the new economic policy and further marginalisation of the indians

8/3/2019 The New Economic Policy and Further Marginalisation of the Indians

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Kajian Malaysia,Vol. XXI, Nos.1&2,2003THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND FT'RTI{ERMARGINALISATION OF THE INDIANSK. AnbalakanSchool of HumanitiesUniversiti SainsMalaysiaPenang

INTRODUCTIONThe two fundamentalobjectivesof the New Economic Policy (NEP) werethe eradication ofpoverly irrespectiveofrace and the restructuring ofthesociety so as to eliminate the identification of a race with its economicfunctions, a legacy of the colonial times. The eradicationof poverty andthe restructuring of society, it was argued, would help foster nationalunity - the overriding objective of the whole policy. These objectiveswere to be achieved by redistributing the wealth of the nation equitablyamongall the major races.Thus, in twenty years, t was estimated hat thebumiputera should be enjoying a 30 percent stake and the non-bumiputera 40 percent leaving the remaining 30 percent for theforeigners.Promises were made to the effect that no one race would beunduly discriminated against in pursuing these objectives and all wouldbenefit as the economywas expected o grow with the implementationofthe NEP (Mid Term Review, Second Malaysia Plan [MTR-2MP 1973:85-871). This assurancegave the Indian community, which at that timewas holding a miserable one percent stake in the nation's economicwealth, somehope about its future economicposition. However, in 1990,when the NEP officially came o an end, the community's stake emainedstagnatedat one percent.The National Development Policy (NDP) andthe National Vision Policy (NVP), which were formulated thereafter, oo,did not improve any significantly the Indian community's economicposition. This article analyses he position of the Indian community underthe NEP.

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K. AnbalakanTHE BACKGROUND TO THE NEPIt has become a trend in Malaysian political economy discourses ocloselyassociatehe NEP with the 1969May l3'n racial riot. It is oftenu.gu.d that the racial clashwas the result of continuousneglectof Malayeconomic nterestby the ruling Alliance government.Sometimes,t isclaimed that the May 13 incident was a watershedin the political andeconomic history of Malaysia because only after that the economicpolicies of the nation began to give due consideration towards theiconomic upliftment of the Malay community. Well, while thereoughttobe sometruth in all these,however, to suggest hat the riot was purely aracial clash due to deep-seatedrustrationsof the economically deprivedMalay community is not at all plausible.In the first place, the claim that Malay interestshad all through beencompletely neglected and that only after the riots did the governmentbegan to take measures o overcomethe economic backwardnessof thecommunity is not true. Actually, the Malay grouses about economicbackwardness. oo, was not new. There had been gross dissatisfactionamong he Malay leadersover the community's economicposition evenbefore independence.The British introduced a couple of measures,though haphazardlyand arbitrarily, to help the community. In 1917,forinstance, the Land Reservation Act was enacted to protect Malayownership of agricultural land. In 1950, Rural Industrial DevelopmentAuthority (RIDA) was established o enhancerural development. Sixyears later, FederalLand DevelopmentAuthority (FELDA) was formedio initiate large scaleagricultural land developmentprojects. The Malays,too, were given preferential status when it came to awarding ofeducational scholarships and jobs in the civil service. Yet, thecommunity'seconomicposition did not improvemuch.After independence,he Alliance governmentcontinued to give specialconsiderations for the economic upliftment of the Malays in all itseconomic programmes. The Ministry of Rural Development wasestablishedo specifically take care of Malay economic interests. Underthe First Malaya Plan (1956-1960), or instance,someRNI227millionswas allocated for rural development. This was increased to RM468millions under the SecondMalaya Plan of 1961-1965(Snodgrass 980:47-50). The First MalaysiaPlan (1965-1970)went even further to helpthe Malays. It incorporatedalmost all of the recommendationsput forth

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TheFurtherMarginalisation f the ndiansby the First BumiputeraEconomicConference f 1965.Severalagencies,like Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), Institut Teknologi MARA (ITM),Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA), Bank Bumiputraand so on were establishedo enable he Malay community to improve itseconomicstanding. n short,the governmenthad doneasmuch as t couldto improve the economic position of the Malay community. Yet,unfortunately, while the agricultural sector registered remarkableimprovements, he majority of the Malays remained relatively poor (see2l)i/.P97l: 10-18& Snodgrass980:47-56,192-195).

As it is, the argumentthat the main causeof the riot was the economicdeprivation of the Malay community is not tenable. Rather, it waspolitical factors that had caused he riot. It was the poor performanceofthe Alliance Party, or more accuratelythe United Malayan NationalOrganisation UMNO), in the generalelections hat was held on the l0'hof May 1969 that paved way for the clashes. In that elections, theAlliance which had ruled the country for twelve yearssince ndependencewithout much trouble was able to garner only 49.1 percent of the totalvotes cast compared o 58.5 percent t had received n 1964.Besides, thad also lost the stateof Penang o the GerakanRakyat Party and failed toregain back the predominantly Malay stateof Kelantan from Parti IslamSeTanahMelayu (PAS). n two otherstatests positionwas uncertain. nPerak, t won only 19 out of the 40 seatswhile in Selangor t got only 14of the 28 seats Ismail Kassim 1979: 9). Therefore, ts victory in manyother seats,both stateas well as parliament, was marginal' In total, theAlliancehad lost 22 of the 89 parliamentseatsof which 7 were UMNO's,14 MalaysianChineseAssociation(MCA)'s and one MalaysianIndianCongressMIC) seat Snodgrass 980:54).Of course,many of the UMNO leadersargued hat the poor performanceof the Alliance Party was a reflection of the Malay anger anddisappointment over their economic backwardness.But, it must berememberedhat the Alliance Party's showing n the 1959 elections,oo,was not as sood as its achievement n the earlier one held in 1955'.

I In fact, in the 1959 general elections, the Alliance lost both Kelantan andTerengganu, he two predominantly Malay states n the East coast,to the PanMalayan Islamic Party. It may also be noted here that UMNO had once againlost the state of Terengganuto PAS in the 1999 general elections despite3 8 1


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K. AnbalakanHowever, in 1964 the parfy was able to recoup lost ground. It was alsoargued that in the 1969 elections,the Alliance was able to get only 54percentof the Malay votes as compared with 67 percent in 1964. Butthen, the non-Malay votes too had decreased.Only about 43 percentofthe non-Malays had voted for the Alliance compared o some48 percentin the 1964elections Snodgrass 980:55). That aside, he MCA had ostmore seats o the oppositionChineseparties ike Democratic Action Party(DAP) and Gerakan hen what had UMNO to PAS2. t must also be notedthat most of the MCA seatswere in the predominantly Chineseurbancentres.Also not to be forgotten was that Penang was under the MCArule prior to the 1969 elections. What are we to decipherfrom this? Is itall right to suggest hat the Alliance Party's poor results were purely dueto the economic backwardness and disappointment of the Malaycommunity alone? How are we to explain the defection of the Chinesevotes? Were they too angry with the Alliance governmentover economicgrievances?Obviously, it was the Alliance Party's poor elections result and thevictory celebration by the opposition parties, especially DAP andGerakan, hat createda provocative climate which later led to the flaringup of racial tensions. The fact that both DAP and Gerakan werepredominantly Chineseparties had made the situation worse. Thus, thesupposedlypolitical skirmish betweenthe disappointedAlliance and thejubilant opposition parties, unforfunately, turned out to be a racialbloodshed.Worse still, it was seenmore as a clash between he Malaysand the Chinese hough the Indians too were very much involved in it.TIIE NEP AND TIIE INDIANSAs mentioned above, the government gave assurance hat the NEP wasimplemented for the benefit of all Malaysians irrespective of race andreligion. It was categorically stated hat the programmewas designed oreduce and ultimately do away with the economic imbalances betweenthe various communities by redistributing the wealth of the nation in a

having brought in tremendous economic benefits to the Malay communitythrough NEP.' As hasbeennotedabove n pageone, the MCA had lost 14 seatswhile UMNOlost 7 only.382

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TheFurther Marginalisationof the ndiansmore equitable way. Nevertheless, rom the very beginning the Indianshad felt that the NEP was purely a pro-Malay instrumentto promote theinterestsof the Malays alone.The Indians cannot be blamed for this. The framers of the policy hadmade t very obvious that the main and major objectiveof the NEP was tostrengthen the economic position of the bumiputera, particularly theMalay community, by creatinga commercial and industrial group amongthem in about twenty years. Conceming the position of the Indians andtheir future, there was no mention of it at all. Worse still, unlike theMalays, the Indians were not given separate consideration as acommunity. Rather, they were lumped together with the Chinese, whowere economically far stronger,under the non-bumiputeracategory. Inshort, while everything possiblewas promised for the upliftment of thebumiputera community practically no strategy of any sorts wasformulated to help the poor Indians. For instance,a target was set toincrease he bumiputera equity from 1.9percentto 30 percentby 1990asshown in Table 1 below. No such target or strategywas designed or theIndians though they were holding only onepercentof the nation's wealthin 1970.Table l: Targets or Malay Equity Growth, 1970-1990

Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990Target (%o) 1 . 9 9.0 16.0 23.0

Source:Computed from Mid-Term Review, SecondMalaysia Plan, (1973: 84)It must be understood that the Indians were no better than the Malaysboth economicallyand socially. The majority of them were languishing nthe plantation sector with a meagre income, which was just enough tomeet the basic needsof daily life (Ramachandran1994).Yet, in none ofthe government's economic plans since independence were theireconomic backwardnessaddressed. n the 50s, for instance, when theestateswere fragmentedand sold, thereby causing he Indian labourers olose their jobs, the governmentdid not come up with any plan to helpthem.The calls by the MIC and theNational Union of PlantationWorkers(NUPW) to enact aws to curb fragmentationof estatesof more than 100acres,too, was not at all consideredby the government (Arasaratnam1970: 155).As it is, between1956 and 1967 arowd 324,931acresof

30.0

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K. Anbalakanestateswere fragmented nd sold as small holdingscausingsome28,363labourers, majority of whom were Indians, to lose their jobs'Furthermore, he displaced ndianswere unableto find alternative obs asthey did not possesshe necessary kills. Due to this, the unemploymentrateamong he Indiansin 1967was among he highest,registeringat 12.3percent Stenson1970: 203-204).In 1970, he time the NEP was formulated, the economicposition of theIndians in general was worse than the Malays. Yet, the framers of theNEP seemed o have assumed hat the Indians were economically farbetter off than the Malays. For instance,as could be seen rom Table 2,the meanhouseholdmonthly income of the Indian community had beenstatedas RM304, which was far higher than the Malays' RMl79 andcloseto the Chinese'RM387. This, to say the least, s very misleadingand does not reveal the actual economic position of the community in1970. It must be remembered that the majority of the Indians wereemployed n the plantation sectorsand other low paying jobs in the urbanand sub-urbanareas. n fact, according o the SecondMalaysia Plan Mid-Term Review (1973: 13) itself, in 1970, he Indiansformed only about4.3 percent of the professionaland managementgroup, while there were12 percentMalays and 72 percentChinese n this group. Similarly, thepercentageoflndians in the technical and supervisorycategorywas only6.1 percentcompared o 20 percentof Malays and 73 percentChinese.Besides,a quick glanceat the ownershippattern as shown in Tables2 and3 confirms that the Indians were not any better off than the Malays andnowherenear he Chinese.The Indianswere holding only 1.0 percentofthe country's wealth compared o 1.9 percentby the Malays and 22.5percentby the ChinesecommunitY.Furthermore,as could be seen rom Table 4, the Indianscould not be saidto have fared well in the area of household income. Compared to theother communities n 1970, heir position looked very precarious.Onlyabout 12 percent of the Indians were in the middle income bracketofRM400-699.Therewere33 percentof Malays and56 percentof Chinesein this category.Also close o 40 percentof the Indianhouseholds ere nthe RMl00-199 category.On the whole, in noneof the incomebracketsthe Indianswerebetterthan either the Malays or Chinese.

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TheFurther Marginalisation of the IndiansTable 2: The Economic Position of Malavsians in Peninsular Malavsia.1970

Malay Chinese lndianPopulation (PeninsularMalaysia - %)Mean Monthly HouseholdIncome (RM)Ownership (Corporate Industry - %)Ownership (Non-Corporate Industry - %)Ownership (CorporateAgriculture - %)Ownership (Non-CorporateAgriculture - o/o)

52.7r790.92.30.347. l

3s.838726.292.22s.932.8

10.73040 . 12.30.310.1

Source: Computed from Mid-Term Review, SecondMalaysia Plan (1973: 9-12,23-24 & 83)Table3: Ownership f ShareCapitalof LimitedCompanies,970 in'000)Sector Malay Chinese IndiansAgricultureMiningManufacturingConstructionTransportCommerceBank & InsuranceOthersTotal

137243876

336501258108754715

21164t3349l026tl

09%0.7%2.5%2.2%t33%0.8%5 , J Y o

23%r.9%

1774389r557

2963633085535498184461I 55582203301192083

22A%16.8%22.0%52.8%434%30.4

243%37.8%22.5%

1 6 1 9 12488888044719034 7 t l443413348s2402

0. t%0.4%0.7%0.8%2.3%0.7%0.6%23%1.0%

Source:Mid-Term Review, SecondMalaysia Plan(1973:83)

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Income(RM) (permonth) Malay Chinese Indian TotalPercentaserom total

Malay Chinese Indianr-99100-199200-399400-699700-r4991500-29993000&above

22.9l 9 . l10.43.0l . l0.2

rt

2.61.8I 1 . 95 .32.90.70.1

1.34.43.51.20.60.10.1

27.131.425.99.64.71 . 10.3

84.560.840.33r.623.214.0t 2 . l

9.624.946.055.761.462.r52.0

4.914.013.5t2 . l12.513.617.3

Total 56.7 3 1 . 3 |t.2 100.0 56.7 31.3 tt.2

K. AnbalakanTable 4: Distribution of Householdsby Income and Race n PeninsularMalaysia,1970 %)

Note: * negligibleSource: Computedfrom Mid-Term Review, SecondMalaysia Plan(1973:3 & 4)Table 5 adds further credence o this line of argument. It could be seenthat 46.5percentof Indians were engaged n agriculture. But, unlike theMalays the majority of these were wage labourers in the plantationsectors.According to a MIC Report, 74 percent of these were estatelabourers(MIC 1974:6). Another area of high Indian concentrationwasthe services sector.About 25 percentof Indians were involved in this.Here again, the majority of the Indians were employed in low payingunskilled obs. The Indian involvement n commercewas 10.6percent.But as hasbeennoted n the MIC Report(1974:6), the majority of thesewere involved in sundry and petty shop business.Thus, about 80 percentof the Indians were engaged n non-remunerativevocations.To cap it all,the unemployment rate among Indians was the highest, as is shown inTable 5. Under these circumstances, t is certainly ridiculous to assumethat the Indians were in a better economicfooting than the Malays.

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TheFurther Marginalisation of the ndiansTable5: Employmentby RaceandRaceSectorn PeninsularMalaysia,1970(in%)Sector Malays Chinese Indian % of Indian from

total Indian labourAgricultureMining & QuarryManufacturingConstructionUtility ServicesTransportCommerceServicesTotal(LabourForce)Unemployment

67.624.828.92 r . 748.542.623.548.551 . 58.0

21.466.065.472.118.039.66s.335.736.97.4

l 0 . l8.45.36.0

32.3t 7 . l10.714.010.71 1 . 0

46.52.45.21.62.36.6

10.624.8

100.00

Source:Mid-Term Review, SecondMalaysiaPlan(1973:77;1974: 17)

INDIAN DISAPPOINTMENT AND THE MICFrom the foregoing it is obvious that the Indians were among the mostdisadvantaged conomicgroup in 1970.Nevertheless, or reasonsknownonly to the framers of the NEP, the community was not at all consideredatarget group that needed o be helped out under the NEP. There was nospecific target set, no affirmative plans to uplift their economicpositionand no mention whatsoever of their poor economic position in theframework of the NEP. The MIC was greatly disappointed at themarginalisation of the Indian community by the government. The partyconvened wo economic seminars o draw the attention of the govemmenttowards the plight of the community.First MIC Economic Seminar, 1974The first seminarwas held for two days,on l1 and I2May, n 1974withthe hopeof forwarding recommendationso the governmentwhich was inthe process of formulating the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980). The

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K. Anbalakanseminar argeteda growth of 2.25 percentevery five years and hoped toachieve 0 percentequityby 1990as shownbelow.Table6: Equity Growth Target for the Indian Community,1970-1990

,

j

Year 1970 t975 1980 r985 1990Total ShareCapital*Indian EquityPercentage

5,28952.91 . 0

8 , 6 6 328153.25

14,624804.35.50

25,6501987.97.75

46,8214682.110.0

Note: * in RMmillionSource:IC 1974:4)The seminar reminded the government that the Indians were not at allbenefiting from the NEP and largely remained left out of the economicgrowth of the nation. At the end of the seminar,a blueprint containingrecommendations for the economic upliftment of the Indians wassubmitted o the government.The blueprint, among other things urged thegovernment o formulate specific policies to increase he Indian positionin the country's economyfrom 1.0 percent o l0 percentby 1990 andrequestedan allocation of 10 percent of all newly listed shares n themarket to the community. It was also suggestedthat the estatesbebrought under the purview of the Rural DevelopmentMinistry so that theeconomicproblemsof the estate abourerscould be effectively addressed.The government was also requested to absorb the displaced estatelabourers nder he FELDA scheme MIC 1974: l,12 &27).The MIC had hoped that at least some of its request would beincorporated in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) that was beingframed just around that time. In fact, the MIC President, Tan Sri V.Manickavasagam,had openly expressed his hope in his opening speechat the seminar (MIC 1974: l). But, the governmentdid not take note oftheserecommendations.According to one report (Ramachandran1994:307) the then Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, did not show anyinterest owards he MIC's blueprint.As such,none of theMIC's requestswere given consideration in the Third Malaysia Plan. However, anassurancewas given to the effect that the governmentwas not unawareofthe Indian community's economic backwardnessand action would betaken to elevate heir problem (Third Malaysia Plan 1976:47,74, 159,

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TheFurther Marginalisation of the Indians165-167 & 177). Unfortunately, for the entire period of the ThirdMalaysia Plannothing specificwas doneto assist he community.

SecondMIC EconomicSeminar,1980The secondeconomicseminarwas held by the MIC on 13 June 1980,ustabout the time the government was framing the Fourth Malaysia Plan(1981-1985). t must be rememberedhat l0 years had passedsince heimplementationof the NEP and yet the Indian position of 1.0 percent nthe nation's wealth had not at all improved. The seminar criticised thegovernment for neglecting the welfare of the Indian community. Thistime around the Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah' wasinvited to officiate the seminar.The aim was none other than to make thegovernment ealise he real economicpositionof the Indians.As in 1974,several requests for the economic upliftment of the community weremade o the governmentMIC 1980).At the same ime, the original argetof 10percentequity was slasheddown to a more reasonable6 percent andstrategieswere discussedo achieve hat target.Table 7: Equity Growth Target for the Indian Community,1970-1990Year 1970 r975 1980 I 985 1990Percentage 1 . 0 2.25 3.5 4.75 6.0Source: IC 1980:8)Tengku Razaleigh, on his part, gave an assurance hat the governmentwas aware of the Indians' plight and would take action to overcometheproblem (MIC 1980: 15). But, as usual, there was no mention of anyaffirmative actions on the part of the government to help the Indians inthe Fourth Malaysia Plan too. Furthermore,when the Fifth Malaysia Plan(1986-1990), he final leg of the NEP was formulated here was still nomention of any specificplans for the upliftment of the Indian community.

Thus at the end of the NEP, the Indian posilion remainedunchanged romthe 1.0 percent hey were holding in 1970i. It must be noted that duringthe sameperiod, the Malay stakehad moved from 1.9 percent o 19.3percent while the Chinesepercentagehad leapt from 225 percent o 44.5percent. Besides, the percentage of Indians in most sectors of the3 It may alsobenotedhere hat between1982and1985 heIndianshare apitaldroppedo 0.9Yo.eeMTR-5MP 989: 09and6MP1991: 4.

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K. Anbalakaneconomyhad dwindled during this period. As could be stieri rom Table 8below, the NEP had worked against he interest of the Indians in almostall sectors of employment. The acclaimed objective of abolishing theidentificationofa raceby its vocation had not at all been effective in thecase of the Indians. Rather, they remained categorisedas the labouringcommunity even at the end of the NEP. As Ramasamy 1999: 30) puts it,the mobility of the Indians under the NEP was horizontal and not vertical.Thus, if in 1970 they were associatedwith the estates,now, after twentyyearsofsocial engineeringby the government, hey had an added abel asthe proletariat, argely engaged n menial odd jobs in the urban and semi-urban sectors.Table8: Employmenty OccupationndEthnicGroup,1970, 985,1990

Race Bumiputera Chinese IndiansOccupation/Years r970 1985 1990 r970 1985 1990 1970 1985 1990Prof.& TechnicalTeachers

NursesAdmin &ManagerialClericalSalesServicesAgricultureProduction

47.0n.a.24.135.426.744.372.034.2

58.864.234.854.1J J . Z

61.675.94't.3

60.368.33.354.936.061 .576.448.5

62.945.96t.739.717.355.9

39.5n.a.

30.928.957.537.859.227.815.241 .8

30.825.158.736.956.527.015 .840.0

10.n.a.7 . 817 .2I . I14.69 . 79 . 6

8 . 76 . 45 . 17 . 66 . 810.8 . 210.5

7 . 76 . 35 . 37 . 86 . 5

10 .7 . 0t0.7

Total 51 .8 57.3 57.8 36.6 ) J . Z 32.9 10. 8 . 8 8 . 5Source: ourthMalaysia lan 1981: 9,6MP, 99l:34)

THE POST NEP PERIODThe NEP officially ended n 1990. The governmentclaimedthat the mainobjectives of poverty eradication and restructuring of society had beenachieved o a remarkable evel. Nevertheless, he governmentwas quickto add that the affirmative policies to alleviate the bumiputera economicposition would be continued in future policies too. As the targeted 30percentsharecapital ownership for the bumiputera was not attainedunder

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TheFurther Marginalisation of the ndiansthe NEP it was indicated hat continued emphasiswould be given towardsachieving this. Surprisingly, nothing was mentioned about the patheticperformanceof the Indians under the NEP. The fact that the communityhad stagnatedat the miserableone percentwas not at all recognisedas aproblem. Rather, disappointment were expressed from somegovernment's UMNO quarters on the failure to attain the targeted 30percent for the bumiputera community and calls were made to enhancestrategies o improve the Malay position further.However, the National Economic ConsultativeCouncil OrECC) that wasformed in 1985to appraise he performanceof the NEP and recommendsuggestions o overcome its shortcomings n the National DevelopmentPolicy (NDP) which was to replace the NEP, took note of the poorprogress made by the Indians under the NEP. In its final report, theNECC had expressed oncern that the Indian community as a whole hadnot benefitedmuch under the NEP. It had explicitly mentioned that theIndians' involvement in many of the sectorsof employment was grosslydisproportionate o their population (Semparuthi 1999:4). To overcomethis, the NECC recommended hat some affirmative policies similar tothose designed for the Malays must be initiated in the NDP. Therecommendations f the NECC, inter alia, includeda:

o awarding of monthly wages o the estateworkers5. opening of kindergartensn estateso convertingall the partially-aidedTamil schools nto fully-aidedo providing technicalskills to Indian youths in the estateso enabling he Indians to set up a bank. enabling the Indiansto invest in sharemarketby providing creditfacilities

Unfortunately, as in the past, the government did not show seriousinterest to the NECC's recommendationson Indians. In his forward toThe Second Outline Perspective Plan 199l-2000 (OPP2), whichembodies he structure of the NDP, the Prime Minister. Datuk Seri Dr.o For an elaboration seeSemparuthi 1994:4.5 In February 2001, almost after a decade it was announced that the estateworkers would finally be paid a monthly wage. However, the RM325.00agreed upon was much lower than the Poverty Line Index (PLI) which wasRM510 for a household izeof 4.6 in PeninsularMalaysia see8MP 2001:58).39r


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K. AnbalakanMahathir Mohamad, while thanking the NECC for its useful ideas andsuggestionshad specified that "not all of their recommendationshavebein accepted".And as usual, mention was made in oPP2 to the effectthat the governmentwas awareof the Indian economicbackwardness. oquoteverbatim rom the OPP2 1991: 11),

However,n the caseof the Indians, heir sharen someof theprofessionss below theirpopulation atio' In thoseprofessionswhere hey arewell represented,he increasen absoluteermshas been much slower than that for the bumiputeraand theChinese.As a result, he shareof Indianemploymentn theseprofessionsasdeclinedontinuouslyince1970'

As could be noted from the above, the government even after havingagreed hat the position of the Indians was really bad did not give anyurrurun." as to what was going to be done to overcome his sorry stateofaffairs. In fact, this was what the governmenthad done in all its five yearplans between 1970 and 1990. It was not surprised hat this trendcontinuedeven after the NEP. In that context, it may not be out of placeto havea glanceat how the government iewedthe economicposition ofthe bumiputera, of more specifically the Malays. The first half of theabovequotedparagraph eads:

While bumiputera ccountor the largestshareof public sectoremploymentand predominaten the uniformedservices, heclericaland secretarial ervices ndthe teaching rofession,henon-Bumiarewell representedn the professional nd echnicalcategories,particularly in the medical, engineering andaccountancyervices.n the light of the above,there is anurgentneed o expand he supplyof bumiputera rofessionaland technicalmanPower."

It must be emphasised ere that the aim of quoting the above s not totake issue with the government's initiative to help out the bumiputeracommunity, but, rather to point out that the interests of the Indians,perhaps lso of the Chinese, ad consistently eenneglectedn all of thegovernment'S rve year economic plans. As a result of this neglect, theeconomic position of the Indian community in general continued to

'

6 Emphasisadded rom the original texl392


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TheFurtherMarginalisation f the ndiansdeteritirateunder the NDP and NVP. Tables 9, 10, 1l and 12 belowexplain the position of the Indians underthe NDP and NVP.

Table 9: Employmentof Indiansby Sector,1990-2000 in%)Sector/Years 1990 t993 t99s 1998 2000AgricultureMining/QuarryManufacturingConstructionElectricity.Gas & WaterTransportCommerceFinance& InsuranceOther ServicesTotal EmployedUnemployment

7.99.2

1 1 . 15.8

17.0l 5 . lt . )9.97.98.88.3

6.37 . 1

t2.95.2

13.3t3.46.79 .11 . 58.57.6

6.010.5rt.24.7

l l . ll l.16 .19.36.87.96.6

5.99.5

I 1 . 84.8

I r . 912.36.s9.66.98.37.8

6.110.2tt.44.7

I 1 . 3t2.06.79.97.18.37.0

Unemployment Rate 4.8 2.7 3.6 2.7Source:Mid-TermReview,SixthMalaysiaPlan 1999:76-77) andEighthMalaysiaPlan(2001:66)Table 0: Employmentf Indians y Occupation,990-2000in%)Occupatior/Years 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000Prof.& TechnicalTeachers NursesAdmin & ManagerialClericalSalesServicesAgricultureProduction

7.86.44.38.77 . 19.57.9

10.9

7.76.55.07.96.68.76.7

1 1 . 8

7.06.64.87.46.28.26.99.6

8.47.06.19.36.38.26.99.7

7.66.9).)8.66.88.56.9

10.0Total 8.8 8.5 7.9 8.3 8.3Source: Mid-Term Review, Sixth Malaysian Plan (1993: 65), Seventh Malaysia Plan(1999: 78-79) and Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001 79)

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K. AnbalakanTable I 1: Percentage of Indian Involvement by Occupation, 1990-2000Occupation 1990 t993 r995 1998 2000Prof. & TechnicalTeachers& NursesAdmin & ManagerialClericalSalesServicesAgricultureProduction

7.82.41.29.79.3

12.625.434.r

8.22.61.69 . 19.3

12.620.039.3

8.82.91 . 9

10.28.6

I 1 . 517.741.3

10.93 . 12.9

t2.48.2

I 1 . 515.938.2

10.93.03.2

12.08 . 1

I 1 . 814.339.7

Total 100 100 100 100 100Source:Computedrom Mid-TermReview,SixthMalaysiaPlan 1993:64-65),Seventh

Malaysia lan 1999: 8-79)andEighthMalaysiaPlan(2001:66-67)Table 12: Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies, 1990-1995(in RM million)Race 1990 % 1995 % GrowthRate AbsoluteGrowthBumiputeraChineseIndiansOthers

20,877.549,296.01,068.0389.5) 1 \ ) S \

19.345.51 . 00.32s.4

36,981.273,552.72,723.11 , 7 5 1 . 149.792.7

20.640.91 . 51 . 027.7

12. r8.320.635.12.6

16,t03.124,256.71,655.11,361.622.267.2

Source:SeventhMalaysiaPlan(1996:86)

CONCLUSIONThe governmenthad repeatedlyemphasisedhat the oveniding mission ofits social engineeringpolicies - the NEP, NDP and NVP - was nationalunity. It was stressed hat the restructuring of society, and ensuring anequitabledistribution of the nation's wealth among all the major ethnicgroups, would strengthen nter-ethnic relations and help forge nationalunity. However, as has beenarguedand substantiatedwith statistics n theforegoing there had been extraordinarypreoccupation on the part of thegoveflrment to favour the bumiputera, especiallythe Malays in all the

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TheFurther Marginalisationof the ndiansthreeprogrammes.So much so, that the interest of other weaker groups,particularly the Indians, had been neglected. Not to say that the otherMalaysian had not at all benefited from the government policies. TheChinese community, for instance, had almost doubled its economicstrength. But then, this was largely due to the strong economicfundamentals hat the community enjoyed since before the launch of theNEP. The Indians too, had enjoyed some benefits. Again, this was notdue to genuineefforts on the part _of he governmentbut from the spillover of the pro-bumiputera projects'If the governmenthad been serious n helping the Indian community thensome attention should have been paid to the Indian poverty in theplantation sector. The majority of Indians were languishing in poverfy inthe estates. It is not that the government did not know of it. Thecommunity leadershad at severaloccasionsbrought to the attention of thegovernment he plight of the estateworkers. At both economic seminarsof the MIC, the government had been requested o include the estatesunder the purview of the Rural Development Ministry. It must be notedthat about 35 percentof the budget of all the economicprogrammeshadbeen allocated for rural development (Ramachandran1994: 329). Forinstance, he estimateddevelopmentexpenditure or rural and agriculturaldevelopmentwas RM2,279,000under the SecondMalaysia Plan. In thenext three plans the allocations had been significantly increased toRN16,448,250, M7,888,200 and 11,799,850 espectively(see 2MP -5MP). The major share of the allocations for the eradication of ruralpoverty was utilised specifically for the alleviation of the lot of theMalaysonly.It was fervently hoped by the Indians that if the estateswere to be placedunder the Rural Development Ministry, perhaps, hey too could benefit alittle from these allocations. But, the government up to now has beenrefusing to consider this proposal by hiding behind the old lame excuse

' The MIC Presiden,Datuk Seri S. SamyVellu had oncecommented hat underthe NEP the Chinese had improved because they had strong economicfoundations and the Malays because of govemment support whereas theIndians had none of these (Tan Chee Khoon 1984: 157). On 28 September1989 he had said that the failure of the govemment to initiate any affirmativeaction was the causeof Indian backwardness seeSemparuthiNovember 1999:2) .395


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K. Anbalqkanthat the plantations were private properties and it was for the estatesowners to cater for the well being of their workers. unfortunately, thegovemment did not take any action to coax the estatemanagement oi-p.ou" the social amenities n the estates.tWith the same ustificationsthe governmenthas also been refusing to absorball thoseTamil schoolsin the estatesas fully-aided governmentschools. n conclusion t could besaidthat, unless he government s willing to change ts perception of theIndian economic backwardnessand formulate some kind of affirmativepolicy to alleviate the community's economic misery the Indians willremain a marginalised group. This in turn will continue to create aconducive environment for more and more social problems among theyouths of the community.

REF'ERENCES:Arasaratnam, S., 1970, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, London:Oxford University Press.Ismail Kassim, 1979, Race, Politics and Moderation: A Study of theMalaysianElectoral Process,Singapore:Times Book International.Malaysia, 1971, Second Malaysia Plan, 1970-1975, Kuala Lumpur:GovernmentPrinters.-, 1973, Mid-Term Review of the SecondMalaysia Plan, l97l-1975,Kuala Lumpur: GovernmentPrinters.-, 1976,Third Malaysia PIan, 1976-1980,Kuala Lumpur: Govemment

Printers.-, lg7g, Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980,

Kuala Lumpur: GovernmentPrinters.

8 According to one report in 1995,the health facilities provided in some estateswere worse than those available in the 50s (The star 25 June 1995). Thesituationdid seem o have improved even in 1999 (seeDr. Krishnan, the pastPresidentof Malaysian Medical Association [MMA], in The Star,24 October1999).396

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The Further Marginalisation of the Indians*s 1981, Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985,Kuala Lumpur:Government rinters.-,1986, Fifth MalaysiaPlan, 198G1990,KualaLumpur:GovernmentPrinters.-, 1989,Mid-TermReviewof the Fifth MalaysiaPlan, 198G1990'KualaLumpur:Government rinters.-,I99I, SixthMalaysiaPIan,1991-1995,KualaLumpur:GovernmentPrinters.-, 1991, The SecondOutlinePerspectivePlan, 1991-2000,KualaLumpur:Government rinters.-, lgg3, Mid-TermReviewof the Sixth MalaysiaPlan, IggFlggsKualaLumpur:Government rinters.-s 1996, Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000, Kuala Lumpur:Government rinters.-, lg9g,Mid-TermReviewof the SeventhMalaysiaPIan, 1996-2000,KualaLumpur:Government rinters.-t 2001, Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001-2005, Kuala Lumpur:Government rinters.-, 2001, The Third Outline PerspectivePlan, 2001-2010,KualaLumpur:Government rinters.Malaysian ndianCongress, 974,DasarEkonomiBaru danMalaysianIndians:RantindakMIC. KualaLumpur,30June.-,1975, Kemukakan epada awatankuasaabinet entangpelajaran.KualaLumpur,28 Januari.-, 1980,DeclarationandRecommendations,econdMalaysianndianEconomicSeminar, ualaLumpur,13July.

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K. AnbalakanRamachandran,S., 1994, Indian Plantation Labour in Malaysia, KualaLumpur.

Ramasamy,P.,|ggg,NEPandtheIndians,unpublishedmanuscript.Semparuthi, November 1999.Snodgrass, D.R., 1980, Inequality and Economic Development inMalaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.Stenson,M.R., 1970,Industrial Conflict in Malaya: A Prelude to theCommunistRevolt of 1948, London: Oxford University Press.Tan Chee Khoon, 7984, Without Fear or Favour, Singapore: EasternUniversitiesPress.TheStar,Z5June1995. .

.24 October1999.

the new economic policy and further marginalisation of the indians

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