Samuel Hollander, The Source of Increased Efficiency: A Study of Du PontRayon Plants. Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1965, and RobertK. Yin, Karen A. Heald, Mary E. Vogel, Patricia D. Fleischauer, andBruce C. Vladek, A Review of Case Studies of Technological innovationsJLP State and Local Services, Santa Monica, Caiif., The Rand Corporation,R-1870-NSF, February 1976.

6Joseph T. Schwab, The Practical: A Language for Curriculum, Washington,l^-C, National Education Association, 1970.

Kan Chen, "Exploring New Directions in Engineering Education," Techno-logical Forecasting and Sociai Changes 3, 391-396 (1972).

The Policy Dilemma:Accommodation of Dimensional ShiftStewart FergusonUniversity of Windsor

The benefits of science and technology to society areobvious. Out of a recognition of the positive contributionthat these areas can make has grown a concern for the evolu-tion of policy best capable of accommodating scientific andtechnological innovation. Unfortunately, innovation andpolicy are, in many regards, incompatible by nature.

The full implications of policies designed to cope withthe anticipated effects of innovations may not be realizedat the time the policies are formulated. The English govern-ment's reaction to the introduction of the automobile wellillustrates this point. In response to the perception ofcertain hazards raised by the automobile. Parliament passeda law requiring that all automobiles be accompanied by a manrunning in front, waving a red flag to warn of the vehicle'sapproach. This adaptation to the problem may seem highlycomic in retrospect, but at the time the people wereresponding in complete seriousness to a new factor in theirenvironment. This adaptation was functional in terms of thesociety into which the innovation intruded.

Nonetheless, the very quintessential contribution ofthe innovation was being inhibited in the process of theattempted adjustment. What the automobile offered was a newdimension of speed in transportation, and this speed had now•̂ een shackled to the speed of the man carrying the red flag.Such is frequently the case in policies formed to deal withscientific and technological innovations.

In The Politics and Technology of Satellite Communica-iion_. Galloway observed that technological innovation createsthe necessity for new policy but does not alter the process"Y which policy is made. He noted: "In the shifting pat-tern of expectations, one sees not the inevitable force ofechnology making its mark on man but a multiplicity ofeconomic, political, and technological influences operating°n each other."! Through this interaction, the social insti-utions mold the technological innovations to society'seeds. Agreement with Galloway's proposition could lead toWo distinct, and indeed opposite, conclusions. A negativeinterpretation of this statement implies the fostering ofpolicies that put the man with the red flag in front of the

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automobile; a more positive interpretation acknowledges thatthe desirability of man's being clairvoyant does not makehim so, and he must accommodate change in the best way thathe knows. This approach recognizes that as social adapta-tion is on a different time scale from technological innova-tion, there will always be a lag between introduction andaccommodation.

Policy making is necessarily backward-looking. Guide-lines for drawing up policy demand that consideration begiven to how policies were framed in the past and to experi-ence gained from the consequences of such policies. Thenature of innovation is such that the experience of the pastmay become irrelevant to the novel patterns of interactiongenerated by the innovation. Mesthene discussed this point:

Much technological potential lies fallow . . .because existing social structures and incen-tive structures are poorly attuned to exploitingthe opportunities it offers. . . . When onlythose organizational changes follow a techno-logical innovation that serve the goals of theorganizations involved, the society at largetends to suffer, for two reasons. First,institutional inertia, vested interests, andcommitments to existing goals operate to inhibituse of technology in the service of other pos-sible goals not served by existing institutions;that is, socially desirable public goods wind upin short supply. Second, new technologicalthreats against which there is no institutionalsafeguard are not contained; that is, the publicwinds up paying for costs incurred without itsconsent and against its will. The lesson isclear: technological change must be accompaniedby institutional innovation if its benefits areto be maximized and its costs kept to a minimum.Old organizations and habits were spawned byolder technologies and older problems. Newertechnologies and newer problems, by the samelogic, call for new organizations and forrestructured social institutions. In a time ofrapid technological change, moreover, institu-tional innovation must also be rapid, which meansit needs to be deliberately induced; it cannotany longer be left to time and chance. Toenvisage technological changes without attentionto the institutional changes they imply maytherefore be, in the present condition ofsociety, to court disaster.2

Likewise Roger Morgan noted the potential danger thatpolicy makers might remain addicted to a theory when it hadbeen rendered obsolete by events. He stated, for example,that Keynesian economics were still being applied "as auto-matically appropriate although the nature of the economicworld had radically changed."3 Morgan concluded thatimplicit in such a state of affairs is the likelihood thatmajor decisions on such subjects as the introduction of cabletelevision will be made by the "tyranny of small decisions."

This situation is further aggravated when the expertisenecessary in the analysis of anticipated consequences is held

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by that segment of the population most likely to be affected,or indeed made redundant, by the innovation. Looking at therecommendations of military personnel on defense policy, forexample, will not reveal much evidence of recommended cuts inthe branches of the military that the experts represent.Likewise, the case of satellite communications illustratesthis point. The major innovationary implication in satellitecommunication is the promised capacity to make televisioncontact with areas of the world where no modern communicationssystems exist. The technology has been developed so that itwill soon be possible to communicate, via satellite, directinto domestic television receivers. However, present uti-lization and legislation have been directed towards thesupplementation of existing carrier systems. Using thecommunication technology to upgrade existing systems indeveloped countries offers the fastest economic return. Theindustrial monopolistic corporations who control existingcommunication carrier systems maintain the strongest polit-ical lobbies, thus exercising a firm control over policy.Because these groups are predominantly concerned with pro-tecting their present investment, the policies that theyunderwrite emphasize improving these carrier systems ratherthan in making them redundant by setting up direct broadcastsatellite linkages. Furthermore, the major communicationsorganizations such as I.T. & T. and Bell, by virtue of theirtechnical expertise, are frequently called in to act asConsultants on policy. The recommendations that they canoe expected to make are predictable ones.

Temporary policy is often offered and accepted on theproposition that the urgency of the need posed by scientificor technological innovation demands immediate action. AsMorgan noted, many decisions on communications policy have to'̂e made before those responsible can wait for the results ofexhaustive research. Looking at the development of thesatellite technology enables a view of the consequences ofsuch temporary policy. The relay station is offered as thelogical intermediate step towards direct reception. Thisinvolves setting up cable systems that, once established,will demand and generate use and expansion, so prolonginga system already technologically redundant.'* In the ThirdWorld context, such a cable secondary system could only beset up by user funding (as with the telephone system). Onlythe top strata of the Third World population could affordto subsidize such a system. Thus, its use would berestricted to the middle and upper classes in cities. Be-cause the redistribution system promises maintenance of thenierarchial status quo, the development of satellitetechnology could stagnate at this stage.

Policies concerning communication potential are likelyto be particularly vulnerable to the conflict between thenature of policy and the nature of innovations. As noted^arlier, predicting the exact results of any act of innova-tion is difficult. The complexity of the administrativeprocess itself is a direct outgrowth of the communicationcapacity of the society. For example, sociologists make airect connection between the transition from the ancient° the modern city and an enhanced administrative potentialafforded by improved communication processes. A majornnovation in communication implies a shift in the dimensionOf complexity of administrative process. A policy makingprocess that draws its models from the past and makes linear

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extrapolation into the future does not recognize suchshifts. This is the essence of the problem of accommodatingchange through policy. In referring to the debates over theFederal Communications Act of 1934 and the structure of theI.T.U., Leonard H. Marks observed that the debates centeredabout the capacity to develop and administer policies thatwere "theories or laboratory experiments" only a few yearsago.5 Speaking to this same area of concern, a UNESCO studystated that traditional concepts and social arrangementscannot cope with new interdisciplinary, interinstitutionalactivities. The study noted that the dilemma grows out ofinstitutional inertia and resistance to new approaches."

Policy is institutional. Policy making processes changeslowly and incrementally in an evolutionary way. Lindblompointed out that "what is feasible politically is policy onlyincrementally, or marginally, different from existing pol-icies."' Innovations change the environment to which thepolicies must be applied, often in a radical way, more akinto the process of gross mutation than to evolutionarychange. As a consequence of innovation, a sudden dimensionalshift in the order of complexity may occur. As suggestedearlier, a linear extrapolation, based upon an analysis ofthe situation prior to this shift, cannot well accommodatethe shift of dimension. Linear extrapolation assumes thatthe new situation is an extension of the old situation, dif-ferent only in scale. This kind of logic would lead toconsidering a village to be a large family and a city, inturn, to be a large village. The fallacy of this reasoningis obvious. There are considerable differences in thedimension of complexity of the patterns of interaction inthese different kinds of social organisms.

The incremental change characteristics in the institu-tions of administration lead to an extension of processesbeyond the point where a dimensional shift has occurred; yetafter such a shift, the earlier policies of the administra-tion may no longer be appropriate. The criteria upon whichthe policies were based have changed. A very simple analogycan illustrate this change of criteria concept.

A straight 30-foot long tube can be positioned levelwith the surface of the earth in such a way that a man canview a distant object through the tube. A linear extrapola-tion approach assumes that attaching additional tubes, takingcare that these tubes also are level and straight, will notalter the man's capacity to sight the distant object throughthe now-longer tube. In fact, by extending the tube inthis manner, there comes a point in the length of the tubewhere it is not possible to see through the tube at all.This comes about because a long straight level line is acontradiction in terms. For a line to be level at all points,the line must follow the curvature of the earth. If a longline is truly straight, it can only be level relative to theearth at one point.

Although the criteria for levelness, straightness, andflatness are useful within the compass of everyday experi-ence and within the environment with which we are intimatelyassociated, the concept cannot be pushed indefinitely andstill fulfill the initial criteria. At the point where thecriteria become invalid, a shift of dimension has occurred.

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The difficulties of evolving policy making processescapable of accommodating dimensional shifts in social evolu-tion have already been mentioned. However, realizing thatthe problem exists does not, of itself, generate solutions.In many regards, our understanding of policy processes,political processes, and social interaction grows out oflinear extensions of ground rules laid down by the Greeks.To complicate the situation still further, the ground rulesWere designed for a state that never was. Society has passedthrough many dimensional shifts since the period of theGreeks. The policies proposed for the administration of ahypothetical city-state of 47,000, three thousand years ago,are unlikely to be appropriate as a model for a modern cityof millions. The modern state, comprising tens or hundredsof millions, is yet further removed dimensionally from theGreek city-state concept; and the predicted global village oftomorrow, counting its population in billions, is concep-tually light years removed from the models used for theextrapolation of policies.

FOOTNOTES

Jonathan Galloway (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972), p. 70.2iimmanuel G. Mesthene, "Prolegomena of Technology," Appendix A, in TheSgjl Communications Technology and Its Social Implications, report of asymposium of the international Broadcast Institute at Ditchley Park,Oxfordshire, England, 2-6 November 1970, by Roger P. Morgan (n.p.:International Broadcast Institute, 1971), pp. 59-60.3.,J!gw_JLommunications Technoiogy, pp. 37-39.

Speaking to this point, William H. Melody, "The Role of Advocacy inPublic Policy Planning," in Communications Technoiogy and Sociai Policy,ed. George Gerbner, Larry P. Gross, and Wiiiiam H. Melody (New York:John Wiiey & Sons, 1973), p. 172, states: "The application of the tech-nology has been so compromised by the established institutional structureot the communications industry and its vested interest in cable tech-nology that the satellite technology has been treated as though it werejust another point-to-point communications facility."

International Conflict and the Free Fiow of Information," in Controi of£hg_JHrect Broadcast Satellite: Values in Confiict (Palo Alto, Calif.:Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1974), p. 66.6United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,^̂ -Suide to Satellite Communication (UNESCO Reports and Papers on MassCommunication, no. 66), 1972, p. 27.

Charles E. Lindblom, The Poiicy Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 20.

Reflections on the End of Carte Blanche:rhe Inevitability of Conflict between^ngress and the Scientific CommunityBarry BozemanUniversity of Missouri-Coiumbia

Recent tensions between Congress and the Nationalcience Foundation may well signal a fundamental change in

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