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TheProtectionofFamilyUnityinDublinProcedures

TowardsaProtection-OrientedImplementationPractice

FrancescoMaiani,UniversityofLausanne

October2019

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ProfessorFrancescoMaianiisamemberoftheAdvisoryBoardoftheCentreSuissepourlaDéfensedesDroitsdesMigrants(CSDM).Theviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthor.Thispapermaybefreelyquoted,citedandcopiedforacademic,educational,orothernon-commercialpurposeswithoutpriorpermissionfromtheCSDM,providedthatthesourceandauthorareacknowledged.Thepaperisavailableonlineatwww.centre-csdm.organdwww.refworld.org.PublishedwiththesupportoftheUNHCROfficeforSwitzerlandandLiechtenstein.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ExecutiveSummary.......................................................................................................................................5

1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................................10

2. TheDublinSystem:institutionalandinterpretiveelements...............................................13

2.1. Asylumsharingarrangementsandfamilyunity:generalconsiderations....................132.2. TheDublinsystem:institutionalaspects.................................................................................152.3 TheDublinsystem:generalinterpretiveconsiderations...................................................172.4 TheDublinrulesandprocessinoutline...................................................................................202.5 Summaryofmainpoints................................................................................................................21

3. ProtectingfamilylifeintheinterpretationandapplicationoftheDublincriteria......22

3.1 OverviewofthefamilycriteriaanddefinitionslaiddownintheRegulation..............223.2 The“familymember”definitionsoftheRegulation:interpretiveissues......................233.2.1 Therequirementtointerpretthedefinitionsbroadlyandflexibly............................................233.2.2 Therequirementtoapplythefamilyprovisionswithoutdiscrimination...............................253.3 The“familymember”definitionsoftheRegulation:evidentiaryissues.......................273.3.1 Meansofproofandevidentiaryrequirements....................................................................................273.3.2 Theadministration’sdutiestoproactivelyestablishfamilyties.................................................303.3.3 Issuesoftimelinessinproducingevidenceoffamilyties...............................................................313.4 Interpretiveissuesrelatingtoindividualcriteria.................................................................323.4.1 Thecriteriarelatingtochildrenandissuespertainingtoageassessment.............................323.4.2 The“ordinary”familycriteriaofArticles9-11....................................................................................353.4.3 DependentpersonsunderArticle16.......................................................................................................363.5 Summaryofmainpoints................................................................................................................39

4. Protectingfamilylifethroughthediscretionaryclauses.......................................................40

4.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................404.2 Shouldthediscretionaryclausesbeappliedrestrictively?...............................................434.3 Applyingthediscretionaryclausesinordertorespecthumanrightsobligations....454.3.1 TheapplicabilityofArticle8ECHRinaDublincontext..................................................................454.3.2 StrikingafairbalanceunderArticle8ECHR:generalaspects.....................................................474.3.3 StrikingafairbalanceunderArticle8ECHR:Dublin-specificaspects......................................494.3.4 Specialconsiderationsapplyinginsituationsofdependencyandvulnerability..................534.3.5 TheequalenjoymentoffamilylifeundertheDublinRegulation................................................564.4 Humanitarianandcompassionatereasonsforapplyingthediscretionaryclauses..564.4.1 HumanitariangroundsundertheDublinRegulation:onthecontinuingrelevanceoftheK

judgment..............................................................................................................................................................574.4.2 HumanitarianreasonsunderArticle29aofOrdinance1onAsylum........................................584.5 Optionstopreventorendtheseparationoffamilymembersunderthe

discretionaryclauses.......................................................................................................................594.6 Summaryofmainpoints................................................................................................................60

5. Concludingremarksandnotesonlegalprotection.................................................................62

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List of abbreviations AAD AgreementassociatingSwitzerlandtotheDublinsystem(CH)AG Advocategeneral(EU)ATAF DecisionsoftheSwissFederalAdministrativeCourtCAT UNCommitteeAgainstTortureCFR CharterofFundamentalRights(EU)CH SwitzerlandCJEU CourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionCRC ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(UN)CSDM CentreSuissepourlaDéfensedesDroitsdesMigrantsDRII DublinRegulationII(EU)DRIII DublinRegulationIII(EU)DRC DanishRefugeeCouncilEASO EuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EU)ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

FundamentalFreedomsECRE EuropeanCouncilonRefugeesandExilesECtHR EuropeanCourtofHumanRightsEFTA EuropeanFreeTradeAssociationEMN EuropeanMigrationNetworkEP EuropeanParliamentEU EuropeanUnionExCom UNHCRExecutiveCommitteeFAC SwissFederalAdministrativeCourtHEKS/EPER EntraideProtestanteSuisse(SwissChurchAid)ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(UN)ICFi ICFInternationalIJRL InternationalJournalofRefugeeLawIR ImplementingRules(EU)LIBECommittee CivilLiberties,JusticeandHomeAffairsCommittee(EU)NGO Non-governmentalorganisationOA1 Ordinance1onAsylum(CH)ODM Officefédéraldesmigrations(CH)OSAR SwissRefugeeCouncilOUP OxfordUniversityPressSEM StateSecretariatforMigration(CH)TEU TreatyontheEuropeanUnionTFEU TreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionUN UnitedNationsUNGA UNGeneralAssemblyUNHCR UNHighCommissionerforRefugees

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Executive Summary Thereisconsiderabletension,inpractice,betweentheoperationoftheDublinsystemandtheprotectionoffamilyunity.However,ifproperlyinterpretedandapplied,theDublinIIIRegulation could afford comprehensiveprotection to the families of those towhom itapplies.InkeepingwiththeprincipleofhomogeneousinterpretationoftheDublinacquis,Swissauthoritiesshouldtakeintoaccountthecase-lawoftheCJEU.TheymustalsorespectatalltimestherelevantinternationalstandardsincludingtheGenevaConvention,theCAT,theCRCandtheECHR,inlightofthecase-lawoftherespectivemonitoringbodies.InkeepingwiththepreambleoftheDublinIIIRegulation,andasattestedbythecase-lawoftheCJEUsincetheGhezelbashjudgment,humanrightsshouldbemainstreamedfullyinDublin practice. Recital 14DR III specifically requires that respect for family life be a“primaryconsideration”.Thisimpliesthat:

• Family-relatedprovisionsof theRegulationshouldbe interpretedasbroadlyaspossible,withoutundueformalism;

• In all the situations where the interest in family unity is balanced against

competinginterests,considerableweightshouldbeaffordedtoit;

• The decision-making process should include an evaluation of the impact ofprospectivedecisionsonfamilylife.

Under the Regulation and other applicable standards, family-related aspects must beexaminedatall thestagesoftheDublinprocess. Intakechargeprocedures, thefamilycriteriamustbeexaminedfirstandtheirapplicabilitymustbepositivelyexcludedbeforelower-rankingcriteriaareevenconsidered.Furthermore,whenevertheapplicationofthecriteria or any other action under the Regulation (e.g. take back transfer) wouldnegativelyaffect family life, thequestionofwhetheraderogation is called for is tobeexaminedinlightoftherelevanthumanrightsstandards–especiallyArticle8ECHR–aswellasofhumanitarianandcompassionatereasons.As the European Commission has recommended, “Member States […] should […]proactivelyandconsistentlyapplytheclausesrelatedtofamilyreunification”.1Thefamilydefinitionsgivenby theRegulationshouldbereadandapplied inabroadand flexiblemanner.Formaritalandparentalrelationships,inparticular,Article2(g)DRIIIsetsnorequirementastofactualintensityorstability,requiringonlythattheallegedfamilytieexistattherelevanttime.The“validity”ofmaritalunionsshouldalsobeassessedinanon-formalisticmanner.

1 EuropeanCommission,CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncil,

theEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommitteeandtheCommitteeoftheRegions.AEuropeanAgendaonMigration, 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 240, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/555c861f4.html,p.13.

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InconformitywithArticle14ECHR,the familydefinitions laiddownintheRegulationmay not be applied in a manner that entails unjustified differences of treatment. Inparticular,the“pre-flightrequirement”ofArticle2(g)DRIIIshouldbeappliedasananti-abuse clause so itdoesnot exceedwhat isnecessary to achieve its aim.For the samereason, the family definitions given in some provisions call for an extensiveinterpretation:thusArticle16DRIIIshouldbeappliedsoastoincludethespouse,andchildrenborn“post-flight”shouldbeincludedinthescopeofArticle20DRIII.Regarding the proof of family ties, the Regulation lays down a number of importantprinciples.First,responsibilitydeterminationmustinvolveasfewrequirementsofproofaspossible.Second,proofoffamilyties(e.g.anextractfromregisters)issufficientandmayonlybesetasideifcontraryproofisproduced–notonthebasisofgenericsuspicions.Third, responsibilitymaybe established inter alia by “verifiable information from theapplicant”,aswellas“statementsbythefamilymembersconcerned”.Suchcircumstantialevidencemustbeseriouslyexaminedandacceptedassufficientwheneveritiscoherent,verifiableand sufficientlydetailed.Fourth, inassessingevidence,MemberStatesmusttake into account the particular difficulties that protection seekers face in obtainingformal proof. Fifth,DNA testingmay only be used as anultima ratio. Sixth, in case ofuncertaintytheapplicantsshouldbegiventhebenefitofthedoubt.Intheapplicationoftheserulesandprinciples,theinquisitorialmaximisofparamountimportance.Oncetheapplicant’sdutytocooperatehasbeendischarged, it isuptotheSEMtoestablishthefacts.Suchdutiesareenhancedwhenitcomestotheapplicationofthe criteria applicable to unaccompanied children, particularly in light of the tracingobligationsetoutinArticle6(4)DRIII.Asamatterofgoodpractice,itisrecommendedthatSEMapplythelatterprovisionsalsotoothercategoriesofapplicants.Lastly,underArticle7(3)DRIII,whichonacorrectreadingappliestoallthefamilycriteriaincludingArticles9and11DRIII,nationalauthoritiesarerequiredtoacceptevidenceoffamilytiesproducedbeforetheacceptanceofarequest.AgeassessmentshouldbecarriedoutinconformitywiththerecommendationsoftheUNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild.Inparticular,aqualifiedrepresentativeshouldbeappointedalreadyduringageassessment;identitydocumentsshouldonlybesetasideifproven false; absent such documents, age assessment should be carried by qualifiedexperts in the framework of a holistic evaluation; the State should refrain fromusingmedicalmethodsbasedonboneanddentalexamination;and thebenefitof thedoubtshouldbegiventothepersonconcerned.Concerning the interpretation of individual criteria, the following points have specialimportance:

• Asaffirmed innational case-law, thenotionof “internationalprotection”underArticle9DRIIIincludesprovisionaladmissiongrantedongroundscomparabletothose set out inArticle 15of theQualificationDirective.When a beneficiary ofprotection has his or her provisional admission replaced with an ordinaryresidence document, Article 9 DR III remains applicable. Logically, the sameprincipleshouldapplyincaseofnaturalization.

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• Accordingtoitsaims,Article11DRIIIshouldbeappliedwheneveritistechnicallypossible to run a joint Dublin procedure for the family members. In thisperspective,thefactthattheDublinproceduresarenot“atthesamestage”,orthatSwitzerland has implicitly accepted responsibility for certain family memberswithoutformallyengagingtheDublinprocess,shouldnotruleouttheapplicationofthatprovision.

• Article 16 DR III on dependent persons is not subject to the “freezing rule” of

Article7(2)DRIII.Liketheothercriteria, itshouldbeappliedbroadly inall itselements. The demonstration of a “particular dependency” or “intensivedependency”betweenthepersonsconcernedisnotrequiredfor itsapplication.On the contrary, in keepingwith the indications of the CJEU, Article 16 DR IIIshouldapplywheneveroneofthelistedsituationsofvulnerabilityisestablished,therequisitefamilytieand“legalresidence”areproven,thepersonsupposedtoprovideassistanceisinapositiontodoso,andthepersonsconcernedgivetheirconsent.Oncetheseconditionsaremet,thepersonsconcernedshouldbebroughtorkepttogethersubjectonlytotheexceptionsforeseeninArticle16(2)DRIII.

TheapplicationofthediscretionaryclausesofArticle17DRIIImaypreventthenegativeimpactonfamilyunitythatcouldpotentiallyresultfromtheapplicationofthecriteria.Thisis,indeed,oneoftheirchiefpurposes.AstheCounciloftheEUnoted,theyaiminteralia“atavoidingsituationswherefamilymemberswouldbeseparatedduetothestrictapplication of the Dublin criteria”. 2 Their application is mandatory whenever this isnecessary to guarantee respect for Switzerland’s international obligations, includingthose that protect family life. Compelling humanitarian grounds may also make itmandatorytoapplythem.Contrary towhathasbeenheld in some leading judgmentsof theFAC,nothing in theDublin Regulation requires or encourages a restrictive approach in applying thediscretionaryclauses.Onthecontrary:inlightofthestatedintentionsofthelegislator,asexpressedinparticular inthePreambleoftheRegulation,theclausesshouldreceiveabroadandsystematicapplicationwheneverfamilylifeisatstake.Article8ECHRisoneofthecentralprovisionsinthiscontext.ItsapplicationcomesintoplaywheneveractionsoromissionstakenundertheDublinRegulationmayaffect“familylife”within itsmeaning.Accordingtothecase-lawoftheECtHR,“settledstatus”ofthefamilymemberoftheapplicantisnotaconditionfortheapplicabilityofArticle8ECHR.Marital relations constitute “family life” under Article 8 ECHR even if not yet fullyestablishedinfact.Likewise,therelationsbetweenparentsandminorchildrenconstituteipso jure “family life”. Denying the existence or stability of “family life” between theapplicantsandmembersofthenuclearfamilysimplybyreferringtoperiodsofseparation–whichmaybe andoftenarewholly involuntary – runs counter to thatprovision. Inappraisingwhetherotherfamilytiesconstitute“familylife”,theexistenceinpracticeofclosepersonaltiesisthecontrollingfactor.LiketheDublinRegulation,theECHRrequiresthatinassessingtheexistenceof“familylife”,theadministrationadoptanon-formalistic,flexibleapproach,respectitsinquisitorialdutiesandaffordprotectionseekersthebenefit

2 CounciloftheEU,doc.No.12364/09,belowfn.101,p.35.

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ofthedoubtinviewoftheirparticularsituation.Astheapplicableprinciplesaretoagreatextentconvergent,andasamatterofgoodpractice,thefirstinstanceauthorityshouldascertaininaholisticmanner,attheoutsetoftheDublinprocedure,thefamilysituationfromthestandpointofboththeDublinRegulationandtheECHR,takingfulladvantageofthe procedural infrastructure provided by the Dublin Regulation (e.g. the right to aninterviewandfamilytracing).ThefindingthatArticle8ECHRappliestriggersanumberofobligations:ensuringthatthedecision-making process is “fair and such as to afford due respect to the interestssafeguardedbyArticle8”;strikinga“fairbalancebetweenthecompetinginterestsoftheindividualandofsociety”;guaranteeinganeffectiveremedyagainstallegedviolationsaswellasnon-discriminationintheenjoymentoffamilylife.WheneverprivateandpublicinterestsarebalancedagainsteachotherpursuanttoArticle8ECHRinaDublincontext,thefollowingaspectsshouldbetakenintoconsideration:

• Thepossibilityofestablishingandenjoyingfamilylifeelsewherewithoutundueobstaclesmaynotbeassumed.Onthecontrary,thestartingassumptionshouldbethat the possibilities of enjoying family life “elsewhere” in the Dublin area areseverely restricted. Evenwhen such a possibility exists, itmust be ascertainedwhether the sacrifice imposed on the persons already present in Switzerlandwouldbeproportionate.

• The potentially “temporary” character of the separation entailed by a Dublin

transfermaybetakenintoaccount,butitmustbeborneinmindthatseparationcouldinfactlastforaconsiderabletime,andthatevenrelativelyshortperiodsofseparationmayinfringeArticle8ECHR,e.g.incasesinvolvingchildren.

• Asylumseekersareavulnerablegroupentitledtoparticularprotection.

• WhenassessingthecompatibilitywithArticle8ECHRofmeasuresadoptedunder

theDublinRegulation,itisimportanttoaccuratelyidentifyandassessthepublicinterestatstake.InDublincases,theintensityofthepublicorderinterestsof“[…]controlling immigration” is arguably less pronounced than in ordinary familyreunificationcases.ThepublicinterestisfurtherdiminishedwheretheapplicantmanifestlyfulfilstheconditionstobenefitfromfamilyreunificationinSwitzerland,includingasylumgrantedtofamilymembers(Familienasyl).

• Asalreadynoted,Recital14of thePreamblerequires thatadditionalweightbe

afforded to the interest in familyunity thanwouldnormallybe the caseunderArticle8ECHRalone.

Globally speaking, in a system where the protection of family life is a “primaryconsideration”,preservingorpromotingfamilyunityshouldbethenormratherthantheexception.The obligations flowing from Article 8 ECHR are especially strong when it comes toparticularly vulnerable persons. In cases where such persons, including children, aretransferred with their family, the case-law of the ECtHR requires that appropriateguaranteesbeinplacesothatfamilyunitywillbeensureduponreception.Accordingly,

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whenthetransferiscancelledonaccountofthevulnerabilityofthepersonconcerned,therestofthefamilyshouldalsonotbetransferredsoastomaintainfamilyunity.Inlinewith theA.N., decision of the UN Committee Against Torture, the transfer to anotherMemberStateofatorturevictimseparatingherfromasupportivefamilyenvironmentisasaruleprohibited.UndertheECHRandotherinternationalstandards,thisreasoningshouldbeextendedtoothercategoriesofparticularlyvulnerablepersons.Thisisthecase,inparticular,ofchildrenfallingunderthescopeofArticle39CRC.UnderArticle 14ECHR, borderline cases – i.e. cases that fall just outside the scopeofapplication of the family-based responsibility criteria – must be subjected to carefulscrutiny, including an analysis of the comparability of the situations involved, of theobjectivereasonscapableofjustifyingadisparityintreatment,andoftheobservanceoftheprincipleofproportionality.Asnoted,humanitarianconsiderationsmaymandatetheuseofthediscretionaryclauseseven in the absence of human rights obligations. In the cases formerly covered byArticle15(2)DRIIandnowfallingoutsidethescopeofArticle16DRIII–e.g.dependencybetween mother-in-law and daughter-in-law – “keeping or bringing together” therelativesconcernedremainsaqualifiedobligationinlinewiththeKjudgmentoftheCJEU.Article29a(3)OA1mustalsobeconsidered.Itisa“may”provision(Kann-Vorschrift)andvestsbroaddiscretionintheSEM.Thisnotwithstanding,underthecase-lawoftheFAC,theSEMhasthedutytoexamineineachcasewhetherthatprovisionshouldbeapplied,toestablishalltherelevantfactsandtotakethemintoaccountinitsdecision.Thedecisionitselfmustbetakenonthebasisoftransparent,reasonablecriteriaincludinginparticularthe vulnerabilities of the persons concerned, the best interests of the child andconsiderationspertaining to familyunity.Whenon thebasisof cumulative grounds itappears that a transfer would be problematic from a humanitarian standpoint, theapplication of that provision must be considered. Finally, the SEM is subject to anenhanceddutytostatereasons.Whenever human rights law or compelling humanitarian considerations require thatfamilyunitybemaintainedorreconstituted,thismayimply,asthecasemaybe,adutytoapply(or torefrain fromapplying) thesovereigntyclause,oraduty tosendoracceptrequestsunderthehumanitarianclause.TheproceduralguaranteesestablishedorimpliedbytheRegulationandbyapplicableEUand international standards – e.g. the right to information, to an interview, to arepresentativeforunaccompaniedorseparatedchildren,andtoalegalremedy–mustbeobservedthroughouttheDublinprocess. Inparticular,comprehensive legalprotectionmustbeafforded.WhileArticle27DRIIIonlyforeseesarighttoappealagainsttransferdecisions,aneffectiveremedymustbeavailableagainstanydecisionaffectingtherightsthatapplicantsderivefromEUlaw(Article47CFR)andfromtheECHR(Article13ECHR),including theright to familyunity.Thepossibilitiesofferedby internationalcomplaintproceduresalsohavetobeconsidered.Inthisperspective,itmaybefruitfultosubjectthesamenationalpracticetothescrutinyofseveralinternationalbodies–particularlytheECtHR,theUNCommitteeAgainstTortureandtheCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild.

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1. Introduction Therighttoenjoyfamilylifewithoutundueinterferenceisrecognizedasoneofthemostbasichumanrights.Accordingly,thefamilyisprotectedasthe“naturalandfundamentalgroupunit of society” in universal and regional human rights instruments.3While the1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees includes no provisions on the issue, theConferenceofPlenipotentiaries thatadopted itnoted that familyunity isan“essentialrightoftherefugee”,andthatsuchunityis“constantlythreatened”.Inconsiderationofthis, it recommended that Governments take the necessary protective measures. 4Internationalpolicydocumentsadoptedsinceregularlystresstheimportanceofensuringfamilyunityforrefugeesandpersonsinrefugee-likesituations.5Theselegalandpolicydevelopmentsmirrorpressingpersonalandsocialneeds.AsaptlystatedintheSummaryConclusionsadoptedbyaUNHCRExpertRoundtableinDecember2017,6

[w]hen refugees are separated from familymembers as a consequence oftheir flight, aprolongedseparationcanhavedevastatingconsequencesonthewellbeingoftherefugeesandtheirfamilies.Thenegativeconsequencesimpactontherefugees’abilitytointegrateintheircountryofasylum,becomeactivecontributorstothesociety,andrebuildtheirlives.Findingandbeingreunitedwithfamilymembersisoftenoneofthemostpressingconcernsforasylum-seekersandrefugees.

Asevincedbythelastphrase,theseconsiderationsfullyapplyto“protectionseekers”,i.e.personswhoaffirmthemselvestoberefugeesorpersonsotherwiseinneedofprotection,butwhoseclaimstillhastobedetermined.Indeed,inthecaseofprotectionseekersthe

3 SeeinparticularUNGA,InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,16December1966,UNTS,

vol. 999,p.171, availableat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html (hereafter “ICCPR”),Article 23 (1); Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamentalFreedoms,asamendedbyProtocolsNos.11and14,4November1950,ETS5,availableat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html(hereafter“ECHR”),Article8;UNGA,Conventiononthe Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, UNTS, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at:http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html(hereafter“CRC”),Article10.

4 UNConferenceofPlenipotentiariesontheStatusofRefugeesandStatelessPersons,FinalActoftheUnitedNationsConferenceofPlenipotentiariesontheStatusofRefugeesandStatelessPersons,25July1951, A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/40a8a7394.html,RecommendationB.

5 See in particular UNHCR ExCom, Conclusions on Family Reunion, No. 9 (XXVIII), 1977 and No. 24(XXXII),1981;UNHCRExCom,ConclusiononRefugeeChildrenandAdolescents,No.84(XLVIII),1997;UNHCRExCom,Conclusionon theProtectionof theRefugee’sFamily,No.88 (L),1999; andUNHCRExCom, Conclusion on Local Integration, No. 104 (LVI), para (n), on the importance of familyreunificationinpromotingintegration.AllExComConclusionsarecompiledinUNHCR,ConclusionsonInternationalProtectionAdoptedbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheUNHCRProgramme1975–2017(Conclusion No. 1–114), October 2017,HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV. 2017, available at:http://www.refworld.org/docid/5a2ead6b4.html.SeealsoUNGA,NewYorkDeclarationforRefugeesandMigrants:ResolutionadoptedbytheGeneralAssembly,3October2016,A/RES/71/1,availableat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/57ceb74a4.html,para79andAnnex1,para14(a).

6 UNHCR,SummaryConclusionson theRight toFamilyLifeandFamilyUnity in theContextofFamilyReunification of Refugees andOther Persons InNeedOf International Protection, 4December2017,ExpertRoundtable,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b18f5774.html,para1.

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promotionoffamilyunitypresentsspecialopportunitiesandchallenges.Arrivalandfirstreceptionareoftentimesmomentsofgreatinstabilityandvulnerability.Familysupport–beitfromfamilymembersinflightwiththeapplicant,orfromrelativesthatarealreadypresent in thehost State –mayprove crucially importantmaterially and emotionally,especiallyforparticularlyvulnerablepersonssuchasunaccompaniedchildrenortorturevictims.At the same time, promoting family unity for protection seekers presents distinctadvantagesforthehostState.Asprotectionseekersareoftendejureordefactoexcludedfrom the labour market pending the examination of their application, the support ofestablishedrelativesmayreducethe financialcostsofreception incurredbytheState.Furthermore,theprocessingtogetheroftheapplicationslodgedbymembersofthesamefamily is conducive to theefficiencyand thoroughnessof the fact-findingprocess, andhelpsinpreventingtheadoptionofcontradictorydecisions.7Lastbutnotleast,generousand inclusive provisions favouring the family unity of protection seekers are liable toreducetheincentivesforirregularonwardmovement(called“secondarymovements”inEUpolicyandlegaldocuments).8Unfortunately,suchadvantagesareoftenoverlookedandmany factorsendupplayingagainstreunification.Indeed,forallitsbenefitsfamilyunityisfarfrombeingagivenforprotection seekers. Their residence status is provisional, and rarely if ever does itencompassaright to join familymemberswhoarealreadypresent inapotentialhostState,ortobejoinedbyfamilymemberswhofindthemselveselsewhere–includingwhenthey were separated en route. Indeed, the practical situation may be such that theapplicantisunabletolocatehisorherfamilymembers.Inthiscontext,inter-Statearrangementstoapportionresponsibilityinasylummatters–“asylumsharingarrangements”astheyhavealsobeencalled9–constitutebothathreatandanopportunity. Ifdesignedaroundrulesaiming to reunite families in flight,or tobring protection seekers together with settled relatives, they may be of great help.Conversely, if drafted or implemented with a predominant focus on different policypriorities–e.g.responsibilizing“safethirdcountries”or“firstasylumcountries”–theyriskexacerbatingthechallengesfacedbyrefugeefamilies.

7 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(EU),Regulation(EU)No.604/2013oftheEuropeanParliamentandof

theCouncilof26June2013establishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesby a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 2013 180/31, available at:http://www.refworld.org/docid/51d298f04.html, (hereafter “Dublin III Regulation” or “DR III”),recital15.

8 SeeEuropeanCommission,Proposal foraRegulationof theEuropeanParliamentandof theCouncilestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalor a stateless person (recast), 3 December 2008, COM(2008) 820 final, (hereafter: EuropeanCommission,ProposalforaRegulationestablishingthecriteriafordeterminingtheresponsibleMemberState),availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/493e8e3a2.html,p.13:“[Additionalsafeguardsforfamilyunity]willnotonlyprovideforanincreasedstandardofprotectionforasylum-seekersbutwillalsocontributetoreducethelevelofsecondarymovements”.

9 T. Clark, F. Crépeau, "Human Rights in Asylum Sharing and Other Human Transfer Agreements",NetherlandsQuarterlyofHumanRights,vol.22,no.2(2004),pp.217-240.

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The Dublin system, which is the foremost example of a multilateral asylum sharingscheme and the focus of the present study, constitutes an in-between case. The EUlegislationonwhichthesystemisbasedhasprogressively incorporatedfamily-relatedconcernsandthelatestversion–the“DublinIIIRegulation”–hasthepotentialforofferingcomprehensive protection to families in flight. Yet the implementation of the Dublinsystemhas traditionallybeendrivenbyotherconsiderationsso thaton thewhole thesystemhasimpactedfamilyunitynegatively.ThepresentstudyanalysesthevariouslegalissuesarisingbeforeSwissauthoritiesinthisarea,andproposespossiblewaystoaddressthem.GiventhatthepoliciespublishedbytheSwissfirstinstanceauthority,theStateSecretariatforMigration(SEM),lackdetail,10theprimarysourceusedtoreconstructSwisspracticearethejudgmentsofthesecondandlastinstancebody,theSwissFederalAdministrativeCourt(FAC).Reportspublishedbycivilsocietyorganizationsandinternationalorganizationsarealsoreferenced.Lastly,inordertoconfirm,contextualizeandcompletetheinsightsgainedthroughdocumentarysources,theauthorhasconductedaseriesofinterviewswithstakeholdersfromnationalandinternationalNGOs.11Whileit isfocusedonSwisspractice,thestudyprovidesinsightsthatmaybeuseful inother “DublinMemberStates”aswell. Indeed, toa largeextent it addressesproblemsobservedacrossthe“Dublinarea”12asdocumentedinteraliaintheLeftinLimbostudypublishedbyUNHCRin2017,13andproceedsonthebasisofstandardsthatareapplicablethroughoutit.Asafirststep,thestudywillpresenttheDublinsysteminoutlineand,indoingso,recallkey institutional and interpretive elements that decision-makers have to take intoaccountwhenapplyingit(section2).Secondly,thestudywilladdressthefamily-relatedDublincriteria, thehermeneuticalandapplicativechallengestheypose,andprincipledsolutionsthatcanbederivedfromapplicableEUandinternationalstandards(section3).Following this, the study will consider in the same manner the rules and principlesstructuring the use of discretion by national administrations under the Regulation(section 4). The concluding remarks will summarize the main findings and furthercomment on the national and international appeal rights through which protectionseekersmayvindicatetheirrights(section5).

10 See SEM, Manuel asile et retour, 2019 edition, available at:

https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/fr/home/asyl/asylverfahren/nationale-verfahren/handbuch-asyl-rueckkehr.html,sectionC3.

11 Fortheinsightsprovidedtheauthorwishestothank,inalphabeticalorder,KarinePovlakic(Serviced’aide juridiqueauxexilé·e·s,SAJE/EPER),ValerioPrato(InternationalSocialServiceSwitzerland),GabriellaTau(CaritasSuisseandCentresuissededéfensedesdroitsdesmigrants,CSDM)andMurielTrummer(AmnestyInternationalSwitzerland).Theresponsibilityforanyinaccuraciesintheanalysisrestssolelywiththeauthor.

12 I.e.thesumtotaloftheStatesapplyingtheDublinsystem:theEU-28andEFTA-4.13 UNHCR,LeftinLimbo:UNHCRStudyontheImplementationoftheDublinIIIRegulation,August2017,

availableat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/59d5dcb64.html.

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ThepresentstudyisacompaniontothestudyauthoredbyDr.StephanieMotzfortheCSDMandUNHCR,entitled“FamilyreunificationforrefugeesinSwitzerland”.14

2. The Dublin System: institutional and interpretive elements

2.1. Asylum sharing arrangements and family unity: general considerations To the extent that the apportionment of asylum responsibilities among States entailsphysically “distributing” protection seekers among their territories, asylum sharingagreements unavoidably impact family unity,which is predicated on familymembersbeingallowedtobepresentinthesameplacesimultaneously.Thisimpact,asnoted,maybepositiveornegativedependingonhowtheagreementisdesignedandimplemented.The very first blueprintwas put forward in 1979 by the Executive Committee of theProgramme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In itsConclusions on Refugees without an Asylum Country, the Committee suggested that aninternationalresponsibility-allocationsystembeestablishedinordertoprevent‘refugee-in-orbit’situations.15Asfortheprinciplesthatshouldinformsuchasystem,theExecutiveCommitteerecommendedinteraliathat“theintentionsoftheasylum-seeker”betakenintoaccount“asfaraspossible”,andthatapplicantsbecalledupontosubmittheirrequesttoanotherStateonlyifjustifiedbyaprevious“connectionorcloselinks”,andonly“if[…]fairandpossible”.AccordingtoUNHCR,thenotionof“connectionorcloselinks”includesfamilytieswithpersonsthatarepresentinaState,alongsideculturalconnectionsandprevious abode. 16 UNHCR also emphasized that any responsibility-allocation systemwould need to have as its central consideration “[t]he interest of the refugee to havehis/herclaimdeterminedfairlyandpromptly,inanenvironmentsupportiveofhis/herpsychologicalandsocialneeds”.17Allinall,ExComandUNHCRdocumentsmilitateforthewidest possible application of the principle of family unity, combined with dueconsiderationfortheindividualaspirationsofprotectionseekers.InlinewiththeExComConclusions,theDublinsystemseekstopreventorbitsituationsand to ensure access to asylum procedures. However, it was initially conceived as a“flankingmeasure”totheabolitionofbordercontrolswithintheEUandisinspiredbydifferent priorities: 18 preventing the examination of multiple applications, denyingapplicants the choice of the State responsible for their application, and discouragingsecondarymovements. Pursuant to the latter policy objectives, the “intentions” of the

14 S. Motz, Family Reunification for Refugees in Switzerland - Legal Framework and Strategic

Considerations,CSDMOctober2017,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a0971d54.html.15 UNHCRExCom,ConclusionsonRefugeeswithoutanAsylumCountry,No.15(XXX),1979,availableat:

https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68c960.html. On the broader context see A. Hurwitz, TheCollectiveResponsibilityofStatestoProtectRefugees,OUP,2009,pp.17-30.OnrefugeesinorbitseeG.Melander,“RefugeesinOrbit”,AWRBulletin,Vol.16(1978),pp.59-75.

16 UNHCR,RevisitingtheDublinConvention:SomeReflectionsbyUNHCRinResponsetotheCommissionStaffWorkingPaper,19January2001,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b34c0.html,p.5.

17 Ibidem,p.1f.18 Forahistoricalreconstruction,seeD.Joly,“ThePorousDam:EuropeanHarmonizationonAsylumIn

TheNineties”,IJRL,Vol.6,no.2,(1994),pp.159-193.

14

protection-seeker are not taken into consideration for the purpose of responsibilitydetermination.Instead,theMemberStatesapply“objective”,politicallyagreedcriteria.19Furthermore,suchcriteriaarenotallbasedontheapplicant’s“closelinks”withparticularMember States. Instead, they reflect primarily political considerations linked to the“progressive creation of an areawithout internal frontiers” (Recital 25DR III). In thewordsoftheCommission,theDublinsystemisbasedontheprinciplethat

responsibilityforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionliesprimarily with the Member State which played the greatest part in theapplicant’sentryintoorresidenceontheterritoriesoftheMemberStates,subjecttoexceptionsdesignedtoprotectfamilyunity(emphasisadded).20

SuchastrongemphasisonStateresponsibilityforentryorstayisratherinimicaltoafullandinclusiveprotectionoffamilyunity.TheproblemisexacerbatedbythefactthattheDublinprocessistraditionallypermeatedbyconsiderationsofceleritywhichmayendupconflictingwithathoroughassessmentofindividualcircumstances.21Largelybecauseofthese factors, there is inpracticea strong tensionbetween theDublin systemand theprotectionoffamilyunity.Still,itisworthstressingthatevenasystemprimarilypursuingmigrationmanagementobjectivescouldaffordcomprehensiveprotectionforfamilyunity.Afterall,itisamatterofhowwidethe“exceptionsdesignatedtoprotectfamilylife”arecast,andhowbroadlytheyareapplied.Forinstance,theUS-Canada“SafeThirdCountryAgreement”of2002includesanextremelybroad“familyexception”toitsbasic“countryoflastpresence”rule:pursuanttoArticle1(1b)and4(2a-b),responsibilityforexaminingtheapplicant’sclaimfallstotheStatewherefamilymembersbroadlydefined(includinge.g.auntsandnieces)are legally staying other than as visitors, or are present and eligible to file a refugeeclaim.22ThefamilyclausesincludedintheDublinsystemhaveneverbeenquiteasbroad.Still,aswillbeexplainedbelow,progress since thedraftingof the1990SchengenandDublinConventionshasbeenconsiderable,andfamilyunityhasrisento firstrankamongthe

19 Theconsentofthepersonsconcernedishoweverrequiredfortheapplicationofthecriteriabasedon

familyties,examinedbelowinsection3.20 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria for determining the

responsibleMemberState,abovefn.8,p.5f.21 AccordingtoRecital5DRIII,responsibilitydeterminationmustbe“rapid”andmustnot“compromise

theobjectiveoftherapidprocessingofapplicationsforinternationalprotection”.Moregenerally,theCJEUhasobservedthattheDublinsystemhasbeenadopted“inordertorationalisethetreatmentofasylumclaims[…]itbeingtheprincipalobjective[…]tospeedupthehandlingofclaimsintheinterestsbothofasylumseekersandtheparticipatingMemberStates”(N.S.v.SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment, Case C-411/10, CJEU, 21 December 2011, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,4ef1ed702.html,para79).

22 See theAgreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States ofAmericaforcooperationintheexaminationofrefugeestatusclaimsfromnationalsofthirdcountries(Safe Third Country Agreement), 5 December 2002, available at:https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/42d7b9944.pdf.Forpracticaldifficulties intheimplementationoftheclause,seehoweverE.Arbel,“ShiftingBordersandtheBoundariesofRights:ExaminingtheSafeThirdCountryAgreementbetweenCanadaandtheUnitedStates”,IJLR,vol.25,no.1(2013),pp.65-86,atp.69.

15

considerations that should inform the interpretation and implementation of theRegulation.

2.2. The Dublin system: institutional aspects Asnoted,theDublinsystemwasfirstestablishedunderthe1990SchengenandDublinConventions.FollowingtheTreatyofAmsterdam(inforcesinceMay1999),theDublinConvention was transformed into a piece of EU legislation with the 2003 “Dublin IIRegulation”(DRII),23thenrecastin2013asthe“DublinIIIRegulation”(DRIII)currentlyinforce.24AspartofEUsecondary legislation, theDublinRegulation is subject to–andmustbeinterpretedandappliedinconformitywith–EU“primarylaw”.ThisincludestheCharterofFundamentalRights(CFR)25and,viaArticle78(1)oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion (TFEU),26theGenevaConvention and “other relevantTreaties”.27ThelastwordonthevalidityandmeaningoftheprovisionsoftheRegulationbelongstotheEuropeanCourtofJustice(CJEU:seeArticle19oftheTreatyontheEuropeanUnion,TEU).28In this last regard, theposition is slightlydifferent for the fourEFTAStates, includingSwitzerland. These States are not EUmembers and, accordingly, they are not directlybound by the judgments of the CJEU. Still, the Agreements associating them to theimplementation of the Dublin system postulate legal homogeneity across the whole“Dublinarea”.29Moreparticularly,theydeclaretheParties’commongoalof“ensuringthemostuniformpossibleapplication”oftheDublinacquisandforeseespecialprocedurestopreventorsuppress“substantialdivergences”.30Accordingly,whilestressingthatCJEUcase-lawisnotstrictosensubindingonit,theFAChasconstantlyheldthatit

23 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,CouncilRegulation(EC)No343/2003of18February2003establishing

the criteriaandmechanisms fordetermining theMemberState responsible for examininganasylumapplicationlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynational,OJL200350/1,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e5cf1c24.html(hereafter“DublinIIRegulation”or“DRII”).

24 For an in-depth analysis, see C. Filzwieser, A. Sprung, Dublin III-Verordnung - das europäischeAsylzuständigkeitssystem:Kommentar,NeuerWissenschaftlicherVerlag,2014;C.Hruschka,F.Maiani,“Dublin III Regulation (EU) No 604/2013”, in Hailbronner and Thym (Eds.), EU Immigration andAsylumLaw:ACommentary,Beck,2016,pp.1478-1604.

25 EuropeanUnion,CharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion,OJ2012C326/02,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b70.html.

26 EU,Consolidatedversionof theTreatyontheFunctioningof theEuropeanUnion,OJ2016C202/47(hereafter“TFEU”).

27 SeeamongmanyN.S.,CaseC-411/10,abovefn.21,paras64ffand75.28 EU,ConsolidatedversionoftheTreatyonEuropeanUnion,OJ2016C202/13(hereafter“TEU”).29 SeetheAgreementassociatingSwitzerlandtotheDublinsystem(Accorddu26octobre2004entrela

CommunautéeuropéenneetlaConfédérationsuisserelatifauxcritèresetauxmécanismespermettantdedéterminerl’Etatresponsabledel’examend’unedemanded’asileintroduitedansunEtatmembreouenSuisse,RS0.142.392.68,hereafter“AAD”),Articles5-7.

30 Ibidem.A.Cornu,“LesaspectsinstitutionnelsdesAccordsd'associationdelaSuisseàSchengenetàDublin”, in C. Kaddous,M. Jametti Greiner (Eds.),Accords bilateraux II Suisse-UE et autres Accordsrécents,Helbing&Lichtenhahn,2006,pp.207-244.

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“mustcontributetoauniformapplicationbytakingintoaccountthecase-lawoftheCJEU,anddoesnotdeviatefromitwithoutseriousreasons”.31

It is also important tonote that, asRecital32DR III recalls, theRegulation leaves theinternational human rights obligations of the Member States unaffected, as also thecompetence of the relevant monitoring bodies. 32 Therefore the case-law of, e.g., theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsisasauthoritativefornationaladministrationsasthatoftheCJEUineverythingconcerningtheECHR-conformityofmeasurestakenundertheDublinsystem.ItfollowsfromtheabovethatnationalauthoritiesapplyingtheDublinRegulationmustatall times bemindful of the obligations flowing from the human rights instruments towhichtheyarepartiesandfromEUprimarylawasinterpretedbytheCJEU.Itisworthrecallingalreadyingeneraltermstheobligationsthataremostdirectlyrelevanttoourstudy:

• Whenever proposed (in-)action under the Regulation may affect “family life”withinthemeaningofArticle8ECHR,aconceptindependentfromandbroaderthanthatof“family”undertheRegulation,33theproceedingauthoritiesareunderthegeneralobligationto“strikeafairbalancebetweenthecompetinginterestsoftheindividualandofsocietyasawhole”.34Thisobligationalsohasaproceduraldimensiontoit:thedecision-makingprocessleadingtomeasuresaffectingfamilylifemustbe“fairandsuchastoaffordduerespecttotheinterestssafeguardedbyArticle8”.35Thus,nationalauthoritiesmustassessspecifically,inlightofalltheindividualcircumstances,theconsequencesoftheir(in-)actiononthefamilylifeofthepersonsconcerned.36Thispresupposes,inthefirstplace,thattheyacquaintthemselvesfullywiththerelevantfacts.

• Any (in-)action affecting “family life” must be amenable to review before an

independentanddulyempowerednationalauthorityinthecontextofan“effectiveremedy”withinthemeaningofArticle13ECHR.

• Theprotectionoffamilylifemustbeguaranteedwithoutunjustifieddistinctions.

Thus,rulesanddecisionsthatareperse inconformitywithArticle8ECHRmay31 ATAF (published ruling of the FAC) 2017VI/9, § 5.3.1 (free translation). See alsoATAF2010/27,

2014/1, 2015/19. Judgments of the FAC may be found athttps://www.bvger.ch/bvger/en/home/judgments/entscheiddatenbank-bvger.htmlbysearchingforthejudgmentreferencenumber.

32 Inparticular, theso-calledBosphoruspresumptionofcompliancewith theECHRdoesnotapply tomeasures taken under the Dublin Regulation: see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no.30696/09, ECtHR, 21 January 2011, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,4d39bc7f2.html,para338f.

33 Seebelowsections3.3.1and4.3.1.34 See e.g.L.H. et V.S. contre laBelgique, Applicationno. 67429/10, ECtHR, 7May2013, available at:

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-120614, paras 72–74; Paposhvili v. Belgium, Application no.41738/10, ECtHR, 13 December 2016, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,5859459b4.html,para221.

35 Tanda-Muzinga c. France, Application no. 2260/10, ECtHR, 10 July 2014, available at:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145653,para68.

36 Paposhviliv.Belgium,abovefn.34,para222ff.

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still fall foulof theConvention if theyarediscriminatorywithin themeaningofArticle14ECHR.37

• Wheneverchildrenare involved,be theyaccompaniedorunaccompanied, their

bestinterestmustbeaprimaryconsiderationinlinewiththeUNConventionontheRightsoftheChildandwithArticle24CFR.ThisobligationalsoimpactsthewayinwhichtheECHR-derivedrightsandprinciplesmentionedabovearetobeinterpretedandappliedwithrespecttochildren.38

ThepublishedguidelinesoftheSEMonlymentionhumanrightsobligationsasthebasisfor“exceptions”tothenormaloperationoftheDublinsystem.39WhileitiscorrectthathumanrightsmaymandatetheuseofdiscretionaryderogationsundertheRegulation,restricting their relevance to this aspect is not in line with the legislative conceptunderlyingtheRegulation.Aswillbeshownimmediatelybelow,theprotectionandactivepromotion of human rights is one of the overarching aims of the Dublin Regulation.Accordingly,basedontheexpressedintentionofthelegislator,humanrightsshouldnotonlyberespected–ifneedbethroughcase-by-casederogations–butfullymainstreamedintheinterpretationandapplicationoftheDublinRegulation.

2.3 The Dublin system: general interpretive considerations SincetheinceptionoftheDublinsystemin1990,itsbasicfunctionsandprincipleshaveremainedunchangeddespitecontinuouscriticismandsuggestionsforchange.40Thus,theEUlegislatorhastwice“confirm[ed]theprinciplesunderlying”thesystem“whilemakingthenecessaryimprovementsinthelightofexperience”(seeRecitals5DRIIand9DRIII).Article3(1)DRIIIsummarizessuch“underlyingprinciples”:

1. Everyapplicationlodgedbyathird-countrynationalinthe“Dublinarea”mustbeexaminedbyoneof theMemberStates.Thisreflectsthe“main

37 Seee.g.Abdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandaliv.TheUnitedKingdom,Applicationno.9214/80,9473/81

and 9474/81, ECtHR, 28 May 1985, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,3ae6b6fc18.html; Hode and Abdi v. The United Kingdom,Application no. 22341/09, ECtHR, 6 November 2012, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,509b93792.html,paras42ff.

38 Seebelowsection4.3.2.39 SEM,abovefn.10,p.8.40 Seee.g.E.Guildetal.,NewApproaches,AlternativeAvenuesandMeansofAccesstoAsylumProcedures

forPersonsSeekingInternationalProtection,2014,StudyfortheEuropeanParliament(EP),availableat:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509989/IPOL_STU(2014)509989_EN.pdf;E.Guildetal.,EnhancingtheCommonEuropeanAsylumSystemandAlternativestoDublin,2015,Study for the EP, available at:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519234/IPOL_STU(2015)519234_EN.pdf; F. Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation, 2016, Study for the EP, available at:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571360/IPOL_STU(2016)571360_EN.pdf;M.DiFilippo,“TheAllocationofCompetenceinAsylumProceduresunderEUlaw:TheNeedtoTaketheDublinBullbytheHorns”,RevistadeDerechoComunitarioEuropeo,vol.59,2018,pp.41-95.

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objective” of the system according to the CJEU: “to guarantee effectiveaccesstoanassessmentoftheapplicant’s[protectionneeds]”.41

2. Each applicationmust, in principle, be examined “by a single MemberState”.

3. TheresponsibleState“shallbetheonewhichthecriteriasetout[intheRegulation] indicate is responsible”. Such criteria, as noted above, are“objective” (Recital 4 DR III) in that they apply independently of theapplicant’sconsentorpreferences.42

Beyondtheseaspects,thestoryoftheDublinsystemisoneofconstantevolution.Thisisparticularlytruewithrespecttotheprotectionofhumanrightsandfamilylife.Recital9of the new Regulation states that the aim of the 2013 recast was to strengthen “theeffectivenessof theDublinsystemandtheprotectiongrantedtoapplicants” (emphasisadded).Thirteenmorerecitalselaboratefurtheronthisaspect.Herearetheonesmostrelevanttooursubject:

• Whilethelegislatorof2003maintainedthatfamilyunity“shouldbepreservedinsofarasthisiscompatiblewiththeotherobjectivespursued”bytheDublinsystem(Recital6DRII),thelegislatorof2013stressedthatthebestinterestsofthechildandrespectforfamilylifewithinthemeaningoftheECHRandoftheCFRmustbe“primaryconsiderations”whenapplyingtheRegulation(Recitals13and14DRIII;seebelow).

• While the legislator of 2003 justified processing together the applications of

membersof the same familypurelyonefficiencygrounds (Recital7DR II), thelegislatorof2013alsoemphasizesthatthisallowsmembersofthesamefamilynottobeseparated(Recital15DRIII).

• Recital 17 now recommends applying the discretionary clauses, examined in

section4,“inparticularonhumanitarianandcompassionategrounds”.UnderthehermeneuticalprinciplesprevailingunderEULaw,theserecitals–aswellasthe others that attest to the central place assigned by the legislator to the rights andwelfareofapplicants(seeRecitals18to21,24and27DRIII)–arehighlyrelevanttotheinterpretation of the Regulation.43 Accordingly, the new “spirit” of the Regulation, asreflectedinthePreamble,hashadaprofoundimpactonthewayinwhichtheCJEUitselfreadsthetextasawhole.UndertheoldRegulation,theCourtdescribedtheDublinsystemasasetof“organisationalrulesgoverningtherelationsbetweentheMemberStates”,and

41 MAandOthersv.SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,C-648/11,CJEU,6June2013,available

at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,51b0785e4.html,para54.42 Onlytheapplicationofthecriteriaandclausesbasedonfamilytiesisconditionalupontheconsentof

theconcernedpersons:seeArticles9,10,16and17(2)DRIII.43 “Theoperativepartofanactisindissociablylinkedtothestatementofreasonsforit,sothat,whenit

has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption” (TWDTextilwerkev.Commission,C-355/95P,CJEU,15May1997,para21).

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interpreteditwithastrongemphasisonefficiency–attimes,tothedetrimentoffulllegalprotection.44StartingwiththeGhezelbashjudgment,theCourthasreviseditsposition,judginge.g.thatpreviousrestrictionstotheapplicants’rightsofappealweretobeconsideredaslifted.Key in this reversalwas not only thewording of the directly relevant provisions andRecitals,butalsothe“generalthrust”ofthechangesbroughtbytherecastRegulation.Inthisregard,theCourtobservedthatthearrayofneworenhancedrightsmadeapplicantsintoactorsofthesystem,whichcouldnolongerbeconsideredassimplyasetofinter-Staterules,andstressedthefirmintentionofthelegislatortointroducebetterprotectionoftheapplicant.45Thisneworientationofthecase-lawappliestoallaspectsoftheDublinIIIRegulation46andappliesinparticulartofamilyunity.47Inviewoftheobjectofthispaper,itisworthgivingRecital14closerconsideration.Toquote it in full, the Recital states that “[i]n accordance with [the ECHR and with theCharter],respectforfamilylifeshouldbeaprimaryconsiderationofMemberStateswhenapplying [the] Regulation”. It is submitted that thiswording cannot be interpreted asmeaningsimply that theright to respectof family lifemustberespected,48as suchaninterpretationwouldmakeitredundant(seeRecitals32and39DRIII).Rather,Recital14shouldbereadasreflectingthe“mainstreaming”intentofthelegislator:

• Bycitingrespectfor“familylife”inthepreambleasa“primaryconsideration”forenforcingauthorities,thelegislatorindicatesthattheRegulationasawholeoughtto be read and applied in light of this concept. Accordingly, the competentauthoritiesshouldnotonlyavoidviolationsofArticle8ECHR,butalsointerpretthe provisions of the Regulation drawing on the methodologies and conceptsdeveloped under this provision. In particular, in line with the case-law of theECtHR,theyshouldavoidmechanicalandoverlyformalisticinterpretationsoftherelevantprovisions.49

• Furthermore,aplainreadingofthestatementthatfamilylifemustbea“primary

consideration” is that in all the situationswhere the interest in family unity is44 Shamso Abdullahi v. Bundesasylamt, C-394/12, CJEU, 10 December 2013, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,52d7ba9b4.html,paras56ff.45 Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-63/15, CJEU, 7 June 2016,

availableat:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,575ae1ec4.html,paras45ff.46 See e.g. Al Chodor, C-528/15, CJEU, 15 March 2017, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,58d545f44.html, paras 33 ff; Tsegezab Mengesteab vBundesrepublik Deutschland, C-670/16, CJEU, 26 July 2017, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,598dd0804.html,paras45ff.

47 Foranexample,seeStaatssecretarisvanVeiligheidenJustitievH.andR.,JoinedCasesC-582/17andC-583/17,CJEU,2April2019,paras81ff.

48 See e.g. FAC, E-2700/2015, p. 6. Judgments of the FAC may be found athttps://www.bvger.ch/bvger/en/home/judgments/entscheiddatenbank-bvger.htmlbysearchingforthejudgmentreferencenumber.

49 Seee.g.Abdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandali,abovefn.37.OnavoidanceofexcessiveformalismunderArticle8ECHRgenerallyseeRodzevillov.Ukraine,Applicationno.38771/05,ECtHR,14January2016,availableat:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159791,para85;Pencheviv.Bulgaria,Applicationno.77818/12,ECtHR,10February2015,availableat:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-150999,paras57and71.

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balancedagainstcompetinginterests,considerableweightmustbeaffordedtoit(seebelow,section4).

• Lastly, it is interesting to note that Recital 14 uses an expression drawn from

Article 3 CRC and essentially foreign to the jurisprudence relating to Article 8ECHR.Thischoiceofwords,whichcannotbecoincidental(seeRecital13)butisleftunexplainedinthetravaux,arguablyindicatestheintentionofthelegislatortotransposetofamilymattersthe“bestinterest”approachdevelopedundertheCRC.Onthisreading,respectforfamilylifeshouldbetreatedasa“threefoldconcept”wheninterpretingandapplyingtheRegulation:(a)asasubstantiveright inthesense just described – i.e. the right to have family life assessed and taken as a“primaryconsideration”bythecompetentauthorities;(b)asaninterpretivelegalprinciplecommandingthatlegalprovisionsopentomorethanoneinterpretationbereadinthesensethatmosteffectivelyservestheprotectionoffamilylife;(c)asa rule of procedure requiring that the decision-making process include anevaluationoftheimpactofprospectivedecisionsonfamilylife–andbeforethat,requiringthatfamilylifebecorrectlyidentifiedbytheauthorities.50

2.4 The Dublin rules and process in outline TheDublinRegulationestablishestherulesfordeterminingwhichStateisresponsibleforan applicant, defines the content and extent of said responsibility – including theobligationsto“takecharge”ofapplicantsandto“take”them“back”shouldtheymovetoanotherMemberState–andlaysdowntheattendantevidentiaryandproceduralrules.ProvidingadetaileddescriptionoftheDublinRegulationandprocedure isbeyondthescopeof thisstudy.51What followsisratherareminderof thekeypoints,whereasthenext sections are devoted to a detailed analysis of family-related provisions and theinterpretiveandapplicativeissuestheygiveriseto.ThefirststepintheDublinprocess,whetherSwitzerlandisdeterminingresponsibilityorwhether it is the recipient of a “take charge” request, is to examine the responsibilitycriteria.52MostofthesearefoundinChapterIIIoftheRegulation.“ChapterIIIcriteria”applyonthebasisofthefactualsituationexistingatthedatewhenthefirstapplicationforprotectionislodgedwithaMemberState(“freezing”or“petrification”clause:Article7(2)DRIII).Theyarehierarchicallyrankedandmustinprinciplebeappliedintheorderin which they are set out (Article 7(1) DR III). Thus, the proceeding authority must

50 SeemutatismutandisUNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild,GeneralcommentNo.14(2013)onthe

rightofthechildtohavehisorherbestintereststakenasaprimaryconsideration(art.3,para.1),29May2013,CRC/C/GC/14,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/51a84b5e4.html.Notethatthis threefold obligation can to a large extent be derived directly fromArticle 8 ECHR (see abovesection2.2).

51 ForafullanalysisseeC.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24;C.Hruschka,F.Maiani,abovefn.24.Foracomprehensive analysis of Swiss jurisprudence under the Dublin system, see J.-P. Monnet, “Lajurisprudence du Tribunal fédéral en matière de transferts Dublin”, in S. Breitenmoser, S. Gless,O.Lagodny,SchengenundDublinindiePraxis–AktuelleFragen,Dike/Nomos,2015,pp.359-439.

52 In“takeback”procedures,thecriteriaplayonlyamarginalrole:seeH.andR.,JoinedCasesC-582/17andC-583/17,abovefn.47,paras80ff.

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examine the higher-ranking criteria, and come to the conclusion that they are notapplicable,beforeevenconsideringlower-rankingcriteria.In thisregard, it isworthpointingout that thecriteriabasedon family ties (hereafter“familycriteria”)areplacedatthetopofthehierarchyandmustbeexaminedbeforethecriteriabasedondocumentation,entryorstay.Itfollowsthattheproceedingauthoritymaynotsendout“takecharge”requestsbasedon lower-rankingcriteriauponfindingrelevantevidence(e.g.aEurodac“hit”indicatingirregularentryfromanotherMemberState) before seeking and considering evidence that could make the family criteriaapplicable. Such a course would be in clear violation of the Regulation and wouldundermine the legislative choice of giving priority to family unity. 53 ResponsibilityallocationmayalsooccurbasedoncriteriaplacedoutsideofChapterIII:Article16DRIIIon“Dependentpersons”,basedonfamilyties,andArticle3(2)DRIII,whichlaysdownthecriterionthatappliesbydefaultwhenalltheothersareinapplicable.Article22DRIIIlaysdowntherelevantevidentiarystandards.Alltheseaspectsareexaminedinsection3,totheextentthattheyconcernfamilyunity.Examinationofthecriteriadoesnotconcludetheprocessorresponsibilitydetermination.Indeed,the“discretionaryclauses”ofArticle17DRIIImakeitpossibleforMemberStatestoderogatefromthecriteriaandotherruleslaiddownbytheRegulation.Whenevertheapplicationofthecriteriawouldnegativelyaffectfamilylife,thequestionofwhetheraderogationiscalledformustbeexaminedinlightoftherelevanthumanrightsstandardsaswellasofhumanitarianandcompassionatereasons.54Thequestion,itshouldbenoted,mayariseatanystageoftheDublinprocessandnotonlyat“takecharge”stage.Theseaspectsareanalysedinsection4.Throughouttheprocedure,theapplicantsenjoyawholerangeofproceduralguarantees:the right to be informed, including on the possibility of submitting family-relatedinformationandrequests(Article4DRIII);therighttoapersonalinterview,whichmayonlybeomittedinexceptionalcircumstances(Article5DRIII);therighttoasuspensivejudicial remedyagainst transferdecisions, coveringall issuesof lawarisingunder theRegulationorhumanrightsstandardsaswellasissuesoffact(Articles26and27DRIII);therighttolegalandlinguisticassistance(Article27(5)and(6)DRIII).Unaccompaniedand/orseparatedchildrenmustalsobegivenaqualifiedrepresentative,andbenefit fromfamily tracing(Article6DRIII).Thesemattersarenotconsidered indepth in the present study. However, section 5 includes some observations on thenationalandinternationalremediesavailabletoprotectionseekers.

2.5 Summary of main points SwissauthoritiesmustinterprettheDublinRegulationinconformitywiththeEUCharterof Fundamental Rights and relevant international instruments including the Geneva

53 SeeUNHCR,LeftinLimbo,abovefn.13,p.43.SeealsoFAC,D-2987/2019.54 J.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.429f.

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Convention,theCAT,theCRCandtheECHR.Theymustdulytakeintoaccountthecase-lawoftheCJEU,oftheECtHR,andofotherrelevantmonitoringbodies.Human rights should be mainstreamed in every aspect of the interpretation andapplicationoftheDublinRegulation.Inparticular,Recital14DRIIIspecificallyrequiresthatrespectforfamilylifebea“primaryconsideration”.Thisimpliesthat:

• Family-related provisions of the Regulation should be interpreted and appliedwithoutundueformalism,andinthewaythatbestservesfamilyunity;

• In all the situations where the interest to family unity is balanced against

competinginterests,considerableweightmustbeaffordedtoit;

• The decision-making process should include an evaluation of the impact ofprospectivedecisionsonfamilylife.

Family-relatedaspectsmustbeexaminedatallthestagesoftheDublinprocess.Intakechargeprocedures,thefamilycriteriamustbeexaminedfirstandtheirapplicabilitymustbepositivelyexcludedbeforelower-rankingcriteriaareevenconsidered.Furthermore,whenevertheapplicationofthecriteriaoranyotheractionundertheRegulation(e.g.takebacktransfer)wouldnegativelyaffectfamilylife,thequestionofwhetheraderogationiscalledformustbeexaminedinlightoftherelevanthumanrightsstandards–especiallyArticle8ECHR–aswellasofhumanitarianandcompassionatereasons.TheproceduralguaranteesestablishedorimpliedbytheRegulation–e.g.therighttoinformation,toaninterview, toarepresentative forunaccompaniedorseparatedchildren,andtoa legalremedy–mustbeobservedthroughout.

3. Protecting family life in the interpretation and application of the Dublin criteria

3.1 Overview of the family criteria and definitions laid down in the Regulation Articles8-11,16and20(3)DRIIIassignresponsibilitytoMemberStatesbasedonthepresence,ontheirterritory,offamilyrelationsoftheapplicant.Thescopeofthesecriteriaisvariouslycircumscribedbyreferenceto(a)thenatureof thefamilytiesconsidered;(b)themomentwhenthetiewasformed;(c)thestatusoftheapplicant’sfamilyrelationattherelevanttime.The“freezingclause”,examinedabove,canalsoactasanimportantlimitationasitpreventstheauthoritiesfromtakingintoaccountsituationsarisingafterthefirstapplicationislodgedwithaMemberState–includingthecreationoffamilyties,ortheacquisitionofthe“right”statusbythefamilymember.55Article2(g)DR IIIgives thebasicdefinitionof “familymembers”applicableunder theRegulation.Thisdefinitionincludesthespouseorunmarriedpartneroftheapplicant,56unmarriedminorchildrenand,iftheapplicantisanunmarriedminor,thefather,mother,55 Seee.g.ATAF2013/24,§4.3;J.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.431-432.56 Thepartnerisincludedonlyifina“stablerelation”,andifnationallawsorpracticesconcerningthird

countrynationalstreatunmarriedcouplescomparablytomarriedcouples.

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or other adult responsible. Such family links are covered only “insofar as the familyalreadyexistedinthecountryoforigin”(hereafter,“pre-flightrequirement”).Thebasic definition is variouslymodified or complementedby the individual criteria,which also provide for the status limitations referred to above. Thus Article 8 DR IIIforesees that unaccompanied child applicants are to be assigned to theMember Statewhere“familymembers”,57siblingsor“relatives”58are“legallypresent”.Article9DRIIIforesees the reuniting of the applicantwith familymemberswho are beneficiaries ofinternational protection in a Member State, “regardless of whether the family waspreviouslyformedinthecountryoforigin”.Article10DRIII–theonlyprovisiontoapplythedefinitionofArticle2(g)DRIIIwithoutanyalterations–foreseesthereunitingoftheapplicant and “family members” who are themselves applicants waiting for the firstdecisionconcerningthesubstanceof theirclaim.Article11DRIIIprovides for“familymembers”orminorunmarriedsiblingsapplyingatornearlyatthesametimeinthesameStatetobekepttogether.Article20(3)DRIIIprescribesthatthesituationofapplicantsand children accompanying them shall be indissociable, provided they are “familymembers”orthechildisbornaftertheapplicantarrivesinaMemberState.Lastly,Article16 DR III relies on an entirely different definition of family as it foresees keeping orbringingtogethertheapplicantandhischild(regardlessofage),siblingorparentthatis“legallyresident”inaMemberState,whenthereisalinkofdependencyforanumberofspecifiedcauses,andprovidedthatthefamilyalreadyexistedinthecountryoforigin.Inkeepingwiththe interpretiveprinciplesoutlinedinsection2, thecriteriashouldbeappliedbroadly.AstheCommissionitselfrecommended,“MemberStates[…]should[…]proactivelyandconsistentlyapplytheclausesrelatedtofamilyreunification”(emphasisadded).59In practice, the biggest challenge confronting applicants invoking the family criteriabeforeSwissauthoritiesisthatofhavingtheirfamilytiesrecognizedasrelevant.Themainobstacles in this regard are a rigid interpretation of the relevant family definitions(section3.2)andthetendencyoftheadministrationtodisregardordenytheexistenceoffamilytiesonevidentiarygrounds(section3.3).Furtherissuesariseintheinterpretationoftheindividualcriteria,andareexaminedbelowinsection3.4.

3.2 The “family member” definitions of the Regulation: interpretive issues

3.2.1 The requirement to interpret the definitions broadly and flexibly Themultiplerelationsbetweenthedefinitionsof“family”givenbytheRegulationandthenotionof“familylife”underArticle8ECHRareanimportantfactortobeconsideredwheninterpretingandapplyingtheRegulation.

57 Notethattheruleappliesalsotothemother,father,adultresponsible,orsiblingofamarriedchild

whosespouseisnotlegallypresentinaMemberState.58 I.e.adultaunts,unclesorgrandparents.Article8DRIIIaddstheconditionthatsuchrelativesmustbe

capableof“tak[ing]careof[the]applicant”.59 EuropeanCommission,AEuropeanAgendaonMigration,abovefn.1,p.13.

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• First,thereisconsiderableoverlap.“Familylife”readilyincludesallthefamilytiescovered by Article 2(g) DR III. Depending on the circumstances, it may alsoencompasstheextendedfamilytiesconsideredelsewhereintheRegulation.60Inpractice,oneshouldstart fromtheassumptionthat“family life”exists inall thesituations covered by the definitions and criteria. This has importantconsequences on the interpretation and application of the definition that arefurtherspelledoutbelow.

• Per Recital 14 of the Preamble, respect for family life must be a “primary

consideration”.Asmentioned,thisrulesoutformalismandcallsforawide,flexibleinterpretationoftheconceptsoftheRegulation(seeabove,section2.3).

• Atthesametime,thedefinitionsof“family”laiddownintheRegulationarelegally

autonomousfromthatof“familylife”underArticle8ECHR,andviceversa.Thus,conditionsrelatingtotheexistenceof“familylife”(e.g.anappraisalofitsfactualintensity)shouldnotbesuperimposedmechanicallyonthedefinitionoffamilyintheRegulation.

TheSEMtends inpracticetodisregardthesehermeneuticalprinciplesandto favourarestrictivereadingofthefamilydefinitions,settingahighthresholdbothsubstantivelyandformally:

• Ontheonehand,ithasthepracticeofaddingtotheconditionssetoutinArticle2(g)DRIIIbyrequiringproofthatamaritalorparentalrelationshipisstableandfactuallyexistent(tatsächlichgelebteunddauerhafteBeziehung).61However,whentheRegulation imposes factual conditionsof this kind, it provides explicitly forthem(seeinparticularArticle2(g),firstindent,and8(2)DRIII).Inalltheothercases,astheFAChasheldconsistentlyinitscase-law,theonlyrelevantquestioniswhethertherelevantfamilytieexists(e.g.marriageorfiliation)withoutitsfactualintensity playing any role.62Quite tellingly, in such cases, extracts from publicregistersaresufficientproofbyexpressprovision(seealsobelow,3.3.1).63

• Ontheotherhand,marriagesthatforonereasonoranotherdonotfulfilallthe

conditionsforrecognitioninSwitzerlandtendtobeexcludedfromthedefinitionofArticle2(g)DRIII.64Whileitisnaturalfornationalauthoritiestorefertosuchcriteriawhenjudgingthe“validity”ofmarriage,utmostcareshouldbetakentoavoid an overly rigid application.Article 2(g)DR III only refers to the law and

60 SeeECtHR,GuideonArticle8oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights-Righttorespectforprivate

and family life, 31December2016, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a016ebe4.html,paras235ffand245ff.

61 Seee.g.ATAF2017VI/1.SeealsoATAF2013/24,§4.2and5.3;FAC,D-4248/2015,§6.4;FAC,D-840/2017,§CandD;FAC,D-2137/2017,§I;FAC,D-2987/2019,§7.1.

62 SeeATAF2013/24,§5.3;ATAF2015/41andATAF2017VI/1,§4.2. 63 SeeEuropeanCommission,CommissionImplementingRegulation(EU)No118/2014of30January2014

amending Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of CouncilRegulation (EC)No343/2003 establishing the criteriaandmechanisms for determining theMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganasylumapplicationlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynational(hereafter“ImplementingRules”or“IR”),OJL201439/1,AnnexI.

64 Seee.g.FAC,D-4424/2016,p.9;FAC,E-4791/2017,p.5.

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practiceofthehostState(s)fordetermining(a)whetherunmarriedcouplesaretobe treated inawaycomparable tomarriedcouples,65and(b)whetheranadultotherthanthefatherandmothercanberegardedas“responsible”forachild.Inallothercases,nosuchreferenceismadeandcriteriadrawnfromnationallawe.g.onthevalidityofmarriagesmaynotbemechanicallyapplied.Indeed,absentanyindicationtothecontrary,thenotionof“familymember”isanautonomousnotionofEULaw66which,asstated,shouldbeinterpretedwidelyandflexiblyperRecital14DRIII.Furthermore,“recognizing”amarriageforthepurposesoftheDublinRegulation isentirelydistinct fromrecognizing it forcivilpurposesandhasthesoleobjectiveofdeterminingwhichStateisbestplacedtoreceivetheapplicantforthe duration of the asylum procedure. In keeping with the principle of non-formalismderivedfromECHRlaw,eveniftheformalvalidityofmarriageisnotfullyestablished,theauthoritiesshouldbesatisfiedofthelatter’sexistenceforthepurpose of Article 2(g) DR III whenever the applicant and his or her spouse“believe themselves to be married and […] genuinely [wish] to cohabit”. 67 Ofcourse, incaseswherethemarriageopenlyviolatestheordrepublicofthehostState,thequestionmayariseofwhetheranylegaleffectshouldbederivedfromit,including underDublin.68It is submitted, however, that even in such cases theordre public criterion should be applied with care. In the case of marriagesinvolvingchildren,inparticular,theoutrightexclusionofthefamilytiefromtheprotectivescopeofArticle2(g)DRIIImaybetooblunt,andanindividualized“bestinterests”assessmentasforeseenbyArticle8DRIIImaybethebestapproach.69

Similar care in appraising the reality of family relations, and flexibility in theinterpretationoftheRegulation,shouldbeexercisedwhenapplyingArticle2(g)DRIIItotheotherfamilyrelationsitencompasses.

3.2.2 The requirement to apply the family provisions without discrimination

The family provisions of theRegulation establishdistinctions thatmay result in starkinequalities of treatment. Thismay be problematic under the ECHR. As noted above,wheneveritisestablishedthatafamilytieconsideredintheRegulationexists,onemayassumethatArticle8ECHRisalsoapplicable,andthisentailstheapplicabilityofArticle14ECHRalso.Therefore,discriminationintheenjoymentoffamilyliferesultingfromtheapplicationofthecriteriaisforbiddenandmustbeavoided.HereareafewexamplesoftheinequalitiesoftreatmentflowingfromtheRegulation:

65 Onrelationsbetweennon-marriedpartnersaccordingtoSwisslaw,seeATAF2012/5,§3.3.2;FAC,E-

747/2015,§2.4.66 SeemutatismutandisD.M.LevinvStaatssecretarisvanJustitie,Case53/81,CJEU,23March1982.67 Abdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandali,abovefn.37,para63.SeealsoATAF2013/24,§4.3.2infine.68 Seee.g.FAC,D-7084/2016.69 Inthe(different)contextofArticle8ECHR,seeZ.H.andR.H.v.Switzerland,Applicationno.60119/12,

ECtHR,8December2015,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,566843824.html,para44.NotethatinthisjudgmenttheCourteventuallyleftthequestionoftheexistenceof“familylife”open(para45f),andthataspointedoutbyJudgeNicolaouinhisConcurrentOpiniontherewaslittledoubtthatthetwoapplicantsdidenjoyonafactuallevel“familylife”.Seealsobelowsection4.

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• Whereasthecircumstancesoffamilyformationandseparationmaylegitimatelybetakenintoaccount–includingfromthestandpointofArticle8ECHR70–astarkdistinction between families formed “pre-flight” and “post-flight” is notpermissibleasitleadstodifferentialtreatmentofsituationsthatmay,infact,beperfectly comparable. 71 The fact that the Regulation applies this “pre-flight”conditionintermittently–e.g.notinthecasesforeseenbyArticle9DRIII,norfortheextendedfamilytiesaddedinindividualclauses(e.g.“relatives”and“siblings”underArticle8DRIII)–addstotheoverallincoherenceandmayresultinfurtherunjustifieddistinctions.UnderapurelytextualreadingofArticles2(g)and8DRIII, for instance, the “pre-flight” conditions should apply to the relationshipbetweenanunmarriedchildandhermother,whileitwouldbeinapplicabletotherelationshipbetweenthatsamechildandheruncle.

• Asnoted,Article20DRIIImakesthepositionofanadultapplicantandofachild

accompanyinghimorherindissociable,solongastheyare“familymembers”orifthechildisborntotheapplicantafterthearrivalintheUnion.Childrenborninacountryoftransitfallbetweentwostools,unlessitcanbedemonstratedthatthefamilytiewasformedintheircountryoforiginandthisisacceptedassufficientunderArticle2(g)DRIII.

• ThespecialdefinitionoffamilycontainedinArticle16DRIIIincludesthe“child,

siblingorparent”oftheapplicant,butexcludesthespouse,andnojustificationforthis isapparentorhasbeenprovided in the travaux.72Particularly in thecasescontemplated there, where the situation is one of mutual dependency, thisexclusion is problematic: is it permissible to foresee the reunion of a pregnantwomanwithher“legallyresident”sister,orelderlyfather,butnotwithher“legallyresident”husbandandfatherofthechild-to-be?

• Beyondfamilydefinitionsstrictosensu,manyprovisionsoftheRegulationcreate

starkthresholdeffects.Consider,e.g.,thecaseofanapplicantwhosespousehasenjoyedrefugeestatusforalongtime,butisnaturalizedhoursbeforetheapplicant– unbeknownst to him or the naturalization authorities – lodges her claim inanotherState.Insuchasituation,Article9DRIIIisstrictlyspeakinginapplicable–butisitacceptablethatfamilyunitybemadedependentonsuchtrivialfactualdifferences?

ThetraditionalremedyforthesevariousinsufficienciesandinconsistenciesoftheletteroftheDublinRegulationistheuseofthediscretionaryclauses,addressedbelow(section4).Itishoweversubmittedthatinatleastsomeofthecasesdescribedabove,itisnotsomuchamatterofmakingderogationsfromthoseprovisionsforcertainclassesofcases,butratherof interpreting them in lightof theobjectives, schemeandprinciplesof theRegulation.

70 Seebelow,section4.3.3,inreferencetofamilytiesformedduringperiodsof“tolerated”stay.71 HodeandAbdi,abovefn.37.72 C.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article16,K1,callthisomission“surprising”.

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Forinstance,itiswidelyacceptedthatthe“pre-flight”conditionisintendedtopreventabuseperpetratedbytheapplicantstomanipulatetheapplicationofthecriteria.73Ifthisis true, the condition should not be interpreted as automatically excluding all familyrelationsformed“post-flight”,asthisexceedsitsobjective,butratherasexcludingfamilytiesformedoutsideofthecountryoforiginandforwhichelementssuggestingabusiveintent are available. 74 Such a teleological reduction, perfectly acceptable from amethodologicalstandpoint,75isneededinordertobringthepre-flightconditioninlinewiththeproportionalityprincipleimpliedbyArticle14ECHR.Otherinconsistenciescouldbeeliminatedthroughawideoranalogicalinterpretation.76For instance, rather thanproceedingdirectly to thediscretionaryclauses, it shouldbecarefullyconsideredwhethertheexclusionofthespousefromthescopeofArticle16DRIII,ortheexclusionofchildrenbornintransitfromthescopeofArticle20DRIII,wereintendedbythe legislatororshouldratherbeconsideredas lacunæ inthebodyof theRegulation.Similarly,thenaturalizedrefugeecould(or,dependingonthecircumstancesofthecase,should)betreatedasarefugeeforthepurposeofArticle9DRIII,77verymuchinthesamewayastheFACincludesinthescopeofthisprovisionformerbeneficiariesofinternationalprotectionnowenjoying“ordinary”migrantstatus(seebelow,section3.4).

3.3 The “family member” definitions of the Regulation: evidentiary issues

3.3.1 Means of proof and evidentiary requirements

Another significant obstacle confronting applicants who invoke family criteria beforeSwissauthoritiesisestablishingtheexistenceoftheallegedfamilyties.78TheDublinRegulationandImplementingRules(IR)laydowntwoimportantprinciplesinthematter.79

• First of all, States must “check exhaustively and objectively, on the basis of allinformationdirectlyandindirectlyavailable[…],whether[their]responsibility[…]is established” under the criteria (see Article 3(2) IR, emphasis added). Thisprincipleunderscorestheobjective,asopposedtoadversarial,natureofDublin

73 C.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article2,K26.74 Fora fuller formulationof theargument,seeC.Hruschka,F.Maiani,abovefn.24.Seealso,mutatis

mutandis,StaatssecretarisvanVeiligheidenJustitievH.andR.,JoinedCasesC-582/17andC–583/17,CJEU,OpinionofAdvocateGeneralSharpston,29November2018,paras67ff.

75 K. Lenaerts, J.Gutierrez-Fons,ToSayWhat theLawof theEU is:Methodsof Interpretationand theEuropean Court of Justice (2013), Academy of European LawDistinguished Lectures AEL 2013/9,availableat:https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/28339,p.28f.

76 OnanalogicalreasoninginEULaw,seee.g.K.Langenbucher,“ArgumentbyAnalogyinEuropeanLaw”,CambridgeLawJournal,1998,vol.57,no.3,pp.481-521,especiallyatp.510ff.

77 Forasimilarexample,inwhichhowevernationalauthoritieshaveoptedfortheserialapplicationofthediscretionaryclauses,seeEuropeanCouncilonRefugeesandExiles(ECRE),DublinIIRegulation–LivesonHold,February2013,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/513ef9632.pdf,p.35.

78 Seee.g.ATAF2013/24,§4.2,4.3.2and5.3;ATAF2015/41,§7.1.SeealsoFAC,E-747/2015.79 Both principles are formally addressed to the “requested Member State”, but as the FAC has

determined,theyarefullyapplicablealsoinsituationswhenaStateexaminesitsownresponsibility:ATAF2015/41,§7.3infine.

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proceedings and the inquisitorial duties of the administration (see also below,section 3.3.2). In practice, whenever the SEM receives or possesses ex officioinformationontheexistenceoffamilyties(e.g.throughapplicants’statements),itmaynotdisregarditbutshouldonthecontraryfollowitthrough,includingwhenittendstoindicatethatSwitzerlandwouldbecometheresponsibleState.80

• Article22(4)DRIIIfurtherstipulatesthat“therequirementsforproofshouldnot

exceedwhatisnecessaryfortheproperapplicationof[the]Regulation”.Theveryobjectoftheprocedure–determiningresponsibilityasopposedtograntinglong-termfamilyreunification–aswellastheconsiderationsofcelerityunderpinningtheRegulation81bothentailareducedevidentiarystandard.Indeed,astheFAChasconfirmed,“responsibilityforprocessinganasylumapplicationshouldinprinciplebedeterminedonthebasisofasfewrequirementsofproofaspossible”.82Thisis,in fact, a longstandingprincipleagreeduponby theMemberStates inDecision1/97 of the “Article 18 Committee”, a body established under the 1990DublinConvention. Decision 1/97, which was inter alia quoted with approval in theCommission proposal for the Dublin II Regulation, continues as follows: “AMember State should be prepared to assume responsibility on the basis ofindicativeevidenceforexamininganasylumapplicationonceitemergesfromanoverall examination of the asylum applicant’s situation that, in all probability,responsibilitylieswiththeMemberStateinquestion”.83ThishasfoundexpressioninthetextoftheRegulationitself(seeArticle22(5)DRIII,discussedbelow)anditprohibits,inparticular,insistenceonproofpositiveoffamilyrelations.

Beyond these general principles, Article 22 DR III distinguishes between “proof” and“circumstantialevidence”–theformerbeingsufficienttoestablishresponsibilityintheabsenceofcontraryproof,thelatterbeingcapableofdoingsoif“coherent,verifiableandsufficiently detailed” (see Article 22(3) and (5) DR III). 84 Annex II, List A of theImplementingRules,which enumerates the elements of proof, includes among others“extractsfromregisters”aswellastheopen-endedindication:“evidencethatthepersonsarerelated”(ListA).AstheFAChasconfirmed,proofofthiskindmustbeacceptedassufficient to establish the existence of the family tie except where additional factualcircumstanceshavetobeproven(seeabove,section3.2.1).Furthermore,doubtsastotheauthenticityofthedocumentsandevidenceproducedarenotenoughtosetthemaside.Inordertodothat,theadministrationmustbringcontraryproof, i.e.provethelackof

80 SeeFAC,D-2987/2019,especiallyat8.3f.SeealsoC.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.22,Article7,K6.81 SeeRecital5DRIIIandN.S.,CaseC-411/10,abovefn.19.82 See ATAF 2015/41, § 7.2 (own translation, based on the original English text of EuropeanUnion,

DecisionNo1/97of9September1997oftheCommitteesetupbyArticle18oftheDublinConventionof15June1990,concerningprovisionsfortheimplementationoftheConvention,14October1997,OJL281/1-281/25).

83 EuropeanCommission,ProposalforaCouncilRegulationestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordetermining theMember State responsible for examininganasylumapplication lodged in oneof theMember States by a third-country national, 26 July 2001, COM(2001) 447 final, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb2ed.html,p.18.

84 SeealsoATAF2015/18,§4.1.4,wheretheFACsetsouttheevidentiarystandardtobesatisfiedasinvolvingproofora“faisceaud'indicescohérents,vérifiablesetsuffisammentdétaillés”oftheexistenceofafamilyrelation.

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authenticity.85Lastly,pertheclearletteroftheImplementingRules(ibidem),DNAtestingcanonlyberequested“failing”otherformsofproofand“ifnecessary”,andmustthereforebeconsideredasanultimaratio–notasaformofproofthatcanberoutinelyrequested.86“[V]erifiable information from the applicant”, aswell as the “statementsby the familymembersconcerned”,arelistedascircumstantialevidenceintheIR(ListB),alongsidereportsorconfirmationbyinternationalorganisationssuchasUNHCR.Asnotedabove,such circumstantial evidencemay not be disregarded and should on the contrary beseriously examined and accepted as sufficient whenever it possesses the qualitiesdescribedinArticle22(5)DRIII.87Furthermore,astheCJEUhasaffirmedinacomparablelegal context, when judging on the absence of documentary proof of family ties, andassessingthecircumstantialevidenceoffered,MemberStatesmusttakeintoaccountthespecific situations of protection seekers, the difficulties they are facing in providingevidence,aswellasthebestinterestsofanychildreninvolved.88These evidentiary principles dovetail with those that the ECtHR has established inrelation to Article 8 ECHR. 89 In Tanda-Muzinga, the Court posited that proceedingsimpactingfamilylifemust“offerguaranteesofflexibility,promptnessandeffectiveness”(emphasis added).90It also emphasized the need for the decision-makers to take intoaccountsourcesofevidenceotherthanformalproof,includingthestatementsoffamilymembers and information from international organizations. With respect to theparticulardifficultiesconfrontingasylumseekers,itfinallyrecalledthatitis“appropriateinnumerouscasestogivethemthebenefitofthedoubtwhenassessingthecredibilityoftheirstatementsandthedocumentssubmittedinsupportthereof”.91Toconcludeonthispoint:alltheapplicablerulespointtotheneedfornationalauthoritiestoadoptaflexible,constructive,proportionateapproachinassessingevidenceoffamilyties.TheRegulationanditsImplementingRulesmakeanyformalproofthattheapplicantsmayproduceconclusive,subjectonlytocontraryproof.Theyalsogiveapplicantstherightto rely on a broad range of evidentiary materials including their own verifiable

85 SeeATAF2013/24,§5.3;ATAF2015/41,§7.1and7.3.86 EuropeanCommission,CommissionStaffWorkingDocument:AccompanyingdocumenttotheReport

fromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilontheevaluationoftheDublinsystem,6June2007,SEC(2007)742,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb080.html,p.24.SeealsoUNHCR,UNHCRNoteonDNATestingtoEstablishFamilyRelationshipsintheRefugeeContext,June2008,availableat:http://www.refworld.org/docid/48620c2d2.html,p.4.

87 ForapositiveexampleofSwisspracticeinthisregard,seeATAF2013/24,§4.3.2.88 E. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-635/17, CJEU, 13 March 2019, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,5c8bb6324.html, paras 65 and 76 ff. The legal frameworkdescribedinthejudgment–thatofCouncilDirective2003/86/ECof22September2003ontheRighttoFamily Reunification, OJ L 2003 251/12, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f8bb4a10.html–iscomparableinmanywaystothatoftheDublinRegulation.TheevidentiaryrulesoftheDirective,whilelessspecific,alsorequirethatevidenceotherthandocumentaryproofoffamilytiesbetakenintoaccount,bearinginmindthebestinterestsofthechildandtherighttorespectforfamilylife:seeibidem,paras7ff.

89 Such principles are applicable because of the linkages between Article 8 ECHR and the familydefinitionsoftheRegulationpointedoutaboveinsection3.2.1.

90 Tanda-Muzinga,abovefn.35,para82.91 Ibidem,paras69and79.

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statements. Lastly, the Regulation lays down reduced evidentiary standards – a pointreinforcedbythe“benefitofthedoubt”principlethatcanbederivedfromArticle8ECHR.

3.3.2 The administration’s duties to proactively establish family ties The authorities conducting the Dublin procedure should not only be open to theevidentiarymaterialsofferedbytheapplicant,butalsoproactivelyhelpinestablishingtheexistenceoffamilyties.Thisalsoresultsunambiguouslyfromapluralityofsources.Under Swiss Law, the Dublin procedure is inquisitorial rather than adversarial(Untersuchungsgrundsatz, maxime inquisitoire). It is therefore the duty of the SEM toestablishexofficioalltherelevantfacts,includingthosethatrelatetothefamilysituationoftheapplicant.Thisdutyistemperedby,andhasitscounterpartin,theapplicant’sdutytocooperate,aswellasher right toparticipate in theprocedure interalia throughaninterview (see Articles4 and 5 DR III). In particular, the applicant bears a particularresponsibilityinhelpingtoestablishherpersonalcircumstances.Still,theadministrationis not entitled to place the burden of proof of family ties on the applicant: once theapplicant’sdutytocooperatehasbeendischarged,andtherearestillpointsinneedofclarification,itisuptotheSEMtoinquireuntiltheevidentiarystandardsetoutpreviouslyissatisfied.92ThisprincipleofSwissPublicLawisinlinewiththestipulationsoftheDublinRegulationand of its Implementing Rules, which also foresee an active role for the authorityconductingtheprocedure(seeabove,section3.3.1).Therequirementsfortheadministrationtotakeaproactivestanceareenhancedwhenitcomes to the application of the criteria listed in Article 8 DR III concerningunaccompaniedchildren.Ontheonehand,Article6(4)DRIIIrequirestheMemberStatesto“takeappropriateactiontoidentifythefamilymembers[…]ontheterritoryofMemberStateswhileprotectingthebestinterestsofthechild”assoonaspossible.Indischargingthis tracing obligation, the Member States may call on the assistance of relevantorganizations (e.g. the Red Cross). On the other hand, Article 12(4) IR requires thedeterminingMemberState toengagewith theotherMemberStateswhenever it “is inpossessionof information thatmakes itpossible to start identifyingand/or locatingamemberofthefamily”.Crucially,suchstepsoughttobeundertakenexofficioassoonaspossibleafterthelodgingoftheapplication,evenwhenthechildhasnoinformationtoofferonthewhereaboutsofhisorherfamily.93ThestipulationsofArticle6(4)DRIIIand12(4)IRshouldinspireStatepracticebeyondtheirformalscopeofapplication.Indeed,tracingfamilymemberswiththeassistanceofrelevantinternationalorganizations,andengagingwithotherMemberStateswhenthere92 Fortheenunciationoftheinquisitorialmaximanditsrelationtotheapplicant’sdutytocooperate,see

e.g.ATAF2015/4,§3.2.Foraconcreteapplication,seee.g.FAC,D-5170/2018,p.5ff.93 SeeUNHCR,LeftinLimbo,abovefn.13,p.75ff;ICFi,EvaluationoftheImplementationoftheDublinIII

Regulation – Final Report, Study for the European Commission, March 2016, available athttps://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants/docs/evaluation_of_the_implementation_of_the_dublin_iii_regulation_en.pdf,p.17f.

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are indications that family relations are present there, may be regarded as ways ofdischarging the general inquisitorial duties of the administrationoutlined above.As amatterofgoodpractice, theSEMshouldapplythoseprovisionssystematicallyalso forapplicantsotherthanunaccompaniedchildren,especiallyiftheapplicantisanotherwisevulnerableperson.

3.3.3 Issues of timeliness in producing evidence of family ties Forthepurposesofthreefamily-relatedcriteria–Articles8,10and16DRIII–Article7(3)DRIIIrequiresMemberStatestotakeintoconsiderationanyavailableevidenceofthepresenceofafamilymemberorrelativeinaMemberState,onconditionthatsuchevidenceisproducedbeforetheacceptanceofatakechargeortakebackrequest,94andthatafirstdecisiononthesubstancehasnotyetbeentaken.95Animportantimplicationofthisruleisthatnationalauthoritiesmaynotdisregardevidenceoffamilytiesonthepretextthatatakechargeortakebackrequesthasalreadybeensent,andthereforetheprocedureissotospeak“closed”fromtheirperspective.96It isunclearwhytheremaining family-relatedcriteria–Articles9and11DRIII–areexcludedfromthescopeofArticle7(3)DRIII,97andwhethersuchexclusionshouldbetakenliterallyandappliedstrictly98ornot.99Thetravauxpréparatoiressuggestadraftingmistake. The rule originally proposed by the Commission was a derogation to the“freezingclause”ofArticle7(2)DRIIIthatwouldbeapplicabletoallthefamilycriteria.100InCouncil,concernwasexpressedthatsuchaderogationmightencourageapplicantstoconcludemarriagesofconveniencetotriggerArticle9DRIII,whichasseenappliestofamilytiesformed“post-flight”.101Accordingly,thePresidencyproposedacompromisetextexcludingArticle9DRIIIfromthescopeofArticle7(3)DRIII.CurrentArticle11DRIII,whichpresentsnosuchrisk,wasalsotargetedwithoutanyexplanationandpossiblybyoversight.102Lateron,Article7(3)DRIIIwastransformedfromaderogationtothe

94 Onthelimitedrelevancethefamilycriteriamayhaveintakebackprocedures,seeH.andR.,Joined

CasesC-582/17andC-583/17,abovefn.47,paras80ff.ForaninterpretationreadingArticle7(3)DRIII asamoregeneralexception to the rule that responsibility criteriaarenotapplied in takebackprocedures,seeATAF2017VI/5,§6.2ffand8.2ff.

95 Onthenotionof“firstdecisiononthemerits”,seebelow,section3.4.2.96 C.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article7,K7.97 Ibidem,K8.98 Seee.g.FAC,E-6932/2016,§6.3.99 SeeimplicitlyFAC,D-2359/2014.100 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria for determining the

responsibleMemberState,abovefn.8,Article7(3).101 CounciloftheEU,ProposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishing

thecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson, doc. No. 12364/09, 27 July 2009, available at:http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12364-2009-INIT/en/pdf,p.37f.

102 CounciloftheEU,RegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson(recast),doc.No.12328/09,29July2009,availableat:https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12328-2009-INIT/en/pdf,Article7(3).

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“freezingclause” intoapurelyevidentiaryrule,103thuseliminatinganyrisk that “post-application”marriagescouldbeused to triggerArticle9DR III.Thischangemade theexclusionofArticle9pointless,butthiswasseeminglylostonthedrafters.104Thereis,inconclusion, no objective reason to excludeArticles 9 and 11DR III from the scope ofArticle7(3)DRIII.Furthermore,theexclusiongeneratesuncertaintyastowhatdeadlineshould apply for producing evidence under these two criteria. The most reasonablesolutionistointerpretArticle7(3)DRIIIasapplicabletoallfamilycriteria.Alternatively,asproposedbyAGSharpston,sincetheexclusionwasoriginallyinspiredbyfearofabuse,itshouldthenbeappliedonlyincaseswherethereissomeevidencethereof.105Before concluding on this point, it is important to stress that Article 7(3)DR III onlyimposesaminimalobligationforthepurposesoftheapplicationofthecriteria:itdoesnotprohibitMemberStates from taking intoaccount evidenceproduced later in time.Furthermore,Article7(3)DRIIIisnotapplicablewhenitcomestoprovingtheexistenceof“familylife”underArticle8ECHR(seebelowsection4).106

3.4 Interpretive issues relating to individual criteria

3.4.1 The criteria relating to children and issues pertaining to age assessment Article8DRIIIcomesfirstinthehierarchyandlaysdownaself-containedsetofcriteriaapplicabletounaccompaniedchildapplicants.107UnderArticle8(1)DRIII,responsibilityis tobe assigned to theMember Statewhere “familymembers” or siblings are legallypresent.Paragraph2assignsresponsibilitytotheStatewhere“relatives”whocan“takecare of the minor” are legally present. Should there be no family connection, theresponsibleStateistheonewherethechildhaslodgedhisapplicationandispresent.108Contrarytowhatthe“hierarchyrule”ofArticle7(1)DRIIIwouldsuggest,thereisnopre-determinedorderofapplicationforthecriteriaofArticle8DRIII.Theselectionoftheapplicable paragraph, and the choice of the responsible State in cases where familyrelationsarepresentinmorethanone,mustbemadeinlightofanindividualizedbest

103 SeeS.Peersetal.,EUImmigrationandAsylumLaw(TextandCommentary):SecondRevisedEdition–

Volume3:EUAsylumLaw,Brill/Nijhoff,2015,p.357.StillpostulatingthatArticle7(3)derogatesfrom7(2)DRIII,seeC.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article7,K9.

104 SeeCounciloftheEU,RegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishingthecriteriaand mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application forinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson (recast), doc. No. 17167/09, 16 December 2009, available at:https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17167-2009-INIT/en/pdf,p.17,andCounciloftheEU,ProposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishingthecriteriaand mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application forinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson (recast), doc. No. 9191/11, 26 April 2011, available at:https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9191-2011-INIT/en/pdf,p.34.

105 H.andR.,JoinedCasesC-582/17andC-583/17,AGSharpston,abovefn.74,paras67ff.106 SeesimilarlyC.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article7,K10.107 Of all the other criteria, only Article 11 applies by its express provisions to unaccompanied child

applicants(seebelow,section3.4.2).108 SeeMAandOthers,C-648/11,abovefn.41.

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interestsassessment(seeArticles8(3)and6(1)DRIII).Furthermore,boththeletterofArticle8DRIII,thebestinterestsprinciplethatgovernsitanditsunderlyingobjective–providing “particularly vulnerable” 109 applicants with the greatest possibilities ofenjoying the care of their family relations – indicates that the terms “legal presence”should be interpreted widely as encompassing any form of lawful presence on theterritoryofaMemberState.110Under Article 20(3) DR III the position of children who accompany an adult isindissociablefromthatofthelatter,providedthattheyare“familymembers”andthatthis is in the best interests of the child. The clause has the purpose of preventingseparation,andthuscompletesArticle8DRIII,whichaimstoremedyit.Asithasbeenarguedabove,Article20(3)shouldbeappliedbroadlyinordertocoversituationsthatwouldotherwiseescapeitsscopebecauseofthe“pre-flight”requirement.Asthebenefitofthesecriteriaandtheirbroad“familyreunion”clausesarereservedforchildren, age assessment is a crucial andoften contentious step. InMay2019, theUNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild(CRC)summarizedtheapplicableprinciplesinViewsadopted following individual complaints against Spain. 111 These deserve to besummarizedhere,andputinrelationwiththecorrespondingSwisspractice.Firstofall,apersonallegingminoragemust“begiventhebenefitofthedoubtandtreatedasachild”duringtheageassessmentprocessitself.Thusthe“best interests”principlemustbeobservedthroughout,and“aqualifiedlegalrepresentative,withthenecessarylinguisticskills”mustbeappointedalreadyatthisstage.112ItisnotclearthatthelatterguaranteeisfullyandsystematicallyrespectedunderSwisslawandpractice.113Asforthemeansandstandardsofproof,theCRChasmadethefollowingpoints:

• Just as is the case under the Regulation, identity documents produced by thepersonconcernedmustbeconsideredauthenticuntiltheyareprovenfalse.114Thisstandardisnotsatisfiedwhenofficialdocumentsaresetasidebasedonthegeneric

109 SeemutatismutandisMAandOthers,C-648/11,abovefn.41,paras54ff.110 SeeinthissenseATAF2016/1,§4.2.111 UNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild(CRC),A.L.v.Spain,communicationno.16/2017,10July2019,

CRC/C/81/D/16/2017, available at:https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%252FC%252F81%252FD%252F16%252F2017&Lang=en;UNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild(CRC),J.A.B. v. Spain, communication no. 22/2017, 9 July 2019, CRC/C/81/D/22/2017, available only inSpanish at:https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%252FC%252F81%252FD%252F22%252F2017&Lang=en.

112 CRC,A.L.v.Spain,abovefn.111,paras12.3and12.8.113 SeeEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO),EASOPracticalGuideonageassessment,Secondedition,

2018, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/easo-practical-guide-on-age-assesment-v3-2018.pdf,p.107;FAC,E-7333/2018,§2.3.

114 CRC,A.L.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para12.4(birthcertificate);CRC,J.A.B.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para13.4(passport).

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assumption that falsedocumentsmaybeobtained in theapplicant’s countryoforigin.115

• Refusal to undergo medical age testing cannot be taken as conclusive of

majority.116

• Absent identity documents or other appropriate evidence, Statesmustmake a“comprehensiveassessmentofthechild’sphysicalandpsychologicaldevelopmentconductedbyspecialistpaediatriciansorother[qualified]professionals.”Physicalappearancecanneverbetakenasconclusivesince“ageassessmentmustnotonlytake into account the physical appearance […] but also […] psychologicalmaturity”.117The assessment must be “carried out in a prompt, child-friendly,gender-sensitiveandculturallyappropriatemanner,includinginterviews[…]inalanguagethatthechildunderstands”.Inthiscontext,“statementsbychildrenmustbe considered”. 118 Importantly, the requirement that a “comprehensiveassessment”becarriedoutineverycaserulesoutautomaticrelianceonexplicitorimplicitageassessmentsorageregistrationsmadeinotherMemberStates.119

While, subject to some points, FAC case-law appears to correspond to the aboveprinciples, Swiss practice is characterized by increasing reliance onmedicalmethodsbasedonboneanddentalexamination.BoththeCRCandtheFAChavepointedoutthatradiology of the hand, combined with the Greulich and Pyle atlas, is not sufficientlyreliable. 120 The FAC appears however to assign high probative value to moresophisticated bone and dental testing techniques, at the expense of the holisticassessmentrequiredbytheCRC.121Thisshouldbereconsideredinlightoftheclearviewof theCRCthat“Statesshouldrefrain fromusingmedicalmethodsbasedonboneanddentalexamination,whichmaybeinaccurate[…]andcanalsobetraumaticandleadtounnecessarylegalprocedures”.122Asanimportantlastpoint,theCRChasstressedthatwhentheauthoritiesareunabletoreachafirmconclusionontheageofthepersonconcerned,“itiscrucialthatthebenefitof the doubt should be given” to him or her.123 From this standpoint, the reasoningadoptedinsomejudgmentsoftheFACisnotentirelysatisfactory.124

115 SeeFAC,D-5795/2015,§3.5(unpublishedpassageofATAF2016/1);seehowever,foranexampleof

thereasoningcriticisedinthetext,ATAF2018VI/3,§5.2.116 CRC,J.A.B.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para13.4.117 CRC,A.L.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para12.7.SeealsointhissenseFAC,E-7333/2018,§2.3.118 CRC,A.L.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para12.4.119 SeeinthissenseFAC,D-5795/2015,§3.6(unpublishedpassageofATAF2016/1).120 CRC,A.L.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para12.6;FAC,D-5795/2015,§3.3.1f.(unpublishedpassageofATAF

2016/1);FAC,E-7333/2018,§2.3.ItisamatterofconcernthattheSEMhasadoptedthismethodology,combinedwithsubjectiveimpressionsoftheapplicant’sappearance,eveninrecentdecisions:seeFAC,D-5795/2015,loc.cit.andmorerecentlyFAC,E-7333/2018,§D.

121 SeeinparticularATAF2018VI/3,notably§4.2.2and4.4.122 CRC,A.L.v.Spain,abovefn.111,para12.4.123 Ibidem.124 Seee.g.ATAF2018VI/3,§6.

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3.4.2 The “ordinary” family criteria of Articles 9-11 Articles9-15DRIIIlistthecriteriaapplicabletoapplicantswhoarenotunaccompaniedchildren.Articles12-15DRIII,whichlaydowncriteriabasedondocumentation,entryandstay,arenotexaminedhere.UnderArticle9DR III, the responsibleState is theonewherea familymemberof theapplicant is staying as a “beneficiary of international protection”, i.e. as a recognizedrefugeeorbeneficiaryof“subsidiaryprotection”.ThelatterstatusisbasedonEULaw125andisunknowntoSwissasylumlaw,whichinsteadincludesafunctionallysimilarandpartiallyoverlappingstatusof“provisionaladmission”.126AccordingtotheFAC,inorderto ascertainwhether Article 9 DR III applieswhen the applicant has a “provisionallyadmitted” familymember inSwitzerland, itmustbeexaminedonacase-by-casebasiswhetherthegroundsonwhichprovisionaladmissionwasgrantedfallwithinthescopeofArticle 15 of the Qualification Directive as interpreted by the CJEU. A restrictiveinterpretation based on notions of Swiss law is specifically excluded,while in case ofdoubt the administration may apply Article 9 DR III widely. 127 The FAC has furtherclarified that when a beneficiary of protection has his or her provisional admissionreplaced with an ordinary residence document (in casu: Permis B), Article 9 DR IIIremainsapplicablesolongasthegroundsforprotectionstillexist–acircumstancewhichmustbepresumed.128Thesameprincipleshouldapply,logically,whenthebeneficiaryofprotectionhasbeennaturalized(seealsoabovesection3.2.2).Article10DRIIIassignsresponsibilitytotheStatewherea“familymember”ispresentasanapplicant forprotection, andher applicationhasnot yetbeen the subjectof a firstdecision“regardingthesubstance”–anotionthatexcludesinadmissibilityorproceduraldecisions.Thesubsequentcriterion,laiddowninArticle11DRIII,islinkedtoArticle10.Whereas the latterseeks toreunite familiesofprotectionseekers thathavearrived indifferentStates,Article11seekstopreventtheirseparation.Again,thisArticleincludesits own special family definition, including “family members” and child unmarriedsiblings.WhenpersonssodefinedlodgetheirapplicationinthesameState,oratdatessufficientlyclosethatitispossibletoconductajointDublinprocedure,theruleisthatthesame Member State must be responsible for all of them: unless the same State isresponsible for the whole group under the ordinary criteria, Article 11 indicatessupplementary criteria, i.e. that the State responsible for thewhole family is the oneresponsible for the largest number or, failing this, for the oldest applicant. The keyinterpretiveproblemistheprovisothattheapplicationsmustbe“closeenough”.Inlinewiththeobjectiveoftheprovision,andwiththelegislator’sintentionthatfamilyunitybea primary consideration, the application of Article 11 should not be refused on puregroundsofadministrativeexpediency(e.g.becauseafirsttakechargehasbeensent)but

125 CounciloftheEU,Directive2011/95/EUoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof13December

2011onstandardsforthequalificationofthird-countrynationalsorstatelesspersonsasbeneficiariesofinternationalprotection,forauniformstatusforrefugeesorforpersonseligibleforsubsidiaryprotection,and for the content of the protection granted (recast) (Qualification Directive), OJ L 2011 337/9,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f197df02.html.

126 SeeS.Motz,abovefn.14,p.8.127 ATAF2015/18,§3.7and3.8.128 ATAF2018VI/1.

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onlywhenitisimpossibletorunajointDublinprocedure,e.g.becausethiswouldnotbecompatiblewiththedeadlinessetinArticle21.Fromthisperspective,thecriterionsometimesappliedbytheFAC–namely,thatDublinproceduresare“atthesamestage”–seemsquestionable.129Norisitpersuasivetohold,astheFAChasdone,thatwhenSwitzerland’sresponsibilityforsomefamilymembershasbeenestablished“withoutaresponsibilityprocedurebeingnecessary”,thenArticle11DRIIIisinapplicablewhenitcomestodeterminingresponsibilityforafamilyrelation.130AstheCJEUhasclarified,theDublinRegulationisapplicabletoeveryapplicationmadebyathird-country national in a Member State. Thus, when a Member State implicitlyacknowledges its responsibility for an applicant or a groupof applicants, it shouldbedeemedtohavecarriedoutaDublinprocedurewhetherspecialstepsinthisregardweretakenornot.131Insuchcases,totheextentthatitisstillpossibletodetermineafreshtheresponsibilityfortheseapplicants,andafamilymemberorsiblingappliesinSwitzerland,Article11DRIIIshouldbeapplied.

3.4.3 Dependent persons under Article 16 Article 16 DR III instructs Member States to “normally keep or bring together” theapplicantand“legallystaying”familyrelations132whereoneisdependentontheotheronenumeratedgrounds.133While thewordingandpositioningof theprovisionoutsideofChapterIIIoftheRegulationmightgiverisetodoubts,thepreambleclarifiesthatitindeedlays down a “binding responsibility criterion” (see Recital 16),134as distinct from thepreviousArticle15(2)DRIIwhichlaiddownadiscretionaryclause.Because it is located outside of Chapter III, Article 16DR III is subject neither to the“freezing clause” nor to the rulewhereby hierarchical rank is dependent on position.Accordingly,thecriterionappliesevenifitsconditionsarefulfilledaftertheapplicanthaslodgedherfirstapplicationwithaMemberState,e.g.ifshebecomespregnant,orfallsill,at a later time.According toArticle 7(3)DR III,whichunlikeArticle 7(2) is explicitlyapplicable to Article 16, the relevant evidence must however be produced before aMemberStateacceptstotakechargeofortotakebacktheapplicant,orafirstdecisiononthesubstanceoftheapplicationisdelivered.Furthermore, inkeepingwithitsaimandeffetutile,Article16takesprecedenceoveranyotherapplicablecriterionthatwouldleadtoseparation,providedofcoursethatthepersonsconcernedconsentthereto(seeArticle16(1)DRIIIinfine).Thephrase“shallnormallykeeporbringtogether”meansthatwhentheconditionslaiddowninArticle16arefulfilled,familyunitymustasarulebeensuredandexceptionsare

129 FAC,E-2794/2018,§5.2.130 Ibidem.131 BahtiyarFathi v. Predsedatel naDarzhavnaagentsia zabezhantsite, CaseC-56/17,CJEU,4October

2018,paras44ff.132 Child,siblingorparent,providedthatfamilytiesexistedinthecountryoforigin.Seethearguments

developedaboveinsection3.2.2fortheinclusionofthespouse.133 Pregnancy,anew-bornchild,seriousillness,severedisabilityoroldage.134 ATAF2017VI/5,§8.3.2.

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only permitted in particular cases. Under the old Regulation, interpreting identicalwording, theCourt held thatMember States could only separate or keep apart familyrelations in“exceptionalsituations”.135Basedonthetextualsimilarity, theFACfollowsthesameinterpretationwithrespecttoArticle16(1)DRIII.136Thisisofcourseatenableinterpretation.However, itnullifiesthelegislativeintentionoftransformingoldArticle15(2)DRIIintoabindingcriterion,i.e.inaprovisionestablishingfirmerobligations.Inthisperspective,itseemspreferabletointerpretthenewprovisionasimplyingthatonlyexplicitexceptionsarepermitted,i.e.thatfamilyrelationsmayonlybekeptapartinthecasesofprolongedinabilitytotravelthatareexplicitlyforeseenbyparagraph2.137ThescopeofArticle16isdelimitedbymanycumulativeconditions,someofwhichhavealreadybeenrecalled:(a)oneoftheenumeratedfamilytiesmustexist;(b)thefamilytiemusthaveexisted in thecountryoforigin; (c) theapplicant’srelativemustbe“legallyresident” in a Member State; (d) on account of enumerated circumstances (e.g.pregnancy),onepersonmustbe“dependantontheassistance”oftheother;(e)theotherpersonmustbe“abletotakecareofthedependentperson”and(f)thepersonsconcernedmust express their desire to be kept or brought together inwriting.138Due to a strictapplicationoftheseconditions,Article16DRIIIhasunfortunatelyfailedtogaintractionsofarinpractice,andhasthereforebeendeprivedofmuchofitseffetutile.139However,thepreambleoftheRegulationandthehumanitariancharacteroftheprovisionrather call for a broad interpretation. As has been argued above in section 3.2.2, thedefinitionof“family”givenbyArticle16DRIIIshouldbereadextensively,insuchawayas to also encompass the spouse. In parallel, the “pre-flight” condition should not beappliedmechanically,but ratherasan “anti-abuse”clause inconformitywith itsaims.“Legalresidence”shouldbeinterpretedsimplyasexcludingsituationsofirregularstay.140TheenumerationofArticle16DRIII–pregnancy,anew-bornchild,seriousillness,severedisabilityoroldage–isnotanexclusionarylist.Onthecontrary,itaimstocapturethe“essentiallife-eventsthatmakeapersonvulnerableinsuchawaythatthereunionwithcertainreferencepersonsbecomesahumanitarianobligation”.141Andwhileillnesssmustbe“serious”toqualify,142anddisability“severe”,pregnancy,anew-bornchildandold-agesufficeinandofthemselvestotriggerthisprovision.TheapplicationofArticle16DRIIIisoftendeniedbytheSEMwiththeargumentthattheapplicant cannot show the existence of a “particular dependency” (besonderesAbhängigkeitsverhältnis) or an “intensive dependency” (intensives Abhängigkeits-verhältnis).143Thishappened,forinstance,toasinglemotherwithtwochildren,havingundergonetheoncologicalremovalofheruterusandstillsufferingfromseriousphysical

135 K. v. Bundesasylamt, C-245/11, CJEU, 6 November 2012, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,50a0cd8e2.html,para46.136 ATAF2017VI/5,§8.3.3.137 Inthesamesense,C.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article16,paraK4.138 SeealsoFAC,E-7488/2014,§6.2.2.139 SeeUNHCR,LeftinLimbo,abovefn.13,p.109ff.140 FAC,E-4303/2014.141 FAC,E-7488/2014,§6.2.1.142 SeeFAC,F-6844/2017,§3.3.2.2.143 Seee.g.thepositionoftheSEMinFAC,D-3794/2014,§3.3andinFAC,D-2069/2016,§5.2.

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andpsychologicalproblems,whoreliedonthehelpofheroldersisterinSwitzerland.Itwasundisputedthatshehadacloserelationwithhersister,thatshewasseriouslyill,andthathersisterwasprovidingherandherfamilywithmuch-neededsupport–still, theSEMheldthatthiswasnota“besonderesAbhängigkeitsverhältnis”.144Ofcoursethisraisesthequestionofwhata“besonderesAbhängigkeitsverhältnis”is,butinrealitythequestionisnotrelevant.AsthetextoftheRegulationandoftheIRsuggest,andas the case-law of the CJEU and of the FAC confirm, the whole line of argument isconceptuallyflawedbecause“dependency”isnotaseparateconditionunderArticle16DRIII.Thisprovisionmerelyrequires thatpersonA is (e.g.)seriously ill,and that “onaccount”ofthissheis“dependentontheassistance”ofpersonB,whohappenstobeafamily relationmeeting thecriteriaofArticle16DR IIIandwho iswillingandable toassist.“Dependency”isaby-productoftheconditionofpersonAandofherrelationtopersonB,notanindependentcondition.Coherentlywiththispremise,Article11IRdoesnotrequiretheapplicanttoshowa“particulardependency”suchaslongcohabitation,emotional ties going beyond what is normal among family relations, etc. Instead, itdemandsthat“thesituationsofdependency”beassessed,asfaraspossible,“onthebasisofobjectivecriteriasuchasmedicalcertificates”(emphasisadded).Thus,allthathastobeprovenisthatpersonAfindsherselfinoneofthesituationsofvulnerabilityenvisagedbyArticle16DRIII,andthatpersonBpossessestherequisitequalities.TheoneleadingjudgmentoftheCJEUonthematter,K,confirmsthisinterpretationinfull.Inlayingdownthetesttobeapplied,theCourtmerelystates:“Wherefamilytiesexistedinthecountryoforigin,itisnecessarytoestablishthattheasylumseekerorthepersonwithwhomhehasfamilytiesactuallyrequiresassistanceand,asthecasemaybe,thatthepersonwhomustprovidetheotherpersonwithassistanceisinapositiontodoso”.145Inthatcase,thedaughter-in-lawoftheapplicantwasindisputablyinadifficultsituation146andtheapplicantwasprovidingherwiththerequisitesupport–andthissufficed.Thefactsofthecasedidnotdiscloseanythinginthewayofa“particulardependency”beyondthese circumstances. Quite on the contrary, the applicant had merely become thedaughter-in-law’s“confidanteandclosestfriend”inthefewweeksbetweenherarrivalinAustriaandthelodgingofherrequest,after“severalyears”ofnotlivingtogether.147BeitnotedinpassingthatthislastpointdefeatstherecurrentargumentoftheSEMthattherecannotbea“dependency”situationifthetwopersonshavelivedapartforalongtime.148AlthoughithassometimesemployedlanguagethatmightbetakentoundulyrestrictthescopeofArticle16DRIIIbyrequiringa“particulardependency”,149theFAChasonthewholeadheredtothepositionjustargued.144 FAC,D-2069/2016,passim.145 K,C-245/11,abovefn.135,para42.SeealsoATAF2017VI/5,§8.3.3.146 K.v.Bundesasylamt,C-245/11,CJEU,OpinionofAdvocateGeneralTrstenjak,27June2012,available

at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,500d54432.html,para9ff.147 Ibidem,para7ff.148 Seee.g.FAC,E-7488/2014,§6.2.3;FAC,D-3794/2014,§3.3.149 Seee.g.ATAF2017VI/5,§8.3.5(“uneassistance immediateet importante[…]queseul lerequérant

serait àmemed’offrir”); FAC, F-6844/2017, §3.3.2.3 (“une relationdedépendance telle que seule laprésence du recourant serait à même de répondre aux besoins spécifiques […]”). The idea that theassistanceofferedbytheapplicantmustsomehowbesingularandirreplaceablebyanothersimilarlysituatedfamilymemberisforeigntothewording,purposeandaimofArticle16DRIII.

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To concludeon thispoint:whileblood tiesand tiesof affectionare in themselvesnotenoughtotriggertheapplicationofArticle16DRIII,150theprovisionshouldbeapplied,and family unity preserved subject to paragraph 2 only, whenever a situation ofvulnerability as described inArticle 16DR III is established, a family relation “legallyresiding”inoneoftheMemberStatespossessestherequisitecharacteristics,andbothpersonsconsent.

3.5 Summary of main points As the European Commission has recommended, “Member States […] should […]proactively and consistently apply the clauses related to family reunification”.151Thefamily definitions given by theRegulation should be read and applied in a broad andflexiblemanner.Formaritalandparentalrelationships,inparticular,Article2(g)DRIIIsetsnorequirementastofactualintensityorstability,requiringonlythattheyexistattherelevant time.The “validity”ofmaritalunions shouldbeassessed inanon-formalisticmanner. The family definitions laid down in theRegulationmust also be applied in amanner that entails no unjustified differences in treatment. In order to avoiddiscrimination,the“pre-flightrequirement”shouldbeappliedasananti-abuseclauseinconformity with its aim. For the same reason, the family definitions given in someprovisionsrequireanextensiveinterpretation:thusArticle16DRIIIshouldbeappliedasincludingthespouse,andchildrenborn“post-flight”shouldbeincludedinthescopeofArticle20DRIII.Regardingproofoffamilyties,severalprinciplesmustbeobserved.First,responsibilitydeterminationmust involveas fewrequirementsofproofaspossible.Second,proofoffamily ties (e.g. an extract from registers) may only be set aside if contrary proof isproduced.Third,responsibilitymaybeestablished interaliaby“verifiableinformationfromtheapplicant”,aswellasthe“statementsbythefamilymembersconcerned”.Suchcircumstantialevidencemustbeseriouslyexaminedandacceptedassufficientwheneverit is coherent, verifiable and sufficiently detailed. In assessing such evidence,MemberStatesmust take intoaccount theparticulardifficulties thatprotectionseekers face inobtainingformalproof.Fifth,DNAtestingmayonlybeusedasanultimaratio.Sixth,incase of uncertainty the applicants should be given the benefit of the doubt. In theapplicationoftheserulesandprinciples,theinquisitorialmaximmustbeborneinmind.Oncetheapplicant’sdutytocooperatehasbeendischarged,itisuptotheSEMtoclarifyanyremainingissues.Suchdutiesareenhancedwhenitcomestotheapplicationofthecriteria applicable to unaccompanied children, particularly in light of the tracingobligationsetoutinArticle6(4)DRIII.Asamatterofgoodpractice,theSEMshouldapplythe latter provisions also for other categories of applicants.UnderArticle 7(3)DR III,which should be applied to all the family criteria including Articles 9 and 11 DR III,nationalauthoritiesmustacceptevidenceoffamilytiesproducedbeforetheacceptanceofarequest.

150 ATAF2017VI/5,§8.3.5.151 EuropeanCommission,AEuropeanAgendaonMigration,abovefn.1,p.13.

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AgeassessmentshouldbecarriedoutinconformitywiththerecommendationsoftheUNCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild.Inparticular,aqualifiedrepresentativeshouldbeappointedalreadyduringage-assessment;identitydocumentsshouldonlybesetasideifproven false; absent such documents, age assessment should be carried by qualifiedexperts in the framework of a holistic evaluation; the State should refrain fromusingmedicalmethodsbasedonboneanddentalexamination;thebenefitofthedoubtshouldbegiventothepersonconcerned.Concerningtheinterpretationofindividualcriteria,thefollowingpointsmustbemade:

• Thenotionof“internationalprotection”underArticle9DRIIIincludesprovisionaladmissiongrantedongrounds comparable to those set out inArticle15of theQualificationDirective.Whenabeneficiaryofprotectionhashisorherprovisionaladmissionreplacedwithanordinaryresidencedocument,Article9DRIIIremainsapplicable.Thesameprincipleshouldapplyincaseofnaturalization.

• Article11DRIIIshouldbeappliedwheneveritistechnicallypossibletorunajoint

Dublinprocedureforthefamilymembers.ThefactthattheDublinproceduresarenot “at the same stage”, or the fact that Switzerland has implicitly acceptedresponsibility forcertainfamilymemberswithout formallyengagingtheDublinprocess,shouldnotbedecisive.

• Article16DRIIIondependentpersonsisnotsubjecttoArticle7(2)DRIII.Likethe

othercriteria,itshouldbeappliedbroadlyinallitselements.Thedemonstrationof a “particular dependency” or “intensive dependency” between the personsconcerned isnot required for its application.On the contrary,Article16DR IIIshouldapplywheneveroneofthelistedsituationsofvulnerabilityisestablished,therequisitefamilytieand“legalresidence”areproven,thepersonsupposedtoprovideassistanceisinapositiontodoso,andthepersonsconcernedgivetheirconsent.Oncetheseconditionsaremet,thepersonsconcernedshouldbebroughtorkepttogethersubjectonlytoArticle16(2)DRIII.

4. Protecting family life through the discretionary clauses

4.1 Introduction Ifappliedbroadlyandpurposively,asdetailedintheprevioussection,thefamilycriterialaiddownintheRegulationcangoalongwayinprotectingthefamiliesofapplicants.Still, even under the best interpretation, the criteria alone are insufficient to affordcomprehensiveprotectiontofamilyunity.In addition to the inherent limitations of the criteria taken singly – consider the casewherebyanapplicantiscriticallyillanddependsontheassistanceofacousinoraunt–the choice of identifying several fragmentary “criteria” with inconsistent familydefinitionsinsteadofoneholisticfamilycriterionastheUS-Canadaagreementdoes(seeabovesection2.1)createsloopholes.LetusimaginetheplightofSenait,a17-year-oldgirl,and Mariam, her mother. If they arrive together in the EU, Article 20 DR III should

41

guaranteethattheywillbekepttogether.Notso,however,ifpoorSenaithasbeenforcedto marry – quite possibly the very thing that caused the two to flee. In such a case,paradoxically,itmighthavebeenbettertohavebeenseparatedinflight.Indeed:ifMariamsecureslegalpresenceinaMemberStatebeforeSenaitappliesforasylum,theirreunionis guaranteed byArticle 8(1)DR III. Unfortunately, if not, Articles 9-11DR IIIwill beinapplicablebecauseofSenait’smarriedstatus.Asonecansee,theprotectionaffordedbythecriteria ispatchy,andittakesaneffortonthepartofthecompetentauthoritiestomakeitcomprehensive.The interplaybetween the freezingclauseand thecriteria isalsoacommoncause forfamilyseparation.InacasedecidedbytheFAC,anAfghanmotherandhertwochildrenfled their country of origin together. The eldest son became separated en route andarrived in Switzerlandwhile themother and the younger brotherwere left behind inBulgaria.Bythetimetheylocatedhim,hehadobtainedprotectionstatus.Article9DRIIIwouldhavebeenapplicable,buttheydidnotthinkofapplyinginBulgariaand“freeze”thesituationatthatmoment.WhentheymadeittoSwitzerlandandapplied,triggeringthe “freezing clause”, the eldest son had just turned 18 and none of the criteria wasapplicableanylonger.Inspiteofthemother’sdesperateefforts,sheandheryoungersonweretransferredbacktoBulgariawhileherolderson–fromwhomitwasneverintendedthattheyshouldpart–remainedinSwitzerland.152Intheseas inmanyotherconstellations, thecriteriaallowfamiliestobekeptapartorseparated because of coincidental circumstances, or because of actions whoseconsequenceshavenotbeen–andinallfairnesscouldnotbeexpectedtobe–foreseenbythem.Inasystempredicatedonfamilylifebeinga“primaryconsideration”andontheprohibitionofunjustifieddifferencesoftreatment,thisishardlysatisfactory.Thisiswherediscretionentersthepicture.Article17DRIIIincludestwo“discretionaryclauses”authorizingMemberStatestoderogatefromtheordinarycriteriaaswellasfromthe“one-chance-only”rulesetoutinArticle3(1)DRIII.Suchdiscretionhasalwaysbeenavitalpartof theDublinscheme, including for theprotectionof family life. Indeed,asRecital 17 of the Regulation states, the clauses are to be applied “in particular onhumanitarianandcompassionategrounds, inorder tobring together familymembers,relativesoranyotherfamilyrelations[…]”.OrastheCouncilhasputit,thediscretionaryclausesaiminteralia“atavoidingsituationswherefamilymemberswouldbeseparatedduetothestrictapplicationoftheDublincriteria”.153Indeed,throughthetwoclausestheauthorities have the opportunity to reconsider the interests at stake, forego a blindapplicationofthecriteriaandclosethegapsandloopholespresentintheDublincriteria.Article17(1)DRIII,the“sovereigntyclause”,authorizesanyMemberStatewithwhichanapplicationhasbeenlodgedtoexamineit,andthusbecometheresponsibleState.Article17(2)DR III, the “humanitarian clause”, authorizes the determining State or the Stateresponsible torequestanotherMemberState toassumeresponsibility.Sucharequestmustintervenebeforeafirstdecisionistakenonthesubstanceoftheapplication,andmust aim at bringing together any “family relations” – an undefined and open-ended

152 SeeFAC,D-3794/2014.153 CounciloftheEU,doc.No.12364/09,abovefn.101,p.35.

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expression 154 – on humanitarian grounds based in particular on family or culturalconsiderations. The reference to “cultural considerations” implies thatMember Statesshould appraise the existence of family ties in a culturally sensitive manner. TherequestedStatemustreplywithintwomonthsoftherequest,andthepersonsconcernedmustconsenttotheassumptionofresponsibility.Asarule,theapplicationoftheclausesisoptional.Inparticular,thesovereigntyclauseallows“eachMemberStatetodecide,initsabsolutediscretion,onthebasisofpolitical,humanitarianorpracticalconsiderations,toagreetoexamineanasylumapplication”.155However,according to thewell-establishedcase-lawof theFAC, theapplicationof theclauses becomes mandatory whenever this is necessary to guarantee respect forSwitzerland’s international obligations, including those that protect family life.156TheEuropeanCourtofJusticehasnotsubscribedtothislineofargumentintheinterpretationoftheRegulation.157Still,MemberStatesareentitledtodefineforthemselvesthecasesinwhichtheyintendtoapplythediscretionaryclause,andthecase-lawoftheFACdoesjustthat.Furthermore,evenifitfollowsadifferentargumentativepath,thecase-lawoftheCJEUconvergesonthekeypoint,i.e.thattransfersviolatingrelevantinternationalandEUstandardsmay not be carried out,158andmore generally that the Regulationmust beappliedinsuchawaythathumanrightsareatalltimesrespected.159Theapplicationofthediscretionaryclausesinlightoftherighttorespectforfamilylifeandother fundamental rights isconsideredbelow insection4.3.Beyond internationalobligations,thediscretionaryclausesmay(andshould)alsobeappliedonhumanitarianandcompassionategrounds.Indeed,underSwissLawthisistheonlyotherpermissiblegroundforaderogationtoordinaryDublinrules.160Insection4.4,theprinciplesapplyinginthisregardwillbereviewed.Before turning to these aspects, it is necessary to critically scrutinize the argument –recurring in Swiss practice, and informing a restrictive approach to the protection of

154 SeemutatismutandisK,C-245/11,abovefn.135,para40.Notethat,indistinctiontoArticles2(g)and

16DRIII,theterms“familyrelation”arenotqualifiedbyapre-flightcondition.155 See among othersM.A. and Others v. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others, C-

661/17,CJEU,23January2019,para58.156 Concerning the sovereignty clause, see e.g. ATAF2013/24, § 5.1; ATAF2017VI/5, § 8.5.2. In this

perspective, the FAC has also pointed out that while the sovereignty clause vests in the State adiscretionarypowerandmaynotbeinvokedpersebyapplicants,itmaybeinvokedinconjunctionwithinternationalordomesticprovisionsprotectingtheapplicant(seeATAF2010/45,§5).Thecase-lawislessdevelopedinrespectofthehumanitarianclause,butthesameratiodecidendiappliestoit.Indeed,MemberStatesmustatalltimesrespecthumanrightsinapplyingtheDublinRegulation,andmustthereforeapplyanyprovisionsthatmakethispossibleinthegivencircumstances–includingsendingoracceptingarequestunderArticle17(2)DRIIIifnecessary.

157 SeeinparticularBundesrepublikDeutschlandv.KavehPuid,C-4/11,CJEU,14November2013,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,52d7bb664.html,para24ff;M.A.andOthers,C-661/17,abovefn.155,para71f.

158 See e.g. C. K., H. F., A. S. v Republika Slovenija, C-578/16, CJEU, 16 February 2017, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,598b18334.html,especiallyatpara65.

159 SeeinparticularN.S.,CaseC-411/10,abovefn.21,para77.160 SeeOrdonnance1 du11 août 1999 sur l'asile relative à la procédure (hereafter: “Ordinance1 on

Asylum”or“OA1”),RS142.311,Article29a(3);J.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.407.

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familyunityviathediscretionaryclauses–thatderogationstotheordinaryDublinrulesshouldonlybemadesparingly(section4.2).

4.2 Should the discretionary clauses be applied restrictively? Asjustobserved,aconceptrecurringinthecase-lawoftheFACintheliteratureisthattheuseofthediscretionaryclausesshouldnotbetoobroadinordernottounderminetheeffetutileoftheDublinsystem.161Thislineofargument,however,doesnotsitwellwiththeprovisionsandpreambleoftheRegulation.Tobeginwith,thetextofArticle17DRIIIinnowaysuggeststhattheclausesshouldbeused“exceptionally”.Indeed,theCJEUhasmanytimesconfirmedthattheapplicationofthe sovereignty clause “is not subject to any particular condition”. 162 As for thehumanitarian clause, Article 17(2) DR III does establish some conditions (e.g. time-related)butnothingthatwouldsuggestarestrictiveinterpretation.Thisisconfirmedbythe fact that,on theonlyoccasionwhere it interpreted thehumanitarianclause(recteArticle15(2)oftheDublinIIRegulation),theCJEUoptedforabroadinterpretationandrejectedthevariousrestrictiveinterpretationsthatweresubmittedtoit.163ComingtotheeffetutileoftheRegulation,itmustberecalledthatits“principalobjective”is to “speedup thehandlingof claims in the interestsbothofasylumseekersand theparticipating Member States” 164 by determining swiftly which Member State isresponsible.Applyingthesovereigntyclauseisarguablytheswiftestandmostdirectwaytoachievethisobjective.Muchthesamecanbesaidofthehumanitarianclause,whoseapplication leads either to a consensual transfer – by definition swifter and easier toexecute than a coercive one – or to examining the applicationwhere the applicant ispresent.Asnotedintheintroduction,broaduseofthediscretionaryclausesintheinterestof family unity also has the potential of reducing incentives for irregular onward(“secondary”) movements 165 – another objective often associated to the DublinRegulation.Last but not least, the unambiguously expressed aim of the legislator is that theRegulation, including thediscretionaryclauses,beapplied: (a)with family lifeandthebest interestsofthechildinmindas“primaryconsiderations”(seeabovesection2.3);161 ATAF2015/9,§7.2.SeealsoC.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article17,K2,andmutatismutandis

ATAF2011/9,§8.1.162 ZuheyrFrayehHalafv.DarzhavnaagentsiazabezhantsitepriMinisterskiasavet,C-528/11,CJEU,30

May 2013, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECJ,51a85c224.html, para 36; M.A. andOthers,C-661/17,abovefn.155,para58f.

163 K,C-245/11,abovefn.135,paras29ff.164 N.S.,CaseC-411/10,abovefn.21,para79.165 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a

RegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordetermining theMember State responsible for examining an application for international protectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson(Recast),ImpactAssessment, 3 December 2008, SEC(2008) 2962, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/49997ad90.html,p.20;CounciloftheEU,doc.no.12364/09,abovefn.101,p.35.

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(b)with derogations being made in particular on “humanitarian and compassionategrounds, inorder tobring together familymembers”;and(c) in full respectofhumanrights.Farfromencouragingarestrictiveapplicationoftheclauses,thepreambleratherunambiguouslysuggeststheopposite:thatthelegislatorintendsthediscretionaryclausesto be used systematically to guarantee family life and the best interests of the childwhenevertheordinarycriteriafallshort.Inlinewiththisunderstanding,theCommissionhas over the years invited Member States to make “broader and regular use of thediscretionaryclauses”,nottoshowrestraintintheirapplication.166To conclude on this point, the Dublin Regulation neither requires nor encourages arestrictiveapproachinapplyingthediscretionaryclauses.Theoppositeistrue:inlightoftheaimsandprinciplesoftheRegulation,asexpressedinparticularbythepreamble,theclausesshouldreceiveabroadandsystematicapplicationwheneverfamilylifeisatstake.A similarbut conceptuallydistinctargument is that thecaseswhere thediscretionaryclauses must be applied to protect family life under Article 8 ECHR should be“exceptional”becauseitwasthelegislator’sintentionthatthecriteriashouldcovermostofthesituationswhereArticle8ECHRmandatesfamilyunity.167Certainly,suchalineofargument can be used in support of a broad interpretation of the criteria (see above,section 3). Conversely, it is questionable whether it could be used in support of arestrictiveapplicationofthediscretionaryclauses.In the first place, the assessment of whether the ECHR requires that family unity bemaintainedinagivencasemustbedoneonthetermsoftheECHRitself,notofanapriorilegislative intention that suchcases shouldbe “exceptional”. Inotherwords, even if itwere true that the legislator has deemed the criteria sufficient to ensure ECHR-conformingresultsin“most”cases,itwouldbemethodologicallywrongtoletthiscolour

166 European Commission, A European Agenda on Migration, above fn. 59, p. 13. See also European

Commission,ReportFromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilontheEvaluationof the Dublin System, 6 June 2007, COM(2007) 299 final, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/466e5a082.html,p.7.Delegeferenda,theCommissionhasarguedthe opposite position and proposed to restrict the use of the sovereignty clause (see EuropeanCommission,ProposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson(recast),4May2016,COM(2016)270,Recital21andArticle19).ThisishoweverirrelevanttotheinterpretationoftheDublinIIIRegulation.Furthermore,theonlybranchofthelegislaturethathasexpresseditselfontheDublinIVproposalsofarhasroundlyrejectedthepositionoftheCommission(EuropeanParliament,ReportontheproposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncil establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible forexamininganapplication for internationalprotection lodged inoneof theMemberStatesbya third-countrynationalorastatelessperson(recast),6November2017,doc.A8-0345/2017,Amendments11and125-129;theReporthasbeenendorsedbytheplenary:EuropeanParliament,Decisiontoenterinto interinstitutional negotiations: Establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining theMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMember States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 16 November 2017, PV16/11/2017–7.4,availableat:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/PV-8-2017-11-16-ITM-007-04_EN.html).Therefore,shouldonewanttotakethemethodologically incorrectoptionofinterpretingtheDublin IIIRegulation in lightof thetravaux relatingto itssuccessor, theweightierpositionwouldstillbetheonefavouringabroadapplicationofthediscretionaryclauses.

167 Ibidem.

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anassessmentthatistobecarriedoutonthebasisofthecriteriaidentifiedbytheECtHRinitscase-law(seebelow,4.3and4.4).Secondly,assection4.1abovemakesabundantlyclear,thecriteriafallshortofprovidingcomprehensive protection to family life in the ECHR sense.168 The EU legislator wasacutelyawareofthisevenduringthelastrecastoftheDublinsystem.Toreiterate,theclauseshavebeenknowinglymaintainedinthecurrentRegulationinordertocaterforthe situations in which “the strict application of the binding criteria will lead to aseparationoffamilymembersorofotherrelatives”.169Thus,theargumentthatthecriteriashouldasarulebeenoughtoensureECHR-conformresults,andthatthereforetheuseoftheclausesforthepurposeoffamilyreunificationshouldbeexceptional,isalsodevoidofmerit.

4.3 Applying the discretionary clauses in order to respect human rights obligations

4.3.1 The applicability of Article 8 ECHR in a Dublin context Aswehaveseen,therearecircumstanceswheretheapplicationoftheDublinsystemmayleadtotheseparationoffamilyrelationsorpreventtheirreunion.TheapplicantmayfindherselfinaStatewherefamilyrelationslive,butfallundertheresponsibilityofanotherState.Insomecases,theapplicationofthecriteriamayresultintheseparationoffamiliesofapplicantsbecauseonlyapartofthemistobetransferred,orbecausetheyaretobetransferredtodifferentStates.170OrelseaStatewheretheapplicant’sfamilyrelationsarepresentmay refuse to accept responsibility for her, or the transfermay fail on othergrounds.Article8ECHRcomesintoplaywheneveractionsoromissionstakenundertheDublinRegulation affect “family life”. According to the case-law of the Swiss Supreme Court,intermittentlyappliedbytheFACintheDublincontext,171anadditionalconditionshouldbefulfilledforArticle8ECHRtoapply:thefamilyrelationpresentonnationalterritoryshouldhavesettledstatus(“droitdeprésenceassuré").172Thisisnotinlinewiththecase-lawof theECtHR.Several judgmentsdemonstrate thatwhile thestatusof thepersonsconcerned may have considerable importance when balancing private and publicinterestsagainsteachother(seebelow,4.3.1),itisnotaconditionfortheapplicabilityof

168 SeealsoJ.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.430.169 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria for determining the

responsibleMemberState,abovefn.8,p.9.SeealsoCounciloftheEU,doc.no.12364/09,abovefn.101,p.35.

170 Seee.g.FAC,joinedcasesD-3153/2014andD-3154/2014.171 Seee.g.ATAF2012/4,§4.3and4.4(conditionrecalledbutsetaside);ATAF2013/24,§5.2andFAC,

joinedcasesD-3153/2014andD-3154/2014,§9.7,aswellasFAC,E-7670/2016(conditionapplied).Foranexaminatiooftheissue,concludingthatinanycasetheconditionwasfulfilledinthecaseofapersonhavingenjoyedprovisionaladmissionstatusforalongperiod,seeFAC,F-762/2019,§6.2and7.1.

172 Fordiscussion,seeJ.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.432f.

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Article 8 ECHR.173As mentioned, the only relevant question at this stage is whether“familylifeisaffected”.According to the ECtHR “family life” has no fixed definition. Rather, its existence is“essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of closepersonal ties”. 174 This passage can be misunderstood, however. Bona fide maritalrelations,whoseexistenceshouldbeappreciatedinanon-formalisticmanner(seeabovemutatismutandissection3.2.1),constitute“familylife”evenifnotyetfullyestablishedinfact.175Likewise, therelationsbetweenparentsandminorchildrenconstitute ipso jure“familylife”,andlackofclosepersonaltiesmayonlyexceptionallybeinvokedtodenytheprotectionofArticle8ECHR.176ThesepointsareworthstressingbecauseofthetendencyoftheSEMtodenytheexistenceorstabilityof“familylife”betweentheapplicantsandeven their closest familymembers by referring to periods of separation.177This runscounter to Article 8 ECHR, especially in regard to families of refugees and protectionseekers,whomayexperienceevenprolongedseparationduetocircumstancesthatarenotimputabletothem.Forothertypesoffamilyties,factualaspectsplayagreaterroleunderArticle8ECHR.Inthecaseofunmarriedpartners,boththeECtHRandtheFACgiveweighttocohabitation,thebirthofcommonchildrenand,moregenerally,circumstancesattestingtothefactthata relation is stable even in the absence of marriage. 178 Relations between siblings,between parents and adult children, and between members of the extended familyconstitute “family life” when they are real and effective, and are characterized byadditionalelementsofdependency(seealsobelow,section4.4).179Theapplicableprinciplesfromanevidentiarypointofviewhavebeenoutlinedaboveinsection 3.3: non-formalism in appreciating the existence of family ties, flexibility inassessingtheevidenceputforwardand,inthecaseofasylumseekers,theprincipleofthebenefit of the doubt. The inquisitorial maxim and the duty of the administration toestablishtherelevantfactsincooperationwiththeapplicantalsoapply.Bycontrast,theevidentiaryrulesandprincipleslaiddownbytheArticle7(3)DRIII,22DRIIIandtheImplementingRulesarenot formallyapplicable.Still, inpractice, there isconsiderable173 Seee.g.MengeshaKimfec.Suisse,Applicationno.24404/05,ECtHR,29 July2010,availableonly in

Frenchat:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,4c56cc952.html,paras55and61;Agrawc.Suisse,Application no. 3295/06, ECtHR, 29 July 2010, available only in French at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,4c56caa92.html,para44;M.P.E.V.andOthers v. Switzerland,Application no. 3910/13, ECtHR, 8 July 2014, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,53bd356f4.html,paras24,33,45and51ff.SeealsoZ.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,paras44ff;S.Besson,E.Kleber,“CommentairedesArticles3,5,8,12,13,14et16CEDH et du Protocole No 7, CEDH”, in M.S. Nguyen, C. Amarelle (Eds.), Code annoté de droit desmigrations:Droitshumains,Vol.1,Stämpfli,2014,pp.1-72,p.40f.

174 K. and T. v. Finland, Application no. 25702/94, ECtHR, 12 July 2001, available at:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58576,para150.

175 Abdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandali,abovefn.37,para62f.176 SeeS.Besson,E.Kleber,above fn.173,p.31.SeealsoATAF2017VI/5,§8.5.4.1.For theshocking

argumentthatrelationsbetweenafatherandaveryyoungchildwere“toorecent”toamountto“closerelations”,seeFAC,F-762/2019,§5.

177 Seee.g.thepositionoftheFederalOfficeforMigrationinATAF2013/24,§5.1.178 SeeATAF2012/4,§3.3.3.179 SeeS.Besson,E.Kleber,abovefn.173,p.31;M.P.E.V.andOthers,abovefn.173,para31.

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overlapbetweentheevidentiaryissuesarisingunderArticle8ECHRandthosearisingundertheDublinRegulation,aswellasconsiderableoverlapintheapplicablerules.Asamatterofgoodpractice,thefirstinstanceauthorityshouldascertaininaholisticmanner,attheoutsetoftheDublinprocedure,thefamilysituationfromthestandpointofboththeDublinRegulationandtheECHR,takingfulladvantageoftheproceduralinfrastructureprovidedbytheDublinRegulation(e.g.therighttoaninterviewandfamilytracing).ThefindingthatArticle8ECHRappliestriggersinitselfanumberofobligations,alreadyhighlightedabove insection2.2:ensuring that thedecision-makingprocess is fairandsuch as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded byArticle 8; striking a fairbalancebetweenthecompetinginterestsoftheindividualandofsociety;guaranteeinganeffectiveremedyagainstallegedviolationsaswellasnon-discriminationintheenjoymentoffamilylife.Asanapplicationofthegeneralobligationto“strikeafairbalance”,anddependingonthecircumstancesof the case,Article8ECHRmay require theState to ensure that familymembersarenotseparatedorthat theyarebroughttogether in theapplicationof theDublinRegulation.

4.3.2 Striking a fair balance under Article 8 ECHR: general aspects Article8ECHRdoesnotguaranteeperse therightofforeignerstoenterorresideinaparticularcountry.180Nordoesitentaila“generalobligationonthepartofaContractingState to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonialresidenceandtoacceptthenon-nationalspousesforsettlementinthatcountry”.181Still,whenevermigrationcontrolshaveanimpactonfamilylife,acarefulassessmentiscalledforincompliancewiththeobligationsjustrecalled.In thecaseof “settledmigrants”– i.e. foreignerswhohavealreadybeenauthorized toreside – a proposed or actual removal entailing a separation from family membersconstitutesaninterferencethatisprohibited,unlessitcanbejustifiedunderArticle8(2)ECHR.Inthecaseofforeignersseekingadmission–anotionincludingprotectionseekersawaitingadecisionontheirapplication–thequestionis“whether,havingregardtothecircumstancesasawhole,the[authoritiesofthehostStateare]underadutypursuanttoArticle 8 to grant […] a residence permit, thus enabling [the persons concerned] toexercisefamilylifeon[its]territory”.182AspersonssubjecttoaDublinproceduredonotas a rule possess a residence document, Dublin cases usually fall into the lattercategory.183

180 Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, Application no. 12738/10, ECtHR, 3 October 2014, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,584a96604.html,para100.181 Abdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandali,abovefn.37,para68.182 Jeunesse,abovefn.180,paras104ff.SeealsoJihanaAliandOthersv.SwitzerlandandItaly,Application

no. 30474/14, ECtHR, 4 October 2016, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-168401,paras42ff.

183 See e.g.Z.H. and R.H., above fn. 69, paras 39 ff. Indeed, protection seekers possessing a residencedocument issued by the State conducting responsibility determination fall under the latter’sresponsibilityandarethereforenotliabletobeingtransferred,unlesstheyagreetotheapplicationofhigher-rankingfamilycriteria.SeeArticles12and19DRIII.

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Whilethecase-lawrelatingto“settledmigrants”differsfromthatrelatingto“admissioncases”inthereasoningstructureandarguablyinthelevelofprotectionafforded,184theapplicableprinciplesaresimilar:“inbothcontextsregardmustbehadtothefairbalancethat has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of thecommunity as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin ofappreciation”. 185 In carrying out this balancing exercise, the factors to be taken intoaccount – as codified by the Court itself – are “the extent towhich family life wouldeffectivelyberuptured,theextentofthetiesintheContractingState,whetherthereareinsurmountableobstaclesinthewayofthefamilylivinginthecountryoforiginofthealienconcernedandwhethertherearefactorsofimmigrationcontrol”.186Anotherfactorthatisnotexplicitlycitedinthispassage,butthatisextremelyimportant,isthenatureandintensityofthefamilyrelation–inotherwords,thefamilysituationofthepersonsconcerned.187In this regard, it is important tonote that the authoritiesmustnot onlyconsider the position and interests of the applicant but also those of his familymembers.188Wheneverchildrenareaffectedinonewayoranother,theirbestinterestsmustbe“paramount”andbeplacedatthe“heart”oftheauthorities’considerations.189Overall,theStrasbourgCourttendstoshowdeferencetoStateParties’righttocontroltheentryandstayofforeigners,andtoderivepositiveadmissionobligationsfromArticle8ECHR only in especially poignant cases. 190 This seems true also of the handful ofjudgmentsanddecisionsrenderedsofaronArticle8ECHRinaDublincontext.191Theseareexaminedbelow.Asapreliminaryobservation,itisworthpointingoutthatcautionisrequired in handling them as precedent-setting decisions. Firstly, their continuingrelevanceneedstobereassessedinlightofmorerecentdevelopmentsinthepracticeofother international bodies (see below section 4.3.4). Secondly, the case-law is as yetscarce, and largely dependent on the idiosyncratic facts of each case. 192 Thirdly, as

184 Foranin-depthanalysis,seeF.Maiani,L’unitéfamilialeetlesystèmedeDublin-Entregestiondesflux

migratoiresetrespectdesdroits fondamentaux,Helbing&Lichtenhahn,2006,Chap.VI,especiallyatparas106ff.

185 Seee.g.ElGhatetv. Switzerland,Applicationno.56971/10,ECtHR,8November2016,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,5836a1854.html,para43.SeealsoTanda-Muzinga,abovefn.35,para64.

186 Tanda-Muzinga,abovefn.35,para66;Jeunesse,abovefn.180,para107.SeealsoA.S.v.Switzerland,Application no. 39350/13, ECtHR, 30 June 2015, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,5592b8064.html,para47andZ.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,para41.

187 See e.g. Haliti c. Suisse, Application no. 14015/02, ECtHR, 1 March 2005, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,42d3ea164.html; Boultif v. Switzerland, Application no.54273/00, ECtHR, 2 August 2001, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,468cbc9e12.html.

188 SeeinthisregardJeunesse,abovefn.180,para117.189 Seee.g.Tanda-Muzinga,abovefn.35,para67andElGhatet,abovefn.185,para46.190 Foracompellingglobalanalysisandparticularlycriticalappraisal,seeM.-B.Dembour,WhenHumans

BecomeMigrants,OUP,2015,Chapter4.191 A.S.,abovefn.186;A.M.v.Switzerland,Applicationno.37466/13,ECtHR,3November2015,available

at:http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-158985;Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69;JihanaAli,abovefn.182.192 Seee.g.Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,especiallyparas43-45andtheConcurringOpinionofJudgeNicolaou,

pointingouttheuncertaintiesrelatingtotheexistenceof“familylife”andtheextremelyshortdurationoftheseparation.Asafurtherexample,inJihanaAlì,thecaseforfamilyunitywasespeciallyweak,and

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detailedbelowinsection4.3.3, thereasoningoftheCourt inthesedecisionsisstill farfrombeingfullydeveloped.Foritspart,theFAChasdevotedtwoleadingjudgmentstotheissueandaverysubstantialnumberof“unpublished”judgments–manyofwhichhavearathercasuisticcharacter.Itwouldbebeyondthescopeof thispapertoattemptevenacursorydescriptionof thisabundantcase-law.Rather,thefollowingsectionconcentratesonargumentsthatoftenprovedecisive–orshouldprovedecisive–inaDublincontext.Particularconsiderationsarisingoutofsituationsofvulnerabilityarediscussedfurtherbelowinsection4.3.4.

4.3.3 Striking a fair balance under Article 8 ECHR: Dublin-specific aspects WheneverprivateandpublicinterestsarebalancedagainsteachotherinthecontextofArticle8ECHR,thepossibilityofestablishingandenjoyingfamilylifeelsewherewithoutundueobstaclesisacriticallyimportantelementoftheassessment.Unfortunately,inthecontextoftheDublinsystem,theexistenceofsuchapossibilitytendstobeassumedtoolightly.Thus,inATAF2012/4,theFACnotedthatitcouldnotbe“ruledout”thattheapplicant–whoseapplicationforasylumhadbeenrejectedinFrance–couldaccess a family reunificationprocedure there.193In a similar vein, inZ.H. andR.H., theECtHRdismissedtheclaimthatArticle8ECHRhadbeenviolatedbynotinginteraliathat“ithadnotbeenargued”thattheapplicant’swife–aprotectionseekerherself,enjoyingnorighttofreemovement–“waseverpreventedfromjoiningthesecondapplicantafterthelatterhadbeenexpelledtoItaly”.194Suchspeculativeassumptionsareproblematicbecausetheymightleadtheauthoritiestodecline anArticle 8ECHR claimwhen, in fact,no realistic possibility exists to reuniteelsewhere. Indeed, in a Dublin context, the starting assumption should be that thepossibilitiesofenjoyingfamilylifeelsewhereareseverelyrestricted.First,solongastheasylumapplicationispending,returnofthefamilytotheStateoforiginoftheapplicantinordertoenjoyfamilylifethereisruledout.Second,unlessthefamilymembersareEUorEFTAcitizens,EUlegislationdoesnotgivethemtherighttofollowtheapplicanttotheresponsible State – especiallynot if they areprotection seekers.195Third, such a rightmightaccruelater,ifandwhentheapplicantobtainsrefugeestatus.196However,shouldtheapplicantobtainsubsidiaryprotectionor“humanitarian”protectionstatus,heorshewill not benefit from an EU-wide right to family reunification, and the possibilities of

further undermined by the violent resistance opposed by the first applicant to her and her son’stransfer.

193 Seee.g.ATAF2012/4,§4.4.4.194 Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,para45.195 Third-country nationals holding a Swiss residence document enjoy no form of free movement of

personsotherthanforshortstaysundertheSchengenborderscode(CounciloftheEU,Regulation(EC)No.562/2006oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof15March2006establishingaCommunityCodeontherulesgoverningthemovementofpersonsacrossborders(SchengenBordersCode),OJL2006105/1,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb0525.html).

196 See Council of the EU,Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to FamilyReunification, OJ L 2003 251/12, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f8bb4a10.html,Articles9ff.

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reunificationwilldependonnationallegislationandnationalpolicy.197Norwillhisorherresidencedocument, issued inanotherMemberState, automaticallyentail the right tosettlewith the family inSwitzerlandata later stage– indeed,Switzerland isnotevenboundtorecognizethelimitedrightsoffreemovementthatbeneficiariesofprotectionmay theoretically derive from the Directive on the Status of Long-Term Residents.198Fourth,theersatzformsofcontactaffordedbymodernmeansofcommunication199arenot comparable to “enjoying each other’s company”,which is the core of the right torespecttofamilylife.200In short: the possibility of re-establishing family life after aDublin transfermay existunderveryspecificcircumstancesbutcannotbeassumedand,ifatallconsidered,shouldbe the object of a careful and realistic prognosis. 201 Thus the authorities should notdismissArticle8ECHRclaimsmadeinaDublincontextbasedonthegenericassumptionthatsuchapossibilitycannotbeexcluded.As a further observation on this point, even when it is stricto sensu possible for thepersonsconcernedtoestablishfamilylifeelsewhere,itmuststillbeascertainedwhetherthe sacrifice imposed on the persons already present in Switzerland would beproportionate.202InthisregardSwissauthoritiesexaminewhetherthefamilyasawholehas closer tieswith Switzerland orwith the otherMember Statewhere reunificationmightoccur.203Thisisperseunobjectionable.Again,however,careshouldbeappliedtotake into account concretely andholistically thepositionall of thepersons concerned(including theirmigration status), rather than isolated circumstances such as e.g. thepresumablelengthofpresenceontheterritoryofaState.204AnotherrecurringargumentopposedtopersonsinvokingArticle8ECHRagainstaDublintransferisthatseparationmustbeacceptedasitwillonlybe“temporary”.Theargumentappears,inparticular, inapublishedjudgmentoftheFACfrom2012.205Asamatterofprinciple,thereasoningissound:thelengthofseparationcertainlyisarelevantfactorin197 See EMN, Synthesis Report for the EMN Focussed Study 2016 Family Reunification of Third-Country

Nationals in the EU plus Norway: National Practices, April 2017, available at:https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/00_family_reunification_synthesis_report_final_en_print_ready_0.pdf,especiallyatp.12,15and20.ThelegislationoftheStatethatgrantedstatusmightalsoconstituteanobstacletotravel:seeFAC,F-762/2019,§7.4.

198 CounciloftheEU,CouncilDirective2003/109/ECof25November2003ConcerningtheStatusofThird-Country Nationals Who are Long-Term Residents, 23 January 2004, OJ L. 16-44, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/4156e6bd4.html.

199 Seee.g.FAC,D-4424/2016,p.11;FAC,F-6/2019,p.9.200 Olsson v. Sweden No. 1, Application no. 10465/83, ECtHR, 24 March 1988, available at:

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57548,para59.SeealsoFAC,F-762/2019,§7.4.201 SeeforinstanceATAF2013/24,§5.1infine.202 See Sen c. Pays-Bas, Application no. 31465/96, ECtHR, 21 December 2001, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,402a26b74.html, paras 38-41; Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v.the Netherlands, Application no. 60665/00, ECtHR, 1 December 2005, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,43a29e674.html, paras 47 ff; Jeunesse, above fn. 180, paras120ff.

203 J.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.435andreferencesgiven.204 CompareATAF2012/4,§4.4.4andATAF2013/24,§5.1.205 See,again,ATAF2012/4,§4.4.4.

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assessing the compatibility of a StatemeasurewithArticle8ECHR206– including in aDublincontext.207However,becauseofthelegalframeworkregulatingintra-EUmobilityofthirdcountrynationalsdescribedabove,andbecauseofthevaryingdurationofasylumproceduresintheDublinStates,itwillusuallybedifficulttomakeareliableprognosisonthis point, and “temporary” may very well mean that the separation will last for aconsiderableamountof time.Furthermore,as theFAC itselfhasrightlypointedout inATAF2013/24,dependingonthefactsofthecase,evenrelativelyshortseparationsmayinfringe Article 8 ECHR.208This will be the case, particularly, when the separation ofchildren fromoneof theirparents is involved209or,byanalogy,ofdependentpersonsfromthosegivingthememotionalandpracticalsupport.Whereas the points above have been rather intensively discussed inDublin litigation,otheraspectsthatwoulddeserveatleastasmuchattentionhavebeenhithertolargelyignoredbothbytheECtHRandtheFAC:

• First,astheECtHRhasreiteratedonmanyoccasions,asylumseekersandrefugeesare a vulnerable group entitled to particular protection. 210 This aspect, whichdominates discussions around the compatibility of transfers with Article 3ECHR,211isoften leftunaddressed in “family”cases.A.S.,discussedbelow in thefollowing section, provides an egregious example. Even in Z.H. and R.H. theStrasbourgCourthasfailedtotakeintoconsiderationtheintenseanguishcausedtotheyoungbridebythetransferofherhusband.212Thespecialvulnerability(andthe special position) of protection seekers and refugees should be taken intoaccountparticularlywhenitcomestoadjudicatingonthecircumstancesoffamilyformation and family separation. True, it is settled case-law, applicable also toprotection seekers, that family ties formed during periods of temporarily“tolerated” staywillnotasa ruleentail anobligationof admission for thehostState. 213 Conversely, however, in regard to family ties formed previously thecircumstances of separation will oftentimes be involuntary and should weighdecisivelyinfavouroftheapplicant’s interests.214Similarly,asrecalledaboveinsection4.3.1,itisimpropertoimpugntheeffectivenessoffamilytiesbecauseofperiods of involuntary separation caused by the circumstances of flight andonwardtravel.

206 See e.g. Gül v. Switzerland, Application no. 23218/94, ECtHR, 19 February 1996, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,3ae6b6b20.html,para36;Yilmazc.Allemagne,Applicationno.52853/99, ECtHR, 17 April 2003, available at:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,3f264a480.html,para48.

207 Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,para45andCuncurringOpinionofJudgeNicolaouinfine.208 SeeATAF2013/24,§5.1.209 Onthetimefactoringeneralfamilyreunificationprocedures,seeTanda-Muzinga,abovefn.35,para

80.210 Seee.g.M.S.S., above fn.32,para251;Tarakhelv. Switzerland,Applicationno.29217/12,ECtHR,4

November2014,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,5458abfd4.html,paras118ff.211 Seee.g.M.S.S.,abovefn.32.212 Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,ConcurringOpinionofJudgeNicolaou,p.13.213 SeeinparticularJeunesse,abovefn.180,para103faswellasA.S.,abovefn.186,para44andZ.H.and

R.H.,abovefn.69,para38.InSwisspractice,seeATAF2012/4,§4.4.3f.214 SeeTanda-Muzinga,abovefn.35,paras74ff.

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• WhenassessingthecompatibilitywithArticle8ECHRofatransfer,oranyothermeasure adopted under the Dublin Regulation, it is important to accuratelyidentifyandassessthepublicinterestatstake.o Assumingthattherearenospecialcircumstances,theinterestserved

byaDublintransferis–inthetaxonomyofArticle8ECHR–“thepublicorder interests of the respondent Government in controllingimmigration”.215Whilethisisindisputablyalegitimatepublicinterest,decision-makers often fail to appreciate that its intensity is far lesspronounced than in criminal cases. Arguably, the public interest incontrollingimmigrationisalsolesspronouncedinDublincases,whichconcernaformoftemporaryadmissionthatmayormaynotbecomemore stable, than in ordinary family reunification cases, where thequestionisimmediatelywhetheraforeignershouldbeauthorizedtosettleinthecountry.216

o AsJean-PierreMonnethasargued,thepublicinterestintransferringthe applicant is further diminished where the applicant manifestlyfulfils the conditions to benefit from family reunification inSwitzerlandatalaterstage–particularlysowhenheorshehastherighttobenefitfrom“familyasylum”withinthemeaningofArticle51of the Swiss Asylum Act. 217 In such cases, the transfer to anotherMember State would not serve any discernible public interest andshouldthereforeasaruleberenouncedinfavouroftheapplicationofthesovereigntyclause.

o Thepublicinterestisalsoaprioriinsufficienttojustifyaninterferencewith family life when the administration decides, for “practicalconsiderations”,toassumeresponsibilityunderthesovereigntyclauseand thus prevents the application of the family-based criteria.218Insuchcases,theapplicationofthesovereigntyclauseshouldarguablybetreatedasaninterferenceintherighttorespectforfamilylife,andinourviewnoneoftheinterestslistedinArticle8(2)ECHRmaycoverreasonsofpureadministrativeconvenience.

215 Seee.g.Jeunesse,abovefn.180,para121;Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,para46.216 Alongsimilarlines,seeJ.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.433.Foritspart,theECtHRhasnotyetmadesuch

finedistinctions:seeA.S.,abovefn.186,para46;Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,para40.This,ofcourse,doesnotexcludethatinparticularcases,characterizedbyaclearattempttocircumventtheordinaryrules on family reunification, the public interest in controlling immigration may be especiallypronounced:seeFAC,F-762/2019,§7.2.1.

217 Loi sur l’asile du 26 juin 1998 (Asylum Act), RS 142.31, English translation available at:https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995092/index.html.J.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.433.OnthescopeofapplicationofArticle51,seeATAF2017VI/4aswellasFAC,E-5669/2016andFAC,E-1721/2019.OnArticle51(4)andtheconditionsofpre-flightfamilyformation,seeFAC,D-3664/2016.

218 M.A.andOthers,C-661/17,abovefn.155,para58.Forexamples,seeUNHCR,LeftinLimbo,abovefn.13,p.126.SuchasituationshouldintheorynotoccurinSwitzerland,astheonlylegalgroundsforderogating from the ordinary criteria are, in addition to respecting international obligations,humanitarianreasons.Still,itmaynotbeentirelyexcludedasamatterofpractice:seeJ.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.409.

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• AsamatternotofECHRlaw,butof“DublinLaw”,whenbalancingtheinterestsatstakeagainsteachotherregardshouldbehadtoRecital14DRIII,whichmentions“respect for family life” as a “primary consideration” for the authoritiesimplementing the Dublin Regulation (emphasis added). As it has been arguedaboveinsection2.3,andbyanalogywiththeprincipleofthebestinterestsofthechild, this implies thatadditionalweightmustbegivento the interest in familyunityintheimplementationoftheDublinsystem.

TheseargumentsweighstronglyinfavourofmaintainingorreconstitutingfamilyunityintheDublincontext,andfurtherbuttresstheconclusionexposedaboveinsection4.1thatthecaseswhereArticle8ECHRrequiresthisshouldnotberegardedas“exceptional”.Indeed, in a system where the protection of family life is a “primary consideration”,preservingorpromotingfamilyunityshouldbethenormratherthantheexception.Thisconclusion is valid a fortiori in situations characterized by particular vulnerabilities,examinedbelow.

4.3.4 Special considerations applying in situations of dependency and vulnerability Whileprotectionseekersingeneralarea“vulnerablegroup”,theapplicationoftheDublinRegulation may impact persons finding themselves in situations of particularvulnerability and dependency (e.g. ill persons, elderly persons, children, pregnantwomen,motherswithyoungchildren).Becauseoflimitationsinitsscopeofapplication,Article16DRIIIdoesnotprovidecomprehensiveprotectiontothesepersonsagainsttherigoursoftheDublinprocess.Theapplicationofthediscretionaryclausesmaythereforebecomenecessary.Fromthestandpointofhumanrightslaw,thevulnerabilityofanapplicantmaygiverisetoseveralquestions.Tobeginwith,theperson’sstateofhealthmaybeperseincompatiblewithatransfer,219orelse theremaybedoubtsas to theavailabilityofappropriatereception facilitiesorhealthcareintheresponsibleState.Suchissues–whichareusuallyanalysedundertheangleoftheprohibitionofinhumanordegradingtreatment–donotnecessarilyrelatetofamilyunity,220anddonot formperse theobjectof thepresentstudy.Still, itmustbeemphasizedthatinthecasesdescribedaboveappropriateguaranteeshavetobeinplacethatfamilyunitywillbemaintained:

• AsexplicitlyaffirmedintheTarakheljudgmentoftheECtHR,thetransferringStatehas theobligation toobtainguarantees fromtheresponsibleState that familieswithchildrenwillnotbeseparatedoncetheyaretakenchargeofortakenback.221The FAC has denied that such an obligation applies to other categories of

219 Seee.g.C.K.,C-578/16,abovefn.158.220 See e.g. UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), Adam Harun v. Switzerland, communication no.

758/2016,8February2019,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5c5ab4bc4.pdf.221 Tarakhel,abovefn.210,para120.Inpractice,problemsarestillobserved:seeOSAR/DRC,Ismutual

trust enough?, 9 February 2017, available at: https://www.osar.ch/assets/news/2017/drc-osar-drmp-report-090217.pdf,p.13,17;OSAR/DRC,Mutualtrustenoughisstillnotenough,12December2018,availableat:https://drc.ngo/media/5015811/mutual-trust.pdf,p.22.

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vulnerable persons.222However, theA.S. judgment of theECtHR clearly impliesthat theprinciples affirmed inTarakhel, including theprincipleof familyunity,applyatthevery leastwithrespectto“critically ill” transferees.223FurthermoretheUNCommitteeAgainstTorturehasmorerecentlyaffirmedtheapplicabilityofdutiescomparabletothosestemmingfromTarakheltotorturevictims.224

• As a corollary of the principle of family unity affirmed in Tarakhel, when the

transfer is cancelled for some members of the family on account of theirvulnerability,utmostcareshouldbetakennottoseparatethemfromtherestoftheirfamilybytransferringthelatter.225

Dublin transfer involving situations of particular vulnerabilitymay alsomore directlyraise issuesof familyunity.Thiswillbe thecasewhen the transferee isaparticularlyvulnerableperson,andthetransferwoulddepriveheroffamilysupportavailableinthetransferring State – orvice versa,when the transferwouldmake it impossible for thetransfereetoprovidecareandsupporttoavulnerablememberofherfamily.SuchacasehasbeenexaminedunderthestandpointofbothArticles3and8ECHRbytheECtHR inA.S. vs Switzerland. In this case, a torture victim suffering from severe post-traumaticstressdisorder,andbenefitingfromthesupportofhissistersinGeneva,wastobetransferredtoItaly.Letitbenotedthat,undertheinterpretationproposedaboveinsection3.4.3,Article16DRIIIshouldhavebeenappliedandtheissueshouldnothavebeenexaminedunderthestandpointofthediscretionaryclauses.BeforetheECtHR,theapplicantreferredtoboththeinadequateconditionsawaitinghiminItalyandtothedetrimentaleffectsthathewouldsufferifdeprivedoffamilysupport.TheCourtrejectedbothclaims.First,itappliedtherestrictiveNvstheUnitedKingdomtesttothequestionofwhethertheapplicant’sillnessraisedanissueunderArticle3ECHR,andconcludedinthenegative.226Thispartofthejudgmentisnolongergoodlaw.Ontheonehand,theCourtitselfhasrevisedtheapplicabletest.227Ontheotherhand,andmoreimportantly,theEuropeanCourtofJusticehasdefinedamorelenienttestapplicableintheDublincontext.228Secondly, concerningArticle8ECHR, theCourtmerely repeatedstandard language of dubious relevance to the facts of the case,229andnoted that theapplicant could not during his short stay in Switzerland have “establish[ed] and

222 SeeATAF2017VI/10,§5.3ff.223 A.S.,abovefn.186,para36.224 SeeinparticularCAT,A.N.v.Switzerland,communicationno.742/2016,3August2018,availableat:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,CAT,5b964c664.html,paras8.6and8.8.SeealsoCAT,AdamHarunvSwitzerland,abovefn.220.

225 Asanexampleofhowpurelyadministrativeaccidentsmayresultinseparationofthiskind,seeZ.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69.

226 A.S.,abovefn.186,paras31-38.227 Paposhviliv.Belgium,abovefn.34,paras181ff.SeealsoATAF2017VI/7,§6.2.228 C.K.,C-578/16,abovefn.158,para74.Underthiscase-law,transfersresultingina“realandproven

riskofasignificantandpermanentdeterioration”oftheapplicant’sstateofhealthconstituteinhumananddegradingtreatment.SeealsoATAF2017VI/10,§6.4ff.

229 E.g.A.S.,abovefn.186,para44onconfrontingtheStateauthoritieswithfamilylifeasafaitaccompli,whereinfact itwasnotseriouslycontestedthattherelationbetweentheapplicantandthesistersalreadyexistedintheircountryoforigin.

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develop[ed] strong family ties” with his sisters.230 This last argument, however, wasbesidethepointraisedbytheapplicant.Asfarasfamilyunityisconcerned,theapplicantargued that (a) he was demonstrably dependent, as a torture victim, on his sisters’support, and (b) the proposed transferwoulddeprive himof that support. TheCourtfailed entirely to address thesepoints, be it from the standpoint ofArticle 3ECHRorArticle8ECHR.231This unfortunate judgmenthas apparently encouraged the SEM to followa restrictivecourse.232ThispracticeneedstoberevisedinlightoftherecentpronouncementsoftheUNCommitteeAgainstTorture. InA.N.,acasefactually indistinguishablefromA.S.andraisingtheissueofwhetherthetransfertoItalyofatorturevictimwouldbecompatiblewiththeCAT,theCommitteegaveconsiderableweighttothefactthatsuchacourseofactionwould deprive the applicant of the support of his extended family (in casu thebrother) and thus compromise his rehabilitation.233 The Committee concluded that atransferwouldbeincompatiblewiththeCAT.ItwouldbemistakentotreatA.N.asanisolateddecision.Onthecontrary,A.N.addressesageneralissueandsetsanimportantprecedent.Torturevictimsoftenseekrefugeinacountrywheretheirfamilymembersarepresentbecausefamilysupportisessentialtothereconstructionoftheirlivesinanewandunfamiliarenvironment.Inrecognitionofthis, theCommitteehasclarifiedthatsincetorturevictimshavearighttomedicalandsocialrehabilitationunderArt.14CAT,depriving themof familysupportbyremovingthemtoanotherStatewillnormallycontravenethisprovision.A.N.shouldalsoleadtoareconsiderationofA.S.fromthestandpointofArt.8ECHR.Basedon what has just been said concerning the importance of family support for therehabilitationoftorturevictims,andoftheexceptionalvulnerabilityofthelatter,specialelementsofdependence for thepurposeofArticle8ECHRshouldbeconsideredtobepresentbydefinition.Inconclusion,whenevertheyareconfrontedwithasituationsimilartothatofA.S.andA.N., the authorities should start from the presumption that the transfer to anotherMemberStateisimpermissible,andthatthesovereigntyclauseshouldbeappliedinstead.Giventhat thisreasoning is toa largeextentbasedonthevulnerabilityof thepersonsconcerned,thereisastrongcaseforapplyingtheA.N.precedentnotjusttotorturevictimsbut to other categories of particularly vulnerable persons who benefit from familysupportinSwitzerlandand,foronereasonoranother,donotcomeunderthescopeofArticle16DRIIIortheotherfamilycriteria.Thisistrue,inparticular,ofchildrenwhoarevictimsof“anyformofneglect,exploitation,orabuse;tortureoranyformofcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment;or armed conflict”. Under Art.39 CRC, States must take all appropriate measures to

230 Ibidem,para49.231 Ibidem, paras20and41.SeealsoS.Nicolosi,R.Delbaere,A.S. v. Switzerland:missedopportunity to

explain different degrees of vulnerability in asylum cases, 16 July 2015, available at:https://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/07/16.

232 Seee.g.FAC,D-7674/2015;FAC,D-6273/2017;FAC,D-2069/2016.233 CAT,A.N.vSwitzerland,abovefn.224,particularlyparas8.7and8.10.

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promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of thesechildren,inanenvironmentthatfosterstheir“health,self-respectanddignity”.Asarule,thisshouldbartransferringthechildawayfromasupportivefamilyenvironment.

4.3.5 The equal enjoyment of family life under the Dublin Regulation Inapplying theDublinRegulation,as inanyother legal field, theMemberStatesmustensureunderArticle14ECHRtheequalenjoymentoffamilylife(seeparticularlyrecital32DRIII).This implies thatunjustifieddifferencesof treatmentmustbeavoided. Inasimilarvein,theFAChascitedtheprincipleofequalityasoneoftheprinciplesthatmaybeinvokedbyapplicantsinconjunctionwiththesovereigntyclause.Thegapsand inconsistenciesof the family-relatedprovisionsof theDublinRegulationhavebeenhighlightedaboveinsections3.2.2and4.1.Insection3.2.2,ithasbeenarguedthatcarefuluseofteleologicalandanalogicalinterpretationshouldbemadeinordertosystematicallyeliminateanyunjustifieddistinctionsthatmightderivefromthem.Fromamethodologicalstandpoint,thealternativeistomakesystematicuseofthediscretionaryclauses.234AsconcernstheECHR,itdoesnotmatterwhichlegalmethodisemployedsolongasnodiscriminationiscommitted.Appliedintheperspectiveofnon-discrimination,thediscretionaryclauseswillhavetobeusedparticularlyinorderto“roundofftheedges”oftheresponsibilitycriteria,235andtoavoidthat–astheFAChasputit–someapplicantsfallbetweentwostools(zwischenStuhlund Bank). 236 Thus in borderline cases – i.e. cases that fall just outside the scope ofapplication of the family-based responsibility criteria – careful scrutiny under thestandpointofnon-discriminationisrequired,includingananalysisofthecomparabilityof the situations involved, of the objective reasons capable of justifying a disparity oftreatment,andoftheobservanceoftheprincipleofproportionality.

4.4 Humanitarian and compassionate reasons for applying the discretionary clauses

Beyondinternationalobligations,humanitarianconsiderationsmaybestrongenoughtowarranttheuseofdiscretioninfavouroffamilyunity.Ontheonehand,theCJEUjudgmentinKisarguablystillapplicableinthecontextofArticle17DRIIIforthesituationsthatarenotcoveredbyArticle16DRIII.Ontheotherhand,first-instancedecision-makersmusttake intoaccount theprinciples establishedby theFAC in respectofArticle29a(3)ofOrdinance1onAsylum.237

234 Seee.g.C.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article16,K1,onremedyinginthiswaythedefective

formulationofArticle16ondependency.235 SeeforanexampleofthisreasoningJ.-P.Monnet,abovefn.51,p.431.236 FAC,D-3794/2014,§7.6.Unfortunately,inthatcasetheFACdidnotexaminewhethertheprincipleof

equalityof treatmentcommandedanextensiveapplicationofArticle9DRIIIvia thediscretionaryclauses.

237 Ordinance1onAsylum,abovefn.160.

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4.4.1 Humanitarian grounds under the Dublin Regulation: on the continuing relevance of the K judgment

UnderoldArticle15(2)DRII,dependentrelativeshadtobe“normally”keptorbroughttogether,providedthatfamilytieshadexistedinthecountryoforigin.IntheKcase,theCJEUmade itclearthat thenotionof“relative”shouldbe interpretedbroadlyand inamannerinclusivee.g.ofthedaughter-in-lawandgrandchildrenoftheasylumseeker.238Furthermore, the Court interpretedArticle 15(2)DR II asmeaning that States shouldmaintainorreconstitutefamilyunitysavein“exceptionalcircumstances”.239TheoldprovisionhasbeenreplacedbyArticle16DRIII,whichisamandatorycriterionandimposesafirmerobligation,buthasasignificantlynarrowerscope(seeabovesection3.4.3).Inviewofitswording,andevenmakingallowanceforanextensiveinterpretationasproposedabove,Article16canhardlybereadaslayingdownanobligationto“keeporbringtogether”applicantsand“relatives”broadlydefinedsuchascousinsorin-laws.240Therefore,allthesituationsofdependencythatwereformerlycoveredbytheKcase-law,and do not fall under Article16 DR III, must be examined in light of the “general”discretionaryclausesofArticle17DRIII.ThequestioniswhetherinsuchsituationsthequalifieddutyaffirmedinKstillapplies,despitethechangedlegallandscape.Theissueappearsnottohavebeenaddressedinthecase-lawoftheFAC,whichseeminglyrefers to theK case only in the context ofArticle 16DR III.241Still, there areweightyargumentsinfavourofacontinuedapplicationofKbeyondtheconfinesofthatprovision.First, as evinced by the travaux préparatoires, the restrictive wording chosen forArticle16DRIIIwasaresponsetotheproposedtransformationofoldArticle15(2)DRIIfrom a “semi-binding” to a fully binding criterion, 242 but cannot be interpreted as arejectionof theK judgment by the legislator.243In the secondplace, an interpretationaccepting that – beyond the scope ofArticle 16DR III – the obligations affirmed inK238 K,C-245/11,abovefn.135,para38.239 K,C-245/11,abovefn.135.240 SeeC.Filzwieser,A.Sprung,abovefn.24,Article16MNK1.ForthecontrarypositionthatArticle16

DRIIImuststillbeinterpretedinlightoftheKjudgment,seeECRE,ECRECommentsonRegulation(EU)No604/2013oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof26June2013establishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson(recast),March2015,availableat:https://www.refworld.org/docid/552254094.html,p.21.ItisworthnotingthatinK,theCourtreliedonnowrepealedwordingofoldArticle15(2)DRII:seeK,C-245/11,abovefn.135,paras38-41.

241 SeeinparticularATAF2017VI/5,§8.3.3.SeealsoFAC,D-3566/2018;FAC,D-5090/2017.242 NotethatthecharacterizationofArticle15(2)DRIIassemi-bindingorimplicitlybindingpredatesthe

K judgment:seeCouncilof theEU,Proposal foraRegulationof theEuropeanParliamentandof theCouncil establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible forexamininganapplication for internationalprotection lodged inoneof theMemberStatesbya third-countrynationalora statelessperson (recast) -Certain issues, doc.no.14950/10,15October2010,availableat:https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14950-2010-INIT/en/pdf,p.2.

243 NegotiationsontheprovisionwereinessencefinalizedmonthsbeforetheCJEUgaveitsjudgment:seeCounciloftheEU,ProposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganapplicationforinternationalprotectionlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathird-countrynationalorastatelessperson (Recast), doc. no.12746/2/12, 27July 2012, available at:https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12746-2012-REV-2/en/pdf.

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disappearunder thenewRegulationwould contradict the statedaimof theDublin IIIRegulationof“making[…]improvements[…]to[…]theprotectiongrantedtoapplicants”(Recital9).Thirdlyandlastly,theinterpretationproposedherewouldnotmakeArticle16redundant. As it has been argued above, this provision identifies a narrow subset ofdependency situations and places them under a firmer obligation to “keep or bringtogether” (see above, section 3.4.3). For all the other cases formerly covered byArticle15(2) of the Dublin II Regulation and now covered by Article17 DR III – e.g.dependency between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law – “keeping or bringingtogether”remainsamorequalifiedobligationinlinewiththeKjudgment.244

4.4.2 Humanitarian reasons under Article 29a of Ordinance 1 on Asylum Article29a(3)ofOrdinance1onAsylum(OA1)authorizestheSEMtoexamineanasylumapplication that would fall under the responsibility of another Member State for“humanitarian reasons”.Asnotedalready, apart from the caseswhere the clausesareapplied to fulfil the international obligations of Switzerland, this is the only legallypermissiblegroundfortheSEMtoapplythesovereigntyclause.245Article29a(3)OA1isa“may”provision(Kann-Vorschrift)andvestsbroaddiscretionintheSEM.Therefore the latter’sdecisionscanonlybe reviewed toverifywhether suchdiscretionhasbeenusedinalaw-abidingmanner.ThisdoesnotmeanthatthediscretionoftheSEMisunfettered.Firstofall,theSEMhasthedutytopositivelyexaminewhetherArticle29aOA1shouldbeappliedinagivencase.Tothiseffect,itmustestablishcorrectlyandexhaustivelyalltherelevantfactsandtakethemintoaccountinitsdecision.246Thedecisionitselfmustbetakenonthebasisoftransparent,reasonablecriteriaincludingthefollowing:247

• Particularvulnerabilitiesofthepersonsconcerned;

• Thebestinterestsofthechild;

• Traumaticexperiences,especiallyintheStatetowhichatransferisproposed;

• Considerationspertainingtofamilyunity;

• The duration of theDublin procedure or of the presence in Switzerland of thepersonconcerned.

Takenindividually,factorsofthiskindareasarulenotsufficientfortheapplicationofArticle29aOA1.However,whenon thebasisof cumulativegrounds it appears that atransferwouldbeproblematic fromahumanitarianstandpoint, theapplicationof that

244 Inthesamesense,seealsoU.Brandl,"FamilyUnityandFamilyReunificationintheDublinSystem:

StillUtopiaorAlreadyReality?”in:V.Chetail,P.DeBruycker,F.Maiani(Eds.),ReformingtheCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem:TheNewEuropeanRefugeeLaw,Brill/Nijhoff,2016,pp.143-158,atp.153.

245 Article29a(3)OA1constitutesthe“concretization”indomesticlawofthesovereignyclause:seeATAF2010/45,§8.2.1;ATAF2015/9,§7.5.

246 ATAF2015/9,§8.1.247 SeeATAF2015/9,§8.1;ATAF2017VI/10,§6;FAC,E-504/2016,§5.4.SeealsoJ.-P.Monnet,abovefn.

51,p.426ff.

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provisionmustbetakenintoconsideration.248UnfortunatelytheSEMhasnotmadeitspolicyknown,249andthisdetractsfundamentallyfromthetransparencythatisrequiredbytheFACinitspublishedcase-law.Asa lastpoint, thedecision takenby theSEMmustbeexempt fromarbitrarinessandrespect the right to be heard, as well as the general principles of equality andproportionality. In order to enable effective judicial review, and in light of the broaddiscretion enjoyed by the SEM, the Secretariat is subject to a reinforced duty to statereasons.250

4.5 Options to prevent or end the separation of family members under the discretionary clauses

Intheparagraphsabove,thesituationswherethereisahumanrightsorhumanitarianduty to keep or bring together family relations have been outlined. Usually, thesesituationsarise inacontextwheretheapplicant isresistingremoval fromSwitzerlandandrequestingtheauthoritiestoapplythesovereigntyclause.This,however,isnottheonly contextwheremaintaining or restoring family unitymay be required, nor is theapplicationofthesovereigntyclausetheonlymeasureliabletobeadoptedtothisend.Iftheapplicantandhis familyarepresentonState territory, familyunitymay in factbeachieved either by applying the sovereignty clause or by transferring all the familytogether,unlesstherearecounter-indications.251If theapplicant is inanotherMemberState, positive obligations to admit the applicant as derived from the ECHR or fromhumanitarianconsiderationsmaytranslateintoadutytoacceptarequesttransmittedtoSwitzerland under the humanitarian clause of Article 17(2) DR III. This is simply theapplicationtoadifferentsetofcircumstancesofthesamelogicthattheFAChasfollowedinstatingthatArticle8ECHRmaymake itmandatorytoapplythesovereigntyclause.Likewise,iftheapplicantisinSwitzerlandandthemembersofthefamilyareinanotherMemberState,thedutytopromotereunificationmayentailadutytosendatakechargerequestanddiligentlyfollowitthroughunderArticle17(2)DRIII.252Theremayevenbecaseswhereconsiderationsoffamilyunitymakeitimpermissibletousethesovereigntyclause.True,Article17DRIIIgivestheMemberStatestherighttoderogatefromthecriteriaanditsexerciseisnotsubjecttoanyparticularconditions(seeabove,4.1).Still,asnotedabove,usingthatrightinasituationwherethefamilycriteriawouldotherwisebeapplicablemaybeconstruedasaninterferenceinfamilylifethat–assumingthatthesovereigntyclauseisbeingusedforreasonsofexpediency–cannotbejustifiedinlightofArticle8(2)ECHR.253Inshort:wheneverhumanrightslaworcompellinghumanitarianconsiderationsrequirethatfamilyunitybemaintainedorreconstituted,suchdutiesmaytranslatevariouslyin248 SeeATAF2011/9,§8.2.SeealsoFAC,E-504/2016,§5.2.249 SeeSEM,abovefn.10,point2.3.3.250 SeeATAF2015/9,§8.1and8.2.2;FAC,E-504/2016,§5.4ff;FAC,E-2780/2016,§7.4.251 Seee.g.Z.H.andR.H.,abovefn.69,ConcurringOpinionofJudgeNicolaouinfine.252 SeeFAC,D-3153/2014,§9.9-9.19.253 Seeabove,section4.3.4.

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dutiestoapply(ortorefrainfromapplying)Article17DRIIIinallitsaspects.Theonlyimperativeisfamilyunity.

4.6 Summary of main points Thediscretionaryclausesaim interalia “atavoidingsituationswhere familymemberswould be separated due to the strict application of the Dublin criteria”. 254 Theirapplication is mandatory whenever this is necessary to guarantee respect forSwitzerland’s international obligations, including those that protect family life.Compellinghumanitariangroundsmayalsomakeitmandatorytoapplytheclauses.Nothing in the Dublin Regulation requires or encourages a restrictive approach inapplyingthediscretionaryclauses.Onthecontrary:inlightoftheaimsandprinciplesoftheRegulation, as expressed in particular in thePreamble, the clauses should receivebroadandsystematicapplicationwheneverfamilylifeisatstake.Article8ECHRcomesintoplaywheneveractionsoromissionstakenundertheDublinRegulationmayaffect“familylife”withinitsmeaning.The“settledstatus”ofthefamilymemberoftheapplicantisnotaconditionfortheapplicabilityofArticle8ECHR.Maritalrelationsconstitute“familylife”evenifnotyetfullyestablishedinfact.Likewise,the relations between parents and minor children constitute ipso jure “family life”.Denyingtheexistenceorstabilityof“familylife”betweentheapplicantsandmembersofthenuclearfamilybyreferringtoperiodsofseparationrunscountertoArticle8ECHR.Inothercases,theexistenceinpracticeofclosepersonaltiesisthecontrollingfactor.In assessing the existence of “family life”, the administration should adopt a non-formalistic, flexible approach, respect its inquisitorial duties and afford protectionseekersthebenefitofthedoubtinviewoftheirparticularsituation.Asamatterofgoodpractice,thefirstinstanceauthorityshouldascertaininaholisticmanner,attheoutsetofthe Dublin procedure, the family situation from the standpoint of both the DublinRegulationandtheECHR,takingfulladvantageoftheproceduralinfrastructureprovidedbytheDublinRegulation(e.g.therighttoaninterviewandfamilytracing).ThefindingthatArticle8ECHRappliestriggersanumberofobligations:ensuringthatthedecision-making process is “fair and such as to afford due respect to the interestssafeguardedbyArticle8”;strikinga“fairbalancebetweenthecompetinginterestsoftheindividualandofsociety”;guaranteeinganeffectiveremedyagainstallegedviolationsaswellasnon-discriminationintheenjoymentoffamilylife.WheneverprivateandpublicinterestsarebalancedagainsteachotherpursuanttoArticle8ECHRinaDublincontext,thefollowingaspectsshouldbetakenintoconsideration:

• Thepossibilityofestablishingandenjoyingfamilylifeelsewherewithoutundueobstaclesmaynotbesimplyassumed.Onthecontrary, thestartingassumptionshouldbe that thepossibilitiesofenjoying family life “elsewhere” in theDublin

254 CounciloftheEU,doc.No.12364/09,abovefn.101,p.35.

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area are severely restricted. Even when such a possibility exists, it must beascertained whether the sacrifice imposed on the persons already present inSwitzerlandwouldbeproportionate.

• The potentially “temporary” character of the separation entailed by a Dublin

transfermaybetakenintoaccount,butitmustbeborneinmindthatseparationmayinfactlastforaconsiderabletime,andthatevenrelativelyshortperiodsofseparationmayinfringeArticle8ECHR,e.g.incasesinvolvingchildren.

• Asylumseekersareavulnerablegroupentitledtoparticularprotection.

• WhenassessingthecompatibilitywithArticle8ECHRofmeasuresadoptedunder

theDublinRegulation,itisimportanttoaccuratelyidentifyandassessthepublicinterestatstake.InDublincases,theintensityofthepublicorderinterestsof“[…]controlling immigration” is arguably less pronounced than in ordinary familyreunificationcases.ThepublicinterestisfurtherdiminishedwheretheapplicantmanifestlyfulfilstheconditionstobenefitfromfamilyreunificationinSwitzerlandatalaterstage.

• As amatter not of ECHR law, but of “Dublin Law”, Recital 14 of the Preamble

requiresthatadditionalweightbeaffordedtotheinterestinfamilyunity.

• In a system where the protection of family life is a “primary consideration”,preserving or promoting family unity should be the norm rather than theexception.

Incaseswhereparticularlyvulnerablepersons,includingchildren,aretransferredwiththeirfamily,appropriateguaranteesmustbeinplacesothatfamilyunitywillbeensuredupon reception.When the transfer is cancelled on account of the vulnerability of thepersonconcerned,therestofthefamilyshouldnotbetransferred.WheneverthetransfertoanotherMemberStateofatorturevictimwouldseparateherfromasupportivefamilyenvironment,theauthoritiesshouldstartfromtheassumptionthat the transfer is impermissible and that the sovereignty clause should be appliedinstead.Thisreasoningshouldbeextendedtoothercategoriesofparticularlyvulnerablepersons,inparticularchildrenfallingunderthescopeofArticle39CRC.Inborderlinecases–i.e.casesthatfalljustoutsidethescopeofapplicationofthefamily-based responsibility criteria – careful scrutiny under the standpoint of non-discrimination is required, includingananalysisof the comparabilityof the situationsinvolved,oftheobjectivereasonscapableofjustifyingadisparityoftreatment,andoftheobservanceoftheprincipleofproportionality.ForthecasesformerlycoveredbyArticle15(2)DRIIandnowfallingoutsidethescopeofArticle 16 DR III – e.g. dependency between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law –“keepingorbringingtogether”therelativesconcernedremainsaqualifiedobligationinlinewiththeKjudgmentoftheCJEU.

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Article29a(3)OA1isa“may”provision(Kann-Vorschrift)andvestsbroaddiscretionintheSEM.Thelatterhasnonethelessthedutytoexaminewhetheritshouldbeappliedinagivencase,toestablishalltherelevantfactsandtotakethemintoaccountinitsdecision.Thedecisionitselfmustbetakenonthebasisoftransparent,reasonablecriteriaincludinginparticularthevulnerabilitiesofthepersonsconcerned,thebest interestofthechildandconsiderationspertainingtofamilyunity.Whenonthebasisofcumulativegroundsit appears that a transferwould be problematic from a humanitarian standpoint, theapplicationofthatprovisionmustbetakenintoconsideration.Finally,theSEMissubjecttoareinforceddutytostatereasons.Whenever human rights law or compelling humanitarian considerations require thatfamily unity bemaintained or reconstituted, such dutiesmay translate variously intodutiestoapplyArticle17DRIIIinallitsaspects:applying(orrefrainingfromapplying)the sovereignty clause; sending requests under the humanitarian clause; or acceptingsuchrequests.

5. Concluding remarks and notes on legal protection Properly interpreted and applied, the Dublin Regulation affords comprehensiveprotectiontothefamiliesofthosetowhomitapplies.In keeping with the preamble, which makes respect for family life a primaryconsideration,thecriteriashouldbeinterpretedandappliedwidely,flexiblyandwithoutundueformalism.Indoingso,theadministrationhastoassessabroadrangeofevidenceoftheexistenceoffamily,anddulyconsiderthereducedevidentiarystandardsforeseenby theRegulationand the ImplementingRules.Furthermore, it shouldbeproactive inestablishingtherelevantfacts,incooperationwiththeapplicantandhisfamilymembers.Theobligation to trace familymembers,which is formallyapplicableonly in favourofunaccompanied child applicants, should as a matter of good practice be appliedsystematically for all applicants, as it promotes a broad interpretation of the familycriteria.Ageassessment,whichdeterminestheapplicabilityofthegenerousprovisionslaiddownintheRegulationinfavourofchildren,shouldbecarriedoutinconformitywiththerecommendationsoftheCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild.Itthereforeshouldbecarriedoutinaholisticandchild-friendlymanner,respectingkeydueprocessguaranteesincluding the appointment of a qualified representative, without undue reliance onmedicalmethods,andinkeepingwiththeprinciplethatwhentheresultsareinconclusivethebenefitofthedoubtmustbegiventotheapplicant.Astheapplicationofthecriteria is limitedinprincipletothe“takecharge”phase, it isessentialthatcomprehensivelegalprotectionbeaffordedatthisstage.Article27DRIIIexplicitlyforeseestherightofapplicantstoappealagainsttransferdecisions,andinthiscontext they may raise any argument relating to the incorrect application of theRegulation,includingthewrongapplicationofthecriteriaaswellastheviolationoftheattendantproceduralorevidentiaryrules.255Ahostofotherdecisionstakenunderthe

255 SeeH. and R., Joined Cases C-582/17 and C-583/17, above fn. 47, paras 38 ff. On the violation of

evidentiaryrules,seeATAF2017VI/1.

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Regulation–explicitorimplicit256–mayhaveawide-rangingimpactontheapplicationofthecriteriaandonthelivesoftheapplicantsandtheirfamilies:decisionsnottosendor not to accept a “take charge” application; decisions to assume responsibility, andthereforenottoeffectatransfer,whentheapplicanthasfamilymembersinanotherStateandthecriteriaindicatethelatterasresponsible.ThefactthatArticle27DRIIIdoesnotexplicitly foresee a right to appeal against these decisions is not decisive. While theconsiderationsofefficiencyunderpinningtheRegulationspeakagainsttheavailabilityofwhattheCJEUcalled“multipleremedies”–e.g.therighttochallengethedecisionnottousethesovereigntyclauseandthenlatertochallengethesubsequenttransferdecision257– an effective remedymust be available againstany decision affecting the rights thatapplicantsderivefromEUlawunderArticle47CFR.258Thesameprinciplesapplymutatismutandisatthetakebackstage,exceptthatherethecriteriaonlyplayalimitedrole.259At all stages of theDublin procedure, human rightsmust also be fully respected, andhumanitarianconsiderationsduly taken intoaccount.Whenevernecessary inorder torespecttheECHR,theCAT,theICCPR,theCRCorotherrelevantstandards,theSEMhasaduty to apply thediscretionary clauses– assume responsibilityunder the sovereigntyclause, accept take charge requests under the humanitarian clause, or present suchrequests. In particular cases, human rights obligationsmay require the authorities torefrainfromapplyingthesovereigntyclause.TheSEMalsohasapositivedutytoexaminehumanitariangrounds,todecideonthebasisofrelevantandtransparentcriteria,andtoprovide reasons. Cumulative grounds may make a transfer problematic from ahumanitarianstandpoint,andrestricttheadministration’sdiscretion.Humanrightsobligationsalsohaveimportantdueprocessramifications–e.g.therightofchildrentobeheardinanyprocedureaffectingthem,andtochallengetheoutcomeofageassessment. 260 More generally, whenever it is alleged that applicable human rightsstandardshavebeenviolated–nomatterthestageoftheDublinprocedure,orthetypeordecisionoromissionthatmayhavecausedtheallegedviolation–aneffectiveremedymust be available domestically. The possibilities opened by international complaintprocedurealsohavetobeconsidered,astheA.N.v.SwitzerlandandA.H.v.Switzerlanddecisions taken by the CAT demonstrate.261Furthermore, as the comparison betweenthese decisions and the judgment A.S. v. Switzerland of the ECtHR shows, it may beextremely fruitful to subject the samepractice to the scrutinyof several internationalbodies. Switzerland is subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, and has ratified theinstrumentsgivingindividualstherighttobringindividualcomplaintsbeforetheCATand256 SeeFathi,C-56/17,abovefn.131,paras57ff.257 M.A.andOthers,C-661/17,abovefn.155,paras63ff.258 Ibidem, para77. In regard to Article 8 ECHR, seeMeijers Committee,Note on the Proposal of the

EuropeanCommissionof26June2014toamendRegulation(EU)604/2013(theDublinIIIRegulation),2 December 2014, CM1415, available at: https://www.commissie-meijers.nl/sites/all/files/cm1415_note_on_the_proposal_of_the_european_commission_of_26_june_2014_to_amend_the_dublin_iii_regulation_0.pdf,p.5.

259 H.andR.,JoinedCasesC-582/17andC-583/17,abovefn.47,paras41ff.260 CRC,A.L. v. Spain, above fn. 111, para 12.3; CRC, J.A.B. v. Spain, above fn. 111, para 13.3; FAC, E-

7333/2018,§2.4-2.5.261 CAT,A.N.vSwitzerland,abovefn.224;CAT,AdamHarunvSwitzerland,abovefn.220.

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theCommitteeontheRightsoftheChild.262Thesebodiesmayilluminate,eachfromthestandpointofitsareasofcompetence,andindialoguewitheachother,thehumanrightsimplicationsoftheDublinsystem,andbringanessentialcontributiontoahuman-rights-compliantandhumaneDublinpracticeincluding,andparticularly, inmattersof familyunity.

262 UN Human Rights Council, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a

Communications Procedure, 14 July 2011, A/HRC/RES/17/18, available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e72fbb12.html,Article5;SwissUnitedFederalAssembly,Arrêtéfédéraldu6octobre1986(OptionaldeclarationunderArticle21CAT),RO19871306,Article1,para1.