the overlord state: turkish policy and the kurdish issue · the overlord state: turkish policy and...

The overlord state: Turkish

policy and the Kurdish issue

PHILIP ROBINS

Turkey is widely seen by observers in the United Kingdom and United States as an oasis of stability in afragmented and uncertain region, a view which has added to the prominence accorded it in post-Cold War NA TO politics. However, an examination of the problems posed to Turkey both domestically and in its relations with its immediate neighbours, in particular Iraq, shows this view to be an oversimplification. Philip Robins argues that Turkey's allies would do better to recognize the extent and complexity of the problems relating to the Kurdish south- east of the countryfor the sake of all involved.

'Kurdistan has always been ruled by "overlord" states, whose centres layfar outside the land of the Kurds.' (Malcolm Yapp)1

From an Atlanticist strategic perspective Turkey has been one of the winners of the post-Cold War period. It is no longer a marginal player on the southern flank of NATO. Rather, it is regarded as being 'in the eye of the storm'. It has replaced the Federal Republic of Germany as the member state located in the region of greatest uncertainty. In recognition of this new importance, this central role, Britain and the United States have set about bolstering the country's position. Britain used its presidency of the EC Council of Ministers to usher in an enhanced political status for Turkey. The United States led a massive transfer of military resources, both bilaterally and through the process of' cascading'.2 Arabists in both Whitehall and the State Department have been obliged to include Turkey in their complex equations. It is now de rigueur for 1 Malcolm Yapp, "'The mice will play": Kurds, Turks and the Gulf war', in Hanns Maul and Otto

Pick, eds, The Gulf War (London: Pinter, I989), p. ioi. 2 NATO's Equipment Transfer and Equipment Rationalization Programme more popularly known as

the Cascade Agreement. The object of the programme was to ensure that up to date NATO equipment was not destroyed as being surplus to CFE agreed levels. Turkey and Greece have been the main beneficiaries of cascading from the US and Germany. The agreement covers tanks, ACVs and artillery pieces.

International Affairs 69, 4 (I993) 657-676 657

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Philip Robins

senior figures in the US administration to 'mention Turkey' when giving solemn renditions of how they see the world.3

A recurrent theme in this new Anglo-American perspective is that Turkey is an island of stability in a world increasingly awash with instability. There is a fondness for describing the turmoil and uncertainty which exist in the geopolitical regions that lie adjacent to Turkey: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. With this goes an implicit assumption that Turkey is different: stable, democratic, secular, unencumbered by extremism, reassuringly pro-Western. Of course, to varying degrees, Turkey is all of these things. What gives cause for concern about such an assumption is that it implies that Turkey is impervious to the stresses that pervade such regions; inoculated against the forces which have been brought to the fore since the end of the Cold War. The reality is that Turkey is no less susceptible to the collapse of ideology, the centrifugal forces within states, and the dangers of interstate conflict than any other country in Eurasia.

To date, such tensions have been most apparent for Turkey in relation to the Kurdish issue. The presence of such a large minority in Turkey has exposed a serious contradiction in the Kemalist ideology, at a time when authoritarian ideologies are deeply unfashionable in the world. The disaffection of the Kurds of the south-east represents the strongest centrifugal force in the country. An insurgency led by the Partiya Karkaran Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party), which since I989 has grown to dangerous proportions, has rendered part of the country a no-go area and has threatened the stability of the whole state. The collapse of state authority in northern Iraq, together with the alacrity with which Turkey's southern and south-eastern neighbours appear willing to exploit the Kurdish question to weaken the Turkish state, indicate the extraterritorial dimension of the problem. The acute nature of the threat posed by the PKK insurgency has exacerbated interstate tensions in the area over the past four years.

This article explores the Kurdish issue in the context of both the domestic and the foreign policy of Turkey. The nature and origin of the internal conflict will be discussed, as will the policy response of the Turkish state. As space does not permit a comprehensive survey of the Kurdish issue in Turkish foreign policy, the article will confine itself to a treatment of Turkish relations with Iraq in the context of the Kurdish issue. Turkish-Iraqi relations have been chosen as a case- study for three reasons: it is in these two states that the question of the Kurds is most significant as a domestic issue; this is the bilateral relationship that is most affected by the issue; and it is the Kurds of Iraq who have been the 'pace- setters of Kurdism'.i4

The approach adopted here underlines the extent to which the Kurdish issue is both an internal and a foreign policy issue for Turkey; the Kurdish issue in the internal domain affects foreign policy, and vice versa. The central argument

3 As, for instance, in the post-prandial address by Samuel Lewis, Head of the State Department Planning Staff, following the Washington Institute for Near East Policy lunch, Sheraton Carlton, Washington DC, I9 May I993. 4 Yapp, "'The mice will play"', p. I07.

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of this article is that the Kurdish issue presents some serious challenges for contemporary Turkey, challenges which the Turks are not necessarily well equipped to face. From this conclusion, a plea follows: that Turkey's friends, in particular, should take more seriously the problems currently besetting that country. To assume that because Turkey is a friend and ally such issues should be played down may, in the long run, be to the detriment both of Turkey and of its relationship with the West.

The Kurdish question as a domestic policy issue

Historical lessons

For Turkey, the Kurdish question is an existential issue. The first threat to the integrity of the Turkish state came when that state was still in the womb of history. The Treaty of Sevres of io August I920 prescribed the creation of a fragile and inconsequential state out of the grand ruins of the Ottoman empire.' This rump state was to be created because the entente powers wished to bring both the Kurds and the Armenians closer to statehood. Regarding Kurdistan, the treaty stated that 'a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates' should be drafted.6 The treaty went on to say that:

If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish people ... show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these people are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.7

The Treaty of S'evres became irrelevant soon after it was concluded,8 as the Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, ignored international convention and carved out a Turkish state of the proportions which exist today. With the demise of Sevres went the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state. Some 70 years later, however, the Sevres experience remains fresh in the minds of Turks. The diplomatic lesson drawn by many is that the creation of a Kurdish state will inevitably weaken the Turkish state. The practical lesson has been that only through self-reliance and the resort to arms can such an eventuality be prevented.

If S'evres continues to cast a shadow over Turkish existence today, the Treaty of Lausanne, adopted against a very different political background, remains a political talisman for the Turkish state.9 The most important aspect of Lausanne

For the full text of the treaty of peace with Turkey signed at Sevres on I0 August I920 see Treaty Series no. ii, Cmd 964 (London: HMSO, I920). 6 Section III, Article 62 in ibid., p. 2I. Article 64 in ibid.

8 Irrelevant, that is, except for Kurdish nationalists who refer back to it in the same way as Turkish nationalists refer to the Treaty of Lausanne, namely as an international treaty which enshrines their aspirations. See, e.g., interview with Kurdish nationalist in Nokta, repr. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 26 March I99I. For the full text of the treaty of peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on 24 July I923, see Treaty Series no. i6, Cmd I929 (London: HMSO, I923).

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was that it superseded S'evres and 'certified and legalized the victory won by the Turkish War of Independence'.1? Lausanne was also important because it dealt with the minorities issue in Turkey. Given its context, coming as it did soon after the slaughter of Armenians and the defeat of the Greeks, the treaty was preoccupied with non-Muslim minorities;" the Turkish negotiators were adamant in their refusal to recognize ethnically based minorities."2 No reference was made to non-Turkish minorities, though there were some very general provisions on the rights of Turkish nationals."3 This effective exclusion of the Kurds from the definition of a minority has been referred to countless times by Turkish politicians to justify the lack of any special status or provisions for the Kurds of Turkey.14

A second historical lesson for Turkish nationalists came soon after the foundation of the modern state of Turkey. The first rebellion against the state took place in February I925, and was led by a Kurdish religious leader, Sheikh Said of Piran. His appeal was far from being exclusively nationalist, garnering support on the basis of tribal and religious allegiance. Moreover, he was spurned by Kurdish nationalists based at Diyarbakir. The threat to the state was, however, no less serious for that, as Sheikh Said and his men succeeded in occupying one-third of Kurdish Anatolia. The revolt was ruthlessly suppressed by the state, underlining the centrality of the use of coercion in Turkish policy on the Kurdish issue. The Turkish state also employed tactics which have been used against the current insurgency in the south-east of the country, including the destruction of villages and the forced movement of Kurds to other parts of the country.

The Sheikh Said rebellion was followed by two other significant, though less threatening, revolts, in I930 and between I936 and I938. Both were suppressed by the Turkish military. The fact that the three major armed rebellions against the state were led by Kurds and based in the Kurdish region of the state firmly established the Kurds in Turkish minds as the originators of the primary challenge to their independent existence.

Even before the Sheikh Said revolt, Mustafa Kemal had begun to develop an ideology based on ethno-nationalism, drawn from the European experience. It set out simultaneously to deny and to coopt the Kurds (and, of course, other members of the Turkish state). The essence of the ideology to which Mustafa Kemal gave his name as it related to the national question was that those 0 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman empire and modern Turkey, vol. 2

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I977), pp. 365-8. See treaty of peace with Turkey, Section III, 'Protection of minorities', pp. 29-35.

12 Lord Curzon noted that: 'The Turkish delegation insisted that these minorities [Muslim "racial minorities ... for instance, the Kurds, Circassians and Arabs "] required no protection, and were quite satisfied with their lot under Turkish rule'. See Lausanne conference on Near Eastern affairs 1922-23:

records of proceedings and draft terms of peace, Cmd I8I4 (London: HMS0, I923), p. 296. 13 For instance Section III, Article 39 does include the following, of relevance to future policy issues

relating to the Kurds: 'No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings' (ibid., p. 3I).

14 For instance, the Minister of the Interior, Ismet Sezgin, made such a reference to Lausanne when arguing that Kurds were not a minority but actually first-class citizens of the Turkish state. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Middle East (BBC/SWB/ME), 24 March I992.

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disparate people of the modern state were to have their previous identities subsumed under that of being Turkish. Such an approach spawned a number of half-baked attempts to deny the existence of Kurds by categorizing them as 'Mountain Turks'. In practical terms various attempts were made to deny, hide or eradicate this separate identity. Such measures as the banning of traditional Kurdish costume, the Turkification of village names and various restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language were introduced.

The quid pro quo was that all Turks were to be treated as equal members of the state with equal opportunities and equal duties. Members of the Turkish establishment argue that this means that there is no barrier to the advancement of Kurds within the state. And it is indeed true that people identifiable as being of Kurdish origin have become members of parliament and have been appointed as ministers. Even President Ozal let it be known that he had a Kurdish grandmother.15 However, it is important to note that until recently such figures have achieved high office only by doing so as Turks."6 While those who suppressed their Kurdish identity could prosper within a Turkish state, up to around I989 those who did not were immediately subject to suspicion and possible persecution. The very rigidity of this contract implied that those who did not subscribe to it must be engaged in trying to subvert the state.

This combination of authoritarian ideology and state power might have been successful in stifling a specific Kurdish self-consciousness had it not been for the size of the Kurdish community in Turkey and the presence of significant Kurdish communities in neighbouring states (see below), over which the Turkish state had no control. Hardly surprisingly in view of the political sensitivity of the matter, the number of Kurds in Turkey is disputed. The range extends from the official figure of 7. I per cent of the population, to as high as 24 per cent according to Kurdish sources. A more reasonable estimate may be around I7 or i8 per cent, which, with the Turkish population standing at around 6o million, would mean between io and i i million. With the natural birth rate significantly higher among Kurds than Turks, this proportion is increasing.17 A population of such magnitude, in both relative and absolute terms, is too large to ignore. Furthermore, the continued location of about half this figure in the Kurdish region of south-east Turkey,18 even while the rest of Turkey's Kurdish population has migrated westwards, gives a discrete character to the Kurds who have remained there. 15 The Guardian, i8 October I99I. 16 A good example of this phenomenon was Serafettin Elci who is Kurdish. He rose to the top of the

political ladder in Turkey when he was chosen by Biilent Ecevit to be his Minister of Public Works in the late I970s. However, he was sentenced to over two years in prison in March I98I for 'making Kurdish and secessionist propaganda', apparently for stating that 'I am a Kurd. There are Kurds in Turkey'. See Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: a political dilemma (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview, 1990), p. 46.

17 The natural increase among Kurds in the six provinces included within the South-east Anatolian Project is 2.9 per cent, while the national average (including that for the Kurds) stands at 2.4 per cent.

18 Turkish Daily News (TDN), 27 May I992.

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State policy since 1980

From the suppression of the Kurdish revolts of the 1930S until the I960s the Kurds of the south-east of Turkey were relatively quiet, lacking a focal point for their disaffection. The Kurdish issue re-emerged as a source of violent anti- state activity in the late 1970s, on the back of the growth in radical politics in Turkey during that decade. It was, for instance, in 1978 that the PKK was founded."9 Even so, during this period the membership of such organizations was paltry, and their operations tended to be both on a small scale and sporadic in nature.

Nevertheless, the Kurdish question was perceived by the military as sufficiently serious to be a factor in their decision to launch a coup d'etat in September ig80.20 The fact that the military was worried about the growing trend of Kurdish nationalism and armed operations in the south-east can be seen in the policies they subsequently pursued. First, the military sought to crush those groups responsible for the violence in the south-east. In the long run, such operations were of limited success.2" While many Kurdish nationalists were jailed or killed, others simply went underground or found refuge abroad.22 The PKK, for instance, succeeded in regrouping in Syria.23

Second, the military authorities initiated a vigorous campaign to stamp out manifestations of the Kurdish identity. In 1983 a law was introduced which implicitly banned the use of the Kurdish language.24 There was a new campaign to control the population of the south-east through the permanent stationing of two of Turkey's four armies in the region. This contrasted with the 1970s, when there had been an easing of the military presence.25

The intervention of the Turkish armed forces and the severity of their policies had a counterproductive effect as far as the Turkish state was concerned. First, the very fact of the coup d'etat resulted in a large number of Turkish citizens seeking and gaining political asylum in Western European countries. Because of the nature of the intervention, a large number of these asylum- seekers were leftists or Kurdish nationalists. The repressive policies of the Turkish state had in any case prompted a disproportionate number of Kurds to seek employment opportunities in continental Europe during the opening up of employment markets there in the I960s. Consequently, by I990 there were 19 For an extensive survey of the origins, establishment and activities of the PKK and its allied

organisations see Ismet G. Imset, The PKK: a report on separatist violence in Turkey (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, I992).

20 For references to the senior military officers' growing concern at the level of violence and the danger of secession, see Mehmet Ali Birand, The generals' coup in Turkey (London: Brassey's, I987), pp. 39, 40-4I, 78, I39.

21 This was not necessarily the perception at the time. One contemporary source, for example, declared that the PKK had been 'entirely eliminated in I98I'. See 'Iraq' in Colin Legum, Haim Shaked and Daniel Dishon, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. 5: 1980/81 (New York: Holmes & Meier, I982), p. 840.

22 Of the I5,000 charged with membership of left-wing terrorist organizations at the end of March I983, 3,I77 were accused of 'separatist activities'; PKK suspects numbered I,790, the largest group. See Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey, p. 68. 23 Imset, The PKK, p. 3 I.

24 In fact the law banned any language other than the first official languages of countries recognized by the Turkish Republic. In reality, the aim of the law was to proscribe the Kurdish language.

25 David McDowall, The Kurds: a nation divided (London: Minority Rights Group, I992), p. I4.

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estimated to be some 500,000 Turkish Kurds in Western Europe, with over 400,000 of them in the Federal Republic of Germany and important communities in France (60,000) and Sweden (io,ooo).26 The military intervention, coming on top of the repression of previous generations, helped to create a large body of anti-Turkish opinion in the liberal states of Europe. It is the campaigns fostered by these communities and the emphasis placed by them on human rights violations in Turkey which have helped to complicate relations between the Turkish state and its European allies.27

The second and more major consequence of the coup d'etat and the pursuit by the Turkish government of a more confrontational set of policies was to re- entrench the polarization of politics which has for so long characterized the south-east of the country. Moderate, liberal Kurdish nationalism was unable to flourish. The choice for the Kurds of the south-east became ever more starkly one between the Turkish state, with its Kemalist ideology and hardline policies, and the strategy of violent opposition pursued by the PKK. The failure to establish a political middle ground for the Kurdish south-east was to be critical in the growth of support for the PKK from the late I98os onwards.

The political polarization of the south-east has in turn been exacerbated by the growing gulf in economic well-being in Turkey. It has always been true that the south-east has been one of the poorest parts of the country. Agriculture has been run on a semi-feudal basis; per capita incomes are among the lowest; social provisions are few. People living here do not have many avenues for economic improvement. This situation was aggravated in the I98os with the country's 'economic miracle': rapid economic growth and consequent prosperity benefited the big cities and the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, while economic development by-passed rural Anatolia, especially in the south- east. Only through migration could poor villagers gain access to such prosperity. For those who remained, the situation is grim. Per capita GDP in the south-east is less than half the national average. Unemployment is estimated to be twice the national average at around 25 per cent. Social development is also retarded. In the province of Mardin the literacy rate is only 48 per cent, compared to the national average of 77 per cent. Only 9 per cent of school children in the south-east complete secondary school, and only i8 per cent begin it.28 The absence of such economic benefits has left the Kurds of the south-east with little stake in the prosperity of the new Turkey.

The Turkish government has recognized the centrality of the economic issue to Kurdish unrest. The South-east Anatolian Project (GAP) is aimed at regenerating the economy of the south-east. Countless other plans for rapid economic transformation have also been unveiled. The GAP, however, is more 26 Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey, p. I03. 27 For instance, Germany decided to halt all arms transfers to Turkey in I992 when it became clear that

some of the armoured personnel carriers supplied by the Federal Republic had been used by the Turkish state in the south-east of the country. The German Defence Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, was later forced to resign on 3I March I993 when it was revealed that, due apparently to a bureaucratic error, a further iS Leopard-i tanks had been transferred to Turkey in effective defiance of the German parliament.

28 David McDowall, 'Comment', Turkey Briefing, 5: i, February I99I.

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likely to benefit the larger landowners and tribal chiefs; in any case it does not cover all the areas of greatest support for the insurgency,29 and will not be economically significant until towards the end of the decade. Periodic announcements of new investment plans leave those in the region numb, and are likely to be greeted with wariness until it is proved that both the political will and the strength of the Turkish economy necessary to disperse such substantial sums exist.

The apparent military successes of the armed forces in the wake of the I980 coup proved to be short-lived. In I984 the PKK relaunched its guerrilla campaign in the south-east of the country; from this moment onwards the Kurds of this region were to have their rallying point. Although the military had handed the reins of government in Ankara to an elected administration a year before, the military was to retain a grip on the making of policy towards the Kurds. The leader of the coup d'etat, General Kenan Evren, served as president of the republic until I989. Even after that, the National Security Council, which is chaired by the president and includes the armed forces chiefs, remained central to the making of policy on this subject.

Thus the military-inspired approach continued under a civilian adminstra- tion, and underlay two key policy developments towards the south-east in the late I980s. First, in I985 the ANAP (Anavalan Partisi, Motherland Party) government led by prime minister Turgut Ozal introduced a system of civilian militias to supplement gendarme operations.30 The intention was to organize those familiar with local conditions as auxiliaries to the armed forces in trying to confront the PKK. The creation of these groups would also serve the purpose of showing outsiders that the Kurds in the south-east were far from united in their opposition to the Turkish state. The Village Guard system soon became embroiled in the tribalism of the region. With the PKK using violence as an instrument of terror against members of the militia and their families, those attracted to membership of the Village Guard have often been clans who are traditionally loyal to the state.

Second, in I987, also under Turgut Ozal's premiership, the government introduced a state of emergency, to be extended every four months by a parliamentary vote, in ten provinces in the south-east of the country.3" The state of emergency, though falling short of martial law, effectively curbed the application of Turkey's emerging political liberalization process in the region. Extraordinary powers were vested in the hands of a governor responsible for the area. The range of powers at the disposal of the regional governor was radically extended in April I990 through the adoption of Kararname 4I3 (subsequently revised as Kararname 424). The main thrust of this package of measures was to increase the punitive effect of measures that could be applied

29 GAP covers the six provinces of Adlyaman, Diyarbaksr, Gaziantep, Mardin, ,anhurfa and Siirt, and therefore not such provinces as Hakkari, Van, Bitlis ,Srnak and Batman.

" For a detailed description of the establishment, composition and functioning of the Village Guard system see Imset, The Kurds, pp. I05-I7.

31 These provinces are: BiMgol, Diyarbaksr, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman and ,sirnak.

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to the region, and to restrict the flow of information by imposing increased restrictions on the media.32

Missed opportunities: I

The year I990 represented in two ways a watershed with regard to the breach between the Turkish state and the Kurdish south-east. First, there was a major quantitative increase in the level of violence in the south-east of the country, which grew even further over the following two years. This made it plain that the Kurdish issue was not just a minor local problem. Moreover, the level of violence and the growing unwillingness of Turks to serve in the south-east, whether as soldiers or as public servants, reinforced the difficulty of maintaining normality in the region.33 Second, there was also a qualitative change in the nature of Kurdish protest. There was evidence that recruitment to the PKK was increasing rapidly. Growing numbers of Kurds seemed willing to take to the streets in support of the PKK and to protest against the presence and policies of the Turkish state. This increased level of Kurdish public protest (which was to reach its peak during the Nevruz celebrations of 2I March I992) was first seen in early spring I990. Mass demonstrations, together with strikes and subsequent unrest, racked the frontier towns of Nusaybin and Cizre, with the disaffection spreading to the regional city of Diyarbakir. The protests were ominously labelled the beginning of a Kurdish intifada by members of the Kurdish nationalist movement.

With the level of violence growing and the people of the south-east increasingly showing public support for the PKK, the situation appeared poised on the edge of regional civil war. Against this background, the opposition Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) issued a report on the south-east in July I990. In this report the SHP recommended a number of measures that it envisaged would help build confidence between the state and the Kurdish population of the south-east. These included rescinding the ban on the Kurdish language, ending the state of emergency and abolishing the Village Guard system.34 With the SHP weakening as a political force in Turkey, it was left to Turgut Ozal, who had succeeded Evren as head of state, to give life to one of the key proposals. The cabinet, meeting under his chairmanship (and clearly at his instigation), decided to abolish the law 'restricting the use of languages other than Turkish Though the move was initially dismissed by notables from the south-east as a "'manceuvre politique" ',36 Ozal's action was to forge his image as a flexible politician, capable of looking for an imaginative and non-dogmatic 32 For an edited translation of Kararname 4I3 see Turkey Briefing, 4: 3, June I990. 33 For instance, Imset describes the reluctance of young Turkish conscripts (those from rural areas of

Anatolia whose families do not have the influential contacts necessary to ensure a posting elsewhere in Turkey) and members of the police to serve in the south-east: TDN, 4 September I992. The Turkish magazine Tetnpo carried a report on the desire of state employees to leave the south-east under the headline 'They Want to Escape from Hell'; see TDN, 8 September 1992.

34 For a commentary on the SHP report and its reception in Turkey, see Turkey Confidential, no. ii,

September I990, pp. I3-I5. 35 BBC/SWB/ME, 28 January I99I. For a discussion of the change in the law see Turkey Confidential,

no. i6, February I99I, pp. 8-I4. 36 Le Monde, 30 January I991.

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solution to the ills of the south-east. The move also arrested the spiral of increasingly confrontational action, which offered nothing but violence as a means to address the Kurdish issue.

The lifting of the language ban prefaced a degree of public discussion on the Kurdish question hitherto not seen in Turkey. The defeat of the ANAP government, led by Mesut Yllmaz, in the October I99I general election did not stifle this process; in fact, the election offered a precious window of opportunity for consideration of the Kurdish question. The ANAP government was replaced in November by a coalition led by Suileyman Demirel, which included the SHP as junior partner. Moreover, the SHP's Kurdish credentials had been strengthened by an electoral pact with the People's Labour Party (HEP),37 which had been prevented from contesting the elections in its own right. The HEP had seen 22 of its deputies returned, about a quarter of the SHP's parliamentary strength at that time. While Demirel was regarded by many Kurdish nationalists as 'a determined chauvinist on the Kurdish problem '38 he at first, rhetorically at least, committed himself to a flexible approach. He was prepared to go on record as saying that Turkey had 'realized the reality of its Kurdish population', a not inconsiderable statement in view of the state's past approach to such matters.39 At the same time, the deputy premier and head of the SHP, Professor Erdal Inonii, was urging that the 'Kurdish citizens' cultural identity must be recognized in full'."4

This promising beginning to the life of the coalition government was, however, a false dawn as far as the Kurds in Turkey were concerned. There were three reasons why this hopeful atmosphere did not yield a breakthrough, and indeed ended with recrimination and a return to hardline positions. The first was the inability of the coalition government to translate a positive political atmosphere into tangible action. The Kurdish south-east had become embittered and alienated after years of uncompromising state repression, poor state services and a backward economy; rhetorical change was deemed woefully inadequate in the absence of concomitant change on the major issues of substance. For example, in the March I992 vote to extend the state of emergency, the coalition government (with the SHP split) renewed the provisions.4" With the armed forces still exerting considerable influence on the Kurdish issue from behind the scenes, Demirel, who had already experienced two military interventions in civilian politics, was determined not to provoke the army into ousting him for a third time.

The second reason for this lost moment of opportunity was the political immaturity of some of the leading Kurdish nationalist politicians. Rather than nurturing the transformation in the political atmosphere in Turkey in I99I, a

37 The HEP was founded in I990 by a group of nationalist Kurdish deputies, seven of whom had been expelled from the SHP for attending a conference on 'the Kurdish national identity and human rights' in Paris in October I989. For a commentary on the conference see Turkey Confidential, no. 3, November I989, pp. 2-3.

38 Kemal Burkay, leader of the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (TKSP), FBIS, I7 September I99I. 39 BBC/SWB/ME, ii December I99I. 40 FBIS, I7 December I99I. 41 TDN, i8 March I992.

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handful of HEP members seemed determined to give offence to the symbols of the Turkish state at every opportunity. For example, during the inauguration of the new Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 6 November i99i, HEP deputies Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle added separatist sentiments to their oath-taking.42 Their actions antagonized their opponents and embarrassed their potential friends,43 thereby setting back rather than advancing their cause.

The third and most serious reason for failure was the actions of hardliners on both sides. The PKK insurgency had continued unabated during the public debate in Turkey on the Kurdish issue. This was hardly surprising as the attempt to re-establish the political middle ground was effectively aimed at marginal- izing the organization and its methods. The Turkish right (and, one may reasonably assume, a significant body of the armed forces) was also alarmed at recent developments. They regarded the recognition of the Kurdish reality and the expression of Kurdish cultural rights as the thin end of a secessionist wedge; as the first step in a strategy of stages. Cultural rights would inexorably lead to demands for political rights, then leading to federation, statehood and eventually union with adjacent Kurdish lands. The creation of a united Kurdish state, as it was envisaged at S'evres, would inevitably reduce the power of the Turkish nation.

Matters came to a head during Nevruz on 2I March I992.44 According to a Turkish Human Rights Foundation report into the affair, 92 died and 34I were wounded over the holiday period. Just two members of the security services were killed, indicating the one-sided nature of the violence.45 Violence, according to the report, took place only where the security forces intervened to stop the celebrations. Though the overall situation had been deteriorating prior to Nevruz, with the emergence since the advent of the coalition of an assassination campaign by shadowy Islamist death squads,46 for the Kurds it was a decisive event. As a result of the Nevruz disaster, I4 of the remaining 20 HEP members of the SHP parliamentary delegation resigned. The emerging relationship between moderate Kurdish nationalism and liberal Turkish thinking had broken down. The Turkish government, with Demirel in the driving seat, proceeded to abandon policy towards the south-east to the military. The Kurdish issue in the south-east was once again reduced to the level of a domestic security problem. 42 Turkey Briefing, 5: 6, December I99I. For an English translation of the oath, which is enshrined in the

constitution and commits the deputies to preserve the 'indivisible integrity of the country and nation', see Newspot, 7 November I99I.

43 The oath-taking furore was a 'grave embarrassment' to SHP leader Erdal Inonu, and also to Suleyman Demirel, who was getting ready to team up with Inoniu. See Turkey Confidential, no. 24, December, I99I, p. 8.

44 Nevruz is celebrated by the Kurds as a time of resistance against tyranny. It marks the probably mythical story of an ironsmith who led an uprising against a tyrannical ruler.

45 TDN, 9 July I992. 46 The death squads were popularly identified as being run by the Hezbollah-contras, Islamists who were

violently opposed to the nationalist creed which was gaining currency in the south-east. There were recurring suspicions that the death squads were in some way connected to elements in the Turkish state, the absence of successful arrests and prosecutions tending to reinforce such an impression. By November I992 senior HEP officials estimated that 27 party officials, ii journalists and over IOO Kurdish activists had died in this dirty war. See The Independent, 23 November I992.

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Missed opportunities: II

The second missed opportunity was the unilateral ceasefire formally declared by the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, on I7 March I993.47 The declaration came after the bloodiest year in the PKK insurgency.48 It also followed a concerted attempt by the Turkish state to deprive the PKK of its main base of operations in northern Iraq. This took two forms: a military campaign in northern Iraq in October and November;49 and an open alliance with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to ensure that the PKK could not operate so freely in the future. Both these operations were deemed a profound success on the side of the Turkish state. They were reinforced by what appeared to be a greater willingness on the part of Syria to curtail the activities of the PKK in Lebanon, where its training had hitherto been carried out.50

These three successes led to a major misconception in some quarters, namely that the PKK was defeated and virtually unable to operate. The military campaign in northern Iraq had indeed been a military success. After initially attempting to resist, the PKK guerillas had withdrawn from the border areas in some disarray. They had been pushed either into Syria or deep into the south- eastern part of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the numbers of casualties sustained by the PKK were fiercely contested.51 Against such a backdrop, a view was fostered in some Turkish military circles that the PKK was on the verge of collapse. Intelligence sources predicted that the strong centralized discipline was weakening, leading to the fragmention of the organization. There was a strand of thought in the military that the spring should be used to capitalize on the existing victories and crush the PKK completely. Those who took this line immediately interpreted Ocalan's ceasefire declaration as a sign of weakness. The PKK was regarded as being desperate to stave off hostilities in order to rebuild its communications and its morale.52 Underlying this view was a widely held assumption that the Kurdish problem for Turkey was in essence that of an

47 For a report on the announcement see Turkish Probe, 2: I9, 23 March I993. 48 As with earlier years, estimates differ on the number of casualties resulting from the insurgency and

political violence in Turkey in general. The overall trend in I992, however, is clear enough. The state of emergency governor, Unal Erkan, estimated that there were 4,132 deaths resulting from terrorism in I992 (almost certainly an exaggeration, due to the inclusion of 2,000 members of the PKK estimated to have been killed in the operation in Northern Iraq): BBC/SWB/ME, 5 January I993.

The Turkish Human Rights Foundation estimates that 2,933 people were killed in the 'general atmosphere of political violence' in Turkey, the vast majority of the deaths being related to the insurgency: TDN, 25 February I993.

49 The Iraqi Kurds announced that they had launched an operation to expel the PKK on 5 October: TDN, 6 October I992. The Turkish military began a combined air and land operation in northern Iraq on I2 October; the army general staff announced that it was over on 27 November: TDN, 28 November I992.

50 Syria appeared at the very least to lower the profile of the PKK following the visit to Damascus by the then Turkish Minister of the Interior, Ismet Sezgin, in April I992. For details of the security agreement signed during his visit see TDN, 25 April I992.

51 The Turkish Chief of Staff, General Dogan Giires, put the number of PKK operatives killed in the operations at I,056, with over i,ooo injured: TDN, I9 November I992. Other reports put PKK casualties as high as 4,500, with nearly 2,000 dead. Kurdish sources put the figure for those killed at between I5o and 200: TDN, 28 November I992.

52 Sezgin appeared to adopt such a view when he greeted news of Ocalan's ceasefire by calling it 'an intelligent move ... he has no other course', BBC/SWB/ME, i8 March I993.

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estranged minority operating beyond the frontier under the patronage of Turkey's hostile Middle Eastern neighbours. There was, therefore, a consistent failure to recognize the extent of the strength of the PKK inside Turkey's borders.

More generally, the PKK ceasefire was met with great relief.53 There was considerable joy throughout the country at the thought that the conflict in the south-east might be at an end. The ceasefire was a unilateral declaration made as a 'gesture of goodwill'. It was to run from 20 March through to I5 April, with the benefits immediately being garnered through a more or less peaceful Nevruz. The only condition of the ceasefire was that it would hold 'as long as Turkish troops don't advance on us and as long as we are not forced into a very crucial state of self-defense'.5 Ocalan subsequently extended the ceasefire indefinitely, as it was only towards the end of the initial period that Turks in general began to trust its durability.

It was at this point that the ceasefire became the victim of fate. The sudden death of President Ozal on I7 April delivered a threefold blow to the constructive atmosphere engendered by the ceasefire. First, there was the fact that, as we have already seen, Ozal was regarded among Kurdish nationalists as the best of the leading Turkish politicians (a perception that glossed over his introduction of the Village Guard system and the state of emergency). This image had been further bolstered when in March i99I Ozal broke with the long-standing Turkish government policy of not dealing with any Kurdish group when he met Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talebani.55 Second, there was evidence that Ozal was already on the point of initiating a positive political response to the ceasefire.56 Third, the death of Ozal left a vacuum in the Turkish political system, which was exacerbated when Demirel let it be known that he would seek the presidency, thereby precipitating a contest for the premiership.

From I7 April through to I3 June Turkish political life was in abeyance as first the presidency and then the premiership were filled. The existence of the ceasefire was treated with complacency. Before the process of choosing new leaders was complete the PKK declared that the ceasefire was over and was to be replaced by all-out war. Ocalan put forward two reasons for his return to arms: the absence of any political gestures, such as allowing Kurdish language radio and television broadcasts; and the fact that military action had been resumed by the government. The former criticism was to an extent justified: the only exceptions had been the suspension of a spring offensive and an offer to extend an amnesty to PKK operatives (which was aimed more at weakening the organization than at addressing the Kurdish issue). However, the expectation of such gestures at a time of policy drift was plainly unrealistic. The latter criticism had more substance to it; yet while Turkish military operations

53 For instance, Mehmet Ali Birand in his column in Sabah, I5 March I993, wrote of how news of the ceasefire had inspired hope in Turkey (repr. in TDN, i6 March I993).

54 TDN, i8 March I993. 55 Middle East International, no. 396, 22 March I99I. 56 Certainly Ocalan has claimed that Ozal was working towards a political solution to the Kurdish

problem at the time of his death. See interview with Ozgiir Giindem summarized in Turkish Probe 3: 4I, 3 I August I993.

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continued in the south-east throughout the ceasefire period,57 they did not appear to pose a decisive threat.58

The ceasefire was in reality dead well before Ocalan's announcement rescinding it. The decisive blow was a PKK attack at Bingol which resulted in the death of 35 unarmed soldiers and precipitated a strong Turkish response. The perpetrator of the Bingol attack was a PKK unit under the overall leadership of a regional commander, ,emdin Sakik, known for his hardline approach. Sakik was presumably acting to undermine the ceasefire ;59 Ocalan made it clear that he had not authorized such an attack,60 but when faced with the dilemma of disowning his lieutenant (and thereby possibly splitting the PKK) or disowning the ceasefire, Ocalan chose the latter.

The Kurdish question as a foreign policy issue

The spatial distribution of the Kurds, spanning as they do at least five states in the area, means that the Kurdish issue is not an exclusively domestic one for Turkey. The presence of significant Kurdish populations in Iraq, Syria and Iran has meant that since the early years of the contemporary state system in the Middle East, the Kurds have been a factor, and periodically a significant factor, in the interstate relations of the region. For Turkey this has complicated the Kurdish issue. At times when the Kurds have been used by Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours to weaken it, the Kurdish issue has blighted bilateral relations; at other times, the Kurdish issue has given Turkey and its neighbours, especially Iraq and Iran, a shared interest when they have had little else in common.

The extraterritoriality of the Kurdish issue means that Turkey is not able exclusively to determine the policy context in the south-east. Ankara has to take into account developments regarding the Kurdish issue in neighbouring states. For example, the uprising among Iran's Kurds in January and February I979 in the wake of the fall of the Shah helped raise Kurdish expectations in Turkey, as well as adding to instability on the border. Ankara also has to take into account the policies being implemented by neighbouring governments towards their Kurdish populations. For instance, the improved conditions won by the Kurds in Iraq following the I958 revolution helped to give Kurdish sentiment a new momentum in Turkey.6" Even more importantly, the policies of the Baghdad regime towards its Kurdish population since I974 (though un- doubtedly brutal in other ways) created a precedent that has been invoked by the Kurdish opposition in the Turkish case. Prior to i99i the Iraqi Kurds enjoyed certain political and cultural rights not available to the Kurds of Turkey, including the formal trappings of political autonomy, and language and cultural rights.62 5 Kurdish sources claim that between I7 March and 24 May more than I30 PKK fighters were killed

by the Turkish army. See Kurdistan Focus, 2: 7, July I993, p. I. 58 Turkish Probe, 3: 30, I5 June I993. 59 Turkish Probe, 3: 29, 8 June I993. 60 Turkey Briefing, 7: 2, Summer I993. 61 Yapp, "The mice will play", p. io6. 62 For a description of the general provisions of the I974 Autonomy Law see McDowall, The Kurds,

p. 22.

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The Kurdish issue in Turkish-Iraqi relations goes back to the foundation of the respective modern states, and is bound up with the issue of their demographic composition. When the Turkish Republic was established, it made a virtue of consolidation, eschewing irredentist claims over the former provinces of the Ottoman empire. There was, however, one territory which Turkey claimed but which was denied it: the vilayet of Mosul.63 The Turkish government considered that Mosul should be included in the Turkish state because it was an area inhabited by Kurds and Turcomans. Indeed, concerns were expressed that it would be harder to assimilate Turkey's Kurdish population if the approximately 500,000 Kurds of northern Iraq were not also incorporated into the state.64 Ultimately, however, Ankara was obliged, in exchange for British support for the international recognition of Turkey, to relinquish its claim to Mosul. The legacy of this early period of Kemalism was to give legitimacy to a claim to Mosul. The key issue over Mosul today is not so much whether Turkey itself harbours irredentist designs over the province (such an ambition may have died with President Ozal), but more that Turkey's neighbours suspect and fear that Ankara's ambitions are still alive.

Cooperation over the Kurdish issue

Once the Mosul question was put to one side, Turkey and Iraq experienced a period of some 6o years of cooperation over the Kurdish issue. For instance, both Turkey and Iraq were signatories of the Saadabad Pact.65 This treaty prescribed 'a policy of complete abstention from any interference in each other's internal affairs'; 'the inviolability of their common frontiers'; and a willingness 'to consult together in all international disputes affecting their common interests'.66 Such principles were clearly aimed at limiting the potential impact of the Kurdish issue.67 Nearly two decades later the Baghdad Pact, which also included Turkey and Iraq among its members, had similar aims.68 The foundation for this long-standing mutual interest in bilateral ties between Ankara and Baghdad was the profile of the Kurdish issue in both states. As in Turkey, the Kurdish population in Iraq is significantly large as a proportion of the total, some 4 million Kurds representing around 20 per cent of the population; and here too a significant proportion of the country's Kurdish population lives in a discrete area, adjacent to the Turkish-Iraqi border. 63 Turkey was also initially deprived of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which it also claimed; Turkish

sovereignty was extended to include this as the province of Hatay in I939. 64 Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey (London: Benn, I974), p. I30. 65 For a detailed discussion of the Turkish view of the Pact together with a text of the Pact see Retd

Amb. Ismail Soysal, 'I937 Saadabad Pact', in Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations-Annual 3 (Istanbul: Foundation for Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, i988), pp. I3I-57.

66 For the full text of the treaty of non-aggression involving Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey signed at Tehran on 8 July I937 see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXC (Geneva, I938), pp. 21-7.

67 Michael M. Gunter, 'Transnational sources of support for the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey', unpublished paper presented to 25th annual meeting of Middle East Studies Association of North America, 24 November I99I, p. 3.

68 For the full text of the pact of mutual co-operation between His Majesty the King of Iraq and the President of the Republic of Turkey, 24 February I955, see Treaty Series no. 39, Cmd 9859 (London: HMSO, I956).

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There has long existed a common perception on the part of both governments that the loyalty of their respective Kurdish populations is dubious, and that the Kurds are easily manipulated by foreign powers to the detriment of the centre.

This convergence of interest between the two states continued under Ba'thist Iraq, confirming that the approach to the Kurdish issue had the potential to transcend changes in both regime and ideology in Iraq. Cooperation focused on the issue of border penetration. For instance, in April I979 the head of the Turkish armed forces, General Kenan Evren, travelled to Baghdad to coordinate the two countries' Kurdish policy in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Kurdish rebellion in Iran. As a result, the two governments concluded an agreement on the suppression of Kurdish separatism in the border regions between the two countries and Iran.69 The growing importance of the Iraqi border in relation to the strengthening insurgency in Turkey was seen in the mid-ig8os, as the Iraqi and Turkish governments struck a security accord in October I984 giving both states the right of hot pursuit.70 With Iraq embroiled in a war with Iran, it was unable to police the entire territory of the state. Indeed, Baghdad was obliged to cede effective control over large parts of northern Iraq in order to consolidate its resources in the more strategically critical areas of the country. This left a vacuum on the Turkish border, representing a more limited forerunner of the situation which would prevail after March I99I. Turkey was periodically to make use of this right of hot pursuit by launching bombing raids into northern Iraq during the second half of the Iran-Iraq war.

The convergence of interest between Iraq and Turkey with regard to their Kurdish populations was strengthened by the links forged between the respective dissident Kurdish groups. By I98I the PKK had decided to seek closer relations with the Iraqi Kurds. This strategy bore fruit in I983 in the form of a protocol of solidarity, when the PKK concluded an alliance with the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party), whose stronghold lay in the region adjacent to the Turkish border. During the mid-ig8os the PKK was to use northern Iraq extensively as a springboard for its attacks into Turkey, and as a base from which to strengthen the organization. Three years later, however, Turkey's cross-border bombing raids had proved successful in helping to persuade the KDP to re-evaluate the wisdom of such an alignment.7" The frequent reluctance or inability of the Turkish armed forces to distinguish between PKK and KDP bases in northern Iraq speeded up the revision of this strategy. In August I987 the KDP announced that it had severed relations with the PKK.72

The mutuality of interest between Ankara and Baghdad with regard to their respective Kurdish problems did not always lead to agreement on tactics. In

69 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958 (London: I. B. Tauris, I990), p. I90. 70 See 'Iraq' in Itamar Rabinovitch and Haim Shaked, eds, Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. 9:

1984/85 (Boulder, CO, Oxford: Westview, I987), p. 47I. 71 Among other reasons, Michael Gunter speculates that the break may have been in part to do with

reports that the PKK was giving the Iraqi military information on the location of KDP camps. See 'Transnational sources of support for the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey', p. 8.

72 Imset, The PKK, p. I86.

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I984 the Iraqi government responded to its worsening relations with the KDP by opening negotiations with the latter's major rival in the Kurdish nationalist camp in Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two sides appeared to be very close to an agreement when the Turkish foreign minister, Vahit Halefoglu, flew to Baghdad in October of that year. When the talks broke down soon after (whereupon the PUK sought a rapprochement with the KDP), suspicion was widespread that Turkey had pressurized Iraq into curtailing such contacts, fearing that Baghdad might have been contemplating further concessions to its Kurds.7"

Conflict over the Kurdish issue

The close relationship which had been forged between Ankara and Baghdad over the Kurdish issue began to unravel after the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war in August I988. This in part reflected the fact that the prosecution of the war with Iran had eclipsed all other policy issues in Iraq. Relations with Turkey had been reduced to the level of trade, which had grown in importance during the eight years of war, and the assistance that Turkey could give in pressurizing the Iraqi Kurds, who had themselves cooperated extensively with Iran during the war. Once the war had ended, the bilateral relationship became more diverse, and issues of potential friction once again came to the fore. Chief among these for Baghdad was Turkey's water policy. Having largely ignored Turkey's steady damming of the waters of the Euphrates during the period of the war, Iraq now became much more critical of Ankara's action, which threatened both the volume and quality of the flow to Iraq as the third riparian state.74

It took even less time for Turkey to become disenchanted with its relationship with Iraq. After the ceasefire, the Iraqi government sought to re- impose the authority of the state in the Kurdish area of the north which it had been obliged to abandon during the war. In so doing, the Iraqi military was used extensively and with great ferocity.75 The onslaught resulted in a sudden influx of ioo,ooo Iraqi Kurds into Turkey, which Premier Ozal decided to admit as a humanitarian gesture--principally to impress the EC. The Turkish authorities were alarmed at such a development because of the burden it placed upon them, especially as some 30,000-40,000 of the refugees ended up as long- term residents of Turkey.76 More importantly, the Turkish government was concerned at the effect that the Iraqi Kurds, who in Iraq had enjoyed cultural rights denied to Turkey's Kurds, might have on the latter.

It was, however, the aftermath of the war to terminate Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in January and February I99I which led to the breach between the two governments over the Kurdish issue. The crushing of the Kurdish uprising in 73 For the PUK version of events see McDowall, The Kurds, p. 25. 74 For instance, Iraq protested strongly in collaboration with Syria in January I990 as Turkey greatly

reduced the flow of the river for one month as it partially filled the reservoir behind the Atatuirk Dam. For a general discussion of water politics involving the three riparian states see Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: RIIA/Pinter, I99I), pp. 87-99.

75 See Middle East International, no. 333, 9 September I988. 76 Turkey Confidential, no. i8, April I99I, p. i6.

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northern Iraq in March and April I99I by the Iraqi military precipitated a massive flight of refugees. It proved to be a replay of the events of autumn I988, but on a much larger scale. This time some 700,000 refugees headed for the Turkish-Iraqi border.77 In the light of its experience during the previous refugee crisis, and in view of the larger numbers involved, President Ozal was much less happy about admitting those who had taken flight. To placate Western public opinion and to help Turkey, the Gulf War coalition formulated a policy of safe havens. Iraqi Kurds were to be encouraged to remain on the land in return for being given guarantees of safety by the coalition partners.78

Though relieved to have been spared the long-term implications of such a refugee crisis, Turkish policy was presented with a contradiction which it is still attempting to resolve. In order to stem the flow of refugees the international community was obliged to limit the authority of the Iraqi state so that Baghdad would be unable to project its military power against its Kurds. By participating in this programme, however, Turkey had helped to create a political vacuum in northern Iraq which could be filled only by the Iraqi Kurds themselves. Sure enough, the Iraqi Kurds subsequently held elections in May I992, leading to the establishment of a Kurdish assembly, an executive authority and ultimately to a parliamentary vote for a federated state.79 Thus was created the embryo of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. It could not fail to give a fillip to Kurdish nationalism, and an additional incentive to the PKK and other Kurdish groups in Turkey. Moreover, the loss of strong state authority over northern Iraq, combined with the Iraqi Kurds' ambivalence towards the political aspirations of the Kurds of Turkey, meant that the PKK was to find it easier than ever before to operate from northern Iraq for the next year and a half.

Though Turkey's position had clearly deteriorated with respect to the Kurdish issue, Ankara still enjoyed a double veto over this embryonic Kurdish state. First, the continued existence of the deterrent to the projection of Iraqi power into the Kurdish north lay almost exclusively in Turkey's hands. The deterrent force, operating under the codename Provide Comfort 2 (or, as the Turks habitually refer to it, Poised Hammer), consisted of an air contingent based in south-east Turkey.80 The mandate for the deterrent force has to be renewed every six months by the TGNA. Its continuation therefore lies entirely within Turkey's gift. Second, Turkey controls supplies into the safe haven. The state of Iraq as a whole continues to be subject to the terms of the UN Security Council economic embargo. Since early I992 the Iraqi state has imposed a strict economic embargo against the Kurdish north, whose primary lines of communication and supply therefore lie through Turkey. With the indigenous economy having all but collapsed under the weight of the embargo, the Kurdish north is heavily dependent on Turkey. Both the main Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talebani of the KDP and PUK respectively,

77 Estimate given by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on a visit to London, 23 April I99I.

78 The safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan spans some I70,000 square miles. 79 TDN, 6 October I992.

80 The force has settled down at 5i warplanes, 8 helicopters and I,77I staff: TDN, 29 June I992.

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have been obliged to court the Turkish government. The Turkish authorities were in turn better placed to extract political concessions from the Iraqi Kurds, such as cooperation in the military campaign against the PKK in October and November I992, as their price for keeping such routes open. The extent of this economic dependency became clear in May I993, when the Iraqi government suddenly withdrew the 25 dinar note from circulation. The Iraqi Kurds, whose economy was hit especially hard by this move, felt obliged to appeal to Turkey to introduce the lira as a currency of exchange in the safe haven.8"

If Turkey has succeeded in gaining control over the fortunes of the Kurds inside Iraq, it has, in conjunction with Syria and Iran, also stabilized the external dimension of the future of northern Iraq. Iran, as well as Turkey, had been concerned at the growing independence of the Iraqi Kurds for fear of the effect on its own Kurdish minority. Syria and Iran were also concerned at the possible breakup of the Iraqi state in the event of a complete collapse of central authority. Both suspected Turkey of having designs of finally completing the incorporation of the old vilayet of Mosul. All three states were in turn alarmed at the potential regional turmoil that could result from a rush to divide Iraq. To ensure regular consultations on the future of Iraq and to regulate tensions among them, the three regional powers introduced periodic, formal meetings at foreign minister level to discuss such matters. In the first such meeting in Ankara in November I992 the summit officially rejected the idea of either the division of Iraq or a Kurdish state.82 As far as Kurdish nationalist aspirations were concerned, the meetings had an echo of the past: according to two Iraqi Kurdish leaders, the meeting was a reminder of the old northern tier treaties like the Saadabad Pact and the Baghdad Pact which were aimed at containing the Kurds.83

Conclusion

The Kurdish issue has remained a major preoccupation of the Turkish state throughout the 70 years of its existence. It presents an existential challenge to the identity, composition and territorial integrity of the state. It also looms large in foreign policy-making, having been a critical variable in Turkey's relations with its immediate Middle Eastern neighbours, particularly Iraq. Over the past four years the importance of the Kurdish issue for Turkey has reached an unprecedented intensity in both domestic and foreign affairs. Moreover, the Kurdish issue in one domain has an immediate and direct effect on the other. Post-Cold War developments, from the containment of Iraq to the disaggregation of states, have become of even more pressing concern for Turkey. There seems every possibility that the Kurdish issue will remain the dominant domestic question in Turkey for some time to come. The existence of the safe haven in northern Iraq will maintain the uneasy limbo which prevails at present. 81 For a discussion of the Turkish response to the notion of a lira zone within Iraq see Turkish Probe, 3:

28, 25 May I993. 82 Turkish Probe, no. I, I7 November I992. 83 The Independent, I4 November I992.

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In the I99OS Turkey has become an increasingly valued ally for the Atlanticist-minded members of the West. Examination of the Kurdish issue suggests that the conception of Turkey as an island of stability in the midst of a tempest is a flawed oversimplification. It is precisely because of Turkey's enhanced importance that the critical impact of the Kurdish issue should be both recognized and addressed, and concerted attempts made to find a sustainable political and economic formula capable of ending the alienation of Turkey's Kurdish south-east.

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