B .

"Approximately one third of mixed marriages among Tatars and Bashkirs were to Russians according to ou rsurvey . In contrast, within the two youngest age groups, between 6 and 8% of mixed marriages amon gChechens and Dagestani and between 12 and 19% of mixed marriages among the Kabardians and Balkars wereto Russians .

54A comparable table for the parents of the respondents was not presented because the incidence of ethni cinter-marriage among the parents generation was sufficiently low as to make it imprudent to generalize from afew cases .

1 8

By comparing Tables 14B and 14C it is clear that respondents in inter-ethnic marriages ar e

somewhat less active Muslims than respondents in ethnically homogeneous marriages, but the mor e

striking difference continues to be the divide between the Sufi and non-Sufi Muslims within eac h

table. Where we expected to see uniform incidence of religious practitioners we see instead tha t

Chechens/Dagestani in mixed marriages continue be much more likely to practice Islam . Further ,

there is little difference between the Kabardians/Balkars and Tatars/Bashkirs despite the fact tha t

Tatars/Bashkirs have a higher rate of mixed marriage to non-Muslims and a longer history o f

acceptance of mixed marriages than the Kabardians/Balkars .

Among the youngest age cohort of the Chechens/Dagestani, that age group with the highes t

intermarriage rate, the difference in religiosity between those in mixed marriages and those in a

homogeneous marriages is only 5% . Sufi Muslims were able to continue to encourage the active

practice Islam, despite an increasing tendency to enter into inter-ethnic marriages .

The data presented in this section allow us to conclude that factors which may explain variatio n

in rates of linguistic and ethnic assimilation are not very effective in explaining variation i n

religiosity among the Muslim peoples of Russia . The best explanation for the variation in levels o f

religious practice among Muslims at the end of the Soviet era continues to be the regional characte r

of the Islamic tradition .

PART VI: Implications for Economic and Political Belief s

Given that the Sufi movement in Chechnia and Dagestan has been closely linked wit h

movements for national self-determination, one would expect that the rise of Sufism would hav e

consequences for economic and political attitudes . This would set the Chechens and Dagestani apar t

in the economic/political realm as they are in the religious realm . The data show that the Chechen s

and Dagestani do stand apart on issues related to nationalism but do not stand apart on issues o f

economic change .

Several indicators of economic attitudes were studied to see if the religious/ethnic divid e

between Chechens/Dagestani and the other Muslim groups manifested itself . The results consistently

showed little difference in attitude among the three large ethnic groupings with respect to question s

on economic reform . The answers to the question about the respondent's preferred pace of economi c

reform are typical . Chechens/Dagestani appear slightly less likely to favor a quick transition to th e

market than the other Muslim groups . (See Table 15, page 36) . They are also a little more likely to

oppose the transition to a market economy . Though statistically significant, the results do not sho w

substantively interesting divisions .

Sufism does not have a major impact on attitudes toward economic reform, but it does clearl y

influence questions of Russian/periphery relations and nationalism . Is is sufism or do all religiou s

practitioners believe the same thing regardless of ethnic affiliation? This was anticipated as Sufism i s

1 9

often closely tied with ethnic nationalism and anti-Russian sentiment . The results of two

representative questions concerning nationalism are presented in Tables 16 and 17 (page 37) .

When asked whether everyone living in the republics of Russia should be fluent in the loca l

language, 64% of Chechens/Dagestani agree that everyone should be fluent in the local language .

while less than half of the other Muslim minorities agree . (See Table 16) . This result makes sense

because we know that Sufi leaders have actively discouraged their followers from learning Russian .

The jadidist tradition, in contrast, emphasizes doing what is rational to compete in the secula r

world - this would no doubt include learning Russian . (Russians living in the autonomous republic s

are strongly against this idea of having to attain fluency in the local language, with 74% opposin g

it .) When asked whether the Russians were helpful to ethnic minorities in the former Soviet Union .

the Chechens/Dagestani were overwhelmingly negative . 82% gave a negative response .

Tatars/Bashkirs were somewhat more negative than positive on this issue . Surprisingly, given th e

Balkars experience of deportation - a fate which they shared with the Chechens - th e

Kabardians/Balkars are evenly divided on the issue of Russian treatment of ethnic minorities . Though

the Kabardians/Balkars are neighbors of the Chechens and the Dagestani, these results imply tha t

Kabardino-Balkaria provides a much friendlier environment for Russians than either Chechnia o r

Dagestan .

Conclusion

The findings clearly demonstrate that the strength of Islam in Russia at the end of the Sovie t

era varied regionally despite the shared experience of Soviet anti-religious policies . Muslims i n

Chechnia and Dagestan were much more likely to report that they actively practice Islam than thos e

living in Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan, or Bashkortostan . In addition to self-evaluation of religiou s

behavior, the incidence of adoption of Muslim names is much higher among all age groups o f

Chechens, Avartsi, Darghins, and Kumyks reinforcing the finding that Islam had a greater popula r

significance in Chechnia and Dagestan .

The second fact about Islam in Russia in 1993 is that religious practice was high among non -

traditional groups of Chechens and Dagestani . The young, the urban migrants, the highly educated .

and men reported high levels of active worship . With the downfall of communism, Islam in Russi a

had the broadest base of support in Chechnia and Dagestan . These findings suggest that Sufi Isla m

contained features necessary for religious survival in the face of state opposition . Key among thes e

features would be its de-centralized nature and lack of dependence on formal hierarchy, its basis i n

local clans, its perpetuation of Arabic as a language of religious worship, and its ties to ethni c

nationalism .

In Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and Kabardino-Balkaria, active religiosity was predominantl y

confined to old rural women with low levels of education . This demographic profile of activ e

2 0

believers provides a narrower base for a post-Communist Islamic revival in Bashkortostan . Tatarstan .

and Kabardino-Balkaria . Tatars and Bashkirs show the lowest level of both religious belief an d

religious practice of all the Islamic people studied here, yet they are viewed as the typical Musli m

minority population in Russia . This research suggests that they are typical of followers of officia l

Islam, but not representative of all Muslim minorities . As the most secular of the Russian Muslims .

Tatars and Bashkirs should not be taken as representative of all Islamic ethnic groups within Russia .

Tatars and Bashkirs would serve as excellent populations for research into the question as to whethe r

it was the reform character of Islam in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan and/or the reliance on forma l

hierarchical structures which made it particularly vulnerable to state control .

Those factors which studies of ethnic assimilation have found to be important in explainin g

regional variation in Russification were length of Russian colonial rule, deportation, native languag e

schooling, and intermarriage rates . These factors either fail to correspond to differences within Isla m

in Russia or, when controlled for, fail to diminish regional variation in religious practice . This

papers argues that a more probable explanation for regional variation can be found in the characte r

of the local Islamic tradition . Areas dominated by Sufist Islam are the same areas with high levels o f

religious activity among the populace . Areas dominated by Jadidist Islam show much lower levels o f

active religiosity . Kabardino-Balkaria, which was dominated by neither tradition falls in the middle .

From a strategic point of view these data suggest that Islam is less likely to facilitat e

Russian/minority conflict in those regions were it is weak, but very likely to facilitate such conflic t

in Chechnia and Dagestan where it is strong and widespread among young urban males ." Sufis m

in Russia contains a strong nationalistic element, which causes Sufi Muslims to view issues o f

national identification in a less compromising manner than non-Sufi Muslims .

Sufism is less relevant in determining attitudes toward economic change . While it would b e

logical to expect Sufi religious leaders to play an increasing role in issues of national self-

determination in Chechnia and Dagestan, just as they did in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, i t

would be incorrect to assume that Chechens and Dagestani would oppose market reform . That is a n

important distinction which should be made .

Obviously this analysis is limited by the available data which inevitably reflects th e

secularization processes of the past . One should be cautious about concluding that communist anti -

religious campaigns have permanently crippled Islam in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in particular .

The fall of the communists afforded institutional Islam a new opportunity for growth, based as it i s

on mosques and the ability to publish religious materials in the local language of the population . This

author, in collaboration with Hough and Guboglo, conducted a follow-up study of religious an d

It is important to realize that prior to the recent war there already existed a compact Chechen diaspora o fnearly 170,000 living just inside neighboring Dagestan (Valekh Ryzayev, "Chechen Diaspora in Action," i nMoscow News, (January 6-12, 1995) : 3 .

2 1

ethnic tolerance in Dagestan . Kabardino-Balkaria. Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan in the summer o f

1995 . 56 The follow-up study consisted of a national random sample of 2,000 respondents in each o f

the republics . The survey instrument contained 13 general questions on religious affiliation . beliefs .

and practices for all respondents . and 18 separate questions for Muslims and 10 separate question s

for Christians . These data will be the basis for several articles examining the factors effectin g

religious revival in Russia .

The current research also leaves us with the important question as to what features of Sufis t

Islam aided its survival under communism and what features of Jadidist Islam hastened its decline .

Why did Jadidism, a movement whose purpose was to insure Islam's eminent role in moder n

society, instead seem to have fostered Islam's decline? What features of Sufism are most importan t

for Islam's survival - its organizational structure, use of Arabic . reliance on holy places . closed

character of its communities? How does the nationalist character of Sufism contribute to its vitality ?

These are crucial questions for the sociology of religion and suggest the need for more detaile d

study of the mechanisms by which religious attitudes are transmitted and the role of institutions i n

this process . 57 The need for a comparison study with Soviet Central Asia and different Islami c

countries outside of the former Soviet Union is obvious .

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2 2

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2 4

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Table 1 : Factors Thought to Influence the Decline in Islami cPractic e

Religious Sufi Jadidis tConversion Presence Movemen t

BALKARS 18th

c . No No(Crimean Tatar )

BASHKIRS 10th

c . No Yes ?(pre—Golden Horde )

CHECHENS 16th

c . Yes No(Dagestani )

DAGESTANI 664/16th

c . Yes No(Arabs)

AvarsDarghi nKumyks

KABARDS

16th c .

No

No(Crimean Tatar )

VOLGATATARS

1320s

No

Ye s(Golden Horde )

Sources : Akiner 1983, Bennigsen 1977, Lazzerini 1992 ,Wixman 1984 .

2 5

Table 2 : Religiosity by Ethnic Grou p1993 Russian Election Stud y

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY

Believe

Only

Equivocal

Tolerant Figh tETHNIC GROUP

Practice Believe

Atheist

Religion

N

Group I

Chechens

71%

29%

0%

0%

0%

60 6

Avars*

72%

22%

3%

3%

0%

30 3

Kumyks*

51%

39%

2%

9%

0%

17 6

Darghins* 44%

37%

5%

13%

0%

13 4

--------------------------------------------------

Group I I

Kabardians

19%

67%

9%

5%

0%

44 1

Balkars

13%

73%

5%

8%

1%

11 2

-------------------------------------------------------------- -

Group II I

Tatars 20% 31% 15% 34% 1% 89 2

Bashkirs 16% 33% 17% 34% 0% 218

----------------------------------------------------------------- -

Russians**

10%

32%

18%

39%

1%

637 2

* The three most numerous ethnic groups in Dagestan .

** The data presented throughout this paper are only for Russian sliving in the 16 autonomous republics surveyed . The results do no tinclude Russians living in the 35 oblasts .

Results are only for those belonging to the dominant religiou stradition, Christianity or Islam, or those who are not religious .Results from the few Christian Kabardians, for example, have bee nexcluded since the vast majority of the Kabardians are Muslim .

---------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- -

26

Table 3 : Ethnic Groups by Religious Affiliation

RELIGION

Othe rETHNIC GROUP

None

Islam

Orthodox

Christian

N

Chechens /Dagestani

6%

94 %

Kabardians /Balkars

14%

87 %

Tatars /Bashkirs

49%

51 %

Russians

56%

35%

9%

657 8

Table 4 : Ethnic Group by Degree of Religiosity

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY

ETHNIC GROUPBelievePractice

Only

EquivocalBelieve

Toleran tAtheist

FightReligio n

Chechens /Dagestani 65% 29%

2% 4% 0 %

Kabardians /Balkars 18% 68%

8% 6% 0 %

Tatars /Bashkirs 19% 31%

15% 34% 1 %

Russians 10% 32%

18% 39% 1%

p< .000 0---- ------------------------------------------------------ -

123 3

56 2

115 8

27

Table 5 : Incidence of Non-Muslim First Name sby Age Group and Ethnic Group

ETHNIC GROU P

YEAR OF BIRTH

Chechens/

DagestaniKabardians /Balkars

Tatars /Bashkir s

1877-1900 8% 15_% 10 %

1901-08 7% 7% 9 %

1909-16 5° 7% 7°0

1917-24 5% 11% 5 %

1925-32 8% 13% 10 %

1933-40 9% 220 12 %

1 941 -48 7% 33% 14 %

1949-56 8% 40% 16 %

1957-64 13% 45% 25 %

1965-72 17% 43% 28 %

1973-80 16% 46% 38 %

1981-88 15% 41% 41 %

1989-93 15% 40% 58%

These data were calculated using information about the respondent ,the respondent's parents, and the re sp ondent's oldest child.Parents' ages were set equal to respondent's age + 25 years . Thos ewith Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, and Non-Religious names wer ecombined into the category " Non-Muslim Names " . Those names tha tbelonged to more than one religion and non-answers were coded a smissing .

28

Table 6 : Gender Distribution by Ethnic Groupof

Religious Believers and Practitioners Onl y

ETHNIC GROUP Men Women

Chechens /Dagestani 49% 51 %

Kabardians /Balkars 30% 70 %

Tatars /Bashkirs 26% 74 %

Russians 21% 79%

p< .000 0---------------------------------------- -------------------------------------- -

Table 7 : Percent Who are Religious Believers and Practitioner s

Within Each Age Group by Ethnic Group

AGE GROUPS

18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-7 0

53% 57% 68% 76% 83 %

4% 9% 15% 20% 51 %

6% 8% 12% 20% 45 %

4% 5% 5% 9% 23 %

------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------ -

ETHNIC GROUP

Chechens /Dagestan i

Kabardians /Balkar s

Tatars /Bashkir s

Russians

29

Table 8 : Percentage Who are Religious Believers and Practitioners

Within Each Educational Classification by Ethnic Grou p

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Illit /Primary

Inc .2ndary 2ndary

Spec .2ndary

Some Higher ,High,Adv .Deg

90% 82% 71% 57% 45 %

68% 36% 13% 11% 8 %

60% 37% 14% 14% n o

40% 22% 8% 7% 5°0

ETHNIC GROUP

Chechens /Dagestan i

Kabardians /Balkar s

Tatars /Bashkir s

Russians

30

================================================================= =

Table 9 : Percentage Who are Religious Believers and Practitioner sWithin Each Urban/Rural Classification by Ethnic Group

ETHNIC GROUP Rural/RuralRural toUrban Migrant Urban/Urban

Chechens/ 75% 49% 43 %Dagestani n=567 n=91 n=6 2

Kabardians/ 20% 19% 6 %Balkars n=59 n=26 n= 3

Tatars/ 25% 18% 9 %Bashkirs n=98 n=64 n=2 2

Russians 14% 11% 7 %n=197 n=188 n=143

Note : The upper left hand cell, for example, contains th epercentage of rural Chechens/Dagestani who both believe an dpractice their religion : 75% . All results for respondents 30 year sand older only .

Rural/Rural = born and spent the majority of childhood in either a"settlement of an urban type" or in a "rural place" . Never movedto the city . Interviewed in a town of < 10,000 .

Migrant = born in either in a " rural place " or a " settlement of anurban type " . Migrated from a rural birthplace to a city at som eage

Urban/Urban = Interviewed in a city of > 50,000 . Spent majorit yof childhood in a city . Respondents were born in cities rangingfrom " small cities up to 50,000 inhabitants " to " capital of arepublic, a krai or oblast " .

31

Table 10 : Alternative Explanations for Religious Variatio n

OriginsRussianConquest

NativeSchool*

Post-WarSex Ratio** Deported

BALKARS Turkic 1827 No .70_ 1944-5 7

BASHKIRS Turkic 1556 Yes .62 No

CHECHENS Caucas . 1859 No .72 1944-5 7

DAGESTANI 1859 .6 8

Avars Caucas . No NoDarghin Caucas . No NoKumyks Turkic No No

KABARDS Caucas . 1774 No .70 No

VOLGATATARS Turkic 1556 Yes .40 No

Sources : Anderson and Silver 1985, Akiner 1983, Conquest 1960 ,Silver 1974, Tsentral'noe statisticheskoi upravleniie pr esovete ministrov SSSR 1963, Wixman 1984 .

* Native School refers to the availability of native languag emedium of instruction throughout grades 1-10 in 1972 (Silve r1974 :33) . It should not be assumed that availability wa swidespread or uniform in those autonomous republics in which it wa soffered, nor that most native peoples availed themselves of nativ elanguage instruction .

** The Post-War Sex Ratio was computed using 1959 census data fo reach republic . It is therefore an imperfect measure of th emale/female ratio for each ethnic group, particularly those tw owhich were deported and resettled just 2 years prior to the census .The data are for the ratio of males to females among those aged 3 0to 59 in 1959, those who would have been 16 to 45 in 194 5(Tsentral'noe statisticheskoi upravleniie pre sovete ministro vSSSR, Itogi vsesoiznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda RSFSR, 1963 :68-71) .

------------------------------------------------------------ -

32

Table 11 : Language Use* by Ethnic Grou p

ETHNIC GROU P

LANGUAGE USEChechens /Dagestani

Kabardians /Balkars

Tatars lBashkir s

All Native 93% 87% 65 %n=898 n=329 n=57 7

Native/Russian 4% 7% 24 %n=40 n=25 n=21 0

Russian/Native 1% 1% 1 %n=11 n=4 n=1 0

All Russian 2% 5% 10 %n=18 n=19 n=90

* Language use refers to the language which the respondent spoke a sa first language and that which he/she currently speaks wit hhis/her spouse . " Native/Russian " indicates that the first languag ewas the same as the respondent's ethnic group and the spousa llanguage is Russian . " Russian/Native " is the reverse .

Table 12 : Religiosity by Ethnic Grou pAmong Native Language Speakers Onl y

LEVEL OF RELIGIOSIT Y

ETHNIC GROUPBelievePractice

Only

EquivocalBelieve

TolerantAtheist

FightReligion N

Chechens /Dagestani 72% 25% 1% 2% 0% 89 8

Kabardians /Balkars 25% 67% 5% 3% 1% 32 9

Tatars /Bashkirs 29% 35% 11% 24% 0% 57 7

p< .000 0Only those respondents whose first language and spousal languag ecorresponded to their ethnicity were included .

33

------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------- -

Table 13 : Incidence of Ethnically Homogeneous Marriag eby Age Group and Ethnic Grou p

ETHNIC GROU P

YEAR OF BIRTHChechensDagestani

Kabardian sBalkars

TatarsBashkirs Russian

1877-1900 100% 100% 98% 92 %

1901-08 97% 94% 94% 93 %

1909-16 94% 92% 90% 87 %

1917-24 92% 86% 89% 82 %

1925-32 94% 92% 86% 82 %

1933-40 96% 88% 82% 80 %

1941-48 93% 88% 78% 80 %

1949-56 88% 74% 66% 75 %

1957-64 83% 58% 56% 68%

These data were calculated using information about respondent' smarriage and parents' marriage . Parents' age was set equal t orespondent's age - 25 years . Answers were then grouped by ag ecohort .

34.

Tables 14A-C : Percentage of Respondents Who Both Believe andPractice

their Religion by Ethnic Group and Age

14A . Respondent's Parents in an Ethnically Homogeneous Marriage

ETHNIC GROUP

Chechens /Dagestani

Kabardians /Balkars

Tatars /Bashkirs Russian s

57% 7% 8% 5 %n=320 n=18 n=31 n=8 7

72% 16% 16% 7 %n=275 n=25 n=59 n=14 4

84% 51% 45% 23 %n=150 n=44 n=92 n=279

14B . Respondent in a Ethnically Homogeneous Marriag e

ETHNIC GROU P

RESPONDENT' SAGE

Chechens /Dagestani

Kabardians /Balkars

Tatars /Bashkirs Russian s

18-35yrs 58% 13% 11% 5 %n=181 n=12 n=17 n=5 7

36-55yrs 74% 17% 17% 7 %n=266 n=22 n=46 n=12 2

56-70yrs 84% 52% 48% 23 %n=147 n=44 n=87 n=23 1

RESPONDENT' SAGE

18-35yr s

36-55yr s

56-70yrs

35

14C . Respondent in a Ethnically Mixe d Marriage*

ETHNIC GROUP

RESPONDENT' SAGE

Chechens/

DagestaniKabaraians /Balkars

Tatars /Bashkirs Russians

18-35yrs 51% 4% 5% 4 %n=145 n=7 n=15 n=4 9

36-55yrs 50% 19% 13% 6 %n=26 n=8 n=19 n=3 4

56-70yrs 67% 33% 27% 24 %n=6 n=3 n=11 n=69

* For Russians this is a mixed marriage with a non-Russian .

Table 15 : Attitude Towards Market Reform by Ethnic Group1993 Russian Election Stud y

ETHNIC GROUPATTITUDEMARKET Chechens/ Kabardians/ Tatars /REFORM

Dagestani Balkars Bashkir

Russians

Quick

9%

12%

10%

12 %Transition

n=105

n=65

n=111

n=78 9

Gradual

37%

43%

43%

46 %Transition

n=459

n=242

n=495

n=304 6

Against

26%

24%

19%

18 %Transition

n=315

n=136

n=221

n=120 1

Don't Know

29%

21%

29%

23 %n=354

n=119

n=331

n=154 2

p< .0000. . . . . . . . . .---

36

------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------- -Table 16 : Should Everyone be Fluent in the Language

of the Autonomous Republi cby Ethnic Group

ETHNIC GROUP Yes No

Chechens/ 64% 36 %Dagestani n=651 n=36 8

Kabardians/ 47% 53 %Balkars n=225 n=25 8

Tatars/ 44% 57 %Bashkirs n=411 n=53 4

Russians 26% 74 %n=1410 n=4083

p< .000 0

Table 17 : Did the Russians Greatly Help the Development o fOther Peoples of the Former Soviet Union ?

ETHNIC Helped Harm> HardGROUP Yes Some No Good to Sa y

Chechens/ 6% 3% 39% 43% 10 %Dagestani n=75 n=33 n=477 n=531 n=11 7

Kabardians/ 33% 7% 21% 21% 18 %Balkars n=186 n=40 n=117 n=120 n=9 9

Tatars/ 17% 16% 35% 20% 14 %Bashkirs n=192 n=184 n=400 n=226 n=15 6

Russians 20% 6% 26% 33% 16 %n=1331 n=363 n=1680 n=2159 n=104 5

37

p < .00000