PraiseforThePopulistExplosion

“ThePopulistExplosion is far and away themost incisive examinationof thecentraldevelopmentincontemporarypolitics:theriseofpopulismonboththeright and the left. John Judis, whose track record is unrivaled, is the idealauthor to tackle the subject, and he has done a superb job, placingcontemporary trends, including the rise of Donald Trump, in historicalperspective.Judisdemonstratesthecrucialroleofthe2008recessionbothhereandinEuropeindiscreditingtheneoliberalagenda.Thisismustreading.”

—ThomasEdsall,NewYorkTimescolumnist

“The Populist Explosion blends groundbreaking reporting with insightfulscholarshipinthebestguideyettothemostimportantpoliticalphenomenonofourtime.”

—MichaelLind,authorofLandofPromise:

AnEconomicHistoryoftheUnitedStates“JohnJudisdemonstratesagainwhyheisoneofAmerica’sbestpoliticaljournalists.Thereisnowiserorbetterinformedanalysisofcontemporaryvoterdiscontentonboth

sidesoftheAtlanticthanThePopulistExplosion.”

—MichaelKazin,editorofDissent,authorofThePopulistPersuasion:AnAmericanHistoryandWarAgainstWar:The

AmericanFightforPeace,1914-1918

Copyright©2016byJohnB.JudisAllrightsreserved

PublishedbyColumbiaGlobalReports

91ClaremontAvenue,Suite515NewYork,NY10027globalreports.columbia.edufacebook.com/columbiaglobalreports@columbiaGR

LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2016945882ISBN:978-0997126457

BookdesignbyCharlotteStrickandClaireWilliamsMapdesignbyJeffreyL.WardAuthorphotographbyHilaryP.Judis

ForJonCohn,RichardJust,andJoshMarshall

CONTENTSIntroductionWhatIsPopulism,andWhyIsItImportant?

ChapterOneTheLogicofAmericanPopulism:FromthePeople’sPartytoGeorgeWallace

ChapterTwoNeoliberalismandItsEnemies:Perot,Buchanan,theTeaParty,andOccupyWallStreet

ChapterThreeTheSilentMajorityandthePoliticalRevolution:DonaldTrumpandBernieSanders

ChapterFourTheRiseofEuropeanPopulism

ChapterFiveTheLimitsofLeftwingPopulism:SyrizaandPodemos

ChapterSixRightwingPopulismontheMarchinNorthernEurope

ConclusionThePastandFutureofPopulism

Acknowledgments

FurtherReading

Notes

WhatIsPopulism,andWhyIsItImportant?

PopulistpartiesandcandidatesareonthemoveintheUnitedStatesandEurope.DonaldTrumphaswon theRepublicannomination;BernieSanders came in averystrongsecondtoHillaryClintonfortheDemocraticnomination.Andthesecandidacies came on the heels of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Streetmovements. In Europe, populist parties in France, Sweden, Norway, Finland,Denmark, Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland are contending forpowerorarealreadypartofthegovernment.

InFrance,theNationalFront(FN)cameinfirstintheregionalelectionsinDecember2015with27.73percentofthevote,butwasdeniedavictoryintheregionalpresidenciesbecausetheRepublicanandSocialistpartiesjoinedforcesagainstitintherunoff.InDenmark,thePeople’sParty(DF)cameinsecondinthe June 2015 parliamentary elections. In Austria, Freedom Party (FPÖ)candidate Norbert Hofer came in first in the first round of the presidentialelectioninApril2016.

In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) came in first in theparliamentaryelectionswith29.4percentof thevote,almost twice the totaloftheSocialDemocratsandtheLiberals.InNorway,theProgressParty(FrP)hasbeen part of the ruling government coalition since 2013. In the Netherlands,GeertWilders’sFreedomParty(PVV),currentlythecountry’sthirdlargestparty,is well ahead in polls for the 2017 parliamentary elections. Britain’s UnitedKingdom Independence Party (UKIP), after disappointing results in the 2015parliamentary elections, bounced back in local elections, ousting the LabourParty in Wales and was at the forefront of the British campaign to exit theEuropeanUnion.

In Europe, populist parties have also arisen on the left and center-left. InItaly, comedianBeppeGrillo’sFiveStarMovementwon themost seats in the2013electiontotheChamberofDeputies.IntheJune2016municipalelections,

FiveStarcandidateVirginiaRaggiwaselectedRome’smayorwith67percentofthe vote. In Spain, the Podemos Party, founded in 2014, came in third in theDecember2015andJune2016parliamentaryelections. InGreece, thedecade-oldSyrizaPartycameinfirst intwoparliamentaryelectionsin2015,andtookchargeofthegovernment.Thisbookisabouthowthesepopulistcandidatesandmovementshavecomeabout,andwhyinthewakeoftheGreatRecession,theyhaveprovensosuccessfulinmobilizingsupport.

DefiningPopulismWhen political scientists write about populism, they often begin by trying todefineit,as if itwereascientific termlikeentropyorphotosynthesis.That’samistake.Thereisnosetoffeaturesthatexclusivelydefinesmovements,parties,andpeoplethatarecalledpopulist—fromtheRussianNarodnikstoHueyLong,andfromFrance’sMarineLePentothelatecongressmanJackKemp.Aswithordinarylanguage,evenmoresowithordinarypolitical language, thedifferentpeople and parties called “populist” enjoy family resemblances of one to theother,butnotasetoftraitscanbefoundexclusivelyinallofthem.

There is, however, a kind of populist politics that originated in theUnitedStates in the nineteenth century, has recurred in the twentieth and twenty-firstcenturies,andinthe1970sbegantoappearinWesternEurope.Whereaspopulistparties andmovements in Latin America have sometimes tried to subvert thedemocratic competition for power, the populist campaigns and parties in theUnitedStatesandWesternEuropehaveembraced it. In the lastdecades, thesecampaignsandpartieshaveconvergedintheirconcerns,andinthewakeoftheGreatRecession,theyhavesurged.That’sthesubjectofthisbook:Iwanttosaya little about what this kind of populist politics is, and why it includes bothTrumpandSandersandbothFrance’sNationalFrontandSpain’sPodemos.

Firstofall,thekindofpopulismthatrunsthroughAmericanhistory,andistransplantedtoEurope,cannotbedefinedintermsofright,left,orcenter.Therearerightwing,leftwingandcentristpopulistparties.It isnotanideology,butapolitical logic—a way of thinking about politics. In his book on Americanpopulism,The Populist Persuasion, historian Michael Kazin gets part of thislogic.Populism,hewrites,is“alanguagewhosespeakersconceiveofordinarypeople as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class; view their elite

opponents as self-serving and undemocratic; and seek to mobilize the formeragainstthelatter.”

That’s a good start. It doesn’t describe someone like Ronald Reagan orVladimir Putin, both of whom have sometimes been called “populist,” but itdoes describe the logic of the parties, movements, and candidates fromAmerica’sPeople’sPartyof1892toMarineLePen’sNationalFrontof2016.Iwould, however, takeKazin’s characterizationone step further anddistinguishbetween leftwing populists like Sanders or Podemos’s Pablo Iglesias andrightwing populists like Trump and the National Front’s Le Pen. Leftwingpopulists champion thepeopleagainst aneliteoranestablishment.Theirs is avertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top. Rightwingpopulists champion the people against an elite that they accuse of coddling athirdgroup,whichcanconsist,forinstance,ofimmigrants,Islamists,orAfricanAmericanmilitants.Leftwingpopulismisdyadic.Rightwingpopulismistriadic.Itlooksupward,butalsodownuponanoutgroup.

Leftwing populism is historically different from socialist or socialdemocratic movements. It is not a politics of class conflict, and it doesn’tnecessarilyseektheabolitionofcapitalism.Itisalsodifferentfromaprogressiveor liberal politics that seeks to reconcile the interests of opposing classes andgroups. It assumes a basic antagonism between the people and an elite at theheartofitspolitics.Rightwingpopulism,ontheotherhand,isdifferentfromaconservatism that primarily identifies with the business classes against theircriticsandantagonistsbelow.InitsAmericanandWesternEuropeanversions,itis also different from an authoritarian conservatism that aims to subvertdemocracy.Itoperateswithinademocraticcontext.

Justas there isnocommonideologythatdefinespopulism, there isnooneconstituency that comprises “the people.” It can be blue-collar workers,shopkeepers,orstudentsburdenedbydebt;itcanbethepoororthemiddleclass.Equally, there is no common identification of “the establishment.” It can varyfrom the “money power” that the old populists decried to George Wallace’s“pointy-headed intellectuals” to the “casta” that Podemos assails. The exactreferentsof“thepeople”and“theelite”don’tdefinepopulism;whatdefinesitisthe conflictual relationship between the two—or in the case of rightwingpopulismthethree.

Theconflict itself turnsonasetofdemands that thepopulistsmakeof theelite.These are not ordinary demands that populists believewill be subject toimmediate negotiation. The populists believe the demands are worthy and

justified,buttheydon’tbelievetheestablishmentwillbewillingtograntthem.Sanderswants “Medicare for all” anda$15minimumwage. If hewanted theAffordable Care Act to cover hearing aids, or to raise the minimumwage to$7.75,thatwouldn’tdefineaclashbetweenthepeopleandtheestablishment.IfTrumpwere to demand an increase in guards along theMexican border, or ifDenmark’sPeople’sParty campaignedona reduction in asylum-seekers, thesewouldnotopenupagulfbetweenthepeopleandtheelite.ButpromisingawallthattheMexicangovernmentwillpayfororthetotalcessationofimmigration—thatdoesestablishafrontier.

These kinds of demands define the clash between the people and theestablishment. If they are granted in whole or even in part, as when theDemocratsin1896adoptedthePeople’sParty’sdemandforfreesilver,oriftheyabandon themas tooambitious, asSyrizadid itsdemands for renegotiationofGreece’sdebt,thenthepopulistmovementislikelytodissipateortomorphintoa normal political party or candidacy. In this sense, American and WesternEuropeanpopulistmovementshaveflourishedwhentheyareinopposition,buthavesometimessufferedidentitycriseswhentheyhaveenteredgovernment.

TheSignificanceofPopulismThe second important feature of the populist campaigns and parties I amdescribing is that they often function as warning signs of a political crisis.American populist movements have arisen only under very specialcircumstances.InEurope,populistpartieshaveenduredonthefringesattimes,because the European multi-party systems tolerate smaller players. But likeAmerican populists, they havewon success only under certain circumstances.Thosecircumstancesaretimeswhenpeopleseetheprevailingpoliticalnorms—putforward,preservedanddefendedbytheleadingsegmentsinthecountry—asbeingatoddswith theirownhopes, fears,andconcerns.Thepopulistsexpresstheseneglectedconcernsandframetheminapoliticsthatpitsthepeopleagainstanintransigentelite.Bydoingso,theybecomecatalystsforpoliticalchange.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the major parties favored increasedimmigration,onlytofindthatintheUnitedStatesvoterswereupinarmsaboutillegal immigration and in Europe about immigrant communities that becameseedbeds of crime and later terror. The populist candidates and parties gave

voicetotheseconcerns.InEurope,themajorpartiesonthecontinentembracedtheideaofacommoncurrencyonlytofinditfallintodisfavorduringtheGreatRecession.IntheUnitedStates,bothparties’leadersembraced“freetrade”dealsonlytodiscoverthatmuchofthepublicdidnotsupportthesetreaties.

Themovements themselvesdon’toftenachieve theirownobjectives.Theydon’t necessarily succeed in providingMedicare for all or protectingworkersagainst global capitalism or the European Union. Their demands may be co-optedbythemajorpartiesortheymaybethoroughlyrejected.Butthepopulistsroil thewaters.Theysignal that theprevailingpolitical ideology isn’tworkingand needs repair, and the standard worldview is breaking down. That’s whyTrumpandSandersareimportantinAmerica,andwhythepopulistleftandrightare important in Europe. In what follows, I will describe how the logic ofpopulismhasworkedandwhyatthisparticularmomentsimilarkindsofpopulistprotestsareeruptingacrossbothsidesofthenorthAtlantic.

TheLogicofAmericanPopulismFromthePeople’sPartytoGeorgeWallace

Noone,notevenDonaldTrump,expectedhimtogettheRepublicanpresidentialnominationin2016.Similarly,noone, includingBernieSanders,expectedthatup through theCalifornia primary in June, theVermont senatorwould still bechallengingHillaryClintonfortheDemocraticnomination.

Trump’s successwas initially attributed to his showmanship and celebrity.Butashewonprimaryafterprimary,politicalexpertssawhimplayingonracistopposition to Barack Obama’s presidency or exploiting a latent sympathy forfascism among downscale white Americans. Sanders’s success invited lessspeculation,butcommentators tendedtodismisshimasautopianandtofocusontheairyidealismofmillennialvoters.Ifthatwerenotsufficientexplanationforhissuccess,theyemphasizedHillaryClinton’sweaknessasafrontrunner.Itmakesmoresense,however,tounderstandTrumpandSanders’ssuccessasthelatestchapterinthehistoryofAmericanpopulism.

Populism is an American creation that spread later to Latin America andEurope.WhilestrandsofAmericanpopulismgobacktotheRevolutionandtheJacksonian War on the Bank of the United States, it really begins with thePeople’sPartyof the1890s,which set theprecedent formovements that havepopped up periodically. In the United States, in contrast to Europe, thesecampaigns have burst forth suddenly and unexpectedly. Usually short-lived,neverthelesstheyhavehadanoutsizedimpact.Whiletheyseemunusualatthetime,theyareverymuchpartoftheAmericanpoliticalfabric.

TwoKindsofPoliticalEvents

While the history of American politics is riven with conflicts—over slavery,prohibition,thetrusts,tariffs,abortion,interventionabroad—itisalsodominatedfor long stretches by an underlying consensus about government’s role in theeconomy and abroad. If that consensus doesn’t always unite the parties, itdetermines the ultimate outcome of political conflict. Thus, from 1935 to the1970s,therewereoccasionaldebatesaboutthevirtuesofaprogressiveincometax, but American policy reflected an underlying consensus in favor of it.ProgressivetaxationwasitselfpartofabroaderworldviewsometimesdescribedasNewDeal liberalism. It had replaced aworldview that stressed a farmorelimitedroleforgovernmentintheeconomy.

TheroleofunderlyingworldviewsischaracteristicofpoliticsintheUnitedStatesandEurope, andofall countries that aregovernedprimarilybyconsentrather than by force and terror. In Great Britain, for instance, laissez-fairecapitalism,associatedwithAdamSmith’sinvisiblehand,prevailedformuchofthenineteenthcentury,butafterWorldWar II itwassupersededbyKeynesianeconomics.

American politics is structured to sustain prevailing worldviews. Itscharacteristics of winner takes all, first past the post, single-member districtshaveencouragedatwo-partysystem.Third-partycandidatesareoftendismissedas “spoilers.”Moreover, in decidingonwhom to nominate in party primaries,votersandpartybigwigshavegenerally takenelectability intoaccount, and inthegeneralelection,candidateshavegenerallytriedtocapturethecenterandtostay away frombeingbranded as an “extremist.”Americanpolitical history islitteredwithcandidateswhoprovedtooextremefortheprevailingconsensusofone or the othermajor parties—think of Fred Harris or Jesse Jackson amongDemocratsandTomTancredoorPatRobertsonamongRepublicans.

Asaresultofthistwo-partytilttowardthecenter,sharppoliticaldifferencesover underlying socioeconomic issues have tended to get blunted or evenignored,particularly inpresidentialelections.Campaignsareoftenfoughtoverfleeting social issues such as temperance or abortion or subsidiary economicissuessuchastheminimumwageorthedeficit.Buttherearetimes,when,inthefaceofdramaticchangesinthesocietyandeconomyorinAmerica’splaceintheworld,votershavesuddenlybecomeresponsivetopoliticiansormovementsthatraiseissuesthatmajorpartieshaveeitherdownplayedorignored.Therearetwokindsofsuchevents.

The first are what political scientists call realigning elections. In these, apartyorapresidentialcandidate’schallengetotheprevailingworldviewcauses

an upheaval that reorders the existing coalitions and leads to a newmajorityparty.FranklinRoosevelt’scampaignsin1932and,evenmoreso,1936didthis,andsodidRonaldReagan’scampaignin1980.Suchelectionsarerare.Theyareusually precipitated by economic depression or war, and by a succession ofpoliticaloutbursts thatchallenge,butdonot replace, theprevailingworldview.InAmericanpolitics,theseoutburstsoftentaketheformofpopulistcandidaciesandmovements.

These catalytic populists have defined politics in “us vs. them” terms—asstrugglesof thepeopleagainst theestablishmentbasedon issuesanddemandsthatthelatterhadbeensidestepping.TheriseofthePeople’sPartywasthefirstmajor salvo against the worldview of laissez-faire capitalism. Huey Long’sShare Our Wealth coincided with Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932 andhelpeddrivetheRooseveltadministrationtodevelopanewpoliticstosustainitsmajority. Together, these movements established the populist framework thatBernieSanders,whodescribedhimselfbothasademocratic socialist andasaprogressive,wouldadoptduringhis2016campaign.

As liberal criticswouldpointoutduring the1950s, thePeople’sPartyhadwithinitstrainsofanti-Semitism,racism,andnativism,particularlytowardtheChinese,butthesewereatbestsecondaryelements.Untilthemovementbegantodisintegrate,theoriginalPeople’sPartywasprimarilyamovementoftheleft.Thefirstmajorinstancesofrightwingpopulismwouldcomeinthe1930swithFather Charles Coughlin, and then in the 1960s with George Wallace’spresidentialcampaigns.WallacehelpeddoomtheNewDealmajorityandhelpedlaythebasisfortheReaganrealignmentof1980.Hecreatedaconstituencyanda rightwing variety of populism—what sociologist Donald Warren called“middleAmerican radicalism”—thatwouldmigrate into theRepublican PartyandbecomethebasisofDonaldTrump’schallengetoRepublicanorthodoxyin2016.

ThePeople’sPartyInMay1891,thelegendgoes,somemembersoftheKansasFarmersAlliance,riding back home from a national convention inCincinnati, came upwith theterm“populist”todescribethepoliticalviewsthattheyandotheralliancegroupsintheWestandSouthweredeveloping.Thenextyear,thealliancegroupsjoinedhandswith theKnightsofLabor to form thePeople’sParty thatover thenexttwoyears challenged themost basic assumptions that guidedRepublicans andDemocrats in Washington. The party would be short-lived, but its example

wouldestablishthebasisforpopulismintheUnitedStatesandEurope.At the time the populists were meeting in Cincinnati, the leading

RepublicansandDemocratsintheUnitedStateswererevelingintheprogressofAmericanindustryandfinance.Theybelievedintheself-regulatingmarketasaninstrument of prosperity and individual opportunity, and thought government’srole should be minimal. Grover Cleveland, who was president from 1884 to1888 and from1892 to 1896, railed against government “paternalism.” Publicsectorintervention,hedeclaredinhissecondinauguraladdress,“stiflesthespiritoftrueAmericanism”;its“functions,”hestated,“donotincludethesupportofthe people.”Government’s principal rolewas tomaintain a “sound and stablecurrency” through upholding the gold standard. Cleveland and his rivalsquarreled over the tariff andwhether theDemocratswere the party of “Rum,Romanism, and Rebellion,” but they agreed on the fundamental relationshipbetweengovernmentandtheeconomy.

Butduringtheseyears,farmersintheSouthandthePlainssufferedfromasharpdropinagriculturalprices.Farmpricesfelltwo-thirdsintheMidwestandSouthfrom1870to1890.ThePlains,whichprosperedintheearly1880s,werehitbya ruinousdrought in the late1880s.Butunsympathetic railroads,whichenjoyedmonopoly status, raised the cost of transporting farm produce.Manyfarmers in theSouth and thePlains states could barely break even.The smallfamilyfarmgavewayto thelarge“bonanza”farm,oftenownedbycompaniesbasedintheEast.Salarieswerethreatenedbylow-wageimmigrantsfromChina,Japan, Portugal, and Italy. Farmerswho retained their landwere burdened bydebt.InKansas,45percentofthelandhadbecomeownedbybanks.

Thefarmrevoltbeganin the1870swith theFarmerAlliances in theNorthand South. These were originally fraternal societies, modeled on theMasons,with secret handshakes that bonded the members together. The SouthernAlliance began in Texas and spread eastward over the South. In theNorth, itbegan inNewYork,diedout, and thenwas revived in the1880s in thePlainsstates.Thealliancesorganizedcooperativestotrytocontrolprices,whichwereincreasingly set in distant markets, and they began to pressure legislators toregulate railroad rates.As they becamemore deeply involved in politics, theybeganto joinforceswith theKnightsofLabor, theworkingman’sorganizationthathadbeenfoundedin1869and thatby theearly1880swas themain laborgroupin theUnitedStates.In1885, theTexasalliancedeclaredinaresolutionthatitsoughta“perfectunityofaction”betweenitselfandtheKnightsofLabor.

While the Grange, a farm advocacy group that started just after the Civil

War, foreshadowed later interest groups like the National Farmers Union, thealliancessawthemselvesrepresentingthe“people,”includingfarmersandblue-collarworkers,againstthe“moneypower”or“plutocracy.”Thatwasreflectedintheir early programs, which included a demand for the incorporation andrecognitionoflaborunionsalongsidedemandsforrailroadregulation,anendtolandspeculation,andeasymoney(throughthereplacementorsupplementingofthe gold standard) to ease the burden of debt that the farmers suffered from.Exceptforafewscatteredleaders,thepopulistswerenotsocialists.Theywantedto reformrather thanabolishcapitalism,and theiragentof reformwasnot thesocialistworkingclass, but the loosely conceived ideaof “thepeople.”DanielDeLeon, the head of what was then the country’s main socialist party, theSocialistLaborParty,criticizedthemas“bourgeois.”

Some of the alliance members backed the Greenback Party’s presidentialslatein1880and1884,butmostsoughttoinfluencethedominantpartiesintheirregion.TheSouthernAlliancewantedtotransformtheDemocraticParty,andthealliance in the Great Plains wanted to change the Republicans. In December1889, the alliances began a series ofmeetings to develop a national program.Besidesthedemandsoncurrencyandland, theprogramnowalsoincludedthenationalizationofrailroads,agraduatedincometax,politicalreform(includingthesecretballotanddirectelectionofsenators),anda“sub-treasury”plan thatwouldallowfarmerstoborrowmoneyfromthefederalgovernmenttostoretheircropsuntilpricesrosehighenoughforthemtobeprofitable.

WhenthealliancepressuredcandidatesfromtheDemocratsandRepublicanstoendorsethisplatform,thedemandsprovedtobetooradicalandfar-reachingforthemajorparties.InthePlains,Republicansscornedtheallianceproposalsasutopian moralism. “The Decalogue and the golden rule have no place in apolitical campaign,” Kansas Republican Senator John J. Ingalls wrote. In theSouth,someDemocraticstatehousecandidatesendorsedtheallianceproposals,butonceinofficetheyrebuffedthem.AllianceleadersconcludedtheDemocratsandRepublicanswereinthegripoftheplutocracyandthatthepopulistswouldhavetoorganizetheirownparty.Kansasalliancemembersorganizedin1890astate People’s Party that did well in that year’s elections. Then in 1892, thealliances,alongwith theKnightsofLaborandothergroups,formedanationalPeople’s Party and nominated James K. Weaver, a former Greenback Partypresidentialcandidate,torunforpresident.

The party held its convention in February in St. Louis, where Minnesotapopulist Ignatius Donnelly penned a preamble to the platform that won

widespread acclaim and became the group’s manifesto—what the populistscalled the nation’s “second Declaration of Independence.” Donnelly was aformerRepublicancongressmanandrailroadlobbyistwhointhemid-1870shadbegunmovingleftwardandhadwonacclaimasanauthorandanorator.Inthepreamble, Donnelly charged that “the fruits of the toil of millions are boldlystolen to build up the colossal fortunes of a few.”Government and themajorpartieswere complicit in this theft. “We charge that the controlling influencesdominatingboththesepartieshavepermittedtheexistingdreadfulconditionstodevelopwithoutseriousefforttopreventorrestrainthem,”Donnellywrote.

Donnelly’spreambleechoedthethemesofJacksoniandemocracy.“WeseektorestorethegovernmentoftheRepublictothehandsof‘theplainpeople,’withwhoseclassitoriginated,”hewrote.ButwhiletheJacksonDemocratswantedtorestore popular democracy by eliminating the role of government in theeconomy,Donnellyand thepopulists—inachallenge to theprevailing laissez-faire worldview—wanted government to actively combat economic injustice.“We believe that the powers of government—in otherwords, of the people—shouldbeexpanded...asrapidlyandasfarasthegoodsenseofanintelligentpeopleandtheteachingsofexperienceshall justify, totheendthatoppression,injustice,andpovertyshalleventuallyceaseintheland.”

At the St. Louis convention, Donnelly’s platform was enthusiasticallyendorsedbyGeorgia’sTomWatson,whohadbeenelectedtoCongressin1890asaDemocratbackingtheallianceplatform.“Neverbeforeinthehistoryoftheworldwas therearrayedat theballotbox thecontending forcesofDemocracyandPlutocracy,”Watsondeclared. “Willyou standwith thepeople . . . by theside of the otherwealth producers of the nation . . . orwill you stand facingthem,andfromtheplutocraticranksfireaballotinsupportoftheoldpartiesandtheirpoliciesofdisorganization,despotism,anddeath?”

Therewasalwaysamoreconservativestrainwithinthepopulistmovement.In the South, some alliance members cooperated with the parallel ColoredFarmers’Alliance,butothersdidnot, and racial issuesoftendividedpopulistsfromthePlainsandtheSouth.Populistsalsofavored theexpulsionofChineseimmigrants,whombusinesseshad imported toprovidecheap laboronwesternfarms and railroads. That was understandable, but their support for exclusionwas often colored by racist rhetoric. Kansas populist leader Mary E. Leasewarnedofa“tideofMongols.”AndWatson’sPeople’sPartyPaperdenouncedthe Chinese as “moral and social lepers.” But in the 1880s and early 1890s,populist politics was primarily directed upward at the plutocrats. As historian

Robert McMath recounts, they were repeatedly accused of being “MollyMaguires,Anarchists,andCommunists.”

Inthe1892election,thePeople’sPartydidremarkablywell.Theirwoefullyunderfunded presidential candidate received 8 percent of the vote and carriedfive states. Then in 1893, as Cleveland was taking office, an economicdepressiontookhold,leavingaquarterofAmericansunemployedandthousandsof farmers bankrupt. Cleveland reaffirmed the gold standard, and to pleas forgovernment aid from farmers, Cleveland’s Secretary of Agriculture, JuliusSterling Morton, responded, “The intelligent, practical, and successful farmerneeds no aid from the government. The ignorant, impractical, and indolentfarmerdeservesnone.”

In the 1894 election, the People’s Party’s candidates for the House ofRepresentativeswon10percentofthevote.Thepartyelected4congressmen,4senators, 21 state executives, and 465 state legislators.With their base in theSouthandtheWest,andwithClevelandwildlyunpopular,theylookedtobeontheirwaytochallengingtheDemocratsasthesecondparty,but theelectionof1894turnedouttobetheparty’sswansong.

Thepopulistsweredoneinbythedynamicsofthetwo-partysystem.InthePlains states, angeragainstCleveland turnedvotersback to themoreelectableRepublicans. In the South, Democrats subdued the People’s Party by acombinationofcooptationand,inresponsetothewillingnessofsomepopuliststocourtthenegrovote,viciousrace-baiting.WatsonsaidoftheoppositiontothePeople’sParty,“TheargumentagainsttheindependentpoliticalmovementintheSouthmaybeboileddownintooneword—nigger.”

In the wake of 1894, Southern Democrats like South Carolina Senator“Pitchfork” Ben Tillman commonly combined a patina of populist economicsandpoliticalreformwithwhitesupremacy.(Tillman’snicknamecamefromhispromisein1984thatifhewereelected,hewouldgotoWashingtonand“stickapitchforkinGroverCleveland’soldfatribs.”)WatsonhimselfandTexas’sJames“Cyclone”Davis,whilecontinuingtosupportpopulisteconomics,becamealliesoftheKuKluxKlan.

But the biggest damage occurred on the national stage. In 1896, theDemocrats nominated Nebraskan William Jennings Bryan and adopted keyplanksofthepopulistplatform,includingmonetizationofsilver(“freesilver”!),the regulation of the railroads and other corporations, and a restriction on“foreign pauper labor.”At its convention, thePeople’s Party chose to endorseBryanratherthantorunacandidateofitsown.Inthe1896election,thepopulist

votemigratedtothemajorparties.Tomakemattersworse,thepopulistsalsolosttheirblue-collarallywhentheKnightsofLaborfellapartandwasreplacedbythe interest-group oriented American Federation of Labor. The People’s Partylimpedalongandfinallycollapsedafterthe1908electionwhenWatson,runningasitspresidentialcandidate,received0.19percentofthevote.

Butduringtheirheydayfrom1885to1894,thepopulistsofthealliancesandthePeople’sPartyhadaprofoundeffectonAmericanand,asitturnedout,LatinAmerican and European politics. They developed the logic of populism—theconcept of a “people” arrayed against an elite that refused to grant necessaryreforms.InAmericanpolitics,theywereanearlysignoftheinadequacyofthetwoparties’viewofgovernmentandtheeconomy.

The populists were the first to call for government to regulate and evennationalizeindustriesthatwereintegraltotheeconomy,liketherailroads;theywantedgovernmenttoreducetheeconomicinequalitythatcapitalism,whenleftto its own devices, was creating; and they wanted to reduce the power ofbusiness in determining the outcomeof elections. Populismhad an immediateimpacton thepoliticsofsomeprogressiveDemocrats likeBryan,andevenonRepublicanslikeTheodoreRooseveltandRobertLaFollette.Eventually,muchofthepopulists’agenda—fromthegraduatedincometaxtoaversionofthesub-treasuryplan—wasincorporatedintotheNewDealandintotheoutlookofNewDealliberalism.

HueyLong’sShareOurWealthIn the 1920s, while much of Europe suffered from economic and politicalinstability, partly as a result of post-World War I reparations and gold-basedfinance, the American economy enjoyed a boom. Republican businessboosterismand rugged individualismdominatedpolitics.But the stockmarketcrash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed shattered the public’sconfidenceinthefreemarket,aswellasinRepublicanrule,andhelpedtobringaboutanewDemocraticmajority.

FranklinRooseveltandtheDemocratswonalandslidevictoryin1932,butnot by repudiating the Republicans’ overall outlook on government and theeconomy. In thecampaign,Roosevelt criticizedRepublican incumbentHerbertHooverforoverspendingandpromisedtocutthegovernmentbureaucracyby25percentandbalancethebudget.Onceinoffice,Rooseveltactuallytriedtomakegood on this promise through theGovernmentEconomyAct,which cutmorethan $500 million from the budget mainly out of veterans’ benefits and

governmentsalaries.Rooseveltdidmoveaggressivelyduringhisfirsttwoyearstoreformbanking

and provide jobs through new government programs. He created a NationalRecovery Administration that was supposed to work out corporatistarrangementsbetweenbusinessandlaborandstemcutthroatpricecompetition.ButRoosevelt did not directly address economic inequality,which had grownduring theyearsof theRepublicanmajorityandwhichprogressiveeconomistsbelievedlayat theheartofthecrashandtheDepression.It tookpressurefromoutside to get Roosevelt to do this, and much of it came from LouisianapoliticianHueyLong.LongcreatedapopulistmovementthatDemocratsfearedwould threaten Roosevelt’s reelection and possibly even the existence of theDemocraticParty.

Long grew up inWinn, Louisiana, a small, poor farming town thatwas ahotbed of populist and socialist support. He carried on the populist tradition,campaigningforgovernorontheslogan,“Everymanaking,butnomanwearsacrown,” and railing against oil companies and the “money power.” Electedgovernorin1928,hefundedLouisiana’sroads,healthcaresystem,andschools,whileexempting low-incomepeople from taxesandproposing (andeventuallygetting)anextraction taxonoilcompanies.Hedidn’t repudiate racism,buthedidn’tactivelyencourageiteither.“Don’tsayIamworkingforniggers,I’mnot.I’mforthepoorman—allpoormen,”hedeclared.Dictatorialandcharismatic,hewasanexemplarofthepopulistwhobecametheunifyingforceholding“thepeople”together.OnereporterwroteofLong’sconstituents,“Theyworshipthegroundhewalkson.”

Longgotelectedtothesenatein1930,andin1932hebackedRooseveltforpresident.ButsoonafterRoosevelttookoffice,Longbrokewithhim.HespokeoutandvotedagainsttheGovernmentEconomyAct.Heclaimeditwastheworkof“Mr.Morgan”and“Mr.Rockefeller.”InFebruary1934,Longannouncedonradio the formation of a Share Our Wealth Society. Its centerpiece was aproposaltocapafamily’swealthat$5millionandincomeat$1millionthroughtaxes,andtousetherevenuetoprovideeveryfamilya“householdestate”thatwould be enough for “a home, an automobile, a radio, and ordinaryconveniences” and a guaranteed annual income to “maintain a family incomfort,”aswellasanold-agepension.

Long’staxratesonthewealthyweredraconian,buttheystillwouldnothaveproducedtherevenuenecessaryforwhathepromised.Roosevelt’sallies in themedia mocked Long’s proposal. The New Republic sent Long a mock

questionnaire about the details of his plan, asking, “Upon what statistics ofeconomicstudiesdoyoubaseyourconclusions?”ButtheveryextravaganceofLong’s plan established a political dividebetweenhimand thepowers-that-bethatcouldnoteasilybebridged. Itdefined themovement’sradicalismthewayfreesilver,thesub-treasuryplan,andthenationalizationofrailroadsdefinedthePeople’sParty.

Long’s Share Our Wealth clubs—more than 27,000 had started by thefollowingFebruary—functionednotonlyas localpoliticalorganizationsbutasthe basis for a new political party. They were often run out of churches andschools. In addition, Long boasted of amailing list ofmore than 7.5million.Long’smostactivebase,likethatofthePeople’sPartyandsubsequentpopulistmovements,wasnotamongtheverypoor.Itwasamongthemiddleclass,whofearedthattheywouldbecastdownbytheDepressionintotheranksoftheverypoor.HistorianAlanBrinkleywroteofLong’sfollowers:

Havinggainedafootholdintheworldofbourgeoisrespectability,theystoodin danger of being plunged back into what they viewed as an abyss ofpowerlessnessanddependence.Itwasthatfear thatmadethemiddleclass,even more than those who were truly rootless and indigent, a politicallyvolatilegroup.

RooseveltandtheDemocratsfearedLong’scandidacy.In1935,theDemocraticNationalPartydidasecretpollinwhichtheydeterminedthatifLongranonaThird-party ticket against Roosevelt in 1936, he couldwin between three andfourmillionvotesand throwtheelection to theRepublicans.That fearwasanimportantfactorinRooseveltandtheDemocratsjoiningforcesthatyeartopasswhatwascalled“theSecondNewDeal.”Unlikethefirst, itdealtdirectlywiththeissueofeconomicinequalitythatLonghadrepeatedlyraised.

OnJune19,theSenatepassedtheSocialSecurityAct,whichprovidedold-age pensions and unemployment compensation. On the same day, RooseveltsurprisedCongress by proposing a tax reformmeasure to encourage “awiderdistributionofwealth.”Heimposedleviesonlargebusinessesandraisedtaxesonthewealthyandonlargeinheritances.Longcriticizedtheproposalsasbeingweak, but they were widely portrayed as “soaking the rich.” Roosevelt alsoincorporated populist rhetoric in his presidential campaign that year,championingthe“averageman”againstthe“economicroyalists.”

As it turned out, Roosevelt did not have to fear Long’s candidacy. In

September1935, theKingfishwasassassinated inBatonRouge.And in1936,Rooseveltwonanotherlandslide.ButLonghadasignificantinfluenceovertheNewDealandoverAmericanpolitics.HeandhismovementpushedCongresstoadopt programs that became pillars of American policy for the next fourdecades. Long brought the New Deal’s outlook into line with the public’sunderlyingconcernabouttheinequalityofwealthandpower.

GeorgeWallaceThe’60swerethoughtofasaneraoffermentontheleft.InEurope,thereweretheMay–June1968protestsinFranceandtheHotAutumninItalyin1969.Inthe United States, it was the time of civil rights, black power, anti-war,feminism, and environmentalism. But it was also when a rightwing populist,GeorgeWallace,actinginoppositiontocivilrightsrulingsandlegislation,blewa large hole in the roof that NewDeal liberalism had erected over Americanpolitics.

TheNewDealhadrestedonatacitalliancebetweenliberalDemocratsandconservative Southern Democrats who resisted any legislation that mightchallengewhitesupremacy.Asaresult,keyNewDeallegislation,includingtheSocialSecurityandMinimumWageacts,wereformulatedtoexcludeSouthernblacks from their benefits. But after World War II, northern Democrats,propelledbytheColdWar’sideologicalstruggle,Brownv.BoardofEducation,andapowerfulcivilrightsmovement,embracedtheblackAmericancause.

As the party of Abraham Lincoln, Republicans had traditionally beenreceptive to black civil rights, and the Republican leadership in Congresssupported Lyndon Johnson’s Civil Rights andVotingRights acts of 1964 and1965. Barry Goldwater was an early dissenter, but in the 1964 presidentialelection,Johnsoneasilydefeatedhim.Johnson’svictorydidnot,however,signalwidespreadsupportforhiscivilrightsinitiatives,andafterhepassedtheVotingRightsActandlaunchedtheWaronPoverty,apopularbacklashgrew.Wallaceturnedthebacklashintoapopulistcrusade.

Wallace was raised in a rural small town in Alabama. His father andgrandfather dabbled in politics. They were New Deal Democrats underRoosevelt’s spell. Wallace would eventually make his name as an arch-segregationist,buthewasinitiallyapopulistDemocratlikeLongforwhomrace

was strictly a secondary consideration. When he was a delegate to the 1948DemocraticConvention, he didn’t join theDixiecratwalkout in protest of theparty’scivilrightsplatform.Heinitiallyranforgovernorin1958asaNewDealDemocratandlostagainstacandidatebackedbytheKuKluxKlan.Afterthat,hepledged,“Iwillneverbeoutniggeredagain.”

In 1962, Wallace ran again and this time he won as a proponent of“segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” In 1963, hegainednotorietywhenheattemptedtoblocktwoblackstudentsfromregisteringat the University of Alabama. In 1964, he ran in the Democratic primariesagainstJohnson’ssurrogatesinWisconsin,Indiana,andMarylandandgotaboutathirdofthevote—ashighas43percentinMaryland,wherehecarried15of23counties. In 1968, he ran as an independent against Nixon andHumphrey. InearlyOctober,hewasaheadofHumphreyinthepolls,butintheend,hegot13.5percent of the vote and carried five states in the South. In 1972, he ran as aDemocrat, and stoodachanceof taking thenominationwhenanassassin shotandcrippledhimwhilehewascampaigninginMayfortheMarylandprimary.

Wallaceemphasizedhisoppositiontoracialintegration,butheframeditasadefense of the average (white) American against the tyranny of Washingtonbureaucrats. Big government was imposing its way on the average person.AppearingonMeetthePressin1967,Wallacesummeduphiscandidacy:

There’s a backlash against big government in this country. This is amovementofthepeople....AndIthinkthatifthepoliticiansgetinthewayalotofthemaregoingtogetrunoverbythisaveragemaninthestreet—thismaninthetextilemill,thismaninthesteelmill,thisbarber,thisbeautician,thepolicemanonthebeat...thelittlebusinessman.

Wallace opposed busing—which became a major issue after a 1971 SupremeCourt order upheld it as a means to achieve desegregation—because it wasbreaking up working-class neighborhoods, and he attacked the white liberalswhopromoteditashypocriteswhorefusedtosubjecttheirchildrentowhattheyinsistedthatworking-andmiddle-classkidsbesubjectedto.“Theyarebuildingabridge over the Potomac for all the white liberals fleeing to Virginia,” hedeclared.

Wallacewasnot,however,apoliticalconservative.Ondomesticissuesthatdidn’t directly touch on race, Wallace ran as a New Deal Democrat. In hiscampaign brochure in 1968, he boasted that in Alabama, he had increased

spendingoneducation,welfare, roads, and agriculture.Whenhewas asked in1967whohewouldappointtohiscabinetifhewereelected,hesaidhewouldconsidereitherAFL-CIOheadGeorgeMeanyorLeonardWoodcock, theheadof theUnitedAutoWorkers.He also drew a line between the people and theveryrichandpowerful.CampaigninginFlorida,hesaid,“We’resickandtiredoftheaveragecitizenbeingtaxedtodeathwhilethesemultibillionairesliketheRockefellers and the Fords and theMellons andCarnegies gowithout payingtaxes.” Wallace, like Long, was often called fascist, but he was a rightwingpopulistinthetraditionofthepost-1896TomWatson.Whenprotestersaccusedhimofbeingafascist,Wallace,whoservedinWorldWarII,responded,“Iwaskillingfascistswhenyoupunkswereindiapers.”

LikeWallace,hissupporterswereamixofleftandrightintheirconvictions.In1976,sociologistDonaldWarrenpublishedastudyofwhathecalled“middleAmerican radicals,”orMARs.On thebasisof extensive surveysconducted in1971–72and1975,Warrendefinedadistinctpoliticalgroupthatwasneitherleftnor right, liberal nor conservative. MARs “feel the middle class has beenseriouslyneglected,”Warrenwrote.Theysee“governmentasfavoringboththerichandpoorsimultaneously.”

Warren’s MARs held conservative positions on poverty and racial issues.They rejected racial busing and welfare agencies as examples of “the rich[giving] in to thedemandsof thepoor, and themiddle incomepeoplehave topay the bill.” They disliked the national government, but they also thoughtcorporations “have toomuch power” andwere “too big.”They favoredmanyliberalprograms.Theywantedgovernmenttoguaranteejobstoeveryone.Theysupportedprice(butnotwage)control,Medicare,somekindofnationalhealthinsurance,federalaidtoeducation,andSocialSecurity.

WarrenfoundthatMARsrepresentedaboutaquarteroftheelectorate.Theywereonaveragemoremalethanfemale;theyhadahighschoolbutnotacollegeeducation;theirincomefellinthemiddle,orslightlybelow;theyhadskilledorsemi-skilled blue-collar jobs, or clerical or sales white-collar work. WhenWarren grouped by income and education the other groups he surveyed into“lowerincome,”“averagemiddles,”“higheducationmiddles,”and“affluents,”hefoundthatofallof themtheMARsweremost likelytocontemplatevotingforGeorgeWallace in 1972.AGallup studyof the demographics of the 1968WallacevotefoundhisconstituencytobeidenticaltothatofWarren’sMARs.

In other words,Wallace’s base was among voters who saw themselves as“middle class”—the American equivalent of “the people”—and who saw

themselves locked in conflictwith those belowand above.LikeWallace, theyremainedNewDealliberalsinmanyoftheirviews,butnotonmattersthatboreonraceorlawandorder.Inthesecases,theyadamantlyrejectedthewelfareandbusing and affirmative action policies that 1972 Democratic presidentialcandidate George McGovern and many liberal Democrats favored. They hadbegun the political journey fromDemocrat to Independent to Republican thatwouldfinallyconcludeinthe1994congressionalelections.

Wallace, likeLong,was amovementuntohimself.Whenhewas shot andforcedtodropoutofthepresidentialcampaign,itendedhisattempttotransformAmericanpolitics.Hewouldrunagainin1976butwouldbeeclipsedbyanotherSouthern politician, Jimmy Carter. Attempts by conservatives to retain hisAmerican Independent Party flopped. Hewould serve as governor again, andwould repudiateandapologize forhisownopposition to racial integration.Hewouldendhiscareermuchashebegan—asaNewDealDemocrat.ButWallaceandhisfollowershadalreadyhadaprofoundinfluenceonthetwo-partysystem.

Wallace’s campaigns were the opening wedge in the realignment of theparties in the South. The Republicans would subsequently accommodateWallace’spositionsonbiggovernment,welfare,busing,andaffirmativeaction.AndNixonhad alreadybegun to do that.AsKevinPhillips understood in hisprescient1969book,TheEmergingRepublicanMajority,Wallace’svoteswouldmigrate to the Republican Party. In 1972, Nixon’s percentage vote againstMcGoverncloselyresembledthetotalofNixonandWallace’svotesin1968in45of50states.In14states,thepercentageswerealmostidentical.

TheDemocraticandRepublicancoalitionsthatwouldemergeafterWallace’s1968runandMcGovern’s1972campaignwouldbesignificantlydifferentfromthe coalitionsof theNewDeal era.From1932 through1960, the twoparties’support could roughly be arrayed in a pyramid with income and educationmovingupward.Democrats,asthepartyofthe“commonman,”tookupmostofthebottomtwo-thirds.ThatallowedtheDemocratstowinmostoftheelections.

In1972,manywhitevotersinthelowerandmiddlesegmentsofthepyramidwouldbeginshiftingtotheRepublicans,whilemanyprofessionals—fromnursesandteacherstoengineersandarchitects—whohadbeenloyalRepublicans,butwhohadbeentouchedbythenewleftmovementsofthe’60s,andhadexpectedbutnot foundautonomyandsatisfaction in theirwork,wouldbeginvoting forthe Democrats. They became critics of unregulated capitalism, and theirdescendantswould providemuchofBernieSanders’s support.TheDemocratsbegan building an odd coalition of theminority poorwith upper-middle-class

whites. Therewould no longer be a clear demarcation between the parties onincomeandeducation.

The transformation of the coalitions would be delayed by the Watergatescandalandwouldn’tfullycometofruitionuntil1980oreven1994,whentheRepublicanswouldwinbothhousesofCongress.Wallace’spopulistcandidacies,farmorethanGoldwater’s,setthisprocessinmotion.HiscampaignswouldleadtoRepublicansadoptingWallace’sstandongovernmentandstate’srights,alongwithanopportunistic imitationofhisownpopulistanti-elitistpolitics(directedat“Washington”).ButthenPatBuchananinhis1992and1996campaignsandTrumpinhis2016campaignwoulddrawon theunrulypopulismofWallace’smiddleAmericanradicalsandwouldmobilizeitagainsttheRepublicans’moretraditionalsupporters.

NeoliberalismandItsEnemies:Perot,Buchanan,theTeaParty,andOccupyWallStreet

New Deal liberalism reigned from 1932 to 1968. The New Deal did notrepresent,assomecriticsclaimed,arepudiationofcapitalism,butanattempttosave and reform it, after the laissez-faire, pro-business policies of Republicanadministrations had helped to bring about the financial crash and the GreatDepression. The New Deal approach, which used government to countercapitalism’s tendencies toward unemployment, inequality, monopoly, andenvironmental pollution, helpedproduce several decadesof post-WorldWar IIprosperity.

George Wallace’s populist crusade undermined the Democrats’ politicalmajority, which depended upon the support of Southern states, but it didn’tdiscredit the New Deal liberal worldview of government and the economy.Wallace, after all, was a New Deal liberal himself. That discrediting wouldhappen during the 1970s, as theUnited States faced economic conditions thatappeared to justify a new conception of the relationship between governmentand the economy. The business community would champion this newconception, andRepublicans,many ofwhom had reluctantly backed theNewDeal—Goldwater famously called the Eisenhower administration’s budget a“dimestoreNewDeal”—wouldembracethenewapproach.

Democratswould initially object to the new conception, but by the 1990swouldinsomecasescomearoundtoitsessentials,orinothersbeforcedtodosobyapowerfulRepublicanopposition.Theapproachwasinitiallycalled“supply-sideeconomics,”and that termfitspartof it.Leftwingpoliticalscientistshavealsocalledit“neoliberalism”andhavedrawnaconnectiontosimilarpoliticsinEurope.The term is ambiguous, becausewhile liberalism in theUnitedStatesrefersoftentoNewDealliberalism,itrefersinEuropetoclassicalfree-market

economics. But I am going to use it because the result in both cases isequivalent.

IntheUnitedStates,neoliberalismmeantthemodification,butnotwholesaleabandonment,ofNewDealliberalism—supportfortheNewDealsafetynet,butbeyond that, priority to market imperatives—while in Europe, it meant thepartialreturntoanolderfreemarketliberalism.TheUnitedStatesisstill inaneradominatedby thisneoliberalworldview,but ithascomeunderattackfrompopulistpoliticiansandmovements—fromRossPerotandPatBuchananintheearly1990stotheTeaPartyandOccupyWallStreetinthe2010s.

TheTriumphofNeoliberalismThe origins of neoliberalism go back to the global challenges that Americanbusiness began to face in the early 1970s, asWestern Europe and Japan hadrebuilt their factories and were able to compete effectively with Americanmanufacturers. That became evident when for the first time in the twentiethcentury, theUnitedStates rana tradedeficit in1971.Withdevelopingnationsbeginningtobuildsteelmillsaswellastextileplants,Americanproducerswerealso facedwithglobalovercapacity inkey industries like steel, shoes, textiles,shipbuilding,chemicals,televisions,automobiles,andrefrigerators.(Thelisthascontinuedtogrowovertheyears.)Thecombinationofgrowingcompetitionandglobal overcapacity was an important factor in driving down profit rates forAmerican producers. According to economic historian Robert Brenner, from1965to1973,ratesofprofitfell40.9percentinmanufacturingand23.1percentinnon-manufacturing.

Duringthedecadesofpostwarprosperity,businesshadacquiescedinsteadywage increases, especially in unionized industries, because they could bedefrayed through risingprices,productivity,andsales.Butby theearly1970s,businesseswerealsoincreasinglyworriedaboutwagepressurefrombelowthatwasthreateningtheirratesofprofit.Amajorlaborwavehadoccurredfrom1965to1973,almostdoublingthenumberofstrikesthathadoccurredinthepreviousdecade. In addition, businesses increasingly feared an alliance between theunions and New Left militants. In a special issue on the Seventies, BusinessWeek voiced fears of a challenge to “corporations and the middle-and upper-bracketincomeearners”from“theblacks,thelaborunions,andtheyoung.”

American businesses responded to these threats by adopting a hard lineagainst unionization, sometimes even in violation of labor law. They movedplantstoright-to-workstatesandoverseas.TheycreatedanextensivelobbyingnetworkinWashington—pro-businessthinktanksandpolicygroupsaswellasthenewlyestablishedBusinessRoundtableofcorporateCEOs—topromotetaxcutsandtherepealorweakeningofregulations.Theylobbiedfortradedealsthatnot only removed tariff barriers to American exports, but eased overseasinvestmentbyprotectingAmericanfirmsfromexpropriation.

Businesswasn’tthemainforcebehindthe1965ImmigrationandNationalityAct,but itcertainly tookadvantageof it.Throughfamilyreunification, theactledtoafloodofnewimmigrants,includingunskilledlaborfromLatinAmericaand Asia. Agribusiness, food processing, meatpacking, construction, hotel,restaurant,andotherservicebusinessesusedtheseworkers,manyofwhomwereundocumentedornoteligibleforcitizenship,topushdownwagesandtoresistorundermineunions.Businesseswouldlaterfightanyattemptstopenalizethemforhiringundocumentedworkers.

One example is what happened with Midwestern meatpacking plants.According to a New York Times report in 2001, “Until 15 or 20 years ago,meatpackingplants in theUnitedStateswerestaffedbyhighlypaid,unionizedemployees who earned about $18 an hour, adjusted for inflation. Today, theprocessingandpackingplantsarelargelystaffedbylow-paidnonunionworkersfrom places likeMexico and Guatemala.Many of them start at $6 an hour.”AccordingtoaPewreport,by2005between20and25percentoftheworkersintheseplantswereundocumented.

There wasn’t widespread public support for these measures. The 1965immigrationbillwasnotpopular,andbythelate1990s,stateshadbegunpassingreferendaagainst illegal immigration thatwerealsodirected implicitlyat legalimmigrants.Therewasalsopublicskepticismabouttradedeals,andoppositionto American firms moving plants overseas, as I remember once attending aconvention of the Christian Coalition, a major organization of conservativeevangelicals run by two pro-business Republicans, Pat Robertson and RalphReed.RobertsonandReedgottheorganizationtoendorsetheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA),butwhenItalkedtothegroup’srank-and-fileIfound almost universal opposition to it. ANovember 1993Gallup poll foundoppositiontoNAFTAat46percentagainstwithonly38percentfor.InJanuary1999,aPewpollfound54percentofthepublicopposedtograntingChinamost-favored-nationtradingstatusand32percentfor.

In spite of public skepticism, business carried the day in the RepublicanParty—and eventually in the Democratic Party as well. Operatives crafted amajority coalition that was composed of the traditional Republican businessclass, small businesses and farmers, and white working-class voters who hadbegan fleeing the Democratic Party because of its support for civil rights,feminism,andthesecularcounterculture.Therewasanimplicitarrangementbywhich themajorbusiness lobbieswouldacquiesce inRepublicanopposition toabortion, gun control, or affirmative action in exchange for working-classsupportforreductionsinregulationsandtaxes.

TheoneareainwhichRepublicanbusinessandthenewwhiteworking-classRepublicanscouldwholeheartedlyagreewascuttingsocialspending.Businessesgenerallyfavoredanyspendingcutsthatwouldlowerpressuretoraisetaxesonthem and their stockholders. The working and middle classes, with somejustification, believed theywouldhave topay thebulkof the taxes to supportprogramsthattheybelievedwouldprimarilybenefitminoritiesandthepoorandnotthemselves.Thisoppositiontospending(andtoanytaxincreasesthoughttosupport it)wascapsulizedinageneraloppositionto“Washington”andto“biggovernment.”

ManyDemocratsinitiallyresistedtheneoliberalagenda,butattemptsinthefirst twoyearsoftheCarteradministrationtostrengthenlaborlaw,progressivetaxreform,consumerregulation,andcampaignfinancereformwerebeatenbackbyRepublicansandthebusinesslobbies.Inaddition,Democraticpolicymakersfoundthemselveshamstrungbythecombinationofgrowingunemploymentandinflation—the result in the latter case of rising energy and food prices. This“stagflation” (stagnation + inflation) defied the usual Keynesian demandsideremedies, and there was little support for going beyond those remedies toextensive price controls. By the late 1970s, the Carter administration hadacquiescedtosupply-sidebusinesstaxcutsandtoamonetariststrategyofusinghighinterestratesandrisingunemploymenttocurbinflation.

Over the next 12 years, Democrats, led by the “new Democrats,” wouldaccept other key aspects of the neoliberal agenda, including trade pacts likeNAFTAthateasedforeigninvestment,deregulationoffinance,andimmigrationmeasures to accommodate unskilled and later highly skilled guest workers.Democrats would continue to fight Republicans on some social spendingmeasuresandonincomeandinheritancetaxchanges,butoncetheRepublicanswon control of Congress in 1994, Democrats would be forced intouncomfortablecompromises.Attemptstorevivelaborlegislationwouldsimply

fail.Electionbattleswouldalmostinvariablyleavetheheightsoftheneoliberalapproachuntouched,andfocusinsteadonsocialpoliciessuchasabortionorguncontrolandonrelativelymarginaldifferencesoversocialspendingandtaxes.

Thekey contention that sustained the neoliberal agendawas that the olderNew Deal liberalism, by focusing on raising consumer demand and reducinginequality, would stifle growth and reduce Americans’ standard of living. Bycontrast, the neoliberal and supply-side agenda,while not directly confrontingeconomicinequality,promisedtospureconomicgrowth,whichwouldbenefitallAmericans.AsRonaldReagan,borrowingfromJohnKennedy,putitinthe1980campaign,“arisingtidewillliftallboats.”Similarkindsofargumentswouldbemade in Europe by the “ThirdWay” centrists,whowere partially inspired byToryPrimeMinisterMargaretThatcher.

Butevenbythelate1980s,realityonthegroundappearedtocontradicttheseclaimsofwidespreadprosperity. In the1980s,growthandemployment laggedbehindthatofpreviousdecades.Theshapeoftheeconomyalsobegantochangeunder Reagan. The Reagan and Bush administrations ignored calls for anindustrial policy thatwould protect and help expandAmerica’smanufacturingsector.Instead,Reagan’srelianceonhighinterestratesandanovervalueddollarhelpedacceleratethedeclineofAmerica’smanufacturingindustries,fuelingthegrowthoffinanceandfinancialservices.

By the end of the ’80s, large swaths of domestically based industries,including consumer electronics, machine tools, and textiles, had disappeared.The jobs in these industries were replaced by lower-wage service sector andhigher-wage professional-level jobs—many either employing or employed byinformation technology—which created an indentation in the middle of theworkforceanda rise in inequality.EconomichistorianPeterTeminargues thatthese neoliberal policies created a “dual economy” composed of a high-wageFTE(finance, technologyandelectronics) sectoranda low-wageoneofsemi-skilledandunskilledworkersthatstraddledashrinkingmiddle-incomegroupofmanufacturingandwhite-collarjobs.

Along the same lines, economist Stephen Rose has shown that the risingdifferenceinincomeandwealthprevailednotjustbetweenthe1percentandthe99percent,butbetweenthetop30percent—includingagrowinguppermiddleclass—andthebottom70percent.These trends, reinforcedbyfurther financialderegulation, anovervalueddollar, and regressive taxpolicies,wouldcontinueup through the onset of the Great Recession and fuel discontent among themiddle and lower-middle classes, many of whom felt cast aside by themove

toward a post-industrial economy heavily dependent on finance and financialservices. (As I will recount, something very similar happened in WesternEurope.)

Thefirstvisiblecrisiscamein1991,whentheU.S.sufferedfromapeculiarrecession that seemed to dragon for fourmore years in joblessness andwagestagnation.Inaddition,manyAmericansweretroubledbythecontinuinglossofmanufacturing jobs to Japan andWesternEurope, and the rapid rise in illegalimmigrationintheSouthwest.PublicopinionexpertDanielYankelovichwrote,“Even though they can’t put their finger on it, [people] fear something isfundamentallywrongwiththeU.S.economy.”

Whenparty leaders’promises—that free tradedealswould create farmorejobsthantheywouldthreaten, that immigrationmeasureswouldstopthefloodof immigrants entering the country illegally, and that financial deregulationwould have no ill effects—proved false, it sparked a populist challenge to theprevailingconsensus.Thatchallengecameinthe1992and1996electionsfromTexas businessman Ross Perot, and from former Nixon and Reagan aide PatBuchanan. Perot represented a left and center-left populism, and Buchanan achallenge from the right, but likeotherAmericanpopulists, theydidn’t fit theconventional conflict betweenDemocrats andRepublicans or between liberalsandconservatives. Instead, theyarosepreciselybecause the leadingDemocratsand Republicans were ignoring popular concerns about Americanmanufacturing,immigration,andlobbyinginWashington.

RossPerotPerotgrewupinTexarkana,asmallfarmingtowninEastTexasthatusedtobeastopover for People’s Party agitators. His father was a cotton broker whostruggledtomakealivingduringtheGreatDepression.Followingtwoyearsatjunior college, Perot talked a retiring senator from neighboringArkansas intoappointinghimtotheNavalAcademy.Aftergraduating,Perotspenttwoyearsatseabeforeobtaininganearlydischargeinordertogointobusiness.

PerotbeganhiscareersellingandservicingmainframecomputersforIBM,but in 1962, he set up his own data processing company, Electronic DataSystems,whichheturnedintoamulti-billiondollarenterprise.In1985,hesoldittoGeneralMotorswiththeideathatheandEDSwouldhavealeadershiprole

withinthefalteringcompany,butwhenGM’smanagementignoredhim,heleftand started Perot Systems. The experience helped turn him into an outspokencritic of corporateAmerica and of the Republican andDemocratic politicianswhohadcoddledit.

PerothadbeenanactiveRepublican.In1968,heloanedmembersofEDStotheNixon campaign.But hewas amoderate. InTexas, he devoted himself toimproving the state’s school systems, and particularly those schools thatprimarilycateredtominorities.Hewaspro-choiceandinfavorofgayrightsandgun control.Hewas not viscerally opposed to government intervention in theeconomy like some hardline conservatives, and after his experiencewithGM,Perot became convinced that government had to take a stronger and moreeffectivehand in steering theeconomy.Thatputhimdirectlyatoddswith theBush administration, which condemned “industrial policy.” In the spring of1992,Perotgavehisconsenttohisfollowersputtinghisnameontheballotforanindependentrunforthepresidency.

Perotportrayedhimselfasanunpaidservantofthepeopleagainstacorruptgovernment and inept corporate hierarchy. America’s CEOs like GM’s RogerSmith, he argued, were too concerned with quarterly returns, and politicalleaders with poll findings. TheWhite House and Congress, he charged, wereunder the grip of an army of lobbyists, including those representing foreigncompaniesandgovernments,whichhaddescendedonWashingtonoverthepriortwodecades.Perotpromisedtoreversetherelationshipbetweenthepeopleandtheirgovernment.“Weownthiscountry,”PerottoldtheNationalPressClubinMarch1992:

Government should come from us. It now comes at uswith a propagandamachine in Washington that Hitler’s propaganda chief, Goebbels, wouldhave just envied.We’ve got to put the country back in the control of theowners.AndinplainTexastalk,it’stimetotakeoutthetrashandcleanoutthebarn,orit’sgoingtobetoolate.

Like a conventional pre-Reaganite Republican, Perot wanted to balance thebudget.Buthealsowantedtopreventcorporationsfromtransferringtheir jobsoverseas,andopposedNAFTA.“TheWhiteHouseisallexcitedaboutthenewtradeagreementwithMexico.Thisagreementwillmovethehighestpaidblue-collaredjobsintheU.S.toMexico.Thisisgoingtocreateseriousdamagetoourtax base during this critical period.We have got tomanufacture here and not

theretokeepourtaxbaseintact,”PerottoldthePressClub.PerotpromisedthathewouldrestoreAmericanmanufacturingjobsandthatconsumerswouldonceagain see American products in stores. “We need jobs here, and we mustmanufacture here if wewish to remain a superpower.Wemust stop shippingmanufacturingjobsoverseasandonceagainmakethewords‘MadeintheUSA’theworld’sstandardofexcellence,”hedeclared.

Perothadbeenskepticalof theBushadministration’sdecision to intervenemilitarily tooust Iraq fromKuwait.He thought theUnitedStateshad tostressburdensharingwithitsalliesinEuropeandAsiaandtofocusonrebuildingitseconomy.“Ourhighest foreignpolicypriority is togetourhouse inorderandmake America work again,” he declared. To do that, he favored publicinvestments that would target “industries of the future” after the manner ofJapan’sministryofinternationaltradeandindustry.Hedismissedtheobjectionsoffreemarketadvocates.“Don’ttheyrealizethatthebiogeneticsindustryistheresultofourfederallyfundedresearchuniversitiesandtheNationalInstitutesofHealth?”hedeclared.

To reclaim Washington for the people, Perot advocated tightening therestrictions on former officials becoming lobbyists, reforming campaignspendingtolimitcontributions,shorteningthecampaignseason,makingvotingmoreaccessible(“WhydowehaveelectionsonTuesday?Workingfellowscan’tget there”), and using computers to create “electronic town halls” where thenation could learn about and debate issues. Perot promised to overcome the“gridlock” (a term he popularized) between Republicans and Democrats. Hepledgedthathewouldbethe“servant”andthatthepeoplewouldbethe“boss.”But inPerot’scontempt forCongressand thepoliticalpartiesandhisproposalfor electronic plebiscites, he was in effect putting himself in a position of asuper-president who would have an unmediated relationship to the Americanpeople.LikeLong,hewasseenas“dictatorial,”evenbyhisownvoters.

Perotquicklyclimbedtothetopofthepolls.InaCNN/TimepollinMayhehad33percentto28percentforBushand24percentforClinton.ButPerotwasnotpreparedfor thekindof intensivequestioning that thepress thensubjectedhim to. Perot’s own conspiratorial streak also undid him. He had troubleconfirmingaclaimthattheBlackPantherParty,oncontractwiththeVietCong,hadoncetriedtobreakintohishouse.AshebegantofalterinthepollsinJuly,andafterhiscampaignmanager resigned,Perotsuddenlyquit therace.ButonOctober1,Perot reentered the race.His eccentricities had alreadydoomedhischance towin,buthisexceptionalperformance in thedebates—hememorably

warned in the October 15 debate that NAFTA would create a “great suckingsound”onAmericanjobs—kepthimintheraceuntiltheend.Hewon19percentof thevoteoverallandmore than25percent inninestates. Inanexitpoll,40percentofvoterssaidthattheywouldhavevotedforhimiftheythoughthehadhadachancetowin.

PerottookvotersalmostequallyfromtheDemocratsandtheRepublicans.Infocus groups he did for Perot, Frank Luntz found that “not once did a Perotsupporter identify either Perot or himself as liberal or conservative.” InNovemberexitpolls,Perotdidbestamongvoterswhoidentifiedthemselvesas“moderates” and “independents.” Pollster Stanley Greenberg characterized hisvoters as representing“the radicalmiddle—split evenlybetweenconservativesand liberal/moderates.”His highest numberswere among voterswho believedtheir financial situationwas“worsenow than in1988.”Perotwasmore in thetraditionoftheoriginalpopulistsandofLong,buthisvotershadsomethingofthe Wallace rightwing populist outlook. In a post-election survey, GreenbergfoundthatamajorityofPerot’svotersthoughtthat“businesscorporations”didnot “strike a fair balance betweenmaking profits and serving the public,” butthey also strongly supported the idea that “It’s themiddle class,not the poor,whoreallygetarawdealtoday.”(ItwasnotsurprisingthatPerotvotersbytwo-to-onesubsequentlybackedRepublicansinthe1994congressionalraces,whichtheGOPswept.)

In his initial campaign speeches, Perot started off with an attack on thedeficit,butlaterinthecampaign,hebeganbyattackingtradedealsandrunawayshopsandKStreet lobbyists.That resonatedwithhisvoters.According to theexitpollsinNovember,whenvoterswereasked,“Overall,wouldyousayU.S.tradewithothercountriescreatesmorejobsfortheU.S.,losesmorejobsfortheU.S.,orhasnoeffectonU.S.jobs?”Perotvoterssaidby49to35percentthattradelosesmorejobs.AsRuyTeixeiraandGuyMolyneuxnotedintheir1993electionstudy,“SomeofPerot’sbiggestapplauselinesintheteleviseddebates—bothasmeasuredinthestudioandamongviewersinthehome—werethosethatbluntly asserted theneed to limit the influenceof foreign lobbyists and take atougherU.S.tradestance.”Heandhisvoterepresentedthefirstclearrepudiationoftheneoliberalagenda.

PatBuchanan

The same year that Perot ran, former Nixon and Reagan speech-writer PatBuchananchallengedGeorgeH.W.BushfortheRepublicannomination.HeranagainstBushprimarily from the right, criticizing thepresident for renegingonhisvownottoraisetaxes.ButBuchananalsocriticizedBushforoverextendingAmerica’s commitments abroad and for neglecting America’s economicchallenge from Japan andWestern Europe. “We can’t just let foreign importscomeinhereandrobusofAmerican jobs,”Buchanandeclared inacampaignspeech.”Buchanangotasurprising38percentinNewHampshire,asuresignofRepublican dissatisfaction with Bush, but because he was seen as a protestcandidate,Buchananfailedtotopthatinanyofthesubsequentprimaries.

Buchanan decided to run again in 1996. This time, he took aim moreexplicitlyat theneoliberal agenda thatRepublicansandDemocrats shared.Onthe eve of the campaign Buchanan wrote, “As transnational corporationscompete evermore ferociously, FirstWorldworkers become expendable. . . .What has global competition done for the quality of life ofMiddleAmerica?What,afterall,isaneconomyfor,ifnotforitspeople?”Inanothercolumn,hewarned,“Thebattleforthefuturewillbeasmuchabattlewithinthepartiesasitwillbebetweentheparties,abattlebetweenthehiredmenoftheMoneyPowerwho long abandoned the quaint but useless old ideas of nationhood—andpopulists, patriots and nationalists who want no part of [Secretary of theTreasury underBillClinton]RobertRubin’sworld.”During his campaign, hefiredsalvosatcorporateAmericaandWallStreet.“TherewillbenomoreGATTdealsdoneforthebenefitofWallStreetbankers,”Buchananpromisedduringacampaign stop in Youngstown. And of NAFTA: “You don’t force AmericansmakingtenbucksanhourtocompetewithMexicanworkerswhohavetoworkforadollaranhour.”AtthesametimeasimmigrationwasbecomingabigissueinEurope,Buchananwasalsothefirstmajorpresidentialcandidatetosingleoutillegal immigration. He promised, in fact, to stop immigration altogether. “Acountry that loses control of its borders isn’t really a country anymore,” hedeclared.

Buchanan,whofamouslydescribedhiscampaignasrallying“peasantswithpitchforks” against the “establishment,” astonished pundits in Washington aswell as party leaders by winning the Alaska and Louisiana caucuses, comingwithin twopointsof favoredSenatorBobDole in Iowa, and thenwinning theNewHampshire primary.But afterNewHampshire, party leaders and punditsclosed ranks behind Dole, and Buchanan failed to win another primary. Hisfailure was partly due to voters’ seeing him as they did in 1992 as a protest

candidate.Hehadnever, after all, heldanelectiveoffice.Hewaspugnacious,eloquent,funny,andattimesnastyandatothertimesgenerous,buthewasnotpresidential.

ThecollapseofBuchanan’scandidacywasalsoduetowhathappenedtotheAmerican economy. Like Perot in 1992, Buchanan initially benefited from aflaggingeconomy.Evenbyearly1996,theUnitedStateshadnotfullyrecoveredfromwhathadbeencalleda“joblessrecovery”andlaggingwagegrowth.Bythespringof1996,however,unemploymentwasdroppingbelow5percent,andrealincomehadbeguntorise.Clintonwouldcitetheawakenedeconomythatyeartodefeat Dole in the November election, but even by the late spring, it hadundercutBuchanan’scandidacy.

With the economy booming in the late 1990s, neoliberalism seemed to beworking.Thegapbetween thevery richandeveryoneelsewasgrowing, legalandillegalimmigrationwassoaring,andAmerica’stradedeficitwasincreasing,but neither Perot, who ran again in 1996 as the Reform Party candidate, norBuchanan,whoranagainin2000astheReformPartycandidate,couldgetanytraction.Andwhatdoubtstheearlydot-comrecessionof2001wouldhavesownaboutneoliberalismwereovershadowedbytheSeptember11terroristattackandthe Iraq War. But Perot and Buchanan had nonetheless demonstrated thepotential for a revolt against neoliberalism among the “middle Americanradicals.”ThecomplaintsthatPerotandBuchananvoicedwouldbeheardagainafterthefinancialcrashof2008.

TheTeaPartyLike the crash of 1929 that led to the Great Depression, the global financialcrisisof2008wasrootedinlong-term,systemicproblems.Asiancountriesweresending back dollars acquired from trade surpluses.With the high-tech boomexhausted, and manufacturing still generally plagued by global overcapacity,these dollarswere directly or indirectly fueling consumer debt, particularly inhousing.Thehousingboomwas sustainingdemand in aneconomy thatmighthave otherwise slowed.When the housing bubble burst in 2007,millions losttheir homes and financial institutions were put at risk. A steep recessionfollowed.Butthecrashwasalsoprecipitatedbythepoliticsofneoliberalism—byfinancialderegulationunderCarter,Reagan,andClinton,andlaxregulation

underGeorgeW.Bush; by trade and investment policies that led to unwieldydollar surpluses in the hands of China and other Asian nations; and by taxpoliciesandanti-unionbusinesspracticesthatwidenedeconomicinequalityandledtotheneedtopropupconsumerdemandthroughtheaccumulationofdebt.

ThefinancialcrisisbecamewidelyvisibleinSeptember2008whentheNewYorkinvestmentbankLehmanBrothershadtocloseitsdoors.ThecrashhelpedelectBarackObamaandaDemocraticCongress.Obama’smajorityreflectedthegrowthandincreasedDemocraticcommitmentofthepeculiarcoalitionthathadbackedMcGovern in1972.These includedminorities,whoweremakingupagrowing percentage of the electorate, single women, and professionals. Itappearedatthetimethatbyrespondingforcefullytothecrash,Obamamightbeable,likeRooseveltin1933,tocreateanewenduringDemocraticmajority.Butitwasnottobe.Therewasadramaticdifferencefromthestart:WhileRoosevelthadbeenpushedbyLongandthelabormovementfromtheleft,Obamaalmostimmediatelyfeltpressurefromanewpopulistmovementontheright.

Obama may have contributed to the public turning right-ward. WhileRoosevelt went after the “moneychangers” during his first months in office,Obama’srhetoricandinitiativesreflectedadeferencetowardWallStreetandthefreemarket.Inhisinauguraladdress,hecastblameequallyonWallStreetandMainStreetfor thecrisis.“Oureconomyisbadlyweakened,aconsequenceofgreedandirresponsibilityonthepartofsome,butalsoourcollectivefailuretomakehardchoicesandpreparethenationforanewage,”hedeclared.Obama’sJusticeDepartmentdidnotprosecuteorevensingleoutanyofthemajorplayersin the financial crisis. And on the advice of his Treasury Secretary TimothyGeithner,Obamadelayedintroducingspecificfinancialreformmeasuresduringhisfirstmonthsinofficeforfeartheywouldshakebusinessconfidence.Healsogave bailing out the banks priority over aiding insolvent homeowners. Thatapproach would later spark a reaction from the left, but in the first year ofObama’spresidency,itleftapoliticalvacuumthatwasfilledbytheangryright.

TherightreactedinparticulartoinitiativesthatObamaundertookinhisfirstyear. First, he championed several measures to combat the recession. Theseincludeda$787billionstimulusbillanda$75billionbilltohelphomeownersthreatened by foreclosure. Second, he introduced his plan for national healthinsurance.Towinthesupportofinsuranceanddrugcompanies,Obamacobbledtogether a complex plan that wouldmandate individuals not covered by theiremployerstobuyinsurancefromexchanges;theplanwouldsubsidizeuninsuredlower-income individuals who might not be able to afford insurance on the

exchanges. Typical of post-New Deal Democratic social policy, it clearlyaddressedtheneedsoflower-incomegroups,butdidn’tappeartoofferasmuchtothemiddleclassor,inthiscase,toseniorcitizens,whowereinformedthattheplanwouldbefinancedbyreductionsinthegrowthofMedicarespending.

ThereactionspawnedtheTeaPartymovement,whichattackedneoliberalismfrom the far right. The movement was sparked by CNBC commentator RickSantelli’sdenunciationofObama’smortgageplan.“This isAmerica,”Santelli,speakingfromtheflooroftheChicagoMercantileExchange,exclaimed.“Howmanyofyoupeoplewanttopayforyourneighbor’smortgagethathasanextrabathroomandcan’tpaytheirbills?”Santellicalledfora“ChicagoTeaParty”toprotest the administration’s plan. Santelli’s plea was answered by a group ofbloggers, policy wonks, and Washington politicos who organized Tea PartyprotestsinFebruaryin30citiesandthenmoreprotestsinAprilandSeptember.

The Tea Party has never been a single unified organization. Instead, itconsistedofmyriadlocalgroupsthatwereindependentofeachotherbutunitedby socialmedia. Therewere several national Tea Party groups that used theirmailing lists to raise money and boost candidates, and two corporate-fundedWashington groups, FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity, whichexploited the movement to further their own lobbying agenda. SociologistsTheda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson estimated that in 2011, when themovement was probably at its height, Tea Party groups boasted 160,000members.Thatdoesn’tincludeseveralmillionpeoplewhoduringObama’sfirsttermtooktheircuesfromwhattheyunderstoodtheTeaPartytobeadvocating.That helped nominate a score of “Tea Party candidates” for the House andSenatein2010.

TherewasneveracommonplatformfortheTeaPartygroups,buttherewasa certain argument that ran through many of the groups’ positions. Santelliexpressed it in his rant: the idea that America is divided into “makers” and“takers”—peoplewho earn a living and pay taxes and peoplewho live off ofwhat other people earn. The Tea Party activists viewed Obama’s stimuluspackageandmortgagereliefthroughthatprism.Theysawthemselvesashavingto pay higher taxes in order to cover for other people’s mistakes in buyingmortgages they couldn’t afford. The Tea Party position was summed up in abumperstickerthatread,“YouarenotentitledtowhatIhaveearned.”

TheTeaPartyalsoviewedtheAffordableCareActthatCongresspassedin2010 as a program aimed at getting peoplewho already had insurance to payhigher premiums and co-payments, so that those who didn’t have insurance

could afford it. Seniors onMedicare,whohadpaid for their insurance,wouldalsoseetheirbenefitsreducedinordertocoverthecostoftheAffordableCareAct.EmilyEkins,whodidextensiveinterviewswithTeaPartymembers,writesthat the Tea Partiers “tended to view the ACA as a redistributive transferprogram that they would be disproportionately responsible for funding.” TeaPartiersviewed illegal immigration the sameway. In their interviews,SkocpolandWilliamsonreport,“themajorconcernwastheillegitimateandcostlyuseofgovernmentfundsandservicesbyillegalimmigrants.”

Manyof the localTeaPartygroupswerepartof the traditionofAmericanpopulism and reflected opposition from the right to the neoliberal consensus.TheyobjectedtotheresidualelementsofNewDealliberalismthatneoliberalismhad retained, even thosepopular amongRepublicans. If anything, theywere athrowback to the Jacksonianproto-populists.TheTeaPartiers’ argument about“makers” and “takers” recalled the “producerism” of the Jacksonians and thePeople’s Party, which was rooted in a distinction between productive andunproductiveelementsofsociety.Bankers,landspeculators,andgamblersweretypicallynumberedamongtheunproductive—aswere,for thepopulists,recentimmigrantswhotookjobsfromnative-bornAmericans.

TheTeaPartiers initially singledoutObama for coddling the “takers,” butafter Republicans won the Congress in 2010 but failed to deliver on the TeaParty’s non-negotiable demands to repeal Obamacare, the Tea Party focusedtheirireontheRepublicanestablishment.TeaPartycandidatesranagainstbothSenate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Majority Leader EricCantor—andinthelattercase,won.McConnellandCantor’ssinlayinrefusingto go all the way in repudiating even the bare rudiments of the neoliberalconsensus between the parties and in failing to block even discussion ofimmigrationreform.

Cantor’s sin also lay in being too close to Wall Street and the BusinessRoundtable. In the primary, Tea Party candidate David Brat said, “All theinvestmentbanksinNewYorkandD.C.—thoseguysshouldhavegonetojail.Insteadofgoingtojail,theywentonEric’sRolodex,andtheyaresendinghimbigchecks.”ThissideoftheTeaParty,whichechoestheoriginalPeople’sParty,was largely ignored by political scientists and other commentators, even afterTrump’spresidentialcampaignbroughtittothesurface.

Therightwing’ssuccessduringObama’sfirsttermwasinmarkedcontrasttoits relative obscurity during Roosevelt’s first term. In the 1930s, there wasrightwingoppositiontotheNewDealledbytheLibertyLobby,butitamounted

toafootnotecomparedtoLongandthelabormovementontheleft.Partofthereason for thiswas the difference between the political economy of theGreatDepression and the Great Recession. During the Great Depression,unemploymentclimbedashighas25percent,andthreatenedthemiddleaswellasthelowerclasses.Themiddle-classvoterswholookedtoLongfeared“beingplunged back into what they viewed as an abyss of powerlessness anddependence.”Theydidn’tscornthosebelowthem,butidentifiedwiththem.

DuringtheGreatRecession,mostAmericansenjoyedtheprotectionscreatedbytheNewDealandGreatSociety.Theydidn’thavetofearactualstarvation,homelessness,andhavingtheirsavingswipedoutinabankcrash.Therecessionfarlessaffectedtheolder,whitemiddleclasses,whoformedthebaseoftheTeaPartymovement than itdid the lowerclasses.During theGreatRecession, themiddle class, defined as the third quintile in income statistics, lost pre-taxincome, but when post-tax and transfer payments are included, didn’t loseincomefrom2007 through2011.Unemployment rateswerealsofarhigher forthosewithonlyahighschooleducationorlessthanforthosewithsomecollegeorabachelor’sdegree.Thatcreatedasituationinwhichwhatpartsofthemiddleclass feared most was having to subsidize through higher taxes or healthcarepremiums those in the lower classes or illegal and recent legal immigrants. Itencourageda rightwing rather thana leftwing response to theGreatRecessionandtoneoliberalism.Apopulistresponsewouldeventuallycomefromtheleft,butitwouldnotinitiallybeaswidespreadoremanatefromthesamepartoftheelectorate.

OccupyWallStreetByFebruary2011,Obamahadcomeunderattackfromtheleftfornotmovingaggressively against Wall Street. That month, a website, AmpedStatus.com,publishedareportontheAmericaneconomyentitled,“TheEconomicElitevs.thePeopleoftheUnitedStates.”ItsauthorDavidDeGrawwrote,“It’stimefor99percentofAmericanstomobilizeandaggressivelymoveoncommonsensepolitical reforms. It has now become evident to a critical mass that theRepublicanandDemocraticparties...havebeenboughtoffbyawell-organizedEconomic Elite who are tactically destroying our way of life.” When theAmpedStatus site was mysteriously knocked off line, the hacker group

Anonymoushelpedcreateanewsite,anditjoinedwithAmpedStatustoformaneweffortcalledA99.

A99calledforanoccupationofZuccottiParknearWallStreetonJune14.Thedemonstration fizzled,but theorganizersgot togetherwith anothergroup,theNewYorkCityGeneralAssembly,thathadbeenprotestingcitybudgetcutsandwanted to organize an occupation for the fall. Amonth later, a Canadiananti-capitalist publication Adbusters, citing the success of the EgyptiandemonstrationsinTahrirSquare,putoutacallonitsblogforanoccupationonSeptember17thatwould“setuptents,kitchens,peacefulbarricadesandoccupyWallStreetforafewmonths.”WhileAdbustersbilleditselfasanti-capitalist,itrejecteddefiningtheoccupation’sgoalas“theoverthrowofcapitalism”forfearthatit“willquicklyfizzleintoanotherinconsequentialultra-leftspectaclesoonforgotten.” It suggested coming up with “a deceptively simple Trojan Horsedemand...thatisimpossibleforPresidentObamatoignore.”

Theorganizersfailedtocomeupwithasingledemand—thereseemedtobetoomanyofthem,mostofwhichdemandedanendtothereignofneoliberalism—butonanewOccupyWallStreetwebsite,theycameupwithasimpleslogan,borrowedfromtheoriginalAmpedStatuspost,“Wearethe99percentthatwillnolongertoleratethegreedandcorruptionofthe1percent.”Thatslogan,whichframed the protest in populist terms, defined the movement as an attack ongrowingpoliticalandeconomicinequality.OnSeptember17,somewhereoverathousand demonstrators showed up and about 300 ended up camping out onZuccotti Park. And over the next month—aided by police overreaction—theoccupationandthedemonstrationsitspawnedattractedthousandsinNewYork.NewoccupymovementssprungupinscoresofAmericancities.OccupyBoston,Chicago, Oakland, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., to be sure, but alsoOccupy Tupelo, Wichita, Tampa, Nashville, Missoula, Birmingham, El Paso,andmany other cities and towns. It drew primarily from the college-educatedyoung(reducingorwritingoffstudentdebtswasaprominentdemand),butalsofrom veterans of past anti-globalization struggles, like the demonstrations inSeattlein1999againsttheWorldTradeOrganization.

PartofthekeytoOccupy’sinitialsuccesswasthatitstruckapopularnervethat went well beyond the demonstrators. It exposed the fallacy ofneoliberalism’sclaimto“liftallboats.”Inhisbook,OccupyNation,sociologistToddGitlinwrote,“UnlikeanyothermovementontheAmericanleftinatleastthree-quarters of a century, this movement began with a majority base ofsupport....Whatitstoodfor—economicjusticeandcurbsonthewealthy—was

popular.”Butthemovement’srejectionofformalleadership,andasthemonthswenton,thereversiontoobnoxiouslydisruptivetacticsthataffectedmorethanthemovement’soverttargets,finallyundidit.WhenNewYorkMayorMichaelBloombergclearedZuccottiParkofoccupiersonNovember15, themovementdissipatedand,exceptforafewwebpages,disappearedasanorganizedforce.

ButOccupyWallStreet’ssymbolicimpactwashuge.Itbroughttheissueofpoliticalandeconomicinequality,anissuethatlayattheheartofthechallengetoneoliberalism,tothefore—notjustintheUnitedStates,butinEurope,wherepopulistpartiesinGreeceandSpainwereinspiredbythemovement’sexample.MicahWhite, theAmerican senior editorofAdbusterswho helped inspire themovement, called it a “constructive failure.” In the 2012 election, Obamaborrowed from Occupy Wall Street’s rhetoric to pillory Republican MittRomney.AndOccupy’sradicalismwouldrecurinmoreorganizedform—whenaVermontsenatorwoulddecidetorunforpresidentin2016.

TheSilentMajorityandthePoliticalRevolution:DonaldTrumpandBernieSanders

In an interview with the Washington Post in July 2015, former MarylandGovernorMartinO’MalleydismissedBernieSanders as a “protestcandidate.”“I’mnotrunningforprotestcandidate,I’mrunningforPresidentoftheUnitedStates,”O’Malleydeclared.But after receiving0.57percentof thevote in theIowa Caucus on February 2, O’Malley dropped out, while Sanders, who tiedClintoninIowa,movedontoNewHampshire,wherehewontheprimaryeasilyandestablishedhimselfasaviablecontenderforthenomination.

DonaldTrump’scandidacywasalsogreetedwithderision.TwoweeksafterO’Malley dismissed Sanders’s candidacy, the Huffington Post’s Washingtoneditorsannouncedthattheywouldn’t“reportonTrump’scampaignaspartoftheHuffingtonPost’spoliticalcoverage.Instead,wewillcoverhiscampaignaspartof our entertainment section. Our reason is simple: Trump’s campaign is asideshow.” Six months later, with Trump leading the Republican pack in thepolls,HuffingtonPosteditorArianaHuffingtonsheepishlyannouncedtheyweremovingtheircoverageofhimbackintotheirpoliticssection.

Manypoliticalexpertsattributedthecandidates’successtosomethingotherthanwhat theywereadvocating.Trump’scoalition, theNewYorkTimeswrote,“is constructed around personality not substance.” Sanders’s success wasattributedtohis“authenticity.”AcolumninPoliticoaskedwhySanders’syoungsupporters“aresoobsessedwithSanders’sauthenticity?”

Partof thecandidates’appealdid liewith theirpersonalstyle.Sanders, the74-year-olddemocraticsocialist,exudedapassionandsinceritythatappearedtobe lacking in Hillary Clinton’s campaigning. As a man of the turbulent ’60s,whentheyoungwereunwillingtoacceptthestatusquo,hewasabletoestablishan emotional bond with young voters. And Trump, a seasoned television

performer,hadtherareskillofsayingvirtuallythesamethingtooneaudienceafter another but appearing each time to be having a conversation with hisaudience. His was in marked contrast to the wooden style of his chief rival,formerFloridaGovernorJebBush.

Butover thedecades, therehasbeennoabsenceofcandidateswhoappearauthentic,butwhohaven’tfaredaswellasSanders.TheyincludeIowaSenatorTom Harkin and former Vermont Governor Howard Dean on the DemocraticsideandformerPennsylvaniaSenatorRickSantorumandformerCongressmanJackKempamong theRepublicans.Equally, therehavebeenRepublicans likePat Robertson or Pat Buchanan and Democrats like Jesse Jackson who couldentertainandenlivenanaudienceaseffectivelyasTrump,butwhonevergotasfarasTrumpdid.

What’smissing from these explanations is thewayTrump’s andSanders’spoliticalmessages have resonatedwith large parts of the electorate. From therightandleft,respectively,TrumpandSandersweretakingaimattheneoliberalconsensus,towhichmanyvoters,withoutnamingoridentifyingitassuch,havebecome hostile, particularly in the wake of the Great Recession. Trump andSanders were continuing what Perot and Buchanan had started, but with asuccess that suggested the political consensus had become increasinglyvulnerable.

TrumpandNeoliberalismTrumpwasthesonofarealestatedeveloperfromQueenswhohadmadeasmallfortune building and renting out low-and middle-income apartments in theborough. Donald Trump aspired to more—he wanted the wealth and prestigefrom building and living inManhattan. Trump eventually developed a billiondollarbusinessoutofhotels,apartmentbuildings,casinos,andotherproperties.Healsogained thecelebrityhesought. In1981,whenTrumpwasonly35,hewasfeaturedinPeoplemagazine.Hejoinedexclusiveclubsfrequentedbysportstars,gangsters,andothernouveauxriches.Healmostwentunderinthe1990sashisinvestmentsinAtlanticCitycasinosfloundered,butherecoupedhislossesandbecameatelevisionstarwithhisownshow,TheApprentice.

Real estate developers like Trump need licenses and sometimes contractsfromcitiesandstates,andhavetobeperpetuallywooingpoliticians.Hecourted

and funded Democrats as well as Republicans, and for his first decades inbusiness,kepthispoliticalopinionslargelytohimself.ButunderthetutelageofRepublicanoperativeRogerStone,whoafterRoyCohn’sdeathin1986,becameTrump’sconsigliere,Trumpbegantodabbleinnationalpolitics.In1987,herana full-page ad inTheNew York Times and other major dailies titled “There’snothingwrongwithAmerica’sforeigndefensepolicythatalittlebackbonecan’tcure.” In October that year at the invitation of a NewHampshire Republicanwhowantedtodrafthimforpresident,heairedhisviewsondefense,trade,andbusiness at a Rotary Club luncheon in Hampton, New Hampshire. TrumpattractedalargercrowdthananyoftheannouncedRepublicancandidates,buthedemurredfromrunning.

In1999,Trumpactivelysought thenominationof theReformParty,whichRossPerothadcreatedasavehicleforhissecondpresidentialrunin1996.Stoneformedan exploratory committee for him,butTrumpbackedout after severalmonthsandcededthenominationtoPatBuchanan.In2011,heagainhintedatinterest in theRepublicannomination; afterMittRomney’s loss,Trumpbeganpreparing for the2016 racewithappearances in Iowa thenextyearandat theConservativePoliticalActionConferenceinWashington.

Trump’s views, as expressed over these two decades, defy easycategorization.OntheissueswhichDemocratsandRepublicansnormallybattleover, such as abortion and gay rights and social spending, Trump, like Stone,wasamoderateEasternRepublicansimilar, say, to formerRepublicanSenatorAlfonse D’Amato or even Democrat Ed Koch. He supported abortion rights(“I’mvery pro-choice,”Trumpdeclared in 1999), hewanted to protect SocialSecurity andMedicare from cuts, and he even backed some kind of universalnational health insurance. “I’ma conservativeonmost issues, but a liberal onhealth,”hewroteinhis2000campaignmanifesto,TheAmericaWeDeserve.Asa real estate developer, he enthusiastically favored infrastructure spending thatmanyconservativeRepublicansdisdained.

In the 2016 campaign, he abandoned his support for abortion rights, apoliticalnecessityinRepublicanprimaries.ButheretainedhisdefenseofSocialSecurity and Medicare and even suggested—without spelling out a plausibleprogram—that he would replace the Affordable Care Act with a program foruniversalhealth insurance.Healsobackedmassiveexpendituresonhighways,bridges,andairports.

If he had based his campaign on this moderate Republicanism, Trumpprobably would not have won a single delegate. He would have suffered the

samefateasHowardBaker,LamarAlexander,JonHuntsman,andothercentristcandidates. But he combined his moderate Republicanism with a set ofconvictions, most of which went back two decades or more, that were verysimilar to those of Perot or Buchanan. They challenged the prevailingDemocraticandRepublicanviewsof foreignpolicy, tradeand investment,andimmigration.Theyformedthesubstanceofhiscampaign:

Defenseandnationalsecurity:AstheColdWarended,leadingRepublicansandDemocrats had sought tomaintain the alliance system forged during theColdWar and to support American military intervention abroad to sustain theAmerican-ledsystem.Inhisfirstpublicstatementofhisviewsin1987,TrumpinsistedthattheUnitedStatesgetJapan,SaudiArabia,andotheralliestopayfortheprotectiontheyweregettingfromtheU.S.TheUnitedStates,Trumpwrote,“shouldstoppaying todefendcountries thatcanafford todefend themselves.”Trumpwantedthecountryfreetodevoteitsresourcesathometo“ourfarmers,our sick, our homeless.” In the 2016 campaign, he would return to the samepoint. “You have countries in NATO that are getting a free ride,” TrumpcomplainedonCNN.“It’sveryunfair.TheUnitedStatescannotaffordtobethepolicemanoftheworldanymore,folks.Wehavetorebuildourowncountry.”

LikePerotandBuchanan,Trumpwentfrominsistingon“burdensharing”toquestioningAmerica’sColdWarcommitmenttoNATOandtootheralliances.Inhis2016campaign,hecriticizedNATOas“obsolete”and“expensive.”TrumpalsoopposedAmericanmilitaryinterventionwhentherewasnotadirectthreatposedtotheUnitedStates.PerotandBuchananhadbothrejectedGeorgeH.W.Bush’s intervention inKuwait.TrumpcriticizedGeorgeW.Bush’s invasionofIraq. Trump insisted that his skills as a dealmaker could improve Americandiplomacy. Unlike his opponents in 2016, he didn’t promise to tear up theObamaadministration’sagreementwithIran.Instead,hesaidhewould“policethatdeal.”WhilehepromisedtodestroyISIS,hesuggestedthathecouldmakeadealwithRussianPresidentVladimirPutin,whomheadmired,toendtheSyrianconflict. Taken together, Trump’s views, like those of Perot, represented aversion of foreign policy realism that was contrary to both Republican neo-conservatismandDemocraticliberalinterventionism.

Free trade:AlongwithBuchanan and Perot, Trump opposedNAFTA and thepre-WTO most-favored-nation trading status for China. He claimed theseagreements costAmerican jobsby incurring tradedeficits.Other countries, he

saidin1999,“can’tbelievehoweasyitistodealwiththeU.S.Weareknownasabunchofsaps.WeneedourbestpeopletonegotiateagainsttheJapaneseandmanyothercountries.”Trumppromisedtogetbusinessleaderstonegotiatethesetreaties.

In his 2016 campaign, Trump opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnershipagreement that the Obama administration had signed, but Congress had notratified. And Trump continued to rail against trade arrangements with China,Japan,andMexico,withChinadrawingthemostire.“Ourcountryisinserioustrouble.We don’twin anymore.We don’t beat China in trade.We don’t beatJapan,withtheirmillionsandmillionsofcarscomingintothiscountry,intrade.We can’t beatMexico, at the border or in trade,” Trump declared in the firstRepublican debate in August 2015. To force China to revalue its currency tomake its exports more expensive, and American exports to China cheaper,Trumpproposedthreateningthemwitha45percenttariffontheirexportstotheUnited States. And he reiterated his promise to have businessmen and not“politicalhacks”negotiatetradedeals.

Outsourcing and offshoring: In 1999, Trump’s principal case against tradetreaties was that they allowed foreign countries to keep out American goodswhilesendingtheirowngoodstotheUnitedStates.Butbeginningwithhis2011manifesto, Time to Get Tough, Trump, like Perot and Buchanan, began tocriticize American corporations for taking advantage of trade treaties tooutsourcetheirproductiontoMexico,China,andJapanandtoestablishfactoriesin these countries that would export goods back to theUnited States, in bothcasesdeprivingAmericanworkersofjobs.InTimetoGetTough,heproposeda15percenttariffongoodsthatwereoutsourced.

Inthe2016campaign,Trumpsingledoutspecificcorporationsforshippingorplanningtoshipfactoriesandjobseithersouthoftheborderoroverseas.Inhis announcement speech in July 2015, he dwelled on the example of Fordsayingitwasgoingtobuilda$2.5billioncarandtruckplantinMexico.Trumpsaidthatifhewerepresident,hewouldcalltheCEOofFordandthreatenhimwitha35percenttaxoneverycarandtruckthatFordshippedacrosstheborder.TrumpalsocriticizedNabiscoforplanningtomoveitsplantfromIllinois.“Theyare moving their plant toMexico.Why, how does it help us?” Trump askedduring a speech inDallas in September 2015.And in theRepublican primarydebateinFebruary2016,hewentafterCarrierformovingaplantand1,400jobsfromIndianapolis toMexico.“In theolddays, theymoved fromNewYork to

Texas,”Trumpsaid.“Nowtheygofromthiscountrytoanothercountry,findinglowerlaborandlowertaxes,theyhavenorealloyaltytotheUnitedStates.”

Like Perot, Trump wanted to restore American manufacturing—it wascentraltohispromisetomakeAmericagreatagain.Trumpincreasinglyusedthesame languageasPerot.Speaking inNewYorkafterhisprimaryvictoryApril19,hesaid,“Our jobsarebeingsuckedoutofourstate.They’rebeingsuckedout of our country, andwe’re not going to let that happen anymore.” LiberalcommentatorsandeconomistschargedthatTrumpwasdeceivingthepublicbypromising to bring back jobs that could never be restored. Thatwas probablytrue.ButTrumpwas takingaimat theskeweddistributionof jobsand incomethatneoliberaleconomicshadcreatedoverthepriordecades.

Trumpalsodenouncedcorporateplans—dubbed“taxinversions”—bywhichcorporations moved their headquarters overseas in order to avoid payingAmerican taxes. Trump made these criticisms of corporate offshoring andoutsourcing and tax inversions in every speech of his that I heard. Together,these stands struckat theheartof theneoliberalagenda.And in June,afterhesewed up the Republican nomination and turned his attention to the generalelection, he began reemphasizing these themes in his speeches. In a June 22speechon“TheStakesofthisElection,”Trumpasked“BernieSanders’svotersto join our movement: so together we can fix the system for all Americans.Importantly,thisincludesfixingallofourmanydisastroustradedeals.Becauseit’snotjustthepoliticalsystemthat’srigged.It’sthewholeeconomy.It’sriggedbybigdonorswhowanttokeepdownwages.It’sriggedbybigbusinesseswhowanttoleaveourcountry,fireourworkers,andselltheirproductsbackintotheU.S.withabsolutelynoconsequencesforthem....It’sriggedagainstyou,theAmericanpeople.”

Immigration:WhenTrumpwasseeking theReformPartynomination in1999,heagreedwithBuchanan,hisrivalforthenomination,ononlytwoissues,tradeandimmigration.Inhiscampaignbook,hewrote:

America isexperiencingserious social andeconomicdifficultywith illegalimmigrants who are flooding across our borders. We simply can’t absorbthem. . . . The majority of legal immigrants can often make significantcontributionstooursocietybecausetheyhavespecialskillsandbecausetheyadd toournation’s culturaldiversity. . . .But legal immigrantsdonot andshould not enter easily. It’s a long, costly, draining, and often frustrating

experience—bydesign....Itcomesdowntothis:Wemusttakecareofourownpeoplefirst.Ourpolicytopeoplebornelsewhereshouldbeclear:Enterbythelaw,orleave.

Trumpdidnotwaverfromthisstanceoverthenext16years.Inhis2011book,he wrote, “Illegal immigration is a wrecking ball aimed at U.S. taxpayers.Washingtonneedstogettoughandfightfor‘WethePeople,’notforthespecialinterests who want cheap labor and a minority voting bloc.” In the 2016campaign,henotonlyopposedillegalimmigration,butfavoreddeportation.Hiscaseagainstillegalimmigrationwaspartlyeconomic—theydrovedownwagesandraisedsocialcosts—butalsosocio-cultural—theywereacauseofcrime.HeproposedthatMexicofinanceawallwithitstradesurplusfromtheUnitedStatestostopillegalimmigration.

Trump’sviewson immigrationdisplayedaspecialanimus towardMexicanAmericans. Trump described Mexico as sending America people who bring“crime” and “drugs” andwhoare “rapists.”Hedescribed a judge in a lawsuitbroughtagainstTrumpUniversityasa“Mexican,”eventhoughhewasborninIndiana,andcalledforhimtostepdownfromthecase.Trump’sviewrecalledthe nineteenth-century nativists of the Know-Nothing Party and the People’sParty support for deporting Chinese laborers. But where the People’s Party’sracistorxenophobicviewsoftheChineseweresecondarytothethrustoftheirpopulism, Trump’s views of Mexicans—as well as of Muslim immigrants—becameincreasinglycentraltohisappeal.

TheSilentMajorityOn the surface, Trump appeared to be an unlikely candidate for a populistcampaign. He was, after all, a billionaire who flaunted his wealth. But TomWatsonhadalsobeenawealthylandownerandRossPerotwasalsoabillionaire.What’simportantisthatTrump,liketheTexarkana-bornPerot,wasn’taperfectfitforupperclassAmerica.HewasstilltheboyfromQueenswhoaspiredtoliveontheUpperEastSide,butendedupspendinghistimeatdemimondehangoutslikeStudio54ratherthantheHarvardClub.

Trump’sviewofhissocialclasswasalsoinfluencedbyRogerStone.StonehadgottenhisstartinpoliticsdoingdirtytricksforNixon’s1972campaign.Like

Trump, he was a moderate Republican on issues like abortion and socialspending—heandhis firstwife foundedRepublicansforChoice—buthe likedtoframecampaignsinfranklypopulisttermsof“wethepeople”vs.thespecialinterests.Trump’sbiographerMichaelD’AntoniowritesofStone:

In general, Stone’s attackswere intended to persuade voters that theGOP,whichwas traditionally the party of big business and the country-club set,wasactuallytheanti-elitepartyoftheworkingclass.

Trump took this tack inhiscampaigns. Inanop-ed inTheNewYorkTimes inFebruary 2000, Trump explained that he was abandoning his presidential bidbecausehenolongersawtheReformPartyasaviablevehicle.Buthesaidheregretted not being able to run “a race against Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore, twoestablishmentpoliticians.”“I felt confident,”hewrote, “thatmyargument thatAmericawasbeingrippedoffbyourmajor tradepartnersand that itwas timefor tougher trade negotiationswould have resonance in a race against the twoIvyLeaguecontenders.”(TrumpfailedtonotethathehadgraduatedfromanIvyLeagueuniversity.)

In 2016, he portrayed himself as the champion of the “silentmajority”—aterm borrowed from Nixon—against the “special interests” and the“establishment”ofbothparties.“Thesilentmajorityisback,andit’snotsilent.It’s aggressive,” Trump declared in Dallas. At rallies, the campaign gave outsigns,“ThesilentmajoritystandswithTrump.”InJanuaryrightbeforetheIowacaucuses,Trumprananadtitled“TheEstablishment.”Seatedbehindadesk,hesaid, “The establishment, the media, the special interest, the lobbyists, thedonors, they’re all against me. I’m self-funding my campaign. I don’t oweanybodyanything.IonlyoweittotheAmericanpeopletodoagreatjob.Theyarereallytryingtostopme.”

SomeofTrump’sdemandsreflectedhisownpeculiarbrandofsalesmanship.InThe Art of the Deal, Trump explained that a “little hyperbole” helped sellproducts.Andinthissense,aproposaltobanallMuslimsortoslapa45percenttariff on Chinese imports or to getMexico to pay for a wall may have beendeliberateattention-gettingploys,not tobe takenseriously.But theywerealsotypical of a populist approach. They were his equivalent of “free silver” orLong’sconfiscatorytaxonthewealthy—incapableofbeingnegotiated,evenbythegreatdealmaker,butjustforthatreasondramatizingthedifferencebetweenwhatthe“silentmajority”wantedandwhatthe“establishment”wouldcondone.

Trump’s supporters didn’t necessarilybelieve that he couldgetMexico topayfor awallor thathe coulddeport all immigrantswhohadentered the countryillegally.What they heard in his demandwas a point of demarcation betweenwhat“we”wantedandwhat“they”—Congress, theMexicanpresident—wouldaccept.

Some of Trump’s demands about trade and runaway shops and his tiradesagainst lobbyists, big donors, and special interests recalled Perot, but TrumpconductedhimselfmuchdifferentlyfromPerot.Perot’smannerwasprofessorialandatworstcondescending—hewaswidelyandunfairlycriticizedforreferringto anNAACP audience as “you people”—but hewas not nasty toward thosewho disagreed with him and didn’t scapegoat out groups. Trump was highlypersonal in his attacks on rivals and bigoted in his characterizations ofnationalitiesandreligionsanddemeaninginhisattitudetowardwomen.(WhenHillaryClintondeclaredhercandidacyTrumptweeted,“IfHillaryClintoncan’tsatisfyherhusbandwhatmakesherthinkshecansatisfyAmerica?”)

WhileTrump’sviewsmostclearlyechoedtherightwingpopulismofWallaceand Buchanan, his manner was different from those men as well. Wallacestudiouslyavoidedappearingbigotedtowardblacks.Healmostalwayscouchedhis proposals in terms of state’s rights or some other abstract principle. AndunlikeTrump,Wallacewasanexperiencedprofessionalpolitician.Heenjoyingsparringwithcriticsandprotestorsathisrallies.Bycontrast,Trumprepeatedlydisplayed the thin skin of a businessman who treasured his celebrity. At hisrallies, he cheered supporterswhobeat up protestors.Andhe tried to turn hissupporters against the press. Trump’s actions reflected a bilious disposition, ameannessborneoutofbare-knuckle realestateandcasinosquabbles—in1993TrumptriedtorepealalawallowingdestituteIndiantribestooperatecasinos—and a conviction, borne out of his financial success or, perhaps, arresteddevelopment, thathecould say inpublicwhateverhe thought inprivateaboutMexicansorwomenwithoutsufferinganyconsequences.

Stone himself formally left as the campaign’s head in August 2015 afterTrump excoriated Fox News commentator Megyn Kelly, although Stoneremained a supporter and advisor. FromStone’s standpoint, Trump’s nastinessdetractedfromhisanti-establishmentmessage.ButTrumpcontinuedtoclimbinthepolls.Hemay in theendhave tossedawayanychanceofbeingPresident,buthisnastiness—seenasdefyingstandardsofpoliticalcorrectness—combinedwithhissubstantiveappealson trade, immigration,andrunawayshops, tappedintoaveinofsupportamongRepublicansandindependents.

TrumpandtheRepublicansTrump’s success threatened the coalition that conservative Republicans hadforged in the 1970s. That coalition included the party’s business interests andwhiteworking-andmiddle-class voterswhohadbegun fleeing theDemocraticParty in the 1960s. Trump’s candidacy drove a wedge into that coalition.Trump’s stands against neoliberal economics and neo-conservative foreignpolicydeeplyoffendedtheparty’suppercrustofbusinessleaders,thinktankers,writers,editors,columnists,andtelevisionandradiohosts.Theseleaderswageda vigorous and unsuccessful multi-million dollar campaign against hiscandidacy. Their real targetwas often Trump’s positions on the economy andforeignpolicy.AfterTrump’stiradeagainstmultinationalsandtradedealsinhisJunespeechon“theStakes”of theelection, topRepublicandonorPaulSingerwarned that if Trump were elected, it would cause “a widespread globaldepression.”ButTrump’s intemperance andbigotry allowed them to condemnhim on other counts without emphasizing their substantive concerns with hisforeignanddomesticeconomicviews.

Trump’s political base was among the party’s white working-and middle-class voters—precisely the voters who had originally flocked toWallace andthentoNixon,whohadbeenattractedbyPerotandBuchanan,butwhonowfeltthattheyhadfoundachampioninTrump.HehadbecomethevoiceofmiddleAmerican radicalism and more broadly of the white Americans who felt leftbehindbyglobalizationand the shift to apost-industrial economy.Therehavebeen two extensive polls of Republican voters: the first by the AmericanNationalElectionStudies (ANES) inJanuary2016and thesecondby thePewResearchCenter inMarch.Theybearout thesameconclusionsaboutTrump’ssupporters.

Trump’s supporters were older and disproportionately less educated—thesurestsignofclassstanding—thanthoseoftheothercandidates.In1971,whenDonald Warren surveyed Wallace voters, a working-class voter could beassumed tohavenomore thanahighschooleducation.By2016, thesevotersmight have gone to junior college or a trade school and have an associate’sdegree.Bythatstandard,70.1percentofTrumpvotersintheANESsurveywerenot college graduates, compared to 45.1 of Republican establishment favoriteJohnKasich’svoters.Inincome,halfofTrump’svotersmadelessthan$50,000ayear,whileonly35.3percentofKasich’svotersmadethatlittle.TheseTrump

voters can be characterized as the descendants of those white working-classvoters who begin leaving the Democrats in the ’60s. Already alienated fromWashington and the changes they had seen around them in 1972, they hadbecomeevenmoresoin2016,astheGreatRecessionseemedlikethefinalblowto their economicprospects in an economy thatdisproportionately favored theuppermiddleclassandveryrich.

OfalltheRepublicanvoters,Trump’sappeartohavebeenthemostworriedby theGreatRecession,even if they themselveswerenot thrownoutofwork.Theywerethemostpessimisticabouttheeconomy.AccordingtothePewpoll,48 percent of Trump voters thought economic conditions in theUnited Stateswere poor compared to 31 percent of Cruz voters and 28 percent of Kasichvoters.

TherewerealsocleardifferencesbetweenTrump’sandotherRepublicans’supportersoverimmigrationandtrade.AccordingtothePewpoll,69percentofTrump voters thought immigrants did more to burden than to strengthen thecountry. For Kasich voters, this was 40 percent. According to ANES, 66.4percent of Trump voters opposed birthright citizenship for immigrant childrenborn in theUnitedStates.Thatwas compared to 26 percent ofKasich voters.AccordingtoPew,67percentofTrumpsupportersthoughtfreetradeagreementswerebadfortheUnitedStatescomparedto46percentofKasichsupportersand40percentofCruzsupporters.Trumpvoterswerealso the least likely to thinkthatpeopleshouldbemoresensitiveinwhattheysayaboutpeoplewithdifferentbackgrounds.According toANES,75.7percentofTrumpvoters, compared to45.9percentofKasichvoters,thoughtpeopleweretooeasilyoffended.

Trump supporters fit the profile ofmiddleAmerican populism.Theywereskeptical about the powers below and above. According to the Pew poll, 61percentofTrumpvotersthoughtthattheU.S.economicsystemunfairlyfavoredthepowerful compared to51percentofKasichvoters and45percentofCruzsupporters.IninterviewsIconductedatrallies,Trumpvotersinvariablypraisedhis self-financing, which was seen as making him independent of specialinterests and lobbyists. It was an important part of his appeal, as it was ofPerot’s.

Trump’svoters, likeWallace’s, alsocontinued to favor theuniversal socialprogramsthathadoriginatedwiththeNewDeal,whileopposingprogramsliketheAffordableCareActthattheythoughtprimarilybenefitedminoritiesandthepoor. According to the Pew poll, 73 percent of Trump voters opposed anyreductioninSocialSecurity.Trump’svoterswereeconomicpopulists;theywere

notfreemarketlibertarianslikemanyofthewealthybackersofgroupsliketheClub for Growth or FreedomWorks; and they were also not hardline socialconservativeswhoput a candidate’s standonprayer or abortion first andwhowerewillingtogoalongwiththeRepublicanbusinessagenda.

Trumpappearedaware thathewas threateningtheRepublicancoalition. Inan interview with Bloomberg News, he said, “Five, ten years from now—different party.You’re going to have aworker’s party.A party of people thathaven’thadarealwageincrease ineighteenyears, thatareangry.”Would thisactually happen? Would a party that had represented corporate and smallbusiness America since at least 1896 turn its back on its longstandingconstituency?Hisimmediateimpactmaybelimitedbythewayheconductedhisgeneral election campaign. Like a businessman who having succeeded inintroducing a new product refuses to recognize that his market has changed,Trump continued after June the same impromptu assaults on his rival and thepressandthesamecasualbigotrythathadwonhimtheRepublicannomination.Thatcouldleadtoadefeatthatwillcastatemporarypallonthesubstanceofhispopulism. Trump’s longer-term influence may also be limited by his havingbeen,likeLong,Wallace,andPerot,thesingularlycharismaticmessengerforhispopulism.Buthiscandidacywillhaveproducedanothercrackintheneoliberalfirmament.

SandersandtheBillionaireClassSanders, likeTrump,was raised inoneofNewYork’souterboroughs,but theresemblanceendsthere.SandersgrewupinBrooklyninhumblecircumstances.HisfatherwasaJewishémigréfromPolandwhosoldpaintandhismotherthedaughterofémigrés.HewenttothesamehighschoolthatRuthBaderGinsburgandChuckSchumerattended, andhe spent ayear atBrooklynCollegebeforetransferringtotheUniversityofChicago,wherehegraduatedin1964.HelivedonaKibbutzinIsraelforsixmonths,returnedtoNewYorkwhereheworkedatoddjobs,andin1968,heandhisfirstwifemovedtoVermontaspartoftheNewLeft’sback-to-the-landmovement.

TheBrooklyn inwhichSandersgrewupwas ahotbedof leftwingpoliticsandculture,andSanders,whenhecametoChicago,joinedtheYoungPeople’sSocialistLeague, theyouthwingofNormanThomas’sSocialistParty,and the

Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which at the time was a militant civilrights group. He read Marx and the history of American socialism, and gotarrested in civil rights protests, but he never took the turn toward sectarianviolencetheleadersofSDS(StudentsforaDemocraticSociety)tookinthelate’60s.Instead,SanderscombinedacommitmenttothesocialismofEugeneDebswithvariouscountercultureenthusiasms, includingfree love,Reichian therapy,ecology,homebirth,andhomeschooling.

Livingonoddjobswhileraisingayoungchild,SandersranforSenatetwiceand governor twice in the ’70s on the ticket of the LibertyUnion, a leftwingthirdpartyinVermont.Disillusioned—hegotnomorethan6percentofthevote—he quit the Liberty Union in 1977. Four years later, he ran for mayor ofBurlington,andtothesurpriseofthetown’sleaders,wonby10votesovertheDemocraticincumbent.Sanderswasasuccessfulmayor.Hewasreelectedthreetimes and helped turn the town of 45,000 into one of New England’s mostlivablecities.In1990,hewonVermont’sseatintheHouseofRepresentatives,and in 2006, when Republican Jim Jeffords retired, Sanders won one of theSenateseats.

In his Liberty Union campaigns, Sanders advocated for socialism. In thediaryhekeptofhisSenatecampaignin1972,hewroteofacampaignstop,“Ieven mentioned the horrible word ‘socialism’—and nobody in the audiencefainted.” He would recommend Albert Einstein’s essay, “Why Socialism,” toanyoneinterested.Inthatessay,Einsteinwrotethattheonlywaytoremovethe“evils”ofcapitalismwas“throughtheestablishmentofasocialisteconomy....Insuchaneconomy,themeansofproductionareownedbysocietyitselfandareutilizedinaplannedfashion.”Asmayor,Sandersfrettedthathecouldn’tbringsocialism to Vermont. “If you ask me if the banks should be nationalized, Iwouldsayyes,”SanderstoldtheBaltimoreSun.“ButIdon’thavethepowertonationalizethebanksinBurlington.”

AfterSanderswaselected toCongress,hisviewof socialismsoftenedandincreasinglycametoresemblesocialdemocracy.“Tomesocialismdoesn’tmeanstateownershipofeverythingbyanymeans,”hetoldtheAPinNovember1990.“Itmeanscreatinganationandaworld,inwhichallhumanbeingshaveadecentstandardof living.”Inhis1997autobiography,Outsider in theHouse,Sandersdidwrite,“BillClintonisamoderateDemocrat.I’mademocraticsocialist.”Butinthisbookhemostoftendescribeshimselfasa“progressive.”Bythetime,hewas elected to the Senate, he explicitly equated socialism with Scandinaviansocialdemocracy.“I’mademocraticsocialist,”hetoldtheWashingtonPost.“In

Norway, parents get a paid year to care for infants. Finland andSweden havenationalhealth care, free college, affordablehousing, andahigher standardofliving.”

Whathadn’tchangedovertheyearswasSanders’sindictmentofcapitalism.Hestillsawyawningeconomicinequality.Inhis1971campaign,hehadcalledforradicaltaxreformdirectedatthe“twopercentofthepeoplecontrollingonethird of the country’s wealth.” In his 1996 Senate reelection campaign, heattacked the influenceof the“onepercent.” In theHouseandSenate,hestoodfirmagainst theparty’sembraceofneoliberalism.HeopposedNAFTAandtheagreements with China, tax cuts on business, budgets that reduced socialspending, and financial deregulation. He continued to dissent in the Obamayears. In December 2010—in a move echoing Huey Long’s rejection ofRoosevelt’sGovernmentEconomyActin1933—hestagedaone-manfilibusteragainst the budget and tax agreement thatObama, chastened by congressionallosses,hadworkedoutwiththeRepublicansthatprolongedtheBushtaxcutsforthewealthy.

Sanders first started thinkingseriouslyabout running forpresident inApril2013,whenhecalledameetinginBurlingtonwithhistopfriendsandadvisorstodiscusswhetherheshoulddoso.ThegroupspeculatedthatSanders’soutrageoverincomeinequalitymightfindareadyreceptionin2016.TheynotedthattheOccupyWallStreet protestshaddissipated, but that the issues theyhad raisedwere now widely discussed. Sanders took another two years to make a finaldecision,butinApril2015,hetoldhisfriendshewasrunning.Inaninterviewwith Rachel Maddow on MSNBC that month, Sanders, noting “this strangemoment inAmericanhistory,whenourmiddleclass isdisappearing,whenwehave so many people living in poverty, when we have to deal with climatechange,whenwehavetodealwiththehorrendouslevelof incomeandwealthinequality,”asked

[H]owdoweaddresstheseissuesinawaythattakesonthebillionaireclass.Wheretheyhavesignificantcontroloverthemedia,wheretheybyandlargedeterminethelegislationthatgoesoninCongress,andasaresultofCitizensUnitedarepreparedtobuytheUnitedStatesCongress.”

Ashiscampaignunfolded,Sandersunveiledasetofradicalreformsthatwould,among other things, entail government reassuming control over the privatemarket.HeproposedMedicareforall(whichwouldremoveprivateinsuranceas

amiddleman and guarantee health insurance as a right), free tuition to publiccollegesfinancedbyatransactiontaxonWallStreetspeculation,acarbontaxtoreducecarbonemissions,thereinstatementoftheGlass-SteagallActseparatingcommercialandinvestmentbanking,andpubliccampaignfinancing.

Sanders’s critics among Democrats argued that his proposals wereimpractical because they would never get through a Republican congress. Acolumn in New York magazine was entitled, “What Bernie Sanders Doesn’tUnderstandAboutAmericanPolitics.”Sandersrespondedthat toobtainanyofthese reforms, there would have to be a “political revolution” that pitted thepowerof thepeopleagainst thebillionaireclass.“Ifwearegoingto transformAmerica,”SanderssaidduringaspeechinNorthLasVegasinNovember,“Weneedapoliticalrevolution.Millionsofpeoplehavetostandupandgetinvolvedinthepoliticalprocessinawaywehavenotinmany,manyyears.”

In an editorial, The New York Times criticized Sanders’s “facile calls forrevolution,” but what Sanders meant by “revolution” was greater activeparticipationinpoliticsratherthanarmedstruggletoseizestatepower.Coupledwithhisdemandforreformofcampaignfinance,Sanderswasactuallymakingamuch more arguable point than The New York Times and other critics werewillingtoacknowledge:namely,thattoachievethekindofsignificantchangeintheexistingrelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandeconomythathisreformswouldentailwouldrequireamajorshiftinpoliticalpowerandallegianceinthecountry,suchashadhappenedbetween,say,1929and1935.

Inan interviewwithStephenColbert,Sanders said thathewouldprefer todescribe his proposals as “progressive” rather than as “socialist” or “liberal.”That use of the term “progressive” made sense, but historically speaking,Americanprogressivismhadarisenasanalternativetopopulismandsocialism.Where populism had rested on a conflict between the people and theestablishment, and socialism on a conflict between the working class and thecapitalist class, progressivism sought to reconcile classes—to removeantagonisms.“‘Iamfor labor,’or ‘Iamforcapital,’substitutessomethingelsefor the immutable laws of righteousness,” TheodoreRooseveltwrote in 1904.“Theoneandtheotherwouldlettheclassmanin,andlettinghiministheonethingthatwillmostquicklyeatouttheheartoftherepublic.”

Sanders’spoliticalapproachandhisdemandsfitmoreappropriatelyintotheAmericanpopulisttraditionofthePeople’sParty,Long,Perot,andOccupyWallStreet. He aimed to rouse the people against the “billionaire class.” And hisdemands created a political divide between the 99 percent and the 1 percent.

Theydefinedtheconflictratherthanprovidinganopeningtonegotiations.Therewasnowaythattheinsuranceanddrugcompanieswouldpermit“Medicareforall” without what Sanders called a political revolution, or that the banks andotherWall Street firms would submit to further regulation or pay transactiontaxessothatAmericanscouldgotopubliccollegeforfree.InamannerrecallinghowthepoliticalelitesdealtwithLongandPerot,Sanders’scriticsarguedthathis numbers didn’t add up, as if the demands in a campaign needed to passmusterattheCongressionalBudgetOffice.

SandersagreedwithTrumpabouttradetreatiesandforeigninvestment.“Myunderstanding, talking tomanyeconomists, is thatNAFTA,PNTR[permanentnormaltraderelations]withChina,othertradeagreementshavecostthiscountrymillions of jobs,” Sanders told theNew YorkDaily News. He added, “I don’tthink it isappropriate for tradepolicies to say thatyoucanmove toacountrywherewagesareabysmal,wheretherearenoenvironmentalregulations,whereworkers can’t form unions.” But Sanders was a leftwing and not a rightwingpopulist. Unlike Trump and his supporters, he didn’t blame unauthorizedimmigrants for the plight of American workers or seek to end terrorism bybanningMuslimsfromcomingintothecountry.Hewasentirelyfocused,asheexplainedtoMaddow,oncombatingthe“billionaireclass.”

TheBernieVotersInthe2016election,Sanderslostthebattleforthenomination,butthesupportforHillaryClintonmaynothave reflected the extent towhichDemocrats andDemocratic-leaningindependentsweresupportiveofhisapproach.Muchofthenominating contest hingedon thebelief ofAfricanAmerican andolder votersthatClintonwasmoreelectable in ageneral electionandmoreprepared, afterheryearsat thehighest levelsofpower, toassumethepresidency than the74-year-olddemocraticsocialistwhoduringtheelectionshowedverylittleinterestin or knowledge of foreign policy. But something can still be learned fromlookingatSanders’scoresupporters.

Sanders’ssupport,likeTrump’s,showedhowmuchtheGreatRecessionhadradicalized significant parts of the electorate. Of all voting groups, his voterswere themost harshly critical of the American economic system. In the Pewpoll,91percentofSanders’svotersthoughtthatthe“U.S.systemunfairlyfavors

the powerful.” That’s in comparison to 73 percent of Clinton voters and 61percentofTrumpvoters.AccordingtoPew,82percentofSanders’svotersalsothought that corporations “make too much profit.” In the ANES poll, 90.2percentofSanders’svoters thought thedifferences in incomebetween the richandpoorwerelargerthantheywere20yearsago.

Sanders’s voters were also the most pessimistic about their own and thecountry’seconomicfuture.ThattooshowstheimpactoftheGreatRecession.InthePewsurvey,57percent—farmorethananyotherDemocraticorRepublicanvotingbloc—thought that hardwork is noguaranteeof success. In theANESsurvey 63.3 percent of Sanders’s supporters (compared to 43.2 percent ofClinton supporters) thought there was either no or little opportunity for theaveragepersontogetaheadinAmerica.

Onaverage,Sandersgothisgreatestsupportamongyoungpeople.Frommyobservationsatrallies,manyoftheseyoungvoterswereeithergoingtocollegeorhad recentlygraduated fromcollege.Theyare, ineffect, thedescendantsoftheMcGoverngenerationwhobegangravitating to theDemocratic party overpost-material socialandenvironmentalconcernsandovermoraloutrageat theVietnamWarandlatertheAmericaninvasionofIraqandmorerecently,inthewakeoftheGreatRecession,whattheysawastheirresponsibilityofWallStreetandthebillionaireclass.

But there was also a material dimension to their concern that Sanderstouched.Theywereworried about theopportunities that awaited them,or thattheyhadfound,onthejobmarket.Theyfoundlessautonomyintheirwork;theymade less than they had expected. In the wake of the Great Recession, theseyoung voters became concerned whether any jobs would await them, andwhethertheywouldeverbeabletopaybackthedebtstheyhadincurredtogotocollege.

Theymight,ofcourse,bewonovertoneoliberaleconomicsbyareversalofthesetrendsintheeconomy,butit’snotlikelytohappen.Inthelastdecadesofthetwentiethcentury,economiststalkedaboutacollegegraduatewagepremiumbutitshrunkaftertheboomofthelate1990s.AccordingtotheEconomicPolicyInstitute, thereal inflation-adjustedwagesofyoungcollegegraduateswere2.5percentlowerin2015thantheywerein2000.Atthesametime,studentdebts—akeyissueintheSanders’scampaign—skyrocketed,risingby84percent from2008 to 2014. In addition, graduates of community and four-year collegesincreasingly have to find roles within a labor force divided into specializednichesthatarebeingcontinuallyreshapedbyinformationtechnology.Thathas

probablycontributedtotherisinglevelsofanxietythatpsychologistshavefoundamongcollegestudents. If these trendscontinue,a largenumberofradicalizedAmericanvoterswillbeginmovingthroughtheelectorate.

Sanders’s identification as a socialist would have certainly become ahandicap in a general election, but there is some indication that it may havehelped him among younger voters. In a January 2016 survey by the pollinggroupYouGov,youngadults18to29hadafavorableviewofsocialismby43to26 percent, with the remainder having no opinion. Democratic voters had afavorableviewby42to34percent.Theseresults—inconceivable50oreven25yearsago—arepartlytheresultoftheColdWar’sendandtheidentificationofsocialismwithEuropeansocialdemocracyratherthanwithSovietcommunism.SomeSanderssupportersthatIinterviewedcitedEuropeansocialprograms.Butothers, reminiscent of nineteenth-century Christian socialists, stressed thecooperativenatureofsocialismincontrasttocapitalism.Ineithercase,youngervoters’ attraction to socialism is the flip side of their growing disillusionmentwithcapitalisminthewakeoftheGreatRecession.

Younger voters were also not turned off by Sanders’s age, nor by hisignoranceofpopculture.TherewasanaffinitybetweenSanders,whohadcomeof age in the raucous sixties, when young people were determined to lookbeyondthestatusquo,andhisyoungsupporters.WhileoldervotersandliberalpunditsevaluatedSanders’sprogrambywhether theycouldbe included in thepresident’sFiscalYear2018budget,youngervoterslikedthevisionarysweepofMedicare for All and Free Public College. They understood that adoptingprograms like these couldn’t happen within the current “rigged system” andwould require a political revolution. The contrast couldn’t have been sharperwithClinton’scampaignthatlackedanyvisionarycomponentanddweltentirelyonlistsofincrementalchanges.

AsSanders’schancestowinthenominationevaporated,someofhisardentsupportersplannedmeetingstoturnhiscampaignintoapoliticalmovementthatwouldsurvive the 2016 election.But it is difficult to turn political campaignsintopoliticalmovements.Movementsmostoftenarisearoundparticular issues(abortion,temperance,civilrights,gaymarriage,theVietnamorIraqwars),andbecomewidespreadwhentheyconfrontanadministrationthattakesanopposingposition.GeorgeW.Bush’sinvasionofIraqhelpedspuramovementthathelpedgetObamathenominationandthepresidencyin2008,butthemovementfailedto survive Obama’s election. It is even less plausible to expect Sanders’scampaign to spawn a movement that could survive the November election,

especially if Hillary Clintonwere to be elected. (If Trump is elected, that’s adifferentmatter,butinthatcase,amovementontheleftcanbeexpectedtoariseregardlessofSanders.)

Sanders’simpact(likeLong’s)willbemostlikelybefeltintheDemocraticParty,whereithasalreadyacceleratedtheturnagainstneoliberalorthodoxyonfinance, trade, and capital mobility, although not necessarily on unskilledimmigrationandguestworkers.Youngpeoplearenota functionalvotingblocexceptasstudents,butSanders’scampaignhasrevealedtheextenttowhichtheGreat Recession radicalized the descendants of the McGovern generation ofcollege-educated professionals. They could be a major force in Americanspoliticsforyears tocome—andonethatcouldeventuallyseal thedoomof theneoliberalorthodoxy.

TheRiseofEuropeanPopulism

Inthelastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury,asthePeople’sPartywaseruptingontheAmericanscene,EuropewasseeingtheemergenceofSocialDemocraticparties inspired by Karl Marx’s theory of socialism. Over the next 70 years,Europewouldseeanarrayofpartiesontheleft,centerandright,butitwouldn’tseeanything resemblingAmericanpopulismuntil the1970s.Europeanswouldcall these parties, which only began to flourish in 1990s by the American-derivedname.It’s“populiste”inFrenchand“populist”inGerman.

Like the original American People’s Party, the European parties operatedwithin the electoral arena and championed the “people” against an“establishment”or“elite.”France’sNationalFrontrepresentsthe“littlepeople”andthe“forgottenmembers”againstthe“caste.”Finland’sFinnsPartywants“ademocracy that rests on the consent of the people and does not emanate fromelitesorbureaucrats.”Spain’sPodemoschampionsthegenteagainstthecasta—thepeopleagainst theestablishment. Italy’sBeppeGrillo railsagainstwhathecalls the “three destroyers”—journalists, industrialists, and politicians. GeertWilders’s Freedom Party represents “Henk and Ingrid” against “the politicalelite.”

ThefirstEuropeanpartieswererightwingpopulist.Theyaccusedtheelitesofcoddlingcommunists,welfarerecipients,orimmigrants.Asaresult,theterm“populist” in Europe became used pejoratively by leftwing and centristpoliticians and academics. Political scientistCasMuddewrites, “In the publicdebate populism is mostly used to denounce a form of politics that uses (acombination of) demagogy, charismatic leadership, or a Stammtisch (pub)discourse.”ArecentstudyofEuropeanpopulistpartiesbyareputablethinktankwas titled, “Exposing theDemagogues.” In the last decade, however, leftwingpopulist parties have arisen in Spain, Greece, and Italy that direct their ireagainst the establishment in their country or against the European Union

headquartersinBrussels.ThemaindifferencebetweenAmericanandEuropeanpopulistsisthatwhile

Americanpartiesandcampaignscomeandgoquickly,someEuropeanpopulistparties have been around for decades. That’s primarily because Europe hasmulti-partysystems,andmanyofthecountrieshaveproportionalrepresentationthatallowssmallerpartiestomaintainafootholdevenwhentheyarepollinglessthan 7 percent in elections. (In France, which has a majority system inpresidentialelections,theNationalFront(FN)hasstillbeenabletowinnotonlylocal elections, but seats in the European Parliament, which are allottedproportionally.)

TheEuropeanpartiesmuddledalong in the ’70sand ’80s,but theycaughtfireinthe1990sforsomeofthesamereasonsthatAmericancampaignsdid.InEurope, in the wake of the downturn during the ’70s, a neoliberal outlookreplacedoneheavilyinfluencedbysocialdemocracyandKeynesianeconomics.The Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labour parties as well as the ChristianDemocratic,Conservative,andLiberalpartiesembracedthisoutlook,andwhenitfailedtocreatebuoyantprosperity,thatleftanopeningforpopulists.So,too,didtheleadingparties’commitmentstoimmigrationwithintheEUandasylumfromcountriesinNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast.

TheEndoftheBoomPopulistpoliticswerelargelyabsentinWesternEuropeinthethreedecadesafterWorldWar II. In those years, Socialist, SocialDemocratic, and labour partiesshared power relatively equitably with Christian Democrats, Tories, Gaullists,andothercentristandcenter-rightparties.InFranceandItaly,evenCommunistpartieshadasubordinaterole.Thepartiesandtheirsupportersinbusiness,labor,and themiddle classes, eager to avoid the clashes of the 1920s, cooperated toexpand social programs. Countries established universal access to healthcare,generous unemployment benefits and family allowances, and free collegeeducation.Thecenter andcenter-rightpartiesheldpowermoreoften thannot,but a politics borne of reform-minded social democracy and KeynesianeconomicspredominatedinthesamewaythatNewDealliberalismheldswayintheUnitedStatesevenduringRepublicanadministrations.

What sustained this social democratic approach was the economic boom.

WesternEuropebenefitedfromwhateconomistBradDeLongcalleda“virtuouscircle”:

Trade expansion drove growth, growth drove expanded social insuranceprograms and real wage levels; expanded social insurance states and realwagelevelssocialpeace,socialpeaceallowedinflationtostaylowevenasoutput expanded rapidly, rapidly expanding output led to high investment,which further increased growth and created the preconditions for furtherexpansionsofinternationaltrade.

Duringthisperiod,unemploymentrateswereimpossiblylow.Theratewas0.6percent inWest Germany in 1970, 2.2 percent in the UK, and 2.5 percent inFrance.InFrance,thiserawascalledlestrenteglorieuses,or30gloriousyears.

ButEuropebegantosufferadownturnintheearly’70s.Theprincipalcause,as in theUnitedStates,was a combinationof aprofit squeeze fromamilitantlabor movement and the development of global overcapacity in key postwarindustries like textiles and steel. But in Western Europe, the slowdown wasaggravatedbytheabandonmentofcapitalcontrolsandAmerica’sabandonmentofafixedandovervaluedcurrencythathadgivenEuropeansapriceadvantage.The energy price hike that began in 1973 also hit oil-dependent Europeparticularlyhard.Growthslowedandunemploymentrose.Comparingtheperiod1950to1973withtheperiodfrom1973to1995,France’saveragerateofgrowthfell from5.1 to2.7percent;Germany’s from6.0 to2.7percent;andSweden’sfrom 4.1 to 1.5 percent. During the 1960s, unemployment inWestern Europeaverageda lowly1.6percent.By theendof the1970s,unemployment rose tomore than7percent. InItaly,whichhadenjoyed3.2percentunemployment in1971, unemployment among 14-to 29-year-olds rose to 17.2 percent by thedecade’send.

Astheeconomyslowed,governmentrevenuesdeclined,whilesocialwelfareexpenditures rose sharply. In 1976, with deficits soaring and balances ofpayments inarrears,bothGreatBritainandItalyhad toaskfor loansfromtheInternationalMonetaryFund.ThroughoutWesternEurope,governmentstriedtolimit wage increases in the face of inflationary pressures, but faced militantopposition frompowerful labor unions. In Italy, awave of strikes and studentdemonstrationsfrom1969through1973forcedconcessionsinwagesandsocialbenefits. In Britain, a miners’ strike in early 1974 caused the Conservativegovernment to declare a three-dayworkweek to conserve energy.During the

boom,wageincreasescouldbeabsorbedbyhigherproductivity;butduringtheslowdownandinflation,theyonlyincreasedpressureonprices, threateningthebalanceoftrade.

All in all, the slowdown undermined social democratic and Keynesianpolicy. It turnedavirtuous circle into aviciousone.Becauseof risingoil andfoodprices,deficitsmeanttostimulatetheeconomyandreduceunemploymentcould lead to inflation,which in turn could undermine investment and reduceemployment.Withheightenedcompetitionwithinaglobalfreemarket,deficitscould lead tomore demand for imports and to a growing trade deficit,whichthreatened a country’s currency. These pitfalls of the old approach becameapparent first in Great Britain and France. The European version ofneoliberalismaroseoutoftheexperiencethatthesetwocountriesfaced.

In the winter of 1978–79, attempts by Labour Prime Minister JamesCallaghan to limitwage increases led to awave of strikes, creatingwhatwascalled the “winter of discontent.” Callaghan’s failure to halt Britain’scombination of inflation andunemployment led to his defeat in 1979byToryMargaret Thatcher. Thatcher had brokenwith her own party’s commitment toKeynesianism.Sheresortedtowhatcametobecalledaneoliberalstrategy.Shefocusedonincreasingthe“supplyside”—corporateratesofprofit—rather thanthedemandside.Bycurtailingthemoneysupply,sheraisedinterestrates,whichcreatedadeeprecession,thatinturnreducedthepressureonwagesandpricesand thedemand for imports, forcedobsolete firmsoutofbusiness, andhelpedbolsterprofitratesinthefirmsthatsurvived.

Thatcher also removed regulations on industry and finance, and loweredtaxesonbusinessand thewealthy.Sheprivatizedsomegovernment industries,andattemptedtodownsizeothers.Whencoalminersresistedmassivelayoffsin1984,Thatcherheldoutsuccessfullyagainstthem,asRonaldReaganhaddoneagainsttheair trafficcontrollers.Over250,000jobsinnationalindustrieswerelost, but as a result, the remaining industries becamemore efficient, and after1984,theeconomybegantoslowlypickup.WriteshistorianTonyJudt,“Thereis no doubt that Britain’s economic performance did improve in the Thatcheryears,afteraninitialdeclinefrom1979–81.”

Butashappened in theUnitedStates, thedistancebetween the topearnersandthoseinthemiddleandbottomwidened,andthemiddle-incomeblue-collarworkerwas threatenedwith extinction.DuringThatcher’syears (when the topincome tax rate dropped from 60 to 40 percent) the top fifth of all earnersincreased their share of the nation’s income from 36 to 42 percent.

Manufacturing, a source ofmanymiddle-income jobs, fell from18percent ofGDPwhenshetookofficeto15percentwhensheleftin1992.ThetrendtowardinequalitycontinuedunderBritain’ssubsequentLabourandTorygovernments.By 2010,manufacturing accounted for 10 percent ofGDP, and inequality hadcontinuedtorise.

In France, inflation had climbed to 14 percent by the 1981 presidentialelection,and1.5millionwereunemployed.ThatallowedFrançoisMitterrandtobe elected the first Socialist Party president of the Fifth Republic.MitterrandtriedtodevelopanalternativetoThatcher’sneoliberalism.Electedin1981aftera center-right government had failed to halt France’s slide,Mitterrand and hisadvisorsassumedthatthedownturnhadexhausteditselfandthatglobaldemandwould soon be picking up.With a parliamentarymajority,Mitterrand and theSocialistsenactedahugeboostinsocialspendingaimedatredistributingwealthandfuellingconsumerdemand,andtheyundertookextensivenationalizationstoassurethattheprofitsbusinessesreceivedwerereinvested.Ifitwasn’tsocialism,itwasaleftwingversionofCharlesdeGaulle’scommandeconomy.

Mitterrand’spoliciesdidboosteconomicgrowth.France’seconomygrew2percent in his first two years, while most of Europe’s economies were inrecession.Butbythesametoken,withtherestofEuropeandtheUnitedStatesin recession, the demand for France’s exports lagged well behind Frenchconsumers’ demands for imports. France’s trade deficit almost doubled duringMitterrand’sfirstyear.Thatcreatedabalanceofpaymentscrisis.

Ordinarily, a country running very large trade deficits can devalue itscurrency,whichwouldmakeitsimportsmoreexpensiveanditsexportscheaper.ButFrancefeareddevaluation.Oilwaspricedindollars,andifFranceweretodevalueitscurrency,itsoilbillswouldsoar,negatinganyeffectthedevaluationwould have on its trade balance. In addition, France, concerned about itscurrencybeingdestabilizedby floatingdollar,hadagreed in1979 to joinwithWest Germany and the four other members of the European EconomicCommunity in creating a European Monetary System (EMS) that requiredmaintainingitscurrencywithinafixedrange.

Mitterrand’s Minister of Research of Industry, Jean-Pierre Chevenement,advocatedleavingtheEMSandlettingtheFrancfall.ButMitterrand,whowasalsoundertheswayofthe“Francfort”(strongFranc)asasymbolofFrance’sgreatness,decidedinsteadtogoalongasimilarroadasThatcher.Beginningin1982, he reduced demand for imports by reducing consumer demand throughcuts inspendingandtax increasesandbyfreezingwages.Unemploymentrose

from7.3percent in1981 to10.5percent in1985,but inflationslowedand thetrade balance improved, and after falling, growth began to inch up. It wasn’tentirely clear at the time, but Callaghan’s failure and Mitterrand’s U-turnsignaledtheendofpostwarconsensusaroundsocialdemocracyandKeynesianeconomics.

Socialist Lionel Jospin, who was prime minister under Mitterrand’ssuccessorJacquesChirac,endedupprivatizingmoreofthefirmsthatMitterrandhadnationalizedand reducing taxeson thewealthy.Afterbeinghighlycriticalduring the election of the EU’s growth and stability pact limiting the size ofdeficits, Jospin adhered to it. After taking office in Germany in 1999, SocialDemocratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröeder oversaw an agreement betweenGerman unions and management in 1999 to hold down wages. In 2003,SchröederchampionedthecontroversialHartzlawsthatmadeiteasierforfirmstohireandfireworkers.LabourPrimeMinisterTonyBlair,whotookofficein1995,continuedThatcher’spolicyofderegulatingfinanceandbusiness.Askedin2002whathergreatest achievementwas,Thatcher replied, “TonyBlair andNewLabour.Weforcedouropponentstochangetheirminds.”

Someof theSocialist,SocialDemocratic, andLabourparties succeeded inwinningofficeandevenreelection,asBlairdid,butinabandoningtheirsupportforanexpandingpublicsectorandforviablemanufacturingindustriesinfavorof supporting free trade,deregulated finance,andaglobalizedcapitalism, theybegantoforfeittheloyaltyoftheirworking-classconstituents.That,alongwiththedisintegrationoftheCommunistpartiesinFranceandItalyafter thefalloftheSovietUnion,leftanopeningforanewappealtotheworkingclasses.Andtheopening,particularlyforarightwingpopulism,wasenlargedbyanadditionalfactor—the rapidgrowthof anon-European immigrantpopulationat the sametimejobopportunitieswerenolongerplentiful.

ImmigrantsandIslamistsDuring the boom years, northern European countries, facedwith severe laborshortages,beganactivelyrecruitingguestworkers.InWestGermany,therewere95,000recruitedworkersin1956;by1966,therewere1.3million.Twomillionmigrant workers came into France from 1946 to 1970, along with 690,000dependents.Belgium,theNetherlands,GreatBritain,Denmark,andSwitzerland

had similar programs. And in these countries, employers began recruitingworkers independently without authorization. Some countries like Swedenopenedtheirborderstoanyimmigrantwhowantedtowork.Andformercolonialpowers likeFrance encouraged their former subjects to emigrate.By the early1970s, there were 4.1million foreign-born workers in Germany; 1million inSwitzerland;and3.4millioninFrance.

During this time, there was little anti-immigrant sentiment in WesternEurope.Themigrants didn’t competewith thenatives for jobs, and theywereseenastemporaryresidentswhowouldeventuallyreturnhome.Butthesituationchanged in the 1970s when labor shortages transformed into labor surpluses.WesternEuropeended formal recruitmentof foreignworkersandevenofferedworkers financial incentives to return to their homelands, but that hadunexpected consequences. Workers from other European countries tended toreturnhome,whileworkers fromAfricaand theMiddleEast,whereeconomicconditions were worse than those in recession-hammered Europe, stayed andtookadvantageofthelegalopportunitytobringtheirfamiliestoliveinEurope,where they reproducedat ahigher rate thannativeEuropeans.Asa result, thenumbersofimmigrantscontinuedtorise,andtheproportionofthosethatcamefrom non-European societies did as well. In France, the proportion ofimmigrants from theMaghreb regionofwesternNorthAfrica increasedby16percentagepointsfrom1968to1982.

In the ’80s and ’90s, a dramatic increase in asylum-seeking refugees fromAfricaandAsiafurtherswelledtheproportionsofnon-Europeanimmigrants—from75,000in1983toalmost320,000in1989.Sincethen,thesenumbershavecontinued to grow. In Denmark, the number of non-European immigrantsincreasedby 268,902, or 520 percent, between 1980 and 2005,making up 90percent of the total increase of immigrants to Denmark. Where the previousgenerationofimmigrantshadoftenworkedinmanufacturing,manynowfoundthemselves without jobs or taking menial jobs in hotels, restaurants, or inconstruction.Theyclusteredindownscalecommunitiesinsideorontheoutskirtsor Paris, Marseilles, Antwerp, Brussels, Rotterdam, or Copenhagen. Crimebecamerifeinmanyofthesecommunities,andsomeofthem,largelypopulatedbyMuslims,becamecutoffculturallyfromnativecommunities.

Fearandangerover the influxof immigrants fromnon-EuropeancountriesbegantoshowupinEuropeanpollingintheearly1990s.IntheEurobarometerpolls taken by the European Commission in 1991, 23 percent of respondentsfrom the 12 nations of the EuropeanEconomicCommunity thought that their

countries should not accept immigrants from countries south of theMediterranean.InFrance,itwas33percent;inDenmark,25percent.InFrance,56percentofrespondents thought theircountryhadtoomanyimmigrants,and24percentthoughtthatFranceshouldnotacceptpeopleseekingasylum.Therewasapronouncedjumpevenfrom1988.Intheautumn1988survey,18percentof respondents in the EC countries had wanted the rights of immigrantsrestricted;by1991,itwas33percent.

According to the first European Social Survey, done in 2002, the maincomplaints about immigrants (in this order)were that theymade crimeworse,took outmore social benefits than they paid for in taxes, and took jobs awayfrom natives.Many European leaders ignored or denigrated these sentiments.TheEuropeanCommissionthatstudiedattitudestowardimmigrantswascalled“TheCommissionofEnquiryonRacismandXenophobiainEurope.”Initially,political parties, especially the Socialist and Social Democratic parties, urgedacceptance of the immigrants, including immigrants who had entered thecountriesillegally.Thatleftapoliticalvacuumthattherightwingpopulistpartiesfilled.

ThePopulistRightMany of today’s populist organizations in Western Europe can trace theirancestry from the anti-tax groups of the 1970s (which resemble theAmericananti-taxmovementofthosesameyears)andfromnationalistorganizationswithquestionabletiestoformerfascistsandNazis.Jean-MarieLePen,thefounderoftheNationalFront,gothisstartinFrenchbookstoreownerPierrePoujade’santi-taxmovementofthe1950s.TheNationalFront,whichLePenfoundedin1972,combinedremnantsofPoujade’sshopkeepers’movementwithcriticsofFrance’sdecolonization, some of whom, like Le Pen, looked back favorably on VichyFranceanddownplayedtheevilsofHitler’sGermany.Duringthe1970s,theFN,whichwasmilitantly anti-communist andanti-tax, barely counted in thepolls.TheFNgot0.76percentinthe1974presidentialelection.

TheDanishPeople’sPartywasaspin-offfromtheProgressParty,whichtaxlawyerMogensGlistrupfoundedin1973.Glistrup,whoeventuallywenttojailfortaxevasion,calledforabolishingtheincometax.Thepartydidsurprisinglywellinthe1970s,butlesssointhe1980swhentheLiberalsandConservatives

coopteditsanti-taxmessage.Itwasrevivedin1995whenPiaKjærsgaardsplitoffandformedthePeople’sParty.TheAustrianFreedomPartygrewoutofthepostwarLeagueof Independents,which included formerNazis, and advocatedtherestorationoftheGermannation.In1956,itwassucceededbytheFreedomParty,whichcontinued (butmoderated) theLeague’sGermannationalism,andwhich functioned as a submissive junior partner to the reigning SocialDemocratic andChristianDemocraticparties.Like theotherparties it initiallycombinednationalismwithlibertariananti-taxeconomics.

Then,fromroughlythelate1980sthroughtheearly2000s, theseandotherolder parties, as well as some new populist parties that formed, took off andbecame players in Western European politics. The National Front, whichgravitatedbetween10and15percentinnationalelectionsinthe1990s,got16.8percent for Le Pen as its presidential candidate in the first round in 2002,knockingSocialistprimeministerLionelJospinoutoftherunoff.Initsveryfirstnational election in 1998, the Danish People’s Party got 7 percent. Then inNovember2001, it received13percent, putting it in thirdplace.TheAustrianFreedom Party went from 16.1 percent in 1990 to 26.9 percent in 1999. TheSwissPeople’sPartywent from11.9percent in1991 to22.5percent in1999.AndtheNorwegianProgressPartywentfrom3.5percentin1985to13percentin1989to15.3percentin1997,makingitNorway’ssecondlargestparty.

The most immediate factor in the parties’ rise was the way they tiedthemselvestothegrowingpopulardisapprovalofnon-Europeanimmigrantsandasylumseekers.Duringthelasttwodecadesofthetwentiethcentury,thepartiesturnedtheirattentionfromcommunismandtaxestoimmigration.Inthefallof1992, theAustrian FreedomParty announced an “Austria First” initiative thatincluded a constitutional amendment declaring Austria a land of non-immigrants.ThenewDanishPeople’sParty,formedoutoftheProgressPartyin1995,introducedaten-pointplanthatcalledforrepatriatingasylumseekersandrepealingSocialDemocratic legislation thathadallowed immigrants tovote inlocalelectionsafterthreeyears.InNorway,theProgressParty,whichhadearlierbeendividedover itsattitudetowardimmigration,adoptedahardlinestanceinthe 1997 elections, raising its national vote from 6.3 percent in 1993 to 15.3percent.

Inhis studyof theEuropeanpoliticsof immigration,ChristopherCaldwelldescribed theDanishPeople’sParty as “themost immigrant-obsessedparty inEurope.”UnlikeotherWesternEuropeancountries,Denmarklargelyescapedthedownturnthatcameinthe1970s.OfEuropeancountries,ithasoneofthemost

generous welfare states, and the least economic inequality. What sparked thebacklash to immigration and asylum seeking were socio-cultural rather thanstrictlyeconomicconcerns.Danesweren’tworried that immigrantswould taketheir jobs,but that theywouldn’tworkatallandwouldbecomefree ridersonDenmark’s generous welfare system. (Denmark, for instance, grants up to 90percentofprevioussalaryforfouryearsforworkerswholosetheirjobs.)Thatconcernwaspartly economic,butmorebroadly it stemmed from the idea thatthe Danish welfare state, financed by high taxes, was based on mutual trustamongDanishcitizenswhosharedthesamevaluesofworkandfamilyandwhowould not take advantage of the Danish state’s generosity. As more MuslimimmigrantsfromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaenteredDenmark,thecriticsofimmigrationalsoraisedconcernsaboutcrimeandreligiouspractices.

Much of the inspiration for the People’s Party stand on immigration camefromaLutheranpastor,SørenKrarup. “BetweenGlistrup and the foundingofthePeople’sPartyisagap,”MikaelJalving,acolumnistforJyllands-Postenandthe author of a book onKrarup, explained. “The gapwas taken up by SørenKrarup.”Beginninginthe1980s,KraruparguedthatDaneshadaspecialcultureinformedbyLutheranismtowhichIslam,whichhesawasapoliticalmovementandnotsimplyareligion,wasantithetical.Krarup’scrusadeagainstDenmark’simmigrationpolicieswassparkedbytheDanishparliament’spassagein1983ofanAlienActwelcomingrefugeeswhohadbegunpouringintoEuropefromtheIran-Iraqwar, andwho after the act began enteringDenmark annually by thethousandsratherthanhundreds.Krarupdenouncedtheactas“legalsuicide”forallowing“theuncontrolledandunconstrainedmassmigrationofMohammedanandOriental refugees [who] come through our borders.” In 1997,KrarupwasinvitedtoaddressthenewlyformedPeople’sParty’sconvention,andin2001,hewas elected to parliament from the party and headed its immigration andnaturalizationcommittee.

ThePeople’sParty campaignswere incendiary.One campaignposter from1999 showed a woman with a burqa. The text read: “Your Denmark: Amultiethnicsocietywithrapes,violence,insecurity,forcedmarriages,oppressedwomen, gang crimes.” The leading Social Democratic and Liberal partiesdismissedthepartyanditsleaderPiaKjærsgaard,whohadbeenahomehealthaide.Inadebateinparliamentthatyear,SocialDemocraticPrimeMinisterPoulNyrupRasmussentoldher,“Youarenothouse-trained,”usingawordstuerenethatnormallyreferstoanimalswhohavenotlearnedtourinateinlitterboxes.

ButKjærsgaardhad the last laughonRasmussen.After theSeptember11,

2001 al Qaeda attack in the United States, concern about Islamic immigrantsroseinEurope.InthatNovember’selection,whichwasdominatedbytheissueof immigration, thePeople’sParty’s13percentof thevotehelpeddeprive theSocialDemocratsofthelargestnumberofseatsinparliamentforthefirsttimesincetheparty’sformationin1924.Amajorityofblue-collarworkersbackedthePeople’sPartyandtheLiberalParty.

InFrance,theissueofimmigrationhadbecomeinterwovenwiththeissueofIslamic integration as early as the 1980s when a controversy broke out overMuslimgirlswearingheadscarvestoschool.In1995,anIslamicgroupsetoffbombs in the Paris subway. In April 2002, French concern over Islamicimmigration,reinforcedbytheSeptember11attacks,playedaroleinJean-MarieLePen’ssecondplacefinishoverJospin,whohadlegalized80,000immigrantswhohadenteredFranceillegally.

The same concerns also contributed to an astonishing election in theNetherlands. In theNetherlands, themajorparty leadership strongly supportedimmigrationand the idealofamulticulturalHolland.WhenHansJanmaat, theleaderofthedissidentCenterDemocrats,declaredin1997that“Hollandisnotacountryofimmigrants”and“wewillabolishthemulticulturalsocietyassoonaswegetthechanceandpower,”hewasindictedandconvictedforincitingracialhatred. In 2002, in thewake of September 11, PimFortuyn, a colorful publicspeaker and magazine columnist who had been kicked out of another partybecause of his anti-Islamic views, established his own party, the Pim FortuynList, and campaigned against Islam’s influence in Holland. Fortuyn wasassassinatedninedaysbeforetheelectionbyaleftwingactivistwhoobjectedtohisattacksonIslam,butintheelection,Fortuyn’spartystilltook17percentofthevote,makingitthesecondlargestinparliament.WithoutFortuyn,thepartyeventually fell apart, but it was succeeded in 2006 byGeertWilders’s highlysuccessfulPartyforFreedom.

PopulistsandtheWelfareStateAs populist parties gained support for their stand against immigration, theywidenedtheirpoliticalbase.Thefirstpopulistparties,suchastheNationalFrontandtheFreedomParty,hadbeenpetit-bourgeoisieparties.Theirmembersweredrawnprimarily fromsmall towns in thecountryside,andweresmallbusiness

proprietors and small farmers—many of the same groups that had launchedpopulismintheUnitedStatesandspearheadedtherightwinginEuropebetweenthe world wars. But in the 1990s, Europe’s populist parties grew largely byexpanding their base into working-class constituencies that had formerlysupportedSocialDemocrats,Socialists,Laborites,andCommunists. InFrance,LePen’sNationalFrontbeganwinningsupportinblue-collartownsinthenorth.Voters who had backed Socialist FrançoisMitterrand in the 1988 presidentialraceaccountedforone-thirdofLePen’ssupportinthe1995presidentialcontest.“Wearethepartyoftheworkingclass,”LePenboasted.

Thatwasn’tjustbecausethesepartieswerecriticalofimmigrants.Itwasalsobecause these parties, which had once reflected the anti-tax, anti-governmentviewsofsmallbusinessbegantoembracepartsofthesocialdemocraticagendaon welfare and government. In France, Le Pen’s National Front became adefenderofthewelfarestate.Itnolongercalledfortheabolitionoftheincometax. Denmark’s People’s Party broke with its parent group’s anti-tax focus. ItbecameadefenderofDenmark’sgenerouspublicsector,withtheprovisothatitsbenefitsbelimitedtoDanes.Norway’sProgressPartytookasimilartackinthe1997elections.

InAustriaintheearly1990s,theFreedomParty,whichhadbeensteadfastlylibertarianinitseconomics,tookadvantageofthedominantparties’embraceofneoliberalism. In order to prepare for EUmembership, the SocialDemocraticParty and Austrian People’s Party, working in a “grand coalition,” hadchampionedmassiveprivatizationofAustria’s industries,which led to the lossof about 100,000 jobs. In response to the public clamor over the move, theFreedom Party became a defender of the welfare state and critic of the EU’seconomics and globalization. The strategy worked. In the 1986 elections, 10percentoftheparty’svoterswereblue-collarworkers;by1999,47percentwere.Rightwing populist parties got the same kind of results throughout WesternEurope.Thankstothereactiontoimmigrationandneoliberalism,whathadbeenpetit-bourgeoispartieshadbecomeworkers’parties.

TheFoundingoftheEuropeanUnionThe final reason for the rise of the populist right was the operation of theEuropeanUnionandoftheEurozone.AfterWorldWarII,FrenchandGermanleaders,eagertoavoidanothercontinentalwar,tookthefirststepsinintegratingtheir economies. In 1951, France and West Germany, along with theNetherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Italy, established the European Coal

andSteelCommunityonlandsthatthetwoworldwarshadbeenfoughtover.In1957, the six nations established a free trade area, the European EconomicCommunity.Then in1992atMaastricht, thesix,plusGreece,Spain,Portugal,theUK, Ireland, andDenmark, took the fateful step of setting up a EuropeanUnion,withinwhichgoodsandpeoplecouldmovefreely.Thecountries,exceptforDenmarkandtheUK,alsocommittedthemselvestoacommoncurrency,theEuro,whichwouldbegincirculatingin1999.

France and Germany were always the main movers behind the EU; theirprincipal motive was to integrate Germany into a European community. Buteconomics also figured in the design of theEU.Once, after theUnitedStatesabandoned Bretton Woods, Europe’s currencies began floating in value, andsmallercountriesliketheNetherlandsthatweredependentonexportswantedtoprovide some stability to their currencies. Former French Finance MinisterDominique Strauss-Kahn described the Euro as “a tool to help us . . . resistirrational shifts in the market.” The French also thought (mistakenly) that bysubordinatingtheDeutschemarktoaEuropeanCentralBank,whichwouldbeincharge of the Euro, France would no longer be subordinate to Germany’seconomy.AndlessereconomieslikethoseofSpain,Greece,orItalywantedthelower interest rates and greater foreign investment that they expected wouldcomefromhavingthesamecurrencyas theGermansandFrench.Butwhetherwittinglyornot,theEUandEurozoneinstitutionalizedtheruleofneoliberalism.

To accept the subordination of their currency to the Euro, the GermansdemandedandgotagreementfromtheothercountriestoaStabilityandGrowthPact that put the ECB in charge of limitingmembers’ deficits to 3 percent ofGDPanddebt to60percentofGDP.TheEurozonemembersbelieved thatbylimitingdeficits, theywould limitdomestic inflationand thereforewouldkeepthe relationship among their countries inbalance.This proved tobemistaken,but togetherwith thecreationof theEuro itself, theStabilityandGrowthPactdidhavetheeffectofrulingoutKeynesianstrategiesforeconomicrecovery.TheKeynesian strategy had relied on running deficits. If the deficits threatened toupsetthetradebalance,thecountrycouldusetariffsoradevaluationtoprotectits balance of payments. But devaluations were now impossible and tariffsforbidden. As a result, the dominant center-left or center-right parties foundthemselveshamstrunginthefaceofeconomicdownturnsandopentochallengefromthepopulistrightandleft.

Initsfounding,theEUalsoadoptedaprincipleoffreedomofmovementforpeopleandbusinesses(“freedomofestablishment”)amongitsmembernations.

Thatreflectedadesiretoestablishacommonidentityamongthenationsthathadbeenatwarwitheachother.Butitalsoreflectedbusinesspriorities.AstheEUexpandedeastward,EuropeanbusinessesintheWestlikedtheideaofbeingableto import lower-wage labor from the East for restaurants, hotels, andconstructionwithout having to file papers.And businesses in the higher-wageWest were now free tomove their factories to the lower-wage East, asmanybegantodo.

Laborunionsgrumbledatthefreedomofestablishment,whiletherightwingpopulists took aim at the policy of open borders, which had the effect ofundermining member countries’ efforts to control immigration and asylum-seeking.Open bordersmeant, for instance, that legal or illegal immigrants orasylum seekers from North Africa could migrate from France or Italy to theNetherlands or Denmark. During the debate in Denmark in 1998 over theratificationoftheTreatyofAmsterdam,whichaffirmedtheEU’sacceptanceofopenborders,the“no”voteranacampaignheadlined,“Welcometo40millionPoles.”

But the EU’s administration was insulated from these protests. The EU’seconomic and immigrationpolicieswere chosen and reviewedby themembercountries,butinsuchawaythattheaveragecitizenhadlittleinputintothem.OftheEU’sprincipal institutions,onlyone, theEuropeanParliament,waselecteddirectly—and it only had the power to approve or disapprove proposals andbudgets submitted by the European Commission, whose members wereappointedby the leadershipsof themember states.TheEuropeanCommissionoversawthedailyoperationsoftheEU,includingitsbureaucracy.TheEuropeanCentralBankwascontrolledbyacouncilofrepresentativesfrommemberbanks.TheEuropeanCourtofJusticewasappointedbymemberstates.Itwastoissuerulings,butitsdeliberationandopinionswerekeptsecret.InhisprescientbookabouttheEuropeanUnion,PerryAndersonwrote,“Whatthecorestructuresofthe EU effectively do is to convert the open agenda of parliaments into theclosedworldofchancelleries.”

Some leaders of the populist rightwere initially in favor of theEU. Jean-MarieLePensaw itasavehicle forFrenchdominanceof thecontinentandabulwarkagainstSoviet communism. In theNationalFront’s1985platform,hewrote, “The European Union will remain utopia as long as the Communitydoesn’thavesufficientresources,acommoncurrencyandapoliticalwill,whichis inseparable fromtheability todefend itself.”Butafter thefallof theSovietUnion and after it hadbecomeclear that that theEUwouldhave awill of its

own,LePensouredonit,comparingMaastrichttotheTreatyofTroyes,whichinthefifteenthcenturycededthethroneofFrancetoEngland.

OtherpopulistpartiesjoinedinrejectingtheEU’s“democracydeficit.”TheDanish People’s Party called for Denmark to leave the EU. The SwedishDemocratsdeclared,“Europeancooperationisagoodthing,butanewEuropeansuperstateisnot.”Thepopulistparties’unhappinesswiththeEUwassharedbymanyEuropeanvoters.InpreparationforsigningthetreatyatMaastricht,Franceand Denmark held referenda. The French barely approved the treaty by 51.1percent, and theDanes defeated it by a similarmargin, narrowly approving itlaterafterDenmarkwasallowedtoopt-outofseveralprovisions.AftertheEUinvitedNorway to join, 52.2 of its voters turnedmembership down.Sweden’svotersnarrowlyapprovedmembershipby52.8percent.InSeptember2000,53.2percentofDanesvotedagainstjoiningtheEurozone;andthreeyearslater,56.1percentofSwedesrejectedtheEurozone.

In response to widespread dissatisfaction with the EU’s structure, thefederation’sleadershipadoptedanewconstitutionthatmademinoradjustments.But in 2005, 54.9 percent of French voters and 61.5 percent of Dutch votersrejected the constitution.At that point, the EUwithdrew the constitution, andrelabeleditatreatysothatitwouldnothavetobesubjecttopopularratification.That sparked cries of bureaucraticmanipulation.Within theEU, opposition tothe new constitution was led by the populist right parties, and as with theiropposition to immigration, Islam, and neoliberal austerity, it boosted theirsupportamongthepublic.Italsoallowedthoseparties,whichhadbeentaintedbytheirlinkstoEuropeanauthoritarianism,toclaimthemantleofdemocracy.

TheLimitsofLeftwingPopulism:SyrizaandPodemos

From 2003 through 2007, Europe seemed to be in passable shape.Growth inEurope averaged a low, but not disastrous 2.75 percent a year. Theunemployment rate fell from 9.2 percent to 7.2 percent. The populist wavereceded. But the financial crash that spread to Europe in late 2008 and thegrowth in refugees and Islamist terrorism that seemed to be tied to Westerninterventions and civilwars in theMiddleEast, SouthAsia, andNorthAfricasparkedapopulistrevolt.

Thispopulistreactionwasdifferentfromthe1990sinoneimportantrespect.Inthenortherntier,wheretheGreatRecessiondidnotstrikeasforcefully,andwheremanyoftheasylum-seekersclustered,rightwingpopulismpredominated.ButinSouthernEurope,whereunemploymentreachedGreatDepressionlevels,anewleftwingpopulismemergedinSpain,Greece,andItaly.Whenthemajorcenter-leftandcenter-rightparties,hobbledbytheircountry’smembershipintheEurozone,failedtorevivetheirnation’seconomies,votersbeganlookingtothenewpopulistpartiesinthesecountriesforanswers.

TheEurocrisisThefinancialcrash,whichsurfacedintheUnitedStatesinSeptember2008withthecollapseofLehmanBrothers, spreadby theyear’send toEuropeanbanks,whichhadheavilyinvestedinAmericanderivatives.Creditdriedup,borrowersdefaulted, investment lagged, and unemployment rose. By 2009, the EU’saverageunemploymentratewas9.6percent;in2012,itwouldbe11.4percent.AnditwouldbefarworseinSouthernEurope—18percentinSpainin2009and

25.1percentin2012.By2012,theUnitedStateswouldbeginpullingoutoftheGreatRecession, but inSouthernEurope itwould endure, andwould call intoquestiontheviabilityoftheEUandtheEuro.

In the United States, the immediate cause of the crash was financialderegulationandfraud.InWesternEurope,thecauseofthedeepeningrecessionwasperversefinancialregulation.TheEurozone,whichwentintoeffectin1999,included19nationsatvaryingdegreesofeconomicdevelopmentandwithverydifferentkindsofeconomies.GermanyandtheNetherlands, for instance,wereexport-driven high-tech economies.UnderGerhard Schröeder,German unionshadagreedtorestraintheirwagedemands.Asaresult,Germanwagesactuallyran behind productivity in the 2000s, making German products extremelycompetitive within the EU and internationally, and resulting in soaring tradesurpluses.

Spain and Greece, by contrast, had lower-tech economies that relied onconstruction, tourism, financial services, and agriculture.Until they joined theEurozone,theseeconomieshadmanagedtokeeptheircurrentaccountsbalancedat moments of crisis by devaluing their currency. (Spain had devalued itscurrency four times between 1992 and 1995.) But when they joined theEurozone,theynolongerhadcontroloftheirexchangerates.Whattheylostinflexibility, however, they seemed initially to gain in attractiveness for foreigninvestors.Inthepast,foreigninvestorsmighthaveworriedthattheywouldlosemoney if one of these countries got in trouble and devalued its currency. Butwith theEuro, regulatedby theECB, thatwouldn’thappen inSpainanymorethanitwouldhappeninGermany.

Soin theearly2000s,whenSpainandGreece(aswellas theotherPIIGS,Portugal, Ireland, and Italy) ran large trade deficits, foreign investors, led byGermany, plowed their trade surpluses back into these deficit countries in theformof bank loans and bond purchases. In the 2000s, the demand-driven andeconomies enjoyed a boom in office, home, and hotel construction; theywereabletoselltheirgovernmentbonds;salariesandwagesroseaboveproductivity;and unemployment fell. Their membership in the Eurozone seemed to be anunmitigatedblessing.

Butwhen the financial crash hit, credit dried up internationally, home andoffice buyers began defaulting, investors began pulling out of these countries.The Spanish and Greek banks that had funded the new hotels and housingdevelopments and office buildings were suddenly stuck with billions in badloans. (Even today, the area outside Madrid is dotted with large unfinished

housingdevelopments.)Withthebanksthreateningtogounder,theSpanishandGreekgovernments attempted tobail themout, but thatmerely transferred thebadloansandthedebtsfromprivatebanksintothepublicsector,andcreateda“sovereigndebtcrisis.”

Thesedebtsprovedamortal risk to thesecountries.As thedebtsmounted,thebondratingagenciesloweredthecountries’ratings,andinterestratesontheirpayments rose, enlarging, in effect, the debts themselves. To repeat: undernormalcircumstances,thesecountriescouldhavebeguntodigthemselvesoutofa fiscalhole throughadevaluation,but thatoptionwasclosedas longas theyremainedintheEurozone.Thatleftthreeoptions.First,theycouldconvincethecreditor countries, chiefly but not exclusivelyGermany, to forgive their debts.Thatprovedimpossible.TheGermanelectorate,alongwiththeFinnsandDutch,loudlyprotestedanybailout.Second,theycouldleavetheEurozoneentirelyandaccept radical devaluationof their newcurrency.But voters in these countriesdidn’twant to leave theEurozone.They feared chaos and, particularly amongthe elderly, the loss of savings andof fixed incomes.Or third, these countriescouldundertakeasevereversionofwhatMitterrandhadtodoin1982—curtailspending and raise taxes resulting in even higher unemployment, but also areduced demand for imports, and eventually and hopefully, by loweringwagecosts,morecompetitiveexports.

Greecewasoneof the firstcountriesunable to service itsdebts.When thecenter-rightNewDemocracyParty,whichcontrolledthegovernment,askedforaidfromthe“Troika”oftheEuropeanCommission,ECB,andIMF,theTroikademanded inexchange thatGreece takeharshausteritymeasures to shrink thepublic sector, reduce wages, raise taxes, and privatize public assets. Facingprotests, the New Democracy government balked and called new elections,whichthePanhellenicSocialistMovement(PASOK)underGeorgePapandreouwon.

When economist Yanis Varoufakis, who was then advising PASOK,advocated defaulting on the debts, the leadership dismissed such an idea as“treasonous.” Seemingly at a loss, the Socialist government signed amemorandum in May 2010 with the Troika that in exchange for 110 billionEuros in loans,whichwouldberecycledback to theoriginalcreditors,Greecewouldundertakeharshausteritymeasures.These includedmassivebudgetcutsand a sharp increase in Greece’s value added tax (VAT). These measuresdepressed demand and led to higher unemployment. Due to the closure ofbusinesses, they also increased the budget deficit. “The sovereignty ofGreece

will be massively limited,” Jean-Claude Juncker, the former president of theEuropeanCommission,boasted.

AftersettlingwithGreece,theTroikadealtwithSpain,whichwasalsobeingruled in 2010 by socialists, the Spanish SocialistWorkers’ Party, or PSOE. Inexchangefor50billionEurosinloans,theSpanishgovernmentagreedtosharpbudgetcuts,includingtheendtoafamilyallowanceprovisionandthereductionof old-age insurance through extending the retirement age. After the SocialistgovernmenthadbeenvotedoutofofficeinNovember2011andreplacedbythecenter-right People’s Party, the Spanish government agreed to even moredraconianbudgetcuts,includingabigincreaseintheVAT,andalaborlawthatwouldmakeitmucheasierforemployerstofireworkers.

Measures of austerity like this can work, as Thatcher’s experience in the1980s showed,butonlywhen the countryundergoing themalreadyhasviableexport industries (which can include financial services) and is surrounded bycountries with buoyant economies that are eager to buy imported goods andservices and to invest in lower-wage industries. Greece did not benefit fromeitheroftheseconditions—andSpainonlybenefitedmarginally.InGreece,theTroika’sausteritymeasuresmerelymade thingsevenworse,and led to furtherbailout talks, and to additional measures of austerity. These measures alsosparkedapopulistrevoltdirectedagainst theEU’sfalsepromisesofprosperityandagainstboththeSocialistandcenter-rightpartiesthathadagreedtothem.

Syriza’sAscenttoPowerGreeceonlyemergedfromtheshadowofdictatorshipin1974whentherulingcolonelswere forcedoutby theirownmilitary sponsors after theyprovokedawarwithTurkeyinCyprus.ConstantineKaramanlisandNewDemocracywonelections thenext year, but in1981, theSocialists underAndreasPapandreou,the father ofGeorge, took office, andwith occasional interruptions fromNewDemocracy,remainedinpowerformostofthenextthirtyyears.

PASOK succeeded in creating a low-grade version of social democracy inGreece,withasystemofpensions,aNationalHealthService,andapublicsectorat roughly the size—16 percent of GDP—of some other EU states. WhatPASOKfailedtodowaslimitthehighdegreeoftaxevasionfromthecountry’swealthyand from its large shadoweconomy,or reform theparties’practiceofusingthestatesectorasabribe-takingpatronagemachine.Taxevasiondeepenedthe nation’s deficits, and corruption by public officials bred distrust of bothmajorparties,openingthewaytoachallengetotheirrulefromtheleft.

Greece’s Communist Party had emerged from the dictatorship dividedbetweenanexteriorwing thathadremainedoutof thecountryandwas totallysubordinate to the Soviet Union and an interior “Eurocommunist” wing thatsought tomakeGreece a democraticmember of the European community. In1989,with theColdWarwaning, the twowingsof thepartycame together toformSynaspismos, theCoalitionof theLeft andProgress.The remainsof thepro-SovietCommunistPartyeventuallysplitoff,butin2004,whatremainedofSynaspismos joined with feminist and environmental groups to form Syriza,which stood for “coalition of the radical left.” Syriza was initially a loosecoalitionthatranjointcandidates,anditsfirsteffortsweredecidedlymediocre.In the 2004 elections, it got only 3 percent of the vote, and even as late asOctober2009,whentheonsetofthefinancialcrashwouldsweeptheSocialistsbackinpowerwith43.9percentofthevote,Syrizaonlygot4.6percent.

ButthesubservientresponseoftheSocialistsandtheNewDemocratstotheEU’s demand for austerity transformed Greek politics. Starting inMay 2010,whentheSocialistgovernmentagreedtotheEU’sdemandforsteepbudgetcuts,hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Athens andelsewhere.Manyofthedemonstratorswerestudentsandunemployedyouth,buttheywerejoinedbystrikingworkers.AttheJune2012elections,Syriza,headedbyAlexisTsipras, a civil engineerwhohadbeenamemberof the communistyouthorganization and later the secretaryofSynaspimos’syouthorganization,ranacampaigntargetedattheSocialists’concessionstotheEU.SyrizapromisedtorescindthememorandumwiththeEU,nationalizeGreece’sbanks,raisetaxesonthewealthy,andsuspenddebtrepaymentuntilGreecehadrecoveredfromtherecession. This time, Syriza came in second to New Democracy with anastounding 26.9 percent of the vote. PASOK, discredited by its embrace ofausterity,cameinadistantthirdwithonly12.3percent.Ithasstillnotrecoveredfromthisvote.

Inthe2012elections,Syrizadidbestamongyoungvoters,theunemployed,andtheurbanemployedinbothpublicandprivatesectors.Itdidworstamonghousewives,seniorcitizens,andruralvoters.WhilethepartyhaditsrootsintheEurocommunistleft,Syrizashiftedin2012tomakingapopulistappeal.In2009,Tsiprashadbarelyreferredtothe“people,”butin2012,itbecametheconstantreferent inhisspeeches—occurring51 times inhisclosingelectoraladdress inJune.Inhisspeech,Tsiprasdeclaredaboutthecomingvote,“Sundayisnotjustabouta simpleconfrontationbetweenSyrizaand thepoliticalestablishmentoftheMemorandum....Itisaboutanencounterofthepeoplewiththeirlives.An

encounterofthepeoplewiththeirfate....BetweentheGreeceoftheoligarchyandtheGreeceofDemocracy.”

After its success in the2012elections,Syriza ceased tobe a coalition andbecameaunitedpartyunderTsipras’sleadership.AsitpreparedfortheJanuary2015 elections, it again focused its platform on rejecting agreementswith theTroika—andthisnowincludedNewDemocracy’sevenmoreonerousagreementof2012.“Wewillpreventourcountryfrombeingturnedintoadebtcolony,”itsplatform declared. Varoufakis, who had left PASOK and would later becomeSyriza’sfinanceminister,accusedNewDemocracy’sgovernmentof“actinglikeamodelprisoner,obeyingtheTroika’sinstructions,while,ontheside,pleadingfor a rationalization of the imposed policies, terms, and conditions.” SomeSyrizamemberswantedtoabandontheEuroaltogether,but theparty’sofficialposition was that it wanted to remain in the Eurozone, but not under theconditionsthattheTroikahadimposed.ThatsetupapopulistconfrontationwithNewDemocracyandwiththeTroika.

In the January elections, Greece’s voters affirmed Syriza’s stand andrepudiated theNewDemocracygovernment.Syriza carried the legislature andthe election with 36.3 percent of the vote to NewDemocracy’s 27.8 percent.(PASOK got a mere 4.7 percent.) Under Greek election law, the winner getsextra votes, so by gaining the support of the small IndependentGreeks Party,Syriza took over the government. In February 2015, Tsipras and VaroufakisbegannegotiatingwiththeTroikaforaloanthatwouldallowthemtofendofftheECBandIMF,towhomGreeceowedpayments.

Bothmencameout fighting,Tsipras announcing that “theTroika is over.”Butasthenegotiationsproceeded,theIMF,theECB,andtheEUministers,ledby Germany, which had become the dominant power in the EU and itsadministration, held tough, demanding still more cuts in spending and taxincreasesasaconditionfornewloans,andrejectingtheGreeks’pleatoforgivepartof theirdebt.Finally, inJuly,havingdefaultedonthe loanpayment to theIMF,TsiprascalledforareferendumonwhethertoaccepttheTroika’sdeal.AtSyriza’surging,62percentofGreeksvotedtorejecttheTroika’soffer.ThestageseemedsetforafinalshowdownbetweentheGreekpeopleandtheTroika.

ButTsiprasastonishedGreekvotersandmanyinhisownpartybyreturningtothetalksandagreeingtotermsthatwereevenmoreonerousthantheTroikahaddemandedearlier.Morespendingcuts,moretaxincreases,theeviscerationofGreece’sold-agepensions, new taxeson small andmediumbusinesses thathad been the heart blood of Greece’s economy, and the sale of the state’s

remainingassets.EconomistPaulKrugman termed thedeal “madness.”WroteKrugman, “The European project—a project I have always praised andsupported—hasjustbeendealtaterrible,perhapsfatalblow.AndwhateveryouthinkofSyriza,orGreece,itwasn’ttheGreekswhodidit.”

UnemploymentinGreeceremainedat25percentandyouthunemploymentat double that. And Europe’s economy remained stagnant. Economists HeinerFlassbeckandCostasLapavitsaswrote,“ThepicturethatemergesforGreeceinviewof these trends is simply appalling.The country appears trapped in low-growth equilibrium with exceptionally high unemployment and withoutcommand over the instruments of economic policy that could alter itspredicament.Thenotion that lowwages coupledwithderegulationofmarketsand privatization of public assets would lead to sustained growth is entirelywithouttheoreticalandempiricalfoundation.”

Inthewakeoftheagreement,TsiprascalledfornewelectionsinSeptemberasavoteofconfidence.Withturnoutdown,SyrizaedgedtheNewDemocracyagainby35.5to28.1percent,butasTsiprasandSyrizaneartheirsecondyearofrule, their prospects have darkened. The Troika—now joined by a newinstitution, theEuropeanStabilityMechanism,making it aQuartet—continuesto be in charge of Greek economic policy, and continues to force furtherausterity inexchange forbridge loans.Tsipras’sgovernmentcomplainedaboutthe terms but then, with a narrow 153–147 edge in the Greek parliament,acceded to theQuartet’s demand. In January and again inMay, huge protestsgreetedthenewausteritymeasures,includingathree-daygeneralstrike.InpollsinMay2015,SyrizatrailedNewDemocracy.

PASOKhasvirtuallydisappeared,butinanoddway,Syrizahasreplaceditasthecenter-leftcomponentofGreece’stwo-partymonopoly.Syrizanolongerfightstheestablishment,buthasineffectbecomethecenter-leftcomponentofit,asPASOKwas.Itnolongeradvancesdemandsthatseparatethepeoplefromanintransigent elite, but instead tries to nip away at themargins of the bad dealforced upon it by the Troika-turned-Quartet. Economist JamesGalbraith,whoadvisedSyriza,thinksitstillhas“aradicalconstituencythat...wouldrallytoany authentic opposition force if one existed—which has proved for variousreasonsobjectively impossible.”Heacknowledges that itnow“operatesas theunwillingagentsoftheBerlinfinanceministry.”

Political theorist Stathis Kouvelakis, who served on Syriza’s centralcommittee,butquitovertheJulydealwiththeTroika,saysthattheonlywaytoputGreecebacktogetherisforittoleavetheEurozone.“It’simpossibletofight

austerityorneoliberalismwithintheframeworkoftheexistingmonetaryunion,and,mostlikely,oftheEUassuch.Aruptureisindispensable,”hesays.Butifsuch a rupture was ever possible in the days after the July referendum, themoment for it seems to have passed. As a populist party promising to fightagainsttheforcestryingtoimposeausterityuponthecountry,Syrizaappearstohavefailed.Andthathashadrepercussionsforotherleftwingpopulistgroupsonthecontinent,particularlyPodemosinSpain.

Podemos:YesWeCanSpain,likeGreece,neverexperiencedthepost-WorldWarIIfloweringofsocialdemocracy thatmanyof thecountries innorthernEuropedid.UntilDecember1975, Spainwas ruled by dictator FranciscoFranco.After Franco’s death, hisappointedheirKingJuanCarlosdeBorbonandAdolfoSuárez,oneofFranco’stoplieutenants,arrangedforaparliamentarytransition.TheywantedtobepartofEurope.SpanishphilosopherOrtegayGassethadwrittenearlier,“Spainistheproblem,andEuropeisthesolution.”Suárez’sUnionoftheDemocraticCentre(UCD)wonthefirstelectionin1977andthenewlylegalizedSpanishSocialistWorkers’ Party (PSOE) came in second. Spain joined NATO in 1982—animportant step in taming theSpanishmilitary.Butwith a recessionparalyzingSpain’s economy, the UCD decisively lost the election that year to FelipeGonzalezandthePSOE,whichwouldruleSpainforthenextfourteenyears.

ThePSOE(pronouncedpeh-soy)isSpain’soldestexistingparty,foundedin1879. It emerged from theFranco years as aMarxist, revolutionary party, butGonzalez convinced itsmembership to remove any hint ofMarxism from theparty’s platform and to fashion itself as a multi-class rather than simply aworking-class party. In the 1982 campaign, Gonzalez still advocatednationalizing Spain’s banks, creating almost a million new jobs throughgovernmentspending,andleavingNATO,butherenegedonallthesepromises.Facedwith16.5percentunemploymentand14.4percentinflation,influencedbywhat had happened to Mitterrand in France, and eager to join the EuropeanEconomic Community, Gonzalez adopted a Thatcherite strategy of reducinginflation throughtightmoneyandhigh interest rates.While theunemploymentratesoonexceeded20percent,inflationbegantogodown.

Gonzalez initiallywon thegrudgingsupportof the labormovement forhiseconomicstrategy,butby1986,Spain’sunionswereupinarms,andstagedtwogeneral strikes that frightenedGonzalez. Gonzalez then increased governmentspending,layingthebasisforarudimentarywelfarestate.Butasteeprecession

beganin1992.That,combinedwithgrowingchargesofcorruption—endemictoSpain’s patronage-based party system—contributed to PSOE losing the 1996election to the People’s Party (PP), a right-center party that had replaced theUCDastheprincipalopposition.Overthenexttwodecades,thePPandPSOEhaveexchangedruleinthesamewayasGreece’sPASOKandNewDemocracyoncedid.

In 2004, after eight years of PP rule, Spain elected PSOE’s José LuisRodriguez Zapatero. Zapatero widened the scope of welfare payments andincreased the minimum wage, but faced with the global financial crisis, andpressurefromECB,Zapaterosignedamemorandumin2010toraisetaxesandcutspending,andonMay12thatyear,announcedlargespendingcuts.ZapaterowasfollowingthesamepathasPapandreouinGreece.AyearlateronMay15,young demonstrators gathered atMadrid’s Puerta del Sol,where they began amonth-longsit-inthatspreadthroughoutSpain.

The occupiers, dubbed the “Indignados” (outraged), were protestingZapatero’s spending cuts, bank evictions of people unable to pay theirmortgages,unemployment,andcontinuingcorruption in the twomajorparties.(One sign read, “Democracy is a two-partydictatorship.”)The leadersweren’taffiliatedwithanypoliticalparty,andspurnedidentificationwiththeorganizedleftandthelabormovement.“Weareneitherright,norleft,wearecomingfromthebottomandgoingforthetop,”asloganproclaimed.Theprotestsspreadto57othercities,andatonepointinvolvedasmanyas100,000protestersinMadrid.The demonstrators held assemblies and made proposals. Afterward, many ofthem continued to meet and demonstrate. In the November 2011 generalelection,PSOEsuffereditsworstdefeateveratthehandsofthePP,andMarianoRajoybecameprimeminister.

PabloIglesias,ayoungleftwingpoliticalscientistatComplutenseUniversityinMadrid,hadbegunatelevisiondebateshowsimilartoWilliamF.Buckley’sFiringLine.The showbecame remarkablypopular and theponytailed Iglesiasbecameahouseholdname.In2013,asunemploymentroseto26.3percentinthewakeofnewspendingcutsthatRajoyhadimposedattheECB’sbehest,IglesiasandotherComplutensecolleaguesbegandiscussingapoliticalpartythatwouldcapturetheenergyoftheIndignados.

IglesiashadbeenamemberoftheyouthwingofSpain’sCommunistParty,which after failing to build an electoral following in post-Franco Spain, hadfounded a coalition party called the United Left in 1986 that included peacegroupsandfeministgroups.ButIglesiashaddriftedawayfromtheCommunists’

hardline Marxism. When he approached them about joining forces, theydismissed him as having “the principles of GrouchoMarx.” In January 2014,Iglesias and other colleagues from Complutense University announced theformation of a new party, Podemos (WeCan)—whose name echoedObama’spresidentialcampaignslogan.

Theparty’s leadershipconsistedofpolitical scientists and the leaders fromsome of the groupuscules that had been part of theMay 15movement.Mostwereintheirthirtiesoryounger.(SeveralleadersthatIinterviewedlookedasiftheywouldhavebeen carded if theyhad tried toorder a drink at a bar in theUnitedStates.)Thenewpartywouldn’tbeorganizedlikeaconventionalparty.Itwouldmakeampleuseof televisionand socialmedia todrawpeople togetherand to get itsmessage across. Itwould also have a different political outlookfromconventionalleftwinggroups.

Iglesiasandhistwoclosestassociates,fellowpoliticalscientistsJuanCarlosMonederoandÍñigoErrejón,wereenthusiasticsupportersofthe“pinktide”thatwas sweeping Latin America. It had begun with Hugo Chavez’s election inVenezuelain1999andcontinuedwithEvoMorales’svictoryinBoliviain2006.Chavez andMorales had rejected the classic socialist strategy of championingtheworkingclassagainstthecapitalistclassandhadinsteadembracedapopuliststrategyofrallyingtheircountry’s“bravopueblo”againsttheoligarchs.Iglesiasand Monedero had become advisors to Chavez, and Errejón had written hisdoctoralthesisatComplutenseonMorales’srevolution.(ItwouldlatercomeoutthatMonederohadbeenpaidhandsomelybyChavez.)

Monedero,whoat51was theoldmanof theparty andwhohadbeen thedirectoroftheUnitedLeft,wasamoreorthodoxleftist,butIglesiasandErrejóncombined the example of Latin American populism with the work of “post-Marxist”politicalphilosopherslikeErnestoLaclau,anArgentinianwho taughtatEssexUniversity, andhiswife,BelgianChantalMouffe. “A recent politicalinitiative inourcountrywouldnothavebeenpossible,”Errejón laterdeclared,“withouttheintellectualconfirmationandlearningfromtheprocessesofchangeinLatinAmerica”andwithout“anunderstandingoftheroleofspeech,commonsentiment,andhegemonythatisclearlyindebtedtotheworkofLaclau.”

Laclau andMouffe contended that theold leftwing categories of “workingclass” and “socialism” were obsolete and had to be replaced with a populistproject pitting the people against elites and aimed at creating “radicaldemocracy.” The goal of a populist party was to knit diverse groups into a“people” united by a set of demands that created an ideological “frontier”

betweenthepeopleandtheelite.UnlikeotherEuropeanintellectuals,LaclauandMouffedefinedpopulismasalogicthatcouldtakeeitherleftorrightwingform.Errejón became an eager disciple—in 2015, he published a book ofconversationsbetweenhimandMouffethatbecameabibleforPodemoscadres—andIglesiasinthefirstyearsofPodemosalsoendorsedLaclauandMouffe’sviewofpopulism.

IglesiasandErrejóncalledforaconflictbetween“lagente”and“lacasta,”—thelatteraSpanishword,butaconceptborrowedfromtheItalianandusedbyBeppeGrillo.ThetermreferredtothemajorpoliticalandeconomicinterestsinSpain,oras Iglesiasput itmorecolloquially inhisbook,Politics inaTimeofCrisis,“thethieveswhoerectpoliticalframeworksforstealingdemocracyfromthe people.” Iglesias and Errejón defined the conflict as being between thepeopleandtheelitesratherthanbetween“left”and“right.”Influenced,perhaps,bytheattitudeoftheIndignados,theysawSpain’sleftasstagnantandirrelevant—theUnitedLefthadn’tmountedasignificantelectoralchallengeinalmosttwodecades.Thenewparty,Errejónexplained inLeMondeDiplomatique,“wouldstart a process or at least make possible a new political frontier whichsymbolically postulates the existence of a people not represented by thedominantpoliticalcastes,andwhichisbeyondleftandrightmetaphors.”

Theyalsoworriedthatthemajorpartieswouldmarginalizethembydefiningthemas“theleft.”Iglesiaswarnedthat“whenouradversariesdubusthe‘radicalleft’ and try, incessantly to identify us with its symbols, they push us onto aterrain where their victory is easier.” In his dialogue with Mouffe, Errejónexplained that “the elite were very comfortable with the left-right axis. Theylocatedthemselvesatthecenter-right/center-left,andplacedthe‘challengers’—thosewhodefiedthem—atthemargins.”

IglesiasandErrejónwerepersonallyoftheleft(Podemos’sbookstoreinitsMadrid café is filled with back copies of New Left Review and works bycontemporaryMarxists likeDavidHarvey), but followingLaclau andMouffe,theydidn’tdefinePodemos’sobjectiveas socialism. “Weopenlyacknowledgewearenotopposingastrategyfora transition tosocialism,”Iglesias toldNewLeft Review, “but we are being more modest and adopting a neo-Keynesianapproach, like theEuropean left, calling forhigher investment, security, socialrights, and redistribution.” When I asked Segundo González Garcia, a topPodemosleaderandamemberofParliament,whethertheytookanyoftheLatinAmerican countries asmodels, he said, “Wewant our country to be closer toNorthern Europe. Our model is closer to Sweden and Norway than Latin

America.Wewantawelfarestate,aguaranteedincome.”(Spain’swelfarestate,even before the spending cuts, was far less robust than those of the EU’snortherntier.)

Podemos, likeSyriza,wasananti-austeritypartycontesting theEU’s rulesandtheSpanishgovernment’scapitulationtothem.IglesiasdescribedPodemos’sgoal as “post-neoliberalism.” Its program that first year called for endingevictions, creating a government-funded guaranteed annual income, auditingSpain’s debt with a view to not paying what was “illegitimate,” making theStabilityandGrowthPact“flexible”andmakingitinclude“fullemployment”inits objectives, democratization of Brussels and rejection of the Lisbon Treaty,repealofSpain’sbalancedbudgetlaw,anda35-hourworkweek.Together,thesedemandsestablishedadividebetweenitandthegovernmentandmainpoliticalparties,aswellasbetweentheSpanishpeopleandBrussels.

Bytheirownadmission,Podemos’sleadersthoughtthatinordertoextricateSpain fully from the Eurocrisis, Spain would eventually have to abandon theEuro itself,but theywereaware thatSpain’svoters,whohadearlierprosperedunder the Euro, were unwilling to contemplate breaking with the EU. Afterdecadesof isolationunderFranco,Spanishvoterswouldn’t supporta return toSpain’s own currency.NachoÁlvarez, a colleague of Iglesias at ComplutenseandPodemos’schiefeconomist, toldme,“Noprogressiveforcedares tospeakaboutexitingoftheeuro,basicallybecausethesouthernpopulationsdonotevenwanttohearaboutthatandthisissurelytheonlygoodsolution,oratleast‘final’solution to recoverdemocracyandsovereignty.”So they limited themselves tothreatening to repudiate Spain’s debt and demanding a reformulation of theStabilityandGrowthPact.

As the European elections approached in May 2014, few Spaniards hadheard of Podemos. To publicize the party, the leaders put the well knownIglesias’s photo on their literature. That, too, was consistent with a populiststrategyofusinga leaderasaunifyingsymbol.To theiramazement, thepartywon8percent—asignificantshowinginamulti-partyelection—andfiveseats.Podemos’s success in the European elections gave the party visibility, and asunemploymentmounted,andchargesofcorruptionbeganflyingagainstthePPgovernment, Podemos’s poll numbers began to rise. From December 2014through April 2015, polls for the forthcoming parliamentary elections inDecember2015actuallyshowedPodemosleadingbothPPandPSOE.

Podemos’shopeshadinitiallybeenbuoyedbySyriza’ssuccessinGreece.InAthensinJanuary2015,IglesiasjoinedTsiprasonstageforaclosingcampaign

event. They danced together to a Leonard Cohen song, “First we takeManhattan, then we take Berlin,” but changed the lyrics to “First we takeAthens,thenwetakeMadrid.”ButasthefuriousbattlebetweenSyrizaandtheTroikaragedthatwinter,andasrumorscirculatedthatGreecewasgoingtoexittheEurozone, Iglesias,mindful of Spanish voters’ commitment toEurope andthe Euro, began backing away from Podemos’s identification with Syriza.IglesiasremovedaphotographofhimandTsiprasfromhisTwitterfeed.“Spainis not Greece,” he now declared. Iglesias made clear that Podemos favoredreforming, but not leaving the EU and the Eurozone. In addition, Podemosdroppeditsdemandforanauditofthefederaldebt,whichmighthavejustifiedselectivedefaults,andforauniversallivingwage.ButafterthespectacleoftheGreeks rejecting and then Syriza accepting the Troika’s demands, Podemosplunged in thepolls toas lowas10percent, fallingbehindanewcenter-rightanti-corruptionpartyCiudadanos,orCitizens.

The PP expected to win reelection. While unemployment was still 23.7percenton theeveof theelection, theeconomyhadstartedgrowing, thanks inpart to the ECB curiously ignoring a center-right government running deficitsthat exceeded the 3 percent limit. But Spain’s political system was rife withbribes and kickbacks and as the election approached, 40 PP officials werescheduled to stand trial for a kickback scheme. In the end, the PP got 28.7percent—thelowestpercentageeverforaleadingparty—thePSOE22percent,andPodemosgotanimpressive20.7percent.

Podemos’s voting base had some similarity to Sanders’s voters, but wasbroader. Podemos won young voters and the voters in the large metropolitanareas.BothMadridandBarcelonaelectedmayorsaffiliatedwithPodemos.Bycontrast,PP’sbasewasmiddleandupperclass,olderand ruralor small-town,whilethePSOEretaineditstraditionalworking-classaswellasitsmiddle-classsupport.Butoncea two-partysystem,Spainhasbecomeamulti-partysystem.AndastheresultsfortheDecemberelectionboreout,neitherthePPandPSOEhadwonenoughseatsforaready-mademajority.Theinconclusiveresultledtofivemonthsofwrangling among theparties, highlightedbyPSOE’s refusal toformagrandcoalitionwiththePPandPodemos’srefusaltosubordinateitselftoPSOEinacenter-leftcoalition.TheKingfinallycallednewelectionsfortheendofJune.

As the parties quarreled over theDecember results, a riftwithin Podemosopened up between Iglesias and Errejón. With new elections likely, Iglesiasdecided that Podemos needed to get enough votes and parliamentary seats to

exceedPSOE.Podemoswouldthenbeableeithertobethedominantpartyinagoverning coalition of the left with PSOE, or if PSOEwere to form a grandcoalitionwithPP,become the leadingoppositionparty.Hecasthis eyeon theUnitedLeft,whichhadwon3.68percentof thevote inDecember, andwhichtogetherwithPodemos’s vote,wouldhaveput themoverPSOE’s total. In thefaceofErrejon’soppositiontobecomingapartyof“theleft,”IglesiasdecidedtonegotiateacoalitionwiththeUnitedLeft,whoseleadershiphadchangedsince2013.Hewontheiragreementtorunacombinedslate,UnidosPodemos,intheelection.

Iglesias and Podemos acquired the promise of the United Left’s voteswithout accepting itsmost radicalmeasures, such as abolishing themonarchyand nationalizing banks. Eager to deflect any charges of extremism, Podemoscrafted a platform for Unidos Podemos that was only a shade to the left ofPSOE. Like PSOE, the groups promised that Spain would adhere to theEurozone’s stability pact, but asked for a “new path of deficit reduction” thatwouldbe “moregradual than that raisedby theEuropeanCommission.”Theyinsisted (implausibly) that Spain could meet this deficit target through publicinvestment rather than cuts in social spending; and they asked for a boost insocial spending primarily on education and healthcare, while dropping thedemandforaguaranteedannualincomeor35-hourweek.Andinsteadofcallingexplicitly for the cancellation or reduction of national debts, they called for aEuropeanconference topropose“the restructuringof thedebt in theEurozonearea.”

InthepollsleadinguptotheJune26election,UnidosPodemoswasrunningwellaheadofPSOEandwithinstrikingdistanceofthePP.PSOEandPPstruckbackbyhighlightingPodemos’s ties toLatinAmerica’sauthoritarianpopulism(and the collapse of Venezuela’s oil-based economy) and the communistpresence in Unidos Podemos. (The headline in the pro-PSOEEl Pais on theformationofUnidosPodemosread,“Podemossealsdealwithcommunistgroupto run together in new election.”) To counter these charges, Unidos Podemosfurtherattemptedtosoftenitsimage.Inthelastweeks,itpublisheditsprogramin the form of a 192-page IKEA catalogue with photos of people usinghousewares accompanied by a list of 394 largely anodyne “demands,” whichincluded an AnimalWelfare Act, emotional intelligence, care for forests, andcitizenparticipationingovernment.

In the election—heldon June26, three days after theBritish hadvoted toleave the European Union—Unidos Podemos landed in third with an

embarrassing thud.Thecombined listofPodemosand theUnitedLeftgot thesamenumberofseats—71of350—thatthetwopartieshadgotteninDecember,buttheyactuallyreceived1.09millionfewervotes,duelargelytoabstentionsinareas that had been Podemos’s strongholds in December. PP improved itsshowing,butstilldidnothaveenoughseatstoformamajority.PSOEgotfewervotesthanithadinDecember,butwasstillfaraheadofUnidosPodemos.Thebickeringwillgoon,andtherecouldevenbeanotherelection,butPodemoswillnotplayassignificantaroleinthebickering;ifamajorityisformed,Podemoswillprobablynotholdthebalanceofpowerinanewparliament.ItsattempttodisplacePSOEasthemajorpartyoftheleftfailed.

Monedero,whohad left theparty’s formal leadership theyear before afterthestoryofhisVenezuelanfundingbroke,butwhostilladvisedIglesias,blamedUnidos Podemos’s disappointing showing partly on the “campaign of fear”conductedbythePPandPSOE,butalsoonUnidosPodemos’sfailuretopresentapoliticalalternativetothePSOE.Monederochargedthatthecampaign,whichwasrunbyErrejón,was“constantlyfilingdowntheroughedges”ofitspolitics.Italsorelied,hecharged,toomuchonconventionalralliesandontelevisionandeschewedmilitantstreetprotestswithstudents,socialorganizations,andunions.MonederodefendedthealliancewiththeUnitedLeft,contendingthatPodemoswould have done “evenworse”without it. Errejon, in response, reiterated hisoppositiontohavingalliedwiththeUnitedLeft.“Twoplustwodidnotadduptofour,” he said. Errejon said that Podemos had been “trapped” by the alliance.“Ontheleft-rightaxis,itismoredifficulttobuildanewmajority,”hesaid.“Onthataxis,fieldsremainimmobile.”

Could Monedero and Errejon have both been right—and wrong? In thepreviouselection,somevotershadbackedPodemosasapopulistprotestpartyagainstthePSOEandPP.ButwithpollssuggestingthatUnidosPodemosmightactuallywin,theyhadevaluateditandPodemosasagoverningpartyandfoundit wanting. As Errejón maintained, the alliance with the United Left hadprobablyreinforcedthe“campaignoffear”So,too,didtheBritishvotetoleavethe EU, which caused the Spanish stock market to plunge on the eve of theelection,andmayhaveledmanyvoterstoseekasaferandknownharborinthePSOEandPP.

Monederoalsohadapoint.Bywateringdowntheirdemands,andfailingtodistinguishthemselvesfromPSOEeitherintheirdemandsoractions,Podemoshadabandoneditspopuliststanceforacenter-leftreformismandanappearanceas just another political party. Their demands no longer established a frontier

between the people and la casta. They were no longer clearly campaigningagainst lacasta.Thatmayhaveaccounted formanyof theabstentions in theirpoliticalstrongholds.Voterswerenolongerinspiredbytheirmessageorthewayitwasdelivered.

Syrizaabandoneditspopuliststancewhenithadcomeupagainstthepowerof the Troika. It had become another left-center party with incrementalambitions. But by the time Syriza abandoned its populism, it had alreadydisplaced PASOK. Podemos has had no such luck. Spain’s PSOE has lostsupportsinceZapaterogaveintotheTroika,butitremainsoneofSpain’stwomajorparties,andin theJuneelection,Podemosfailedtodisplaceit.SowhileSyriza,inthefaceofGreece’scontinuingslide,mustdecidehowitcangovern,PodemosmustshowitcanrecapturewhatpropelledittothebrinkofpowerinSpain.

RightwingPopulismontheMarchinNorthernEurope

During the Eurocrisis, leftwing populist groups arose primarily in the south,whilerightwinggroupsfaredbestinnorthernandcentralEurope.Muchofthishad to do with the rise in immigration there. In 2014, there were 280,000migrantstoEuropefromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica;in2015,thenumbergrew to over a million. In 2000, 7.1 percent of Danes were first or secondgeneration immigrants; in 2016, it was 12.3 percent. Sweden’s immigrantpopulationis22.2percent.IntheUnitedKingdom,630,000immigrantsarrivedin2015,whichwouldhavebeenequivalentto3.2millionimmigrantsarrivingintheU.S.thatyear.

Theriseinimmigrationcoincidedwithariseinterroristattacks,particularlyinthenorth.FromDecember2010toMarch2016,therewereninemajorattacksinEurope.Fouroftheworstoccurredinthelasttwoyears:InJanuary2015,theCharlieHebdomassacreinParisclaimed20; theNovember2015ParisattacksbyISISkilled137;inBrusselsinMarch2016,threemoreISISsuicidebombingsleft 35 dead; in July, a cargo truck drove into Bastille Day crowds in Nice,killing 85. In addition, there were sexual assaults involving refugees andimmigrantsfromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica—thebestknownoccurringin Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015. Together, the flood of immigrants, theterrorist acts, and sexual assaults lent credence to two decades of agitation byrightwingpopulistgroupsagainstimmigrantsandIslam.

DenmarkandAustria:PopulismAmidProsperityLeftwingpopulistgroupsflourishedintheleastprosperousEuropeaneconomies.Rightwingpopulismhasfoundahomeinsomeofthemoreandmostprosperouscountries. These are the countrieswhere immigrants and asylum-seekers have

aspired to live.Denmarkhasoneof theworld’smost successful economies. Ithas the secondhighestper capita income in theEuropeanUnion, trailingonlyLuxembourg. In 2016 it had only 4.6 percent unemployment. It was virtuallyuntouched by the Great Recession. Its Social Democratic government mighthavebeenexpected towin reelectioneasily in theJune2015election;and theSocialDemocratsdidwin26.3percent, thehighestpercentageof anyparty inthe election,while the vote for their traditional opposition, theLiberals, fell 7percentagepoints to19.5percent.But theDanishPeople’sParty, campaigningonbordercontrols,furtherrestrictionofimmigration,andacriticalapproachtotheEU,wentfrom12.3in2011to21.1percentinthevote.Theyheldthekeytoa ruling majority, and with their informal support the Liberals were able todisplacetheSocialDemocratsandformagovernment.

ThePeople’sPartydidn’tactuallyjointheLiberalgovernment,becausetheydisagreedwiththeLiberalproposaltocuttaxesfortherich.ExplainedKennethKristensenBerth,whojoinedthepartyatitsinceptionandisnowamemberofparliamentandapartyspokesman,“TheproblemwasthattheLiberalAlliancesaidtothePrimeMinisterthatheshoulddelivertaxreliefforthemostwealthyinthiscountry.Wewouldn’tgointogovernmentonthebasisoftaxreliefforthemostwealthy.”Like other rightwing populists, the People’s Party are stronglysupportive of the welfare state, as long as spending is confined to Danishcitizens. In fact on these issues, Berth acknowledged, they are closer to theSocialDemocrats.ButtheypartedcompanywiththeSocialDemocratsandarealigned with the Liberals on preventing asylum seekers from establishingpermanent residence in Denmark. “If we don’t fix immigration, there is noreasontofixtherest,”Berthsays.

In exchange for informal support from the People’s Party, the Liberalsadopted thePeople’sParty’s agendaon immigrants, refugees, and Islam.Theycuts benefits to refugees and immigrants by 45 percent; they required pork inschool and daycaremenus (to defy Islamic prohibitions on eating pork); theyorderedtheconfiscationofrefugees’cashandvaluablesthatexceeded$1,450—amoveeerilyreminiscentofNaziconfiscationofJewishvaluables.Theseharshstancesreflectedsignificantpopularopinion.

According to one newspaper poll in January 2016, 70 percent of Danesthought refugees were the most important issue facing the country, and 37percentopposedgivinganymoreresidentpermits torefugees.Danishpoliticalexperts, politicians, and journalists, including those opposed to the People’sParty, toldme theyexpected thePeople’sParty to succeedpolitically. “I think

they are going to get the government soon,” saidReneOffersen, a prominentlawyerandConservativePartymember.

Austria, like Denmark, has enjoyed relative prosperity. Its unemploymentrate from 2012 to 2016 hovered between 4.7 and 5.8 percent. But its citizenshavealsobeenup inarmsover refugees. Ithad90,000 requests forasylum in2015,thesecondmostpercapitaintheEU.Whiletherewerenoterroristattacksonitssoil,ithadmurdersandrapesperpetratedbyrecentmigrants.

Since 2013, Austria had been ruled by a “grand coalition” of the SocialDemocrats and the center-right People’s Party, with Social Democrat WernerFaymann serving as chancellor. In 2015, Faymann joinedGerman ChancellorAngelaMerkelinbackingopenbordersforrefugees,butwhenFaymannandhisparty saw polls showing the rightwing populist Freedom Party ahead in theforthcomingAprilpresidentialelections,Faymannchangedcourse.InMarch,hecappedthenumberofrefugees.Butitwastoolate.

In theApril2015election, theFreedomPartycandidateNorbertHofergot34percentofthevote,comparedto11percenteachfortheSocialDemocratandPeople’s Party candidates. In a runoff in May, the Green Party candidate,AlexanderVan derBellen,who had come in second in the first round, barelyedgedoutHoferby50.3 to49.7percent.Butbecauseof impropercountingofabsenteeballots,AustriancourtsruledtherewillhavetobearevoteinOctober2016.The vote bore out the profile ofmany rightwingpopulist groups.Hofercapturednearly90percentofthevoteamongblue-collarworkersandruralandsmall townvoters outside themainmetropolises,whileGreenParty candidatewonwhite-collarvotersandnineoftencities.

UKIP:TheRevoltoftheLeft-BehindsLike Denmark and Austria, Great Britain, where the unemployment rate hasbeenfallingsinceSeptember2011andisnowat5.4percent,hasproventobefertile ground for rightwing populism. Having led the successful fight to getBritain to vote itself out of the EU, theUnitedKingdom Independence Party(UKIP)hashadthegreatestimpactonitscountryandontheEUofanypopulistparty.ThatvotereshuffledpoliticsandeconomicsintheUKandhascastdoubtonthelong-termfutureoftheEU.

UKIPwasfoundedin1993,butremainedamarginalsingle-issuepartyandpressuregroupforalmosttwodecades.Ifithadanoverallpolitics,itwasanti-tax,economicallylibertarian,andsociallyconservative.Itsprimarybasewasinmid-toupscaleshires thatgenerallyvotedConservative. Itgot1percent in the

1995parliamentary elections, 2.2 percent in 2005 and3.1percent in 2010. ItssuccessbegantocomeinelectionsfortheEuropeanparliamentwhereitgot16.1percent in 2004 and 16.5 percent in 2009, second only to the Tories. ThatreflectedtheriseinoppositiontotheEU.

Popular opposition to the EU went back decades and was based on theperceptionthatbyjoiningtheEU,theUKhadabandoneditsownsovereignty.ItdrewonEnglishorBritishnationalism.Butby2009,oppositiontotheEUhadbegun to spread from Tory towns to the working-class areas in Northern andEasternEnglandthatregularlyvotedforLabour.AndUKIPbegantofindvotersthere. According to Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin’s extensive study ofUKIPanditssupporters,thebulkofitssupportshiftedtotheolderless-educatedand primarilymale white working class. This older working class had turnedagainsttheEUandwasbackingtheUKIPinsomeelections.

Many of these newUKIP voterswere clustered in smaller towns that hadoncebeencentersofmanufacturingandmining,butthatinthewakeofThatcherand the 1980s had become industrial ghost towns. Their inhabitants were the“left-behinds”oftheUK’seconomicdevelopment.WhileLondon,asacenteroffinance and financial and legal services, and the universities, as incubators ofhigh-techdevelopment,hadprospered,Britain’solderindustrialareashadfallenintoharderandhardertimes.

Thegrowthinanti-EUsentimentamongthesevoterswasfueledbytheriseofimmigrationtoBritainfromEasternEurope.Thebiggestspikeinimmigrationoccurredafter2004.Inthatyear,eightcountriesfromEasternEurope,includingPoland,Hungary, and theBaltic states, joined the EU. In 2007, Romania andBulgaria joined.According toEUrules, theUKcouldhave institutedaseven-year transitional ban on emigration from these countries, but TonyBlair,whowasthenprimeminister,didn’tdoso.By2015,immigrationhadclimbedtoover600,000ayear.

LondonersandresidentsofGreatBritain’shigh-techenclaveswelcomedthenewimmigrants,butmanyworking-classvoterssawthemasafurtherthreattotheirstandardofliving.DuringtheBrexitcampaign,therewasanintensedebateover whether, and if so how, immigrants had actually affected native-bornworkers, but therewas some agreement, expressed byTheresaMay,whowasthenCameron’sHomeSecretary,andwhofavoredremainingintheEU,thattherecentfloodofimmigrantshadput“pressureonpublicservices,onhousing,oninfrastructure...itcanholddownwagesandpushBritishworkersoutofjobs.”Studies from thegovernment’sMigrationAdvisoryCommitteehadconcluded,

for instance, that immigration “lowers wages at the bottom of the wagedistribution”andthatduringslowgrowthoradownturn,“working-agemigrantsareassociatedwithareductioninnativeemploymentrates.”

The growing opposition to immigrationwas cultural aswell as economic,particularlyamongseniorcitizenswhohadgrownupinaBritainwhen,aslateas 1964, 98 percent of the electorate was white. According to a 2013 BritishSocial Attitudes survey, among those over age 65, 69 percent thoughtimmigration should be reduced “a lot,” 66 percent would mind “if a closerelativemarriedaMuslim,”61percentthoughtbeingborninBritainwas“veryimportant”tobeingBritish,and58percenttthoughthathavingBritishancestorswas “very important” to being British. By contrast, only 13 percent of thoseunder35thoughthavingBritishancestorswasveryimportanttobeingBritish.

Butas lateas2010,opposition to immigrationhadn’t translated into large-scale support for leaving the EU. That happened largely out of the efforts ofUKIP leader Nigel Farage, who after the party’s poor showing in the 2010general election, set about honing UKIP’s message of opposition to the EU.Faragefusedtheincendiaryissueof immigrationwiththatofEUmembership.UKIPadopted theposition that theway to limit immigrationwas togetoutofthe EU. Farage also adapted UKIP’s general political outlook to its newworking-classvoters,manyofwhomhadoncevotedforLabour.HeabandonedUKIP’s commitment to laissez-faire economics. Farage proposed taking thefunds that theUK contributed to theEU and using them to improveBritain’sNationalHealthService.

Farage framed UKIP’s anti-immigrant and anti-EU sentiment in populistterms.UKIPclaimeditwaschampioningthepeople—theleft-behinds—againstLondonandBrussels’selites.Farage’ssuccessshowedupinthe2014EuropeanUnionelection,whenUKIPcameinfirstwith27.49percent.ThatelectionwasaclearindicationthatUKIPhadputtheissueofBritain’sEUmembershiponthecountry’spoliticalagenda.

Within the Conservative Party, Prime Minister David Cameron had tocontendwithagroupofback-bencherswhoalsoopposedBritain’smembershipin theEU,mainlyBritishnationalistswhorepresented theupscaleareaswhereUKIPstillhadsupport.Toappeasethem,Cameronhadpromisedin2013thatifhewerereelectedinthe2015generalelection,hewouldholdareferendumonEU membership. In the 2015 general election, Cameron was easily reelectedagainst a lacklusterLabouropponent.UKIPgot a respectable13percent,withsomeof itsvotescomingatLabour’sexpense.After theelection,Cameronset

thereferendumforJuneof2016.CameronwasconfidentthathecouldkeepBritainwithintheEU.Heandhis

Chancellorof theExchequerGeorgeOsborne, joinedbyBritain’s topbusinessleadersandmajornewspapers,warnedrepeatedlythatadecisiontoleavetheEUcould have dire economic consequences. Labour Party leader Jeremy CorbynwagedahalfheartedcampaignforstayingwithintheEUthatprobablyfailedtoswaypotentialsupportersamongthe“left-behinds”whilefurtheralienatingwhathad once been Labour constituencies. UKIP led the campaign against thereferendum along with two prominent Tories, former London Mayor BorisJohnsonandformerCabinetmemberandMPMichaelGove.

Farage conducted the referendum campaign in classic populist fashion,pittingthepeopleagainsttheestablishment.OnMay20,hetoldreporters,“Itistheestablishment,itisthewealthy,itisthemulti-nationals,itisthebigbanks,itis thosewhoseliveshavereallydoneratherwell in the lastfewyearswhoaresupportingremainingandagainstitisthepeople.”Tendayslater,hesaid,“Thisis our chance as a people to get back at a political class that has given awayeverything thisnationhasever stood for, everythingour forebearsever foughtfor and everything we want to hand on to our children and grandchildren.”Faragewasnotaboveusingincendiaryimagerytopromotehiscause.OneUKIPposter, called “Breaking Point,” showed streams of dark-skinned MiddleEasternerspouringintoSlovenia,presumablyenroutetotheUK.

In the referendum, UKIP and the dissident Tories were able to build amajority for leaving the EU out of the working-class left-behinds and themiddle-class British nationalists. Within England, Remain won heavily inLondon and in the bigger cities, except forBirmingham andSheffield, and inuniversitytowns.Leavewoninblue-collartownsandinthemiddle-classareaswhereEuroskepticismhadbeen strong.Theworkingclasswaskey.Voters forLeavewereconcentratedamongolderandlesseducatedvotersandwithintownswherethemedianincomewaslessthan$45,000.

ThedecisiontoleavewasamajorvictoryforUKIPandamajordefeatforthetwoestablishmentpartiesandthepoliticalworldviewtheypromoted—oneinwhich professional and managerial classes prospered, but the older workingclasssuccumbedtotheglobalforcesofmobilelaborandcapital.TonyBlairtoldSkyNewsafterward,“Thecenter-leftandthecenter-righthavelosttheirpoliticaltraction. The populist insurgent movements on the left and right are takingcontrolrightnow.”

AsBlairsuggested,UKIP’srise,andthedecisiontoleavetheEU,weretied

torejectionofthebroaderneoliberalworldview.InMarch2015,journalistDavidGoodhartwritingintheLabourmagazine,Prospect,hadmadeexactlythispointinexplainingUKIP’spopularity:

The modern social and economic liberalism, that dominates all the mainpolitical parties, has produced an economically abandoned bottom third ofthepopulationwithnorealchanceofevergainingashareinprosperity;andan even larger group who feel a vague sense of loss in today’s atomizedsociety inwhichthestabilityoffamilyandtheidentityofplaceandnationhasbeeneroded.UKIPvotersareacompoundofthoseignored,abandoned,and laughed at by the metropolitan liberals who, despite some partydifferences,dominateourpublicandculturallife.

Inthereferendum,thesevotershadrejectednot just theEU,but itsunderlyingeconomicandsocialphilosophy.

After the victory of Leave, UKIP leaders talked of displacing the LabourPartyasBritain’ssecondmajorparty.Indeed,thereferendumdidshowthattherewas a vacuum inBritish politics, particularly amongwhatwas onceLabour’snatural constituency.But the referendum’s results didn’t necessarily putUKIPintoapositionof filling it.Populistparties can sufferwhen theirdemandsareperemptorilyrejected,asSyriza’swereby theTroika.Or theycansufferwhentheircentraldemandsaremet,aswiththePeople’sPartyintheUnitedStates.

UnderFarage,UKIPhadbecomemorethanasingle-issueparty,butthecalltoleavetheEUwasneverthelessthesingledemandthatdefinedUKIP’sdefenseof the people against the establishment. It was essential to its populistinsurgency.Havingwon it,UKIPmust now either redefine itself or slide intomarginality.Anditwillhavetodoso,atleastforthetime,withoutFarageasitsleader;afterthereferendum,Faragedeclaredhisownmissionaccomplishedandresignedfromhispostattheheadoftheparty.

MarineLePenandtheNationalFrontOf all the EU’s nations, France has been most directly affected by risingimmigration and Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks. It also has Europe’s mostimportant rightwing populist party. In 2017, Francewill hold presidential andparliamentary elections.AsofMay2016, theNationalFront’sMarineLePenled inpollsover theRepublicanandSocialist candidates.Were she towin theFrenchpresidency,itwouldupsetthepoliticalbalanceacrossEurope.Todoso,

however,shewillhavetoovercometheFN’sreputationforrightwingextremismcreatedbyherfatherJean-MarieLePen.

Jean-MarieLePen,theFN’sfounder,wasaverbalbomb-throwerwholovedtoepater lebourgeois—shock thebourgeoisie.He reinforced the imageof theFNas a defender ofVichyFrance and as the voice of theFrenchPieds-Noirswho had angrily fled Algeria during its war of independence. Le Pen alsofamously declared the Holocaust a “detail” of World War II. And his toplieutenantswerecutfromsimilarcloth.BrunoGollnisch,whowaselectedtotheFrenchNationalAssemblyin1986,wasconvictedin2007ofHolocaustdenial.

By reorienting the FN fromopposing communists to opposing immigrantsandIslam,andbysupplementingtheeconomicconcernsoftheshopkeeperwiththoseoftheunemployedsteelworker,LePenaddedworking-classvotersinthenorth to the FN’sCatholic, provincial base in the south. That led to Le Pen’sastonishingsecondplaceshowinginthe2002runoffagainsttheSocialistPrimeMinister Lionel Jospin.ButLe Pen’s successwas short-lived. Fearful of aLePen victory, Jospin and the Socialists advised their voters to support theunpopularincumbentJacquesChirac,thecandidateofthecenter-rightRallyfortheRepublic,inthenextround.Asaresult,ChiracwasabletoroutLePen,82percentto18percent,inthefinalrunoff.

LePen’sfailureinthesecondroundsuggestedthattherewerestrictlimitstothe FN’s popularity. Toomany voters identified the FNwith the hated Vichyregime and thought of its leader as an anti-Semitic extremist.As his daughterMarineLePenput it, therewas a “glass ceiling” that theFNcouldnot breakthrough.The2007electionappearedtoconfirmthat.NicolasSarkozy,whohadbeen interior minister in Chirac’s administration, and was running as thecandidateofthecenter-rightUMP,tookahardlineagainsttheimmigrantyouthswhohad rioted in2005andagainst immigrants ingeneral. If theydon’t “loveFrance,” he declared, they should “leave it,” and he proposed cuttingimmigration.BycooptingtheFNposition,SarkozydoomedLePen,whocameinfourthinthefirstroundwithonly10.44percent.

Inthefirstroundofthelegislativeelectionsthatyear,theFNdidevenworse,gettingonly4.29percentandwinningnoseats.Thatimperiledtheparty’sstatecampaignfunding,whichdependedonitswinningseats.InJanuary2011,Jean-Marie Le Pen, 82, decided to retire as the party chairman. That set up aleadershipbattlebetweenGollnischandMarineLePen.

MarineLePen,whowasbornin1968,wastheyoungestofLePen’sthreedaughters.Hermostvividmemory,recountedinherautobiography,Againstthe

Current,was of someone blowing up their Paris homewhen shewas eight inorder to kill her father. No one was injured, but it was her introduction, shewrote, to a “world without pity.” The next year, however, a wealthy patronwithoutchildrenleftafortunetoJean-MarieLePen,includingamansionintheParissuburbs,whereMarineandhersistersthengrewup.

MarineLePengotalawdegreeandenteredprivatepractice,butin1998,shetookovertheFN’slegaldepartment.ShewaselectedaRegionalCouncilorfromNord-Pas-de-Calais, a beaten-down former mining region dominated bysocialistsandcommunists.MarineLePen isa tall,handsomebleachedblondewithacommandingvoiceandquickwit.Shehasherfather’stoughness,andhiswillingness towithstand and then counter harsh criticism. She also shares herfather’sardentFrenchnationalism—shenamedheroldestdaughterafterJoanofArc—aswellashisoppositiontoimmigrantswhoshebelieveschallengeFrenchvaluesandculture.ButshewasofanentirelydifferentpoliticalgenerationfromherfatherandfrommanyoftheolderFNfollowers.

MarineLePenistwice-divorced,pro-choice,andcomfortablearoundgays.She did not inherit her father’s anti-Semitism or his sympathy for Vichy orcolonialFrance.In2000,shebecamepresidentofGenerationsLePen,ayouthgroupwhosemissioninpartwastoalterthefamily’sandtheparty’sreputation.OneofitsgroupswastheNationalCircleofJewishFrenchman.

Inherautobiography,sheblamedleftwinghumanrightsgroupssuchasSOSRacisme for demonizing the FN, but she admitted that the party had alsocontributedtoitsreputationbycontinuingto“createpolemics”that“reinforcedthecaricature”oftheorganization.Shedidn’tsingleoutherfather,buthisviewswereexactlywhatshehadinmind.In2008,shebrokepubliclywithhimwhen,inan interviewwithaFrenchmagazine,heonceagaindescribed theNazigaschambersasa“detail.”“Idonotshareontheseeventsthesamevision,”MarineLePentoldthemagazine.ShewasalsocriticalofGollnisch’scommentsongaschambers.

In the2011election tohead theFN, shedefeatedGollnischby two-to-oneamongthemembership—asmuchbecauseofhernameasherviews.Butonceinstalledaspresidentandastheparty’sprojectedpresidentialcandidatefor2012,she set about de-demonizing (dédiabolisation) the FN and turning it from arightwingsectintoa“partyliketheothers.”Shechangedtheparty’soutlookinthreekeyrespects:

Anti-Semitism and pro-Vichy: Soon after becoming president of the FN, she

condemned “what happened in the [concentration] camps as the height ofbarbarism”andmadeclearthatanti-Semitesandracistswerenotwelcomeintheparty.Shebannedskinheadsandanyoneincombat-fatiguesfromtheFN’sfirstmarch.AFNcircularsaid,“MarineLePenhaswarnedthatanythingresemblinga‘skinhead’inanyshapeorformwillbeexcludedbyallnecessarymeans.”ShealsobegancitingfavorablyCharlesdeGaulle—whowasdespisedbyherfatherandhisgenerationofVichyloyalists.Sherepeatedlyrebukedherfatherforhisanti-Semiticoutbursts,finallyexpellinghimfromthepartyinAugust2015.

Immigrants and Islam: Le Pen was no less vehement than her father indenouncing attacks by Islamists and in tying them to what she claimed wereFrance’s lax immigrationpolicies.AfteraFrenchMuslimofAlgeriandescent,who had been radicalized in Afghanistan, killed seven people in Toulouse inMarch2012,LePencommented,“HowmanyMohammedMerahsarriveeachday in France in boats or airplanes filled with immigrants? How manyMohammedMerahsarethereamongunassimilatedchildren?”ButLePentriedtocreatedistinctionsbetweenwhatshewassayingandpastFNstatements.SheinsistedshewasnotagainstMuslimsorMuslim immigrants,butagainst thosewho violated French principles of laïcité—or secularism—by imposing theirreligion, either as politics or as cultural practices, on the public realm. “InFrance, we often say the U.S. is a multicultural society, but it’s not. It’smultiethnic, but one single culture. I don’t say that nobody should enter ourcountry.Onthecontrary,intheolddaysimmigrantsenteredFranceandblendedin. They adopted the French language and traditions. Whereas now entirecommunitiessetthemselvesupwithinFrance,governedbytheirowncodesandtraditions,”sheexplainedtoaninterviewerin2011.

Economic Nationalism: Le Pen’s biggest departure in policy was in hereconomics.Shewas influencedbyhavingservedasa regionalcouncilor inanarea devastated by deindustrialization whose-working class citizens feltabandoned by the major parties in Paris. Her views were also shaped by anadvisor she hired to run her 2012 campaign. In 2009, she had met FlorianPhilippot, 30, a graduate of the super-elite École nationale d’administration.(Presidents Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Jacques Chirac, and François Hollandewere all graduates.) In 2002, Philippot had been an enthusiastic supporter ofJean-Pierre Chevenement, a founder of the French Socialist Party in 1969.ChevenementhadresignedfromMitterrand’scabinetin1983overMitterrand’sU-turnandhadalsoopposedMaastrichtand theEuro. In2002,hehadrunforPresident,withPhilippot’ssupport,asthecandidateofanewleftwingnationalist

partyagainstChiracandHollande.PhilippothadgravitatedfromChevenement’sleftwingeconomicnationalism

to theNationalFront bywayof Jean-YvesGallou, a formerFNmemberwhohad originally formulated its turn toward working-class economics. In 2011,Marine Le Pen hired Philippot to run her presidential campaign and to helpdevelopitsplatform.Itsplatformoneconomics—minusthespecialpreferenceinwelfare and employment for the native French—could have been written byChevenement.“Jean-PierreChevenement’sprojectiscarriedforwardbyMarineLePen,”PhilippottoldLeMonde in2012.Assuch, itwasconsiderably to theleftofmanyof theSocialDemocraticorSocialistpartieson thecontinentandtheDemocraticPartyintheUnitedStates.

Theplatform,which isstill theparty’sofficialstand,calledfora“strategicplan for reindustrialization,” tariffs and quotas to protect against “unfaircompetition,” the separation of commercial from investment banking, atransactions tax on stock purchases, the nationalization of banks facingdifficulties,a“cap”oncreditcardcharges,oppositiontocutsinsocialspendingand to the privatization of public services, equal quality health care accessregardlessofincomeorlocation,andrejectionoftheEuropeanUnion’sattemptsto impose austerity. The EU had led, the platform said, to “open bordersinducing relocation, unemployment, market dictatorship, destruction of publicservices, insecurity, poverty, and mass immigration.” The platform blamedGreece’sdebtcrisison“theeliteswhowanttofeedthenewMinotaurtosavetheEuro.”TheFNdemandedthatFrance’srelationshiptotheEUbe“renegotiated”andareferendumheldontheEuro.

TheFN’s newprogramon economic nationalismbecame as integral to itsappeal as its opposition to mass immigration. Its entire program was nowsubsumed under the concept of defending French sovereignty—in an echo ofChevenementandearlierdeGaulle,souveranistewasthenewwatchword.InLePen’s election brochure, its position on immigration, calling for a 95 percentreductioninannualentries,cameonpagesevenafterherpositiononconsumerrights, the Euro, jobs, finance, pensions, and justice. Together, these demandsestablished a divide between the FN’s “little people” and the establishment,which Le Pen referred to derisively (combining the UMP and PS) as the“UMPS.”LePeninsistedherownparty,theFN,wasnota“rightwing”party.Itwasnigauche,nidroite, as thecampaignpostersproclaimed—neither leftnorright.That,again,fitthepopulistprofile.

ThefirsttestoftheFN’snewpoliticsandofLePenasacandidatecamein

the 2012 presidential election. Le Pen came in third with 17.9 percent of thevote,morethanherfatherhadevergotteninthefirstround.Thepartydidwellabove its typical performance among 18-to 24-year-olds (26 percent), officeworkers (23 percent), blue-collar workers (28.6 percent), and high schoolgraduates (27 percent). It did worst among seniors, professionals, managers,peoplewith advanced degrees, and Parisians. Le Pen’s showingwas, perhaps,helped by the public horror over the Toulouse shootings. In its next tests,however, it would benefit not only from new terrorist incidents, but from thegrowingunpopularityofFrançoisHollande’sgovernment.

DeclineoftheSocialistPartyFrançoisHollande,France’s firstSocialist president sinceMitterrand, assumedoffice inMay 2012 with unemployment at 9.7 percent. In his first campaignrally, he promised to get tough with bankers (finance is “my enemy,” heproclaimed) and to bring down France’s unemployment rate. Hollande alsopromised to end Sarkozy andMerkel’s commitment to austerity economics—dubbed “Merkozy”—and epitomized by their crafting in 2010 an even morerigidversionoftheEU’sStabilityPact.Butoutsideofasurtaxonmillionaires,which Hollande rescinded after it failed to bring in significant revenue, heabandonedhispromisestobreakwithneoliberalorthodoxy.

Asunemploymentroseabove10percent,andasHollandewaspressuredbytheECBtoreduceFrance’sdeficittothe3percentlimit,heperformedhisownU-turn.He had already abandoned any effort to persuadeMerkel to relax hersupportforEU-wideadherencetothestabilitypact.Nowhavingannouncedthathe had become a “social democrat” rather than a “socialist,” he proposed toemulateGermany’searlierattemptstoreduceitsproportionofincomegoingtowagesrather thanprofitsbygrantingbusinessgenerous taxconcessions,whilecutting social spending. Hollande called his new approach a pacte deresponsabilité—a pact of responsibility—between the government andemployers.Theoretically,inexchangeforthesetaxconcessions,businesswouldhiremoreworkers.

Hollande’smeasuresalienatedhisownbaseamongworkerswithoutvisiblyreducingunemployment.Inthefirstmajortest,themunicipalelectionsof2014,theSocialistslostcontrolof113citiesandtownswithoutwinninganytownsit

didn’tpreviously control.TheFNdid remarkablywell. It got8percentof thetotalvote,eventhoughitonlyrancandidatesinasixthofthemunicipalities.Itwonsomeimportantsymbolicvictories,includingthemayor’sofficeinHenin-Beaumont,anorthernformerminingtownthatSocialistshadalwayscontrolled,andthatwaspartofMarineLePen’sNord-pas-de-Calaisregion.

After the municipal election, Hollande replaced primeminister Jean-MarcAyraultwithManuelValls,who had strongly supportedHollande’sU-turn. InMay,however,Hollandeand thePSsufferedanother setback. In theEuropeanparliamentaryelections,LePenandtheFNcameinfirstwith24.85percent,theUMP secondwith 20.8 percent, and Hollande’s PS a distant third with 13.98percentofthevote.TheNationalFrontdidbestinthoseblue-collardistrictsintheNorththatSocialistsandCommunistshadoncedominated.UnderHollande,theSocialistswerelosingwhatremainedoftheirblue-collarbase,butHollandecontinuedtomeettheECB’srequirementsandtoemulateGermanlaborpolicy.

InMarch2015,Hollandeunveilednewlaborproposalsthatwerereminiscentof theHartz reforms thatSchröederhad introduced inGermany in2003.Theyallowedemployerstopaylessforovertime,andtodemandmorehoursofworkfromemployees;theymadeiteasiertofireemployeesandlimitedthedamagesfirmswould have to pay for unjustified dismissals; and they allowed firms tobargain with unions for a single company rather than for a sector—a bigadvantage for employers, as the experience of Federal Express in the UnitedStates has shown. These proposals sparked huge demonstrations of over amillion people, and nuit debout (up all night) demonstrations that mimickedthoseoftheIndignadosandOccupyWallStreet.

When Paris was hit with earthshaking terrorist attacks in January andNovember2015.Hollandetriedtotakeatoughlineagainsttheperpetrators.Heeven advanced a proposal, opposed by many in his party, that would havestrippeddualcitizenswhocommittedaterroristactoftheirFrenchcitizenship.ButtheattacksclearlyboostedtheFN.WrotepoliticalscientistPascalPerrineau,“AmongtheFrenchwhoaredeeplyconcernedabout theirsafetyandwhoalsoexpress concerns about immigration and Islam, the National Front has nowreachedveryhighlevels.”

In December, France held regional elections—roughly equivalent tostatehouse elections in the United States. And voters once again repudiatedHollandeand thePS. In the first round,LePenand theFNcame in firstwith27.73percent, theRepublicans (the successor of theUMP) secondwith 26.65percent,andthePSthirdwith23.12percent.Inthesecondround,theSocialists

andRepublicansagreedtoendorsewhicheveroftheircandidatesstoodthebestchanceofdefeatingtheFNcandidate.Thestrategyworked.TheFNdidn’twinanyregionalpresidencies,althoughitgotalmost7millionvotesandwonmanylesser regional offices. The Socialist Party, which had dominated regionalgovernments,lost15regionalpresidencies.

Perrineau, using extensive polls taken immediately after ISIS attacks inNovember,contendedthattheFNwasexpandingbeyondthesmallshopkeepersin thesouthand theblue-collarworkers in thenorth.Byhisestimates, theFNwasbackedby35percentoftheself-employed,41percentofofficeworkersand46percentofblue-collarworkers.Inaddition,FNhadbrokenthroughamongthepublic sector workers who had always been the bastion of Socialist Partysupport.According to Perrineau, FNwas getting 30 percent of theseworkers,who, he explained, were reacting to “the difficulties public servants confrontwithimmigrantpeopleinthepublichospitalsandotherpublicfacilities.”

PoliticalscientistLaurentBouvetattributedtheFN’sgrowingsupportamongtheFrenchmiddleclasstothatclass’sconvictionthatithastopayfor—literallyand figuratively—the burden migrants put on French social services. Bouvetsaid, “The middle class is stuck in the middle, and they have to pay for theunemployed and themigrants. The public services, the social protections, thehospitals,theuniversities,arefallingapart.Theyarepayingmoreandaregettingless.Andtheydon’tseethoseatthetopofthesocietymakingsacrifices.Theycan always put their children in the best schools. The parties have nothing tooffer,bloodandtears,moretaxes,lesssocialbenefits,lessjobs.”

After theelection,Hollande’sapprovalratingstoodatahistoricallylow15percent.Withthepresidentialelectionsloominginthespringof2017,HollandeandtheFrenchSocialistswereindisarray.SomeSocialistPartymemberscalledfor a general “primary of the left,”whichwould include some of the smallerleftwingparties,tochooseanoverallcandidate.WithinthePS,Hollandemaybechallenged from both the right and the left. FrédéricMartel, a writer who isadvisingacandidateontheSocialistleft,said,“ThereisnothingsocialistintheSocialistPartyanymore.Itsbaseismainlycivilservantswithlifetimejobs,thenewbourgeois of the left, people attracted for somethingother than economicreasonssuchasgaymarriage.”

Party loyalists blamedHollande’s ineptitude for theSocialists’ decline, buttheFrenchSocialistswerefollowingthesamedownwardslopingpathasseveralother Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labour parties in the EU, includingPASOK in Greece and Britain’s Labour Party. All these parties have had

difficultydealingwithEurope’sdownturnandwiththeGreatRecession.AndinFrance,aclearbeneficiarywastheNationalFront.

CalmFranceThe question now is whether Marine Le Pen can win the 2017 presidentialelections.ÉricZemmour,aconservativecolumnistforFigaroandtheauthorofthe best-selling Suicide Francais, says, “The French elite want to push thecountry to be part of a European empire. The workers want to keep Francenational.Theelitewant them to forget theoldFrance. It isawarbetween theelite and the people. Seventy percent of the French people want a solutionagainstIslamandforeigners,butseventypercentdon’twanttheNationalFronttocometopower.”WhenpeoplethinkoftheFN,Zemmourexplained,theyhave“afearofcivilwar,fearoftheendofdemocracy,andfearofincompetence.”

Zemmour’s percentages may exaggerate the obstacles the FN faces inwinningoveramajority,butas theDecember regionalelectionsshowed, thereare currently limits to its support, even among those who back its stands onimmigration and Islam.Marine Le Pen and her circle of advisors, headed byPhilippot,havesoughttoshifttheparty’semphasisawayfromimmigrationandIslam to economics and Euroskepticism. Le Pen applauded Britain’s vote onleavingtheEU,andcalledforasimilarreferenduminFrance.

WhenIinterviewedSébastienChenu,whoisthoughttobeinlinetorunLePen’s presidential campaign, he said he was attracted by the party’sEuroskepticismandbyLePen’srefusaltoopposegaymarriage.Hedidn’tevenmentionimmigrationorrefugeesuntilabouthalfwaythroughtheinterview,andwhen I askedhim specifically about theparty’s stand,he lamented theparty’sdemonization on the issue. “We are not going to throw away peoplewho areimmigrants,”hesaid.HealsorejectedanycomparisonbetweenMarineLePenandDonaldTrump.“Wedon’tfeelclosetohim,”hesaid.“TakeouttheTandR,andyouhaveUMP.”

But the party’s active voters are still driven primarily by opposition toimmigrationandIslam.InFebruary,IattendedaregionalconventionoftheFNinHenin-Beaumontand interviewedseveralof the localFN leadersaswell assomeoftherankandfile.WhenIaskedthemwhytheyhadjoinedtheFN,theyinvariably mentioned immigration first. Municipal councilor Antoine Golliot

said,“ItwasthefightagainstimmigrationthatwasthemainthingthatattractedmetotheFN.Thatiswherethedangercomesfrom.”WhenIaskedhimwhethertheFNattractedformersocialistsandcommunists,hesaid,“Wedrawsomefromtherightandsomefromtheleft,butoverallfrombothsides.Whatdrawspeoplethemostisimmigration.”

In the south, theparty’sbaseamong smallbusiness andelderly retains theFN’solderlibertariananti-taxeconomicsandisskepticalofPhilippot’sleftwingnationalism.Theparty’sCatholicsinthesouth,includingLePen’snieceMarionMaréchalLePen,whoisamemberofparliamentandtheparty’svicepresident,areuncomfortablewithMarineLePen’scosmopolitanoutlookonabortionandgay marriage. Several of her key advisors, including Philippot and SébastienChenu, are gay,which prompted her father to rail against his daughter’s “gaylobby.”MarionMarechalLePen and those close to her also rejectPhilippot’semphasis on economic nationalism. “Unemployment is in third place behindsecurityandidentity,”shehassaid.“Afatherisafraidofhisdaughterwearingaburqa.Itdoesn’tmatterwhethershewillbuyitwithfrancsoreuros.”AftertheNice attack,Marine Le Pen singled out “Islamist fundamentalism,” while hernieceframedtheissueasChristiansversusMuslims.“ChristiansmuststanduptoresistIslam,”shedeclared.

Buteveninthefaceofoppositionfromwithin,LePenandheradvisorsaredetermined to soften her image. In January, the FN unveiled a new campaignposter.ItshowedawistfulLePenlookingoutfromaruralbackground.Itwastitledinlargewhiteblockletters,LaFranceApaisee,meaning“CalmFrance”or“FranceCalmedDown.”TheposterrecallsMitterrand’s1981poster,whichreadForce Tranquille, or a “calming force.” Both posters were meant to reassurevoters that the candidateswere not extremistswhowould threaten democracyandpublicorder.

ForLePen,suchanapproachcarriestheriskofdilutingtheparty’spopulistmessageanddistancingherselftoofarfromherparty’sbase.Bouvetsays,“Thiskind of slogan is that of a regular politician. If she starts to be the usualpolitician,shewilllosewhatisinterestinginher—herabilitytobreakthroughtodisruptthesystem.”ButLePenisdetermined,asthe2017presidentialelectionnears,thattheFNbeseenasa“partylikeanyother.”

ThePastandFutureofPopulism

DonaldTrump’scampaignintheUnitedStates,therightwingpopulistpartiesinEurope, and even the left-center Five Star Movement have repeatedly beenlikenedtothefascistsofthe1920s.FormerLaborSecretaryRobertReichtitlesacolumn,“DonaldTrump:AmericanFascist.”“Yes,DonaldTrumpisafascist,”JamilSmithdeclaresinTheNewRepublic.GermanFinanceMinisterWolfgangSchaeuble described the National Front as “not a rightwing party but . . . afascist, extremist party.” Dutch philosopher Rob Rieman accused GeertWilders’sFreedomPartyofbeinga“fascistmovement.”TheBritishSpectatordescribedBeppeGrilloas“Italy’sNewMussolini.”Examplesabound.

The term “fascism” is like the term “populism.” It is hard to pick out acollectionofcharacteristicsthatexclusivelydefineafascistmovementorparty.TheNaziParty scapegoated an out group—the Jews.Mussolini’s fascist partydid not initially single out an ethnicity or nationality. But there are certainlysome resemblances between some of today’s populist campaigns and some oftheinterwarfascists:theroleofthecharismaticleader(Trump,LePen,Wilders,Grillo); theflauntingofdemocraticnorms(Trump); thescapegoatingofanoutgroup(Trump,LePen,UKIP’sFarage,Wilders,theDanishPeople’sParty).ButtherearetwomajorhistoricaldifferencesbetweenpopulismtodayintheUnitedStatesandWesternEuropeandtheinterwarfascistmovements.

First,thetwooriginalfascistpartiesinItalyandGermanyaroseinthewakeof the Russian Revolution. During this period, it was widely believed thatsocialist and communist parties would spread the revolution westward. Thefascists’andNazis’originaltargetsweretheSocialistsandCommunistsintheircountries.Their aimwasnot simply todefeat theseparties in elections,but todestroythemthrougharmedstruggle.ThefascistsandNazisblameddemocracyfor encouraging the rise of thesemovements andwhile some fascists initiallyconcealed their aims, they eventually sought to replace democracy with

dictatorship.Today’s populistmovements inWestern Europe operate openlywithin the

democratic electoral system. They have won power and lost it like normalparties.ThosethathaverootsinfascismliketheNationalFronthaverepudiatedthoseroots.(TherearerightwingpartiesinEasternEuropeandGreecethathavestill not distanced themselves from Europe’s dark past.) While some of thepartieshavecharismaticleaders,theydon’tseektoinvestthemwiththewillofthestate,butmerelytoelectthem.Grillohimselfhasnotevenrunforelection,andtheDanishPeople’sParty,whichhasnopriorlinkstofascism,haschangedits top leadership the way a conventional party would. In the United States,Trumpisaone-manshowwhose initial targetwasotherRepublicansandwhohas not built a movement around himself. He has displayed anti-democratictendencies, but they are idiosyncratic. If he has any correlate in Europeanhistory,itisItaly’sSilvioBerlusconi,notMussolininorHitler.

Second, the original fascist movements arose not only in response torevolutionary change, but also as part of the continuing struggle for imperialdominationthathadbeguninthe1870swhentheEuropeanpowersacceleratedtheprocessofcarvinguptheworldintocolonies,protectorates,andspheresofinfluence. The FirstWorldWarwas at least in part, asWoodrowWilson andVladimirLenin separatelyconcluded,anattemptbyGermany—whichequaledBritain in industry, but not in colonies—to redistribute the spoils of empire.European fascism emerged as part of an attempt by a defeated Germany toreclaimwhat had been taken from it atVersailles and to resume the quest forempire, and by another imperial power, Italy, to gain what it felt it had beencheatedoutof.HitlerwantedaThousandYearReichandMussoliniaspired torecreatetheRomanEmpire.Inthissense,fascismwasinherentlyexpansionist.

The rightwing populist movements in Europe are, if anything, opposed tosupranational formations. They want to reassert national control of theircurrency,fiscalpolicy,andborders.Theydon’tliketousetheterm“nationalist”to describe their objectives because it suggests some links with Europe’sunsavorypast,inwhichexpansionismwasintegraltonationalism.TheNationalFront uses the term souveraniste rather than nationaliste. In Denmark, thePeople’sParty’sKennethKristiansenBerth explained, “nationalismhas averybadtone,sowedon’tcallourselvesnationalist,wecallourselvesnational.”InSpain,Podemosusesthetermpatrioticaratherthannacionalista.Butinfact,asforeignpolicy analystGeorgeFriedmanhas pointedout, thesemovementsarenationalistasopposedtoimperialistorglobalist.Incontrasttointerwarfascism,

they exert a centrifugal rather than centripetal force on European and globalpolitics.

Trump,too,isanationalist.Hispromiseto“makeAmericagreatagain”doesnotentailreacquiringthePhilippinesorlaunchingnewwarsofconquest.Onthecontrary,TrumpwantstowithdrawfromAmerica’soverseasconflictsthatdon’tdirectlythreatenAmericaandtousethecountry’sresourcesinsteadtorebuilditsinfrastructure and manufacturing. He is an outspoken critic of the neo-conservativeswhowanted to create anewPaxAmericana in theMiddleEast.Domestically,Trumpwantstobuildawalltostopillegalimmigration.HewantstostrengthenAmerica’sbordersnotexpandthem.

Callingthesepartiesandcampaigns“fascist”canmakeforeffectivepolitics.Itdoesbringoutwhatismosttoxicaboutthesemovements—theirscapegoatingofothernationalitiesandreligionsandinTrump’scase,too,theencouragementof thuggery—but it is not helpful for understanding their actual role incontemporaryhistory.Calling themfascist exaggerates thedanger theypose—theydon’tthreatentowagewarordisbandparliaments.Thatmaybethecaseinthe future as conditions change in theU.S. orEurope, but it’s not an accurateview of where they are at present. If they are repellent, it is for the kind ofexclusionarynationalismtheyprofessnotfortheirglobalambitions.

PopulismasanEarlyWarningThe heated denunciation of these campaigns and parties, based on inexacthistorical analogies, makes it difficult to understand why what populists sayresonates with the greater public, and how they are pointing, howeverimperfectly,torealproblemsthatthemajorpartiesaredownplayingorignoring.By the nature of populism, these campaigns and parties point to problemsthrough demands that are unlikely to be realized in the present politicalcircumstances. In thecaseof some rightwingpopulists, thedemandsare lacedwith bigotry or challenge democratic norms. In other cases, they are cloudedwith misinformation. But they still point to tears in the fabric of acceptedpoliticalwisdom.

ThePeople’sPartymayhavebeenwronginseeingfreesilverasapanaceaor inadvancingacomplexsub-treasuryschemetohelpfarmers,but itwasnotwrong to decry unregulated finance and freight, growing economic inequality,

andacorruptandundemocraticpoliticalsystem.Long’staxschemesdidn’taddup, but he got the Roosevelt administration to pay attention to themaldistributionofwealth.Sanders’sMedicareforallorfreecollegemaynotgetthroughapenuriousCongress,andtheplansthemselvesmayneedconsiderabletinkering, but they are arguablyworthy objectives that respond to the anxietyabouttheirsituationthatmanyAmericansfeel.

Trump is bloviating in threatening huge tariffs against China or againstmanufacturers that move their factories to Mexico, or in wanting to rip upNAFTA,buttherehasbeenaproblemwithAmericantradewithChinaandwithunfetteredcapitalmobility.AccordingtoDavidAutor,DavidDorn,andGordonH.Hanson,China’s importsbetween1999and2011cost theUnitedStates2.4million jobs andparticularly hurtworkers in thebottom40percent of incomedistribution.During the 2000s, theCommerceDepartment reported,Americanmultinationalcorporationscut theirAmericanworkforcesby2.9million,whilecreating2.4millionjobsoverseas.

SyrizaandPodemosmightendupas“modelprisoners”ofGermanyandtheEurozone, but they and theNational Front, and theFiveStarMovement havebeenrighttopointtothedysfunctionalityoftheEUandtheEuro.Inthiscase,onememberoftheTroikahascomearound,butit’stoolate.InJune2016,afterGreecealreadylayinfiscalruin,theIMF’sjournalFinance&Developmentranan essay by three of its economists entitled, “Neoliberalism: Oversold?” Theeconomistswarnedthat“insteadofdeliveringgrowth,someneoliberalpolicieshave increased inequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion.” On thewebsite Social Europe, economist AndrewWatt commented, “A definition ofchutzpah is murdering your parents and then claiming social benefits as anorphan.Itisnotwidelyrecognized,buttheIMFillustratessimilarbrazennessinthecurrentdebateonGreece’sdebtburden.”

Finally,rightwingpopulistcampaignsandgroupshaveheldracistornativistor xenophobic views, but their complaints point to genuine problems.GeorgeWallace’scallforsegregationforeverwasclearlyracist,buthewasrightaboutthepitfallsofbusingchildrenofdifferentracesfromoneurbanneighborhoodtoanother. It did result inwhite flight to the suburbs andwas in that sense self-defeating.Trump,Buchanan,theNationalFront,andtheDanishPeople’sPartyhavecourtednativist sentiments inattacking illegaland legal immigration,butthey are right that unskilled immigration has tended to pull down wages andburden the public sector. Writes Cambridge University economist Ha-JoonChang, “Wages in rich countries are determinedmore by immigration control

than anything else, including any minimum wage legislation. How is theimmigrationmaximumdetermined?Notbythe‘free’labormarket,which,ifleftalone,willendupreplacing80–90percentofnativeworkerswithcheaper,andoftenmoreproductive,immigrants.”

Inadeepersense, theexistenceofan immigrantunderclasscanunderminethepublictrustonwhichawelfarestateorsocialdemocracyneedstobebased.Social democracy does not necessarily require ethnic homogeneity. But whenethnicheterogeneitytakestheformofanimmigrantunderclass,thenitcanmakecitizenslesswillingtopaytaxestosupportsocialbenefits.Bythesametoken,asFrenchsociologistOlivierRoyhaswarned,theexistenceincountrieslikeFranceof a ghettoized underclass can also be a seedbed for political extremism andterrorism.RightwingpopulistswronglylookatIslamthereligionasthecauseofextremism, and advocate the public suppression of Islam, but they at leastacknowledgethereisaproblemwiththesecommunitiesthatmustbeaddressed.

PopulismandNeoliberalismIn the United States, Trump’s and Sanders’s assault against the neoliberalconsensussignificantlyshiftedtheeconomicdebateduringthe2016presidentialelection. At the Republican and Democratic conventions, there was littlemention of the supply-side nostrums that had been a staple of both parties’economics.Trumpdidn’twaver fromthestandshehad taken in theprimaries;andClintonadoptedmuchofSanders’smessage.Neither candidatementioneddeficits in their speeches nor pledged to reduce what neoliberals have called“entitlements”;bothpledgedtobevigilantabouttradedealsandrunawayshops;bothcommitted themselves toregulatingWallStreet. In theprimaries,SandershadbeentheonlycandidatetocallforrevivingtheGlass-SteagallAct,butbothpartyplatformscalledforrevivingsomeversionoftheact.

HowmuchthisshiftindebatewillbereflectedaftertheNovemberelectionremainsunclear.IfTrumpissoundlydefeated,asseemslikelyatthiswriting,theRepublicancongressionalandbusinessleadershipwillarguethathisdefeatwasdue not only to his intemperate and amateurish campaigning, but to hispopulism. After Barry Goldwater was defeated in 1964, leading Republicansmadesimilararguments.ButinthecaseofGoldwater,morepolishedimitatorssprung up who eventually transformed the Republican Party. If Trump’s

campaigndoesspawnimitators,theRepublicanswillfaceacontinuingconflictbetweenitswhiteworkingclassandbusinesssupporters.

Sanders’s campaign is likely to have a more certain impact on theDemocraticPartyevenifhehimselffadesfromthescene.Sanders’soutlookiswellrepresentedinCongressbysenatorsElizabethWarrenandSherrodBrownandbytheHouseProgressiveCaucus,whichSandershelpedtofound.IfHillaryClintondoeswin thepresidency, theyare likely toprovidea counterweight totheneoliberalinfluenceofWallStreetandSiliconValleyamongtheDemocrats.Thatshouldleadtocontinuingconflictwithintheparty.

In the near term, however, the United States is not likely to experience apolitical earthquake that would overturn neoliberalism and realign the parties.American neoliberalism has been based on an implicit global arrangement inwhich the United States runs large trade deficits, particularly to countries inAsia,andthecountriessendbackthedollarsfromtheirtradesurplusestofundour deficits and fuel consumer demand. That arrangement could fray andprecipitate a crisis, but it remains semi-intact for the moment. The Americanworkforcewillcontinuetoskewawayfromthemiddle,butaslongasthoseinthemiddlecanstillfindwork,acrisisisunlikely.Also,theUnitedStatesisinabetter position than Europe to control its flow of immigrants, includingunauthorized immigrants. What is happening is an erosion rather than adisintegrationoftheneoliberalagenda.

ButinthewordsofHerbertStein,thingsthatcan’tgoonforever,don’t.Thecirculatorysystemoftradedeficits,recycleddollars,andprivateandpublicdebtthatsustainsneoliberalismwon’tgoonforever,andwhenitdoescease,orfrayto the point of breaking, there will be a reckoning for which the Perot,Buchanan,Sanders,andTrumpcampaignswillhavepreparedtheway.

Europe is another matter entirely. The European Union and the Eurozonewerebuiltwith thebestof intentions,butmanyEuropeanshavenotseen theirbenefits, particularly those who live in the less prosperous nations within theEurozone. The case against the Euro is not new. It was stated clearly byeconomistWynneGodleyintheLondonReviewofBooksin1992:

Whathappens ifawholecountry—apotential ‘region’ inafully integratedcommunity—suffersastructuralsetback?Solongasitisasovereignstate,itcandevalue its currency. It can then trade successfully at full employmentprovided itspeopleaccept thenecessarycut in their real incomes.Withaneconomic and monetary union, this recourse is obviously barred, and its

prospect is grave indeed unless federal budgeting arrangements are madewhichfulfillaredistributiverole.

Andofcourse,nofederalbudgetingarrangementsweremade.Fiscalpolicy,andtherevenuesonwhichitisbasedhaveremainedinnationalhands,andtomakematters worse, the Stability and Growth Pact—and its 2012 successor, theStability Pact—have drastically limited the use of deficit spending to easeunemployment.IftheEUweretomovetowardacentralizedfiscalandmonetarypolicy, as Varoufakis and other leftwing economists have proposed, then theEurocrisiscouldbeeased,butthereishugeresistancetodoingthat,particularlyin wealthier northern European countries, including Germany, Holland, andFinland.Asaresult,theprognosisfortheEurozoneisnegative.

And theEU’s other source of disunion—the floodof asylum seekers fromtheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaandfromthepoorerpartsoftheEUitselftothemoreprosperous—isintegrallyrelatedtotheEurocrisis.Partofthelogicofopen borders was that if people in one country couldn’t find jobs they couldmove to another. Large-scale immigration is the price that northern Europeancountrieshavehadtopayfortheirsuccess,andit’samajorreasonforBritain’svotingtoleavetheEU.IthasfueledrightwingpopulismandadamantoppositionamonggroupsliketheTrueFinns,theDanishPeople’sParty,theDutchFreedomParty,andtheAlternativefurDeutschlandtoanyfederalbudgetingarrangementsthatfulfillaredistributiverole.

SomeexpertsonEuropeanpolitics, includingOxfordpolitical scientist JanZielonka, think that theEU is destined to disintegrate.That’s beyondmyownpower of speculation. But I think it is fair to say that the pressures that havecreatedrightwingandleftwingpopulistpartiesinEuropewill,ifanything,grow,and could reach the point where several other countries besidesGreat Britaindecidetobolt.Ifthathappens,theEU,whichBarackObamacalled“oneofthegreatestachievementsofmoderntimes,”willsufferthefatethatformer,andfarlessbenign,attemptsataEuropeanconfederationhavesuffered.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Iwant to thankNickLemann, JimmySo, andCamilleMcDuffieofColumbiaGlobalReportsfortheirhelp,advice,support,andencouragementingettingthisbookdone, andmyagentRafeSagalyn for suggesting tome that I do abookwiththem.LarryLynn,ArthurGoldhammer,ThomasEdsall,DavidPeck,JoanPedro Caranana, Jørgen Dragsdahl and James Shoch read all or parts of themanuscript,andtoldmewhentheythoughtIhadgoneastray.Needless tosay,theyarenot toblameforwhatevererrorsormisinterpretationsI’vemadebutIwouldhavehadahardtimewithouttheirhelp.ItalkedaboutmanyoftheideaswithMichaelLind.IwasalsoaidedintheUnitedStatesonspecificpointsandon suggestions forwhat I should read andwhom I should see byChristopherCaldwell,ThedaSkocpol,CasMudde,SidneyBlumenthal,andJamesGalbraith.In France, I got assistance in understanding the politics and making contactsfrom Frédéric Martel, Anne-Elizabeth Moutet, Nonna Mayer, and MarianneNiosi.InSpain,IenjoyedthehospitalityofDavidPeckandSusanneMack,andDavidwasmy expert guide and advisor. I also got help fromLaura Tedesco,MariaDelValGomez,DanielInerrarity,andMichaelTangeman.InDenmark,IwasadvisedbymyoldfriendJørgenDragsdahl.AndIwasalsoaidedbyMartinBurcharth, Anders Pedersen, and Susi Meret. At the library of the CarnegieEndowmentinWashington,KathleenHiggs,KeighHammond,andChristopherLao-Scottgotme thebooks Ineeded to consult. I ameternallygrateful tomywife,SusanPearson,andtomydaughters,EleanorandHilary,fortheiradvice,encouragement,andforbearance.

FURTHERREADING

I argue in The Populist Explosion that there is a significant strain of politicswidelycalled“populist” thatappearedin theUnitedStates in the1880sandinEurope in the 1970s, and that it is different from conventional Americanliberalism,conservatism,Europeansocialdemocracy,andChristiandemocracy.Inanalyzinghowitworks,IwasinfluencedbythelateErnestoLaclau’sbook,OnPopulistReason(Verso,2005).Laclauportrayspopulismasalogicthatcanbeusedby the leftaswellas the right,andheexplainshow thedemands thatpopulistsmakearedifferentfromthoseofotherpartiesandcandidates.Thereisalsoausefulanthology,PopulismandtheMirrorofDemocracy (Verso,2005),edited by Francisco Panizza, which includes essays by Laclau and ChantalMouffe.Laclau’s essay, “Populism:What’s in aName?” is a remarkably clearsummaryofhisthesis,andMouffe’s“The‘EndofPolitics’andtheChallengeofRightwing Populism” counters the usual dismissal of populism by Europeanintellectualsandpoliticians.(ForafurtherdiscussionofLaclauandMouffe,seemyownessayontheminDissent,Fall2016.)

Americanhistorianshaverecognizedthatpopulismcanappearontheleftorright,fromthePeople’sPartytoGeorgeWallace.MichaelKazin’sThePopulistPersuasion(BasicBooks,1995)reflectsthisunderstanding.Kazin’streatmentofpopulism as a “language” is similar to Laclau’s view of it as a “logic.”MostEuropean studies focus on rightwing populism. That’s partly because populistpartiesinitiallyaroseontherightthere.AndperhapsbecauseofthememoryofHitlerandMussolini,manyofthesestudiesseeWesternEuropeanpopulismasathreat to democracy. I found Cas Mudde’s Populist Radical Right Parties inEurope (Cambridge University Press, 2007) useful. I also liked ChristopherCaldwell’sReflectionsontheRevolutioninEurope:Immigration,IslamandtheWest(Anchor,2009)aswellashisessaysonEuropeanpopulismintheWeeklyStandard.

ThekeybooktounderstandingAmericanrightwingpopulism,fromGeorgeWallace through Donald Trump, is Donald I. Warren’s The Radical Center:Middle Americans and the Politics of Alienation (University of Notre DamePress, 1976).Warren, a largely unheralded sociologist who taught at OaklandUniversity inMichigan, conducted extensive surveys ofWallace voters in the

early 1970s.Warren discovered a strain of politics that blended right and left,whichhecalled“middleAmerican radicalism.” It endures inTrump’s support.Kevin Phillips is another invaluable analyst of American populism, fromTheEmerging RepublicanMajority (Arlington House, 1969) toArrogant Capital:Washington,WallStreet,andtheFrustrationofAmericanPolitics(LittleBrown,1994).OnHueyLong,IreliedonAlanBrinkley’sVoicesofProtest:HueyLong,FatherCoughlin,andtheGreatDepression (Knopf,1982).OntheTeaParty,Ifound Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson’s The Tea Party and theRemakingofRepublicanConservatism (OxfordUniversityPress,2012)useful,aswelladoctoralthesisbyEmilyElisabethEkins,“TeaPartyFairness:HowtheIdea of Proportional Justice Explains the RightWing Populism of the ObamaEra.”(http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3663×343)

In describing the economic roots and ideology of neoliberalism, I wasinfluenced by Robert Brenner’s The Economics of Global Turbulence (Verso,2006).ThecrucialroleplayedbyMargaretThatcherandFrançoisMitterrandisdescribed by Peter Hall in Governing the Economy: The Politics of StateInterventioninBritainandFrance(OxfordUniversityPress,1986).Inanalyzingthe Eurocrisis and the onset of the Great Recession in Europe, I was alsoinfluenced by Hall’s more recent work, particularly an essay, “Varieties ofCapitalismandtheEurocrisis,” inWestEuropeanPolitics,August2014. I firstbecameawarethattheadoptionoftheEurowasleadingEuropeintoacul-de-sacthankstoPaulKrugman’scolumnsinTheNewYorkTimes.Ibecameconvincedof thespecial roleplayedbyGermanexportsurplusesfromthe“Appendix” toMichaelPettis’sbook,TheGreatRebalancing:Trade,Conflict,andthePerilousRoadAhead for theWorldEconomy (PrincetonUniversityPress, 2013). PettisalsohasaninterestingessayonGreece,Spain,andtheEurozonecrisis,“Syrizaand the French Indemnity of 1871–73,” on his blog(http://blog.mpettis.com/2015/02/syriza-and-the-french-indemnity-of-1871-73/).Forotherrelevantbooksandarticles,seemyendnotes.

In following European Union politics, I found two websites invaluable:Social Europe (socialeurope.eu) and Open Democracy (opendemocracy.net).Arthur Goldhammer keeps up with “French politics”(artgoldhammer.blogspot.com) and Michael Tangeman with Spain(progressivespain.com).OneofthebestsourcesonleftwingpopulisminGreeceand Spain is the New Left Review. Podemos’s leader Pablo Iglesias wasinterviewed in the publication’s May–June 2015 issue. The party’s chiefstrategist Íñigo Errejón also conducted a dialogue about populist politicswith

ChantalMouffeinthebookPodemos:IntheNameofthePeople(Lawrence&Wishart, 2016). I also benefited from JamesGalbraith’s analyses of theGreekcrisis, which was summed up in his recent book,Welcome to the PoisonedChalice:TheDestructionofGreeceandtheFutureofEurope (YaleUniversityPress,2016).

NOTES

INTRODUCTION13wellaheadinpolls:“https://www.noties.nl/v/get.php?a=peil.nl&s=weekpoll&f=De+Stemming+van+10+januari+2016.pdf

14exclusivelyinallofthem:Forthisanalysisoflanguage,seeLudwigWittgenstein,PhilosophicalInvestigations,BasilBlackwell,1953,PartI.Forpoliticallanguage,thelackofan“essence”isevenmoreobviousifyouthinkoftermslike“liberal”and“conservative,”andtheirverydifferentusefromcountrytocountry.

14andSpain’sPodemos:Myownanalysisofpopulismhasbeenheavilyinfluencedby,butisstillsomewhatdifferentfrom,thatofErnestoLaclau,OnPopulistReason,Verso,2005.

14formeragainstthelatter:MichaelKazin,ThePopulistPersuasion:AnAmericanHistory,BasicBooks,1995,p.1.

CHAPTERONE18nominationin2016:http://www.xojane.com/issues/stephanie-cegielski-donald-trump-campaign-defector

18downscalewhiteAmericans:Seehttp://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-2016-authoritarian-213533#ixzz43pWmnAgKandhttp://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2016/03/how_donald_trump_happened_racism_against_barack_obama.html

18weaknessasafrontrunner:Seehttp://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-01/what-bernie-sanders-gets-about-millennials.

21thelegendgoes:McMath,p.75.

22thegoldstandard:RobertC.McMath,Jr.,AmericanPopulism:ASocialHistory1877-1898,HillandWang,1992,p.146.

24as“bourgeois”:CharlesPostel,ThePopulistVision,OxfordUniversityPress,2007,p.208.

24JohnJ.Ingallswrote:McMath,op.cit.,p.135.

25“secondDeclarationofIndependence”:Postel,op.cit.,p.158.

25“ceaseintheland”:ThePopulistMind,ed.NormanPollack,Bobbs-Merrill,1967,pp.61–63.

26“despotism,anddeath?”:ThePopulistMind,p.46.

26“moralandsociallepers”:Postel,p.185.

26“Anarchists,andCommunists”:McMath,p.69.

26“farmerdeservesnone”:McMath,p.182.

27“oneword—nigger”:McMath,p.173.

27“foreignpauperlabor”:http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29586

30“thepeople”together:OnLong’slifeandpolitics,seeT.HarryWilliams,HueyLong,Knopf,1969.AlanBrinkley,VoicesofProtest:HueyLong,FatherCoughlin,andtheGreatDepression,Knopf,1982.

30“thegroundhewalkson”:Brinkley,p.29.

30“Mr.Rockefeller”:Brinkley,p.59.

30whathepromised:Brinkley,pp.72–73.

30“baseyourconclusions?”:MichaelHiltzik,TheNewDeal:AModernHistory,FreePress,2011,p.221.

31morethan7.5million:WilliamLeuchtenberg,FranklinRooseveltandtheNewDeal,Harpercollins,1963,p.99.

31politicallyvolatilegroup:Brinkley,p.198.

31totheRepublicans:Leucthenberg,pp.99–100.

31Longhadrepeatedlyraised:OnwhetherRooseveltandtheDemocratsinCongresswererespondingtoLongandCoughlin,seeBrinkley,pp.79–81.OrAlonzoHamby,ManofDestiny:FDRandtheMakingoftheAmericanCentury,BasicBooks,2015,p.238.

32“soakingtherich”:FrankFreidel,FranklinD.Roosevelt:ARendezvouswithDestiny,BackBayBooks,1990,pp.165–66.

32“economicroyalists”:http://www.austincc.edu/lpatrick/his2341/fdr36acceptancespeech.htm

33outniggeredagain:MarshallFrady,Wallace,NewYork,Dutton,1968,p.127.Wallacedeniedusingtheexactphrase,andanotherfellowpoliticiansaidheused“out-segged.”StephanLesher,GeorgeWallace:AmericanPopulist,PerseusBooks,1994,p.129.

34thelittlebusinessman:Lesher,p.390.

34fleeingtoVirginia:http://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=4038.

34welfare,roads,andagriculture:http://www.4president.org/brochures/wallace1968brochure.htm.

35“withoutpayingtaxes”:Lesher,p.474.

35“punkswereindiapers”:http://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=4038.

35“richandpoorsimultaneously”:DonaldI.Warren,TheRadicalCenter,UniversityofNotreDamePress,1976.p.20.

35“havetopaythebill”:Warren,p.21.

35“toobig”:Warren,p.73.

36GeorgeWallacein1972:Warren,p.151.

36Warren’sMARs:IrvingCrespi,“StructuralSourcesoftheGeorgeWallaceConstituency,”SocialScienceQuarterly,June1971.

CHAPTERTWO40freemarketliberalism:Thereisacontroversyabouttheuseoftheterm“neoliberalism”thatIwouldprefertoavoid.Seehttp://coreyrobin.com/tag/neoliberalism/IntheU.S.thereareatleastthreeusesoftheterm:1)post-NewDealliberalismchampionedbyCharlesPetersoftheWashingtonMonthlyandhisprotégésthatiswaryof“biglabor”and“biggovernment”solutionsandprefersmeans-testedoveruniversalsocialprograms.2)GaryHart’spoliticsof1984–88thatstressedachievinggrowthratherthanequitythroughtheuseofanindustrialpolicythattargetedhigh-techindustries;and3)thedominanceofReagan’sRepublicanismthatacceptedtheexistenceofthesafetynet,butsoughttolowertaxesonbusiness,removeregulations,freecapitaltomoveoverseas,andallowimmigrantstomoveintotheUnitedStates.Democrats,includingBillClinton,wouldacceptsomequalifiedversionofthisthirdversion,asLabor’sTonyBlair’sNewLabourwouldacceptsomeversionofMargaretThatcher’sneoliberalism.It’sthethirdkindofneoliberalismtowhichIamreferringinthisbook.

41automobiles,andrefrigerators:Onglobalovercapacityinthe’70sandbeyond,seeTheInternationalPoliticsofSurplusCapacity,ed.SusanStrangeandRogerTooze,Routledge,1981.

4123.1percentinnon-manufacturing:SeeRobertBrenner,TheEconomicsofGlobalTurbulence,Verso,2006,pp.108–9andLeoPanitchandSamGindin,TheMakingofGlobalCapitalism:ThePoliticalEconomyofAmericanEmpire,Verso,2012,p.135.

41ratesofprofit:Forthe“profitsqueeze”theorythatrisingwageandbenefitcostsdrovetheneoliberalreaction,theclassicexplanationisAndrewGlynandRobertSutcliffe,BritishCapitalism,WorkersandtheProfitSqueeze,PenguinBooks,1972.SeveraleconomistsappliedthisanalysistotheU.S.Forarecentexample,seePanitchandGindin,op.cit.Theovercapacityandprofitsqueezethesesaresometimespresentedasalternativeexplanations,butIthinktheybothdescribepressuresthatresultedintheendofthepostwarboomintheU.S.andEurope.

41“laborunions,andtheyoung”:JohnB.Judis,TheParadoxofAmericanDemocracy,Pantheon,2000,p.11.

41Americanfirmsfromexpropriation:Idescribebusiness’snewlobbyingoffensiveinTheParadoxofAmericanDemocracy,ChapterFive.

42plantswereundocumented:TheNewYorkTimes,December12,2001.Inaddition,immigrationalsoexactedacostinwelfarespendingforcities,states,andthefederalgovernment.AccordingtoaCenterforImmigrationStudiesanalysis,in2012,between62and65.6percentofillegalimmigrantsreceivedsomekindofwelfareassistancecomparedto48.5percentoflegalimmigranthouseholdsandonly30.2percentofnative-bornhouseholds.

4338percentfor:http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-09/news/mn-54845_1_gallup-poll.

4332percentfor:http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Globalization/AmericansGlobalization_Mar00/AmericansGlobalization_Mar00_apdxa.pdf

43“biggovernment”:SeeKevinPhillips,ArrogantCapital:Washington,WallStreet,andtheFrustrationofAmericanPolitics,LittleBrown,1994.

45riseininequality:SeeJohnH.Dunn,Jr.“TheDeclineofManufacturingintheUnitedStates,andItsImpactonIncomeInequality,”TheJournalofAppliedBusinessResearch,September–October2012.

45white-collarjobs:PeterTemin,“TheAmericanDualEconomy,”InstituteforNewEconomicThinking,

November2015.

45bottom70percent:http://www.urban.org/research/publication/growing-size-and-incomes-upper-middle-class.

46wrongwiththeU.S.economy:DanielYankelovich,“ForeignPolicyaftertheElection,”ForeignAffairs,Fall1992.

47obtaininganearlydischarge:OnPerot’slife,seeGeraldPosner,CitizenPerot:HisLifeandTimes,RandomHouse,1996.

47GM’smanagementignoredhim:SeeDoronP.Levin,IrreconcilableDifferences:RossPerotVersusGeneralMotors,LittleBrown,1989.

48it’sgoingtobetoolate:AddresstoNationalPressClub,March18,1992.

49makeAmericaworkagain:RossPerot,RossPerot:MyLifeandthePrinciplesforSuccess,TapestryPress,2002,p.99.

49“industriesofthefuture”:RossPerot,p.61.

49“biogeneticsindustry”:Ibid.

49“dictatorial”:StanleyGreenberg,TheRoadtoRealignment:theDemocratsandthePerotVoters,DemocraticLeadershipCouncil,1993,pp.II-9.

50hadachancetowin:Posner,p.322.

50asliberalorconservative:FrankLuntz,“PerovianCivilization,”PolicyReview,Spring1993.

50“theradicalmiddle”:Greenberg,pp.II-3.

50“worsenowthanin1988”:http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/1998/states/CA/polls/CA92PH.html.

50“arawdealtoday”:Greenberg,p.III-11.

51tradelosesmorejobs:CitedinRuyTeixeiraandGuyMolyneux,EconomicNationalismandtheFutureofAmericanPolitics,EconomicPolicyInstitute.1993,p.29.

51“tougherU.S.tradestance”:TeixeiraandMolyneux,p.24.

51“robusofAmericanjobs”:WashingtonPost,September9,1991.JohnB.Judis,“TheTariffParty,”TheNewRepublic,March30,1992.

52“ifnotforitspeople?”:Buchanan,PittsburghPost-Gazette,November28,1995.

52“RobertRubin’sworld”:Buchanan,ArizonaRepublic,February9,1995.

52“isn’treallyacountryanymore”:JohnB.Judis,“TakingPatBuchananSeriously,”GQ,December1995.

52“peasantswithpitchforks”:TomRaum,“LeadingaRevolutionofPeasantswithPitchforks,”AssociatedPress,February18,1996.

53realincomehadbeguntorise:https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/incpovhlth/1996/highlights.html.

54Asteeprecessionfollowed:JohnB.Judis,“DebtManWalking,”TheNewRepublic,December3,2008,andMichaelPettis,TheGreatRebalancing:Trade,ConflictandthePerilousRoadAheadfortheWorldEconomy,PrincetonUniversityPress,2013.

54hadbackedMcGovernin1972:SeeJohnB.JudisandRuyTeixeira,TheEmergingDemocraticMajority,NewYork,2002.

54newenduringDemocraticmajority:JohnB.Judis,“AmericatheLiberal,”TheNewRepublic,Nov.19,2008.

55preparethenationforanewage:https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address.

55didnotprosecute:http://www.g-a-i.org/u/2012/08/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf.

55shakebusinessconfidence:SeeNoamScheiber,TheEscapeArtists:HowObama’sTeamFumbledtheRecovery,Simon&Schuster,2011,pp.170–8.

55growthofMedicarespending:SeeThomasB.Edsall,“TheObamacareCrisis,”TheNewYorkTimes,November19,2013and“IsObamacareDestroyingtheDemocraticParty,”TheNewYorkTimes,December2,2014.

56“ChicagoTeaParty”:SeeJohnB.Judis,“TeaMinusZero,”TheNewRepublic,May10,2010.

56160,000members:ThedaSkocpolandVanessaWilliamson,TheTeaPartyandtheRemakingofRepublicanConservatism,OxfordUniversityPress,2012,p.22.

57“YouarenotentitledtowhatIhaveearned”:SkocpolandWilliamson,p.66.

57ACAasaredistributivetransferprogram:EmilyElisabethEkins,“TeaPartyFairness:HowtheIdeaofProportionalJusticeExplainstheRight-WingPopulismoftheObamaEra,”UCLAdiss.,2015,pp.74–75.

57servicesbyillegalimmigrants:SkocpolandWilliamson,p.71.

57tookjobsfromnative-bornAmericans:SeeKazin,pp.35–36.

58sendinghimbigchecks:JohnB.Judis,“DavidBratandtheTriumphofRightwingPopulism,”TheNewRepublic,June11,2014.

59from2007through2011:http://www2.itif.org/2015-inequality-rose.pdf

59somecollegeorabachelor’sdegree:https://web.stanford.edu/group/recessiontrends/cgi-bin/web/sites/all/themes/barron/pdf/LaborMarkets_fact_sheet.pdf

59“TheEconomicElitevs.thePeopleoftheUnitedStates”:ForAmpedStatus.com’sroleseehttp://www.washingtonsblog.com/2011/09/a-report-from-the-frontlines-the-long-road-to-occupywallstreet-and-the-origins-of-the-99-movement.html.OnthehistoryofOccupyWallStreet,seeToddGitlin,OccupyNation:TheRoots,theSpirit,andthePromiseofOccupyWallStreet,ItBooks,2012;EthanEarle,ABriefHistoryofOccupyWallStreet,RosaLuxemburgStiftung,2012;MattathiasSchwartz,“Pre-Occupied,”TheNewYorker,November28,2011.

61finallyundidit:JonathanMahler,“Oakland,theLastRefugeofRadicalAmerica,”NewYorkTimes,August1,2012.

CHAPTERTHREE62“protestcandidate”:https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/07/03/bernie-sanders-seen-as-a-protest-candidate-says-democratic-rival-martin-omalley/.

62“Trump’scampaignisasideshow”:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-note-about-our-coverage-of-donald-trumps-campaign_us_55a8fc9ce4b0896514d0fd66?-section=politics.

62backintotheirpoliticssection:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/a-note-on-trump_b_8744476.html.

63“personalitynotsubstance”:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/us/politics/why-donald-trump-wont-fold-polls-and-people-speak.html.

63“Sanders’sauthenticity”:PabloZevallos,Politico,February12,2016.

64recoupedhislosses:MichaelD’Antonio,NeverEnough:DonaldTrumpandthePursuitofSuccess,ThomasDunneBooks,2015.

65“I’mverypro-choice”:“InsidePolitics,”CNN,October26,1999.

65“liberalonhealth”:TrumpandDaveShiflett,TheAmericaWeDeserve,RenaissanceBooks,2000,p.212.

66“rebuildourowncountry”:http://www.npr.org/2016/04/01/472633800/4-things-to-know-about-donald-trumps-foreign-policy-approach.

66criticizedNATO:http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/03/27/trump_europe_is_not_safe_lots_of_the_free_world_has_become_weak.html

67“policethatdeal”:http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/01/donald_trump_is_the_only_serious_gop_candidate_who_hasn_t_promised_to_rip.html

67“abunchofsaps”:AssociatedPress,December2,1999.

68“politicalhacks”:Debate,June28,2015.

69“It’sriggedagainstyou”:https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donaldj.-trump-on-the-stakes-of-the-election.

70“Enterbythelaw,orleave”:Trump,TheAmericaWeDeserve,p.243.

70“Illegalimmigrationisawreckingball”:Trump,TimetoGetTough,RegneryPublishing,2015.

71“anti-elitepartyoftheworkingclass”:D’Antonio.

72“twoIvyLeaguecontenders”:Trump,“WhatISawattheRevolution,”NewYorkTimes,Feb.19,2000.

72“tryingtostopme”:http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/donald-trump-hammers-home-anti-establishment-message.

72didn’tnecessarilybelieve:MaryJordan,“AVillagenamedSyriaintheHeartofVirginiaexplainswhymanywillvoteforTrump,”WashingtonPost,May24,2016.Jordanwrites,“Severalpeoplesaidthatitmadelittlesensetopayattentiontoocloselytoelection-yearproposalsbecausecandidatesrarelydeliverwhentheyareinoffice,especiallyifCongressisneededtoapproveanewmeasure.Richards,forinstance,

saidshedoesn’tthinkabanwilloccur,justassheknowsthatMexicoprobablywon’tpayforthegiantwallTrumptalksaboutbuildingonthesouthernborder.Butshesaidthatnoothercandidateistellingherwhatshethinks:JustaboutanybodycansetfootintheUnitedStates,andthosedaysshouldend.”

74“awidespreadglobaldepression”:http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/29/gop-donor-paul-singer-says-trump-would-cause-a-depression.html.

75TheAmericanNationalElectionStudies:http://www.electionstudies.org/

75PewResearchCenterinMarch:http://www.people-press.org/files/2016/03/3-31-16-March-Political-release-1.pdf

75leavingtheDemocratsinthe’60s:SomestatisticalsitesclaimedthatTrump’ssupporterswerenotreally“workingclass”becauseonsomeexitpolls,theyhadanaverageincomeof$72,000,whichisabovethemedianincome.Buttheprincipaltestofwhethersomeoneisworkingclassoraboveisusuallyeducation,andTrump’ssupportisinverselyrelatedtothelevelofavoter’seducation.Hedoesbestamonghighschoolgradsandvoterswithonlysomecollege.Buthissupportisalsoproportionaltoage,andannualincomeriseswithage,sothefactthatTrump’ssupportershaveaslightlyaboveaverageincomeprobablyreflectstheirageratherthantheirsocialclass.

77“thatareangry”:http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-reince-priebus/.OnSanders’slifestory,seeJohnB.Judis,“TheBernSupremacy,”NationalJournal,November19,2015;HarryJaffe,WhyBernieSandersMatters,ReganArts,2015;TimMurphy,“HowBernieSandersLearnedtoBeaRealPolitician,”MotherJones,May26,2015;andSimonvanZuylen-Wood,“I’mRightandEverybodyElseIsWrong,”NationalJournal,June2014.

79“nobodyintheaudiencefainted”:Sanders,“FragmentsofaCampaignDiary,”SevenDays,December1,1972.

79“WhySocialism”:AlbertEinstein,“WhySocialism,”MonthlyReview,May1949.

79“Idon’thavethepowertonationalizethebanks”:BaltimoreSun,December23,1981.

79“I’mademocraticsocialist”:SanderswithHuckGutman,OutsiderintheHouse,Verso,1997,p.29.

80higherstandardofliving:MichaelPowell,“ExceedinglySocial,butDoesn’tLikeParties,”WashingtonPost,November5,2006.

80“twopercentofthepeople”:SaintAlbansDailyMessenger,December23,1971.

81“buytheUnitedStatesCongress”:“TheRachelMaddowShow,”MSNBC,April15,2015.

81“WhatBernieSandersDoesn’tUnderstandAboutAmericanPolitics:”JonathanChait,“WhatBernieSandersDoesn’tUnderstandAboutAmericanPolitics,”NewYork,January27,2016.

81“facilecallsforrevolution:”“ItWasBettertoBernOut,”TheNewYorkTimes,June10,2016.

82“eatouttheheartoftherepublic”:GeorgeE.Mowry,TheEraofTheodoreRoosevelt,HarperandBrothers,1958,p.101.

8584percentfrom2008to2014:Judis,“TheBernSupremacy.”

85amongcollegestudents:AbbyHolterman,“MentalHealthProblemsforCollegeStudentsAreIncreasing,”Healthline,July17,2015.

8542to34percent:https://to-day.yougov.com/news/2016/01/28/democrats-remain-divided-socialism/.

86survivethe2016election:HaroldMeyerson,“TheLongMarchofBernie’sArmy,”AmericanProspect,Spring2016.

CHAPTERFOUR88“threedestroyers”:JimYardley,“EuropeontheMarch,”NewYorkTimes,May24,2014.

89“HenkandIngrid”:TheChangingFacesofPopulism:SystemicChallengesinEuropeandtheU.S.,ed.HedwigGuisto,StefanoRizzo,DavidKitching,LexingtonBooks,2013,p.183.

89“demagogy,charismaticleadership”:CasMudde,“PopulisminEurope:APrimer,”OpenDemocracy,May12,2015.

89“ExposingtheDemagogues”:Eds.KarstenGrabowandFlorianHartleb,ExposingtheDemagogues:RightwingandNationalPopulistPartiesinEurope,CenterforEuropeanStudies,2013.Inspiteofitsincendiarytitle,thebookcontainsusefulscholarlystudiesofEurope’spopulistparties.

90“virtuouscircle”:J.BradfordDeLong,“PostWWIIEuropeanExceptionalism:TheEconomicDimension,”NBER,December1997.

91Comparingtheperiod1950to1973:NicholasCrafts,“FiftyYearsofEconomicGrowthinWesternEurope,”StanfordInstituteforEconomicPolicyResearch,November2003.

91alowly1.6percent:EricHobsbawm,TheAgeofExtremes:AHistoryoftheWorld,1914-1991,PantheonBooks,1994.p.406.MyaccountofThatcherandMitterrand’spolicyexperimentshasbeenheavilyinfluencedbyPeterHall,GoverningtheEconomy:ThePoliticsofStateInterventioninBritainandFrance,OxfordUniversityPress,1986.

93“initialdeclinefrom1979–81”:TonyJudt,Postwar:AHistoryofEuropeSince1945,PenguinBooks,2006,p.542.

95“tochangetheirminds”:http://conservativehome.blogs.com/centreright/2008/04/making-history.html.

96activelyrecruitingguestworkers:Forthesefigures,seeStephenCastles,“TheGuestWorkerinWesternEurope—AnObituary,”TheInternationalMigrationReview,Winter1986.

963.4millioninFrance:Hans-GeorgBetz,RadicalRight-WingPopulisminWesternEurope,PalgraveMacmillan,1994,p.73-4.

97numbershavecontinuedtogrow:Hans-GeorgeBetz,“TheNewPoliticsofResentment,”ComparativePolitics,July1993.

97by268,902,or520percent:http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/denmark-integrating-immigrants-homogeneous-welfare-state.

97by1991,itwas33percent:Eurobarometer,June1991,Brussels.

98tookjobsawayfromnatives:JohnSidesandJackCitrin,“EuropeanOpinionsaboutImmigration,”BritishJournalofPoliticalScience,July2007.

98MogensGlistrupfoundedin1973:SusiMeret,“TheDanishPeople’sParty,theItalianNorthernLeagueandtheAustrianFreedomPartyinaComparativePerspective:PartyIdeologyandElectoralSupport,”AalborgUniversity,diss.2010.

100“themostimmigrant-obsessedpartyinEurope”:ChristopherCaldwell,ReflectionsontheRevolutioninEurope:Immigration,IslamandtheWest,Anchor,2009,p.316.

101“ThegapwastakenupbySørenKrarup”:Interviewwithauthor.OnKrarup,IhavereliedonSusi

Meret,op.cit.,author’sinterviewwithKrarup’sbiographerMikaelJalving,andJohnTerrellFoor,“StateofIdentity:NationalHistoryandExclusiveIdentityinContemporaryDenmark,”WesternMichiganUniversityMAthesis.

101“YourDenmark”:translationbyCecillieFeliciaStokholmBanke.

101“Youarenothouse-trained”:TranslationbyJørgenDragsdahl.Textcanbefoundathttp://www.stm.dk/_p_7628.html

102incitingracialhatred:CasMudde,TheIdeologyoftheExtremeRight,ManchesterUniversityPress,2000,ChapterFive.SeealsoPaulLucardieandGerritVoerman,“GeertWildersandthePartyforFreedom,”ExposingtheDemagogues.

104by1999,47percentwere:SeeReinhardHeinsich,“AustrianRight-WingPopulism,”inExposingtheDemagogues,andKarlAiginger,“ThePrivatizationExperimentinAustria,”AustrianEconomicQuarterly,4/1999.

105“irrationalshiftsinthemarket”:CitedinDonaldA.HempsonJr.,“EuropeanDisunion:TheRiseandFallofaPostwarDream,”Origins,September2013.

107“closedworldofchancelleries”:PerryAnderson,TheNewOldWorld,Verso,2009,p.62.

107“TheEuropeanUnionwillremainutopia”:CasMudde,PopulistRadicalRightPartiesinEurope,CambridgeUniversityPress,2007,p.159.

107“anewEuropeansuperstateisnot”:Mudde,p.166.

CHAPTERFIVE11025.1percentin2012:http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/1247/economics/european-unemployment-2/

110causeofthedeepeningrecession:ThereisnowanextensiveliteratureonthecausesoftheEurocrisis,andtheexplanationIofferhereisahybridofseveral.SeePeterA.Hall,“VarietiesofCapitalismandtheEurocrisis,”WestEuropeanPolitics,August2014;HeinerFlassbackandKostasLapavitsas,AgainsttheTroika:CrisisandAusterityintheEurozone,Verso,2015;EngelbertStockhammer,“TheEuroCrisisandtheContradictionsofNeoliberalisminEurope,”PostKeynesianEconomicsStudyGroup,WorkingPaper1401;MarkCopelovtich,JeffryFrieden,andStefanieWalter,“ThePoliticalEconomyoftheEuroCrisis,”ComparativePoliticalStudies,2016;ServaasStormandC.W.Naastepad,“Myths,Mixups,andMishandlings:UnderstandingtheEurozoneCrisis,”InternationalJournalofPoliticalEconomy45,2016;andPettis,op.cit.,Appendix.

Foranarrativeoftheevents,seeStathisKouvelakis,“TheGreekCauldron,”NewLeftReview,November–December2011.

112“treasonous”:Ibid.

113Greecewillbemassivelylimited:http://globalcomment.com/loansharking-greece-Syriza-the-troika-and-the-end-of-greek-sovereignty/.

114memberoftheEuropeancommunity:ForthishistoryofSyriza,seeYanisVaroufakis,“CanGreece’sSyrizaChangeEurope’sEconomy,”BostonReview,December3,2013.

115ruralvoters:YiannisMavris,“Greece’sAusterityElection,”NewLeftReview,July–August2012.

116“theGreeceofDemocracy”:YannisStavrakakisandGiorgosKatsambakis,“LeftwingPopulismintheEuropeanPeriphery:thecaseofSyriza,”JournalofPoliticalIdeologies,2014.TheauthorshavepreciselyenumeratedTsipras’suseofpopulisttermsinhisspeeches.

116“actinglikeamodelprisoner”:Varoufakis,op.cit.

117“theTroikaisover”:Euractiv,February12,2015.

117“itwasn’ttheGreekswhodidit”:PaulKrugman,“KillingtheEuropeanProject,”TheNewYorkTimes,July12,2015.

117simplyappalling:FlassbeckandLapavitsas.

118Berlinfinanceministry:Interviewwithauthor.

119“Aruptureisindispensable”:InterviewwithStathisKouvelakis,NewLeftReview,January–February2016.

119“Spainistheproblem,andEuropeisthesolution”:CitedinOmarG.Encarnacion,SpanishPolitics:DemocracyAfterDictatorship,Polity,2008,p.32.

120inflationbegantogodown:OntheseearlyyearsofthePSOE,seePaulKennedy,“Spain:ExhaustionoftheLeftProject,”ParliamentaryAffairs,2003(56),andSebastianRoyo,FromSocialDemocracytoNeoliberalism,PalgraveMacmillan,2000.

121“Weareneitherright,norleft”:DanHancox,“WhyErnestoLaclauIstheFigurehead,Guardian,

February9,2015.

120energyoftheIndignados:OnthehistoryofPodemos,seeIglesias,NewLeftReview72;Iglesias,PoliticsinaTimeofCrisis:PodemosandtheFutureofDemocracy,Verso,2015;GilesTremlett,“ThePodemosRevolution,”Guardian,March31,2015;authorinterviewswithFernandoRomanandSegundoGonzalezGarcia.

121“theprinciplesofGrouchoMarx”:Tremlett,op.cit.

122May15movement:Iglesias,NewLeftReview.

122the“pinktide”:OntheLatinAmericaninfluenceonPodemos,seeBecquerSeguin,“Podemos’sLatinAmericanRoots,”Jacobin,March27,2015.AndonLatinAmericanpopulism,seeCarlosselaTorreandCynthiaJ.Arnson,LatinAmericanPopulismintheTwenty-firstCentury,Washington,2013.

122ErnestoLaclau:SeeErnestoLaclauandChantalMouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,Verso,1985;ErnestoLaclau,OnPopulistReason,op.cit.;ÍñigoErrejónandChantalMouffe,Podemos:IntheNameofthePeople,Lawrence&Wishart,2016.LaclauandMouffewerealsocolleaguesormentorsofseveralprominentleadersofSyriza,includingeconomistYanisVaroufakisandRenaDourou,thegovernorofAthens.SeeDanHancox,“WhyErnestoLaclauIstheIntellectualFigureheadforSyrizaandPodemos,”Guardian,February9,2015.

123“indebtedtotheworkofLaclau”:JoseIgnacioTorreblanca,StormtheHeavens,DebateEditorial,2015,p.33.

123endorsedLaclauandMouffe’sview:LaclauandMouffe,op.cit.

123stealingdemocracyfromthepeople:Iglesias,op.cit.

123leftandrightmetaphors:ÍñigoErrejón,“QueesPodemos?”LeMondeDiplomatique,July2014.

124“theirvictoryiseasier”:PabloIglesias,“SpainontheEdge,”NewLeftReview,May–June2015.

124“atthemargins”:ErrejónandMouffe,op.cit.

124socialrights,andredistribution:“UnderstandingPodemos,”NewLeftReview,May–June2015.

124Wewantawelfarestate:Interviewwithauthor.

125recoverdemocracyandsovereignty:emailinterviewwithauthor.

125unifyingsymbol:WritinginhisroleaspoliticaltheoristinNewLeftReview,IglesiasdescribedthestrategicinLaclauianterms:“Thetask,then,wastoaggregatethenewdemandsgeneratedbythecrisisaroundamediaticleadership,capableofdichotomizingthepoliticalspace.”“UnderstandingPodemos,”op.cit.

126“thenwetakeMadrid”:LaurenFrayer,“Spain’sNewLeftwingParty,”LosAngelesTimes,May17,2015.

126fromhisTwitterfeed:CasMudde,“PodemosandtheBeginningoftheEnd,”Guardian,December21,2015.

126“SpainisnotGreece”:Guardian,September9,2015.

127middle-classsupport:Author’sinterviewwithpoliticalscientistIgnacioSanchezCueno.

127UnidosPodemos:http://progressivespain.com/2016/03/09/podemos-conflict-boils-over-in-madrid-pointing-to-national-dispute-over-leadership-decision-making/.

128“debtintheEurozonearea”:http://www.izquierdaunida.es/sites/default/files/doc/50_Pasos_Para_Gobernar_Juntos_0.pdf(author’stranslationwiththehelpofGoogleTranslate).

128“sealsdealwithcommunistgroup”:http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/05/10/inenglish/1462867217_272449.html.

128192-pageIKEAcatalogue:http://lasonrisadeunpais.es/programa/.

129wouldhavedone“evenworse”:http://www.comiendotierra.es/2016/06/27/a-la-primera-no-va-la-vencida/andhttp://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/07/01/actualidad/1467402299_031801.html

129“fieldsremainimmobile”:http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/06/29/actualidad/1467185738_087126.html

CHAPTERSIX132ExplainedKennethKristensenBerth:Interviewwithauthor.

133Accordingtoonenewspaperpoll:AlexanderTange,“DenmarkConsidersMovingMigrants,”Reuters,January21,2016.

133saidReneOffersen:Interviewwithauthor.

134murdersandrapesperpetratedbyrecentmigrants:AlisonSmale,“MigrantCrimes,”TheNewYorkTimes,May21,2016.

134nineoftencities:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36362505.

135malewhiteworkingclass:RobertFordandMatthewGoodwin,RevoltontheRight:ExplainingSupportfortheRadicalRightinBritain,Routledge,2014.AlsoFordandGoodwin,“UnderstandingUKIP,”ThePoliticalQuarterly,September–October2014.

136over600,000ayear:http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35658731

136“pushBritishworkersoutofjobs”:Ibid.

145“nativeemploymentrates”:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257235/analysis-of-the-impacts.pdf.

139lessthan$45,000:http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/06/how-did-different-demographic-groups-vote-eu-referendum.

142“worldwithoutpity”:MarineLePen,ÀContreFlots,EditionsJacquesGrancher,2006,author’stranslations.ForMarineLePen’slife,seeElizabethZerofsky,“FrontRunner,”Harpers,May2016;andStefanSimons,“LePen’sDaughter,”DerSpiegel,August2006.

141“reinforcedthecaricature”:LePen,op.cit.,p.256.

143shebrokepubliclywithhim:“ChambresaGas,LePenPersiste,”LeFigaro,March24,2008.ThemagazinewasBretons.

143criticalofGollnisch’scomments:“MarineLePenReprendsesDistancesavecsonPere,”Figaro,April24,2008.

143“partyliketheothers:AlexandreDeze,LeFrontnational:àlaconquêtedupouvoir?,ArmandColin,2012.

143racistswerenotwelcomeintheparty:MathieuvonRohr,“MarineLePen’sPopulismfortheMasses,”DerSpiegel,July7,2011.

144“byallnecessarymeans”:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13206056

144finallyexpellinghim:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34009901

144“amongunassimilatedchildren?”:http://lelab.europe1.fr/debile-ou-degoutant-1403(author’stranslation).

144sheexplainedtoaninterviewer:RussellShorto,“IsThistheMostDangerousWomaninEurope,”TheObserver,June26,2011.

145PhilippottoldLeMonde:“FlorianPhilippot,”LeMonde,November1,2012(author’stranslation).

146referendumheldontheEuro:http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/Programme.pdf(author’stranslation).

146LePen’selectionbrochure:http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/projet_mlp2012.pdf.

147andParisians:NonnaMayer,“LaPlafonddeVerreElectoralEntame,maispasBrise,”LesFaux-SemblantsduFrontNational,PressesdeSciencesPo,2015,p.309.

147“Merkozy”:“HollandecontreMerkozy,”LeMonde,June2,2012.

147abandonedhispromises:OnHollande’sfallandtheFN’srise,seeArthurGoldhammer,“AsEUTechnocratsFalter,theFrenchRightGains,”BostonReview,December16,2015.

149“reachedveryhighlevels”:PascalPerrineau,“LeFrontNational,unepartiedeplusenplusnational,”LeMonde,February4,2015.

149SocialistPartysupport:Perrineau,op.cit.

150“otherpublicfacilities”:Interviewwithauthor.

150Bouvetsaid:Interviewwithauthor.

150FrédéricMartel:Interviewwithauthor.

151Zemmourexplained:Interviewwithauthor.

151SébastienChenu:Interviewwithauthor.

152AntoineGolliot:Interviewwithauthor.

152“gaylobby”:SophiePedder,“MarineLePen,L’Etrangere,”Economist1843,April–May2016.

152buyitwithfrancsoreuros:OlivierFaye,“AuFN,leSujetdel’identite,”LeMonde,June10,2016,author’stranslation.

152“ChristiansmuststanduptoresistIslam”:BriebartNews,July26,2016.

153Bouvetsays:Interviewwithauthor.

CONCLUSION

154“DonaldTrump:AmericanFascist”:http://billmoyers.com/story/trump-the-american-fascist/.

154“Yes,DonaldTrumpisafascist”:JamilSmith,NewRepublic,November2015.

154“afascist,extremistparty”:http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-elections-fascism-idUSKB-N0E71ZS20140527

154“fascistmovement”:https://www.rnw.org/archive/wilders-fascist.

154“Italy’sNewMussolini”:http://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/03/italys-new-duce/.

156KennethKristiansenBerthexplained:Interviewwithauthor.

156movementsarenationalist:SeeGeorgeFriedman,“NationalismisRising,notFascism,”May31,2016.https://geopoliticalfutures.com/nationalism-is-rising-not-fascism/.

158China’simports:DavidH.Autor,DavidDorn,andGordonH.Hanson,“TheChinaShock,”WorkingPaper21906,NBER,January2016.

1582.4millionjobsoverseas:https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/news/2012/07/09/11898/5-facts-about-overseas-outsourcing/.

159“Howistheimmigrationmaximumdetermined?”:Ha-JoonChang,23ThingsTheyDon’tTellYouAboutCapitalism,BloomsburyPress,2011,p.5.

159lesswillingtopaytaxes:SeeMichaelLind,“OpenBordersorHigh-wageWelfareState,”Salon,May4,2010.SeealsothecontroversysurroundingRobertD.Putnam’spaper,“EPluribusUnum:DiversityandCommunityintheTwenty-FirstCentury,”ScandinavianPoliticalStudies,Vol.30,No.2,inwhichPutnamdescribes,onthebasisofextensivestudies,howethnicdiversityisnegativelycorrelatedwithsolidarity.

160OlivierRoyhaswarned:IsaacChotiner,“TheIslamizationofRadicalism,”Slate,June22,2016.

162fulfillaredistributiverole:WynneGodley,“Maastrichtandallthat,”LondonReviewofBooks,October8,1992.

163EUisdestinedtodisintegrate:JanZielonka,IstheEUDoomed?Polity,2014.

ColumbiaGlobalReportsisapublishingimprintfromColumbiaUniversitythatcommissionsauthorstodooriginalonsitereportingaroundtheglobeonawiderangeofissues.Theresultingnovella-lengthbooksoffernewwaystolookatandunderstandtheworldthatcanbereadinafewhours.Mostreadersarecuriousandbusy.Ourbooksareforthem.globalreports.columbia.edu

2015ShakyGround:TheStrangeSagaoftheU.S.MortgageGiantsBethanyMcLeanLittleRice:Smartphones,Xiaomi,andtheChineseDreamClayShirkyTheCosmopolites:TheComingoftheGlobalCitizenAtossaAraxiaAbrahamian

2016Outpatients:TheAstonishingNewWorldofMedicalTourismSashaIssenbergHolyLands:RevivingPluralismintheMiddleEastNicolasPelham

ShadowCourts:TheTribunalsThatRuleGlobalTradeHaleySweetlandEdwardsTheChibokGirls:TheBokoHaramKidnappingsandIslamistMilitancyinNigeriaHelonHabila

2017AQuestionofOrder:India,Turkey,andtheReturnofStrongmenBasharatPeer