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PREFACE

This thesis is the final assignment of the study General Social Sciences. During the last years, I

have not only grown as a person but also tried to gain more new experiences. I learned more than I

have ever could predict at the beginning of my study. The goals I have set for my self have been

reached and I have met a lot of interesting people through UNISCA, University Cambridge,

Institute Clingendael and Ministry of Foreign affairs. At the Ministry I found the subject for my

thesis and was so intrigued by it, that the only logical thing to do was write my thesis about it.

Subsequently, I needed a supervisor willing to help me with it and I found Chris van der Borgh

from the Centre of Conflict Studies. In him I found a strong opinionated, motivated and loyal

supervisor and a good person. I am grateful to him for supporting me and pointing out the path I

needed to follow. Although, it took a while for me to see the path, in the end I found it.

Furthermore, I want to thank Ir. Dr. Georg Frerks and MG Kees Homan RNLMC for supporting me

and making much possible at the Clingendael Institute, which enabled me to work in a stimulating

research environment. It also provided the opportunity to co-write an article on this subject with

Kees Homan for the Netherlands Atlantic Association. Finally, I want to thank my friends, who

have listened to all my endless comments on my subject, especially my partner Rick van Ewijk.

Gloria Geschiere

February 2005

University of Utrecht Department of Social Sciences Gloria Geschiere 9921524 Supervisor: Chris van der Borgh Centre for Conflict Studies (UU)

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CONTENTS

Preface 2

Contents 3

Figures & tables 5

List of abbreviation 6

INTRODUCTION 8

Research methodology 9

Structure of study 12

1 PRIVATISING NATIONAL SECURITY 14

The monopoly of violence 14

Privatization and outsourcing 18

The privatization of military services 24

2 PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS IN CONFLICT 29

Private military actors in conflict 30

The private military industry 35

Controversial PMFs: EO, KBR and MPRI 40

3 OUTSOURCING THE IRAQ WAR 49

The Bush revolution in military warfare 50

The War on Terror 56

Private military firms in Iraq 59

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4 THE PERILS OF IRAQ OPERATIONS 64

Problems of protection and command 65

Lack of monitoring and contract planning 69

Problems of accountability 73

CONCLUSION 80

Bibliography 86

Appendix 1: List of informants 95

Appendix 2: Legislation mercenaries 96

Appendix 3: Soliciting form 98

Appendix 4: Contracts for Iraq 99

Appendix 5: List of contractors casualties 106

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FIGURES &TABLES Figures

Figure 1.1: The tip of the Spear

Figure 3.1: Map of Iraq

Tables

Table 1.2: Distinction between the public and private sector

Table 2.1: Activities of private firms

Table 3.1: Members of the Defence Policy Board and defense

contractors

Boxes

Box 2.3 MPRI training Bosnian soldiers

Box 2.2: Dick Cheney

Box 3.1: Members of the Carlyle group

Box 3.2: Crash of plane in World Trade Center

Box 4.1: Kim Sun-il

Box 4.2: Prime contractor and sub-contractor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AFCAP

Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

CACI International Inc.

Consolidated Analysis Centers Incorporated

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DCMA

Defense Contract Management Agency

DOD

Department of Defense

ECOMOG

Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring group

EO Executive Outcomes

GAO

General Accounting Office

GSG

Gurkhas Security Group

IFOR Implementation Forces

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

KBR Kellogg, Brown & Root

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

LRMP

Long Range Management Program

MEJA

Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

MPRI

Military Professional Resources Incorporated

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OPTEMPO Operation Tempo

PMO

Program Management Office

PMFs

Private Military Firms

PMCs

Private Military Companies

POW

Prisoner of War

PSCs

Private Security Companies

RFPs Request For Proposals

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROTC Reserve Officers Training Corps

RUF

Revolutionary United Front

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SADF

South African Defense Forces

TRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command

UMCJ

Uniform Code of Justice

UN

United Nations

UNITA United Nations

USACE

United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAID United States Agency for International Development

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States

WTC

World Trade Center

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

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INTRODUCTION

On 20 March, 2003, the invasion of Iraq headed by the United States (U.S.) and the United

Kingdom (UK) was conducted under the name "Operation Iraqi Freedom". After only three weeks

of fighting the Iraqi Baathist government was toppled and the "major combat operations" were over.

Although many believed that the coalition troops are the only ones operating in this conflict, they

could not have been more wrong. In addition to the regular troops, there are roughly sixty private

military firms (PMFs) working in Iraq and their ground forces are more powerful than those from

any other ally, including Britain’s.

The presence of PMFs has been hidden behind headlines in newspapers. However, this changed

when four security specialists working for the private military firm Blackwater U.S.A. were

publicly hanged and mutilated in Fallujah.1 Following this incident, another firm made headlines

when an army investigation led by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, accused three employees

from CACI International Inc. of being complicit in the physical abuse of Iraqi detainees in the Abu

Ghraib prison in Baghdad.2 The involvement of the firms in these incidents has put them in a

negative light and revealed an unknown reality about modern warfare.

The term PMF is defined by scholar Peter Warren Singer, who did research on this topic in his book

“Corporate Warriors: the rise of the privatized industry”, as “corporate bodies specialized in the

provision of military skills including: combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk

assessment, operational support, training and technical skills.”3 According to Singer, these are

profit-driven organizations that trade in professional services linked to warfare and compete in the

open global market. PMFs operate in three broad sectors:

Private military provider firms, also known as private military companies (PMCs), which

provide combat and protection services;

Private military consultant firms, which provide advisory and service training;

1 Freeman, 2004. 2 Verloy & Politi, 2004. 3 Singer, 2003: 8 (In Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatised military industry)

9

Private military support firms, which provide back-up services, such as logistics, technical

support, and transportation.4

The reliance of the Bush administration on the PMFs is remarkable, since most firms have no prior

experience in working in conflict zones. There has also never been awarded such a large amount of

contracts to the private sector. Iraq is the largest commitment to the private military industry. The

firms have been entrusted with very important tasks, such as like: the protection of authorities

(among whom Paul Bremer, top American administrator in Baghdad), interrogations, guarding all

oil sites and training the post Saddam army, paramilitary and police.5 Moreover, the administration

has no experienced or qualified personnel available for contract planning, which creates potential

problems in areas of operations since the firms operate outside the chain of command and are not

protected by coalition forces. When a firm decides to leave because of the high level of violence,

there is no one who can stop them. Another problem is that PMFs don not fall within any

international laws and, with such a large amount of employees, it is inevitable that some will break

rules. What makes it more complicated is that only the firm can punish the employee by firing him.

Many worry that the Pentagon is rapidly giving too much responsibility to the PMFs without any

policies about how to deploy them.6 Therefore, this study will investigate the role PMFs played and

determine what the operational challenges are. Therefore, the main research questions of this thesis

are: "What role do private military firms play in the reconstruction of Iraq? Which operational

challenges in terms of protection & command, monitoring & contract planning and accountability

do they encounter?"

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The objective of this research is to gain more insight in the private military industry. This is

especially important since there is limited information available on their involvement in Iraq. This

study offers an analysis of their role and tries to estimate their influence on the conflict. It will also

focus on the operational challenges they faced while working in this conflict. Providing more

insight in these obstacles will help determine their strengths and weaknesses and strengths and the

way in which they can improve their services.

4 Singer, 2004: 14 – 17 (In should humanitarians use private military service?) 5 Singer, 2004: 15 6 Kurlantzick, 2003.

10

The firms are researched by using primary and secondary data sources, mainly from media and

official public sources. Acquiring more in-depth information also includes interviewing

representatives of PMFs and international scholars. The first data source used was the media, which

helped gain more insight in the role of firms in contemporary conflicts as in Bosnia, Sierra Leone.

The media has only investigated controversial firms like Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root. With

the continuance of the Iraq war other firms such as Blackwater. and CACI International were added

to the list. The information came from established American newspapers such as The Washington

Post, CCN, The New York Times, San Francisco Chronicles, Economist and The Los Angeles

Times. The articles often focused on specific issues that related to one or two PMFs and did not put

the phenomenon in a broader perspective.

In order to supplement the incomplete information other sources from journals, periodicals,

television programs and radio, were used. Furthermore, official sources from the United States

Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development, the General

Accounting Office and the Coalition Provisional Authority were included. This study has often used

the information from the U.S. since most articles written outside the country were based on polls or

statistics produced by the U.S. Besides these sources reports from the UK or United Nations (UN)

have alsobeen used. To complement this information, there are also reference to investigations

undertaken by research institutions like the Brookings Institute, Geneva Centre for the Democratic

Control of Armed Forces and the Center for Public Integrity; have been used. The information

gained from these sources focused on the reconstruction efforts, the value of awarded contracts,

allocated money, and the number of contracts awarded.

The last data were obtained from interviews held with the (inter) national experts and

representatives of PMFs (see appendix one). The persons attended the seminar on “Privatization of

Warfare”7 organized by the Clingendael Institute. One of the main reasons to interview the national

experts and representatives was to gain more insight in and enhance my knowledge on the subject.

The interviews had an open character and started with an introduction question on their relation

with the firms. From that point onwards the interviewee could speak freely on the subject with an

average duration of forty-five minutes. The first group that was interviewed were representatives

from Erinys International, the Global Risk Group and the Global Peace & Security Partnership, of

7 The Clingendael Institute in cooperation with the Interchurch Peace Council, June 2, 2004, organised the seminar: Privatization of warfare.

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which only the first two worked in Iraq. The firms appear to be professional and had a serious

attitude towards their business. They were proud of their work in Iraq and believed that it has

benefited the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The representatives were not pleased to being labeled a

private military firm; they would rather be called a consultancy or advising firm. They were afraid

of being associated with mercenaries that do not represent their business. The answers of the

representatives were optimistic although there were some doubts concerning the war in Iraq, since

Erinys and Global Risk have both lost men in the country. Furthermore, I have interviewed a

security firm that was not a PMF, namely KV Connections. Although the firms share some

similarities with private security firms, they are only guarding banks and other properties not

located in conflicts zones. Interviewing the firm was interesting because it provided me with a

greater understanding of the difference in methods, personnel and location between security firms

and private military firms. It also made me aware that before entering a conflict zone there must be

some understanding of the environment at hand.

The second group of interviewees were scholars like David Isenberg (British American Security

Information Council), Chris Kinsey (University Wales) and Michel Bourne (Centre for

International Co-operation and Security). This group was fascinated by the rise of these firms but at

the same time cautious about their increasing role . Although, the scholars did not object to their

involvement in conflicts, they thought that the policy towards the firms should change. They

believe that the unregulated market only harmed the industry. The majority, therefore, advocated

regulations and binding laws.

Using different sources of information has enhanced the accuracy of the findings. This was

necessary since there are some discrepancies between sources of information. For example, some

sources make a different estimate of the numbers of PMFs participating in Iraq. There are some

concerns about the collected data, because reports on figures, sizes and numbers are often not

confirmed or verified by officials. Even when governments confirm information there can still be

flaws. For example, Blackwater has not been mentioned in any official document, even though they

have been awarded major contracts by the American government. Any inconsistency will be

brought to the attention. It has also been difficult to include firms from other countries than the UK

and the U.S. The preference of the U.S. to award prime contracts to American or British firms has

been the main reason to do so. This has made it difficult to illustrate the involvement of firms from

other countries. Also, the latter have been awarded sub-contracts. In this instance there is even less

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information available; their presence is seldomly mentioned, even though they play an important

role.

STRUCTURE OF STUDY

The first chapter will provide a broader understanding on the concept of outsourcing, monopoly of

violence and the military industrial complex. It will also help understand, why states have been

privatised and how the private military industry has grown. But the most important questions of this

chapter are: “Why do states outsource military tasks?” and “Do states lose their monopoly of

violence when they outsource to the private sector?”

The second chapter investigates the history of PMFs and their role in contemporary conflicts. This

chapter will focus on the activities of firms that have been important for the growth of the private

military industry. Namely Executive Outcomes, Military Professional Resources Incorporate and

Kellogg, Brown & Roots. It will also evaluate the critical issues that emerge from their involvement

in conflicts and address important issues like accountability, legitimacy and human rights. The

chapter will also provide the necessary information needed to understand the following chapter,

which solely focuses on the Iraq war. The most important question of this chapter is: “What are

private military firms and which tasks have they performed in contemporary conflicts?”

The third and fourth chapter will focus on the role of PMFs in Iraq. Chapter three will provide

knowledge on the Iraq war and the policy of the Bush administration. This chapter helps understand

why this administration is relying heavily on the private sector. It will show the strong ties that exist

between them. Furthermore, it contains a short summary of the Iraq war to show how it developed

and what the current situation is, in order to demonstrate, not only the increasing violence but also

the environment in which PMFs find themselves. The most important question of this chapter is:

“Why are private military firms hired for the Iraq war?” and “Which tasks do private military firms

fulfil in Iraq and which firms have important contracts?”

The last chapter focuses on the challenges PMFs have faced during their operations, in particular on

issues of protection and command, lacking monitoring and accountability. These three fields are

very important because failures in one of these fields have major consequences for the entire

operation. Understanding the limitations will give us the possibility to enhance their performance

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and address areas in which new policies need to be developed. The most important question of this

chapter is: “What are the most important operational challenges PMFs face when working in Iraq?”

Finally, this study draws some key conclusion elaborating on the implications and policy

recommendations for the future of private military firms.

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CHAPTER 1

PRIVATISING NATIONAL SECURITY

The US government assumes no responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms whose names appear on the list.

- Business Guide for Iraq- This chapter offers insights in the questions: “Why governments outsource military services and if

it affects their exclusive right to use violence.” The answer to this question is important because

when services are outsourced to the private sector the states’ accountability diminishes. Also, when

states choose to share the responsibilities it should find other ways to legitimize their existence,

because the right to use violence has always been a state domain. Privatization enabled states to use

experts and highly qualified personnel to develop new policies, but some argue that states are

giving a way their most important reason for existence. Others argue that the state is still in the

driver’s seat and is still optimizing their services towards their citizens by privatization. In this

chapter, the first paragraphs provide a basic introduction to the concept of states and monopoly of

violence. The second paragraph will introduce the concepts of privatization and outsourcing and

will subsequently focus on the privatization of military services. The last paragraph will review the

rise of the American military industry and show its main characteristics. This chapter will introduce

the general concerns relating to the rise of the private military industry and help understand the

privatization of the military industry.

THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE

The modern state as we know it dates back from the end of the fifteenth century. Before that period,

European governance was divided and was under the jurisdiction of several religious authorities,

independent cities, feudal rulers and various oligarchies, according to Philip Bobbits. He claims that

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states have emerged whenever there were strategic threats to the wealth of sophisticated cities. For

example, because of threats to the Italian societies they turned to the institutional bureaucratization

of a governing authority, which became known as today’s modern state.8 Political philosophers like

Hobbes have described another reason for the creation of states. He describes an anarchistic world

without morals, laws or private property. In this stateless world without monopoly of violence,

humans fight with each other for available resources. He believes that the different needs of humans

can create potential conflicts, especially when resources are limited or scare. He therefore thinks it

would be wise to divide the resources and make arrangements with the different parties involved.

Unfortunately, the lack of trust and selfishness prohibits them to work together, according to

Hobbes. The answer to this problem lies in the creation of a 'State'. The parties involved have to

refrain from using violence and leave it to the sovereign9. In return the sovereign protects them and

creates laws, if necessary. The sovereign enforces the laws with the use of violence.10 Hobbes

concludes that the defining characteristic of a state is its monopoly on the legitimate means of

violence, including the sanctioning, control and use of force.11

This is best described by Max Weber, who believes that a state 'is a human community that claims

the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'.12 When looking at this

concept, there are three distinct elements combined by Max Weber, namely:

a. A given territory or geographical area, which the state controls;

b. The use of physical force to maintain its control; and most importantly;

c. The monopoly of the legitimate use of such force or coercion.13

The use of force is difficult to monopolize because anyone may use violence, everyone can hit,

destroy, attack etc. The use of violence at their disposal is therefore interpreted in a more relative

term since the state is able to use force on individuals and groups in bigger size and with more

impact. Only when the size of the group is larger than the states, the state can loose its monopoly.

Consequently, the most important element is the right to use violence in a legitimate way. As

mentioned by Weber, the state must successfully claim this right, when it fails it loses his

monopoly. In order to further this discussion we can distinguish two components in the monopoly

of violence: 8 Bobbitt, 2002: 215 9 Sovereignty simply means self-government, and is the crucial elements that distinguish the state from other social unite. (Michael Mann, 1988: 12 - 14) 10 Brons, 2002: 6 11 Holmqvist, 2005: 1 12 Reenen, van, 1979.

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1. The potential to use violence;

2. The right to use violence.14

This relates to a power relation in whom the power-holder possesses an acknowledged 'right to

command'. Subjects have the obligation to obey.15 The use of force must be acknowledged by most,

if not all, of those who are subject to the state's power. Van Reenen has further described the two

components.16 He describes two different roles resulted from the mentioned component: the

authoritative and the violence role. The authoritative roles relates to the authority of the state to

exercise its political power; the citizens subject themselves voluntarily to this arrangement.

According to Van Reenen this is the most dominant foundation for a state; legitimacy and

rewarding. When the population is voluntarily allowing states the right on exercising only violence,

then we speak of a dominant value. The violence role is seen in exerting real violence in which the

dominant value is to keep dominant positions.17 These roles will be further discussed in relation to

the history of monopoly of violence in the following sections.

The monopoly of violence has developed throughout history, accompanied by two different

developments, namely rationalization and differentiation. Max Weber best describes the

rationalization trend. According to him; people’s faith in God during the Middle Ages was

diminishing. The disenchantment of the worldview made people redefines their position in their

world and the way they viewed life. Rationalization18 enabled people to get more insight in how to

behave in certain places and what to expect from others. At the same time, different forms of

violence were forbidden. Aggressive behavior and violence -excluding international relations - was

criminalized or pathologic. According to Norbert Elias, who wrote the civilization theory, there was

a transformation of social constraints to self-constraints; people were becoming more rational.19 He,

found that the more people were controlling themselves, the more they could see the world

objectively and see potential complications for the future. Other changes in the society like

individualization, innovation and specialization, occurred at the same time.20 Tasks were becoming

specialized, which could be solved through rationally overthinking this problem and creating formal

protocols. Subsequently, there was a need for specialist to oversee the work of all specialists. The

13 Michael Mann, 1998: 4 14 Brons, 2002: 7 15 Brons, 2002: 9 16 Reenen, van, 1979. 17 Brons, 2002: 6 18 The rationalisation is the regulation of the behaviour, analysing and formalise it. (Schreurs, 1998) 19 Schreurs, 1998: 159 20 Brons, 2002: 7

17

relation between the trend of rationalization and differentiation is that both need to be coordinate

and controlled.21

The history of the monopoly of violence is entwined with the developments of rationalization and

differentiation. These societal developments have influenced the monopoly of violence and vice

versa. According to Toffler & Toffler, there have been three important phases in the development of

societies. The first phase is the agricultural economy. In this period the monopoly of violence, was

given to one person: the ruler. This construction follows the theory of Hobbes closely. There is was

no division of the authoritative and violent role; the ruler was entitled to both. The societies were

relatively simple, including the position of the ruler. In this period there was no rationalization or

differentiation, in which the position and tasks of the ruler were described in documents.22 This

does occur in the second phase, when the monopoly has been divided and there are formal rules on

the positions and tasks of the ruler.23

The second phase begins with the Industrial Revolution; the leitmotiv in this area is the mass-

production. The technological discoveries have enabled societies to make products on larger scale

and create the agricultural way of life. The Industrial Revolution and the rise of modern states

further transformed warfare. Taxation and the conscription of citizens became part of national life.24

According to Von Clausewitz in his book 'Von Kriege', the way violence was used changed. In the

Industrial period, the military became a political tool. Von Clausewitz described the difference

between the potential to use violence and the right to use violence. The governments hold the

initiative and the right to use violence. The army has the potential to use violence, which is referred

to by van Reenen as the “official monopoly of violence.” The authoritative role is primarily

concentrated on keeping power and authority. The violent role is primarily concentrated on keeping

the dominant power. The exercising of violence is captured in rules without direct political

influence.25

The third phase started in the mid- 20th century and is associated with the rise of the knowledge

age. In this period, the differentiation trend was growing; the tasks and mandates of the police were

21 Brons, 2002: 7 22 The process of individuals, groups and organisations in the society that are getting specialized. (Loo, van der & van Reijen, 1997) 23 Brons, 2002: 8 24 Kanagy & Kraybill, 1999: 245 25 Brons, 2002: 8

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differentiated and the police would develop special arresting-teams, commandos' and so on.

Subsequently, institutions and governments increasingly used 'think tanks' or specialists to analyze

problems of different nature.26 In the period, we find a great resemblance between the economy and

the way the monopoly of violence was organized. Most governments did not change the way they

used the exclusive right to use violence. At the same time, people became more opinioned and were

not afraid to retaliate against their government. The people were demonstrating and resisting to their

government. The governments had a difficult time adjusting to the changing environment and were

forced to change in order to deal with the challenges of that time. To meet the problems head on,

the distribution of the monopoly on authoritative and violent roles were changing and were divided

into two separate roles. The authorities and politicians were getting more involved with violence.

They were the ones that determined in which situation violence could be used against the citizens.

This can be seen in the world we live in today. Governments are often directly involved in the

exercise of violence, which can be seen in the U.S.; the Secretary of Defense has its own crises-

centre, which enables him to use violence. The military are interfering with the authoritative role.27

The use of violence by governments changed through the years. In the old days, every group or

individual had to legitimate a right to use violence against citizens. Nowadays, this has come in the

hands of governments whereas the exercise of violence has come in the hands of the military

apparatus.

PRIVATISATION AND OUTSOURCING

During the 1980s and '90s, privatization became a more dominant economic trend, especially in the

U.S. and UK. This trend has often been characterized as part of a 'global wave' of neo-liberal

policies; some argued that it was influenced by the policies of Reagan and Thatcher. The trend has

been associated with industrial or service-oriented enterprises, such as mining, manufacturing and

power generation, but in recent years governments have privatized services such as health,

sanitation, and education.28 One of the main reasons for privatization is that governments have few

incentives to ensure that the enterprises are well running. On the other hand, private firms do have

such incentives: they will lose their business when they are running poorly. Therefore, the theory

26 Loo, van der & Reijen, van, 1997:145 27 Brons, 2002: 8 28 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Privatisation in the news. Available at http:// www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm

19

holds that not only clients will benefit, that the enterprises themselves are will become more

efficient as well. Conclusive, the whole economy will benefit from the trend towards privatization.

In theory, privatization helps establish a 'free market', as well as fostering capitalist competition,

which should enhance the public choices.29 The trend of privatization can be defined as "the shifting

of a function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector."30 There are,

however, different meanings attributed to the term. It can also be defined as a political force,

according to Kamerman & Kahn: "any shift of activities or functions from the state to the private

sector," and more specifically, "any shift from the public to the private realm in the production of

goods and services."31 Privatization may also be defined in more ideological terms as a preference

for private ownership rather than public ownership. There is a basic idea that transferring ownership

to private investors would make them more efficient and profitable. They are expected to

outperform their public counterparts, due to economic disciplines subject that they are subjected to.

In order to be the best they can be and face the competition, they must respond more adequately to

choices made by consumers.32 Privatization is expected to:

• Increase the (private sector and hence) economic growth;

• Reinforce technological development and innovative capacity;

• Be more efficient than public enterprises;

• Give a budgetary advantage.33

The supporters of privatization argue that governments are inadequate in running businesses for the

following reasons:

• They may only be interested in improving a company in cases when the performance of the

company becomes politically sensitive;

• The government may postpone any improvements due to political sensitivity;

• The company may become prone to corruption; company employees may be selected for

political reasons rather than professional reasons;

• The government may seek to run a company for social goals rather than professional goals;

• Privately-held companies can more easily raise capital in the financial market than publicly-

owned ones;

29 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Privatisation in the news. Available at http:// www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm 30 Nugarah, 2002. 31 Kamerman & Kahn, 1998. 32 Hailemariam, 2001: 13 33 Hailemariam, 2001: 13

20

• Governments may try and save unsuccessful businesses with money when, economically, it

may be better if the company folds;

• Parts of a business which persistently lose money are more likely to be shut down in a

private business;

• Nationalized industries can be prone to interference from politicians for political or populist

reasons. 34

The first and last reason becomes important because money is a scarce resource. When government-

run companies that are losing money or are not profitable, this money is unavailable to other, more

efficient, firms. Also, when non-profitable firms are still financed by the government, it could

offend the taxpayers. As the proponents of the laissez-faire capitalism argue, that it's both immoral

and inefficient for the state to force taxpayers to fund businesses that cannot work for them. The

normal process of eliminating businesses that cannot cope with the market reality or are not

preferred by the customer will clean the market.35 The other warnings of government enterprises are

that they can potentially get entwined in political sphere and may be used as a tool.

There are also people who think that the effects of privatization are less positive. For example,

socialist argue that entrusting the private businesses with the control of essential services reduces

the public's control over them, and may result in corruption.36 Whether privatization is the solution

to the challenges that states face remains disputable because research undertaken has shown reach

different conclusions. A research undertaken by Megginsion37, who compared the financial and

operating performances of sixty-one companies from eighteen countries, found that private firms

typically increased sales, became more profitable, increased investments and improved their

operating efficiency.38 The most outstanding conclusion, however, was that this was the result of

other factors not related to privatization. The conclusions showed that the effect was due to the

changes made in senior management and control structure. The result of the research implicated that

internal reorganization rather than privatization must be emphasized.39 Others say that privatization

cannot always fulfil its promise. Among them is Boors, who acknowledges that privatization can

34 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Privatisation in the news. Available at http:// www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm 35 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Privatisation in the news. Available at http:// www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm 36 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Privatisation in the news. Available at http:// www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm 37 Hailemariam, 2001: 14 38 Hailemariam, 2001: 13 39 Hailemariam, 2001: 13

21

lead to higher costs and reduced employment, and in some cases contributes to the loss of quality.40

The opponents argue that it is undesirable to let private entrepreneurs own public institutions for the

following reasons:

• Private companies do not have any goals other than to maximize profit;

• The public does not have any control over or oversight of private companies;

• A centralized enterprise is generally more cost-efficient than multiple smaller ones.

Therefore, splitting up a public company into smaller private parts will reduce efficiency;

• Privatization will not result in true competition if a natural monopoly exists;

• Profits from successful enterprises end up in private pockets instead of being available for

the common good;

• Nationalized industries are usually guaranteed against bankruptcy by the state. They can

therefore borrow money at a lower interest rate to reflect the lower risk of loan default to the

lender;

• The privatization of public services can create a conflict between profit and maintaining a

sufficient service. A private company may be tempted to cut back on maintenance or staff

training etc. to maximize profit. 41

These arguments show that there is a variety of pitfalls to privatization which has rarely worked out

ideally because it is so intertwined with political concerns. For instance, in the Thatcher era,

privatization has been very popular but problems arose because of the fact that privatization

programs are very politically sensitive; raising many legitimate political debates. Moreover, where

free-market economics are rapidly imposed, a country may not have the bureaucratic tools

necessary to regulate it. This notion will be especially important throughout the analysis of the Bush

administration and their outsourcing of military tasks in Iraq. Another point is that if the privatized

company has a natural monopoly, or exists in a market, which is prone to serious market failures,

consumers may be worse off if the company is in private hands.42

Privatization can take on various forms, one of them being outsourcing, which has been identified

as the most common form of privatization. Outsourcing has spread over too many regions

throughout the world and offers the promise of improved public sector performance. As mentioned

earlier, there are a lot of people who feel that the private sector is more suitable for carrying out

40 Hailemariam, 2001: 15 41 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Privatisation in the news. Available at http:// www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm 42 Worldhistory. Privatisation in the news. (See www.worldhistory.com/wiki/p/privatization.htm)

22

public services. They think that the competition between private companies and their profit making

character makes them more efficient. Donahue describes the renewed cultural enthusiasm for

private enterprises in his book 'The privatization decision'. The private firms need to perform well

or they will go out of business, contrary to the public sector, that does not face the same

consequences. The differences between the public and the private sector, it can be reviewed by four

dimensions: including financing, delivery, responsibility, and decision-making (see table 1.2).43

Table 1.2: Distinction between the public and private sector

PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR

Management

Agent-principal relationship: Blurred Clear

Orientation: Inward and production focus Consumer and marketing focus

Style: Reactive Proactive

Constraint: Politically constrained Stakeholders interests but less

constrained

Goals

Goal clarity: Multiple and sometimes

conflicting (public interests)

Uni-dimensionnel (profit)

Focus: On inputs On outputs and outcomes

Organizational structure

Hierarchy: Hierarchy pyramid and

centralized

Decentralized and diversified

Type of structure: Functional Business based on profit center

Labor

Union strength: High unionization and

centralized bargaining

Lower unionization and

decentralized bargaining

Payment: Salary grading Employment based on

performance

Security: High security of employment Low security of employment

Responsiveness to cost control

Cost control: Less cost control due to tax

financing

High cost control to become

competitive

43 Hailemariam, 2001: 15

23

Nature and location of the business

Nature: Politically and geographically

constrained

commercially determined

Development: Limited business development Diversification, investment and

divestment, mergers and overseas

ventures

Location: Mainly national International and global

orientation

Source: Stifanos Hailemariam (2001)

When looking at the difference, Pirie concludes that labor costs is the key differences in efficiency

between the public and private sector. The public enterprises are usually overstaffed and consumers

have no control. Which is contrary to private firms; when a consumer of a private firm is not

satisfied, he or she can seek out another place to do business. To properly adjust the services, the

private firms need to be oriented towards the client and have good quality products for the

consumer to purchase.44 Another distinction between public and private provision, is whether the

provider is acting as a private entity on contract, subject to profit-making discipline, or is operating

within the public sector and thus subject to direct democratic and civil-service accountability

systems.45 The incentives for private-sector encourage them to pursue additional economic routes

towards profitability, such as lobbying and campaign finance.46

The successes of outsourcing in general industry made defense leaders believe, that outsourcing

was the right way to do business. There was a feeling that the private sector could do things more

efficiently.47 Many started to advocate the emulation of business practices by the military.48

Especially, the United States believed that the superiority of the marketplace to fulfill

organizational and public needs could be translated to the military branch.49 The relationship is

based on the guiding principle that as much as possible should be outsourced, with the exception of

'core government' or 'mission-critical' function.50 The main reason for states to resort to

privatization is the lack of capacity. In the military not all goods and services are required in equal 44 Hailemariam, 2001:15 45 Markusen, 2003: 472 – 473 46 Markusen, 2003: 474 47 Kurlantzick, 2003. 48 Singer, 2003: 68 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 49 Singer, 2003: 66 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry)

24

quantities on a regular basis. So, it was more useful for governments to outsource some of those,

instead of continually keeping people on payroll. Private firms would be able to spread overhead,

research and development, and production costs over commercial as well as government operations,

lowering the costs of the government. They also thought that contractors could deliver the same

task but probably at a smaller cost. A large cost advantage of private-sector contractors enables

them to offer employees less wage benefits or job securities than the armed force or civil services is

permitted to do.51 Under these circumstances, even a monopolist that raises prices and restricts

output might be able to provide a service at a lower cost than an in-house team. But according to

says Steven L. Schooner,52 “the cost-saving argument for outsourcing is not nearly as compelling as

the potential improvement from quality or service or flexibility’’.53 All these factors have played a

part in the broader 'privatization of security'. There is, however, variation among the industry's

growth within a specific security contexts. How the privatization of security has made headway is

shown in the next paragraph.

THE PRIVATISATON OF MILITARY SERVICES

Max Weber defined the state by its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Over time, we

have grown used to think about war as an activity carried out by military branches of the state.

Nowadays, however, not only state armies provide security. There is an increasing amount of

private firms that provide security, supply and train personnel or operate alongside military forces.54

But there are no serious proposals to disperse the armed forces and leave defense to corporations.

Nevertheless, the national forces are struggling with efficient provisions and innovation in the

public sector. Also, there have been government proposal to extend privatization to the defense

sector, especially in the United States.

Therefore, the development of the private military industry can therefore be seen mostly in the US.

In the twentieth century, the U.S. evolved more mixed public/private systems than the Europeans.

In Europe the military industrial facilities remained largely government-owned and government-

operated. There have also been other factors that attributed to the rise of the private military

industry. After the Cold war the industry really started to grow, huge military forces of the United 50 Holmqvist, 2005: 25 51 Markusen, 2003: 477 - 478 52 Co-director of government –procurement law at George Washington University Law School. 53 Bianco, & Anderson Forest, 2003: 45

25

States, Soviet Union, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw

Pact were downsizing their military capabilities and military budgets.55 Dictators and explosion of

violent groups like private militias, vigilante’s squads, transnational criminal organizations, self-

defense forces, and survivalist ’s enclaves, in search of power, also characterized this period.56 They

benefited from the fact that more military weapons were in the hands of citizens than in the hands

of national governments. The majority of small arms used in low-intensity conflicts were in the

hands of these groups while national governments posess the large weapon systems. At the same

time, nations were becoming unwilling to commit troops to conflicts outside their economical

interests.57 They were hesitant about sending soldiers on dangerous missions, especially, since the

intervention of the US in Somalia. In this event dead American soldiers were killed and dragged

through the streets of Mogadishu, which caused the public opinion to oppose to interventions that

posed no threat to national security.58 In this climate, governments were more open to alternatives

than they would probably be in other times. Subsequently, governments started to look for

alternatives and turned to the private military industry.

There are some tasks that are useful to privatize, for instance the logistics support, including

mundane tasks like laundry and food service, are tasks that can be outsourced without any

problems. When a contractor would be awarded a contract in which they do the soldiers’ laundry,

there is not much confusion of what this tasks entails. There are, however, other tasks in areas such

as operational support, advice and training that entail concerns about means that would complicate

the success of privatization initiatives. According to Donahue, privatizing these tasks negatively

enables private firms discretions over policies or an impact on what our government public goals

are. For example, the US has hired Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) to help

create western civil military institutions in Croatia.59 The training took place while the country was

at war and the participation of the firm may have affected a political outcome. The use of military

firms for these tasks, it would lead away from democratic accountability. There are others that

argue that this might lead to a change of interest of the state.60

54 Avant, 1999. 55 Cooper, 2004. 56 Mandel, 2000. 57 Interview, Director POl/MIL John Holmes (Erinys), The Hague, June 2004 58 Cooper, 2004: 585 – 588 59 In the last paragraph of chapter two the use of MPRI by the United States will be further discussed. 60 Avant, 1999.

26

However, there is some risks involved when outsourcing military services to the private sector.

Because nowadays outsourcing occurs in areas that are much closer to the core function of military

and security activity than in the past. According to Donahue, the privatization of defense tasks

should be most successful when the tasks have clear and measurable goals. Also when the goals

obtained are more important than the means.61 With privatization, the chain of command is more

complicated. The involvement of civilians in military operations is increasing and the line between

military and non-military occupations seems harder to draw. More private firms were becoming

involved in warfare because most of the information system used by the military were designed,

developed and managed by private companies. To keep their systems running there was a need for

specialists and experts in microelectronics, software engineering, and biotechnology.62Also the

sophistication of military software and hardware require them to work in war zones.63 The private

contractors operate on a profit-making basis at the ultimate discretion of their shareholders. The

contracted firm can fail in management or fail to generate sufficient returns. This can result in

ousting, sale, dismemberment of the firm, or bankruptcy, each of which may have serious

consequences for the Pentagon customer. In a company the employees can go on strike. Such risks

must be carefully assessed, adding to the complexity of the outsourcing and to the cost. There is a

need for contingency plans that provide for alternatives. This must be weighed against apparent

outsourcing savings.64 In 1995, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study assessed the virtues

of public versus private maintenance of military equipment at the depot level. They noticed that

there are many “borders” between public and private provision. The office also saw that officers in

the armed services were afraid that the reliance on private providers might put operations at risk.

There are some economists who conclude that military privatisation will only produce cost savings

and higher-quality, more innovative services if:

1. True and sustained competition is operable;

2. The Pentagon as customer is clear about its requirements and able to articulate this in it request

for proposals (RFPs) and contracts;

3. The Pentagon has adequate oversight talent to ensure that private contracters deliver the goods

and services promised. 65

61 Avant, 1999. 62 Singer, 2003: 60 - 61 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 63 Bianco & Anderson Forest, 2003: 45 64 Markusen, 2003: 488 65 Markusen, 2003: 477 - 478

27

Effective competition is essential in the progress, because private contractors are all loyal to their

shareholders. When competition is limited or absent, contractors can be expected to raise prices,

suppress innovation and quality, and withhold information about the actual costs and

product/service traits. It also affects a very large proportion of the market for defense service, for

several reasons understood by defense economists. First, most contracts are relatively long-term

and, if competitively bid, create a bilateral monopoly once signed. This not only forces

governments into active oversight, but can distort the original bidding process, as firms have an

incentive to "low-ball" bids, knowing they can negotiate add-ons later. Second, even persistent

competition is often oligopolistic in nature- increasing so with the dramatic implosion the number

of large prime contractors in the mid 1990s. When actualsuppliers diminish, the probability that

they will collude on price and/or quality is rather high. This means that governments must have

more competitors in business.

When thinking about the consequences of privatization for accountability, according to Avant, two

relations are particularly important. The first is between those firms that provide security to foreign

entities and their home government. Do firms (indirectly) support foreign policy or does their role

in the provision security allow firms to affect national goals? When they support foreign policy, do

they do so in such a way to allow governments to skirt public debate or otherwise evade mechanism

for democratic accountability? Second, what is the relation between the governments or private

entities paying for security and the companies that provide security? Do the firms provide security

in a way that enhances the political control of the principle or do they use their expertise to affect

political outcomes according to other interests? According to some analysts, the relationship

between private entities and governments is complicated due to the nature of the tasks. As said

earlier, the nature of the job determines whether private contractors or civil servants will be the best

choice. It depends on the goal the contractor what kind of product he will deliver in exchange for

payment/ money. Whereas a civil servant will accept instructions in exchange for a wage. When the

tasks description is uncertain, or when it is difficult to measure the value of production, and it is

disruptive to switch agents, civil servants would make more sense.

The private military industry offers both promise and peril in the world after the Cold War. On the

one hand, the industry present an additional tool for the enhancement of national security. On the

other hand, there are issues of accountability and legitimacy that should be addressed, because it is

still unclear who is responsible for which task and who must face the penalties when laws are

28

broken. When governments continue to use services provided by the private sector, they should be

aware of the downside of this. The outsourcing of military services is related to a number of

unwelcome risks like lack of competition, transparency and the possibility of conflicts of interest.

Another concern is what the consequences are for the monopoly of violence when governments

outsource military services on a larger scale. I will elaborate on this point in the next chapters,

especially in relation to Iraq. The positive side of relying on the private sector is that the state has

the ability to concentrate on core military business. It can also attract specialists in certain fields and

use intelligent weaponry. And if necessary, governments can use firms for missions abroad that are

complex or violent. Governments are still in charge when doing so, because the rules that bind the

firms are laid down in contracts. Also, when the state is not pleased with their performance, it can

break the contract or not prolong it. The way in which governments started to contract private

military firms and the specific issues that accompany them, will be revealed in the next chapter.

29

CHAPTER 2

PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS IN CONFLICT

"Specialist qualities are necessary for regular armies. The modern military cannot function without them performing key roles, sophisticated equipment cannot be handled by 18-to-22-year-olds"

-Michael P. Peters- The monopoly of violence and the rise of the private military industry has been examined earlier. I

have briefly mentioned the existence of historical evidence proving that the supply of military

services by private actors66 is as old as warfare itself. Ancient armies, from the Chinese to the Greek

and Roman, depended to a large extent on contracted forces. Similarly, private actors have played a

role throughout the military history of the Unites States.67 This chapter will primarily focus on the

role of PMFs in contemporary conflicts until the Iraq war, not only to offer more understanding

concerning the origin of the firms, but also to give a comprehensive understanding on how these

phenomena evolved into an industry. Next to that, I will refer to the discussion that emerged with

their participation in conflicts, although the main issues have already been mentioned in the

previous chapter. Subsequently, paragraph one will review preceding private military actors like

mercenaries and military entrepreneurs in order to show the resemblance between the actors and the

private firms. It will show why these firms are not the same as private actors and therefore cannot

be prosecuted by laws. The second paragraph will shed light on the main characteristics, historical

features, contractors, recruitment and opinions toward the firms. This paragraph provides basic

information on what constitutes a PMF. The last paragraph will focus on three different private

military firms, namely: Executive Outcomes, Military Provisional Resource Incorporate and

Kellogg, Brown & Root, since they are considered to be very important for the development of the

Executive vice president of the Council on Foreign Affairs (Cooper, 2004) 66 The role of private actors in contemporary conflicts will be reviewed in chapter 2. 67 Holmqvist, 2005: 1

30

private military industry. All three paragraphs will offer basic knowledge in order to understand the

dynamics of the private industry and how they got involved in Iraq.

PRIVATE MILITARY ACTORS IN CONFLICT

As said earlier, there are a lot of individuals and groups involved in the supply of military service

besides the regular troops. The best known are the mercenaries, who have often been compared to

the PMFs. Even though they share some similarities, they are not the same. In order to make a sharp

distinction between firms and mercenaries, this paragraph will take a closer look at the mercenaries.

A mercenary is traditionally known as "a soldier who is willing to sell his military skills to the

highest bidder, no matter what the cause".68 The first reference to these mercenaries dates back

from 334 BC, Greek mercenaries were used in the war against Alexander the Great and they have

been referred to in the first Punic War 264 BC. The reliance on mercenaries was so complete that the

failure of payment to the soldiers sparked a wholesale revolt, known as the mercenaries’ war.69 In

the third century, Rome also relied heavily on the use of mercenaries; and by the end of the century

there were more Germans in the imperial army than Romans.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, mercenaries became better organised and by the end of the 14th

century, mercenary troops had largely replaced feudal conscripts across Europe.70 The growing

power of these troops posed a new threat to the European order. Individual "free lancers" began to

form "companies" -from con pane, after the bread that soldiers received for delivered services- to

avoid unemployment. The companies offered their services to the highest bidder and the first to

exploit this company model successfully was King Charles VII of France. He taxed the country's

growing middle class and started hiring several companies permanently. The free companies began

replacing the smaller groups and individual mercenaries.

The mercenary business became a lucrative enterprise because there was a need for organised

companies who had the ability to respond to conflicts with a regional or inter-regional character.71

The companies transformed themselves over time into autonomous forces, acting independently of

the rulers who hired them. Subsequently, there was a need to recruit, transport, control, pay, supply

and organize the growing units of manpower. The military entrepreneurs stepped in and became 68 Mills & Stremlau, 1999: 48 69 Cooper, 2004: 574 70 Cooper, 2004: 574

31

owners, suppliers, and organisers of human resources. The proliferation of the entrepreneurs was

also a response to the difficult administration and financing of armies.72 By the end of the sixteenth

century, the system of paying each soldier his due in person was gradually being abandoned.

Different governments started to pay private contractors and entrepreneurs to supply the military

services, which they could no longer afford to, organize themselves.73 Consequently, private actors

began to operate, raise and maintain fully equipped regiments, which they often commanded.

During the Thirty Years War this system reached its peak, with some 1,500 entrepreneurs raising

troops all over Europe and the entrepreneurs being among the wealthiest men on the continent.74

In the late seventeenth century there was a general decline of entrepreneurs that recruited their own

units. Due to the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire and the rise of national sovereignty and

citizenship a major shift occurred. Domestic citizen’s armies were slowly replacing the

mercenaries.75 The number of intermediaries and mercenary sources began to dry up and states

were forced to better organize their troops. In this period people started to think that every man

should fight for his own country and it was dishonorable to serve under another flag.76 The new

conceptions of patriotism made people more willing to fight as citizens than as subjects. This

concept disseminated throughout Europe and many started to believe that it was wrong and immoral

to live from the scourge of war.77

During the two hundred-year of European colonial expansion, however, the private actors enjoyed

resurgence. In this period companies like the Dutch East India Co., English East Indian Co. and

Hudson's Bay Co. hired their own military units to defend their economic interests; these forces

sometimes lasted until the Twentieth Century.78 After a while this glory period faded away and they

were marginalized and pushed underground.79

Then in the 1950's and '60s the notoriety from early days was being reinstalled. The mercenaries

helped fill the security vacuum left by European colonial forces, which withdrew from their

holdings in Africa. Mercenaries worked in countries like the former Belgian Congo, Comoros 71 Contamine, 2003: 19 72 Cooper, 2004: 575 73 Contamine, 2003: 53 - 54 74 Contamine, 2003: 53 - 54 75 Cooper,2004: 576 76 Lilly, 2000: 8 77 Adams, 1999:104 78 Cooper, 2004: 576

32

Islands and Benin. They used nicknames like “Mad” Mike Hoare and “Black Jacques” Scrammed

and participated in assassinating heads of states, staging violent overthrows of government or

destabilizing sovereign states.80 The lack of any ideological concern with the citizens of the

countries they worked in labeled them ‘dogs of war’. Although many thought it was immoral to use

mercenary services, they were still entitled the status of ‘prisoner of war’, under customary

international law.

This situation changed after the United Nation Security Council, the Economic & Social Council,

and the Commission on Human Rights condemned them in 1986. They declared that the use of

mercenaries is punishable and that states should prohibit their nationals from serving as

mercenaries.81 The 'dogs of war' were seen as a threat to the state’s right to self-determination.82 In

1977, their right to the status of prisoner of war was abandoned. The mercenaries were given legal

status within international humanitarian laws with the adoption of the Additional Protocol 1 to

Article 47 of the Geneva Convention of 1949. But the protocol also considered mercenaries as

outlaws, placing them in the category of criminals.83 It states that: “a mercenary shall not have the

right of a combatant or a prisoner of war”.84 To be classified a mercenary six criteria must be met.

A mercenary is a person who:

a. Is recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;

b. Does in fact take part in hostilities;

c. Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain,

and in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party of combatants of similar ranks and

functions in the armed forces of that party;

d. Is neither a citizen of a party to the conflict nor a resident of a territory controlled by

a party to the conflict;

e. Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict;

f. Has not been sent by a state that is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a

member of its armed forces.85

Although the convention does not establish criminal responsibility for being a mercenary, it

attempts to discourage people to engage in such activities. It is very difficult to fall into this 79 Cooper, 2004: 578 80 Musah & Fayemi, 2000: 17 81 Beyani & Lilly, 2001: 11 82 Lilly, 1998: 1 83 Adams, 1999. 84 Beyani & Lilly, 2001:11

33

category because all six of the criteria must be met. This is done to prevent others from misusing

the article because states must still be able to hire groups to supplement their armies. The groups

hired by governments are legitimate combatants and are entitled to receive the privileges of

'prisoners of war'. The article can therefore only be used in a few circumscribed situations, in order

to give states the right to hire foreign soldiers as part of their national forces.86 Regional and

national legislation was adapted in order to discourage states from using mercenaries (see appendix

two).

There were also regional efforts to control the spread of mercenaries in the 1960s and 1970s by

governments in Africa. They have tried to limit the mercenary activities by signing the Convention

for the Elimination of Mercenaries, which was signed in 1977 by the members of the Organization

for African Unity (OAU).87 The Convention came in force in 1985 and is the only international

legal instrument that criminalizes mercenary activities and protects new independent states.88 The

scope of the convention, however, is restricted to acts aimed at overthrowing recognized

governments or undermining a state's territorial integrity. Unfortunately, due to the lack of

resources and legal capacity the Convention seldom has been implemented and enforced.89 This

regional Convention was not the only unsuccessful one.

In 1987 the UN appointed a special reporter, Enrique Ballesteros, to gain more insight into the

spread of mercenaries in conflicts. He produced a yearly report on their involvement in conflicts

and brings cases of human right abuses to the attention of the international community.90 Even

though he has done a good job, there is but limited attention for the activities of the mercenaries and

governments are not really interested in solving this problem. The mercenaries are still hired by

different governments and other actors such as rebel groups, separatist movements, insurgents

groups, warlords, private militias, and religious factions.91 In 1989, the UN introduced another

convention -the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of

Mercenaries. This convention forbids mercenary activities when its main target is to violate a

process of self-determination, stability or the territorial integrity of other states.92 Like the OAU

85 Lilly, 2000: 8 86 Lilly, 2000: 9 87 Musah & Fayemi, 2000: 17 88 Lilly, 2000: 9 89 Lilly, 2000: 27 90 Beyani & Lilly, 2001:11 91 Lilly, 2000: 15 92 OUA Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa, OAU Doc. CM/433/Rev.L.

34

convention, it does not entirely ban mercenaries but is aimed only at those activities that include

overthrowing or undermining the constitutional order and the territorial integrity of a state. This

convention is the only international instrument applicable to the activities of private security

groups. But just like the OAU convention it is not applied. The convention must be ratified by

twenty-two UN member states before it can come into force. Unfortunately, no more than nineteen

countries93 ratified it and ten countries have signed but not yet ratified it.94

Even though there are many reasons not to hire PMFs, states and others continue to use them.

However, there seems to be a need for individuals or groups to work alongside the regular armies.

One of these reasons is that mercenaries are often selected through advertisements in newspapers,

which attract a mixture of people with no military background. They do not have the right

qualifications or experience in conflict; and just want to earn money.95 There is also no existing

hierarchy in mercenaries units, which makes them very prone to fighting among themselves.

Therefore, mercenaries can only deliver limited services for a short period of time such as: direct

combat support at small-unit level and small-scale military training.96Adding to that, most

mercenaries are individuals that work on ad-hoc assignments; they will leave as soon as the job is

done. Having said that, there are still reports on mercenaries that are working in the Ukraine,

Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Liberia and South Africa. Some mercenaries were fighting together with

the Revolutionary United Front during the hostilities in Sierra Leone at the beginning of 1999.

Different mercenaries have also been hired to work in wars outside Africa. They worked in conflicts

like Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Eritrea, and Ethiopia.97 There are, however, more private military actors that work in conflicts, who

will be described in the next paragraph.

THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY

The private military actors that are not considered to be mercenaries, worked with the regular

armies, dating back to the revolutionary war in America. In this period General George

Washington, employed civilians to move and deliver military goods. Subsequently, the Army Air 93 Countries that have ratified are Azerbeidzjan, Barbados, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy, Cameroon, Maldives, Mauritania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Suriname, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uruguay and Belarus. 94 Lilly, 1998: 1 95 Singer, 2003: 41-42 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 96 Singer, 2003: 41-42 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry)

35

Corps, turned to small, private, and intensely competitive American aircraft companies for new

designs and capable crafts. The industry started to lobby for government-contracts and finance in

1920s. In the 1950s, the balance of weapons design and production work was shifted to private-

sector contractors.98 Near the end of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon started to outsource mundane

jobs like cleaning and cooking to attract new recruits.99 The contractors delivered services soldiers

did not want to perform, according to Christopher Hellmann.100

The Vinnell Corporation of California received the first large-scale and long-term contract in 1975

were becoming in charge of creating and operating an entire training establishment for the Saudi

Arabian National Guard.101 During the Gulf War, contractors were in charge of maintenance

equipment and provided technical expertise alongside deployed U.S. military personnel.

Contractors routinely flew on joint surveillance, target attack radar system aircraft; and even moved

into forward areas inside Iraq and Kuwait with combat forces.102 These firms were doing something

different than the first firms being involved in conflicts and engaged in political affairs.

This study has chosen to use the term private military firms, instead of using the two commonly

used terms Private Military Companies (PMCs)103 and Private Security Companies (PSCs).104 The

distinction made between them is not obvious, because both often combine military and security

expertise.105 Therefore, I have decided to use the term PMFs, which encompasses the overall

military industry and all sub-sectors, including the security, operational, advising and supporting

roles.106

The PMFs are described by P.W. Singer -see introduction- and follows his analysis closely. Singer

emphasizes the duality of the private military industry and states that: "the industry is driven by

97 Lilly, 2000: 15 98 Markusen, 2003: 471 99 U.S. General Accounting Office. 'DOD Uses Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of

Force Size Limitations and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity'. 100 Senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information: military research organisation 101 Adams, 1999: 107 102 Castillo, 2000. 103 Private military companies offer a range of services including combat and operational support, military advice and training, arms procurement.(Damien, L. 2000: 10) 104 The core business of private security companies was crime prevention, protecting objects and property in non-conflict situations; they provide private guard services for prisons, airports, installations and private individuals (Damien, L. 2000: 10) 105 Born, 2003: 71 106 Singer, 2001: 186 - 220 (In Corporate Warriors: the rise of the Privatised Military Industry and its

ramifications for International Security)

36

both military and business fundamentals" and "a successful typology must constitute both

elements". The military organizations can be divided into three broad types of units that are linked

to their location in battle space; units operating within the general theatre, those in the theatre of

war, and those in the actual area of operations, the tactical battlefield. These three broad types units

mirror the distinctions made within the general corporate industry, namely service providers,

consultative firms and non-core service outsourcing. When combining these two different

approaches there remain three broad sectors, namely:107

• Private military providers firms, also known as private military companies, which provide

combat and protection services;

• Private military consultant firms, which provide advisory and service training;

• Private military support firms, which provide back-up services, such as logistics, technical

support, and transportation.108

These three broad sectors are best described by showing the range of services and level of force that

they can offer. In order to give a clear picture of the firms and services they provide, Singer uses the

analogy of the “tip of the Spear”, shown in figure 2.1. This concept distinguishes the units within

armed forces by their closeness to the actual fighting. Their tasks in the battlefield, also implicate

their level of training, prestige, and roles in battles. For example, those who serve in the front-line

infantry units have completely different training and experience than those in the logistics support

units.109 The closer the firms are to the frontline, the closer they are to the actual fighting.110

The three broad types of units are linked to a location in the battle space. Using this concept enables

us to explore the variation within the industry, as well as, in the firms' organization, their

operations, and impact.111 Although it sometimes seems that firms can be placed in two or three

sectors, this framework is robust. When determining the core business of a firm, it will always fit

within one of the defined sectors. The tasks undertaken by PMFs seem to include almost every

military task available in the military industry. In order to perform the different tasks, the personnel

of PMFs should be qualified. Therefore, we will take a closer look at the employees of PMFs and

show that PMFs recruit their personnel in a different way than the mercenaries do.

107 Singer, 2003: 91 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 108 Singer. 2004. 15 (In Should humanitarians use private military services?) 109 Singer, 2003: 91 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 110 Singer, 2003: 91 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 111 Singer, 2003: 91 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry)

37

One characteristic for the firms is their frequent us of highly skilled specialists and/or former

soldiers. Most PMFs have, (former)-officers and political figures, ex-military in their pool of

resources. The MPRI from Alexandria, for instance, boasts about having "more generals per square

foot than the Pentagon". A point often stressed by policymakers, is that it is hard to tell where the

U.S. army ends and a private company begins.112 Other personnel members come from jobs with

the Green Barets, Navy Seals and elite groups where they have been receiving years of training and

experience in military service. The members of personnel are well organized within a defined

structure of corporate entities where they are specially grouped to operate within a set doctrine and

greater cohesion of activity and discipline.113 It is very attractive for ex-military personnel to work

for private military firms because of the high financial rewards. Whereas a soldier, sailor or airman

earns $60,000 per year at eighteen years service, troops that work for civilian contractors make an

estimated $200,000 a year.114

The private firms are also more public than twenty to thirty years ago. Nowadays, they have public

relation staffs, professional marketing videos and web sites. They have people who discus their jobs

on symposiums. Many PMFs are occupied with traditional lobbying, which helps them to increase 112 Khan, 2002. 113 Singer, 2003: 46 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 114 Jelinek, 2004.

Figure 2.1: "Tip of the Spear" typology

BA

TT

LE

SPA

CE

FRONTLINE

Private military providers firms Implementation/Command (Executive Outcomes)

Private military consultant firms Advisory and training

(Military Provisional Resources Incorporate)

Private military support firms Non-lethal Aid and Assistance

(Kellogg, Brown & Root) BA

TT

LE

SPA

CE

Figure 2.1: "Tip of the Spear" typology

Source: Singer, W. (2003)

38

"The recruitment is mostly done

by word to mouth. Of the 200

people working in Iraq at the

moment, I suspect, about 110

have come just by word by

mouth.

- Interview John Holmes-

their chances on receiving contracts. Another helpful tool to beat the enormous competition in the

security market is a link with greater financial holdings and conglomerates.115This conduct is

especially used in Iraq. The clients of PMFs are not limited to governments and range from rebel

groups, drug cartels and NGO’s to the United Nations. The environmental group’s World Wildlife

Fund has contracted them to protect endangered species.116

The most important reasons for governments to use PMFs is the lack of resources.117 This is

underlined by the Foreign Affairs Committee who claims that: “there is nothing wrong with

governments employing private sector agents in support of their interest.”118 The resources

available to governments to fulfill missions such as fighting terrorism and defend nations have

dramatically decreased. Another reason is that their presence is beneficial to the army operations.119

In army operations the firms can help in areas that are necessary

to engage in warfare. First, PMFs can facilitate force projections

by permitting more rapid force closures, which is important

because armies are getting more nation-based. They can provide

an in-place capability that does not have to be deployed. This

saves time and money during the deployment operations. Second,

PMFs provide a source of high-tech and low-density skills.

Armies can no longer maintain the training infrastructure for

military occupational specialties for a few soldiers. PMFs can offer such specialties, like the

manufacture of a weapon system and are a common source of such talent. Third, the army is able to

maximize combat forces by using private firms. There are countries in which the status of force

agreements limits the number of uniformed soldiers. When armies hire the firms that are not

accounted for, the army can increase the number of combat soldiers available. Fourth, they can

provide capabilities the army does not have. This does not only refer to high-tech skills, but can also

include more mundane skills. They can perform tasks, which the army cannot fulfill. In Bosnia, for

example, PMFs have provided sewage treatment services for the base camps. Finally, using private

firms helps reduce the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and its inherent burden on soldiers. A force-

projection army requires soldiers to deploy frequently and for long periods of time. The use of

115 Singer, 2001. (In Corporate Warriors: the rise of the Privatised Military Industry and its ramifications for

International Security) 116 Singer, 2004. (In Should humanitarians use private military services?) 117 Mbogo, 2000: 18 118 House of commons, Ninth Report of session 2001- 02: 20 119 House of commons, Ninth Report of session 2001- 02: 20

39

them, especially in relatively benign environments, reduces the need to send soldiers to perform the

mission.120

There are politicians, journalist and governments that consider the use of firms as dangerous and

claim that they should be forbidden. As mentioned in chapter one, there are certainly some

downsides to outsourcing. The most important concern for many is the potential threat of PMFs

pose for weaker nations that are seldomly unique in using violence. Hiring PMFs in these countries

can give them the opportunity to perpetuate war, which means that they create their own business.

The Green Paper, written by the House of Commons, rejects this accusation, because the existence

of the firms does not depend on the perpetuation of wars. They think that the perpetuation of

conflicts is surely a matter for those hiring them.121 There are, however, more justified concerns that

are related to questions of accountability, oversight and human rights.

One of the main concerns is the issue of accountability. Contrary to foreign forces, such as the

foreign legions or Ghurkhas,122 the members of the firms did not swear an oath of alliance, and are

not subjected to the Geneva Convention.123 If an employee acts unlawfully in a weak state with no

functioning legal system, there is little the rest of the world can do to punish that person.124 This is

important since employees of PMFs have been involved in violating human rights. Even though the

firms want to have a good record avoiding such problems, this is not always possible. In May 2001,

several employees of DynCorp working in Bosnia have been fired for alleged sexual misconduct,

including statutory rape and child prostitution.125 There are no guarantees that some employees will

cross the lines, even with carefully screening.126 To avoid these problems they formed a trade

group, the International Peace Operations Association.127 However, according to David Isenberg, it

is not enough for private firms to say “trust us, we police ourselves”. We are talking about people

who are participating in conflicts and carry out actual military tasks, Isenberg comments.128 Another

concern often mentioned is the lack of protection and oversight of the tasks performed by them. The

unregulated private military industry is lacking both formal controls and limits. Members of the

120 House of commons, Ninth Report of session 2001- 02: 21 121 House of commons, Ninth Report of session 2001- 02: 17 - 18 122 The Ghurkhas are a legitimate force recruited by governments on a permanent or temporarily basis. 123 House of commons, Ninth Report of session 2001-02: 15 124 Interview, Chris Kinsey (Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) June 2, 2004 125 Kurlantzick, 2003. 126 Interview, senior analyst David Isenberg (Basic), June 2004. 127 Khan, M. 2002. 128 Interview: Senior analyst David Isenberg (BASIC), June 2004.

40

PMFs can break down in difficult situations, as some employees did in Saudi Arabia; they fled

during the Gulf War because they feared a chemical weapons attack.129 Moreover, the firms do not

posses any loyalty toward their contractor. These firms are also the ones that decide for whom to

work for. This can be very tricky because it should not be the responsibility of PMFs to judge who

is on the legitimate side in a conflict.130 According to Isenberg, there should be a code of conduct,

which is copulated by the International Peace Operations Association131 or something else that

needs to be determined.132 There are also other options for regulations, such as countries that allow

PMFs to operate from their shores being obliged to introduce legislation to control their activities.

The challenges came into light with the use of Executive Outcomes working in Sierra Leone.

Subsequently, two other firms, MPRI (private military consultant firms) and Kellogg, Brown &

Roots (private military support firm), got their share of criticism. These three firms paved the way

for others and have stirred the emotions in the international community. Therefore, the next

paragraph will review their case and show how governments relied on them.

CONTROVERSIAL PMFs: EO, KBR AND MPRI

The first firm reviewed is Executive Outcomes (EO) that is considered to be a providers firm. Their

first mission began in 1989, when they were providing the South African Defense Force (SADF)

with special force training. In 1993 the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, contracted them to

provide security to the Soyo oil installations against United Nations (UNITA) attacks. Although the

installations were lost to them, the contract was renewed every year until 1996. In Angola, they

acted as a force multiplier offering a small group of individuals who trained and increased the

effectiveness of a lager fighting force. EO fielded some 550 men and trained over 5,000 troops and

30 pilots in this period.133 The operation in Angola cost the U.S. $60 million with 20 fatalities. After

a while, the Angolan army came under increasing pressure to withdraw their support of EO; and

they were replaced with the US firm MPRI.134 129 Kurlantzick, 2003. 130 Singer, 2001: 180-181 (In Corporate Warriors: the rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its ramifications for International Security). 131 The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) is an association of private sector service companies engaged in international peace operations around the world. Member companies are involved in all sectors of peace and stability operations including mine clearance, logistics, security, training, and emergency humanitarian services. (available at http://www.ipoaonline.org/) 132 Interview: Senior analyst David Isenberg (BASIC), June 2004. 133 Mills & Stremlau, 1999: 51 134 Mills & Stremlau, 1999: 52

41

The most outstanding contract, however, was in the brutal war of Sierra Leone. In May 1995, Sierra

Leone contracted EO for approximately fifteen million dollars. The government signed three

separate security contracts with EO over a period of twenty-one months. The Sierra Leone

government was not able to pay the start-up fee and made an agreement to bankroll the operations

in exchange for future diamond mining concessions in the Kono region.135 They have been accused

of exploiting the national resources of this weak government for this deal,. But according to David

Isenberg, if the parties involved agree to establish a subsidiary that provides various securities for

mineral distraction firms like the diamond mine or gold mines. It is entirely legitimate to do so,

even if this may seem unfair.136 The operation in Sierra Leone was rapid and within nine days, the

rebels were stopped and sent them back 126 kilometers into the jungle. Afterwards, the rebels

(Revolutionary United Front) agreed to negotiations with the government. After, signing the peace

agreement, the rebels' demanded that all EO personnel should leave. Consequently, President

Kabbah terminated the firm's contract and the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African

States Cease-fire Monitoring group (ECOMOG) entered the country. Within 95 days, the RUF

fighters again terrorized the capital city Freetown and mass killings reoccurred. ECOMOG was

unable to stop the violence and pulled back to its camps. Therefore, another firm Sandline

International was hired for several months to restore the government’s power and proved to be

successful. The end of the conflict, however, was an embarrassment to the Western powers. This

resulted in an investigation of the British government, known as the Ninth Report 2001-2002, on

their involvement in Sierra Leone. 137

In January 1999, EO dissolved because they were never fully able to shake their link to the

apartheid-past of its founders. Their bad reputation was followed by a significant loss of business,

because during their existence they have been accused of being "a mercenary army of racist

killers".138 Another often cited criticism was that they were a threat to weak governments and

undermined their sovereignty.139 There is no reference to a case, however, that underlines this

criticism. EO left Sierra Leone when asked and never threatened the integrity of the government,

135 Mills & Stremlau, 1999: 52 136 Interview: Senior analyst David Isenberg (BASIC), June 2004. 137 The firm’s shipment of arms to the region was held to be in violation of the U.N. arms embargo. Although, the British custom's agencies were launching legal proceedings against, they couldn't deny for a long time, that they were informed on the activities undertaken by Sandline. After admitting, this whole affair nearly cost the job of the British Foreign Minister Robin Cook. (Singer, 2003: 110-115) 138 House of commons, Ninth Report of session 2001-02 : 18 139 Mbogo, 2000: 18

42

even though it was in the position to do so, according to Dr. Kinnely.140 Also, taking over a

government would not stroke with the profit driven motives, according to Isenberg.141 They simply

do not have the military capability to do anything and it would be more profitable to fulfill the

terms of whatever contract they signed, especially, since bad publicity makes it difficult to find

other work, Isenberg states.142 When EO dissolved, this did not mean that its "spin-offs" or

"affiliates" closed their businesses. There have been firms associated with EO, such as Sandline,

Lifeguard, Alpha 5, Saracen, and Cape International, who are still active in the military providers

sector.

Nevertheless, EO has been the most celebrated player in the implementation sub sector, conducting

openly public military operations all over the globe, according to Singer. Their ability to organize

and deploy an elite fighting force in a matter of days, made them not only the most notorious

example of a military provider firm in the purest form, but also, one of the most effective ones.

According to Singer, EO was a true innovator in the overall privatized military industry, providing

the blueprint for how effective and lucrative the market can be.143

The second firm is Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), which is considered to be

a consulting firm. The best known contracts besides the training of the U.S. army were the contracts

in Croatia and Bosnia.144 In Croatia, for example, they have been hired for three different tasks. The

first task involved developing a multi-year program to provide leadership, management skills and a

personnel management system to the Croatian Armed Forces under the name Democracy Transition

Assistance Program (DTAP). In the second tasks they have been involved in assisting the Croatian

government within the Long-Range Management Program (LRMP). The third tasks required the

development of a program with the Croatian Government that focused on assisting and supporting

the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff in the areas of NATO requirements, policy,

planning, and peace support operations. The training of the Bosnian-Croat Army, however, was the

most recognized, controversial and high profile contract awarded to MPRI.

140 Interview, dr. Kinnely (Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) June 2, 2004. 141 Interview: Senior analyst David Isenberg (BASIC), June 2004. 142 Interview: Senior analyst David Isenberg (BASIC), June 2004. 143 Singer, 2003. (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 144 Singer, 2004. (In Warriors for hire in Iraq)

43

Box 2.3 :MPRI training Bosnian soldiers

After signing the Dayton accords on November 1995, the fighting between three ethnic groups in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats, Muslims and Serbs, came to an end. Subsequently, the US started

the Military Stabilization Program, known as the Train

and Equip program,145 which was the equivalent of the

Bosnian-Serbs army. According to Bill Clinton, the

program helps ensure that upon Implementation Forces

(IFOR) departure, a military balance exists among the

former warring parties so that none of them are

encouraged to resume hostilities.146 They believed that

the sooner Bosnian forcers were capable to defend

themselves, the sooner international troops could be

removed from the region. The Europeans were reluctant and feared that the withdrawal of IFOR it

would enfold into a weapons race. According to the Europeans, delivering weapons to the Bosnian

Muslim army would only instigate the proliferation of weapons from Russia to the Bosnian Serbs.

Therefore, the Train and Equip program was not a collective NATO effort, but a U.S. -project in

which they were in charge. Therefore, mainly Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the

United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Brunei funded the program.147

In August 1996, MPRI assisted the Federation Armed Forces with the development of their military

structure, the fielding of military equipment and the conduct of a broad-based individual and unit

training program.148 Hundred eighty-five MPRI personnel participated in the program. The main

reason for hiring MPRI was to avoid international sensitivities that would arise when they brought

in their own military advisers. But there were some loopholes, however to take, because neither the

American government nor military had a legal mandate to introduce an official American presence

into the Balkan theatre of operation. Therefore, the firm entered the Balkans before the US military

to avoid legal problems.149

While MPRI was working in Bosnia, they were shut down many times. The first time was in 1996,

when the US demanded the replacement of Conic (minister of Defense) because of his ties with the

145 Jonge, de, 2000. 146 See the White house office of press Secretary. www.ibiblio.org/.../whitehouse-papers/1996/ Jul/1996 07-

09 Fact-Sheet-on-Bosnia-Training-and-Equipment. 147 Jonge, de, 2000. 148 See http://www.mpri.com/site/int_europe.html. 149 Dakovi & Miseljic, 2001.

Source: http://www.icij.org/dtaweb/icij-bow/documents/2_PMC_PDF_1022.pdf

44

"The purpose of this

program is to assist in

providing Bosnia the ability

to defend itself, and thereby

promoting security in the

region”.

– President Clinton,

Statement on the Train and

Equip program, 1996-

Mujahdien. The actual reason for firing him was his unwillingness to co-operate with the Bosnian

Croats, according to the Muslim authorities. The US used the program as a pressure tool, to force

others to follow their rules. The last time the program was suspended was in 1999. MPRI was

caught off-guard when the Bosnian army arranged for millions of dollars worth of arms to be

(secretly) transferred from Bosnian caches to KLA guerrillas in Kosovo and Yugoslav Muslims in

the province of Sandzak. As a result, the State Department "temporarily suspended" MPRI's

program. The purpose of the Train and Equip program was never achieved, but the involvement of

the private firm made it possible to pressure others without any questions asked.150

Therefore, the hiring of MPRI in Bosnia is therefore a perfect example of manipulating the firm for

political purposes. The US has circumvented obstacles by turning to

MPRI, which enabled them to further utilize American security policy.

At the same time, by using the firm, the casualties among American

military personnel stationed in the region were decreased. In this case

they were being used as a convenient means of achieving foreign policy

goals while at the same time denying official responsibility.151 Their

activities are almost impossible to disassociate from the foreign policy

of the country for which they operate.

This firm is the opposite of EO; MPRI advises governments. The firm

claims to be "the greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in

the world." The staff consists of 350 individuals and a database of approximately 2000 retired

generals, admirals, and other officers. Eight former US senior military officers founded MPRI in

1987.152 In the government, policymakers of the governments noticed their professionalism, service

and loyalty to US foreign policy and they were awarded them with an important contract. The firm

was hired to help retired army personnel to work as professors or military science and

administrative, non-commissioned, officers, known as the Reserve Officers Training Corps

(ROTC). Another important contract awarded to them, was the Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), in which they had to develop and write army's field manuals on how to deal with the

acquisition and management of contractors in conflict environments. This was remarkable since

150 Jonge, de W. 2000. 151 Lilly, 1998. 152 LaRocque, 1997.

45

could write in favor of using contractors, which could lead to more potential work.153 The

accomplishments of the firm and its ability to take advantage of the loopholes, makes it very

successful. The role of firms like MPRI is likely to grow in the light of the war on terrorism, which

they can continue playing an advisory role for times to come.

The last firm reviewed is Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), which is considered to be a private

military supporting firm. Over the last decades it has fed, and maintained American fighting forces

in some of the most geographically remote and politically dangerous regions in the world. They

have proven to be capable of efficiently mobilizing their own vast army of engineers, cooks, and

logistics experts, often on short notice. The firm works strictly in a supporting role and depends

heavily on military customers for protection in combat zones.154

During World War II, Brown & Root landed its first military contract and built hundreds of ships

for the U.S. Navy. Its employees accompanied U.S. troops to Korea and Vietnam, building bases,

roads, harbors and so on. In 1963, Brown & Root sold out to oil-services giant Halliburton.

Consequently, Kellogg, Brown, with the addition of oil-pipe fabricator M.W. Kellogg in 1988,

became Kellogg, Brown & Root.155 The company has worked in countries like Afghanistan,

Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Kuwait, Macedonia, Saudi Arabia,

Somalia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Zaire.156

The firm established themselves as a credited firm when they were awarded a single, infinitely

expandable contract called the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). They won the

contract over three other bidders in 1992. It was a small contract of approximately $3.9 million

dollars, in which they had to plan a possible outsourcing of military logistics. They had to look for

the possibility of feeding and housing U.S. military troops when they were deployed into areas

where the US was not stationed. At that time, no one thought it was going to become a major

contract. This changed with the war in Yugoslavia and went from an initial creating three million to

being worth one billion dollars in revenue for the company. The LOGCAP contract came with

obligations. The firm had to be ready to transport a fighting force of up to 50,000 troops to any

location in the world and to supply them with food and other essentials for as long as six months.

153 Dakovi & Miseljic, 2001. 154 Bianco & Anderson Forest, 2003. 155 Bianco & Anderson Forest, 2003. 156 Singer, 2003: 136 (In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry)

46

The first time they were called into combat to accompany US forces in support of a UN mission

was in Somalia. In 1994, they were sent to another UN mission in Haiti to assist 18,000 troops for

approximately $141 million. Throughout 2002, the army paid the firm about $2. 5 billion for its

work in the Balkans, but neither the company nor the army will disclose KBR’s profit. The reason

for hiring KBR was cost saving. In the Balkans, for example, KBR paid carpenters, electricians, and

plumbers an average $15.80 an hour on average, whereas the government is $24,38 are seldomly

unique in . The contracting of local workers at a much lower rate than US governments saves a lot

of money.157

KBR is most recognized for their work in Bosnia. In this conflict they handled the logistics. The

main reason for hiring them was the unpopularity of using US forces in the Balkans. This meant

that they did not have to recruit nine thousand National guardsmen and reserves. In the Balkans the

firm joined the military engineers to create thirty-four bases from former UN camps, abandoned

factories, ruined buildings, and open fields. The company delivered most of the building materials

because they were faster than the army. The 16,200 soldiers who filled the camps depended on

them for almost entirely the food and other necessities.158 In 1997, however, their LOGCAP

agreement expired and the U.S. Army Material Command was awarded to their rival DynCorp. This

was due to an official report by the General Accounting Office, which reported that KBR had

overrun its estimated costs in the Balkan by thirty-two percent.159 But in 2001, they won back the

contract, now extended to the duration of ten years. Under this contract, they have received $183

million to support the hunt for al-Qaeda and other terrorist operatives in Afghanistan and

neighboring countries.160

Aside their glorious career, there has been a series of allegations and innuendoes against the firm.

The two allegations that stand out the most are the conflicts of interest and fraud. In Kuwait, the

firm has been accused by Pentagon officials of overcharging the US government with as much as

sixty-one million for gas online imports from Kuwait to Iraq. Another source of criticism has been

KBR’s perceived conflict of interests. The relation between KBR and Halliburton gave rice to much

criticism

157 Verloy & Politi, 2004. (In Halliburton Contracts Balloon) 158 Bianco & Anderson Forest, 2003. 159 Verloy & Politi, 2004. (In Halliburton Contracts Balloon) 160 Verloy & Politi, 2004. (In Halliburton Contracts Balloon)

47

Box 2.2: Dick Cheney

Source:www.sfreporter.com/ archive/03-26-03/pix/chene..

In 1995, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney joined Halliburton as its President and

Chief Executive Officer (CEO). This strong link to political power has been heavily debated.

Although Cheney deliberate effort not to participate in the subsidiary

KBR growing contracts with the US military war, it has been difficult

to diminish the appearance of any influence. But with Cheney in the

highest position it certainly benefited KBR, because it provided the

confidence more esteem that would have been otherwise absent. In

the five years, for example, before he joined the firm, it received $100

million in government credit. During Cheney's term, this figure

jumped to $1, 5 billion.161 He left the firm when he was named to the

George W. Bush presidential ticket. When Cheney left the firm many

took note of the fact that the company's board of directors gave him a

lucrative retirement package worth more than $33.7 million. While

on the campaign trail, he criticized the Clinton administration for over-committing US troops in the

Balkans. The irony, however, is that it was the very same surge in US troop deployment, and the

growing reliance on private companies such as Halliburton to support them, that led to the

company's strong financial position for which he was duly rewarded.

Kellogg, Brown & Root was able to provide superior, rapid logistics and engineering services that

established a template for future military interventions. The firm was able to reduce the size of U.S.

troop’s commitments by an estimated 8,900 troops and therefore made the Balkan deployment more

politically palatable. The support given by this firm also freed military personnel on the ground for

other duties more central to the mission’s mandate.162

161 Singer, 2003:140 ( In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry) 162 Singer, 2003:146 ( In Corporate warriors : the rise of the privatized military industry)

48

CHAPTER 3

OUTSOURCING THE IRAQ WAR

“What are the rules of engagement?” “Are they civilians or are they military?”

“I don't know who they are, and I don't want to go anywhere near them”. -Military official in Baghdad-

The previous chapter has shown how the private military firms have grown over the years. Whereas

most of the firms starting in the field of support, they were gradually going in the field of providing

and consultancy services. The best example for the variety of services they provide and their

growing size is through their work in Iraq. This chapter will show how they got involved in order to

understand the role they played in Iraq. This chapter also shows how the ties between the Bush

administration and the private sector are characteristic for the new strategy of the administration.

Moreover, it shows the consequences have been of going to war without many nations contributing

forces. It reviews the development and characteristics of the war to give an understanding on which

challenges they would face during their deployment. Consequently, the high level of violence made

the reconstruction efforts more difficult. Also, many nations that were withdrawing from the area

without filling the gaps. Therefore, the first paragraph will provide a short introduction on the

changes in policy since Bush became president. It will review the Bush doctrine, the increasing

military efforts and the strong ties with the private sector. The second paragraph reviews the war on

terror and the way in which Iraq became a target. Subsequently, it will show how many nations

opposed the war and pulled back afterwards. With the coalition forces facing tremendous violence

and no peace, it made Iraq look like a guerrilla warfare. The last paragraph will show the

development of the war and evaluate the obstacles the coalition faced in Iraq. This is done to

provide the context in which the private military firms had to work.

Daragahi, 2003.

49

THE BUSH REVOLUTION IN MILITARY WARFARE

Since the beginning of George W. Bush’s presidency there have been many changes in the

American foreign policy. Many of the key principles of how America engages in the world have

been discarded or redefined. Even before the so-called anti-terrorism efforts, Bush had planned to

boost the position of the US military-industrial complex. On September 23, 1999, he delivered his

comprehensive defense policy wherein three ambitious goals were set, namely:

1) Renewance of the bond of trust between the American President and the American military;

2) Defending the American people against missiles and terror; and

3) Beginning to create the military of the next century.163

Bush proposed the renewal of trust by increasing military pay and benefits and by clarifying the

mission of US forces to “deter...and win wars,” not to undertake “vague, aimless, and endless

deployments.” The last phrase shows the reluctance of the administration to send US forces on

open-ended peacekeeping missions like the deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo. Bush gave few

specifics on this second promise but indicated that as president he would make substantial new

investments in anti-terrorism efforts and “deploy anti-ballistic missile defenses, both theater and

national”. He also promised “an immediate, comprehensive review of our military” designed to

“challenge the status quo and to envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to

come.” The president urged that the replacement of existing programs “with new technologies and

strategies” aimed at creating forces that would be “agile, lethal, readily deployable and require a

minimum of logistical support.” Although most defense companies naturally resist the idea of

abandoning current programs and the military-industrial complex would oppose to such thing,

Bush's vision of high-tech defense systems gives the military so much more.164

The priorities of the Bush administration include a much larger military budget and more active

projection of American military power abroad. The activity in the DOD and national-security-

related agencies, such as the Department of Energy and Space Administration (NASA) is more than

for most other government agencies. In a research undertaken by Paul Light, he identified almost

five contract and grant jobs for every Defense Department civil servant in 1996. In contrast, he

found only 1.5 private-sector jobs for each civil servant in the rest of government.

163 Rosario-Malonzo, 2001. 164 Rosario-Malonzo, 2001.

50

On this score, they have been tremendously successful. The size of the American defense-contractor

force is very large-an estimated 2.2 million in 2000. In its two years in office, the Bush

administration has sought more than $150 billion in new military spending. Most of budget has

been approved by Congress with few questions asked. Spending on national defense is nearing

fourhundred billion dollars for fiscal year (FY) 2003, up from $329 billion when Bush took

office.165 The new path Bush is walking toward the private sector is not the only thing that changed

since Bush took over the presidency.

Bush started another revolution, this time involving foreign policy, which was conducted in three

distinct ways.166 The first revolution of the Bush administration is the exercise of American power

abroad and the lack of trust in international law and institutions. The administration is convinced

that in a dangerous world, the best way to ensure America's security is to shed the constraints

imposed by friends, allies, and international rules and organisations.167 Bush has a disdain for the

sorts of formal multilateral arrangements developed by presidents from Harry Truman through to

Bill Clinton. This does not mean that Bush opposes working with others, but when he does, the

coalitions must be willing to follow Washington's direction. Second, Bush thinks that pre-emption

should not be the last resort of American foreign policy. Indeed, Washington should be prepared not

only to pre-empt imminent threats but also prevent potential threats from materialising. This policy

is widely known as the “Bush Doctrine”, which emphasis the idea that, the US has the right to use

military force against any state that is seen as hostile or makes moves to require weapons of mass

destruction- nuclear, biological or chemical. The administration has abandoned the strategies of

deterrence and containment. Third, the US should use its unprecedented power to change the

regimes in rogue states; and when necessary use its military force to topple other governments, even

in the absence of a direct attack on them. These new policies were the overriding belief of the wars

in Afghanistan and Iraq. The most effective way of dealing with rogue states is to send in troops

and force regime change.168

The major elements of the Bush administration, from the doctrines of pre-emptive strikes and

“regime change” in Iraq, to its aggressive nuclear posture and commitment to deploying a Star

Wars-style missile defence system, were developed and refined by corporate-backed conservative

think tanks. When the administration took office, think tanks like the Center for Security Policy, the 165 Marcus, 2001. 166 Daalder & Lindsay, 2003. 167 Daalder & Lindsay, 2003.

51

National Institute for Public Policy and the Project for a New American Century created the new

American national security strategy. The unilateralist ideologues formerly affiliated with these think

tanks, along with the thirty-two major administration appointees who are former executives with,

consultants for, or significant shareholders of top Defense contractors, are driving US foreign and

military policy.169 In the Bush administration there are also other influences of the private corporate

sector.

Nine of the thirty members of the Defense Policy Board, a government-appointed group that

advises the Pentagon, have ties to companies that have won more than 76 billion dollars in contracts

in 2001 and 2002. Four members are registered lobbyists, one of whom represents two of the three

largest contractors. The Defense Policy Board was set up in 1985 to provide the Secretary of

Defense “with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense

policy.” Members of the board disclose their business interests annually to the Pentagon, but have

no official role in policy decisions. The companies with ties to Defense Policy Board members

include prominent firms like Boeing, TRW, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and Booz Allen

Hamilton and smaller players like Symantec Corp., Technology Strategies and Alliance Corp., and

Polycom Inc. Michael O’Hanlon, a military expert at The Brookings Institution, told Time

magazine in November 2002 that the board “is just another [public relations] shop for Rumsfeld.”

Former members said that the character of the board changed under his charge. Previously the board

was more bi-partisans; under Rumsfeld, it has become more interested in policy changes.170

The contracts were awarded to the defense companies for numerous reasons; there is, however,

nothing to indicate that serving on the Defense Policy Board confers a decisive advantage to firms

with which a member might be associated with. In spite of that, the board’s chairman, Richard

Perle, resigned in March 2003 but remained a member of the board. He admits allegations of

conflicts of interest for his representation of companies with businesses before the Defense

Department. The Pentagon’s inspector general has investigated the role of Perle as a paid adviser of

the bankrupt telecommunications company Global Crossing Ltd. The Hamilton, Bermuda-based

Company sought approval of its sale of overseas subsidiaries from the Committee on Foreign

Investment in the United States, a government panel that can block sales or mergers that conflict

168 Daalder & Lindsay, 2003. 169 Marcus, 2001. 170 Verloy & Politi, 2003. (In Advisors influence: nine members of the defense policy board have ties to defense contractors)

52

with U.S. national security interests. Perle also reportedly advised clients of Goldman Sachs on

investment opportunities in post-war Iraq, and is a director with stock options of the U.K.-based

Autonomy Corp., whose customers include the Defense Department. “Mr. Perle is considered a

‘special government employee’ and is subject to government ethics prohibition—both regulatory

and criminal—on using public office for private gain,” Rep. Conyers wrote in the letter obtained by

the Center. He was no the only one; table 3.1 shows the other members of the Defense Policy Board

with ties to the private sector. Table 3.1: Members of the Defence Policy Board that have ties with defense contractors Name Job description Ties with defense contractors Richard Perle Resigned board’s chairman

• Director with stock options of the U.K.-based

Autonomy Corp., whose customers include the Defense Department.

Retired Adm. David Jeremiah

Former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who served over 38 years in the Navy

• Director or advisor of at least five corporations that received more than $10 billion in Pentagon contracts in 2002.

Retired Air Force Gen. Ronald Fogleman

Served as a military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the President.

• Board member of directors of companies which received more than $900 million in contracts in 2002

Retired Gen. Jack Sheehan

Served thirty-five years in the U.S. Marine Corp

• Senior vice president and partner for Bechtel and is responsible for the execution and strategy. Bechtel is bidding for contracts to rebuild Iraq and has defense contracts worth close to $650 million in 2001 and more than $1 billion in 2002.

James Woolsey Former CIA Director • Principal in the Paladin Capital Group that is soliciting investments for homeland security firms.

• Joined consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton as vice president in July 2002. The company had contracts worth more than $680 million in 2002.

William Owens Former high-level military officer and architect of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

• Board member of five companies that received more than $60 million in defense contracts last year.

• President, chief operating officer and vice chair of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), among the ten largest defense contractors.

Harold Brown, Former Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter

• Brown, a partner of Warburg Pincus LLC, is a board member of Philip Morris Companies and a trustee of the Rand Corporation, which respectively had contracts worth $146 million and $83 million in 2002.

James Schlesinger, Served as CIA director, defense secretary and energy secretary in the Carter and Nixon administrations

• Schlesinger, a senior adviser at Lehman Brothers, chairs the board of trustees of the Mitre Corp., a not-for-profit that provides research and development support for the

53

government. Mitre had defense contracts worth $440 million in 2001 and $474 million in 2002.

Chris Williams Registered lobbyists to serve on the board and he served as a special assistant for policy matters to Rumsfeld

• Lobby for defense companies joined Johnston & Associates after leaving the Pentagon. The firm was awarded two large defense contractors as clients once Williams was on board: Boeing, TRW and Northrop Grumman, for which the firm earned a total of more than $220,000

Source: Verloy, A & Politi, D. (2003)

There is, however, a more powerful firm in the private sector. The Carlyle Group, a Washington,

D.C.-based private equity firm employs numerous former high-ranking government officials. The

Carlyle group was the ninth largest Pentagon contractor between 1998 and 2003, according to the

Center for Public Integrity, which investigates the contracts awarded by the DOD. The Carlyle

group undertakes different activities, focusing its investments on sectors that are under heavy

government regulation and contracting—defense, telecommunications and banking. Under the

leadership of former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, Carlyle grew from being a small private

equity to a global investment giant, and became a major player among defense contractors.

What sets the Carlyle group apart from others are their members, including former British Prime

Minister John Major and former Philippines President Fidel Ramos; former Office of Management

and Budget director Richard Darman; former Clinton chief of staff Thomas F. "Mack" McLarty;

former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Levitt and former Federal

Communications Commission chairman William E. Kennard. Not only former Secretary of State

James Baker works for the Carlyle group, also his former boss, President George H.W. Bush. Bush

senior joined Carlyle in 1998, before his son George W. Bush became president. Although Bush

senior ended his relationship with the firm in October 2003, he has not stopped giving speeches for

them, which he did at a Shanghai event sponsored by the firm in April 2004.171 Many have

commented that it is remarkable that senior Bush was working for Carlyle while his son was

president. Especially since his son dramatically increased defense spending in what seems to be one

of the most blatant conflicts of interests in history, according to Briody.172

171 Ismail, 2004. 172 Wead, 2004: 1

54

In September 2000, Carlyle hired speakers including Colin Powell and AOL Time Warner chair

Steve Case.173 The firm is not obliged to reveal the details of persons hired by them, and chooses

not to. This has increased the speculations on their businesses. Among the defence firms which

benefit from Carlyle's success is United Defense, a Virginia-based contractor, which currently

produces vertical missile launch systems on board the US Navy ships in the Arabian Sea, as well as

a range of other weapon delivery systems and combat vehicles.

Bush Carlucci Baker Darman Ramos Major

Former

US President and Vice President

Former Director of the CIA

Former Secretary of Defense

and Deputy Director

of the CIA

Former Secretary of State

and Sec. of Treasury

White House Budget Advisor Bush / Clinton

Administrations

Former President of the Philippines

Former Prime Minister of England

Carlyle Senior Advisor Retired 10/03 Shareholder

Carlyle Chairman Emeritus

Carlyle Senior Counselor

Carlyle Managing Director

Carlyle Asia Advisory Board

Retired 2/04

Carlyle Europe

Private firms can also influence government officials in other ways. PMFs have extensively made

use of political campaign donations and have employed lobbyists. President George W. Bush

received more than $4.5 million in campaign contributions from the 737 leading defense contractors

during the six years of study undertaken by the Center of Public Integrity. His Democratic

challenger Senator John Kerry collected a mere $332,000. In 2004, however, the proportions

switched dramatically. Kerry collected nearly twice as much as Bush between 1 January 2004 and

the end of July—$1.6 million versus $824,000 for the president. Including that money, Bush

received nearly $5.4 million from the leading defense contractors; Kerry drew just under two

million.174 The Center of Public Integrity has examined more than 2.2 million contract actions

totaling $900 billion in authorized expenditures over the six-year period from fiscal year 1998

through fiscal 2003. The report provides a new wave of informed reporting about the ever-more-

expensive, and profitable, business of defending America.175

173 Burkeman & Borger, 2001. 174 Markinson, 2004. 175 International Consortium of Investigative Journalist. Marketing the New “Dogs of War”, 2002.

Box 3.1: Members of the Carlyle group

55

The investigation also examined the political influence, as measured through lobbying expenses and

campaign contributions, which is a major undertaking by many of the largest Pentagon contractors.

The report showed results. A surprising number of companies on the top contractor list gave little or

nothing to political candidates and parties, and chose not to invest in Capitol Hill lobbyists. Indeed,

those contractors that spent the most on contributions and lobbying were from business sectors

other than defense. Only two of the ten largest political contributors among the group were

primarily defense companies—Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Nearly a quarter of the top Pentagon

contractors made no political contributions whatsoever during the six-year period, and only 202 of

the 737 gave $100,000 or more in contributions, either through PACs, soft money, or individual

donations from their executives, employees and families. Overall, the top contractors gave nearly

$214 million in campaign contributions, two-thirds to Republicans. According to the report, the

story was much the same in lobbying expenditures, though the amounts were far higher. Fewer than

half the leading defense contractors reported spending money on Washington lobbyists, but those

that did spent a total of $1.9 billion in the effort. Again, the big spenders were not primarily defense

companies, even though contractors did rank high near the top.

The reliance of the Bush administration is something never before seen in military history. What is

more remarkable are the strong ties of the private sector to the administration. Although it will be

difficult to estimate how these ties are beneficial to the firms, one can conclude that having high-

ranking politicians on board certainly increases the credibility of these firms. The firms that have

strong ties with policymakers can jeopardize the contract awarding system and increase the

conflicts of interest. As mentioned in chapter one, it is healthy for the private industry to have a

good competition, which increases the efficiency and profitably. It is questionable if these

qualifications are met and if the government really benefits from using them. The participation of

the firms in Iraq will go into history as the first privatized war without a lot of people knowing.

THE WAR ON TERROR

The origin of the conflict between Iraq and America can be traced back to Bush senior, but the

starting point is the attack on America. On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists trained by al-

Qeada hijacked four commercial planes. Two planes crashed into the north tower and south tower

of the World Trade Center; which collapsed after the crash.176 Another plane crashed into the 176 Sifry & Cerf, 2003: 219

56

Source:http://www.sujee.net/albums/2001/world_trade_center_attack/tn/approach_2_bbc.jpg

Pentagon and the last plane should have crashed into the symbols of the American Republic, the

Capitol or the White House but crashed in an open field. Subsequently, at Bush’s first public

appearance, he made a statement: “The United States would hunt down and punish those

responsible for these cowardly acts.”177

President Bush told the investigators of the 9/11 commissions that he wondered immediately after

the attack whether Saddam Hussein’s regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an enemy

of the US for 11 years, and was the only place in the world

where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat

operations. On September 18, Clarke’s office sent a memo to

Condoleezza Rice,178 entitled “Survey of Intelligence

Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11

Attacks.” The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had

either planned or perpetrated the attacks.179 It argued that the

case for links between Iraq and al-Qaeda was weak. The memo

also pointed out that Osama Bin Laden resented the secularism

of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo noted that

there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam co-operating

with Bin Laden on unconventional weapons.

Nine days later, the Bush administration identified al-Qaeda as their perpetrator. President Bush

announced that “our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but doesn’t end there. It will not end until

every terrorist group of global reach has been found stopped, and defeated.” In a Defense

Department paper on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism, three priority targets for initial

action were specified: al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al-Qaeda and Iraq

posed a strategic threat to the U.S. Secretary Colin Powell180 recalled that Wolfowitz—not

Rumsfeld—argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore

be attacked. Subsequently, Bush ordered the DOD to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted

against US interests, with plans to include the possibility of occupying Iraqi oil fields. 177 Sifry & Cerf, 2003: 283 178 Condoleezza Rice became United States National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush on January 22, 2001. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condoleezza_Rice) 179 The 9/11 commission report, National Commission on Terrorist attacks upon the United States available at http: //www.9-11commision.gov/report/911report.pdf. 180 Colin Luther Powell is the 65th United States Secretary of State. (See

Box 3.2: Crash of plane in World Trade Center

57

In the State of the Union, Bush introduced the concept of an “axis of evil, arming to threaten the

peace of the world”. In this speech, several countries like North Korea, Iraq and Iran were accused

of sponsoring terrorist activities, but only Iraq was singled out for possible military attacks.181

During his speech given at West point, he said that “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt

his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge”- in other words, wage war on other

states preventively.182 This doctrine has led to different discussions, especially in other countries.

Many believed that the policy would undermine the core idea of the UN charter which prohibits any

use of international force that is not undertaken in self-defence or after occurrence of an armed

attack across an international boundary or pursuant to a decision by the UN Security Council.183

Another concern was that it would permit other states to use force non-defensively against their

enemies.

There was also strong opposition from citizens throughout the world to the coming war.184 Many

thought there were ulterior motives for the invasion, like controlling the oil sites or enhancing new

dominant positions in the Persian Gulf. Among them is Phyllis Bennis, who believes that the war

was driven by oil and expanding the US military and economic power. According to her, many of

the top officials185 of the administration are former officials of the oil industry. The country was

invaded to control the oil industry and the ability to set the price on oil.186 Also, the ability of

redrawing the political map of the Middle East has often been mentioned. Also, the absence of

substantial proofs for the WMD undermined the credibility of the US.187 According to Brent

Scowcroft,188 it was unlikely that Hussein would risk his investment in WMD by handing such

weapons to terrorists. Despite these objections, the US was not willing to compromise or look for

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Powell) 181 Bennis, 2004. 182 Sifry & Cerf, 2003: 284 183 Sifry & Cerf, 2003: 272 184 It is estimated that between 6 and 10 million people marched in as many as 60 countries- the largest demonstrations of their kind since the Vietnam War. Some of the largest turnouts were seen in countries whose governments have offered support for the US tough stance against Iraq, threatening military action to force it to comply with UN disarmament rules. 185 The President, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans and others all have strong ties to oil companies. 186 Bennis, 2003. 187 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. 2003 Invasion of Iraq (2003). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki_2003_invasion_of_iraq 188 Lieutenant General Brent Scrowcroft was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George Bush, Sr. (Sifry & Cerf, 2003: 295)

58

political solutions. When needed, they would fight this war alone or with the help of only a few

countries.

PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS IN IRAQ

On March 2003, the invasion of Iraq began and was supported by 49 nations, also known as the

"coalition of the willing".189 The nations provided combat troops, support troops, and logistic

support for the invasion.190 The stated, according to Secretary Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were to:

• end the Saddam Hussein government;

• help Iraqi's transition to democratic self-rule;

• find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, weapons programs, and terrorists;

• collect intelligence on networks of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists;

• end sanctions and to deliver humanitarian support;

• secure Iraqi's oil fields and resources. 191

In addition to the troops there have been an estimated sixty PMFs operating in Iraq with a total of

20,000 personnel including US citizens, third country nationals and Iraqis (see appendix 3 for the

soliciting forms for PMFs). There is, however, no knowledge on the amount of firms actually

operating in Iraq, because many important firms like CACI and Blackwater are not mentioned in

official documents distributed by the U.S. According to Isenberg, Global Risk Strategies employs

around 1,000 - 1,200; Blackwater approximately 600; SOC-SMG 300; Triple Canopy roughly 350;

Control Risks Group 750 and DynCorp 175. The total number of non-Iraqi personnel is probably

less than 20,000. Erinys has hired about 14,000 Iraqi guards to protect the oil fields.192

During the build-up to war, supporting firms conducted tasks such as handling the logistics and

support for coalition troops. The massive US complex in Kuwait was used as private contractors

built the launch pad for the invasion, operated by private contractors, and even guarded by private

189 The nations that opposed to the war were Belgium, Russia, France, the People's Republic of China, Germany, Switzerland, the Vatican, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, the Arab League, the African Union and others, but none openly supported Saddam Hussein's government. (Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. 2003) 190 There are roughly estimated at United States (250,00), United Kingdom (45,000), Korea (3,500), Australia (2,000), Denmark (200), and Poland (54). 191 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. 2003 Invasion of Iraq (2003):, available at http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki_2003_invasion_of_iraq 192 Isenberg, 2004: 15

59

Figure 3.1: Map of Iraq

contractors. During the invasion, the supporting firms maintained and loaded weapons on many of

the most sophisticated weapons systems like the B2 stealth bomber and the Apache helicopter.

Some even helped operate combat systems like the Patriot missile batteries and the Aegis defense

system on board numerous U.S. Navy ships.193 Those who think that these tasks are not important,

could not be more wrong. The official U.S. military doctrine states that " since the dawn of military

history, logistics capabilities have controlled the size, scope, pace and effectiveness of military

operations.194 The most controversial aspect of outsourcing is not the involvement of supporting

firms, but the participation of private military provider firms in combat zones. These firms

supplement the overstretched coalition forces and perform four key roles: help defend key

installations, protect key individuals as Paul Bremer (head of Coalition Provisional Authority),

human intelligence and escort convoys.

On May 1, 2003, Bush announced the end of the major

combat operations in Iraq. The invasion ended after

approximately three weeks of fighting and was viewed as

a success, because the “Battle of Baghdad” was quick and

involved minimal collateral damage and most Iraqi cities

were still intact. Also, the regime failed to mobilise any

significant portion of the Iraqi people to resist the

coalition advance. The US troops were also largely

successful in preventing Saddam’s supporters from

destroying Iraq’s oil production and export facilities. In

the beginning, the troops faced little resistance even

though attacks on Coalition forces and sabotage began almost immediately. More importantly, the

expected humanitarian crisis did not come and no major crises or clashes occurred between the

Kurds and Arabs.195 The fact remains, however, that the coalition’s success in joint warfare was not

matched by its success in conflict termination, peacemaking, and in transitioning to nation

building.196

193 Singer, 2004: 4 - 5 (In The private military industry and Iraq: what have we learned and where to next?) 194 Singer, 2004: 4 - 5 (In The private military industry and Iraq: what have we learned and where to next?) 195 Cordesman, 2003. 196 Cordesman, 2003.

60

In the aftermath of the war, the administration faced major obstacles in its efforts to consolidate its

control over Iraq, known as the transition phase. It is one of the iron laws of military history that

says that armies are better equipped to win the war than to win the peace. The strategic objectives in

war fighting are far easier than the grand strategic objectives necessary to shape the peace that has

lasting value.197 In Iraq this was certainly the case and the coalition forces were confronted with

increasing resistance of different insurgent groups like the Fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or

Baath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis opposing the occupation, and foreign fighters. Different

Iraqi officials have warned that thousands of Islamic militants would join in a guerrilla-style

campaign against the "Invading Infidels". The number of Iraqi resistors has quadrupled between

November of 2003 and early September 2004, from five to twenty thousand. The Deputy

Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq, British Major General Andrew Graham, indicated in Time

magazine in early September that the estimate of 20,000 is too low. He estimates that the Iraqi

resistance strength is at 40,000-50,000.198

Therefore, one of the reasons to attract PMFs is to providing security tasks or to give the troops the

chance to focus solely on core-military tasks (see appendix 4). The firms have fulfilled (even core-

military related) tasks during the build-up, occupation and transition period, including:

• Training local troops and police forces;

• Giving military advice and consultancy;

• Maintaining and repairing vehicles and aircraft, including the guidance and surveillance systems

on tanks and helicopters;

• Running logistics operations and supervising supply lines;

• Driving supply trucks that carry fuel and food;

• Providing warehousing and storage facilities;

• Setting up internet access and maintaining computer systems;

• Preparing meals for roughly 135,000 U.S. soldiers;

• Cleaning military facilities, including Army bases and offices;

• Providing interrogators, translators, and transcribes;

• Guarding officials, military installations, and supply convoys;

• Washing clothes;

• And, building houses. 199

197 Cordesman, 2003. 198 Update News commentary: 2003. (US dilemma in Iraq: threat of extended guerrilla and terror warfare) 199 See http://www.cfr.org/background/background_iraq_outsourcing.php

61

The high level of violence was not the only challenge for the US and private firms. There was also a

shrinking number of countries participating when the war continued. At the beginning of the war,

the coalition troops represented nineteen percent of the world’s population. Today, the remaining

countries with troops in Iraq represent only thirteen percent of the world’s population.200 Even

though most countries believe that stabilizing post-war Iraq is vitally important, they do not rush to

join the reconstruction effort. American troops now constitute more than eighty percent of all

foreign troops in Iraq. This can be a major problem, because there is not enough manpower to

simultaneously occupy and secure the areas that the coalition liberated. The troops are falling short

of the manpower necessary to occupy the country and abandoned sites offer ideal hideouts for

resistant groups.201 But would things be different if the Coalition was better prepared and was able

to draw upon the support of a wide range of other nations? This remains questionable as the UN and

the international community had no resources other than those contributed by individual states.

Moreover, only a limited number of countries had forces trained and equipped for actual

“peacemaking” under conditions that involve actual combat. Most foreign forces are not capable of

dealing with local military and security threats in actual combat and would have had little value.

Furthermore they would have presented a host of interoperability problems from language to a lack

of self-protection capability.202

The private firms hired in Iraq came from sixty-three coalition and troop-contributing countries.203

The PMFs in turn are hiring employees from several countries like Britain, Nepal, Chile, Israel,

South Africa and Fiji. It is believed that 1,500 South Africans are contracted, including members of

the South African Police Services' elite task force and former members of the South African

national defence forces. There have also been reports of PMFs illegally hiring 1, 500 former combat

Indian troops as private guards to protect installations.204 There are many of these cases in which

PMFs are trying to attract former elite or Special Forces from different countries all over the world.

Although some firms have worked in conflicts they have never participated in any conflict of this

magnitude. Most of them were confronted with little advance of warning on which to plan and

execute competitive procurement actions. The contracting was accompanied with great urgency of 200 Bennis, Phyllis and the IPS Iraq Task Force, 2004: 1 201 Update News commentary, 2003. (In Counter-terrorist Warfare: Israeli lessons applicable in Iraq) 202 Cordesman, 2003. 203 See http://www. Missouribusiness.net/cq/2004/rebuilding_iraq_opportunities.asp

62

reconstruction efforts, because of the high speed of the developments in Iraq. The Bush

administration intensified its effort to transfer work from inside the Pentagon to private contractors.

But most of the agency procurement officials had no idea of the magnitude of the work that was

required for the contracts in Iraq.205 This is remarkable since the use of PMFs to support military

operations is no longer an adjunct or supplement to a capability. Their support is an essential and

vital part of the U.S. forces capability and increasing in its importance. This has been recognized by

the U.S. army and has been incorporated into Policy, Regulation and Doctrine. The difficulties for

the PMFs will be further addressed in the next chapter.

Private firms will have a bright future because the U.S. has too many problems with winning the

hearts of the Iraqi population. Experience strongly suggests that it is difficult to defeat guerrillas

who have an attractive cause and outside help.206 With the abuse of Iraqi citizens in the Abu Ghraib

prison, there is not much needed to convince recruiters that the Americans should be ejected from

Iraq. Therefore, the country remains a place where firms can work even when the U.S. leaves.

204 Isenberg, 2004: 15 205 General Accounting Office, Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq reconstruction and for Global

Logistics Support, 2004:11 206 Joes, 1999: 75 - 76

63

CHAPTER 4

THE PERILS OF IRAQ OPERATIONS

This situation made the Pentagon and U.S. lawmakers aware of the problems that uncontrolled outsourcing can bring. The proper relationship between these security companies [PMFs] and

coalition force should be re-examined. - US under-secretary of Defense Douglas Feith.

Iraq is characterised by a high level of violence, but can also be seen as a testcase for the private

military industry. Iraq provides them with the opportunity to show their capabilities and ability to

perform under dangerous circumstances. This chapter will focus on the challenges they face during

their operations in Iraq. This is important because in theory contracting PMFs seems to be easier

and more beneficial than hiring the regular army. The efforts of private firms, however, can only be

evaluated in actual warfare. It is very important to know whether the firms can live up to the high

expectations. Most contracted firms have little experience and have been confronted with many

different obstacles and challenges. Therefore, this chapter will focus on three major challenges the

private firms have faced in Iraq. The main questions asked in this chapter are: which challenges did

they meet and were they able to fulfil the terms of their contract adequately? The first paragraph

will focus on the challenges of protection and command because they had to work outside the chain

of command without the right to use information gathered by the coalition forces. The second

paragraph will focus on the lack of monitoring and contract implementation that PMFs faced in

Iraq. Other flaws such as the lack of resources and controversial firms will be addressed. The last

paragraph will focus on the lack of legal accountability, which makes their participation in Iraq

even more controversial. The employees of the firms cannot be persecuted because they do not fit in

any category. These three paragraphs will also give more insight in the kind of tasks the firms

perform and how they are coping with unpredictable circumstances.

64

PROBLEMS OF PROTECTION AND COMMAND

The firms have faced different operational problems during their employment in Iraq. One of the

major operational problems is that they are not part of the military forces and therefore have no

access to information distributed by the U.S. military or the CIA. It is quite difficult for a

commander in charge to share confidential information with private firms from outside the chain of

command. Their presence in the area of operation has greatly complicated the situation for the

commander in charge.207 This creates many potential problems because they need information on

the environment in which they work. Without it their mission could be at risk. They need to be able

to react in unsafe locations or environments, certainly in a conflict zone. Without the right

information they can jeopardize an operation, especially since firms can be positioned anywhere in

the field in accordance with the terms and conditions of their contract. Even though a lot of firms

operated in fields of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or minor conflicts

spectrum, only a few work in the major field of war. The spectrum can shift during the operation

and in Iraq there are hardly any safe zones within the area of operation. According to Campbell,

most of the employees are at risk wherever they are.208 The dangerous environment has made it

extra difficult to fulfill the term of any contract, according to Beans.209 Bearing in mind that if a

contractor feels unsafe, or feels he is not being paid enough and decides to quit, there is little a

commander can do. It is therefore of great importance that the commander in charge withholds

sufficient combat capability to protect his contractors and their operations, since most PMFs are not

in a position to protect themselves.

The CPA has restricted the use of weapons and limited the use of small arms by employees. They

are responsible for their operations and safety but can only protect themselves with a personal side

arm, generally a military issue 9-millimeter pistol with standard military issue rounds. They cannot

protect their colleagues, their operation equipment (which could be highly classified) or positions.

Should they carry larger weapons, there is a risk of being identified as an illegal belligerent. Their

rights and privileges as “prisoner of war” would when captured, which is examined in chapter

two.210 Should heavy weaponry be permitted, it would raise many questions on the lack of sufficient

207 Singer, 2004. (In Outsourcing the war) 208 Campbell, 2000. 209 Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2004. 210 Campbell, 2000.

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Box 4.1: Kim Sun-il

U.S. force, legal and political issues. The reality one faces today is that some firms are protecting

themselves with heavy weaponry.211

The vulnerability of the employees in Iraq can be illustrated by the beheadings shown on television

(see appendix 5 for the list of casualties among contractors). For example, on May 30 2004, the

Arabic interpreter Kim Sun-il from the firm Gana General Trading was kidnapped along with his

Iraqi driver on a highway running between Baghdad and Fallujah. Kim was returning to Baghdad

after delivering pillows to a U.S. military base near Fallujah. Kim's car was stopped and they were

kidnapped by a group who identified themselves as

belonging to a group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The

group demanded the withdrawal of 660 medics and

engineers from South Korea within 24 hours. Should the

South Korean government fail to meet the demands, Kim

was to be executed.212 Subsequently, the world saw him

on a video, screaming and pleading for his life: "Please,

get me out of here," "I don't want to die. I don't want to

die. I know that your life is important, but my life is

important too." The South Korean government did not

meet the demands of the group and the army found the

decapitated body of Kim Sun-il somewhere near

Baghdad.

Kim Sun-il was not the only contractor; different groups were trying to pressure governments into

leaving Iraq. Employees of KBR were involved when a fuel convoy was ambushed and seven

contractors went missing. Thomas Cahill, a truck driver from KBR, was the only one that could

escape from his kidnappers, while the remaining four were found dead. The ambush raised concern

among Marine officers in relation to the possible effect on critical fuel and supply stocks when the

firms stop delivering these goods, since the coalition forces strongly depend upon them to carry out

their missions and are in no position to replace them with regular armies.213

211 Singer, 2004. (In Outsourcing the war) 212 Korean murdered by Islamic insurgents available at www.economicreport.co.kr/nation/nat0407.htm 213 Campbell, 2000.

Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_id=2347

66

A greater concern for the firms was that coalition forces did not come to their rescue when needed.

Employees of Blackwater -three men and one woman- were brutally murdered; they were stopped

in their cars and beaten, burned, hacked and then dragged through the streets of Fallujah. The locals

cheered as one corpse was attached to a car and pulled triumphantly up and down the main road in

full view of a camera crew.214 The images of Iraqis celebrating over the mutilated bodies were sent

around the world. The attack on the employees was unprecedented, even for this city. When Marine

officials were asked why they waited six hours to intervene when the employees were hanging on

the bridge, the officials said that they only learned of the killings from the media.215 The marines

went down there only to retrieve the bodies.

The attacks had a major impact on the firms; and some supporting firms put their employees on

"lockdown" and some operations were suspended in several key areas. After the attacks, a senior

U.S. official in Iraq told officials that Halliburton considered withdrawing from the country.

Another official at the Pentagon’s Program Management Office in Baghdad, have warned their

superiors that the withdrawal of this firm would cause a complete collapse of the support

infrastructure. Although Halliburton denies considering withdrawal and the CPA216 did not want to

comment, this definitely illustrates the way they feel about Halliburton’s presence in Baghdad.217

Most PMFs, however, are willing to help coalition troops when they are in trouble. When an army

helicopter crashed in Fallujah, the PMFs that were working nearby rushed to the scene to defend the

crash site. When in turn resistant groups attacked them, they were mostly left alone to solve their

own situation. Most firms are not rescued when in danger. In Kut, three outnumbered contractors

requested coalition military assistance, but did not receive it. In the Hart Group unit, one contractor

was bleeding to death while strangled on a rooftop; the unit was forced to self-evacuate.218 These

sorts of problems can occur when contractors are not included in the military chain of command.

For example, during a delivery of food in the area of Falluyah by Blackwater, the firm was called-

up to defend the CPA headquarters in Najaf. Blackwater had to stop radical Shiite militia from

overrunning coalition troops. The firm defended the troops and the confrontation lasted for several

hours. They also sent their own helicopter to re-supply its commandos with ammunition and to

214 Freeman, 2004. 215 Singer, 2004. ( In Outsourcing the war) 216 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is the lawful government of Iraq through June 2004 and is established to restore security in Iraq. (Business Guide for Iraq, US Department of Commerce) 217 Singer, 2004. ( In Warriors for hire in Iraq) 218 Singer, 2004. (In Outsourcing the war)

67

ferry out a wounded U.S. Marine. But when their employees were attacked in Fallujah, they did not

receive any help. Moreover when employees are missing, the army is under no obligation to search

for them. When Kirk von Ackermann, a former Air Force captain working for the Istanbul-based

Ultra Service, disappeared outside Tikrit there was little response from the U.S. military. The

military sent his picture to the local Iraqi police, but little has been heard of the incident since.

Therefore, the most common complaint is that employees of PMFs think they give more than they

receive.

Even though the military is under no obligation to come to the aid of firms that are in trouble or in

need of help. It is, however, important for anyone working in a combat situation that they can rely

on a fellow colleque or soldier. When this put in doubt, the mission may be in peril. Most of the

firms are in a "habitual relationship", meaning that their personnel and the personnel of the army

unit they support, work together. Some firms that perform everyday jobs within a military unit can

become an integral part of the unit, but there is no actual insight into how this habitual relationship

works in hostile environments.219 The soldiers are trained, educated and disciplined both mentally

and physically to survive in a battlefield environment. Whether their job is being a cook, truck

driver, mechanic or technician, they are soldiers first. While employees of private firms may very

well have the expertise to do a job, they often have no knowledge of the environment they work in.

Even when they are ex-military men, the currency of their conditioning both mentally and

physically must be taken into account.220

Working outside the chain of command is dangerous for the employees of private military firms.

Meanwhile, the situation in Iraq has not changed. There is a large group of employees that has been

killed during their operations (see appendix 5) and a smaller group that has been abducted and

killed. There are no signs that this will come to an end and everyone in Iraq is a potential victim. It

is estimated that 17.5 contractors have died each month since the transition, versus 7.6 contractor

deaths per month during the previous fourteen months of occupation.221 The threats toward the

employees must be taken seriously because they can have devastating consequences. Contrary to

soldiers, employees can quite whenever they want. The risks of firms withdrawing themselves

should not be underestimated.

219 Campbell, 2000. 220 Campbell, 2000. 221 Politi, 2004

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LACK OF MONITORING AND CONTRACT PLANNING

Another important issue for PMFs is the lack of qualified human resources, according to the

General Accounting Office (GAO) and the inspector general of the Department of Defense (DOD).

Several reports claimed that the contracting staffs are undermanned, overworked and there is no

sufficient knowledge of the tendering processes. Also, the personnel that were assigned to monitor

the contracts were not properly trained to assure the contractors were monitored well. Some

commented that the contracting rules have been stretched for the sake of expediency, particularly in

the early days of post-war reconstruction.222 There have also been other problems due to the lack of

qualified personnel. According to the Center of Public Integrity, the accuracy of the Defense

Department's records leaves much to be desired, particularly regarding the corporate ownership of

its largest contractors. The Center found more than $35 billion in contracts where the ultimate

corporate parent was misidentified. In some cases this led to major discrepancies between the

amount of contracts actually won by major corporations and the totals reported publicly by the

Pentagon.223 The Center of Public Integrity was not the only one to notice that the distributing of

contracts lacked consistency and accuracy. Similarly, a State Department official told investigators

of the General Accounting Office (GAO) that they did not have enough staff to monitor their law

enforcement support contracts.

The CPA, who was asked to begin a police sector reconstruction effort to restore law and order, was

not able to support the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) team

or follow-on police sector development efforts. The INL therefore needed a firm that was capable of

providing transportation, security, housing, on-the-ground logistical support, and of providing for

these critical needs in a hostile post-conflict environment. The contract -originally valued at $50

million and which could be worth as much as $800 million- was awarded to DynCorp.224 This firm

is in charge of creating the post-Saddam police, paramilitary forces and army, but choosing this

firm is remarkable since it has been under major scrutiny. DynCorp is struggling with scandals from

their involvement in the sex-trade in the Balkans. In this case some employees were implicated in

sex-crimes and the black-market arms trade. Although the firm started to set up an in-house

222 Politi, 2004 223 Markinson, 2004. 224 In the first phase of the efforts in Iraq, DynCorp has been tasked to provide logistical and procurement support for the assessment team and criminal justice personnel. They were also hired to complete the first phase of the build out of the Jordan training facility to support the first class of 500 Iraqi police cadets.

69

screening program to avoid such incidents, contracting private firms should be considered

thoughtfully.225 Their task is critical for the peace in Iraq and without this component, the economic

development and democratization will be more complicated. When the deployment of civilian

police in Iraq fails, it will harm the efforts to restore law and order in Iraq.226 The U.S. plan of

disengagement in Iraq depends on the formation of such local forces, and for decades to come they

will be the operation's institutional legacy.227 When contracts of that importance and magnitude are

given to such a controversial firm it will be hard for the industry to redeem itself from their negative

image.

The best example for awarding contracts to controversial firms is Halliburton and its subsidiary

KBR. They have received important contracts despite their unprofessional and sometimes criminal

behavior.228 The first controversy involving KBR arose in 2003, when a Pentagon inspection report

documented the unsanitary conditions at mess halls and kitchens in Iraq. The report complained that

KBR had been ordered to improve these conditions but had failed to do so. In 2004, there was

another negative evaluation of their work: a Defense Contract Audit Agency memo to the Army

Corps of Engineers229 labeled KBR's system as “inadequate” for estimating the cost of ongoing

work in order to justify payments. In February 2004, it was revealed that KBR over-charged sixteen

million dollars for meals served to troops in Iraq at Camp Arifijan, a large U.S. military base in

Kuwait. Another report written by the Army Corps showed that Halliburton charged $2.64 a gallon

for fuel imported from Kuwait, which amounted to approximately $61 million. The commander of

the Army Corps of Engineers, Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers, cleared the firm from wrongdoing in

Kuwait, but the ruling was called “incomprehensible”. Henry Waxman said, “It appears the Bush

administration is deliberately sabotaging the government’s ability to audit Halliburton.”230 Despite

these investigations, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded the company a competitively bid

contract valued at $1.2 billion to continue to rebuild damaged oil infrastructure in Southern Iraq

(this replaced Halliburton’s previous oil infrastructure contract). In April 2004, Halliburton notified

225 Singer, 2004. (In Warriors for hire in Iraq) 226 Justification for other than full and open competition. Available at http://iraqcoalition.org/economy/PMO/State_Justification.htm 227 Singer, 2004. (In Warriors for hire in Iraq) 228 Halliburton is the biggest player in the supporting sector and their contracts are estimated about $6 billion worth of business in Iraq. It’s the subsidiary KBR is in charge of bringing convoys of food and other supplies to a dozen or more army camps. (Singer, 2004. In Warriors for hire in Iraq) 229 The US Defense Department reconstruction contracts are issued by the US Army Corps of Engineers, their primary goal is to restore the capability for oil production, oil refining and gas processing to pre-war conditions. (Business Guide for Iraq, US Department of Commerce) 230 Bennis, Phyllis and the IPS Iraq Task Force, 2004: 30 - 31

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the Department of Defense that it had over-billed by an additional $11.4 million in 2003. The list of

wrongdoing by these two firms seems endless, but they are still contracted and awarded huge

contracts. The reasons why they still are getting contracts are often debated and labeled as conflicts

of interest.

On March 8, KBR was awarded a no-bid contract to extinguish oil fires and evaluate and repair

Iraq’s petroleum infrastructure. This no-bid, “cost-plus” contract was estimated to cost up to 7

billion dollars over two years, with profits of up to seven percent. The administration argued that

they were the only ones that could begin implementing the plan on extremely short notice. The CBS

News later reported that other qualified companies had attempted to bid on the contract but were

shut out of the process. A report revealed that KBR did not actually extinguish Iraqi oil well fires

during the war. The contract was subcontracted to two other U.S. firms, Boots & Coots

International Well Control and Wild Well Control. According to the Center of Public Integrity, this

is in accordance with the trend that most contracts awarded to the very largest defense contractors

were won without what the Pentagon calls “full and open competition”. Of the ten largest

contractors [PMFs], only one, Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), won through an

open bidding process.231 The Pentagon contracts were conducted under "full and open competition."

Some 44 percent of the contracts were given under “other than full and open competition”,

according to the Center of Public Integrity.

Another problem with contracting is that they are badly monitored or controlled. For instance, there

was no formal contracting plan to purchase equipment at hand. An acquisition specialist with the

Defense Contract Management Agency told investigators of the GAO that the program manager for

the Iraq Free Media contract bought a Hummer H2 and a Ford pickup truck. Then he chartered a

cargo jet to fly the vehicle to Iraq for personal use. The GAO also noted that there was less

compliance with contracting regulations. This means that when a new task is within the scope of the

main elements of the original contract, the law does not require the existing contract to be

competitively bid. Several agencies, however, gave out task orders that went beyond the work

delineated in the original contract. For example, the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

(AFCAP) was used to provide logistical support service to USAID. In addition, it was also used for

services like creating plans for fixing the power generation for Baghdad water treatment plants,

231 Markinson, 2004.

71

which, according to the GAO, were outside the scope of the original contract.232 The original

contract awarded in March 2003, had a value of $26 million; in June 2003, USAID allocated more

than $91 million under this interagency agreement.

Shortage of human resources required the administration to hire PMFs to monitor the work of other

private firms. A report written by the minority staff of the House Committee on Government

Reform and the State Senate Democratic Policy Committee concluded that there was a conflict of

interest.233 The Department of Defense (DOD) determined that thirteen of the twenty-four contracts

it reviewed did not adequately monitor contractors. The joint venture Parsons and CH2M Hill was

contracted to oversee four other contractors, namely Fluor, Washington Group International,

AMEC, and Black & Veatch. Another contract that was evaluated was the joint venture of Parsons

and a separate company Parsons-Brinkerhoff that were both in charge of monitoring the contracts of

four contractors, namely Fluor, Washington Group International, AMEC, and Perini. The

conclusion of the report was that neither Parsons nor CH2M Hill was an independent watchdog, and

that each oversight contractor had shown significant conflicts of interest. The Committee concluded

that Parsons has close business ties with Fluor; they are partners in a $2.6 billion joint venture to

develop oil fields in Kazakhstan. In addition, actions undertaken by Parsons under the oversight

contracts could directly affect its own reconstruction contracts. There are quite similar conflicts of

interests for CH2M Hill. They also have ongoing domestic contractual relationships with three of

the firms it is responsible for overseeing: Washington Group International, Fluor and AMEC.234

This problem caught the attention of USAID235, and they have come to an agreement for the

Defense Contract Audit Agency to audit its contracts.

Despite these new arrangements, USAID procurement officials told GAO that the agency still did

not have enough permanent staff to properly oversee all the contracts in Iraq.236 Without the ability

to monitor and control the work of PMFs it will be quite difficult to estimate how well they

perform. It would also be helpful if PMFs were examined on their performance in order to enhance

it. The lack of qualified personnel to regulate the activities is troubling when there is no coherent

232 Politi, 2004. 233 Politi, 2004. 234 Dorgan, 2004. 235 The US Agency for International Development is in charge of restoring the critical infrastructure, support

essential health and education services, expand economic opportunity, and improving efficiency and accountability of government (Politi, Daniel: 2004)

236 Dorgan, 2004.

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plan. It is not healthy for the private industry that is trying to learn and grow to hire PMFs that are

investigation.

PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Although the lack of adequate planning, qualified personnel and monitoring is a major problem, one

of the most urgent problems is the lack of legal accountability. As mentioned earlier, the

commander in charge has no "Command & Control" authority over the personnel of PMFs.

Although the firms have to work in accordance with all guidance and obey all instructions and

general orders applicable to U.S. Armed Forces and Department of Defense Civilians, they cannot

be "commanded". Their relation to the government is covered by the Terms and Conditions of their

contracts. Only the Contracting officer has the authority to give directions through the contract, but

he has no authority to command or discipline them - unless there is a declaration of war.237 When

Congress declares war, contractors [PMFs] that accompany the force in the field are subject to the

UMCJ238 and under direct command, control and discipline of the commander. The declaration of

war in historical perspective is difficult.. So, without a declaration of war, they are subject only to

national laws.239 Moreover, the CPA has laid down immunity provisions that are carried forward by

the Iraqi interim government. This means that PMFs are protected from local criminal

prosecution.240

PMFs are not considered to be mercenaries in the eyes of law. Their legal status is uncertain

because governments mostly publicly distance themselves from the firms. Under the Geneva

Convention, they can be considered combatants because the firms are working in conflict zones and

are armed. But they can also be treated as non-combatants, as they are mostly not wearing uniforms

or under military command.241 So, at this point they are in legal no man's land and beyond the

established boundaries of military or international law. Or one could say that existing international

law is unable to define the new group of private military actors.242 Employees can murder, rape,

pillage and plunder without being held legally accountable, unlike soldiers: those who are suspected

of committing a crime, will be trailed, prosecuted and punished if appropriate.

237 Campbell, 2000. 238 Regular soldiers are subjected to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UMCJ). 239 Campbell, 2000. 240 Isenberg, 2004. 241 Isenberg, 2004. 242 Isenberg, 2004.

73

When Iraq was invaded there was no government, so the PMFs were not subject to any law.

Therefore, the U.S. Senate made an effort to close this criminal jurisdiction gap by passage of

Senate Bill S. 768: The Military and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction act of 1999. The bill serves two

purposes:243

1. It extends the jurisdiction of the UMCJ during a declared contingency to DOD civilians and

contractors employees (while supporting said contingency).

2. It extends Federal Criminal Legal jurisdiction over said individuals (plus member of the Armed

Service) while they are overseas accompanying the Armed Forces.

However, the 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act does not provide legal resources,

because it applies only to U.S. citizens working directly for the Defense Department on U.S.

installations, not to those, working for other government agencies or private entities, or with other

nationalities.244 There is also a constitutional problem because the placement of civilians under

military rule is an anathema to our democratic society, according to Campbell245. According to him,

when the Congress and President feel that UCMJ extension to civilians is required during

contingency operation (for unity of command, good order and discipline, etc.) for warfare - which is

an inherently governmental function - the political leadership are admitting themselves that they can

no longer defend the national interest. He also argues that it is paramount to reduce the military to a

point, which requires the creation of a true, contracted "Shadow Military" of combat service

support.246

The lack of legal status brings major problems when trying to prosecute a firm or its employees. It

is often unclear which authorities should investigate, prosecute and punish crimes that are

committed by them.247 The best example for this is the major scandal at the Abu Ghraib Prison. In

this prison scandal some employees of CACI International Inc.248 were involved and, according to

investigations, responsible. The firm was awarded a contract to provide interrogators to U.S. forces

administering prisons overseas under a so-called "Blanket Purchase Agreement". The contract

required the firm to work with the U.S. military to provide interrogators. The employees were

243 Campbell, 2000. 244 Singer, 2004. (In Outsourcing the war) 245 Campbell, 2000. 246 Campbell, 2000. 247 Singer, 2004. (In The private military industry and Iraq: what have we learned and where to next?) 248 For more than 42 years, CACI has provided information technology to the U.S. government. According

to the firm, they have over 9,400 employees, operating from over 100 office locations in the U.S. and around the world.

74

tasked with missions such as “debriefing of personnel (…..)intelligence report writing/quality

control, and screening/interrogating of detainees at established holding areas”. The employees

worked under the monitoring and supervision of the U.S. military chain of command and worked

closely with military personnel.249

Abu Ghraib prison was a military prison, where most of the prisoners were civilians, many of

whom had been picked up in random military sweeps and at highways checkpoints. The thousand

imprisoned civilians, including woman and children, had in many cases nothing to do with the

attacks by insurgent groups. The prisoners fell into three loosely defined categories: common

criminals, security detainees suspected of “crime against the coalition” and a small number of

suspected “high-value” leaders of the insurgent groups. In charge was General Karpinski, who had

never before run a prison system. She was now in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and

thirty-four hundred Army reservists, who also has had no training in handling prisoners. Others

recognized the poor job performed by General Karpinksi, who was then formally suspended after

seven months. Subsequently, there was a major investigation into the Army’s prison system,

authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez.

The report written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba concluded that the institutional failures of

the Army prison system were devastating. The report listed some of the wrongdoings:

"Pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;

threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a

detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall of his cell; sodomizing a

detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to

frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a

detainee."250

The evidence for these acts was even more stunning; there were photographs and videos taken when

the abuses took place. The pictures were not included in the report, because Taguba said the nature

of the pictures were extremely graphic. The report was not meant for public release when it was

completed in late February, but The New Yorker got hold of it and a small number of photos was

published, giving rise to much criticism. What is most remarkable is that General Taguba saved the

249 Hersh, 2004. 250 Hersh, 2004

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harshest words in his report for the military-intelligence officers and CACI. There are estimations

of at least thirty-seven interrogators from different private firms operating in the Abu Ghraib prison.

According to Taguba some employees of CACI have been either directly or indirectly responsible

for the abuse at Abu Ghraib.251 They found that contractors were involved in thirty six percent of

the proven abuse incidents.252 CACI was accused of allowing and ordering military policemen

“who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogation by “setting conditions”.

The firm, however, was not authorized to do so. Taguba argued that employee Steven Stephanowicz

should be fired from his army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the

investigating team. He also recommended disciplinary action against a second CACI employee,

John Israel for mistreatment of prisoners. It is remarkable that personnel of CACI were giving

orders to regular soldiers because they hold no responsibility for management, supervisory or

command authority over any non-CACI personnel.253

Although the firm has been accused of committing or initiating atrocities against Iraqi prisoners,

they are not subject to Iraqi law. The interrogators are also not subject to US military law; in the

end they may escape prosecution.254 This also results in the fact that, of the estimated 20,000

contractors present in Iraq, not one has yet been prosecuted or punished for any crime, even though

most firms have been employed in Iraq over a year and a half. One can conclude, according to

Singer, that the lack of any controlling or monitoring power should be a concern to all those who

are concerned with law and order. The most important implication for the private military industry

is that, with laws that are unclear or seen as inappropriate, the respect for the firms and their

effectiveness will diminish.

Why CACI was singled out in the investigation of Taguba’s report remains a question, because

before this report, A army generals released another confidential report in December 2003. It

warned that members of an elite military and CIA tasks force were abusing Iraqi detainees. Six

months later, Defense Department officials were forced to acknowledge that abuse was not policy,

251 Hersh, 2004. 252 Singer, 2004. (In The private military industry and Iraq: what have we learned and where to next?) 253 CACI clarifies information about interrogator service in Iraq. Available at

http://www.caci.com/about/news/news 2004/06_28_04_NR.html 254 Interview, dr. Kinnely (Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) June 2,

2004.

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even though there was no intervention when officials heard about it.255 Another investigation led by

the retired Colonel Stuart A. Herrington, also found that members of Task Force 121256 had been

abusing detainees throughout Iraq and using a secret interrogation facility to hide their activities.

Herrington’s report showed that U.S. military leaders in Iraq were told of such allegations even

before then, and the problems were not restricted to Abu Ghraib. The main conclusion should be

that what happened to the Iraqi citizens is one of the major failures of the conflict. Everyone who

played a role in it, firms and US forces, should take responsibility for not intervening and stopping

the abuse.

Another problem is accountability; most of the work is undertaken by sub-contractors, who are

hired by the prime contractor. Subcontractors are very important in Iraq, according to Senator

Hagel.259 He concluded that most subcontractors are actually carrying out the day-to-day functions.

The prime contractor is fully responsible for the sub-contractors’ work without approval of official

agencies. Should official agencies approve the participation of the sub-contractors, it would make

them responsible. Therefore, the prime contractors are fully responsible in deciding who are

255 White, 2004. 256 A joint Special Operations and CIA mission searching for weapons of mass destruction and high-value

targets (White, 2004) 257 Prime Contractor means a person who has entered into a prime contract with the United States.

(available at: http://www.arnet.gov/far/loadmainre.html) 258 Subcontractor (1) means any person, other than the prime contractor, who offers to furnish or furnishes

any supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind under a prime contract or a subcontract entered into in connection with such prime contract; and (2) includes any person who offers to furnish or furnishes general supplies to the prime contractor or a higher tier subcontractor. (available at: http://www.arnet.gov/far/loadmainre.html)

259 Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2004.

Prime contracts: These are large, complex contracts that will be awarded to contractors from the Coalition countries. The prime contractor must comply with FAR regulations and is wholly responsible for fulfilling all product and service requirements, and will often solicit bids from sub-contractors. The prime contractor is responsible for soliciting and awarding sub-contracts for the required products and services.

1. Contracts between the CPA or government organization and the contractor:

Direct contracts: These are contracts being offered directly to companies for fulfillment.

2. Contracts between the prime contractor257 and a sub-contractor258:

Sub-contractors: They enter into an agreement with the prime contractor and are responsible for providing a set of products or services. The prime contractor will issue a request-for-proposal (RFP), receive the bids, and award the sub-contract. Anyone is eligible to respond and compete for these sub-contracts.

77

appointed as subcontractors; a decision that is based on their judgment, profit margins and their

ability to perform. The contracts can be obtained in two ways: from government or CPA to a

contractor or from prime contractor to sub-contractor (see box 4.1). The subcontractors are based in

a variety of countries,except from countries that are barred by US law, i.e. Syria, Sudan, Libya,

North Korea and Cuba.260 Senator Hagel found it remarkable that there were no records on

subcontractors that have been dismissed over the last two, six, ten or twelve years for non-

performance.261 This defect in information flow is worrying because without controlling

mechanisms, it is impossible to prevent crimes committed by these contractors.

It is desirable to know more about the subcontractor’s background. For example, controversy arose

when Erinys262 was accused of hiring imported former South Africa soldiers and policemen that

worked in the old apartheid regime. According to a recent United Nations report, private security

companies, including Erinys International have served as a magnet for poorly paid and highly

skilled South African security officers. Erinys admits they hired somebody who had a policy

conviction against him and a person that worked in the African police taskforce. According to

interviewee John Holmes, subcontractors employed the persons and Erinys was unaware of their

(criminal) background. As a result they did not do business with the subcontractor. Even though

Erinys performs well and the attacks on oil pipelines have declined, it harmed the image of the firm.

There is one case in which a subcontractor was dismissed, namely subcontractor Nour USA,

because it was too controversial. Nour was linked to neoconservative Ahmend Chalabi, the Iraqi

exile leader who provided faulty intelligence to increase the war sentiment in the U.S. The contract

awarded to Nour had been suspended and the contract had been re-awarded to a different

subcontractor which resulted in months of delay in the vital task of readying an Iraqi army.263

It would be beneficial to the private military firms to be more transparent, since secrecy can harm

the industry. Being more open would enable all parties involved to learn from their successes and

failures. Subsequently, they could deal with the obstacles they face in conflicts and demand more

protection. Also, governments must be prepared to recognize that it is entering the business world in

its relations with PMFs, according to Singer. This requires more expertise in overseeing and

260 See http://www. usembassy.it/economic/files/briefing.doc 261 Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 2004. 262 Erinys employs around Iraq’s as watchmen and security guards to protect Iraq’s oil fields and pipelines. 263 Singer, 2004. (In Warriors for hire in Iraq)

78

managing contracts in order to give PMFs the opportunity to meet its client’s demands. Other

measurements that should be taken should tackle the issue of accountability. This is not only the

responsibility of the private military industry but also of the military itself. According to Singer,

paying the private contractor more than regular soldiers is one thing, but giving them a legal free

pass is wrong. The use of PMFs must be recognized and laws should be developed. Questions that

should be asked in this case are: What kind of employees can work in the private military firms, and

for what countries, regimes can the firms work. Also, which bodies will investigate, prosecute and

punish any wrongdoings.264 Measurements are necessary since the industry is still growing and the

area of work is expanding. And will probably entaild different fields such as the informtiaotn

technogloiy field.

264 Singer, 2004. (In The private military industry and Iraq: what have we learned and where to next?)

79

CONCLUSION

The Bush administration is relying heavily on the private military industry, which operates outside

national and international laws. The outsourcing of military tasks has many advantages, such as the

ability to concentrate on core military tasks, adding substantial human resources and experts in

different areas of operation. When analyzing the role of private military firms in Iraq, the reliance of

the Bush administration on the private military sector in combination with their inexperience in

outsourcing, is very striking. Also, the lack of experience by the firms to operate in conflicts and

war-zones, will become evident. In theory the administration should be responsible for the

contracted firms entering Iraq. In practice, however, this is not so evident because the Bush

administration is taking no responsibilities for their involvement. To understand the dynamics of the

private military industry in the Iraq war, the main questions addressed in the study, are: "What role

do private military firms play in the reconstruction of Iraq? Which operational challenges in terms

of communication, legal accountability and contracting personnel have been encountered?

To answer these questions, the first chapter of this study has focused on theories concerning

governments and outsourcing. The concept of states, monopoly of violence and privatization have

been introduced to provide a broad theoretical framework for a analysis of the central issue. In this

chapter many different concerns were raised relating to the challenges governments meet when they

outsource tasks. The most important concern was the lack of control and accountability which

seems to be inevitable when privatizing public services. Subsequently, I have tried to give more

insight in the rise of private military actors in conflict in the second chapter. This is done by

describing the history of private military actors like the mercenaries and military entrepreneurs. It

also reviews the laws that were created against these actors and the way military actors started to

create armies and corporations. After the cold war the corporations seem to have grown into

professional firms that offer their services to countries, groups and NGO’s in need. The next chapter

focused primarily on the Iraq war and the reliance of the Bush administration on the private

industry. It describes ties between the corporation and politicians, but also show how American

firms were contracted for the Iraq war. Finally, the last chapter reviews the operational challenges

PMFs encountered during their work in Iraq. The answers to the central questions of the paper will

be described next.

80

There are an estimated 20,000 people working in Iraq, both Iraqis and non-Iraqis. The PMFs were

hired for the build-up to the war, theinvasion and reconstruction period. According to different

sources, approximately 60 PMFs operate in Iraq. Their presence is a public secret and would never

been noticed if they were not involved in some controversial cases, like the abuse of prisoners in the

Abu Ghraib prison. The firms have been hired for one of the most controversial conflicts of the

century. Bearing in mind the dangerous environment of guerilla warfare and the restriction of

carrying only small weapons. These restrictions made the employees of the firms very vulnerable.

In addition, a large number of employees has been attacked, taken hostage and sometimes beheaded

during their stay. The firms, however, seem to be highly motivated to work in this environment and

proved to be a reliable force, supporting the coalition forces in many areas.

The most significant role, however, was fulfilled in the reconstruction period. During the

reconstruction period firms like Erinys, KBR, Halliburton, Vinnell, Blackwater, DynCorop and

CACI have won contracts that are considered to be vital for the success of the U.S. mission. The

firms are in charge of fulfilling core military tasks, such as guarding high officials of the CPA,

buildings and oil-pipelines. Some of the firms are responsible for training the Iraqi military police

and interrogating Iraqi detainees. What is most important to understand, is not the amount of

contracts awarded to the firms, but the nature of the contracts. As mentioned in chapter three and

four, firms have won huge contracts that are considered vital for the U.S. mission in Iraq. It is not

important that, for instance, Erinys hired Iraqis for guarding the oil-pipelines, but that this firm can

in part determine the success or failure of the mission in Iraq. Also, the outsourcing of important

tasks as guarding important persons of the CPA or Iraqi officials in charge of the reconstruction of

Iraq is very important for the success of the war. The outsourcing of these tasks is not only

astonishing but also difficult to understand. One of the main reasons that U.S. forces did not

perform these tasks themselves is the lack of resources. At the same time the Bush administration

has great confidence in the private military industry. Using them on such large scale resulted in a

shadow military that cannot be prosecuted or held responsible for committed crimes. The large

number of firms active in Iraq encountered different challenges, the most important ones will be

reviewed next.

The first challenge faced by the private military firms during their operations in Iraq, is that the

firms work outside the chain of command which means that no one in the army is in charge of the

81

firms. The firms do not have access to operational information from the CIA or U.S. forces. This

means that when they are working on different locations in the field, they have limited knowledge

of the presence of other coalition forces or Iraqi resistant groups. Especially in conflict zones it is

important to know where you stand and what the others are doing. It is also important that the

employees of the firms get the protection they need. In Iraq, however, most commanders did not

calculate manpower for the protection of the firms. This is especially important since the employees

were only allowed to carry small weapons. As mentioned earlier there was definitely a need for

self-protection, because several contractors have been kidnapped, killed or even beheaded by

resistant groups. Subsequently, there were firms thinking of leaving Iraq or rethinking their mission

in specific areas. This could potentially have a devastating effect, because the U.S. army had no

soldiers or coalition forces that could replace them. The withdrawal of the firms could also be

devastating since some firms had such important tasks, as mentioned earlier. PMFs should be a part

of the coalition forces; they need to be commanded in some degree and informed. It is important for

firms to be a part of the operations, so that they do not endanger themselves or jeopardise the

mission.

The second challenge was the lack of experience with the outsourcing processes, especially since

firms were contracted on large scale. The Bush administration has clearly overestimated the ability

of firms to work in a dangerous environment without any adequate planning. Outsourcing requires

basic provisions and during the build up tot the war there was no time to properly regulate, control

or monitor the activities of the firms. Besides the operational challenges, there was also a lack of

qualified personnel create an adequate contracting plan. Therefore, PMFs were hired to monitor the

work of other PMFs, which created a potential for conflicts of interest. Without adequate planning

and monitoring facilities there was room left for fraud and firms like Halliburton have been

convicted for fraud. Contracting rules have also been overstretched and new contracts were used to

cover old contracts, in order to keep the contract by the first contractor. Therefore, there is a need

for educated contracting officers with knowledge of the tendering processes. This should prohibit

the hiring of firms that are investigated and should install or enhance competitive bidding.

The weaknesses in the contracting process was most evident with the subcontractors. The case

concerning the use of subcontractors is more unusable, because PMFs are responsible for the

subcontractors. But when there are no regulations or laws to hold the PMF’s accountable, the

subcontractors have to answer to no one. There is also a lack of insight and control over the

82

subcontractors by governments that hire PMF’s. The subcontractors should not be the sole

responsibility of the PMFs; governments should include them in their strategies when rethinking the

use of PMFs. PMFs continue to be a part of regular armies

The last challenge is the lack of legal accountability, which means that there are no laws that hold

private military firms accountable when committing criminal acts. Subsequently, firms that have

been under investigation due to the violation of human rights or fraud were contracted. The only

action firms can do when firms are misbehaving is firing the firm or ask the firm to fire particular

employees. In the case of the abuse of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib by employees of the firm CACI,

the firms had a difficult time to present itself as a reliable firm. The incident not only showed that

there is nothing the army can do to punish them, but it also shows the lack of control firms have

over their employees. CACI cannot be held responsible under national, military or international

law. Without the development of legal responsibility it will be difficult for PMFs to redeem

themselves from failures of their employees. Before the firms enter a conflict zone there are many

issues to address, as suggested in this paper. The firms should receive a legal status in international

law, which improves the execution of prosecutions and contributes to a healthier industry.

Despite these challenges, most PMFs have done a good job fulfilling the terms of their contracts.

Even though there are many downsides to the use of PMFs, there are also positive effects. One of

the most positive contributions is that they can help out a government in need. The war has

provided a platform for the firms to show their capability and flexibility. It has also helped the US

to wage war with a small support of nations. For the future, the firms will continued to be hired by

governments, NGO's, international organisations and other groups to protect them or supplement

their forces in non-conflict and conflict situations. It is therefore necessary to set some rules and

regulate the industry. It is important for the industry to ask themselves whether it is beneficial to

their industry to stay in the grey area. The firms operate in a grey area, in which no one really

knows how to handle the firms properly or get maximum results from their efforts

83

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92

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF INFORMANTS

Name

Function

Organization Interview

Dirk Bart

Former Secretary General

(1995 – 2003)

Ministry of Defense Yes

Stella Beernink

Researcher Interchurch Peace Council No

Michael Bourne∗ Researcher Centre for International Co-operation

and Security

Yes

Max Glaser*

Consultant Pax-Consultancy Yes

Cees Homan

Senior Researcher Netherlands Institute of international

relations Clingendael

Yes

David Isenberg* Senior Analyst British American Security

Information Council

Yes

Huub Jaspers*

Reporter/Editor Argos VPRO Yes

Nando van Ketwich*

Managing Director KV Connections bv Yes

Chris Kinsey*

Researcher University of Whales Yes

Tobias Masterton*

Director Global Peace & Security Partnership Yes

Jeroen Meijer*

Senior Consultant Control Risks Group Yes

Didier Seroo

Policy advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs No

∗ Participants of the seminar “Privatisation of Warfare” on June 2, 2004.

93

APPENDIX 2

OVERVIEW LEGISLATION MERCENARIES

Legislation on global level

Year Organisations Context of legislation 1968 United Nations - The first resolution made condemns the use of mercenaries.

- It declared that "the practice of using mercenaries against movement for nation liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are outlaws, and calls upon the governments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory to be punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries.265

1970 United Nations - Included that”Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state”266.

1974 United Nations - The use of mercenaries against national freedom movements has been condemned267.

1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949

- Article 47, sought to codify disgust for mercenaries. For signatories to this protocol, mercenaries are considered outlaws, placing them in the category of criminals or worse268.

1987 United Nations - Appointed Special Reporter: the Peruvian Enrique Ballesteros. - Researched the influence of mercenaries on human rights and the rights of

the self-determination people. 1989 United Nations - There has been created a far more compelling and broader document

known as the “International convention against recruiting, use, financing and training of mercenaries" 269.

- This convention needs twenty-two countries before it can work. - In December 1999 not more than nineteen countries270 exceeded, where

most of the countries are non-western countries.

The Fifth The Hague Convention

- Concerns with neutrality, as part of international law which is only applicable when it concerns interstate conflicts.

- In article four of this convention it's recognized to states that “Corps of combatants can not be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral power to assist the belligerents"271.

265 General Assembly Resolution 2465, UN Doc. A/7218, 1968. 266 General Assembly Resolution 2625, UN Doc. A/8028, 1970. 267 Abraham, “The contemporary legal environment”, pp 92. 268 Adams, 1999: 106 269 International Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries, UN Doc.

A/Res/44/34, 04/12/89. 270 Countries that have ratified are Azerbeidzjan, Barbados, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy, Cameroon, Maldives,

Mauritanius, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Qatar, Saoedi-Arabie, Senegal, Seychelles, Suriname, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uruguay and Wit Rusland.

271 Hampson, 1991 : 17-18.

94

Regional legislation on mercenaries and PMFs

Year Organisations Context of legislation 1977 Organization of

African Unity - Progressively harsher resolutions universal revulsion of mercenary

activity led, in time, to the OAU - The “Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa”

that in 1977 was signed by the parties. 1985 Organization of

African Unity

- Convention for the elimination of Mercenarism in Africa which entered into force in 1985.

National legislation on mercenaries: United States

Year Context of legislation 1937 - The Neutrality Act was adopted in 1937 by the United States. If forbids the recruiting of

mercenaries in the US. It is not forbidden to work as a mercenary272. 1968 - The Arms Export Control Act: controls the export of arms and military services in the

US. The Act constitutes the primary laws in the US to establish procedures for the sale of military equipment and related services and stipulates the purposes for which weapons and services may be transferred, ranging form self-defence to internal security.

1998 - The Arms Export Control Act is implemented by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and overseen by the Office of Defence Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the US State Department.

- Under the ITAR “every person (other than an officer or employee of the US government acting in an official capacity) who engages in the business of brokering273 activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import or transfers of defence articles or services is required to register with the Government agency charged with the administration of this section.274.

- This registration is just in unique cases required for firms who are in business with NAVO states en other ally of the US.

National legislation on mercenaries: Russian Federation

Year Context of legislation 1996 - Adopted in a new code on criminal law. This doesn’t only forbid the use of mercenaries,

but also the recruiting, financing and training. And it is against the law to hire mercenaries275.

272 Shaerer, Private Armies, pp 20. 273 Brokering activities are defined as including, “The financing, transportation, freight, forwarding or taking

of any other action that facilitates the manufacture, export or import of a defence article or defence service.”

274 Wilton Park Conference, 1999: 43 275 Sandoz, “Private security and international law”, pp 215.

95

APPENDIX 3

SOLLICITING FORM

96

APPENDIX 4

CONTRACTS FOR IRAQ

Contractor Value Agency Abt Associates Inc.

$43,818,278 USAID

Advanced Systems Development, Inc.

$259,958.56 DoD

AECOM

$21,610,501 DoD

AllWorld Language Consultants

$4,051,349 DoD

American International Contractors, Inc.

$1,500,000,000 DoD

American President Lines Ltd.

$5,000,000 USAID

AOS, Inc.

$866,988 DoD

Artel

- -

Atlas Case, Inc.

$17,243 DoD

Bald Industries

$35,734 DoD

Bea Mauer, Inc.

$9,920 DoD

BearingPoint Inc.

$240,162,668 USAID

Bechtel Group Inc.

$2,829,833,859 USAID

Blackwater Security Consulting L.L.C.

$21,331,693 DoD

CACI International Inc.

$66,221,143.19 Interior

Capital Shredder Corporation

$11,803 DoD

Cartridge Discounters

$40,492 DoD

CDW Government, Inc.

$35,174 DoD

Cellhire USA $1,465,983 DoD

97

CH2M Hill

$1,528,500,000 DoD

Chugach McKinley, Inc.

$3,068,407 DoD

Comfort Inn

$47,324 DoD

Complement, Inc., The

$3,358 DoD

Contrack International Inc.

$2,325,000,000 DoD

Creative Associates International Inc.

$273,539,368 USAID

Dataline Inc.

$1,028,851.89 DoD

Dell Marketing L.P.

$513,678.88 DoD

Detection Monitoring Technologies

$5,584,482 DoD

Development Alternatives Inc.

$39,523,857 USAID

DHS Logistics Company

$223,497 DoD

DynCorp (Computer Sciences Corp.)

$50,000,000 State

Earth Tech, Inc.

$65,449,155 DoD

EGL Eagle Global Logistics

$111,000 USAID

EHI Company

$3,956 DoD

Electric Generator Store, The

$6,974 DoD

Environmental Chemical Corporation

$1,475,000,000 DoD

EOD Technology Inc.

$71,900,000 DoD

Expedited World Cargo Inc.

$55,004 USAID

Explosive Ordnance Technologies Inc.

$1,475,000,000 DoD

Export Depot

$21,182 DoD

Fluor Corp. $3,754,964,295 DoD

98

Force 3

$274,651.95 DoD

Foster Wheeler Co.

$8,416,985 DoD

General Electric Company

Value Unknown DoD

Giesecke & Devrient America

$72,700 DoD

Global Container Lines Ltd.

$1,850,000 USAID

Global Professional Solutions

$590,232 DoD

Global Services

$910,468 DoD

GPS Store, Inc., The

$19,761 DoD

Hardware Associates

$4,304 DoD

Harris Corporation

$165,000,000 DoD

Inglett and Stubbs LLC

$1,826,974 DoD

Intelligent Enterprise Solutions

$19,835 DoD

International American Products Inc.

$628,421,252 DoD

International Global Systems, Inc.

$157,383.40 DoD

International Resources Group

$38,000,000 USAID

John S. Connor Inc.

$34,153 USAID

JSI Inc.

$3,376 DoD

Kellogg, Brown & Root (Halliburton)

$10,832,000,000 DoD

Kollsman Inc

- -

Kroll Inc.

Value Unknown USAID

Kropp Holdings

$11,880,000 DoD

Lab Safety Supply $53,379 DoD

99

Laguna Construction Company, Inc.

$19,536,683 DoD

LandSea Systems, Inc.

$47,750 DoD

Landstar Express America Inc.

$24,396 USAID

Liberty Shipping Group Ltd.

$7,300,000 USAID

Logenix International L.L.C.

$29,000 USAID

Louis Berger Group

$27,671,364 DoD

Lucent Technologies World Services, Inc.

$75,000,000 DoD

Management Systems International

$15,116,328 USAID

McNeil Technologies, Inc.

$716,651 DoD

Mediterranean Shipping Company

$13,000 USAID

MEI Research Corporation

- -

Michael Baker Jr., Inc.

$4,528,328 DoD

Midwest Research Institute

$1,765,000 DoD

Military Professional Resources Inc.

$2,608,794.74 DoD

Miscellaneous Foreign Contract

$3,026,630 DoD

Motorola Inc.

$15,591,732 DoD

MZM Inc.

$1,213,632 DoD

NANA Pacific

$70,000,000 DoD

Native American Industrial Distributors Inc.

$123,572 DoD

Night Vision Equipment Company

$153,118 DoD

Ocean Bulkships Inc.

$5,000,000 USAID

Odebrect-Austin $1,500,000,000 DoD

100

Outfitter Satellite, Inc.

$33,203 DoD

Parsons Corp.

$5,286,136,252 DoD

Parsons Energy and Chemicals Group

$43,361,340 DoD

Perini Corporation

$2,525,000,000 DoD

Raytheon Technical Services

$12,412,573 DoD

Readiness Management Support LC (Johnson Controls Inc.)

$173,965,104 USAID

Red River Computer Company

$972,592.90 DoD

Research Triangle Institute

$466,070,508 USAID

Ronco Consulting Corporation

$12,008,289.60 DoD

S&K Technologies Inc.

$4,950,384.80 DoD

Science Applications International Corp.

$159,304,219 DoD

Sealift Inc.

$4,000,000 USAID

Segovia Inc.

$320,636 DoD

SETA Corporation

$3,165,765 DoD

Shaw Group/Shaw E & I

$3,050,749,910 DoD

Signature Science

$4,704,464 DoD

Simmonds Precision Products

$4,412,488 DoD

SkyLink Air and Logistic Support (USA) Inc.

$27,344,600 USAID

Smith Office Machines Corporation

$2,961 DoD

SPARCO

$9,215 DoD

Stanley Baker Hill L.L.C.

$1,200,000,000 DoD

101

Stanley Consultants

$7,709,767 DoD

Staples National Advantage

$4,194 DoD

Stevedoring Services of America

$14,318,895 USAID

Structural Engineers

$1,113,000 DoD

TECO Ocean Shipping Co.

$7,200,000 USAID

Tetra Tech Inc.

$1,541,947,671 DoD

Titan Corporation

$402,000,000 DoD

Total Business

$4,696 DoD

Transfair North America International

$19,351 USAID

Triumph Technologies

$228,924 DoD

Unisys Corporation

$320,000 DoD

United Defense Industries, L.P.

$4,500,000 DoD

USA Environmental Inc.

$1,541,947,671 DoD

Vinnell Corporation (Northrop Grumman)

$48,074,442 DoD

Ward Transformer Sales & Services

$115,000 DoD

Washington Group International

$3,133,078,193 DoD

WECSYS

$3,040 DoD

Weston Solutions, Inc.

$16,279,724 DoD

Zapata Engineering

$1,478,838,958 DoD

Note: Because of inconsistent and, sometimes scarce, information provided by the U.S. government, the amounts in the "contract values" field represent several types of contract payouts. The amount is either what has been paid to date on an existing contract that may extend for several years; or it represents a minimum and maximum value range of the contract; or in some instances it is the only figure provided by the government, and the contract parameters are unclear. All information known about a given contract is included in the individual company profiles. Any

102

information not given about a particular contract could not be ascertained from either the government agency awarding the contract, the company or public sources of information. Contracts for geographical areas that include both Iraq and Afghanistan are listed under Iraq, but individual contracts are explained in the respective company profiles. (Source: http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&fil=IQ)

103

APPENDIX 5

LIST OF CONTRACTORS CASULTIES

Date

Name Nationality Circumstances Occupation Employer

19-Jan-2005 Whyte, Andrew British Convoy attack Security contractor Janusian Security Risk

Mgmt. 16-Jan-2005 Unknown - Convoy attack Security contractor Steele Foundation

16-Jan-2005 Ismail, Ibrahim Mohammed

Egyptian body found dumped in a street Truckdriver Unknown

03-Jan-2005 NAME NOT RELEASED YET

British Suicide car bomb Security contractor Kroll Associates

03-Jan-2005 NAME NOT RELEASED YET

British Suicide car bomb Security contractor Kroll Associates

03-Jan-2005 Hushin, Tracy American Suicide car bomb Financial manager BearingPoint, Inc.

03-Jan-2005 NAME NOT RELEASED YET

British Suicide car bomb Not known yet BearingPoint, Inc.

21-Dec-2004 Davis, Leslie W. American Suicide bomber Construction, QC KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

21-Dec-2004 Smith, Allen American Suicide bomber Constr. labor foreman KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

21-Dec-2004 Stramiello Jr., Anthony M.

American Suicide bomber Constr. carpenter foreman

KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

21-Dec-2004 Hunter, Brett A. American Suicide bomber Lab technician KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

20-Dec-2004 Ozsagir, Saban Turkish Highway ambush Truck driver -

08-Dec-2004 Wemple, Joseph American Shot and killed

outside Baghdad Engineering-construction contractor CLI USA

08-Dec-2004 Stoffel, Dale American Shot and killed outside Baghdad

Executive vice president for CLI Corp CLI USA

25-Nov-2004 NAME NOT RELEASED British attack in Baghdads

Green Zone Security Consultants Global Risk Strategies

25-Nov-2004 NAME NOT RELEASED British attack in

Baghdad’s Green Security Consultant Global Risk Strategies

104

Zone

25-Nov-2004 NAME NOT RELEASED British

attack in Baghdad’s Green Zone

Security Consultant Global Risk Strategies

25-Nov-2004 NAME NOT RELEASED British

attack in Baghdad’s Green Zone

Security Consultant Global Risk Strategies

16-Nov-2004 Myeong-nam, Jung

South Korean

Accident (paint can exploded) - Taehwa Electrict Co

15-Nov-2004 Aaron Iversen American Roadside Bomb security contractor EOD Technology Inc.

15-Nov-2004 Terry, Johan South African Bomb Security Consultants Olive Security

15-Nov-2004 Husband, Shaun British Bomb Security Consultants Olive Security

12-Nov-2004 Tatar, Mike American friendly small arms fire Security Contractor DynCorp

10-Nov-2004 Thomas, Douglas S. American Roadside Bomb Security Contractor DynCorp

09-Nov-2004 Randolph, David American Unknown Weapons Disposal EOD Technology

07-Nov-2004 Unknown Turkish Shot Dead Truck driver Unknown

05-Nov-2004 Gurung, Tikaram Nepali Ambush Security guard Gorkha Manpower

Company 03-Nov-2004 Barker, John British Suicide car bomb Security contractor Global Risk Strategies

03-Nov-2004 Serrett, Jeffery American Small arms fire Medic Halliburton

27-Oct-2004 Schnoor, Travis American Hostile - hostile

fire - IED attack Security contractor Custer Battle

23-Oct-2004 Unknown Turkish Small arms fire Truck driver -

23-Oct-2004 Burazović, Dalibor Croatian See Link Truck driver Eurodelta d.o.o

19-Oct-2004 Lugo III, Felipe E. American Mortar attack Labor Foreman Halliburton

14-Oct-2004 Pinsonneault, John American Suicide Bomb Security Guard DynCorp

14-Oct-2004 Osborne, Steve American Suicide Bomb Security Guard DynCorp

14-Oct-2004 Eric Miner, Eric American Suicide Bomb Security Guard DynCorp

12-Oct-2004 Botha, Johan South African Convoy attack Security contractor Omega Risk Solutions

12-Oct-2004 Campher, Louis

South African Convoy attack Security contractor Omega Risk Solutions

105

11-Oct-2004 Unknown British Sniper fire Security contractor ArmorGroup

11-Oct-2004 Chadwick, Paul British pending review Security contractor ArmorGroup

07-Oct-2004 Bigley, Kenneth British Execution,

beheading Engineer -

28-Sep-2004 Moffett, Roger American Roadside bombing Convoy commander Halliburton

21-Sep-2004 Hensley, Jack American Execution,

beheading Civil engineer Gulf Services Co.

20-Sep-2004 Armstrong, Eugene American Execution,

beheading Civil engineer Gulf Services Co.

14-Sep-2004 Engstrom, Todd American Convoy attack

(RPG) Security contractor EOD Technologies

14-Sep-2004 Shmakov, Andrew Canadian Car bombing - -

14-Sep-2004 Toma, Munir Canadian Car bombing - -

10-Sep-2004 Bowers, William Earl American Vehicle attack Vice president/engineer SEI Group, Inc.

04-Sep-2004 Mallery, John N. American Vehicle attack Project manager

MayDay Supply (dining facility supplyhouse)

04-Sep-2004 Salama (Juma?), Nasser

Egyptian Execution, gunshot Not reported -

30-Aug-2004 Limbu, Mangal Bahadur

Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Shrestha, Gyanendra Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner

Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Thakur, Manoj Kumar

Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Thapa, Bishnu Hari Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner

Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Thakur, Sanjay Kumar

Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Magar, Jit Bahadur Thapa

Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Adhikari, Prakash Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner

Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

106

30-Aug-2004 Sudi, Bodhan Kumar Sah Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner

Morning Star Co. (Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Thapa, Bhekh Bahadur

Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Khadka, Ramesh Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner

Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Shrestha, Rajendra Kumar

Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Koiri, Lalan Singh Nepali Execution Cook/cleaner

Morning Star Co. [Jordanian services firm]

30-Aug-2004 Sadr, Yahya Turkish Execution, gunshot Truckdriver -

30-Aug-2004 al-Gilami, Majid Mehmet

Turkish Execution, gunshot Truckdriver -

30-Aug-2004 Unknown Turkish Execution, gunshot Truckdriver -

27-Aug-2004 Baker, Jawdee Egyptian Hostile death Not reported -

24-Aug-2004 Salman, Jamal Tewfik American? Execution,

beheading Guide/translator -

23-Aug-2004 Ahmed, Beshir Jordanian Car hijacking? Businessman -

23-Aug-2004 Naskovski, Zoran

Macedonian See Link Construction worker Soufan Engineering

(U.S. firm)

23-Aug-2004 Lazarevski, Dalibor

Macedonian See Link Construction worker Soufan Engineering

(U.S. firm)

23-Aug-2004 Markovikj, Dragan

Macedonian See Link Construction worker Soufan Engineering

(U.S. firm)

22-Aug-2004 Ahmad, Fahmi Indonesian Convoy attack Telecommunications

engineer Subcontractor to Siemens (German firm)

22-Aug-2004 Unknown Turkish Convoy attack Construction worker Tikrit bridge repair firm

16-Aug-2004 Pretorius, Herman "Harry"

South African Convoy attack Security contractor DynCorp International

12-Aug-2004 Abraham, Eldho Indian Explosion Electrical engineer British construction

company

11-Aug-2004 Rader, Kevin American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

10-Aug-2004 Abdel Aal (Mutwalli), Mohammed

Egyptian Execution, beheading Car mechanic -

107

04-Aug-2004 Alisan, Osman Turkish Convoy attack Truckdriver Ulasli Oil Company

02-Aug-2004 Nural, Ferit Turkish Convoy attack Truckdriver -

01-Aug-2004 Yuce, Murat Turkish Execution, gunshot Cleaner for catering firm

Bilintur (Turkish catering firm)

01-Aug-2004 Wagner, Robert American IED attack Security contractor Custer Battles

28-Jul-2004 Naeem, Sajad Pakistani Execution,

beheading Driver Al Tamimi group (Kuwait-based constr. co.)

28-Jul-2004 Azad, Raja Pakistani Execution, beheading Maintenance engineer

Al Tamimi group (Kuwait-based constr. co.)

25-Jul-2004 Al Rusan, Marwan Zuheir

Jordanian Not known Businessman -

22-Jul-2004 Kepov, Ivaylo Bulgarian Execution,

beheading Truckdriver Bulgarian trucking company

20-Jul-2004 Korenkov, Anatoly Russian Convoy attack Power plant technician InterEnergoServis

(Russian company)

19-Jul-2004 Copley, Mike American Rocket attack Bradley maintenance technician

United Defense Industries

17-Jul-2004 Nassir, Ayid Jordanian Convoy attack Truckdriver -

17-Jul-2004 Bayik, Abdulcelil Turkish Convoy attack Truckdriver -

13-Jul-2004 Lazov, Georgi Bulgarian Execution,

beheading Truckdriver Bulgarian trucking company

12-Jul-2004 Unknown Turkish IED attack Truckdriver - 09-Jul-2004 Unknown Turkish Convoy attack Truckdriver - 09-Jul-2004 Unknown Turkish Convoy attack Truckdriver -

02-Jul-2004 Richerson, Vern O'Neal American Mortar attack Construction foreman KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

27-Jun-2004 Arguelles, Joseph American Transport plane

over Baghdad Electric power specialist

Readiness Mgmt. Svcs. (subsid. of Johnson Controls)

22-Jun-2004 Davies, Julian British Convoy Attack Security contractor Global Risk Strategies

Limited

22-Jun-2004 Kim Sun-il South Korean

Execution, beheading Supplier Gana General Trading

Co.

19-Jun-2004 Carlos, Roberto Portuguese IED attack Telecommunications

worker

Al-Atheer (telecommunications co.)

17-Jun-2004 Demir, Faysal Turkish Friendly fire Truckdriver Turkish mftr. of prefab

housing

108

17-Jun-2004 Zbryski, Walter J. American IED attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

14-Jun-2004 Flores, Raul Fillipino Car Bomb power industry engineer

Granite Services, Inc. (subsidiary of General Electric)

14-Jun-2004 Unknown French Car Bomb Power industry technician

Granite Services, Inc. (subsidiary of General Electric)

14-Jun-2004 Poole, John British Car Bomb Security contractor Olive Security 14-Jun-2004 Butler, Keith British Car Bomb Security contractor Olive Security

14-Jun-2004 Hoke II, Bill American Car Bomb Power industry worker Granite Services, Inc. (subsidiary of General Electric)

14-Jun-2004 Sprague III, Rex G. American Convoy attack Security contractor Titan National Security

Solutions

13-Jun-2004 Fyfe, Shaun American Natural causes Construction worker Environmental Chemical Corp. Int'l

11-Jun-2004 Alyan, Hussein Ali Lebanese Kidnap/murder Construction worker -

05-Jun-2004 Neidrich, Chris American Convoy attack Security Contractor Blackwater Security

Consultants

05-Jun-2004 Unknown Polish Convoy attack Security Contractor Blackwater Security Consultants

05-Jun-2004 Unknown Polish Convoy attack Security Contractor Blackwater Security Consultants

05-Jun-2004 Dickens, Craig British Convoy Attack Security Contractor ArmorGroup (British

security firm)

05-Jun-2004 Wingate, James Gregory

American IED attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

05-Jun-2004 Little, Jarrod American Convoy attack Security Contractor Blackwater Security Consultants

02-Jun-2004 Bruce, Richard American Vehicle accident Security Contractor Blackwater Security

Consultants 30-May-2004 Tow, Bruce American Ambush Security contractor DynCorp

25-May-2004 Ovsyannikov, Vyacheslav Russian Convoy attack Power plant technician

(?) InterEnergoServis (Russian company)

25-May-2004 Dynkin, Viktor Russian Convoy attack Power plant technician

(?) InterEnergoServis (Russian company)

24-May-2004 Carman, Mark British IED attack Security contractor Control Risks Group

24-May-2004 Morgan, Bob British (Welsh) IED attack Petroleum consultant British Foreign Office

18-May-2004 Harries, British Convoy attack Security contractor ArmorGroup (British

109

Andrew security firm)

14-May-2004 Tilley, Brian British Small arms fire attack Security contractor Egyptian

communications project 13-May-2004 Gentry, Jesse American Vehicle accident Security contractor DynCorp International

13-May-2004 Doll, Henry "Hank" American Vehicle accident Security contractor DynCorp International

12-May-2004 Kaplanli, Suayip Turkish Small arms fire

attack Construction manager? Yuksel Construction (Turkish company)

12-May-2004 Unknown Turkish Small arms fire attack Driver Yuksel Construction

(Turkish company)

11-May-2004 Konorev, Alexei Russian Small arms fire

attack Construction worker InterEnergoServis (Russian company)

11-May-2004 Natividad, Raymundo Fillipino Mortar attack

(Iraqi) Warehouseman Prime Projects International (Dubai)

10-May-2004 Berg, Nick American Execution, beheading Businessman -

10-May-2004 Tyrrell, John Robert

New Zealander

Small arms fire attack Engineer Iraqi construction

company

10-May-2004 Unknown South African

Small arms fire attack Construction worker? Iraqi construction

company

07-May-2004 Parker, Daniel American IED attack Security contractor KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

02-May-2004 Qaranivalu, Kelepi Fijian Convoy attack Security contractor Global Risk Strategies

Limited

02-May-2004 Vunibokoi, Emori Fijian Convoy attack Security contractor Global Risk Strategies

Limited

01-May-2004 Kilpatrick, Christian F. American Rocket-propelled

grenade Security Contractor DynCorp International

01-May-2004 Ugar, Cemal Turkish Convoy attack ? Truckdriver -

30-Apr-2004 Unknown South African

Stepped on land mine Security contractor British security

company 30-Apr-2004 Price, Mike American IED attack Security Contractor Cochise Constultancy

29-Apr-2004 Unknown South African Drive-by shooting Construction consultant Construction company

28-Apr-2004 Reyes, Rodrigo Fillipino Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

25-Apr-2004 Foster, Vincent American IED attack Security contractor Cochise Consultancy,

Inc.

25-Apr-2004 Carter, Thomas American IED attack Security contractor Cochise Consultancy,

Inc.

22-Apr-2004 de Beer, Francois

South African Gunfire Security contractor

Meteoric Tactical Solutions (S.A. sec. co.)

14-Apr-2004 Quattrocchi, Italian Execution, gunshot Security contractor -

110

Fabrizio

12-Apr-2004 Visagie, Hendrik "Vis"

South African RPG attack Security contractor Erinys International

11-Apr-2004 Alexandru, Aron Romanian Convoy attack Security contractor Bidepa (Romanian

security firm)

11-Apr-2004 Frandsen, Henrik Danish Hostile

circumstances Businessman -

09-Apr-2004 Hulett, Stephen American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

09-Apr-2004 Montague, Jack American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

09-Apr-2004 Parker, Jeffery American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

09-Apr-2004 Johnson, Tony Duane American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

09-Apr-2004 Fisher, Steven Scott American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

09-Apr-2004 Bradley, William American Convoy attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

09-Apr-2004 Ram Bahadur Gurung Nepali Vehicle hit

landmine Security contractor Global Risk Strategies Limited

09-Apr-2004 Shiva Prasad Lawati Nepali Vehicle hit

landmine Security contractor Global Risk Strategies Limited

08-Apr-2004 Bloss, Michael John British Small arms fire

attack Security contractor Custer Battles

08-Apr-2004 Smith, Tim American Convoy attack? Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

06-Apr-2004 Manchev, Mario Bulgarian Convoy attack Truckdriver SOMAT (Bulgarian

trucking company)

06-Apr-2004 Branfield, Gray

South African

Small arms fire attack Security contractor Hart Security [The Hart

Group]

03-Apr-2004 Mikha, Emad American Hostile circumstances Translator Titan National Security

Solutions

01-Apr-2004 Unknown Czech Accidental gas explosion Petrochemical expert Chemoprojekt

31-Mar-2004 Teague, Michael American RPG attack Security contractor Blackwater Security

Consultants

31-Mar-2004 Helvenston, Scott American RPG attack Security contractor Blackwater Security

Consultants

31-Mar-2004 Zovko, Jerko "Jerry" American RPG attack Security contractor Blackwater Security

Consultants

31-Mar-2004 Batalona, Wesley American RPG attack Security contractor Blackwater Security

Consultants

111

28-Mar-2004 McDonald, Christopher British Convoy attack Security contractor Olive Security

28-Mar-2004 Bradsell, Andy Canadian Convoy attack Security contractor Olive Security

22-Mar-2004 Haapanen, Seppo Finnish Sniper fire Businessman Ensto Utility Networks

22-Mar-2004 Toronen, Jorma Finnish Sniper fire Businessman Air-Ix

18-Mar-2004 Mounce, Scott British Suicide car bomb Telecommunications

engineer Italian communications company

16-Mar-2004 Unknown German Small arms fire attack Water project engineer -

16-Mar-2004 Unknown Dutch Small arms fire attack Water project engineer -

23-Feb-2004 Cayton, Albert Luther "Al"

American IED attack Truckdriver supervisor KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

16-Feb-2004 Parks, Ray American Ambushed Contractor American Services Center

08-Feb-2004 Ramatau, Tomasi Fijian Mortar Attack Security contractor Global Risk Strategies

31-Jan-2004 Strydom, Francois

South African Suicide car bomb Security contractor SAS International [sub

to Erinys Int'l]

26-Jan-2004 Linderman Jr., Arthur American Convoy attack nr.

Tikrit Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

21-Jan-2004 Deatherage, Jody American Vehicle accident Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

14-Jan-2004 Unknown Convoy attack Driver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

14-Jan-2004 Unknown Convoy attack Driver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

06-Jan-2004 Unknown French Small arms fire attack Contactor Unknown US company

06-Jan-2004 Unknown French Small arms fire attack Contactor Unknown US company

05-Jan-2004 Flynn, Richard Canadian IED attack Security contractor U.S. company

13-Dec-2003 Manelick, Ryan American Small arms fire

attack Company officer Ultra Services.Irex Corp.

30-Nov-2003 Kim, Man-Soo

South Korean Convoy attack Electrician Omu Electric Co. (sub

to Washington Gp.)

30-Nov-2003 Kwak, Kyung-Hae

South Korean Convoy attack Electrician Omu Electric Co. (sub

to Washington Gp.) 30-Nov-2003 Unknown Colombian Small arms fire Contractor KBR (subsidiary of

112

attack Halliburton)

23-Nov-2003 Drobnick, Todd American Vehicle accident Translator team

manager Titan National Security Solutions

23-Nov-2003 Sinclair, Gordon American Vehicle accident Translator operations

director Titan National Security Solutions

17-Nov-2003 McJennett, Brent American Land mine Communications

contractor Proactive Communications Inc

17-Nov-2003 Varga-Balázs, Péter Hungarian Friendly Fire Contractor - Driver ToiFor Kft

13-Nov-2003 Unknown American Small arms fire attack - -

02-Nov-2003 Buckmaster, Roy American IED attack Bomb disposal expert EOD Technology, Inc.

02-Nov-2003 Dyess, David American IED attack Bomb disposal expert EOD Technology, Inc.

04-Sep-2003 Rimell, Ian British Small arms fire attack Bomb disposal expert Mines Advisory Group

(Brit. charity)

03-Sep-2003 Gaston, Vernon American Small arms fire

attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

20-Aug-2003 Unknown American Small arms fire attack Translator U.S. Army

05-Aug-2003 Bryant Jr., Fred American IED attack Truckdriver KBR (subsidiary of

Halliburton)

21-Jul-2003 Rudorf, Peter British Illness while on dive Diver Sub-Surface Eng'g (sub

to Bechtel)

10-Jul-2003 Unknown Unknown Vehicle accident Unknown KBR (subsidiary of Halliburton)

10-Apr-2003 Grimm, Robert American Vehicle accident Fireman National Response

Corp. of Long Island It is understood that the above lists may be incomplete. Source: http://www.icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx NOTE: The numbers are from the U.S. government. Any private individual or news organization who wishes to keep track of war dead gets their information from this same source. Whenever a death occurs, CENTCOM (the United States Central Command in Tampa , FL ) issues a brief news release that gives the bare facts about the incident: when it happened, how it happened, and the soldier’s regiment, if known. The only information not provided at this point is the soldier’s name. These releases are published regularly on the Internet at:http://www.centcom.mil/ After the soldier’s relatives are notified of the death, the U.S. Department of defense then issues its own news release that gives the soldier’s name, age, unit and hometown. Again, these can be found on the Internet here: http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/