the pico-ficino controversy: new evidence in ficino’s … · the pico-ficino controversy ~ 303 ~...

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Maude Vanhaelen

THE PICO-FICINO CONTROVERSY: NEW EVIDENCE IN FICINO’S COMMENTARY

ON PLATO’S PARMENIDES *

1. IntroductIon

Twenty years ago Michael Allen wrote two fundamental articles on Marsilio Ficino’s Parmenides Commentary.1 In his Ficino’s Theory of the Five Substances Allen showed that Ficino’s exegesis was heavily indebted to Proclus’ views on the Parmenides, whether those in the Commentary or in the Platonic Theology. Ficino knew Proclus’ commentary both in the original Greek and in the medi-eval Latin translation of William of Moerbeke, the last section of which is not preserved in the original.2 In addition, autograph marginalia in Riccardianus 70

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Renais-sance Society of America, San Francisco, March 2006. I wish to thank the organisers Christo-pher Celenza and Valery Rees. I would also like to thank Prof. Michael Allen for his sugges-tions and comments. This research was conducted during a post-doctoral Fellowship under Mr. Nigel Wilson at the University of Oxford funded by the Wiener-Anspach Foundation. I wish to thank both institutions for their generous support. I am also grateful to Prof. James Hankins for his support and encouragements.

1 M. J. B. Allen, Ficino’s Theory of the Five Substances and the Neoplatonists’ Parme-nides, «Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies», XII, 1982, pp. 19-44 (reprinted in Plato’s Third Eye. Studies in Marsilio Ficino’s Metaphysics and Its Sources, Aldershot 1995); Id., The Second Ficino-Pico Controversy, in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Studi e do-cumenti, a cura di G. C. GarGaGnInI, 2 vols., Firenze 1986, II, pp. 418-455 (reprinted in Pla-to’s Third Eye, cit., n. X).

2 Proclus’ commentary is only preserved until the end of the first hypothesis (141e 10-142a 8), the final section of which has only come down to us in the Latin translation estab-lished by the Dominican William of Moerbeke (c. 1215-c. 1286): see ProclI Commentarium in Parmenidem, pars ultima adhuc inedita, ed. by R. KlIbansKy and L. labowsKI, London 1953 (19732). The full text has since been edited in Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Pla-ton, traduction de G. de MoerbeKe, éd. par C. Steel, 2 vols., Louvain-Leiden 1982-85. Fici-no used Moerbeke’s translation, at least for the final section, perhaps in Pier Leone da Spo-leto’s copy, Vaticanus lat. 11600 (cf. F. BacchellI, Giovanni Pico e Pier Leone da Spoleto. Tra filosofia dell’amore e tradizione cabalistica, Firenze 2001, p. 9, n° 29). Ficino almost certainly used the Greek version of Proclus’ Parmenides Commentary (pace Steel and Segonds). His ex-emplar, which might have been a copy of Laurentianus Pluteus 85.8 (copied by John Rhosos in 1489 at the request of Lorenzo de’ Medici) has not been identified. For the Greek text,

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indicate that Ficino extensively read and annotated Proclus’ Platonic Theology, probably as early as 1463.3 As Allen has pointed out, Ficino was familiar enough with both texts to work back and forth between them. And indeed, as we shall presently see, the structure of Ficino’s Parmenides commentary follows very close-ly that of Proclus’ own commentary, but also paraphrases some key chapters of the Platonic Theology.

In his article The Second Pico-Ficino Controversy, Allen also considered Fi-cino’s Parmenides in the context of the controversy that took place in the 1490s between Ficino and his younger colleague Pico della Mirandola on the nature of the First Principle. This controversy partly arose when Pico wrote a treatise enti-tled On Being and the One (De Ente et Uno), in which he criticised the Neopla-tonic exegesis of Plato’s Parmenides. Given that Ficino’s commentary was closely following the Neoplatonic tradition, Pico’s treatise was in fact directly attacking the nature of Ficino’s project of renovatio.

Ficino’s response to Pico’s De Ente et Uno, as formulated in his Parme-nides commentary, still awaits detailed analysis.4 In this work Ficino only men-

I use ProclI In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, 3 vols., ed. by C. steel, Oxford 2007-2009 (hereafter Proclus, In Parmenidem), and Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, translation by G. R. Morrow and J. M. DIllon, Princeton 1987. Secondary literature on the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Parmenides includes E. R. Dodds, The Parmenides of Pla-to and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One, «Classical Quarterly», XXII, 1928, pp. 129-142; J. M. Charrue, Plotin, lecteur de Platon, Paris 1978, pp. 43-115; H. D. Saffrey - L. G. Wester-InK, Introduction to Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, texte établi et traduit par H. D. Saf-frey and L. G. WesterInK, I, Paris 1968, pp. lxxV-lxxxIx; H. D. Saffrey, Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin, Paris 1990, and Id., Le néoplatonisme après Plotin, Paris 2000; and Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du colloque international en l’honneur de H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink (Leuven, 13-16 mai 1998), éd. par A.-Ph. SeGonds et C. Steel, Leuven-Paris 2000.

3 H. D. Saffrey, Notes platoniciennes de Marsile Ficin dans un manuscrit de Proclus, cod. Riccardianus 70, «Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et de Renaissance», XXI, 1959, pp. 161-184; Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, stampe e documenti, Catalogo a cura di S. GentIle, Firenze 1984, pp. 35-37, n° 26, argues that Ficino read and annotated Ricc. 70 before 1463. Ficino also knew Balbi’s translation (1461-1462), as shown in a letter to Martin Prenninger in 1489 (MarsIlII fIcInI florentInI … Opera & quæ hactenus extitere & quæ in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia … in duos tomos digesta … una cum gnomologia …, Basileæ, Henricpetri, 1576, en réimpression numérique, suivie et préfacée par S. toussaInt, Paris 2000, p. 899; hereafter Op.), where Ficino lists the works of Proclus available in Latin: «Leguntur etiam utcumque traducta Elementa theologiae Proculi atque ipsius Theologia et liber de providentia simul atque fato». See H. D. Saffrey, Pietro Balbi et la première traduc-tion latine de Proclus, in Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata, éd. par P. cocKshaw et al., Gand 1980, pp. 425-437 (reprinted in Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance, Paris 1987, pp. 189-201).

4 On Ficino’s exegesis of the Parmenides, see R. KlIbansKy, Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, «Medieval and Renaissance Studies», I, 1943, pp. 281-330: 316-325 (reprinted in The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages, London 1981); W. BeIerwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zum Neuplatonismus und dessen Wirkungs-geschichte, Frankfurt 1985 (Pensare l’Uno, trad. it. di M. L. GattI, intr. di G. Reale, Milano

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tions Pico once by name, in a passage that puns on Pico’s surname, Mirandola. At the end of the 49th Chapter, Ficino wishes that «this wonderful young man (mirandus ille, i.e. Mirandule) had had the opportunity to consider diligently the above disagreements and discussions before he had opposed his teacher (i.e. Fi-cino himself) with so much confidence and publicly held without fear, against the opinion of all Platonists, that the divine Parmenides is merely a work of log-ic and that Plato, as well as Aristotle, had identified the One and the Good with Being».5 This passage has generally been considered as a parenthesis, or a lat-er addition buried in the rest of the commentary.6 A close examination of the structure of the commentary indicates, however, that this passage in fact consti-tutes a conclusion to a long and elaborate series of seven «discourses on the su-periority of the One over Being», where Ficino effectively refutes Pico’s thesis. This shows that Ficino structured, at least in some part, his Commentary to re-spond to Pico’s attacks.

In this paper I will compare the arguments presented in these discourses with those developed in Pico’s De Ente et Uno. I will demonstrate that Ficino’s dis-courses constitute a point-by-point rebuttal of Pico’s thesis. Similarly I will argue that the way in which Ficino works back and forth between Proclus’ Commen-tary and Platonic Theology is significant in the context of this controversy. As we shall see, both Pico and Ficino reuse ancient Neoplatonism to defend their own thesis. Thus Ficino carefully selects from Proclus’ Parmenides Commentary and Platonic Theology the doctrines, arguments and counter-arguments that enable

1992, part. pp. 192-196 – «L’Uno parmenideo nel Rinascimento»); Id., Plotino e Ficino. L’au-torelazione del Pensiero, «Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica», LXXXIV, 1992, pp. 293-324; Id., L’interpretazione ficiniana del Parmenide platonico, in Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradi-zione, Atti del III colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (Catania, 31 maggio-2 giugno 2001), a cura di M. BarbantI e F. RoMano, Catania 2002, pp. 389-410; S. ToussaInt, L’esprit du Quattrocento. Le De Ente et Uno de Pic de la Mirandole, Paris 1995, pp. 51-75 and 194-212; A. EtIenne, Marsile Ficin, lecteur et interprète du Parménide à la Re-naissance, in Images de Platon et lecture de ses oeuvres. Les interprétations de Platon à travers les siècles, éd. par A. neschKe-hentschKe et A. EtIenne, Louvain-Paris 1997, pp. 153-185; A. MalMsheIMer, Platons Parmenides und Marsilio Ficinos Parmenides Kommentar. Ein kriti-scher Vergleich, Amsterdam-Philadelphia 2001; F. LazzarIn, Note sull’interpretazione ficiniana del Parmenide di Platone, «Accademia», V, 2003, pp. 17-37; ead., L’Argumentum in Parmeni-dem di Marsilio Ficino, ivi, VI, 2004, pp. 7-34 (with a critical edition and Italian translation of Ficino’s argumentum in Parmenidem).

5 fIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 49 (= Op., p. 1164): «Vtinam mirandus ille iuvenis dispu-tationes discursionesque superiores diligenter consideravisset, antequam tam confidenter tan-geret praeceptorem ac tam secure contra Platonicorum omnium sententiam divulgaret et di-vinum Parmenidem simpliciter esse logicum et Platonem una cum Aristotele ipsum cum ente unum et bonum adaequavisse!». I use my edition of the text, which is based upon the editio princeps (MarsIlII fIcInI Commentaria in Platonem, Florentiae, per Laurentium Francici de Venetiis, 1496), in the copy preserved in the Bodleian Library of Oxford, Auct. Q 4.27. For the reader’s convenience, however, I shall refer to the pagination of the 1576 edition.

6 See, for instance, R. Marcel, Marsile Ficin (1433-1499), Paris 1958, p. 533.

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him to refute Pico. Similarly, Pico defends his thesis by refuting the theological interpretation of the Parmenides and the Sophist, two dialogues that constituted the cornerstone of Neoplatonic metaphysics.7 This is why the Pico-Ficino con-troversy apparently revives ancient debates, yet is concerned with issues that are specific to Quattrocento Florence.

2. PIco’s and fIcIno’s PosItIons

Ficino’s Parmenides Commentary was published in Florence in 1496.8 Pico’s De Ente et Uno was already completed and diffused by 1491, although it was only published in 1496, two years after Pico’s death.9 The issues raised in the De Ente et Uno were echoing criticisms formulated five years earlier by Pico in an-other treatise, the Commento sopra una Canzone d’Amore (1486), a commentary on Girolamo Benivieni’s love poem, where Pico challenged Ficino’s interpreta-tion of Plato’s Symposium. The criticisms contained in the Commento were de-liberately suppressed in the printed version by Pico’s contemporaries, and were rediscovered in modern times in three manuscripts, first by Eugenio Garin, then by Franco Bacchelli.10 These attacks, as well as the titles of the unrealised works Pico projected to write before his untimely death, provide substantial evidence that at the very onset of his career Pico intended to develop an ideological al-ternative to Ficino’s programme of renovatio.11

7 Pico read Proclus’ Platonic Theology in Bodleianus Laudianus graecus 18 (dated 1358) as testified by one of the colophons and Pico’s ex libris (cf. Saffrey-WesterInK, Introduction, cit., pp. cxI-cxVI). Pico also read and annotated Ficino’s copy of Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades, the manuscript Palatinus gr. 63 (cf. P. MeGna, Per Ficino e Proclo, in Lauren-tia laurus. Per Mario Martelli, a cura di F. BausI e V. Fera, Messina 2004, pp. 313-362: 325).

8 P. O. KrIsteller, Supplementum Ficinianum, I, Firenze 1937, pp. lxVIII, cxVII-cxxIII; Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, cit., pp. 155-156, n° 120; P. O. KrI-steller, Marsilio Ficino and His Work After Five Hundred Years, Firenze 1987, p. 119.

9 For the text, I use the edition of ToussaInt, L’esprit du Quattrocento, cit., pp. 134-189. 10 Garin discovered fragments in Riccardianus 2528 and Estensis V. I. 16 (cf. G. PIco

della MIrandola, De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno e scritti vari, a cura di E. GarIn, Firenze 1942, pp. 16-18), while BacchellI, Giovanni Pico e Pier Leone da Spoleto, cit., pp. 103-142, discovered in the 16th century-manuscript C M 328 of the Biblioteca Communale di Padova twenty new fragments of Pico’s Commento, in which Pico criticises Ficino’s interpre-tation of Plato’s Symposium. For an analysis of some of these fragments, see also S. Jayne, Pico. Commentary on a Canzone of Benivieni, New York-Bern-Frankfurt am Main 1984, pp. 21-43. Both Ficino and Pico draw on Plotinus’ two treatises on Beauty, Enneads, III, 5 (18) and V, 8 (13), as exemplified by Pico’s annotations to Ficino’s translation of both treatises preserved in Conv. Soppr. E, 1, 2, 562, dated 1486 (cf. S. GentIle, Pico e Ficino, in Pico, Poliziano e l’Uma-nesimo di fine Quattrocento [Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, 4 novembre - 31 dicembre 1994], a cura di P. VItI, Firenze 1994, pp. 127-47: 131-133, n° 44; pp. 137-141, n° 48-49).

11 See G. PIco della MIrandola, Commento, précédé de Les Formes de l’Invisible, éd. par S. ToussaInt, Lausanne 1989, pp. 54-55. Toussaint argues that the projected Poetic The-


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In his Commento Pico directly challenges Ficino’s Neoplatonic reading of Plato, and tries to establish a distinction between Plato’s definition of love and that of the Neoplatonists. Pico criticises, for instance, Ficino’s essentially Neopla-tonic definition of Beauty as the external manifestation of God’s instrinsic Good-ness.12 Pico adopts a similar stance in the De Ente et Uno: he distinguishes be-tween Plato’s Parmenides and its theological interpretation by the Neoplatonists. According to him, the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being results from the Neoplatonists’ misinterpretation of the Parmenides. In reality, Pico ar-gues, both Plato and Aristotle have called God One and Being.

In their interpretation of Plato’s Symposium and Parmenides, therefore, Fici-no and Pico both focus on two specific issues: the names of God and the ways in which the soul can achieve mystical union with God. In the context of the exegesis of the Symposium, the question concerns Love and Beauty – whether human love is the manifestation of the soul’s participation in the cosmic cycle of Love, as stated by Ficino, or simply the soul’s desire for earthly or heavenly beauty, as argued by Pico. In the context of the Parmenides and the theory of Ideas, the debate concerns the relationship between the Ideal models and the imperfect earthly beings – between the supreme One and the multiplicity of its creation, between unity, being, and intellect.

But the controversy between the two humanists also concerns the nature of the-ology: does theology solely consist in the prisca theologia transmitted by the ancient theologians (from Zoroaster and Hermes to Plato), as defended by Ficino, or does it also encompass the doctrine of Aristotle and his scholastic interpreters, as argued by Pico? As such, the Pico-Ficino controversy concerns the comparatio between Plato and Aristotle, which had already preoccupied the first successors of Plato,13

ology would have been the antithesis of Ficino’s Platonic Theology; the commentaries on the Symposium (of which the Commento was initially intended to be a prelude) and on St Paul’s raptus would have been the counterpart to Ficino’s de Amore and De Raptu Pauli.

12 PIco, Commento, II 3, ed. GarIn, p. 489: «[…] di che si conclude che il bello dal buo-no è distinto come una specie dal suo genere e non come cosa estrinseca da una intrinseca, come dice Marsilio». Cf. BacchellI, Giovanni Pico, cit., pp. 105 ff.

13 On the Plato-Aristotle comparatio in Antiquity, see P. Hadot, L’harmonie des philo-sophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Caté-gories, in Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente, Roma 1974, pp. 31-47; A.-J. FestuGIère, L’ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux V e/VI e siècles, «Museum Helveti-cum», XXVI, 1969, pp. 281-296; L. G. WesterInK, J. TrouIllard et A. Ph. SeGonGs, Pro-légomènes à la philosophie de Platon, Paris 1990, pp. xlIII-lVI; Aristotle Transformed. The An-cient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. by R. SorabjI, London 1990; I. Hadot, Aristote dans l’enseignement philosophique néoplatonicien. Les préfaces des commentaires sur les Catégo-ries, «Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie», CXXIV, 1992, pp. 407-425; P. hadot, La di-vision des parties de la philosophie dans l’Antiquité, «Museum Helveticum», XXXVI, 1979, pp. 201-223; F. RoMano, La défense de Platon contre Aristote par les néoplatoniciens, in Con-tre Platon, I: Le platonisme dévoilé, éd. par M. DIxsaut, Paris 1993, pp. 175-195; Ph. Hoff-Mann, L’arrière-plan néoplatonicien de l’École d’Athènes de Raphaël, in Antiquités imaginaires.

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as well as the Arabic (Al-Farabi),14 Byzantine (Bessarion and George of Trebi-zond) and Renaissance thinkers.15 Both Pico and Ficino defend a concord be-tween Plato and Aristotle: instead of opposing the two philosophies, they un-derline the agreement between the two. They differ, however, on the nature of the agreement between these two philosophers. Following the Neoplatonic tra-dition, Ficino considers that Aristotle has only managed to equal the wisdom of his master Plato up to a certain point, leaving the treatment of divine matters to Plato. In other words, Aristotle’s thought is only a complement to Platonism; his wisdom should be subsumed, therefore, under the sacred wisdom of the an-cient theologians. In contrast, Pico’s main purpose, as we shall see, is to develop a new form of concord, where Aristotle is seen as a philosopher per se, and his philosophy is placed at the same level as that of Plato. As clearly stated at the beginning of the De Ente et Uno Pico intends to «make a concordant philoso-phy of both Plato and Aristotle» («concordem utriusque facio philosophiam»).16 In his famous Conclusiones Pico also establishes that «there is no matter natural or divine in which Aristotle and Plato disagree in thought and in doctrine, even if they appear to disagree in their words» («Nullum est quaesitum naturale aut divinum in quo Aristoteles et Plato sensu et re non convenient, quamvis verbis dissentire videantur»).17

La référence antique dans l’art occidental de la Renaissance à nos jours, Actes de la table ronde (École Normale Supérieure, 29 avril 1994), éd. par Ph. HoffMann et P.-L. RInuy, Paris 1996, pp. 143-158; R. ChIaradonna, Sostanza, movimento, analogia: Plotino critico di Aristotele, Na-poli 1992; G. E. KaraManolIs, Plato and Aristotle in agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford 2006.

14 See F. M. Najjar, Al-Farabi’s Harmonization of Plato’s and Aristotle’s Philosophies, «The Muslim World», XCIV, 2004, pp. 29-44.

15 On the comparatio between Plato and Aristotle in the Renaissance, see Platon et Aris-tote à la Renaissance, Actes du XVIe colloque international d’Études Humanistes (Tours 1973), éd. par J.-Cl. MarGolIn et M. De GandIllac, Paris 1976; J. MonfasanI, George of Trebizond. A Biography and A Study of His Rhetoric and Logic, Leiden 1976, pp. 201-229; J. HanKIns, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols., Leiden 1990, I, pp. 165-203; N. G. WIlson, From By-zantium to Italy, London 1992; E. GarIn, Il ritorno dei filosofi antichi, Napoli 1994, pp. 79-95; ToussaInt, L’esprit du Quattrocento, cit., pp. 51-75; M. MuccIllo, Ficino e Francesco Patri-zi da Cherso, in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Studi e documenti, cit., II, pp. 615-679; Ead., Platonismo, ermetismo e ‘prisca theologia’. Richerche di storiografia filosofica rinascimen-tale, Firenze 1996; G. KaraManolIs, Pletho and Scholarios on Aristotle, in Byzantine Philoso-phy and Its Ancient Sources, ed. by K. IerodIaKonou, Oxford 2002, pp. 253-282; J. Mon fasa-nI, Marsilio Ficino and the Plato-Aristotle Controversy, in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. by M. J. B. Allen and V. Rees, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002, pp. 179-201; Id., Nicolaus Scutellius, O.S.A., as Pseudo-Pletho. The Sixteenth-Century Treatise Pletho in Aristotelem and the Scribe Michael Martinus Stella, Firenze 2005.

16 PIco, De Ente et uno, Proemium, cit., p. 134.17 Conclusiones secundum opinionem propriam paradoxae, 1, in G. PIc de la MIrando-

le, 900 Conclusions philosophiques, cabalistiques et théologiques, éd. et trad. par B. schefer, Paris 1999, p. 108.


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Ficino had also argued several decades earlier that there was an agreement between Plato and Aristotle. In the early ‘trattatelli Moreniani’, preserved in co-dex Palagi 199 and dated 1454/1455, Ficino underlines the harmony between Plato and Aristotle.18 In the De Voluptate, written in 1457, he defends, against the Aristotelians’ criticisms of Plato, the equivalence between Aristotle’s and Plato’s doctrines of pleasure.19 Later on, however, after reading the Greek philosophers in the original, Ficino establishes a distinction between the impious Aristoteli-ans of his time and the pious, i.e. Neoplatonic, interpreters of Aristotle. In this way, he follows the Neoplatonic tradition, according to which Aristotle is inferi-or to Plato. Thus, in the famous preface to his 1492 Plotinus commentary, Ficino condemns Alexandrinists and Averroists alike (i.e. the contemporary theologians and magistri), whom he holds responsible for transmitting impious and errone-ous interpretations of Aristotle. To them he opposes the ‘pious’ interpreters of Aristotle, such as Theophrastus, Themistius, Porphyry, Simplicius, Avicenna, and Pletho, of whom Pico, his complatonicus, Ficino adds, is the follower.20 Similarly, as he states in a letter dated 1488, Ficino had translated Priscianus’ paraphrase of Theophrastus’ De anima because whilst reading this text he had noticed that Plato and Aristotle were in agreement concerning the soul; in this enterprise, he adds, he follows Pico della Mirandola, vir certe mirandus, who has shown that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement concerning the soul.21

18 Cf. codex Palagi 199 (dated ca. 1455), f. 24, ed. P. O. KrIsteller, The Scholastic Back-ground of Marsilio Ficino, in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Roma 1956, pp. 55-96: 78: «Nam intellectus universalitatem facit in rebus, Averrois secundo de anima et Aris-toteles secundo de anima, ubi dicit intellectum esse universalium, sensum vero singularium, quod idem Plato in Phaedro opinatur». See also Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, cit., pp. 12-13, n° 11.

19 Cf. De Voluptate, VII (= Op., p. 998): «Quid ergo restat, cur non dicant Platonici Peri-pateticique unum atque idem de voluptate et dicere pariter et sentire? Quo alio discrepant?». For the date of the treatise, see KrIsteller, Supplementum Ficinianum, cit., I, p. cxV.

20 Op., p. 1537: «Totus enim ferme terrarum orbis a Peripateticis occupatus in duas plurimas sectas divisus est, Alexandrinam et Averroicam. Illi quidem intellectum nostrum esse mortalem existimant; hi vero unicum esse contendunt. Vtrique religionem omnem fun-ditus aeque tollunt, praesertim quia divinam circa homines providentiam negare videntur et utrobique a suo etiam Aristotele defecisse, cuius mentem hodie pauci, praeter sublimem Pi-cum, complatonicum nostrum, ea pietate qua Theophrastus olim et Themistius, Porphyrius, Simplicius, Avicenna et nuper Plethon interpretantur».

21 Proemium in Theophrastum de anima, Marsilius Ficinus Philippo Valori (Op., pp. 896-897): «Verum non multo post Themistius spem mihi praebuit optimam, affirmans tantos in-ter se philosophos non sententia quidem dissentire, sed verbis, tandemque de anima Platonis, Aristotelis [-es Op.], Theophrasti sub diversis verbis esse sententiam. Incidi denique divina quadam sorte in librum Theophrasti de anima a Prisciano quodam Lydo breviter quidem, sed tamen diligenter expositum, ea potissimum ratione qua Plutarchus, Iamblicus Platonici Peripateticique insignes Aristotelicam de anima sententiam explicaverant. Cum igitur in his legendis Platonicos Peripateticosque esse concordes animadverterem, habui ferme tota quod mente petebam. […] Neque tamen hac in re duxi in praesentia mihi nimis elaborandum vel latius evagandum, Ioannes enim noster Mirandulanus, vir certe mirandus, iam hos agit ad

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In the Parmenides Commentary, however, Ficino explicitly attacks Pico’s project of philosophical concord. For, as he states in Chapter 47, the only ade-quate way to describe the ineffable and absolutely transcendent God is through the veils and metaphors used by their divinely inspired predecessors. In this con-text, Ficino insists that, if indeed Aristotle is in agreement with Plato concern-ing the nature of the first Principle, he is not so as a colleague, but as a disci-ple who observes a respectful silence before his master. Therefore, he argues, when Aristotle equates the One and Being, he is not in disagreement with Pla-to’s doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being, since he is concerned with the One that can be apprehended by the Intellect, rather than the supreme One:

«He [scil. Aristotle] will rightly call the Good cause of the causes, as does his master [Plato], and also give it the name ‘end’, since the final cause precedes all the others. If he ever makes Being equal to the One and the Good, he might mean the one and the good that can be perceived by the intellect and compre-hended by being. As to the more eminent One, which his master Plato reveals as completely ineffable and unknowable, he does not approve of with words, but rather honors in silence».22

In this way, Ficino integrates Aristotle’s thought within an essentially Neopla-tonic framework, as a preliminary discourse limited to the visible realm of Being. Aristotle’s silence towards Plato’s doctrine of the supreme One is an expression of reverence rather than disagreement. For God, who transcends human words and knowledge, can only be described through Platonic veils.

In contrast, Pico considers that Aristotle’s doctrine on the First principle, as well as the medieval discourses on God (Thomas, Scot, as well as Avicenna and Averroes), constitute doctrines as valid as those of the Platonists. According to him, both Plato and Aristotle have demonstrated the equivalence between the four universals one, being, true and good. This fundamental agreement between Plato and Aristotle was erased, however, by the Neoplatonists: according to Pico, the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being defended by the Neopla-tonists is based upon a misinterpretation of Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist – a misinterpretation that Ficino was seeking to perpetuate.

Given their opposition regarding the nature of philosophical concord, Pico and Ficino were also opposed regarding the ways in which God could be de-

summum, ubi philosophorum omnium de quavis materia mentes diligentissime discutit ac Platonem Aristotelemque de anima mirabiliter monstrat esse concordes».

22 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1147): «Sic ubi vero ens uni bonoque fac-it aequale, illi forsan uni atque bono par iudicat, quod et ab intellectu percipi et ab ente capi potest. Quod autem Plato suus vaticinatur excelsius id, tamquam ineffabile penitus et incog-nitum, non verbis quidem prosequitur, sed potius silentio veneratur».


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scribed. In his exegesis of the Parmenides Ficino followed the Neoplatonic doc-trine, later adopted by Pseudo-Dionysius, according to which God is so tran-scendent that nothing can be said about Him. God can only be described by means of negations. Negations do not describe what God is, but that which God is above. Comparisons can also be used, but only as a means to describe God in relation to the realities that follow him. Ultimately it is by silence, the negation of negation, that one can be reunited with God.23

Pico also considered that union with God should ultimately be achieved through silence.24 However, as we will see, Pico developed the notion that the knowledge of God cannot be reduced to a unique philosophical concept (i.e. One or Being) or a rigid system of affirmations and negations. Rather it should be achieved by a progressive purification of the divine names through four de-grees described in Chapters 8-9 of the De Ente et Uno. In this context, Pico not only maintained that God could be designated by the names One, True, Good and Being, but also that God could be described either through negations of all attributes (since God is infinitely superior to all perfections), or through af-firmations of all attributes (since God unites within Himself all perfections). In doing so, Pico could establish a concordance between the Neoplatonic doc-trine of negations and the scholastic thesis according to which all perfections are within God.

As we shall see, these are precisely the points that Ficino undertakes to re-fute in his Parmenides commentary: for Ficino, one can only reach God through unity.

23 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 79 (= Op., p. 1189): «Iam vero Dionysius Areopagita li-bri huius summus astipulator in Mystica Theologia longo ordine gradus entium de primo ne-gat, et postquam affirmationes sustulit tamquam dissonas, negationes quoque tamquam non undique consonas tollit e medio indicitque rationi intelligentiaeque silentium, rationi quidem quia mobilis, intelligentiae vero quoniam multiformis. Quo velut in caligine lucem luminum attingamus. Eiusmodi silentium nobis hic imponere Parmenides quoque videtur. Postquam dixit primum neque cognosci neque dici posse ideoque non solum affirmare de illo quic-quam prohibet, sed negationes quoque admonet posthabendas. Vtrobique enim dicimus sive affirmando sive negando, illud vero dici nullo modo potest. Praeterea quicumque palam ne-gat, interim clam affirmat. Negare enim de primo aliquid est hoc ab illo secernere. Secerne-re autem hoc ab illo non possumus, nisi prius hoc in seipso firmaverimus atque illud. Si igi-tur affirmationes tamquam infinitum definientes reprobatae sunt circa primum, negationes quoque tamquam affirmationum participes non sunt penitus approbandae. Quamobrem non iniuria Parmenides admonet non tam negationibus quam silentio tranquillo, divino, amatorio confidendum. Quod quidem Platonici omnes una cum Mercurio et Apollonio Tyaneo pro cul-dubio comprobant et propheta David inquit ‘laus tibi, o Deus, est silentium’ (Psalm, 65, 2, in the first version of the Vulgate)».

24 PIco, De Ente et Uno, V, in ToussaInt, L’esprit du Quattrocento, cit., p. 168: «[…] ex quibus colligi illud potest non solum esse Deum, ut dicit Anselmus, quo nihil maius cogitari potest, ut vere dixerit iuxta hebraicam literam David propheta: ‘tibi silentium laus’».

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3. fIcIno’s resPonse to PIco In the Parmenides coMMentary

Ficino’s seven discourses correspond to chapters 41 to 47 of the Parmenides commentary. They are singled out by a separate heading stating that «there follow the Platonic discourses demonstrating that the One is the principle of all things and that the One and Good is superior to Being» («Sequuntur discursus Platoni-ci probantes unum esse principium omnium et esse ipsum unum bonumque su-perius ente»). Six other chapters form part of Ficino’s refutation. Preceding the seven discourses four chapters (37 to 40) refute Pico’s chapter 2, where Pico at-tacks the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato’s Sophist and Parmenides. Following the seven discourses, and immediately before the explicit mention of Pico («Vti-nam mirandus ille […]»), chapter 48 refutes Pico’s attack against Olympiodor-us’ distinction between being and well-being. Finally, chapter 49 shows that the first Principle cannot be the Intellect, refuting the equivalence Pico had drawn between Plato’s Idea of the Good and Aristotle’s Intellect.25

Before examining Ficino’s arguments, a closer look at the way in which Fici-no introduces the seven discourses is in order here. The structure of the opening paragraph of Chapter 38 strikingly echoes Proclus’ commentary, indicating that Ficino reused Proclus’ structure to integrate his refutation of Pico. In his com-mentary (VI, 1042-3) Proclus mentions the existence of a doctrine according to which the subject of the Parmenides, namely the One, should always be under-stood in the same way throughout the dialogue. Proclus states that he will refute this doctrine later. And indeed, Proclus does so twelve columns later (VI, 1052), devoting the intervening chapters to the doctrine of henads. In his own com-mentary, Ficino reuses exactly the same structure: after alluding to the doctrine mentioned by Proclus, he states his intention to respond to such a question else-where («sed ad hanc quaestionem alibi respondendum»), which he does twelve chapters later (in paragraph 3 of Chapter 50).26 But rather than describing the doctrine of the henads as does Proclus, Ficino states that he will demonstrate the superiority of the One over Being («Nunc vero quomodo ipsum unum sit ente superius et entis universi principium breviter perstringamus»), a demonstration that forms the subject of the seven discourses mentioned above and refutes all

25 PIco, De Ente et Uno, V.26 Chap. 50 (= Op., p. 1165): «Putat ergo Proclus, ut supra tetigimus, significationem ip-

sius unius, quod repetitur ubique, in variis suppositionibus variari quidem, sed interim ipsum suppositionis antecedens quodammodo idem videri posse, propter mirabilem illam divinarum unitatum invicem unionem, sed multo magis passim consequentia variari, ut ostendatur in-terim unitatum earundem sincera distinctio. Quandoque enim in consequenti ponitur ipsum totum, quandoque pars, quandoque figura, et alias quidem affirmativum consequens est, alias negativum. Addit alibi quidem unum super ens, ut diximus, pertractari, alibi vero unum et unitates multas in ente vero ibique per gradus entium late procedi, alibi vero cursim unum in ente non vero perstringi, unde tamen ad divina commodius subito reddeatur».


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the arguments presented by Pico’s De Ente et Uno.27 In other words, Ficino sub-stitutes to Proclus’ henads his point-by-point rebuttal of Pico’s thesis.

This last point is crucial to understand what distinguishes Ficino’s interpre-tation from that of Proclus. Proclus’ doctrine of the henads is fundamental to justify his theological interpretation of the Parmenides: following his master Syr-ianus, Proclus read in the Parmenides’ second hypothesis the complete series of the divine henads and of the hierarchy of the gods.28 In contrast, Ficino’s pur-pose is not to systematically derive a metaphysical system or a hierarchy of gods from the propositions of the Parmenides (an interpretation he explicitly rejects in the previous chapter 29), but to refute Pico’s project of philosophical concord, and find, through the traces of unity that are infused in the Universe, the mys-tical path that leads to God’s supreme Unity.

In addition, the structure of the section differs significantly from that of the rest of the commentary. As we have stated above, most of Ficino’s commentary follows very closely the structure of Proclus’ In Parmenidem. In contrast, in the first part of the section under discussion (chapters 37-44) Ficino paraphrases an-other treatise by Proclus, the Platonic Theology. Chapters 45-47 (Discourses 5-7) do not paraphrase any of Proclus’ works, but reuse Neoplatonic arguments to re-fute specific points of Pico’s thesis. In the last two chapters (48-49) Ficino draws upon both Proclus’ Parmenides commentary and Plotinus’ Enneads to demon-strate against Pico that the superiority of the One over the Intellect is the nec-essary condition for the soul’s supra-rational union with God.

27 Chap. 38 (= Op., pp. 1154-1155): «Oportere enim dicebant in hac ancipiti quaestione ipsum unum in eadem significatione utrobique sumere, alioquin auctoritatem unius ad con-sequentiam inde rerum intelligi numquam posse, nisi id certo sciamus ut uno quidem posi-to, consequenter talia quoque ponantur, eodem vero sublato, talia rursus auferantur. Sed ad hanc quaestionem alibi respondendum. Nunc vero quomodo ipsum unum sit ente superius et entis universi principium breviter perstringamus».

28 Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 10, p. 42.2-20, and Id., In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1061.31-1063.5 and 1049.37-1050.25. On Proclus’ doctrine of henads, see E. R. Dodds, Pro-clus. Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, pp. 257-284; Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., III (Paris 1978), pp. Ix-lxxVII. See also J. M. DIllon, Iamblichus and the Origin of the Doctri-ne of Henads, «Phronesis», XVII, 1972, pp. 102-106, and C. Steel, Iamblichus and the The-ological Interpretation of the Parmenides, «Syllecta Classica», VIII, 2002 (19971), pp. 15-30 («Iamblichus The Philosopher»).

29 Chap. 37 (= Op., p. 1154): «Ego vero mediam secutus viam arbitror tantum saltem theologiae subesse, quantum admittit artificium, ut communiter dicitur dialecticum, ideoque non ubique omnino continuatas, sed quandoque divulsas de divinis inesse sententias». Fici-no also rejects Syrianus’ and Proclus’ interpretation of the second hypothesis. See Chap. 56 (= Op., p. 1170): «Syrianus inter haec et Proclus omnium conclusionum capita deos quosdam seorsum existentes esse putant, ut et multitudo sit deus quidam, et ipsa pars sit deus alius, alius quoque totum, rursus recta figura et sphaerica et iuventus atque senectus, similitudo, dissimilitudo, caeteraque sint numina quaedam, quae per omnes consequentias negativas qui-dem decernantur inferiora primo, affirmativas autem deinceps suo quoque ordine disponan-tur. Sed inventum hoc poeticum potius quam philosophicum esse videtur».

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Chapter 37: «It is said that ‘the following discussion will be difficult’ (Parmenides, 137b), because it is not only logical but also theological». Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, I, 9.

Chapter 38: The superiority of the One over Being in the Philebus, Book VI of Re-public, the Sophist and the Parmenides. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 4 (refu-tation of Origen the Platonist).

Chapter 39: The ascent towards God, distinction between the Idea of Good and the Good above the Ideas. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 7.

Chapter 40: The two paths to ascend towards God (comparisons and negations) and the two names of God («Good» and «One»). Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 6.

Chapters 41-47: The seven «Platonic discourses» on the superiority of the One over Being.

1) First Discourse (Chapter 41): «universal being is either absolutely one, many, or both one and many». Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 1 et 2.

2) Second Discourse (Chapter 42): «The character common to all things is unity». Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 3. This counters Chapter 7 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno.

3) Third Discourse (Chapter 43): The first and last degrees of realities, i.e., God and Matter, are one and not being. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 3. This refutes Chapter 6 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno.

4) Fourth Discourse (Chapter 44): The soul’s ascent towards God. Distinction between Good and Being. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 11 and 12.

5) Fifth Discourse (Chapter 45): Ficino refutes the possibility of describing God by means of perfections, whether abstract or concrete. Cf. Chapter 58. Refutes Chap-ter 4 of De Ente et Uno.

6) Sixth Discourse (Chapter 46): Distinction between being and well-being. Refutes first part of Chapter 5 and Chapter 8 of De Ente et Uno.

7) Seventh Discourse (Chapter 47): Idem. Refutes Chapter 8 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno.

Chapter 48: The principles of the Sun, Nature and Intellect are the unities within their respective intellects, which ultimately depend on the One. Cf. Proclus, In Parme-nidem, VI, 1044-1051 (examples of henads).

Chapter 49: The Intellect cannot be the First Principle. Cf. Proclus, In Parmeni-dem, 1047; PlotInus, Enneads, 6.7 (supra-intellectual union of the Intellect with the One).

a) The Introductory Chapters (37-40)

In the first two introductory chapters (37 and 38), Ficino counters Pico’s at-tempt to dissociate the Neoplatonists’ interpretation from that of both Plato and Dionysius. In Chapter 2 of the De Ente et Uno, Pico rejects the Neoplatonists’ contention that Plato had defended the superiority of the One over Being in the Parmenides and the Sophist. For, he argues, in the case of the Parmenides «noth-


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ing is being positively asserted» («ego vero hoc de Parmenide primum dixero, neque toto illo dialogo quicquam asseverari»). «Hence the Parmenides should not be considered among Plato’s dogmatic works, since it is nothing but a di-alectical exercise» («certe liber inter dogmaticos non est censendus quippe qui totus nihil aliud est quam dialectica quaedam exercitatio») and «there are no more arbitrary and forced commentaries than those brought in by persons wish-ing to interpret the Parmenides of Plato in another sense» («[…] ut nullae ex-tent magis et arbitrariae et violentiae enarrationes quam quae ab his allatae sunt qui alio sensu interpretari Parmenidem Platonis voluerunt»). As to the Sophist, it only states that the One and Being are equal, rather than demonstrating, as ar-gued by the Neoplatonists, that the One is superior to Being («Enimvero in So-phiste in hanc sententiam potius loquitur esse unum et ens aequalia, quam esse unum ente superius»).30

Pico invokes both the Parmenides and the Sophist in support of his the-sis because the two dialogues constitute the cornerstone of Neoplatonic meta-physics. As E. R. Dodds has demonstrated, the Parmenides is the key dialogue from which the Neoplatonists derived their ontological system.31 In addition, as more recent studies have shown, the Sophist is also central to the later Neopla-tonists’ theological interpretation of the Parmenides’ first two hypotheses. Plo-tinus saw the Sophist’s doctrine of the five classes of being (Sophist 248e-249d) as the equivalent, at the intelligible level, of Aristole’s categories.32 Similarly, as C. Steel has convincingly shown, the Sophist constituted within Proclus’ system a proteleia to the Parmenides, namely the preliminary dialogue that Proclus sys-tematically invoked to support his theological interpretation of the Parmenides.33 So Pico was well aware that the Neoplatonists thought that both the Parmenides and the Sophist contained Plato’s most fundamental ideas on ontology, and was prepared to defend, against this tradition, that neither the Sophist nor the Par-menides had stated the superiority of the One over Being.

30 PIco, De Ente et Uno, II, cit., pp. 138-142.31 Dodds, The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One, cit.32 See the famous opening lines of Plotinus’ second treatise on the Genres of Being (En-

neads, VI, 2, 1, ll. 1-5).33 C. Steel, Le Sophiste comme texte théologique dans l’interprétation de Proclus, in On

Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. by E. P. Bos and P. A. MeIjer, Leiden-New York-Köln 1992, pp. 51-64. See also A. Charles-saGet, Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste, in Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, sous la direction de P. Aubenque, Napoli 1991, pp. 477-508 (with the appendix by C. Gérard, Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus, pp. 494-508); J. M. Charrue, Plotin, lecteur de Platon, Paris 1978, Chap. 4, and more recently M.-A. GaVray, Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste. Contribution a l’étude de l’exégèse néoplatoni-cienne, Paris 2007. On the importance of the Sophist in the controversy between Pico and Fi-cino, see M. J. B. Allen, The Ficinian Sophist and the Controversy with Pico, in Icastes: Marsi-lio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. Five Studies and a Critical Edition with Translation, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1989, pp. 9-49: 40-48.

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Pico also calls upon Dionysius the Areopagite’s authority in support of his thesis. Against his opponents, who have distorted the Areopagite’s doctrine (an implicit allusion to Ficino), he argues that Pseudo-Dionysius had also adopted the equality between the One and Being («sed et Dionysius Areopagita, quem qui contra nos disputant fautorem suae sententiae faciunt, non negabit vere a Deo apud Mosen dici ‘ego sum qui sum’, quod Graece ita legimus ‘g imi o wn’, id est ‘ego sum ens’»).34 This, he adds, will lead to a correct understanding of Di-onysius’ works, and will prevent us from relying upon «dreams» and «inextrica-ble commentaries» («somnia et inextricabilia commenta»), an unmistakable ref-erence to Ficino’s exegesis of the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology.35

Against Pico’s position, Ficino demonstrates that the Parmenides is theologi-cal rather than logical, and that the superiority of the One over Being is not only the result of the Neoplatonists’ interpretation, but was also defended by Plato and Dionysius the Areopagite. Drawing upon arguments Bessarion had used two decades before against George of Trebizond, Ficino states that Dionysius the Ar-eopagite always places the One above Being and uses Parmenides’ arguments when treating of divine matters.36 In addition, Ficino argues, the superiority of

34 PIco, De Ente et Uno, V, cit., p. 146.35 Ibid., p. 168: «[…] unde magna etiam aperitur fenestra legitimae intelligentiae libro-

rum Dionysii qui De Mystica Theologia et De Divinis Nominibus inscribuntur in quibus il-lud cavendum ne aut minora faciamus quam sunt quae ille scripsit (sunt autem maxima) aut dum parvum existimamus omne quod intelligimus, somnia nobis et inextricabilia commenta confingamus». On Marsilio Ficino’s translation and interpretation of Dionysius’ Mystical The-ology (1490) and Divine Names (1492), see KrIsteller, Supplementum Ficinianum, cit., I, pp. lxVIII-lxIx, and cxV-cxVI; M. CrIstIanI, Dionigi dionisiaco. Marsilio Ficino e il Corpus Diony-sianum, in Il Neoplatonismo nel Rinascimento, a cura di P. PrInI, Roma 1993, pp. 185-204; S. ToussaInt, L’influence de Ficin à Paris et le pseudo-Denys des humanistes. Traversari, Cusain, Lefèvre d’Étaples. Suivi d’un passage inédit de Marsile Ficin, «Bruniana & Campanelliana», V, 1999, pp. 381-414; C. VasolI, L’Un-Bien dans le commentaire de Ficin à la Mystica Theologia du Pseudo-Denys, in Les platonismes à la Renaissance, éd. par P. MaGnard, Paris 2001, pp. 181-193. For the diffusion of the corpus dionysianum in the Renaissance, mainly through Ambrogio Traversari’s translations (completed between 1431 and 1437), and the medieval Latin versions, see Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au De-nys de l’Aréopage, éd. par P. CheValIer, 2 vols., Bruges 1937; C. L. StrInGer, Humanism and the Church Fathers: Ambrogio Traversari (1386-1439) and Christian Antiquity in the Renaissance, Albany 1977, pp. 158-162; J. MonfasanI, Pseudo-Dionysius The Areopagite in Mid-Quattrocen-to Roma, in Supplementum Festivum, ed. by J. HanKIns et al., Binghamton 1987, pp. 190-219; D. LuscoMbe, Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, in Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale, Actes du colloque inter-national (Corfou, 6-8 octobre 1995), éd. par L. G. BenaKIs, Turnhout 1997, pp. 93-108.

36 Chap. 37 (= Op., p. 1154): «Denique librum hunc esse theologicum non solum caete-ri Platonici praecipue probatissimi convenerunt, sed etiam Dionysius Areopagita confirmare videtur. Quotiens in ipsius unius incidit mentionem, totiens enim enti praeponit, distinguit unum ens ab ipso simpliciter uno ipsumque unum ait ipsius esse principium entisque unius procreatorem, utitur quinetiam argumentationibus, negationibus verbisque Parmenidis saepe quam plurimis in materia divinissima, testificans interea materiam Parmenidis esse divinam. Bonum quoque similiter ut unum, ipsis Platonicorum rationibus semper anteponit essentiae».


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the One over Being is also asserted in the Philebus, Book VI of Republic, the Sophist and the Parmenides. These are the examples Proclus had drawn upon to refute Origen’s thesis according to which the first principle of the Universe is Being and Intellect (Platonic Theology II, 4).37 According to Proclus («ut Proclus narrat»), Ficino goes on, the successors of Plato, persuaded by the words con-tained in the dialogues of their master, have placed the One and the Good be-fore essence and intelligence. According to Ficino, however («ego vero»), Plato himself had conceived the very doctrine over which all Platonists, the old school and the new, are in agreement («Ego vero id sensisse Platonem arbitror, in quo schola illa vetus extra controversiam cum nova consentit»).38 In other words, Fi-cino not only invokes the Neoplatonic tradition in support of the view that the One is higher than Being, he also insists, against Pico, that this view is founded upon a thesis conceived by Plato himself.39

In the last two introductory chapters (chapters 39 and 40), which paraphrase respectively Chapters 7 and 6 of the second Book of Proclus’ Platonic Theology, Ficino describes the elevation towards God and defines the two appellations of the First Principle as ‘One’ and ‘Good’, rather than ‘Being’. Drawing upon the Philebus and Republic VI, he describes the elevation towards God as an ascent from the sensible multiplicity to the Ideas, and from the Ideas to the supreme Good («Proinde Plato in Republica et in Philebo et ubique sensibiles passim multitudines ad intelligibiles redigit unitates, id est ideas, scilicet unamquamque multitudinem rerum invicem cognatarum ad ideam unam, deinde unitates intelli-gibiles ad ipsum simpliciter unum, quod ita saltem intelligibilia superat quemad-modum ab his sensibilia superantur illudque vocat ipsum simpliciter bonum»). One should distinguish, therefore, between the Idea of Good, cause of good

Cf. KlIbansKy, Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, cit., pp. 310-312, quoting BessarIon, In Calumniatorem Platonis, II, 4, edidit L. Mohler, II, Paderborn 1927, pp. 87-89. Ficino received a copy of Bessarion’s work at the date of its publication (1469) from the author himself, as shown by their correspondance preserved in Op., pp. 616-617.

37 On the position of Origen the Platonist and Proclus’ refutation, see Proclus, Théolo-gie Platonicienne, cit., III, pp. x-xx.

38 Chap. 38 (= Op., pp. 1155-1156): «Superioribus Platonis verbis persuasi familiares eius unum bonumque essentiae intelligentiaeque praefecerunt et, ut narrat Proclus, probatissimi quique Platonici, Plutarchus, Ammonius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Iamblichus, Theodo-rus, caeterique sectatores eorum. Ego vero id sensisse Platonem arbitror, in quo schola illa ve-tus extra controversiam cum nova consentit, nova vero a Syriano et Proclo, magnis profecto viris idem penitus sentientibus ducit originem, in qua post illos Hermias et Damascius Olym-piodorusque praecipui numerantur».

39 In his Sophist commentary Ficino insists that Plato’s intention is to explain and resolve, not to refute, the views of the great Parmenides (this enables him to offset the Stranger’s ‘par-ricide’ against Parmenides’ prohibition to make things that are, not be, cf. Sophist, 258d): In Sophistam, 27 (ed. & transl. by M. J. B. Allen in Icastes, cit., p. 243.7-8): «quapropter ma-gnum Parmenidem et quemlibet Pythagoricum hic explicatum et absolutum intellige, non confutatum».

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things, and the Good above the Ideas, which is the cause of all things and supe-rior in dignity and power to essence and the intelligible («nec in essentia est aut essentia est vel intelligible, sicut idea quaevis, sed essentiam et intelligibile antiqui-tate, dignitate, potentia superat, sicut sol generationem et oculos et colores»).40 For it is only by analogy to the Idea of Good that Plato calls the First ‘Good’ in the Republic («Cum vero sit prorsus incognitum intellectu atque ideo proprio nomine designari non possit, ex ideali bono utpote sibi simillimo appellatur idea boni»). Indeed, when Plato denies in the Republic that the Good is intelligible, truth, science, knowledge, or essence, he seems to imitate the negations of the Parmenides («ubi dum probat ipsum bonum quod intellectus omnes cum intelli-gibilibus unit, non esse intellectum, non intelligibile, non veritatem, non scientiam vel cognitionem ullam, non essentiam, examussim imitari videtur negationes en-tium omnium circa unum in Parmenide declaratas»). For the light of Good that shines through all intelligibles, intellects and universal Being, is the superessen-tial Goodness divinely infused in divine realities («Lumen denique boni in omni-bus tam intelligibilibus quam intellectibus et in universo ente vero nihil est aliud quam superessentialis unitas bonitasque divinis infusa divinitus»).41

Accordingly, Ficino argues in the following chapter, the ascent towards God can be achieved in two ways: by negations, as in the Parmenides, and by compar-isons, as described in the Republic («Plato per duas ad summum vias ascendit, per comparationes quidem in Republica, per negationes autem in Parmenide»), each describing God as both the absolutely transcendent principle and the cause of the Universe («Vtraeque pariter tam comparationes quam negationes declarant deum esse tum ab omnibus entibus et intelligibilibus segregatum, tum etiam prin-cipium universi»). Correspondingly, God can be designated by two names, ‘One’

40 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 39 (= Op., p. 1156). Cf. Republic, VI, 505a-509b; Phile-bus, 21d 9-22a 3; 61b 5-6; 61d 1-2; Letter, II, 312e 2-3; Parmenides, 137c 4-142a 8. Cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II (Paris 1974), 7, pp. 45.25-48.19, who demonstrates the supe-riority of the Good over the Idea of Good in the Republic, the Second Letter, and the Par-menides. For Ficino’s reference to the Philebus, see PlotInus, Enneads, VI, 7, 25 and Ficino’s interpretation of the passage: In Plotinum, VI.7, Chap. XXX (= Op., p. 1792): «Finis intellec-tualis animae est expeditus et summus actus intelligentiae in ipsum universi bonum prorsus intentus. Actus eiusmodi beatitudo est, etiamsi nulla huic voluptas exterior adiungatur, neque tamen ipsa est voluptatis expers. Ipsa enim expedita actionis integritas atque summa est vo-luptas. Tunc vero maxime et simplex unumque existit, gaudet vero seipsa penitus ex superi-ori lumine iam formata. Profecto sicut summitas luminis circa speculum concavum iam est calor, ita summitas essendi est vita. Similiter vivendi sensus, sentiendi imaginatio, imaginandi ratio, rationis intelligentia, intelligentiae gaudium, gaudii bonum. Nempe ad supremum uni-versi gradum, non per divisionem, sed per unionem ascenditur paulatim. Iam vero sicut ele-menta eodem naturae nixu, quod sibi consentaneum est, petunt atque fruuntur, ita mens eo-dem actu, quando summus est vergit in finem ultimum tamquam verum et fruitur tamquam bono. Sed de fine et intelligentia et voluptate in commentariis Philebi latius disputamus». See also FIcIno, In Philebum, I, 4-5.

41 Chap. 39 (= Op., p. 1156).


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and ‘Good’, the former describing the procession of all things from God; the lat-ter describing the conversion of all things towards God («Proinde quemadmo-dum via duplici Plato noster ascendit ad primum, ita nominibus illud praecipue duobus appellat. In Republica quidem, ubi per comparationes scandit, appellat bonum. Comparationes enim ex similitudine rerum ad primum infusa bonitate ducuntur. In Parmenide vero, ubi per negationes incedit, nominat unum. Nega-tionibus enim deum principium omnium unicum, simplicissimum, eminentissi-mum esse designat»).42 As we shall see, this introductory section forms the back-ground to the proper refutation of Pico’s arguments on the divine names and the ascent towards God, as formulated in Discourses 4 and 7.

b) Discourses 1-4

Chapters 41 to 47 correspond to Ficino’s seven «Platonic discourses» on the superiority of the One over Being. As already mentioned above, Discourses 1-4 are based on Book II of Proclus’ Platonic Theology. Discourses 5-7 do not draw upon Proclus, but use specific arguments to refute Pico’s thesis.

Ficino’s first two discourses refute Chapter 7 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno. In this chapter Pico criticises the equivalence the Neoplatonists had established be-tween the opposition One/Many and Non-Being/Being in order to equate One and Non-Being, Many and Being. Invoking Book X of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Pico argues that the opposition One/Many is an opposition of privation or con-trariety, while the opposition Being/Non-being constitutes an opposition of con-tradiction; the terms of each opposition (One and Non-Being; Many and Being) cannot, therefore, be equated.43 In addition, Pico argues, the Neoplatonists, by adopting the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being, are led to self-contradiction, since they are forced to admit that the One can be predicated about «nothing», namely «non-being», which was expressly rejected by Plato in the Sophist.44

Drawing upon Proclus’ Platonic Theology II, 1 and 2, Ficino opposes Pico’s argument by demonstrating that universal being is both one and many (first dis-course, chapter 41). In the second discourse (chapter 42), he paraphrases Proclus’ Platonic Theology II 3 and shows that the character that is common to all things

42 Chap. 40 (= Op., p. 1156).43 PIco, De Ente et uno, VII, cit., p. 172: «Non enim eo modo opponitur multitudo uni,

quo modo opponitur non ens enti. Haec enim contradictoriam habent oppositionem; illa aut privativam aut contrariam de qua re late disputant Aristotelici decimo libro primae philoso-phiae», with reference to ArIstotle, Metaphysics, X, 3, 1054a 20 ff, and 6, 1056b 33 ff.

44 Ibid.: «Pari ergo ratione, si sit unum ente communius, fieri poterit ut aliquid sit non ens sive nihil, quod tamen sit unum atque ita de non ente unum praedicabitur, quod expres-se in Sophista confutat Plato».

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is unity. Drawing upon traditional Neoplatonic arguments, he argues that if the One perishes, all things perish; the ancient philosophers call nothingness ou dn (identified as ou d’ n, «not even one») rather than ou d’ on («not even being»).45

In the third discourse (chapter 43), Ficino defends, in opposition to Pico, the Neoplatonic conception of Matter. This doctrine was central to the thesis of the superiority of the One over Being; it also constituted an attack against Ar-istotle’s conception according to which Matter cannot be generated by a Form and is being.46 To refute the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being, Pico had reused Aristotle’s contention that Matter is not non-being, and stated that Matter is simultaneously one, multiple and being: one according to the form provided by its being, multiple, as origin of all multitude, and being. Plato him-self, Pico had argued, testifies that Matter is multiple and being, since he calls it ‘receptacle of Forms’ in the Timaeus and ‘Infinity’ in the Philebus.47

It is precisely this conception that Ficino undertakes to refute in the third Discourse. Following the final section of Proclus’ Platonic Theology II 3 (pp. 26.7-29.21), Ficino states that the first and last degrees of realities (i.e. One and Matter) are like the two extremes of a line, two points that are indivisible and one, but deprived from multitude and being. Matter is formless and thus de-void of division and multiplicity. Matter will therefore be said to be one and not being.48 Ficino then rejects Pico’s interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and Philebus

45 Chap. 42 (= Op., p. 1158): «Vnum ergo communiter inest omnibus, quo sublato per-ditur unumquodque. Quapropter volentes antiqui omnifariam nihilum prorsus exprimere, dixere oudn, id est, ne unum quidem, quasi plus negetur dicendo non unum quam non ens – perinde ac si munus unius universa posterius quam essentia deserat idque sit in nihil peni-tus evanescere, videlicet unum prorsus amittere. Hoc igitur unum omnibus communissimum ab ipso tandem existit simpliciter uno omnium communissimo». Cf. Proclus, Théologie Pla-tonicienne, cit., II, 3, pp. 23.1-26.6.

46 ArIstotle, Physics, A 9 192a 31; Metaphysics, VII, 8, 1033a 23-1033b 29, and VII, 10, 1036a 9-11. See L. BrIsson, La théorie de la ‘matière’ dans le Timée de Platon et sa critique par Aristote dans la Physique, in L’Alchimie et ses racines philosophiques: La tradition grecque et la tradition arabe, éd. par C. VIano, Paris 2005, pp. 15-35. On Plotinus’ doctrine of the two matters (intelligible and sensible), see D. O’BrIen, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter. An Ex-ercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads, Napoli 1991, with further references to the exist-ing literature on the subject. On Pico’s and Ficino’s conceptions of Matter, see Tr. DaGron, Ficin et la conception néoplatonicienne de la matière, in Marsile Ficin ou les mystères platoni-ciens, éd. par S. toussaInt, Paris 2002, pp. 163-178: 170-173.

47 PIco, De Ente et uno, VI, cit., pp. 168-170: «[…] neque enim Plato vult eam esse pror-sus nihil, alioquin quomodo receptaculum formarum, quomodo nutrix, quomodo natura qua-edam et reliqua erit, quae eam esse in Timaeo ille confirmat? Non est igitur nihil, idest non omnino entis expers, si Platoni credimus, qui tamen eandem in Philebo vocat non solum mul-titudinem quae, ut ipsi volunt, opponitur uni sicut nihilum opponitur enti, sed infinitum». Cf. Timaeus, 49a, and Philebus, 23c.

48 Chap. 43 (= Op., pp. 1158-1159): «Praeterea omnis divisio, differentia, multiplicitas fit vel per formarum varietatem vel divisionem ad dimensiones numerosve spectantem. Haec om-nia formalia sunt. In materia nihil est per se formale, nulla igitur multiplicitas inest. Est ita-que maxime unum et, quoniam non habet ullum in se multorum, ideo potentia est ad mul-


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(quoting a passage that is not in Proclus): according to him, when Plato calls Matter ‘infinite’ in the Philebus and ‘receptacle of forms’ in the Timaeus, he means that Matter is one, infinitely to being formed and to receive a multitude of forms, not that it is many.49 Since the One is more extensive than Being, Fi-cino concludes, it is necessarily superior to Being.

In the fourth Discourse (Chapter 44), Ficino describes the soul’s ascent to-wards God and the way in which God can be conceived. According to him, it is only through unity (rather than being) that one can reach God: it is only through the unity infused in our soul by God that one can achieve mystical union. Para-phrasing Proclus’ Platonic Theology, Ficino argues that divine contemplation can only be achieved in a supra-rational way, by «closing the eyes of intelligence» («Proinde, sicut solem conniventibus oculis, sic ipsam boni lucem intelligentia connivente suscipimus vel potius veneramur»).50 For, Ficino argues, it is sacrile-gious to direct the «eyes of the intelligence» towards God, who transcends the intelligible («Neque enim licet neque fas est intelligentiae aciem in illud um quam, quod intelligibili superius est, dirigere»).51 It is possible for the intelligence, how-ever, to form a conception of God, by using that which is most similar to the activity of the contemplative Intellect, namely the One and Good, two concepts that refer to one unique principle.52

ta suscipienda, sicut primum, quia multorum nullum est ad multa sufficit facienda. Est certe materia maxime unum, scilicet formabile, sicut ens primum maxime unum est formale. Neu-trum vero est ipsum simpliciter unum. Quis ergo dixerit unum atque ens idem prorsus existe-re, si modo consideret unum de maximo et de minimo ente pariter praedicari atque quatenus multitudo formalis negatur de materia, eatenus negari ens et affirmari unum?».

49 Ibid. (= Op., p. 1159): «Ac si ex eo quod infinitas subire formare potest et indefinita pariter est ad omnes, Plato in Philebo sub ordine infiniti materiam collocet, non tamen prop-terea eam existimabit esse minus unam, sed maxime unam, siquidem nullum infinitorum na-turaliter habeat. Nam et ipsum infinitum ibi saepe nominat unum, quod quidem non ipsa ra-tione sui multitudinem habeat, immo sub se participantium gradatim contineat multitudinem. […] Quamobrem materia ad ordinem infiniti redacta nec ibi nec alibi a Platone multitudo vo-catur, sed unum in Timaeo ad suscipiendam multitudinem susceptaculum, probatque longius ab ente distare quam formam, quandoquidem forma scilicet materialis ens verum refert velut imago, materia vero non refert, nisi fortassis ut umbra vel potius ut oppositum, si quidem tam informis materia sit quam essentia vera formosa. Verumtamen, dum ita probat, eam quam mi-nimum entis habere declarat unius habere non parum, dicens de hac vere pronuntiari posse ‘hoc est istud’ neque propter ingredientia varia umquam e sua identitate mutari».

50 Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 11, and the first paragraph of Chap. 12 (p. 66.1-17). This section refers to Plotinus’ Ennead, VI, 9 (ibid., pp. 119-122), and Ennead, I, 6.

51 Chap. 44 (= Op., p. 1160). The expression aciem intelligentiae dirigere translates Pro-clus’ a ntwpn (Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 12, p. 64.22-23: «ou gr mi a ntwpn ou d allo tn ontwn ou dn», cf. PlotInus, Ennead, I, 6, 8-9), and refers to the expression acies mentis, a notion that is prominent in Christian mysticism. Here it underlines, however, the supra-intellectual nature of the soul’s union with God, as in Chap. 48-49 below.

52 Chap. 44 (= Op., p. 1160): «Huc autem postremo regressi quidnam de illo potissimum concipimus aut loquimur? Certe quod simillimum est statui mentis illuc usque progressae.

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Ficino then recalls the «consensus of all philosophers» according to which God is the object of desire for all beings. Such a definition indicates the need to distinguish the good that is innate to all beings, from the Good that is above Being, and, as a result, the universal Being which desires the Good, from the Good itself.53 Here Ficino refers to the doctrine of natural desire («appetitus na-tu ralis») according to which all beings naturally tend towards God through the presence of innate logoi within them.54 He also alludes to the Neoplatonic def-inition of the Good as the universal object of desire, a definition that is based upon Plotinus’ reinterpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the individual good.55 As we will see in Discourse seven, Ficino invokes again this definition in order to demonstrate that Aristotle’s philosophy ultimately derives from the divinely inspired wisdom of the prisci theologi.

Eiusmodi vero status maxime unus est et simplex atque optimus. Ideo deum ex hoc statu no-minamus ut unum penitus atque bonum».

53 Ibid.: «Iam vero communis omnium consensus definiens bonum cuius gratia omnia et quod appetunt omnia vaticinari videtur illud nec ullius gratia esse nec aliud prorsus appe-tere, illud itaque nec ens aliquod esse nec aliquod bonum in ente. Omnis enim essentia bo-num appetit, id est esse secundum naturam ac bene perfecteque sese habere. Bonum quoque in essentia forte videri potest illius ipsius substantiae gratia esse quaesitum, ut videlicet se-cundum naturam perfecte se habeat. Nec est bonum simpliciter omniumve bonum, sed ali-cuius dumtaxat et in aliquo bonum et propterea quiddam bonum. Ea profecto ratione quaes-itum ut per hoc ad ipsum bonum propius accedatur. Itaque praeter bonum, quod vel ens vel in ente vel entis est, extat bonum eminentius ente. Sicut enim quodlibet ens suum quodque bonum appetit, tamquam aliud, et suo quoque bono appetit ipsum bonum, sic ens universum consequenter ipsum bonum exoptat tamquam aliud atque superius».

54 Chap. 78 (= Op., pp. 1187-1188): «Illud quoque Procli saepe nostri valde placet per hoc nomen unum non ipsum quidem in se unum, sed intimum hoc quod ex illo nobis inest unum occultumque unius conceptum exprimi. Inest enim cunctis erga primum principium tamquam omnium finem appetitus innatus. Ergo et ante appetitum sensus quidam, ut ita dixerim, illius occultus. Quo quidem naturali sensu sensibus aliis prorsus occulto, grave et leve per rectam lineam locum sibi quasi eligit naturalem respuitve contrarium, radices arborum humorem eli-gunt ariditate vitata, folia sagaciter umbram fugiunt asciscuntque calorem pariter atque lu-men. Hoc itaque sensu appetituque mirabili omnia convertuntur ad primum, etiam non co-gnoscentia primum. Similiter anima etiam ante notitiam manifestam electionemque consilii, naturali sensu inclinationeque per unum inde sibi impressum desiderat ipsum unum. Quo quidem desiderio frequenter admonita unum denique nominat, non tam confidens pronun-tiare primum, quam enitens desiderium suum circa primum exprimere suumque unum qua-si primi illius proferre conceptum». Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VII, pp. 54.3-10, and 54.26-56.6. For Ficino’s doctrine of appetitus naturalis, see P. O. KrIsteller, Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino, Firenze 1953, pp. 180-212.

55 See for instance PlotInus, Enneads, VI, 2, 11; Proclus, Elements of Theology, § 8 and notes, pp. 194-195; Id., In Parmenidem, VII, p. 54.3-10; Id., Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 22, p. 101.27; II, 2, p. 20.22-23; II, 6, p. 40.24-25. This Neoplatonic definition is founded upon a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the good. Denying the existence of an absolute Good, Aristotle defines the good as what each being individually desires. In contrast, Plotinus presents Aristotle’s doctrine as defending the existence of a universal Good, so as to make it compatible with Plato’s doctrine. Cf. PlotInus, Enneads I, 8. 2.2-3. See Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, p. 20, n° 2.


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c) Discourse 5

In the fifth discourse, Ficino interrupts his reading of Proclus’ Platonic The-ology. He counters Pico’s attempt to establish a concord between the Neoplaton-ic negations about the One and the positive attributes used by scholastic philos-ophers to describe God: according to Ficino, God’s only correct appellation is ‘the One and Good’ («ipsum unum bonumque») and the only way to describe Him is through negations.

In Chapter 4 Pico establishes a distinction between concrete and abstract being («ens concretum et ens abstractum»), in order to show that God can be called both pure (abstract) Being and superior to (concrete) Being.56 He distin-guishes between ens, which «has the appearance of a concrete name» («concreti nomini faciem habet»), and esse, which is the corresponding abstract name. Ac-cording to Pico, the difference between abstract and concrete names is such that the former signifies the reality in itself, per se, while the latter means the reali-ty inasmuch as it is caused by another.57 God, as uncaused, cannot be given any concrete name, and is therefore superior to ens. But God can be given the ab-stract name of esse; as such, he will be seen as the plenitude of being. As a re-sult, Pico argues, God is simultaneously «the fact of being» («esse»), and superi-or to being («ens»).58 By using this distinction between ens and esse, which might ultimately derive from Gerson’s scholastic interpretation of Dionysius’ negative theology,59 Pico intends to show that God’s transcendence cannot be reduced to

56 On Pico’s distinction between being, essence and existence, see G. dI NaPolI, Gio-vanni Pico della Mirandola e la problematica dottrinale del suo tempo, Roma 1965, pp. 217-223; 314-343; Id., L’essere e l’uno in Pico della Mirandola, «Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica», XLVI, 1954, pp. 356-389: 366 ff.; Id., L’essere e l’uno in Pico della Mirandola, in Il pensiero italiano del Rinascimento e il tempo nostro, Atti del V convegno internazionale (Montepulciano, 8-13 agosto 1968), a cura di G. TaruGI, Firenze 1970, pp. 117-129.

57 PIco, De Ente et Uno, IV, cit., pp. 148-149: «[…] est autem haec vis illorum et diver-sitas, ut quod abstractum dicitur, id notet quod as se tale est, non ab alio; concretum ex ad-verso id significet quod non a se, sed alterius beneficio tale est».

58 Ibid., pp. 150-151: «[…] tale autem est Deus qui est totius esse plenitudo, qui solus a se est et a quo solo nullo intercedente medio ad esse omnia processerunt. Hac igitur ratione vere dicemus Deum non est ens, sed super ens, et ente aliquid esse superius».

59 See J. Gerson, De simplificatione cordis, passim, where Gerson concludes that mysti-cal theology proceeds by way of abstraction («procedit vero doctrina mystica per abstractio-nem»). In the Theologica mystica pratica Gerson argues that the negations about God do not concern pure intelligibles as such, but the intelligible totality in as much as it implies imper-fection. Pico reuses this interpretation to equate Dionysius’s negative theology with Aristot-le’s theory of abstraction. In contrast, Gerson uses the theory of abstraction to transcend the Dionyian apophatic mode of describing God: the negative theology ultimately leads to the affimations of abstract concepts about God, and these affirmations constitute a further step towards the unio mystica. On Gerson’s mystical theology I am indebted to M. VIal, Jean Ger-son. Théoricien de la Théologie Mystique, Paris 2006, pp. 132-139.

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a univocal concept or a rigidly fixed system of affirmations or negations; it can be called both One and Being and can be adequately described by both nega-tions and assertions.

Unlike Gerson, however, who rejected the use of negations to overcome the apophatic implications of negative theology, Pico establishes an equation be-tween negations and affirmations – between negative theology and theory of abstraction. In other words, both negations and assertions can be used to de-scribe God:

«Whether one calls God with the names mind, intellect, life and wisdom, or one places God above these attributes, one states two equally true and conso-nant propositions; and Plato does not diverge from Aristotle when he calls God the Idea of Good in Book VI of the Republic and places Him above intellects and intelligibles […], while Aristotle frequently calls God the intellect, the in-telligent and the intelligible».60

Similarly, he argues, the negations used by the Platonists and Dionysius are equivalent to the affirmations used by the Peripatetics and the Parisians, i.e., the scholastic philosophers in the universities of Padua and Paris, where Pico had studied before going to Florence:

«[…] Dionysius, followed by the Platonists, denies that life, intellect, wisdom or anything similar are within God. But since God Himself, in the unique per-fection of His infinity and His divinity, unites and embraces within Himself the whole perfection which is plural and divided in these attributes, not as a unity deriving from the many, but as a unity preceding the many, as their principle and their cause, for this reason some philosophers, especially the Aristotelian and Pa-risian theologians, admit that these attributes are present in God. When we say and follow this opinion, we are not only right, but we are also in perfect agree-ment with the philosophers who deny these attributes».61

60 PIco, De Ente et Uno, V, cit., p. 166: «Evidenter tibi jam patet quonam pacto, cum aliquando Deus et mens et intellectus et vita et sapientia nuncupetur, rursus aliquando su-per haec omnia collocetur, utrumque tamen et vere et consone comprobetur, nec propterea Platonem ab Aristotele dissentire quod ille in VI de Republica Deum quem ibi vocat ideam boni super intellectus et intelligibilia statuat […], hic autem scilicet Aristoteles saepe Deum et intellectum et intelligentem et intelligibile vocet».

61 Ibid.: «Quod respicientes et Dionysius et deinde Platonici in Deo et vitam et intel-lectum et sapientiam atque his similia esse negant. Sed quoniam totam horum perfectionem quae in his multa et divisa est Deus ipse unica sua perfectione, quae est sua infinitas, sua deitas quae ipse est, in se unit et colligit non sicut unum ex illis multis, sed unum ante illa multa, et principium illorum et causa, ideo quidam alii, et praesertim Peripatetici quos quan-tum licet fere in omnibus imitantur Parisienses theologi, haec omnia in Deo esse concedunt. Quod dicentes atque credentes non solum recte dicimus et credimus, sed et cum his concor-diter qui illa negant».


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In contrast, Ficino argues in Discourse 5 that it is impossible to describe God by using assertions, which are inferior to the universality and absolute tran-scendence of the First Principle. He reuses the distinction Pico had established between concrete and abstract names. However, he shows that neither concrete (ens, vivens) nor abstract (vita, essentia) appellations can suitably qualify God. At most these appellations can denote that God is cause (rather than the Form) of all perfections, a doctrine, he adds, that is well known to the Platonists and that has been reused by (usurpatum) the Areopagite.62 God’s names of ‘One’ and ‘Good’ derive from the fact that God possesses all these perfections inasmuch as He embraces them all in a unique way, but only possesses one proper thing, its own unity and goodness («Quoniam vero primum haec habet munera, ut et unice perfectiones omnium complectatur et nihil ultra petat et omnibus suum impertiat proprium, solum vero id munus ipsum bonum unumque possidet, me-rito praecipua haec est appellatio primi»).

To understand more fully the implications of this passage, it is worth examin-ing another passage, which appears later in the commentary (in chapter 58), en-titled «the opinion that affirms abstractions of abstracts about God, while nega-tions and comparisons around God are safer» («Opinio affirmans abstractorum abstracta de Deo. Item tutiores sunt negationes relationesque circa Deum»). In this passage Ficino reuses Proclus’ refutation of some ancient Neoplatonic doc-trines to counter Pico’s contention that abstract names can suitably describe God. As such, Ficino’s arguments appear to revive ancient controversies to respond to a specific point developed by Pico. Chapter 58 is part of a long digression where

62 Chap. 45 (= Op., pp. 1160-1161): «Quando nominamus primum, solemus quibusdam perfectionibus communissimis appellare, scilicet essentia, vita, mente, veritate, virtute. Haec autem accipi velut concreta possunt vel abstracta. Si ut concreta, scilicet ens, vivens et reli-qua, non conveniunt simplicitati primi. Si ut abstracta, propter simplicitatem magis conveni-re videntur, ut essentia vel vita magis quam ens vel vivens. Sed haec rursus abstracta, si con-siderentur quasi formae quaedam rationesve formales in concretis, primo non competunt; sin considerentur extra, nec essentia in se numero conducit vitam nec vita mentem, sed et illa ad istam et ista ad hanc appetitu contendunt. Ideo nec essentia nec vita primo competunt. Sed forte magis intelligentia? Nec ista quidem, quia non competit omnibus intelligere, et ipsa in-telligentia contendit ad veritatem et per hanc ad bonum, bonum vero nusquam vertitur. Sum-matim vero inter illa superius numerata nec praecedentia primo congruunt, quia non inclu-dunt sequentia, sed ad illa nituntur, nec insuper sequentia sunt consentanea primo, quoniam et primorum participant neque sunt illa, et quoniam deinceps effectus producunt angustio-res, neque appellare decet primum hoc nomine, scilicet esse vel vivere, quoniam esse est ac-tus quidam per essentiam suam in ente concreto, vivere actus in vivo per vitam. Si quis au-tem primum his nominibus appellare voluerit, causali quadam, ut ita dixerim, appellatione potius quam formali, id quidem libenter accipiemus, tamquam a Platonicis non alienum et a Dionysio frequentius usurpatum». At the level of Being, however, Ficino considers that both abstract and concrete terms are interchangeable. Cf. In Sophistam, 34 (M. FIcIno, In Sophis-tam, cit., pp. 255.29-257.1): «Ens quidem videtur aliquid concretum significare, essentia vero abstractum, saepe tamen sermonis gratia aliud pro alio ponitur». For the theological impli-cations of Ficino’s ambiguous use of the term usurpatum in relation to the Areopagite, see ToussaInt, L’influence de Ficin à Paris, cit., pp. 410-412.

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Ficino addresses issues related to the relation between One and Being, One and Many and the doctrine of Trinity. After explaining why the multitude is negat-ed about the First Principle, Ficino describes three doctrines that had been re-futed by Proclus and reinterprets them in the perspective of the doctrine of ab-stract names invoked by Pico.

Ficino first describes the opinion of the ancient Platonists who advocated the use of affirmations to describe God. According to these commentators, since God is the cause of all things, He necessarily possesses within Himself the powers and roots («vires radicesque») of these things. Therefore, they argue, God can be said to be certain things – not concrete or even abstract things, but, if it is pos-sible to say and hear these appellations without laughing («si pronuntiari possit vel extra risum audiri»), «abstractions of abstract things», such as «essentiality, vitality, and intellectuality» («essentialitas, vitalitas, intellectualitas»).63 Accord-ing to the ancient Platonists, Ficino argues, these «abstractions of abstracts» are within God in the most united and secret way, known only to God, so that they do not hinder the absolute perfection of God. Moreover, while the abstracts es-sentia, vita et intelligentia are distinct and separate from each other, the abstrac-tions of abstracts contain within themselves all the others. As such, they were thought to manifest the unique and perfect power of God.64

In contrast, Ficino goes on, the later Platonists (i.e. Syrianus and Proclus) only used negations to describe God. In this way, they were maintaining God’s

63 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 58 (= Op., p. 1173): «Antiquiores nonnulli Platonici ab-solutis quibusdam affirmationibus utebantur circa deum, existimantes cum deus omnino sit omnium causa praecipue amplissimorum atque priorum, merito vires radicesque horum in se prorsus habere, per quas affirmari de deo absolutissima quaeque possint – nullo quidem pacto concreta, videlicet quod deus sit ens aut vivens aut intelligens, neque rursus proxima his abstracta, ceu quod deus sit essentia vel vita vel intellectus, sed abstractorum potius ab-stractiones ipsae, ut (si pronuntiari possit vel extra risum audiri) essentialitas, vitalitas, intel-lectualitas caeteraque similiter generatim perfectissima quaeque».

64 Ibid.: «Esse autem haec in deo ratione quadam, ut aiunt, quam unitissima, quam secre-tissima nobis soli deo cognita. Opinabantur forsan abstracta concretis proxima nonnullas con-cretorum conditiones habere, abstracta vero remota sive abstractorum abstractiones ab omni-bus concretorum passionibus absolutissimas esse, ut affirmata de deo nihil ibi angustiae, nihil mutabilitatis, nihil multiplicitatis vel divisionis compositionisve ullius afferant, sed eminentis-simam ad optima quaeque perficienda significent potestatem, ut cum essentialitatem dicunt, non formam quandam sive speciem intelligant a vita, vel vitalitate distinctam, similiter cum vitalitatem nominant, non speciem fingant ab essentia vel intelligentia differentem, rursus cum intellectualitatem aiunt, non speciem ab essentia et vita discretam. Haec enim tria et praeter haec sapientia veritasque et virtus et similia his abstracta ita se habent, ut unumquodque ho-rum distinctum sit a caeteris neque sit id ipsum quod sunt illa. Vnumquodque igitur defini-tum est certumque bonum, non simpliciter omne bonum. Volunt ergo per illa quae diximus abstractorum abstracta significari non bonum in hoc genere aut illo nec rursus bonorum cu-mulum differentium, sed absolute, singulariter, eminenter, omne bonum. Quod generum om-nium limitibus omnino subtractis omnique adempta multiplicate omnium generum bona pro-ducat, per unicam videlicet potestatem ad essentias, ad vitas, ad mentes, sapientias, veritates, virtutes efficiendas. Haec inquam antiquiores Platonici forsan meditabantur».


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absolute transcendence. Although they sometimes used comparisons to describe the ways in which things are related to God, they rejected «absolute affirma-tions» (i.e. the «abstractions of abstracts» mentioned above), on the ground that the latter contradicted the Platonic doctrine according to which one should nei-ther name nor qualify God.65

What Ficino characterises as the opinion of the «first Neoplatonists» re-sults from the combination of three different doctrines described and refuted by Proclus in the Parmenides commentary. According to Proclus, three authorities considered that one should attach some «nature and characteristic» (tina fsin ka idita) to the One and therefore make use of affirmations to express God’s transcendence.66 The first commentators postulated the existence, above Intel-lect (no), the existence of something considered ‘simpler’ than Intellect and called intellectuality (noth), which Ficino translated as intellectualitas. Others made a distinction between God and the «state of being God» (t ö inai), the latter being the proper designation of the One. Finally, a third group of com-mentators considered that the One contains within itself the causal principles of Being, Life, and Intellect, and indeed of all the Forms, as «paradigms prior to paradigms», the One itself being «a whole prior to wholes». Proclus rejects these doctrines on the ground that negations are the only correct way of express-ing the One’s absolute superiority; comparisons can only be used to describe God in relation to the things that come after Him. This last statement evident-ly corresponds to what Ficino calls the opinion of the later Neoplatonists, who used only «relative affirmations» (i.e. comparisons) and negations to describe God.67

65 Ibid.: «Posteriores vero Platonici post negationes quas cum Platone prae caeteris eli-gunt, non absolutas quidem affirmationes admittunt, sed solummodo relativas. Non absolu-tas, inquam, quia verentur ne quid penes deum forte definiant, ne quid interim deo adhibe-ant naturae nostrae cognatum, quod quidem in Epistola ad Dionysium Plato providentissime prohibet, asserens hunc circa deum errorem errorum omnium originem esse. Relativas au-tem affirmationes tradunt non significare quid vel qualis sit ipse deus neque nomen eius no-titiamve exprimere (haec enim nobis impossibilia Parmenides inquit), sed quo pacto res ad deum se habeant declarare, ut quando principium dicimus et medium atque finem intelligi-mus res a deo fieri, servari, perfici, quando bonum tamquam finem ab omnibus expeti om-nium perfectorem. Quid vero? Si etiam quando unum videmur affirmare, tunc vel ad ipsum nostra referimus quasi haec uniantur inde, vel forte negamus ipsum esse multiplicem vel ali-qua ratione compositum».

66 Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1106.1-1108.19, and Hadot’s analysis of this passage in Porphyre et Marius Victorinus, I, Paris 1968, pp. 355-375.

67 Ficino might have known these doctrines from Marius Victorinus, an author who was well known by Bessarion (cf. H. D. Saffrey, Notes autographes du cardinal Bessarion dans un manuscrit de Munich, «Byzantion», XXXV, 1965, pp. 536-563: 547-548). Ficino’s terms essen-tialitas, vitalitas, intellectualitas, are strikingly similar to the terminology used by Marius Vic-torinus. The text is Adversus Arium, IV, 5.31-48 (MarIus VIctorInus, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, éd. par P. henry et P. hadot, Paris 1960, p. 514): «Deus, inquam, primo univer-salium universales existentias substantiasque progenuit. Has Plato ideas vocat, cunctarum in

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What is striking here is that Ficino also characterises these appellations as «abstractiones abstractorum», thus using a scholastic terminology to describe the ancient doctrine refuted by Proclus. This certainly echoes Lorenzo Valla’s criti-cism of the scholastic use of words ending with -itas, on the ground that these terms were attested neither in Aristotle nor in classical Latin authors.68 But above all, it alludes to Pico’s use of scholastic affirmations as a legitimate means to de-scribe God. It opposes Pico’s contention that God, who is above the concrete names ens, unum, verum and bonum, is said to be plenissima entitas, individua unitas, solidissima veritas, beatissima bonitas.69 In contrast, Ficino considers the scholastic doctrine of abstraction as a mere preliminary to the Platonists’ via ne-gativa. For elsewhere in the commentary he compares Thomas Aquinas’ method of abstraction with what Proclus considered as the Parmenides’ logical, ‘maieu-tic’ exercise whereby Parmenides initiates Socrates to the truth about the whole structure of the Universe.70 In chapter 11 of his commentary on the second hy-pothesis, Ficino argues that it is to exercise Socrates that Parmenides sometimes leads his disciple to concede false statements, or to use abstractions, since, as Thomas Aquinas put it, «abstraction does not falsify».71 In other words, Ficino

exsistentibus specierum species principales; quod genus in exemplo est: ontth, wth, noth, et item tautth, trth, atque hoc genus genera. Genera igitur generum profonduntur a deo et omnium potentiarum potentiae universaliter principales. Ergo ontth, id est essentialitas vel essentitas, sive wth, id est vitalitas, id est prima universalis vitae potentia, hoc est pri-ma vita, fonsque omnium vivendi, item noth intelligendi vis, virtus, potentia vel substantia vel natura, haec tria accipienda ut singula, sed ita ut qua suo plurimo sunt, hoc nominentur et esse dicantur». See also Ad Candidum, § 7.4-5 (ibid., p. 22): «[…] sunt quaedam eius quod sit natura manifesta, sicuti sunt, quae vere sunt, et omnia supracaelestia, ut spiritus, no, ani-ma, cognoscentia, disciplina, virtutes, lgoi, opiniones, perfectio, exsistentia, vita, intellegen-tia, et adhuc superius exsistentialitas, vitalitas, intellegentitas et supra ista omnia on solum istud ipsum quod est unum et solum on». Bessarion’s autograph manuscript identified by Saf-frey contains at f. 356v the following passage: «existentialitas, vitalitas, intellegentias», quot-ing the same terminology that Ficino uses in his own commentary.

68 L. Valla, Retractatio totius dialecticae, I, 4, a cura di G. ZIPPel, Padova 1982, I, pp. 30 ff., where Valla rejects the use of the terms such as quidditas, perseitas, entitas, «e barbarie quodam gurgustio prolata», since «primum hae ab Aristotele non traduntur, deinde a sub-stantivis deduci nequeunt, postremo nec ab omnibus adiectivis, nisi ab iis quae exeunt in ‘us’ […] aut in ‘er’ […] et quae in ‘is’ […]».

69 PIco, De Ente et uno, V, cit., p. 160: «[…] haec enim nomina ens, verum, unum, bo-num, concretum quid dicunt et quasi participatum. Quare rursus dicimus Deum super ens, super verum, super unum, super bonum esse quia scilicet ipsum esse est, ipsa veritas, ipsa unitas, ipsa bonitas»; IX, p. 182: «Deus ergo plenissima entitas, individua unitas, solidissima veritas, beatissima bonitas». This echoes the scholastic doctrine of transcentals according to which ens, unum, verum et bonum convertuntur.

70 On this exegetical method, see Morrow-dIllon, Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Par-menides, cit., p. 209.

71 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Secunda suppositio, Chap. 11 (= Op., p. 1193r): «Iam vero si rerum formas in mutua rerum communione contueamur, certe cum Anaxagora omnia quo-dammodo in omnibus contuebimur. Si rursum eas per intelligentiam exactissimam in for-


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integrates, as in the case of Aristotle, the scholastic method of abstraction with-in a Neoplatonic framework, as a preliminary exercise to the apprehension of the Platonic mysteries.

d) Discourses 6-7

After rejecting Pico’s equivalence between the concepts of One and Being, Ficino undertakes to refute the equivalence between the names Good and Be-ing. Pico had argued that there is a multiplicity of beings, just as there is a mul-tiplicity of goodnesses («sicut multiplex et est esse, ita multiplicem esse boni-tatem»). For instance, there is natural being (the fact of being a man, a lion or a stone) and accidental beings (the fact of being wise, beautiful etc.). Natural be-ing and good are equivalent, since everything that is good is good inasmuch as it is («unumquodque quod est eatenus esse bonum quatenus est»).72 This posi-tion had led Pico to attack explicitly Olympiodorus’ famous distinction between good and being («similiter autem et bonum est, quia quicquid est, quatenus est, bonum est. Et longe errat Olympiodorus, mea quidem sententia, sic credens pro-bare aliud esse bonum et ens, quoniam bonum simpliciter desideramus, non au-tem esse simpliciter, sed bene esse, ideoque fieri posse ut, si male sit nobis, non esse desideremus»).

In contrast Ficino, implicitly drawing on pseudo-Olympiodorus’ Phaedo commentary, states in Discourse 6 that one does not seek being, but well-be-ing («quod non eligitur esse, sed bene esse atque bonum»), which indicates that Good is superior to Being.73 Thus, Ficino argues, perfections such as life, knowl-

malibus suis eminentibusque rationibus, tamquam iam abstractissimas, inspexerimus iterum cum Anaxa gora intellectum ipsum esse discretorem omnium confitebimur. Qui autem discre-tionibus eiusmodi uti nescit non est Platonicus nec umquam utitur intellectu. Quamobrem Parmenides ad hoc ipsum exercitaturus ingenui adolescentis ingenium passim per angustissi-ma quae que cogit eum vel concedere falsa vel eiusmodi abstractionibus uti, in quibus, ut ille quoque quem nosti fatetur, non est mendacium» (=ThoMas aquInas, Summa Theologica, I, q. VII, a. 3, obj. 1: «Abstrahentium non est mendacium»).

72 PIco, De Ente et Uno, VIII, cit., pp. 176-179.73 Chap. 46 (= Op., p. 1161). Ficino refers to Olympiodorus’ distinction in Platonic The-

ology, XII, 3, 7 (ed. allen-hanKIns, IV, p. 38): «Item, bonum omnia simpliciter appetunt, esse vero non simpliciter, sed bene esse dumtaxat. Forte etiam si bene esse omnino ne queant, esse non appetant, ut probat Olympiodorus, utpote quae esse appetent gratia boni». Cf. ps-OlyM PIo dorus (=DaMascIus), In Phaedonem, edidit W. NorVIn, Lipsiae 1913, 1, 179 and 1, 189. Ficino read and annotated Olympiodorus’ Phaedo commentary and Damascius’ Phae-do and Philebus commentaries in Riccardianus 37 (cf. L. G. WesterInK, Ficino’s Marginal Notes on Olympio dorus in Riccardi Greek Ms 37, «Traditio», XXIV, 1968, pp. 352-378; Mar-silio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, cit., pp. 110-111, n° 86). Ficino fol-lowed one branch of the textual tradition, in ascribing to Olympiodorus the whole content of the manuscript, including the sections that are now attributed to Damascius: see L. G.

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edge, desire and action do not constitute degrees of essence («ut non sint qui-dam quasi gradus essentiae»), but only formal additions («formalia quaedam ad-dita»); they are essential perfections that ultimately depend on the supreme Good («tamquam perfectiones eius et bona quaedam a bono superiore pendentia»). Every essence tends towards something; each desires this thing, non qua being, but qua good. In other words, the elevation towards God cannot be achieved by a purification of the four universals such as described by Pico, but through an innate desire towards the Good.

In the seventh and last discourse (Chap. 47) Ficino defines the difference between being and good («quae differens ratio entis atque boni»).74 To prove this point Ficino uses Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine according to which substance (unlike accidents) does not admit a variation in degree.75 According to Ficino, essence (unlike the good) is not susceptible to more or less («Essentia ipsa, qua ratione essentia est, magis minusve non suscipit. Bonum vero, tamquam aliud, magis suscipit atque minus»). Therefore, «more being» or «having more essence» are not degrees of being, but are «more» in the sense of «better», i.e. thanks to God’s supreme Goodness. Similarly, one seeks a thing because this thing is bet-ter, not because it has more being («saepe etiam quod magis essentiale est in re-bus appetit ut finem aliquem quod in his est minus essentiale, id est actionem motumque aliquem, tamquam melius aliquid vel tamquam per quod melius quan-doque se habeat quasi essentia et bonum non sint idem»). In addition, the op-posites of being and good, namely, non-being and evil, are different: evil and non-good are not only privations of being, but also defects («praetera oppositum quidem entis est non ens, oppositum vero boni malum, sed malum non idem pe-nitus atque non ens. Malum enim dicitur non solum omnimoda, ut ita dixerim, essendi privatio, sed etiam defectus quidam boni»).

Similarly, Ficino demonstrates against Pico that knowledge and pleasure do not constitute an end, but depend ultimately on the Good. The formal per-fection of essence is the intellectual form of which the perfection is the actu-al intelligence («intelligentia actualis») and intelligence has most being when it is most certain («haec vero plurimum sui entis habet quando certissima est»). In both intellectual activity (such as intellectus or certitudo) and supra-intel-lectual activity («voluptas»),76 Ficino argues, the end is the Good, rather than

WesterInK, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. II. Damascius, Amsterdam-Oxford-New York 1977, pp. 15-18.

74 Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1161).75 thoMas aquInas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 5, a. 1, obj. 3.76 The theme of pleasure as an element of the supreme Good rather than Intellect is

discussed by Plotinus (Enneads, 6.7, 25-26) and Proclus (Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 4, p. 36.7-11); it derives from Plato’s Philebus 66c. Here Ficino uses voluptas in the sense of gaudium or furor, just as Pico refers to insania in De Ente et Uno, V, as the ultimate stage in the mys-tical union with God. In the De Voluptate, an early treatise written in 1457 (cf. KrIsteller,


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Being.77 Indeed, Ficino goes on, expressions such as «magis essentiae» and «magis entis» cannot refer to a degree of magnitude, number, time, or any degree of quality, since these do not befit any substance. Magis ens, therefore, necessari-ly refers to what is more desirable (optabile).78 The Good itself cannot be equiv-alent to what is «most being» (maxime ens), for just as within each thing well-being and being are distinct, similarly Being and Good are different. Moreover, what is maxime ens is by no means simple being (simpliciter ens), but being pro-vided with «an essential addition» («addimentum essentiale»), which makes be-ing maxime, namely best (optime), that is, dependent on the Good. Finally, per-fection, or Goodness, is either formal or final. Yet, if one can object that formal goodness is an essential addition, one cannot possibly do so in the case of final Goodness, i.e. the goodness that constitutes the end for each substance.79

Supplementum Ficinianum, cit., I, p. cxV), Ficino distinguishes laetita/gaudium from voluptas («Plato igitur, ut ab eorum principe initium faciam, cum animum in duas partes distri buis set, mentem scilicet ac sensum, menti laetitiam et gaudium attribuit, sensibus voluptatem»; Op., p. 937), but also argues that both terms can be used interchangeably (Op., p. 997): «Quine-tiam interdum et ipse Plato voluptatis et gaudii nomina confundit, utroque vocabulo utens ad utrumque significandum. Nomine igitur vel nullo modo, vel vix, ac minimo discrepant, ex vero re congruant testes esse possunt nonnulli Platonis libri necnon Platonici plerique haud-quaquam philosophi contemnendi […]».

77 Cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 4, p. 36.7-11.78 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1162): «[…] at si etiam susciperis quod

magis essentiae vel entis habet, id magis expeti, equidem non putabo te magis essentiam su-spicari quasi mole maiorem vel numero plurem vel tempore diuturniorem vel gradibus quasi qualitatis intentiorem. Essentia enim suapte natura a magnitudine, numero, tempore, quali-tate simpliciter est abstracta et haec quae modo narravi nonnumquam minus eliguntur quam opposita. Neque rursus substantialiorem, ut ita loquar, eam vocas. Magis enim atque minus non pertinent ad substantiam. Reliquum est ut illud magis ens et optabile magis iudicaturus sis quod ens est melius. Melius autem, per ipsam bonitatem, melius esse censetur. Sed quae bonitas est in essentia qualitas est essentiae entisque conditio. Super hanc igitur extat ipsum absolute bonum».

79 Ibid.: «Si vero dixeris bonum ipsum esse id omnino quod maxime ens est, respon-deo primo quidem sicut in quolibet ente alia quidem est essendi ratio, alia vero bene essen-di, sic aliam esse rationem ipsius maxime entis, aliam ipsius boni. Deinde quod maxime ens appellabas non fore simpliciter ens, sed cum additamento quodam per quod non simplici-ter quidem sit, sed sit quam maxime, id est quam perfectissime, id est quam optime, scilicet per aliquam perfectionem bonitatemque ab ipso simpliciter bono prorsus infusam. Cum vero dicimus ipsum simpliciter bonum, dicimus omne sine limitatione vel compositione bonum. Item perfectio bonitasve est gemina. Alia quidem formalis, alia vero finalis. Si quis ergo con-vicerit formalem bonitatem esse quasi quoddam augumentum essentiale, non tamen de fina-li quae est potissima et optima, idem dicere poterit. Igitur bonum praeter essentiam censetur existere, idque saepe facit ut quod quasi accidentale est in re, vel circa rem optabilius sit et melius eo quod essentiale magis, quod quidem fieri nequit absque condimento boni (sive id quidem formale sit, sive sit finale), praesertim quia quod quasi accidentale est ideo optabilius est quod circa bonum ipsum agit externum, alioquin optabilius numquam foret. Non enim potest accidens esse substantiae finis. Igitur finis eius est ipsum bonum penes quod substan-tia per illud accidens sese versat. Praeterea essentia, vita, intellectus differunt inter se ratione formali, differentes enim definitiones habent, nec idem haec inter se sunt, scilicet non ens,

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Ficino also refutes Pico’s distinction between accidental and natural being. According to him, an accidental thing (i.e. which has less being) can be more desirable than a thing that has more being («idque saepe facit ut quod qua-si accidentale est in re vel circa rem optabilius sit et melius eo quod essentiale magis, quod quidem fieri nequit absque condimento boni (sive id quidem for-male sit, sive sit finale), praesertim quia quod quasi accidentale est ideo optabi-lius est quod circa bonum ipsum agit externum, alioquin optabilius num quam foret»).80

Ficino then rejects Pico’s doctrine of plurality of beings as contrary to the di-vine Providence: the triad of being, life, and intellect differs formally, since their respective opposites are different; however, there are no degrees of being as there are degrees of heat. One could also object, Ficino goes on, that there are no de-grees of essence as such, but that in each composite there are different modes of being. For instance, our soul would first have its natural being, then the being of tranquillity, then of wisdom, then of felicity («forte vero dicet aliquis essen-tiam quidem non magis minusve qualitatis modo suscipere, sed in quovis com-posito multos essendi modos esse posse, ut anima nostra primo quidem habet suum esse naturale, secundo suscipit esse tranquillitatis, tertio sapientiae, quar-to felicitatis»), with an equal number of degrees of being and goodness («toti-demque procedere bonitatis gradus quot essendi modos»).81 In that case, Ficino argues, being and good should remain formally different at every level, for be-ing always seeks the good; therefore, when the soul desires, beyond its natural being, knowledge, it does so because knowledge is good rather than «more be-ing» («essentiae magis compotem»).

Finally, Ficino refutes Pico’s contention that being precedes unity and good within the creation, just as the efficient cause precedes the paradigmatic and the final causes.82 According to Ficino, things created by the First are ‘being’ inas-much as they are created by God (efficient cause), and ‘good’ inasmuch as they are naturally inclined towards Him (final cause). Thus, the final cause provides things with their individual good, while the efficient cause provides them with their essence. Such a distinction, Ficino concludes, demonstrates that the Good is superior to Being («Res vero, sicut diximus, ab ipso deo tamquam effectore sor-

non vivens, non intelligens, et pluribus alia quam alia competunt. Neque per magis minusve differunt, quasi essentia primum gradum et secundum habeat atque tertium, sicut calor, est enim substantiale, sed forte differunt sicut siccitas et calor et lumen. Profecto nisi aliter ens distinguamus quam more qualitatis, per primum eius gradum et secundum atque tertium la-tenter eo deveniemus, ut solam unam essentiam substantiamve fingamus ceu calorem unum modo remissiorem, modo vehementiorem, tollemusque substantialium formarum gradus di-stinctionesque rerum ad providentiam pertinentes».

80 Ibid., Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1162).81 Ibid.82 PIco, De Ente et Uno, VIII-IX, cit., pp. 172-185.


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tiuntur essentiam et tamquam fine praecipue adipiscuntur bonum. Ipsum itaque bonum, ut dicebamus, ipso ente praestantius iudicandum»).83

Aristotle himself, Ficino argues, would not fail to accept this distinction be-tween final and efficient causes, if he remembers that he has received from the ancients the definition of the good as the object of desire for all things («Quod et Aristotelem non arbitror negaturum, si modo meminerit se descriptionem boni hanc a veteribus accepisse: bonum est quod omnia entia appetunt»). Nei-ther will Aristotle fail to concede that there is a difference between the object of desire and the things that desire this object and, as a result, that the Good is different and superior to all beings («Cum enim alia quidem sint appetentia, al-iud vero atque praestantius sit appetibile, certe bonum cunctis entibus expeten-dum, ab Aristotele concedendum est esse tota entium universitate superius»). Aristotle’s definition of God as the prime Mover, which moves all things as an object of desire and love, is therefore in agreement with Plato’s definition of the Good as the final cause («Propterea deum inquit regere movereque omnia non aliter quam ut appetibile et amabile, id est, ut bonum atque finem. Nec iniu-ria causam causarum una cum praeceptore suo nominabit bonum, finis videlicet cognomento, si quidem finalis causa caeteras antecellit»), whilst the equation he draws between one and being actually concerns the one that can be apprehend-ed by intellect, rather than the simple One («Sic ubi vero ens uni bonoque fa-cit aequale, illi forsan uni atque bono par iudicat, quod et ab intellectu perci-pi et ab ente capi potest»). Only Plato has been able to describe the supreme One through veils and metaphors, while Aristotle has venerated the doctrine of his master in silence («Quod autem Plato suus vaticinatur excelsius id, tamquam ineffabile penitus et incognitum, non verbis quidem prosequitur, sed potius si-lentio veneratur»).84

By invoking the Neoplatonic definition of the Good as the universal object of desire, a definition that is based upon Plotinus’ reinterpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the individual good, Ficino intends to demonstrate that Aristotle’s final cause, far from being an innovation, is in fact a re-appropriation of a defi-nition established by the ancient theologians. In other words, Ficino’s aim is to subsume Aristotle’s thought under the divine wisdom of the prisci theologi, which is the only theological discourse capable of describing the ineffable and unknown God. With the two introductory chapters (chapters 39 and 40) as a background, this passage clearly intends to refute Pico’s equivalence between Plato and Aris-totle. More specifically, it counters Pico’s contention that God’s appellations of

83 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1163).84 Ibid. On the distinction between Good and Being, the object of desire and the things

that desire it, see PlotInus, Enneads, V, 5, 13, and Proclus, Elements of Theology, § 8. For the comparison between Aristotle’s and Plato’s definition of the Good, see In Parmenidem, 1169.4-11.

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the One and Good above Being do not constitute a mystery uniquely reserved to the (Neo)Platonists, but had also been explicitly adopted by Aristotle. Invoking the famous passage of Metaphysics L where Aristotle quotes the Homeric verses «let there be one commander, one king»,85 Pico stated that Aristotle, like Plato, had called God the One and the Good.86

e) The Concluding Chapters (48-49)

Two more chapters conclude Ficino’s refutation and precede the explicit mention of Pico. Here Ficino develops against Pico a key argument he had brief-ly alluded to in the seventh discourse: the superiority of the One over Intellect is the very condition for the soul’s supra-rational, ecstatic union with God. It is only through unity that one can attain God. Like Ficino, Pico’s major preoccu-pation was the soul’s apprehension of God through divine madness (insania) and love (amando): 87 as he concluded at the end of the De Ente et Uno, the ultimate goal of his discussion is the attainment of beatitude and the soul’s inner posses-sion of unity, truth and goodness, through divine voluptas, and the love of celes-tial realities.88 Yet unity, truth and goodness, together with the soul’s being, con-stitute, in Pico’s mind, the four universals present in all things («verissima ergo sententia est quattuor esse quae omnia ambiunt, ens, unum, verum et bonum»), including God («examinemus rursus qualiter haec sunt in deo»).89

85 ArIstotle, Metaphysics, L, 1076a 1-4, with reference to Iliad, II, 204-205. 86 PIco, De Ente et Uno, IV, cit., pp. 152-153: «Adiciam et hoc injuria gloriari quosdam

Platonicos qui mysterium habeant Aristoteli ignotum, cum dicunt duas esse proprias Dei appellationes, unum scilicet et bonum, atque ita bonum et unum ante ens esse. Sicut enim ostendimus non latere Peripateticos quo modo supra ens Deus intelligi posit. Possumus et hoc ostendere duo in primis haec nomina boni scilicet et unius Deo Aristotelem dedisse. Nam duodecimo libro primae philosophiae postquam de toto ente separatisque mentibus disputa-vit, quaerit postremo, quasi post omnia ad Dei solius proprietates investigandas conversus, an praeter bonum quod quasi in exercitu in entium universitate est, sit bonum aliquod sepa-ratum quasi in duce hujus exercitus, idque esse determinat, quod bonum Deus est. De quo consequenter eodem capite unitatem probat, in eius testimonium, post validas rationes, illud etiam Homeri: ‘i korano stw, i basil’. Vbi ergo falsus? Vbi discors a Platone est Ari-stoteles? Vbi prophanus? Vbi de Deo minus quam deceat honorifice sentiens?».

87 PIco, De Ente et Uno, V, p. 166 and note 45, p. 344: «Sed vide mi Angele quae nos in-sania teneat. Amare Deum dum sumus in corpore plus possumus quam vel eloqui vel cogno-scere. Amando plus nobis proficimus, minus laboramus, illi magis obsequimur».

88 Ibid., X, p. 186: «[…] admonere autem in primis nos praesens disputatio videtur ut, si esse beati volumus, beatissimum omnium imitemur Deum, unitatem in nobis, veritatem bo-nitatemque possidentes […]. Fugiamus hinc ergo idest a mundo qui positus in maligno. Evo-lemus ad Patrem ubi pax unifica, ubi lux verissima, ubi voluptas optima. Sed quis dabit pen-nas ut illuc volemus? Amor eorum quae sursum sunt».

89 Ibid., VIII («In quo declarat quomodo quattuor haec ens scilicet, unum, verum et bo-num in omnibus sint quae sunt post Deum») and IX («In quo declarat quomodo illa quat-tuor in Deo sint»).


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In contrast, Ficino shows that the principle of each being is what is most uni-tary in them, an innate unity (unitas) which is the character of the simple and ab-solute One («character illius simpliciter unitatis»), and in virtue of which each of these realities is a god and is united to the supreme and absolute God. It is only through its unity, Ficino states, that the Intellect can communicate with the su-preme One and can therefore be a god and a principle.90 In this context, Ficino reinterprets Proclus’ doctrine of the henads in a very specific context. In the first chapter, Ficino paraphrases a section of Proclus’ Parmenides commentary, where Proclus demonstrates through the examples of light, nature and knowledge, that any class of things ultimately derives from a unitary principle, i.e. a divine hen-ad, which is an intermediary between the One and the Ideas.91 But while Pro-clus considers that the henads are intermediaries between the One and the Intel-lect, they become in Ficino’s commentary unities within the intellectual part of the soul («unitas intellectuali illi animae praeest, quasi character illius simplicit-er unitatis, quae est universi principium»).92 In doing so, Ficino reinterprets Pro-clus’ description of henads in the light of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the «one of the soul» («unum animae»), a concept that is also prominent in Christian mys-ticism («apex mentis») and central to Ficino’s thought.93 This position leads Fi-

90 FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. 48 (= Op., p. 1163): «Quae quidem unitas intellectua-li illi animae praeest, quasi character illius simpliciter unitatis, quae est universi principium, cui et intellectus ille per unitatem suam maxime est unitus. Per eandem est diciturque deus. Haec igitur divina solis unitas est uniformis luminis mundani principium, quemadmodum et ipsa simpliciter unitas atque bonitas est luminis intelligibilis auctor. […] Cum vero in hac rerum semina sint quam plurima, unum autem oporteat esse principium, merito per princi-palem unitatem suam, per quam et ipsa divina est summoque deo prorsus unita, est genera-tionis omnis mundanae principium. […] Investigantibus praeterea quid primum cognitionis omnis principium sit, perfectissima cognitio, id est intellectus primus, protinus occurret ut princeps. Verumtamen non per multas species conceptionesque suas primum erit cognoscen-di principium, nam unum tandem hoc esse debet, sed per unitatem suam, qua deus existit, tam sibi quam caeteris virtutem cognoscendi largitur».

91 Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1044-1051. As participated unities, «summits» of the chains of all beings, the henads are intermediaries between the One as totally simple and transcendent, and the One as the source of all being. The fullest presentation of Pro-clus’ doctrine of divine henads occur in the Elements of Theology, §§ 113-165, and in Plato-nic Theology, III, 1-6.

92 Chap. XLVIII (= Op., p. 1163). 93 Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1047, 1071-1072 and 1080, and FIcIno, In Parme-

nidem, Chap. 78 (= Op., pp. 1187-1188). See P. O. KrIsteller, Il pensiero filosofico di Marsi-lio Ficino, Firenze 1953, pp. 400-403. On the Neoplatonic doctrine of the «one in the soul», see J. RIst, Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism, «Hermes», XCII, 1964, pp. 213-225; W. BeIerwaltes, Der Begriff des ‘unum in nobis’ bei Proklos, in Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt 1965, translated in Italian, Proclo. I fondamenti della sua metafi-sica, Milano 1990, pp. 396-411; for the reception of the doctrine in medieval mysticim, see L. ReyPens, Âme (son fond, ses puissances et sa structure d’après les mystiques), in M. VIller et al., Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, I, Paris 1937, pp. 434-469; E. Von IVànKa, Apex mentis, in Plato Christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter, Einsiedeln

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cino to underline, against Pico, that the soul’s union with God is only possible through its innate unity; postulating, as did Pico, the existence within us of any other entity superior to unity renders mystical union impossible.

Similarly, in the following and last chapter Ficino demonstrates that the first principle is the unity and goodness above intellect, life and essence («Primum rerum principium est unitas bonitasque super intellectum, vitam, essentiam»). Ficino’s main argument is that the first Intellect is not god qua intellect, life or essence, but qua one, and depends therefore on the supreme One. This echoes a long Neoplatonic tradition that culminates with Proclus’ famous refutation of Origen the Platonist’s equivalence between the First principle and the Intellect in Book II of the Platonic Theology.94 But here Ficino paraphrases another text of Proclus, Proclus’ description of the henad of knowledge in the Parmenides commentary, and links it with the final section of Plotinus’ Ennead 6.7, How the Multitude of Ideas came into Being, and on the Good (chaps 15-47), where Plo-tinus describes the genesis of Intellect and multiplicity from the One and places the One above life, intellect and essence.95 According to Ficino, the first Intel-lect cannot be the absolute, simple Principle, since it is determined by an intel-lectual condition and order («Existimabit forte aliquis primum intellectum esse simpliciter primum. Tametsi opporteret eum qui sic existimat animadvertere se, dum dicit primum intellectum, significare id ipsum quod dicit non iam esse sim-pliciter, sed certa quaquam conditione et definito quodam ordine, scilicet intel-lectuali, primum»). In addition, the Intellect is related by proportio to individu-al intellects, while this type of relation does not befit the First («Similiter neque quod ipsum intelligibile nominatur poterit simpliciter esse primum, praesertim cum proportionem habeat quandam cum intellectu quolibet a primo principio alienam»). The Intellect cannot be the first and supreme God, since all reali-ties do not possess the character of intelligence or knowledge («Sed dic quaeso, qui intellectum vis esse primum summumque deum, quanam ratione id munus habebit? Non qua intellectus est, alioquin cum omnia primi potentissimi auctoris omnium debeant reportare characterem, intelligentiam vel cognitionem quan-

1964, translated in French, Plato Christianus. La réception critique du platonisme chez les Pères de l’Église, Paris 1990, pp. 299-334.

94 Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 4, and Id., In Parmenidem, Chap. VI, pp. 1064.21-1066.16.

95 Cf. Ennead, VI, 7, 17.11. On Plotinus’ doctrine of the genesis of multiplicity from the One, see M. AtKInson, Plotinus: Ennead V 1. On the Three Principal Hypostases, Oxford 1983, pp. 124-184; A. C. Lloyd, Plotinus on the Genesis of Thought and Existence, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», V, 1987, pp. 155-186; J. BussanIch, The One and Its Relation to In-tellect in Plotinus, Leiden 1988; C. D’Ancona, Determinazione e indeterminazione nel sovra-sensibile secondo Plotino, «Rivista di storia della filosofia», XLV, 1990, pp. 437-474; Ead., La doctrine de la création dans le Liber de Causis, «Revue des sciences philosophiques et théo-logiques», LXXVI, 1992, pp. 209-233.


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dam omnia possidebunt»). Drawing on Proclus’ description of the henad of In-tellect, Ficino argues that there is as much difference between the Intellect and the First as there is between creation and contemplation («Quantum vero in-terest inter facere atque contueri, tanto intellectus intervallo saltem a primo re-rum principio distat»). For it is the proper role of Intellect to contemplate the realities that already exist, whilst the role of God is to create, preserve and per-fect all things («intellectus ille primus, qua ratione est intelligens, ad intelligibilia iam existentia et ad ipsa quae dicuntur entia sese confert, nec aliud habet pro-prium, nisi illa quae iam sunt perspicue contueri. Non igitur hac ratione rerum principium esse potest, cuius proprium est omnia facere, servare, perficere»).96 Finally, the individual intellects are, like the first Intellect, intelligent souls, and as such are either demons or angels, but not gods, unless they also possess the gift of universal providence («Denique intellectus etiam sunt particulariter intel-ligentes animae, sive daemones, sive angeli, neque tamen dii sunt, nisi praeterea universalis providentiae munus habeant»).

Ficino then draws upon the last section of Plotinus’ Ennead VI, 7. He argues that the Intellect cannot be a principle qua life or essence, since life and essence do not constitute universal characters («Sed numquid intellectus ille primus, qua ratione vita est, appellandus est princeps? Minime, nam omnia viverent. Forte vero qua est essentia, sunt enim omnia? Neque id quidem. Perfectior enim est, qua intellectus existit aut etiam vita, quam qua essentia. Si igitur non illa, ne-que ista ratione deus»). The Intellect, therefore, is a principle only in virtue of the unity and the goodness within itself, which ultimately depend from the sim-ple Unity and Goodness («Quanam igitur conditione primus intellectus habet, ut sit principium aliquid atque deus, qua videlicet ferme cuncta sibi quodam-modo similia reddit? Per unitatem bonitatemque omnibus distributam»). Unity and Goodness above Intellect are the names of the first principle, since the First is both incomparable simplicity, whereby it is called unity («incomparabilis ipsa simplicitas quam ipsam dicimus unitatem»), and all-pervading diffusion, where-by it is called goodness («communicabilitas per omnia se diffundens quam bo-nitatem ipsam cognominamus»).97

It is not surprising that Ficino compares Plotinus’ and Proclus’ descriptions of mystical union. Before commenting upon Plotinus’ Ennead VI, 7, Ficino had read and translated excerpts of Proclus’ commentary on the First Alcibiades, where Proclus describes the unity of the soul’s intellect in a mystical context as the supra-intellectual unity that enables the soul to unite with the One.98 Ficino

96 See FIcIno, In Parmenidem, Chap. VI (Op., p. 1047).97 Chap. 49 (= Op., p. 1164).98 In Alcibiadem, 246.21-248.4 (Proclus. Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon, ed. & transl.

by A.-Ph. SeGonds, II, Paris 1986, pp. 294-295). Ficino’s translation is in Op., p. 1922, under the title Multi gradus per quos a multitudine ad unum ascendimus contemplando. On Ficino’s

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had already underlined in his commentary on Plotinus’ ‘last’ treatises the simi-larity between Proclus’ description of the soul’s inner unity, the ‘flower’ of hu-man essence in the First Alcibiades commentary («per unum et tamquam essen-tiae nostrae florem attingere licet, per quod sane nostrum unum divino maxime iungimur») 99 and the soul’s unity described in Ennead VI, 7, 35 («in anima quo-que est unitas intellectu superior per quam deo fruitur visione quadam intel-ligentiam superante»).100 In this way, he underlines the affinity between Plo-tinus’ and Proclus’ descriptions of the soul’s elevation towards God, as also noted by John Bussanich.101 Indeed, beyond the fundamental differences between Plotinus’ and Proclus’ doctrines, and Proclus’ sharp criticisms of Plotinus,102 which Ficino was at least partially aware of,103 both philosophers describe a state of ecstatic, pure thought that transcends the Intellect.104 Proclus himself frequently alludes to Plotinus’ famous reference to the Symposium’s «intoxica-

translation, see KrIsteller, Supplementum Ficinianum, I, cit., pp. cxxxIV-cxxxV; MeGna, Per Ficino e Proclo, cit., who identified Ficino’s exemplar as Palatinus gr. 63.

99 Op., p. 1922.100 Op., p. 1793.101 Cf. J. BussanIch, Non-Discursive Thought in Plotinus and Proclus, «Documenti e studi

sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», VIII, 1997, pp. 190-210; Id., Mystical Theology and Spi-ritual Experience, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, cit., pp. 291-310. It should be noted, moreover, that both doctrines are linked to the problem of the creation by the One of the In-tellect and Multiplicity, a problem that was central to Plotinus and Proclus, but also, through the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology and the Liber de Causis, in Avicennian philosophy: see C. D’ancona costa, La doctrine de la Création ‘mediante intelligentia’ dans le Liber de Causis, «Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques», LXXVI, 1992, pp. 209-234.

102 Proclus rejects the Plotinian doctrine of the direct derivation of the Intellect from the One on the ground that it introduces multiplicity within the One. His own solution is to mul-tiply the hypostatic degrees between the One and multiplicity, by placing between the One and Intellect the universal principles of Limit and Unlimited and the henads, and by estab-lishing a distinction between the intellects and the intelligibles. See Hadot, Porphyre et Vic-torinus, cit., I, pp. 99-100; A. H. ArMstronG, The Background of the Doctrine ‘That the Intel-ligibles are not outside the Intellect’, in Fondation Hardt. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique, V: Les sources de Plotin, Genève 1960, pp. 391-413; J. PéPIn, Éléments pour une histoire de la re-lation entre l’intelligence et l’intelligible chez Platon et dans le néoplatonisme, «Revue philos-ophique de la France et de l’Etranger», LXVI, 1956, pp. 34-64; C. D’Ancona, Primo princi-pio e mondo intelligibile nella metafisica di Proclo: problemi e soluzioni, «Elenchos», XII, 1991, pp. 271-302. Proclus also criticises the Plotinian conception of the soul’s only partial descent from the realm of the divine: cf. PlotInus, Ennead, IV, 8 and In Parmenidem, IV 948; In Ti-maeum, III, 334.3 ff.

103 Ficino rejects Proclus’ criticism of Plotinus’ conception of the second hypothesis as describing the intelligible world as a whole (cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 10, p. 42.2-20). More specifically, Ficino rejects Proclus’ distinction between intellect and intel-ligible, and follows Plotinus’ argument that intellect, intelligible, being, essence and life con-stitute a unique substance. See Chap. 56 (= Op., p. 1170).

104 PlotInus, Ennead, VI, 7 35.19, and Proclus, In Parmenidem, IV, pp. 1071.16-19; 1072.3-5; VII, p. 48.12-19.


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tion with nectar» when describing the Intellect’s supra-rational phase of union with the One.105 Given his deep interest in mysticism, as well as what he saw as his mission of unveiling Plotinus’ oracles through the exploration of other Ne-oplatonic authors, Ficino could not fail to be struck by the similarity between Plotinus’ and Proclus’ doctrines and terminology. In this way, it is safe to as-sume that Ficino’s Parmenides commentary represents an attempt to enlighten, through the exploration of Proclus’ exegesis of the Parmenides, Plotinus’ theo-ry of the One and the Intellect. In the context of the controversy with Pico, this enables Ficino to underline once again the fact that the supra-intellectual un-ion with God necessarily implies that the First Principle transcends Being and Intellect.106

4. conclusIon

To conclude, a close comparison between Ficino’s and Proclus’ commen-taries, regarding both the structure and the nature of the arguments, is crucial to determine the purpose of Ficino’s exegesis. Buried among Neoplatonic argu-ments, some significant discrepancies enable us to determine the specific issues Ficino was addressing in his commentary. In the context of the present article, this analysis provides us with new evidence about the nature of Ficino’s and Pi-co’s controversy and the relation of Ficino’s commentray with that of Proclus. As I have shown, the way in which Ficino works back and forth between Pro-clus’ Parmenides commentary and his Platonic Theology is significant in that it enables Ficino to respond point by point to Pico’s thesis. Ficino integrates his refutation within his paraphrase of Proclus’ works, reusing the arguments of an-cient controversies to defend his own position. In doing so, Ficino demonstrates a remarkable insight into the Platonic tradition as described by Proclus. Similar-ly, Pico was aware of some key Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the importance of the Sophist and the Parmenides within Proclus’ metaphysical system, and re-used these to demolish Ficino’s Neoplatonic exegesis.

But the Pico-Ficino controversy does not simply repeat ancient debates. While the Neoplatonic controversies on the nature of the Parmenides were pri-

105 PlotInus, Ennead, VI, 7, 35, 19-27, quoted in Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1047; 1071-1072 and 1080; Id., Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 14, pp. 65.26-66.2. The expression mwn t nktari ultimately derives from the myth of Poros in Plato’s Symposium (203b 6).

106 In the Commento, Pico describes divine beatitude as occurring in the soul’s intel-lect (PIco, Commento, III 4 and Stanze VI, VII e VIII, ed. GarIn, pp. 530 and 569); in the Conclusiones, however, he states that it occurs in the soul’s unity (Conclusio paradoxa XLIII: «[…] actus quo felicitatur natura angelica et rationalis ultima felicitate non est actus intel-lectus, nec voluntatis, sed unio unitatis, quae est in alteritate animae cum unitate, quae est sine alteritate»).

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marily concerned with describing the world in the most adequate and systemat-ic way, Pico and Ficino were rather concerned with the nature of the concord between Plato and Aristotle and between Neoplatonism and Scholastic philos-ophy. In this context, I would argue that Ficino’s commentary on the Parme-nides represents the ultimate stage in his understanding of Neoplatonism as a unified tradition, and of a fundamental harmony between Plato, Plotinus and Proclus,107 while Pico’s De Ente et Uno rejects any attempt to reduce God and the divine realm to a univocal system of thought. This controversy was also concerned with the definition of the most appropriate theological discourse to describe God: whilst Pico argued that any tradition could lead to the soul’s union with God, Ficino demonstrated that only henology and apophatic mysti-cism could lead to God, since union could only be achieved through the unity within us.

As a last blow against Pico and his legacy, Ficino chooses to praise later in the commentary the doctrine of Beauty of another complatonicus, his disci-ple Francesco Diacceto, «whom the nature and genius seem to have trained to the apprehension of Platonic wisdom», rather than referring to Pico’s exegesis of Benivieni’s poem.108 In the fifth Chapter of his interpretation of the Parme-nides’ second hypothesis, regarding the derivation of the intelligible world from the One, Ficino describes the intelligible world as a double forma totalis. The first form, which precedes the multitude, is the «superessential unity and good-ness» («superessentialis unitas bonitasque») and the «summit of the intelligible world» («mundi illius intelligibilis apex»). The second, which «follows or accom-panies the multitude» is called Beauty and consists in «the continuous and or-dered series of Ideas» («secunda vero pulchritudo, id est contextus quidam et ordo ac series idearum»).109 Characterising the relation between Unity and Being in terms of Goodness and Beauty, Ficino argues that Prime Being and Intellect, as Beauty, is the external manifestation of God’s Unity and Goodness. In doing

107 Cf. S. ToussaInt, L’individuo estatico. Tecniche profetiche in Marsilio Ficino e Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, «Bruniana&Campanelliana», VI, 2000, pp. 351-379: 377.

108 Chap. LXXXIV (= Op., p. 1191r): «Sed dum pulchritudinem hic divinam memoro commemorare fas est Franciscum Diacetum dilectissimum complatonicum nostrum de hac ipsa pulchritudine quotidie multa pulcherrimaque scribentem. Quem sane virum ad Platoni-cam sapientiam natura geniusque formavisse videtur». See f. cattanI dIacceto, De Pulchro, I, 9, a cura di S. Matton, Pisa 1986, pp. 74-75.

109 Ibid. (Op., p. 1191v): «Cum ens primum, tamquam ipsi simpliciter uni proximum, ma-xime unum sit, qualiscumque et quantacumque multitudo sit in eo, ad unam redigitur totius formam. Forma quidem totalis in rebus, quae a diversis causis componuntur solumque aliun-de dependent, partes eiusdem rei multas sequi solet. Sed in ente primo, quod ab unico ge-neratur et quodammodo etiam ex se existit, forma totalis est necessario gemina. Prima qui-dem suam partium multitudinem antecedit, secunda vero sequitur, vel potius comitatur. Illa quidem appellatur superessentialis unitas bonitasque, mundi illius intelligibilis apex, secun-da vero pulchritudo, id est contextus quidam et ordo ac series idearum».


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so, Ficino reassesses, in the context of the Parmenides, a Neoplatonic position he had already adopted in the De Amore and in the Platonic Theology, and that Pico had explicitly rejected in his Commento.110

110 See fIcIno, Platonic Theology, XI, 4 (ed. allen-HanKIns, III, pp. 266-269): «[…] pul-chritudo ipsa pulchrorum omnium est mensura, quia per accessum ad pulchritudinem pri-mam et recessum ab ipsa res sequentes magis minusve pulchrae existimantur. Et quod cadit ab omni pulchritudine, ab omni cadit essentia et quod totam possidet pulchritudinem, totam habet essentiam, quia prima essentia et prima pulchritudino sunt idem»; XII, 3 (ibid., IV, p. 38): «[…] sicut enim in ordine rerum bene esse in unione consistit, quoniam malum dissen-sione et divisione contingit, sic et super ordinem universi idem est unum ipsum atque bonum, cuius splendor est pulchritudo, quae nihil est aliud quam multarum rationalis ordo formarum in mente, anima, natura, materia inde refulgens. Supra quam pulchritudinem esse unum pro-bant, quia illa composita sit»; De Amore, II, 2. Cf. PlotInus, Ennead, I, 6, 6 and V 5, 12; Pro-clus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades, 327, 21-330, 1, a passage translated by Ficino between 1486 and 1489 (Op., p. 927: «omne pulchrum naturaliter est bonum, omne turpe malum et vi-cissim»). As noted above, Pico explicitely rejects Ficino’s definition of beauty as an extrinsic manifestion of God’s intrinsic Goddness, cf. PIco, Commento, II 3, ed. GarIn, p. 489.

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