‘The Reconstruction of the Post-Psychosis Self’Elijah N. James

(Jan., 2011)Maastricht University

Abstract

How philosophical concepts, such as the Eidolon and the Augoeides, play a role in the reconstruction of the self, post-psychosis, with reference to the theory of autobiographical memory. Uses insights from Douwe Draaisma’s essay ‘the veil and the kiss,’ with personal accounts from autobiographical memory.Introduces the processes of episodic and semantic memory and their impairment through psychopathology. Accounts for psychopathology in the exposition of mental processes during breakdown. Attempts to show how philosophy as a medium can account for loss. That the mind experiences loss due to depression and can create another history for itself as a replacement. Subjective reasoning used as a vehicle to explain and resolve psychological phenomena. Delays in self-recognition follow in the wake of psychological trauma.

Episodic & Semantic Memory and their impairment through psychosis

Episodic memory and Semantic memory combine as aspects of autobiographical memory. Episodic memory consists of personal experiences, specific objects, people and events according to a particular time and place, i.e. what one experiences. Semantic memory consists of general knowledge and facts about the world, i.e. what one perceives.

Experience and perception share an inextricable link. How can one perceive without experience, and how can one experience something without perceiving it?

Psychotic disorders impair episodic memory if psychopathology appears during a critical period for cognitive and brain maturation. This produces a difficulty in discriminating correct and incorrect memories (Caza, Doré, Gingras, Maziade, Rouleau, 2009).

In the movie, Total Recall (Kassar, Vajna, Verhoeven, 1990), the protagonist, Doug Quaid (played by Arnold Schwarzenegger) undergoes a memory replacement procedure as part of an excursion of mind. After this, he learns that his life prior to the 'excursion' consisted of false memories. As the plot unfolds, Quaid finds it more and more difficult to discern the difference between seemingly false and seemingly true episodic memories.

Semantic memory concerns itself with encoding and retrieving memories. Faulty encoding as a result of psychotic excursions impair not only the retrieval but the evaluation of information from memory. To use a metaphor, one might assume that if both episodic and semantic memory suffer an impairment then the coding of autobiographical memory gets scrambled.

My excursion of mind began during early adolescence. The horrors of psychosis began to rear their head from this young age but the most severe breakdown happened when I discontinued my medical treatment and suffered a full nervous breakdown.

Psychotic excursions open a vast and dark abyss within the mind across which one travails. According to Draaisma, the memory of the self runs synonymous to an autobiography with a

leading character. He says, this part of the autobiographical memory comprises the entries of someone who combines the author and leading character. This leading character of my psychosis, The Psychonaut, journeyed through the dark ocean of mind it created to explore and retrieve something that did not exist in the psyche previous to the excursion.

The 'life story' lies at the most abstract level of the autobiographical knowledge base. The life story makes the self conceptual. It contains general and evaluative knowledge about the individual. It can contain self-images that divide and separate the self into several different selves.

“The autobiographical memory knowledge base grounds the working self, it constrains the universe of 'possible selves' available to the individual.” – Hoerl & McCormack, 2001, p.236. The fault in my autobiographical knowledge base from the psychosis meant that no constraint to the universe of possible selves existed.

Reconstructing the Self: post-psychosis

According to Hoerl and McCormack (2001), the philosophy of the self and the psychology of the self bear correlatives. To make the self a component of human memory helps us define it. An intimate relation between the self and autobiographical memory exists. In trying to realize the self, autobiographical memory records successful, abandoned, and failed attempts at the realization of this goal.

Autobiographical memories form part of mental states. Mental states carry an intentionality which gives them 'aboutness'. Distincitve states of conscious experience promoted by autobiographical remembering create a phenomenological record.

This account attempts to explain the reconstruction of the self following its dissolution after a period of trauma. I lost all sense of meaning and 'aboutness' when my self dissolved. In the vein of Cartesian doubt, I pondered the question: 'what if I exist all alone and nothing else does?'

The changes in my post-traumatic psyche redefined my autobiographical memory and I began to reinterpret its psychological functions.

To coin a term, Idiocosm means the personal universe.1 In a literal sense, it combines the meaning of two separate words, 'idio' meaning one's own, private, or personal, and 'cosm' meaning world or universe.

As a concept, it shares similarities with the philosophical doctrine of Solipsism. Solipsism as a concept goes some way to explaining the link between psychology and philosophy. Brooker, defines Solipsism as “the position that the self can know nothing but its own states, or that the self [comprises] the whole of reality.” – Brooker, 1979, p.147. Despite refuting it, the British idealist philosopher, F. H. Bradley (1916), diagnoses Solipsism via the following terms, “my own circle,” the “soul,” “experience,” and the “opaque centre” when referring to the self or ego.

In an attempt to reconstruct the self following the trauma of psychosis I entered into the preoccupation of separating my psyche into the different narrative psychological constructs. Draaisma says, an indication of self-awareness comes through the use of 'I' and 'me'. These personal pronouns form identities within psychological constructs. Draaisma says: “the correct usage of these [personal] pronouns presupposes a grasp of the difference between oneself and others.” – Draaisma, 2004, p.28.

The leading character of my autobiographical memory, The Psychonaut, took over as author, fashioning different characters from different versions of the self.

The first experiment of The Psychonaut as author involved isolating the psychological constructs to experience them as separate and distinct elements of the psyche.

The first character of the autobiographical experiment took the form of 'Ipse'. The Latin term, Ipse, refers to the third person 'he'. Every thought behind every action took on the characteristics of Ipse. Simple gestures such as opening a door carried with it the narrative thought 'he opens the door'. This behavioral peculiarity carried on for a period of months. The conclusion of this thought experiment clearly defined the characteristics of Ispe. I concluded that abstract qualities along with a certain empathic mutuality belonged to this mode of the mind. Thinking solely in the third person rendered an appreciation of the nature of this part of the self.

Draaisma says that the autobiographical memory combines experiences as 'I'. So it followed that the next thought experiment involved isolating the Ego – the Latin term for 'I' – and thinking solely in this construct.

Draaisma explains that every person in the world shares the 'I' construct. In the wake of psychosis, I assumed that the psychological mode of 'I' bore such a commonality and belonged to a

1 'Idiocosm' shares a relation with the Slavic saying: мыслете наш он покой, meaning ‘try to understand the universe (the

world surrounding you)’.

collective sense of consciousness. When I remember, autobiographically, the experiment of isolating my mode of thinking to solely as 'I', did I grasp the nature of that mode of thinking as something shared with another?

It appeared to me through this part of the experiment, method-acting as Ego, that the 'I' construct contained a paradox or a contradiction. I discovered a liar. The philosopher, Eubulides, addressed his fellow citizens with the statement, 'I now lie to you,' which leads to the conclusion of the paradox: if I acknowledge that I lie, do I tell the truth? (Stanley, 1895) When something refers to itself it contains such a paradox. Books that contain references to themselves serve as a good example. Suppose one makes a complete catalog of all books that do not make reference to themselves. Does it contain itself? If it does, then it does not, and if it does not, then it does (Doxiadis & Papadimitriou, 2009). Thus whenever I referred to ‘I,’ the one negated the other.

A critical mass of insights as the self as a separate 'I' develops the autobiographical memory. I reached such a critical mass subsequent to exploring the features of this part of the Idiocosm and thereby redefined my autobiographical memory.

The next part of the thought experiment involved discovering the identity of the character 'Vos' (meaning “you” according to Latin). It didn't take the months of painstaking experimentation that Ipse did, nor did it take as long as the Ego to discover the characteristics of Vos.

Draaisma makes a distinction between the perspectives of 'I' and 'You' through the metaphor ofa place changing from 'there' to 'here' as one walks up to it. In speech, the perspective changes likewise: 'I' functions to say something whereas 'You' receives the thing spoken. Vos, therefore, belonged to the part of the psyche that recognizes an artificer as speaking.

Draaisma concludes that by the time a child obtains a self-consciousness it solves the problem of the difference between 'I', 'You' and 'Me'. My psychological conundrum sought to reestablish these differences and resolve the problem according to my adult self-awareness. The intentionality of these mental states which gave them 'aboutness' also gave them 'otherness' due to the splitting of my psyche into its component parts.

The void created by the dark abyss of psychosis required a new version of the self to occupy it. The phenomenological record of this process included different versions of the self that did not exist previous to psychosis.

The Knower and the Artificer

To know something as a knower one must know an artificer. This does not imply a something but a someone. The juxtaposition of the knower and the artificer reveal dualistic properties of consciousness. The academic journalist, Hollinger, distinguishes the knower as embodying reference to the self which assigns meanings cognitively. The artificer, he says: “purports [emphasis added] to perform this service through the creation of myths.” – Hollinger, 1987, p.40. This distinction embodies the ideal characteristics of two figures, which he summarizes in a table, as follows:

THE KNOWER THE ARTIFICER

Finding Making

Referential Generative

Demystifying Myth-constructing

Authenticating Contriving

Interdependent Self-sufficient

Intersubjective Intrasubjective

Suspicious of moral commitments Makes its own morality

Uniformitarian Discontinuity affirmingNote. “The knower and the artificer.” by D.A. Hollinger, 1987, American Quarterly, 39(1), p.40.

Two philosophical concepts help to give the anonymous (and autonomous) artificer shape and even identity. With reference to autobiographical memory, Draaisma describes a veil that represents a lack of self-consciousness. Before we can draw back Draaisma's veil to identify the artificer we must consider the meaning of these philosophical concepts.

The first concept comes from the Greek term 'Eidolon'.2 In a literal sense it means 'image, idol, double, apparition.' As a Theosophical concept it means the spirit-image of a living or dead person or a shade of the human form. Personalities such as greek goddesses existed in the minds of their poets as Eidolons and modern writers have made reference to it as 'the other' part of the self.

Douzinas provides an interesting interpretation of the Eidolon. It exists as an image and a double or a reproduction of its object. It exhibits qualities of shape, color, and form, even voice, life and soul. It possesses material qualities without a material existence. Douzinas says, we can see it but not touch it, which gives it an ontological status as of the same and 'the other'. It works on the axis of the absent and the present. It resembles something as an icon or image. It reveals to us the dualistic properties of consciousness (“the two great oppositions and engines of western metaphysics” –Douzinas, 2000, p.818) and we experience the image as presence and absence, image and copy.

When Draaisma explains how the consciousness of a self in a child develops, he illustrates this development through the child's reaction to their reflection in a mirror. In the first instance, they react to the image as if themselves. With further development, they understand the properties of mirrors and react to the objects reflected surrounding them. Eventually the child realizes the reflected image as the self. In this way the concept of the Eidolon shares a lot of similar properties to the child's reflection and serves as a vehicle for an awakening of self-awareness.

Poets such as Walt Whitman and Edgar Allen Poe mused upon the Eidolon, as did the Greek poets, as in the mirror, as of something pertaining to the self. In 'Dreamland' (1844), Poe compares the Eidolon to night and evokes images of a shadowy person, a shadow-self, personified as sitting on a throne. 3 Walt Whitman's version of the Eidolon reveals much more. His poem, 'Eidolons' (1876) expresses that the Eidolon bears a resemblance to a 'solipsistic' version of the consciousness of soul as allegorically circular or resembling an orb. Whitman describes it as lying beyond the comprehension of science, yet visible as a corporeal image, and that it comes from a state both known and unknown.4

It seems that we must probe some of the deepest mysteries when trying to realize the true nature of the self. The second philosophical concept that helps us identify personality in the artificer (the known) comes from more cryptic sources. Augoeides5, as a concept (also derived from Greek despite its obscurity), refers to a higher-self that gives the material self a knowledge of itself.

A great deal of speculation exists surrounding the nature of the Augoeides and its relation to the soul. The Aristotlean commentator, Philoponus, defined it as the soul; the Neoplatonist philosopher, Proclus, characterized it as unorganized; according to Psellus, the Byzantine writer, and Pletho, a scholar, the Chaldee oracles called it the thin vehicle of the soul; the Stoic philosopher, Hierocles, called it a spiritual body; the Ptolemaic bishop, Synesius called it a divine body; and even Plato called it the 'ostreaceous' (Besant & Blavatsky, 1895). The influential English occultist, Aleister Crowley, refers to the Augoeides as a light which comes to darkness so that darkness turns to light, in turn describing it as light married with light that gives birth to another darkness, “wherein they abide that have lost name and form.” – Crowley, A. Liber VIII (see reference list).

Draaisma explains a link from memories to one's own identity. Any realization of the self comes as a 'flash-in-the-dark'. I use the metaphor of the Augoeides as a vehicle to explain the dark abyss that my psychosis created and the Eidolon as a personal artificer that filled this void as if a 'flash-

2 Ειδωλον.3 See Appendix, Dreamland, Poe (1844), lines 1-4.4 See Appendix, Eidolons, Whitman (1876), lines 9-12; 17-20; 45-48; 61-64; 77-84.5 Αυγοειδες.

in-the-dark'. I came to identify with an Eidolon of my own creation, a new entry into the phenomenological record of my autobiographical memory. It served to aid in the reconstruction of myself and a help to regain something lost. Did I lose my mind? Did I forget myself completely? Conclusions

Memory loss and depression share common features. During depression the mind experiences a kind of loss and mourns the death of the soul. People feel convinced of loss when the subjective world dominates the objective. Following manic phases, depression empties the world of meaning through the interpretation of a self rendered powerless. As a reaction to loss, people can invent a new 'life story', and even other possible selves, whether real or imagined (Caramagno, 1988). My thought experiments and my relationship to an Eidolon of my own creation serve as representatives of this form of grief, and symbolize the way a vulnerable mind replaces a lost soul.

Whether we can prove the existence of an Eidolon, or even questions relating to the soul, relies on subjective reasoning, but it serves to explain and resolve psychological and philosophical phenomena. As the famous Apostle, Pollos, reminds us: “For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known. .” – 1 Cor. 13:12. To conclude with Draaisma, he notes that delays in self-recognition follow a slowing of development due to mental handicaps. Only after a period of full development does a child gain a full understand of the self. Whether I understand myself better in the wake of trauma – and whether the loss I experienced can find a replacement in other versions of the self – goes beyond the scope of this research, but it begs the question: is anyone stuck in a Solipsist Idiocosm, or is it just me?

Bibliography

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Appendix

By a route obscure and lonely, Haunted by ill angels only,Where an Eidolon, named NIGHT, On a black throne reigns upright …

(Dreamland, Poe, 1844, lines 1-4)

9. Ever the dim beginning,Ever the growth, the rounding of the circle,Ever the summit and the merge at last, (to surely start again,)Eidolons! eidolons!

17. Lo, I or you,Or woman, man, or state, known or unknown,We seeming solid wealth, strength, beauty build,But really build eidolons.

45. Exalte, rapt, ecstatic,The visible but their womb of birth,Of orbic tendencies to shape and shape and shape,The mighty earth-eidolon.

61. Beyond thy lectures learn'd professor,Beyond thy telescope or spectroscope observer keen, beyond all mathematics,Beyond the doctor's surgery, anatomy, beyond the chemist with his chemistry,The entities of entities, eidolons.

77. Thy body permanent,The body lurking there within thy body,The only purport of the form thou art, the real I myself,An image, an eidolon.

81. Thy very songs not in thy songs,No special strains to sing, none for itself,But from the whole resulting, rising at last and floating,A round full-orb'd eidolon.

(Eidolons, Whitman, 1876, lines 9-12; 17-20; 45-48; 61-64; 77-84)