2ac iraq aff - withdraw military

7/25/2019 2AC Iraq Aff - Withdraw Military

1/81

2AC Iraq Af Dartmouth2K9 Rachel, Jessie M, Jessie PB, Ryan, Gre

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IRAQ AFF 2AC BLOCKS WAVE 3

IRAN ADVANTAGE........................................................................................................................................... 3No countrie in!"#e Fett$ei......................................................................................................................... %Ir"n &ro'i( "n# )e* #ue to &reence We)re+ ,-.............................................................................................Ir"n /uo &o$er Free0"n -1.........................................................................................................................

WD u& Ar"4 coo&er"tion to 4"'"nce Ir"n.....................................................................................................5$# u& n"tion"'i0....................................................................................................................................... 1Lon* Ter0 &reence 6e+ iue B"r7e*"r 1..................................................................................................... 82AC Ir"n O!er!ie$....................................................................................................................................... ,-AT Ir"n re"#+ to t"'6.................................................................................................................................... ,,AT $e &ot #"te9Ir"n &o'ic+........................................................................................................................,2Ir"n $i'' t"6e Ir"/ "(ter $it)#r"$"' 2--5......................................................................................................,3AT :;S $it)#r"$"' 'e"# to Ir"n @eie u6">Be"'

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2/81


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AT Con#ition C H,2................................................................................................................................. 5AT Con#ition C H22................................................................................................................................. 1AT DOD C H,3...........................................................................................................................................82AC DOD C H23........................................................................................................................................ -2AC DOD C H33........................................................................................................................................ ,AT Conu't NATO.......................................................................................................................................... 2

DISADS........................................................................................................................................................ %AT o'itic @o4 Bi'' H,%............................................................................................................................ AT o'itic @o4 Bi'' H2%............................................................................................................................ AT o'itic @o4 Bi'' H3%............................................................................................................................ 5AT o'itic @o4 Bi'' H%%............................................................................................................................ 1AT CR DA H,3.......................................................................................................................................... 8AT L"er DA H,2......................................................................................................................................... 52AT L"er DA H22......................................................................................................................................... 53AT Ir"n Re#e&'o+0ent DA............................................................................................................................5%AT A(*)"nit"n Re#e&'o+0ent DA................................................................................................................5AT A''ie# ro'i(.............................................................................................................................................. 5AT A&&e"e0ent DA.................................................................................................................................... 55AT Ir"e' Co0&en"tion DA H,2................................................................................................................. 51AT Ir"e' Co0&en"tion DA H22................................................................................................................. 58

TOICALIT.................................................................................................................................................. 1-2AC T Co04"t Troo&................................................................................................................................ 1,

L"t &rinte# 51,- ,2J%- :ou c"n ut c"'' 0e @e''+=> @eie u6">Be"'

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3/81


"

IRAN ADVANTAGE


"


4/81


#

No countries invade Fettweis

Withdrawal increase cooperation, all countries want stability, No countries will invade a perceived wea

Ira!

Fettweis "#Christopher Fettweis, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December!!". #Survival $%.$, &n the Conse'uences of Failure in (ra', p. )*+%)

-he biggest ris of an /merican with0rawal is intensifie0 civil war in (ra' rather than regional conflagration(ra'1s neighbours will liely not prove eager to fight each other to 0etermine who gets to be the ne2t country to spen0 itself into

penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime ne2t 0oor. /s much as the Sau0is an0 (ranians may threaten to interveneon behalf of their co religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter3insurgency role that/merican troops play to0ay. (f the Unite0 States, with its remarable military an0 unlimite0 resources, coul0 not bringabout its 0esire0 solutions in (ra', why woul0 any other country thin it coul0 0o so 45" Common interest ,notthe presence of the US military,provi0es the ultimate foun0ation for stability. /ll ruling regimes in the 6i00le7ast share a common 8an0 un0erstan0able9 fear of instability. (t is the interest of every actor 3 the (ra'is, their neighboursan0 the rest of the worl0 3 to see a stable, functioning government emerge in (ra'. (f the U nite0 S tates were to with0rawincrease0 regional cooperation to a00ress that common interest is far more liely than outright warfare


#


5/81


$

Iran proli$ and he% due to presence Wehrey &"

Iranian drive $or he%e'ony and proli$eration are directly due to () presence

Wehrey Dassa *essica et al &" Fre0eric Wehrey Dalia Dassa :aye ;essica Watins ;effrey 6artini -?7 (


6/81


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Iran s!uo power Free'an "+

Iran is a status !uo power, seen a$ter () invasion o$ uwait

/mb. Free'an "+/mbassa0or Freeman was /ssistant Secretary of Defense for (nternational Security /ffairs -he following is an e0ite0 transcript of the fiftyfirst in a series of Capitol ?ill conferences convene0 by the 6i00le 7ast Policy Council. -he meeting was hel0 on Fri0ay, ;anuary 5), !!), in the =ol0 @eie u6">Be"'

%


7/81


&

WD ups Arab cooperation to balance Iran

() drawdown in Ira! increases Arab-state cooperation to balance Iran

Wehrey Dassa *essica et al &" Fre0eric Wehrey Dalia Dassa :aye ;essica Watins ;effrey 6artini -?7 ( @eie u6">Be"'

&


8/81


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wd ups nationalis'

() pullout o$ Ira! would spar nationalis' allowin% the' to unite a%ainst Iran to chec

.aphe "+;u0ith S. aphe (nstitute for National Strategic Stu0ies National Defense University Dr. ;u0ith S. aphe is a Distinguishe0/fter the SurgeB Ne2t Steps in(ra'4A February !!) httpBblog.lrei.orgtmurphyfiles!!%55after3the3surge.p0f

/ young (ra'i who serves as an a0visor to the prime ministers office spoe last fall in Washington, arguing that theUnite0 States an0 (ran were trying to ill (ra'is national i0entity. ?e blame0 the Unite0 States for creating a politicalvacuum in (ra' an0 faulte0 (ran for institutionaliEing instability as part of its strategy to establish hegemony an0 sprea0 Shiitetheocracy throughout the region. -he only solution , he sai0, is the revival of (ra'i nationalism, even if it meanstemporarily shelving the 0evelopment of 0emocracy. ?e 0escribe0 (ra'i nationalism+once seen as the special i0eologicaprovince of the Gath Party+as increasingly popular, especially the (slamic bran0 of (ra'i nationalism preache0by 6u'ta0a al3Sa0r. ?e calle0 on the Unite0 States to 0raw on a broa0 spectrum of (ra'i political parties+inclu0ing e23Gathistsan0 Communists+to create a new national resistance movement that coul0 counter (ranian efforts to 0estabiliEe(ra' an0 a national compact to frame government reforms an0 national reconciliation .?e also encourage0 the Unite0States to apply the surge strategy that has been successful in Sunni areas of (ra' to pre0ominantly Shia southern (ra'


'


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9

/on% Ter' presence ey issue 0ar1e%ar +

() /on% Ter' 2resence in Ira! is the Critical Impedimentto ()-Iran Relations

:ayhan 0ar1e%ar, Prof. of (nternational


10/81


!(

5A6 Iran 7verview

&4 Iran will tal only i$ there is a () withdrawal8our 'ilitary presence causes the' to $eel insecure and

threatens their 1one o$ in$luence, that9s :u%el'an ";

54 Iranian cooperation hin%es on the plan, respectin% the security a%ree'ent is the only way to have ()-

Iranian dialo%ue that9s )erwer and 2arer "+

balance ofpower.A Gy shifting (ra' to a frien0ly state, (ran 0esires to 0iscar0 the tra0itional 0esignation of (ra' as (rans

counterbalance in the Persian =ulf an0 to turn the new relations into a >balance of interests.A The 'ain con$lict in

Iranian-(4)4 relations in post3invasion (ra' is base0 on re0efining (ra's political3security structure .Un0erstan0ing the roots of (rans foreign policy has important implications for the Unite0 States an0 regional countries thatare currently concerne0 about (rans role an0 aims in (ra'.


!(


11/81


!!

AT Iran ready to tal

&4 Iran will tal only i$ there is a () withdrawal8our 'ilitary presence causes the' to $eel insecure and

threatens their 1one o$ in$luence, that9s :u%el'an ";

54 Iranian cooperation hin%es on the plan, respectin% the security a%ree'ent is the only way to have ()-

Iranian dialo%ue that9s )erwer and 2arer "+

Their evidence is aw$ul,

@Iran is ready to tal, 5"&"

B C They say Iran is ready to tal, but there is no lin to the case---it is not speci$ic to ()-Iranian

dialo%ue, rather broad tals on nuclear weapons

B C This evidence tals about how Iran is postponin% tals

B C It concedes tensions with western culture, Ah'adinead both @avoided direct responses and

went into a @$lurry o$ anti-western rhetoric

B C 2re$er our speci$ic evidence8the ey issue is the $act that WE AVE TR772) 7N TEIR

07RDER----------------------------------------------------------------------------

B C Even i$ they win Iran is ready to tal, this is only because they perceive the () withdrawal, a

$ailure to do the plan would result in a reversal in Iranian policy

>oubayed " Sami 6oubaye0 staff writer for /sia -imes Feb *, !!% >/hma0ineIa0 ri0es the /merican ti0eAhttpBwww.atimes.comatimes6i00le7ast:G!*/!$.html

-hey inclu0e /merican support for a 5%K* coup that topple0 a 0emocratically electe0 (ranian government, 0uring the yearsof presi0ent Dwight 7isenhower. -hey also inclu0e /merican bacing for (ra' 0uring the (ran3(ra' wars, un0er


12/81


!2

AT we post date8Iran policy

This doesn9t 'atter, Iran policy hasn9t chan%ed, the ayatollah still hates () presence, and reli%ious

obections don9t chan%e year by year

Reuters "#-homson Be"'

!2


13/81


!"

Iran will tae Ira! a$ter withdrawal 5""#

&4 E'pirics $low a$$, Iran is a status !uo power, a$ter () invasion o$ :uwait, openin% a door $or Iran to

assu'e re%ional he%e'ony, it chose not to epand, that9s $ree'an "+

54 2lan sovles Irans perceived epansion is a direct blowbac to our presence, En%a%in% Iran in dialo%ue

allows a cooperative e$$ort ensurin% Ira! stability, that9s 0ah%at "#

B C This evidence was power ta%%ed8Tals about %lobal 'iddle east e$$ort, Iran is one o$ the

countries included in the @re%ional $riends to @help the Ira!i nation

B C This evidence !uotes @Ah'adinead warned the west that dialo%ue and $riendship - not

threats - were the ri%ht way to deal with Iran *ust 'ore reason why our advanta%e is true

B C Evidence doesn9t tae into account twitter revolution or nuclear pro%ra', these both chec a

desire to epand, Iran cant control its own populous and it doesn9t need to secure 'ore land now that is

has nuclear 'issiles

B C () pullout o$ Ira! would spar nationalis' allowin% the' to unite a%ainst Iran to chec

.aphe "+;u0ith S. aphe (nstitute for National Strategic Stu0ies National Defense University Dr. ;u0ith S. aphe is a Distinguishe0/fter the SurgeB Ne2t Steps in(ra'4A February !!) httpBblog.lrei.orgtmurphyfiles!!%55after3the3surge.p0f

/ young (ra'i who serves as an a0visor to the prime ministers office spoe last fall in Washington, arguing that theUnite0 States an0 (ran were trying to ill (ra'is national i0entity. ?e blame0 the Unite0 States for creating a politicalvacuum in (ra' an0 faulte0 (ran for institutionaliEing instability as part of its strategy to establish hegemony an0 sprea0 Shiitetheocracy throughout the region. -he only solution , he sai0, is the revival of (ra'i nationalism, even if it meanstemporarily shelving the 0evelopment of 0emocracy. ?e 0escribe0 (ra'i nationalism+once seen as the special i0eologicaprovince of the Gath Party+as increasingly popular, especially the (slamic bran0 of (ra'i nationalism preache0by 6u'ta0a al3Sa0r. ?e calle0 on the Unite0 States to 0raw on a broa0 spectrum of (ra'i political parties+inclu0ing e23Gathistsan0 Communists+to create a new national resistance movement that coul0 counter (ranian efforts to 0estabiliEe(ra' an0 a national compact to frame government reforms an0 national reconciliation .?e also encourage0 the Unite0States to apply the surge strategy that has been successful in Sunni areas of (ra' to pre0ominantly Shia southern (ra'

B C () drawdown in Ira! increases Arab-state cooperation to balance Iran

Wehrey Dassa *essica et al &" Fre0eric Wehrey Dalia Dassa :aye ;essica Watins ;effrey 6artini -?7 ( @eie u6">Be"'

!"


14/81


!#


!#


15/81


!$

AT @() withdrawal leads to Iran $illin% void Taheri "

&4 Iran is a s!uo power, they wont $ill any power vaccu', proven a$ter () invasion o$ :uwait, that9s

Free'an "+

Their evidence is aw$ul,

B C Iran wants Ira! stability and the () out o$ the >iddle East, that9s )erwer and 2arer "+, they

now e'pirically that they cant %et away with invadin% Ira!, with the () in A$%hanistan, it will %o

a%ainst rationality

B C non-uni!ue--This evidence tals about the perception o$ withdrawal, should have been

tri%%ered by 5"&& security a%ree'ent

B C ca other countries will $ill the power vaccu'8they want to balance a%ainst Iran

B C )anctions chec8Iran cannot sustain epansion, it will be tied down econo'ically

B C This evidence is speci$ic to so$t balancin%---because they are not 'ilitarily increasin% their

presence, 'eans this evidence is only observin% bandwa%onin% Iran9s econo'ic power


!$


16/81


!%

AT Iran will tae over--$ree'an

Iran is a status !uo power, seen a$ter () invasion o$ uwait

/mb. Free'an "+/mbassa0or Freeman was /ssistant Secretary of Defense for (nternational Security /ffairs -he following is an e0ite0 transcript of the fiftyfirst in a series of Capitol ?ill conferences convene0 by the 6i00le 7ast Policy Council. -he meeting was hel0 on Fri0ay, ;anuary 5), !!), in the =ol0 @eie u6">Be"'

!%


17/81


!&

AT Free'an indict

@This would 'ean that Iran would never attac

B C No lin--None o$ our i'pacts are based o$$ o$ Iranian a%%ression, they are based o$$ o$ other >E

eastern countries response to Iranian actions lie developin% nuclear 'issiles


!&


18/81


!'

AT @Allowin% Iran to tae over as re%ional he%e'on /T proli$ and war 6oo "

&4 E'pirics $low a$$8:uwait invasion disproves any epansionist Iranian action, that9s $ree'an "+

B C 2lan solves, diplo'acy solves $or nuclear proli$eration, that9s /u%ar ";

Even i$ that is true, the plan is the only way to solve Iran9s !uest $or re%ional he%e'ony and nuclear

'issiles are all a reaction to () presence in Ira!

Wehrey Dassa *essica et al &" Fre0eric Wehrey Dalia Dassa :aye ;essica Watins ;effrey 6artini -?7 (


19/81


!9

AT @() withdrawal will lead to dire conse!uences $or Ira! Ayhan, *un &&, 5"&"

&4 Disre%ard this evidence, Dinar Daddy, the blo%%er o$ the website has a disclai'er

Daddy No date8No 'uals httpBwww.theira'i0inar.com9

DisclaimerNone of the information ( share on this site is my own unless ( create a post where ( share my own opinion or personale2perience. ( simply try to collect the best rumors an0 information ( feel applies to a given 0ays news an0information that ( hear or rea0 on the internet about the >New (ra'i DinarA. -hose ( 0o spea with, ( trust. So, anypersonal phone calls that ( share on the blog , ( have reason to believe they are sincere in their intent, an0 ( believethey are in some way connecte0 to those who 0o now what is going on. /s for myself, ( am connecte0 to no >sourceA, Iust to thosewho tell me they are. ( will never reveal a >contactA of mine, or their >sourceA for the purpose of giving more groun0s or proof of theirclaims. ;ust tae everything as a rumor an0 allow it to reveal itself over time. ( have no hi00en agen0a for posting what ( 0eem to be

worthy rea0ing. (m Iust trying to mae this 0ifficult ri0e easier to follow for my family, frien0s, ac'uaintances an0 anyone they 0eem to share this site with. ( wish you all the very best ( hope this ri0e will en0 soon. (t has0efinitely taen its tollT Dinar Da00y

B C Their evidence concludes that the (N could chec any instability

B C Their evidence concludes Iran would never tae over because countries lie Turey would $lipout at another )hiite state in the re%ion

B C Their evidence concedes that () presence caused instability, 'eans the i'pact is non-u

B C ca .aphe "+ and Wehrey Dassa *essica et al &" No i'pact to a () withdrawal

Withdrawal increase cooperation, all countries want stability, No countries will invade a perceived wea

Ira!

Fettweis "#Christopher Fettweis, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December!!". #Survival $%.$, &n the Conse'uences of Failure in (ra', p. )*+%)

-he biggest ris of an /merican with0rawal is intensifie0 civil war in (ra' rather than regionalconflagration. (ra'1s neighbours will liely not prove eager to fight each other to 0etermine who gets to be the ne2t

country to spen0 itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime ne2t 0oor. /s much as the Sau0is an0(ranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co religionists, they have shown no eagerness toreplace the counter3insurgency role that /merican troops play to0ay. (f the Unite0 States, with itsremarable military an0 unlimite0 resources, coul0 not bring about its 0esire0 solutions in (ra', why woul0any other country thin it coul0 0o so45" Common interest , not the presence of the US military,provi0es the ultimate foun0ation for stability. /ll ruling regimes in the 6i00le 7ast share a common8an0 un0erstan0able9 fear of instability. (t is the interest of every actor 3 the (ra'is, their neighbours an0 the rest ofthe worl0 3 to see a stable, functioning government emerge in (ra'. (f the U nite0 S tates were to with0raw,increase0 regional cooperation to a00ress that common interest is far more liely than outright warfare


!9


20/81


2(

AT () will ne%otiate with Iran

Don9t really need to answer this because we are advocatin% that the proble' with dialo%ue is Iran, and

that is because o$ () presence in Ira!


2(


21/81


2!

AT Iran insists its nuclear pro%ra' is $or peace$ul purposes

/ets thin about the lo%ic behind this clai', there are < countries in the @ais o$ evil Ira!, Iran, and

North :orea4 Ira! %ot ra1ed by the () in a wee on Iran9s border4 North :orea was %oin% to %et toppled

by the (), but then they %ot nuclear 'issiles, and then the () started 'eetin% North :orea9s de'ands4

'''' I wonder what Iran thou%ht would be a %ood idea, and it wasn9t to invest in nuclear ener%y,especially when you have $reain% oil under you country

0ut I %uess it could be $or peace$ul purposes, the (N reportH oh that9s ri%ht, Iran re$used to let (N

o$$icials inspect their nuclear pro%ra'


2!


22/81


22

AT War wont escalate

B C They clearly 'isunderstand our advanta%e, our i'pacts are based o$$ o$ a () 'iscalculation

with Iran, this is so they don9t 'isinterpret actions as hostile and retaliate, that lu%ar ";

2re$er it, this is $ro' a () senator and taes out their de$ense because even i$ Iran is scared

o$ a () striebac, i$ they $eel we are invadin% the', and they have a nuclear 'issile, they wouldrationally launch it


22


23/81


2"

Iran is tryin% to %et in$luence in Ira! by illin% opponents

Don9t tae this evidence into consideration, it is $ro' The National 6ouncil o$ Resistance o$ Iran,

clai'in%, but with no evidence, that the illin% o$ this law'aer was orchestrated by Tehran

Even i$ you buy this, there is no real ar%u'ent here


2"


24/81


2#

IRA )TA0I/IT. ADVANTAGE


2#


25/81


2$

Ira! )tability 7verview

&4 Violence in Ira! is because o$ lac o$ understandin% their culture, our lac o$ plannin%, and the way

our $orces acted by their own ecess that Dod%e "

54 I$ we pull out, this creates the ey space that will allow the co'petent non-sectarian Ira!i9s to rebuildIra! that9s Ad Ali "#


26/81


2%

AT @2re'ature withdrawal destroys Ira! stability

&4 We have to leave now, $ailin% to would e'power al aeda to the point where they would be able to

bleed the () dry in Ira!, that9s *arrar and /eaver &"

54 I$ we pull out, this creates the ey space that will allow the co'petent non-sectarian Ira!i9s to rebuild

Ira! that9s Ad Ali "#

@eie u6">Be"'

2%


27/81


2&

AT, our ev postdates your Ira! withdrawal stabili1es clai'

&4 ere is so'e evidence that post dates yours 6urrent Withdrawal table stabili1in% Ira!, we post date on

this

=eneral Be"'

2&


28/81


2'

AT Ad Ali indict

&4 7ur Ad Ali evidence is a'a1in%, the 'arch elections don9t 'atter with Ira! stability, i$ anythin% this

$lows a$$, they are an ea'ple o$ a hu%e voter turn out, a controversial election, ust lie the 5""" ()

election, and then a )upre'e court rulin% on a decision, this i$ anythin% is 'ore a reason why Ira! can

%overn itsel$


2'


29/81


29

AT constitutional article &="

&4 Non-(ni!ue, this is a DA to the s!uo, withdrawal has no e$$ect, the violence that is bein% taled about

has no solution, since 5""#

54 No lin, no reason why the () would adopt article &=" anyway, doesn9t say @() or @withdrawal thiscard is irrelevant


30/81


"(

AT 6orsi indict

&4 6orsi has a 2D in political science $ro' arvard, the ter'inal evidence is warranted, tals about the

spillover e$$ect o$ a war in Ira!, and the i'plications on Israel and 6hina4 Their indict has no cards and

attacs 6orsi9s ability to challen%e 'ainstrea' thou%ht as i$ it were bad


"(


31/81


"!

AT Ira! is stable now

&4 Recent election coupled due to () perceived control caused violence between two 'aor $actions that9s

2itt &"

54 )tatus !uo violence is up because o$ () presence

Gard and *ohns "?Qieutenant =eneral -here are riss if the U.Swith0raws its troops from (ra'. /re there greater riss in eeping them there4A httpBwww.wagingpeace.orgarticles!!K55!!gar03Iohnsthere3are3riss3if3the3us3with0raws.htm

Charge 5B -here coul0 be a civil war. &nly the presence of U.S. forces is eeping some stability in (ra' an0 preclu0ing a religious war an0 increase0

civilian casualties.


32/81


"2

AT @need an eternal power

&4 We are the proble'--Violence in Ira! is because o$ lac o$ understandin% their culture, our lac o$

plannin%, and the way our $orces acted by their own ecess that Dod%e "

54 Iran could the eternal power--En%a%in% Iran is critical to ensure Ira! stability, it allows a cooperative

e$$ort, that9s 0ah%at "#

@eie u6">Be"'

"2


33/81


""

AT Ira! will be destabili1ed, wea %ov9t reli%ious oil dependence

&4 Ira! will stabili1e i$ we depart, wea %overn'ent and oil dependence don9t 'atter, there will be

political reali%n'ent that9s Ad Ali "#

54 Ev concludes the 'aority o$ Ira!i9s want the () out, this 'eans even i$ our withdrawal destabili1es

Ira!, our presence will cause destabili1ation because o$ the' tryin% to %et us to leave

Be"'

""


34/81


"#

AT 6>R withdrawal shit

&4 2lan solves, this evidence is talin% about 'ilitary distrust with %overn'ent, that is because it is a

puppet %overn'ent o$ the (), that Ad Ali "#, Everyone distrusts the %overn'ent

54 No coup, Ira! is as de'ocratic as we are, in their %reatest test $or the >arch election, a controversial

decision, was reviewed by the supre'e court, uphold, and then everythin% was $ine


"#


35/81


"$

7VER)TRET6 ADVANTAGE


"$


36/81


"%

AT We have hu%e de$icit nownot ey

&4 Ira! is overstretchin% the ar'y, General Ri%%s said that in Be"'

"%


37/81


"&

AT We aren9t ey to %lobal econ

&4 () is ey to %lobal econo'y, we are lined throu%hout the world, 7pen Door econo'ics established

a$ter WW5 caused the () to econo'ically 'onopoli1e the %lobe, we control waterways, $acilitate

international trade, and it was our recession that caused the %lobal recession

54 No lin-their evidence is talin% about the %lobal econo'y o$ 5"?"


38/81


"'

AT No ti'e$ra'e $or econ collapse

&4 Their indict o$ Faiolas is wron%, he says that when overstretch is coupled with overco''it'ents, that

INEVITA0/. results in econo'ic collapse, there$ore EVER. )E67ND we re'ain tied down in Ira!, we

%et weaer to the point where we cant stabili1e the world


"'


39/81


"9

7verstretch ey to hard power $or >iddle East

&4 7ur evidence post dates, their authors soon chan%ed their 'ind when they saw the drain Ira! had on

our %lobal econo'y, a$ter the econo'ic crisis

54 7verstretch ills hard power, pre$er General Ri%%s to their hac, we cant 'eet our recruitin% %oals

because o$ how 'any troops are tied down in Ira!, this is causin% a ne%ative $eedbac loop as we institute

pro%ra's lie stoploss, destroyin% retention, illin% hard power, that9s Gard and *ohns ?

Be"'

"9


40/81


#(

7verstretch ey to %lobal co''unity

&4 )o$t power is a better internal, unilateral occupation has proven to 'aybe %et our presence out in the

world, but it hurts our i'a%e4 A passive () involved in 'ultilateral coalitions is a superior internal

54 Bcross applyC Turn-overstretch breeds anti-A'ericanis' and terroris', our evidence assu'es allbarriers

2ape 5"" #Be"'

#(


41/81


#!

AT overstretch is ey to protect the weaer states

&4 Turn, overstretch 'eans we cant protect anyone, when are 'ilitary is overstretch it ills our hard

power because o$ pro%ra's lie stoploss that causes a recruit'ent and retention crisis that9s %ards and

ohns ?

54 )o$t power solves, 'eans other states and %lobal coalitions will be able to protect weaer states


#!


42/81


#2

AT )olvency Tae-outs

&4 No redeploy'ent, 5 bills have been reected in senate

The Associated 2ress "; Senate reIects (ra' re0eployment motions M!!M "BKBK P6 7-httpBwww.msnbc.msn.comi05*$""MM$

R


43/81


#"

)7FT 27WER ADVANTAGE


#"


44/81


##

)o$t power overview

&4 Ira! taned our credibility, we need to %et out now, to send a si%nal that we aren9t a evil adventurous

he%e'on that9s innebusch "#

54 2olls prove in Ira! Turey 2aistan and *ordan that +"K o$ the people hate us and want us out o$Ira!, it is the steppin% stone to re%ainin% international le%iti'acy that9s Gard and *ohns ?

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@Withdrawal in an insecure Ira! will down cred

&4 2lan stabili1es Ira!, spars nationalis' causin% local citi1ens to 'ore actively en%a%e in de'ocracy,

that9s .aphe "+

54 2lan politically re-alli%ns the %overn'ent, and taes out the cause o$ instability, () troops that9s Ad Ali"#

@eie u6">Be"'

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Withdrawal 'aes us loo inconsistent and downs cred

&4 This is EJA6T/. what Fettweis indicts, this do'ino e$$ect is co'pletely incorrect, as shown with the

() withdrawal o$ Vietna', that9s Fettweis "#

54 Non-uni!ue, 7ba'a already announced withdrawal, their ev doesn9t tae this into account

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Withdrawal 'eans Terrorists win

&4 No, it 'eans terrorists lose, 7sa'a 0in /aden has said his strate%y is to bleed to () dry, withdrawal

'aes his e$$ort unwinnable that9s *arrar and /eaver &"

54 Recruitin% $or al aeda is based o$$ o$ hatred o$ the (), plan solves this thus cripplin% the terrorists9

base

@eie u6">Be"'

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:RITI:)


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#9

AT )ecurity : LM

&4 Re'ovin% troops solves the :4 Valbaorn proves no lin and Turn

54 E'pirical Evidence that there is instability in the 'iddle east4 Ira! Iran wars prove actual 'aterial

violence4 Troop presence has lead to real violence in places lie Israel and Vietna'4

ore productive Than the Narcissistic 6riticis'

6orten ValbPrn, PhD in the Department of Political Science O /arhus, 3= #Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics andRegional Conflict, >Culture Glin0 an0 Culture Glin0e0B (mages of 6i00le 7astern Conflicts in (nternational Be"'

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AT )ecurity : L5#M

=4 The A$$ outwei%hs the :4 Thousands o$ Ira!is have died and will continue to die with troop presence4

2re$er e'ancipation o$ the Ira!is be$ore representations o$ security4

?4 Also, we read speci$ic ev that only a pullout will solve our har's4 Even i$HHH the root cause is basedin security rhetoric, the har's will be inde$initely replicated i$ we allow our troops to stay

;4 And, this usti$ies per' do both4 Doin% both allows $or solvin% the har's outlined while reco%ni1in%

and reectin% the security discourse4 The riti isn9t intrinsic to the a$$, there will inevitably be security

rhetoric, one additional instance won9t preclude the possibility o$ the alt

6riti!ue Alone is not ade!uate to alter the current security environ'ent O 2olitical Action is Necessary to

2ro'ote E'ancipation 7ver )ecurity

Pinar 0il%in, Prof. of (< O Gilent Univ, 3?#Regional Security in The Middle East, p. M!35

/0mitte0ly, provi0ing a criti'ue of e2isting approaches to security, revealing those hi00en assumptions an0normative proIects embe00e0 in Col0 War Security Stu0ies, is only a first step. (n other wor0s, from a critical security

perspective, sel$-re$lection, thinin% and writin% are not enou%h in the'selves. -hey shoul0 becompoun0e0 by other forms of practice8that is, action taen on the groun09. (t isin0ee0 crucial for stu0entsof critical approaches to re3thin security in both theory an0 practice by pointing to possibilities forchan%e i''anent in world politicsan0 suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of

becoming a 1force of change1 in worl0 politics. Cognisant of the nee0 to fin0 an0 suggest alternative practices tomeet a broa0ene0 security agen0a without a0opting militarise0 or Eero3sum thiningan0 practices, stu0ents ofcritical approaches to security have suggeste0the imagining, creation an0 nurturin% o$ security communitiesas e'ancipatory practices8Gooth 5%%$a Gooth an0 Yale 5%%"9. /lthough Deveta1s approach to the theorypracticerelationship echoes critical approaches1 conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter sees to go further in shapingglobal practices. -he 0istinction Gooth maes between 1thining about thining1 an0 1thining about 0oing1 grasps the

0ifference between the two. Gooth 85%%"B 55$9 writesB -hining about thining is important, but, more urgently,

so is thinin% about doin% .... /bstract i0eas about emancipation will not su$$ice it is important forCritical Security Stu0ies to engage with the real by su%%estin% policies, agents, an0 sites of change, to helphu'anind,in whole an0 in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. (n this sense, provi0ing a criti'ue ofe2isting approaches to security, revealing those hi00en assumptions an0 normative proIects embe00e0 in Col0 WarSecurity Stu0ies, is only a $irst8albeit crucial9 step. (t is vital for the stu0ents of critical approaches to re3thinsecurity in both theory an0 practice.


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+4 7ur )cenario Evaluations are 6rucial For Ethically Responsible 2olitics - 2urely Theoretical :riti is

Insu$$icient - We Need @As I$ )tories to 7$$set the Worst International Violence

6ichael Willia's, Professor of (nternational Politics at the University of Wales+/berystwyth, 3?#-he @eie u6">Be"'

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4 )ecurity >eans u'an E'ancipation not >ere )urvival - 2rovidin% )a$ety 6reate 7pportunities For

Flourishin%

:en 0ooth, Prof. of (< O Wales, 3?#Critical Security Studies and !orld Politics, p. -he best starting point for conceptualiEing security lies in the real con0itions of insecurity suffere0 by people an0

collectivities. Qoo aroun0. What is imme0iately striing is that some 0egree of insecurity, as a life 0eterminingcon0ition, is universal . -o the e2tent an in0ivi0ual or group is insecure, to that e2tent their life choicesan0 chances are taen awaythis isbecause of the resourcesan0 energy they nee0 to invest in seeingsafety from 0omineering threats3 whether these are the lac of foo0 for ones chil0ren or organiEing to resist aforeign aggressor. -he corollary of the relationship between insecurity an0 a 0etermine0 life is that a de%ree o$

security creates li$e possibilities. Security might thereforebe conceive0 as synonymous with openin%up space in people9s lives4 -his allows for in0ivi0ual an0 collective hu'an beco'in%3 the capacityto have some choice about living 0ifferently 3 consistent with the same but 0ifferent search by others. -wointerrelate0 conclusions follow from this. First, security can be un0erstoo0 as an instrumental value it frees its possessorsto a greater or lesser e2tent from life30etermining constraints an0 so allows 0ifferent life possibilities to be e2plore0.Secon0, security is synonymous simply with survival. &ne can survive without being secure 8the e2perience of refugees in

long3term camps in war3torn parts of the worl0, for e2ample9. Security is therefore 'ore than 'ere animal

survival 8basic animal e2istence9. (t is survival3plus, the plus being the possibility to eplore hu'anbeco'in%, /s an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people8s9 to some 0egree to 0o other than 0eal

with threats to their human being. -he achievement of a level of security3 an0 security is always relative 3 gives toin0ivi0uals an0 groups some time, energy , an0 scope to chose to be or beco'e, other than 'erelysurvival as hu'an biolo%ical or%anis's. Security is an important 0imension of the process by which the humanspecies can reinvent itself beyon0 the merely biological.

&"4 Their i'pacts are constructed4 There is e'pirical evidence o$ the () bein% i'perialist throu%hout the

war on Ira! and the i'pacts never happened4

&&4 I$ the ne% can sever discourse, then the a$$ can also, reason to pre$er the per'


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AT )ecurity : L;#M

&54 The 6riti!ue9s 7bsession with Representations 0locs AN. 2roductive 6han%e to International

Relations - It 6reates an (navoidable episte'olo%ical crisis

6orten ValbPrn, PhD in the Department of Political Science O /arhus, 3= #Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics andRegional Conflict, >Culture Glin0 an0 Culture Glin0e0B (mages of 6i00le 7astern Conflicts in (nternational @eie u6">Be"'

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AT )ecurity : L##M

&ore E$$ective Than Their blind

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67(NTER2/AN)


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AT 6onditions 62 L&5M

&4 Article &=" cannot be used as a bar%ainin% chip in ne%otiations

Alra$idayn ";; #no author, (ra', !5!, >:ur0sB /rticle 5$! is not negotiable an0 non3recognition of the political scene hel0AhttpBtranslate.google.comtranslate4hlen]ieU-F3)]oeU-F3)]langpairarXen]uhttpBwww.alrafi0ayn.com!!%3!K3M33!"3K*5")"*33335$!333333333.html]prevlanguagetools]rurltranslate.google.com

GayaEi0 ?assan 6P for the :ur0istan list of changeB R/rticle 5$! cannot be a bargaining chip in negotiations an00iscussions the political blocs.R ?e sai0B Rthat any government forme0 in the future, to respect thisconstitutional provision, implementation an0 that all parties not to engage in bi00ing policy on them .R?e continue0 thatB R-here will be fle2ibility over the :ur0ish 0eman0s with regar0 to article 5$! on the 0ispute0areas in the negotiations between political blocs, as it 0eman0s guarantee0 by the Constitution. Ran0 calle0 on concerne0 parties toBR to mae concessionson a can0i0ate as prime minister an0 spee0 up the formation of the government because it is the interest of all (ra'is. R?e sai0BR /ll political scenarios

before possible in the 0istribution of positions of presi0ential an0 sovereign. R For his part, lea0er of the :ur0istan /lliance 6P 6ohsen al3Sa0oun sai0 thevoices we hear from some politicians in the masses of winning the elections on the non3recognition rule of constitutional 5$! further complicate the

political scene in (ra'. Sa0oun sai0 that which 0oes not recogniEe the /rticle 5$! 0oes not recogniEe the Constitution vote0 by the people (ra'i an0 aguarantee of their rights. ?e a00e0B that some politicians, instea0 of hea0ing to fin0 a 'uic solution to form a government at this 0ifficult time talingabout the substance ha0 been resolve0 by the Constitution. calle0 Sa0oun politicians to stay away from political pressure an0 the ten0ency to solve the

problem of forming a government which is now serious concerns on the (ra'i arena. 6eanwhile, 6P for the (ra'i National Coalition @asim al3/raIi, sai0on 6on0ay that the meeting will bring together the lea0er of (ra', (ya0 /llawi, lea0er of coalition rule of law, Nuri al36alii an0 a pressure 0irecte0

against the coalition. R-hey sai0,R (t shoul0 not be a coalition of law hel0 si0e events away from the National /lliance must be the e2istence of Iointmeetings, Rnoting thatR (t is my view that the meeting between al36alii, /llawi is a pressure point on the National Coalition to accept 6alii1s can0i0atesfor the National /lliance for prime minister. R-he spoesman for a coalition of law ?assani reveale0 tals official will be con0ucte0 by the National/lliance with the (ra'i Qist soon to 0iscuss the issue of forming a government. /raIi sai0 that the National Coalition to R/nthov of the meeting, whichwill not yiel0 any result because 6alii, /llawi insist on the post of prime minister, but ( thin it1s leverage against the national coalition.R

54 The only solvency evidence that the ne% reads is the 0oot evidence which only says that >alii wants

$or () troops to leave and does not describe i$ the Ira! %overn'ent would or would not prescribe to

article &=" o$ the constitution O this 'eans that even i$ the 62 is a %ood idea it is i'possible to i'ple'ent

the plan because there is no evidence >alii would say .E) to i'ple'entin% article &="

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AT 6onditions 62 L55M

alii said he would not co'pro'ise on article &=", its not %oin% to pass

A:news &"6PB Diverse views regar0ing article 5$! within 6alii1s bloc Rshay agreementR Sun0ay, ;une "th !5! MBK P6httpBanews.comenanews$5K)%$M

?aIi sai0 the article 5$! an0 :iru were pivotal points for :ur0s in any negotiation with other (ra'i blocs. /ccor0ing to a

:ur0ish 6P of the :ur0istan (slamic Union 8:(U9 7sa'a *a'il, the merger alliance forme0 of the State of Qaw an0 the

(ra'i National /lliance 8(N/9 le0 by /mmar al3?aim was shayR Some figures in >aliiQsState of Qaw coalition

said earlier that they would not co'pro'ise on :iru a$ter the bloc had reportedly a%reed

earlier to i'ple'ent the constitution o$ which the article &=" is a part.

=4 6onditionin% 6ounter-2lans Are Ille%iti'ate and a Votin% Issue

a4 Eplodes the research burden- There are an in$inite nu'ber o$ conditions the ne%ative can put on

the a$$ir'ative plan4

b4 Not co'petitive- The counter-plan is plan plus by addin% the condition o$ so'ethin% to the

i'ple'entation o$ plan usti$ies per'utation per' do the plan and condition on another issue o$

e!ual i'portance

c4 Destroys plan $ocus- Focuses the debate on the condition on which plan is passed instead o$ the

actual plan

d4 2I6s that do the entirety o$ the plan are ille%iti'ate O we cannot %arner any o$ the &ac as o$$ense

which uni!uely sews the debate because it is TE only o$$ense the a$$ir'ative has in the round8

usti$ies the per'utation per' do the counterplan

e4 6an9t %enerate o$$ense- We can strai%ht turn A// the disadvanta%es and they can still solve the'

throu%h the counterplan- they have in$inite prep-ti'e to research and $ind the evidence that the

condition will be 'et 'eanin% that we are F7R6ED to %o $or theory every ti'e

$4 No ri%ht to this %round- they can run the conditions as disads to the plan and a%ent counterplans

which solves bac all o$ their o$$ense and avoids the abusiveness o$ this counterplan

%4 This is a voter $or $airness and education


$'
http://aknews.com/en/aknews/4/158946/http://aknews.com/en/aknews/4/158946/


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AT 6onsult NAT7

&4 I'pacts should have already happened4 We have already be%un pullin% out o$ Ira!, the plan ust

'aes sure we stic to schedule4

54 2er'utation do the 2lan and consult NAT74

a4 6ounterplan doesn9t co'pete O in addition to the $iatin% o$ the plan, the counterplan sets up

consultation $ra'ewor and consults4 >eans that it9s $unctionally plan plus4 Doin% the plan and

consultin% solves all net bene$its4

b4 6ounterplan is tetually plan plus O tetual co'petition is best4 2revents 'ar%inal counterplans

that retreat troops EJ6E2T $or one person O which ill li'its4 Functional co'petition $orces

'ies burdens, which is arbitrary4

oore "; - 2h4D4 6oncordia 6olle%e Depart'ent o$ 2olitical )cience LBe"'

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of unipolar power rather than falling bac, as we 0i0 in the 5%%!s, on paralyEing multilateralism. -he future ofthe unipolar era hinges on whether /merica is governe0 by those who wish to retain , augment an0 useunipolarity to a0vance not Iust /merican but global en0s, or whether /merica is governe0 by those who wish to give itup3either by allowing unipolarity to 0ecay as they retreat to Fortress /merica, or by passing on the bur0en by gra0uallytransferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to /merican hegemony.-he challenge to unipolarity is notfrom the outsi0e but from the insi0e. -he choice is ours. -o impiously paraphrase GenIamin FranlinB ?istory has given you an empire, if you will eep it.

;4 e% solves nuclear war

Valmay :halil1ad, Former /ssist Prof of Poli Sci at Columbia, Spring 5%?, -he Washington @uarterly, Yol. 5), No. P. )$Un0er the thir0 option, the Unite0 States woul0 see to retain global lea0ership an0 to preclu0e the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the

in0efinite future. &n balance, this is the best long3term gui0ing principle an0 vision. Such a vision is 0esirable not as an en0 in itself, but because aworl0 in which the Unite0 States e2ercises lea0ership woul0have tremen0ous a0vantages. First, the global environment woul0 bemore open an0 more receptive to /merican values 33 0emocracy, free marets, an0 the rule of law. Secon0, such a worl0 woul0 have abetterchance of 0eal ing cooperatively with the worl01s maIor problems, such as nuclearproliferation, threats of regionalhegemony by renega0e states, an0 low3level conflicts. Finally, U.S. lea0ership woul0 help preclu0e therise of another hostile global rival, enabling the Unite0 States an0 the worl0 to avoi0 another global col0 or hot war an0 allthe atten0ant 0angers, inclu0ing a global nuclear e2change. U.S. lea0ership woul0 therefore be more con0ucive to global stability than a

bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

#4 (4)4 will 'aintain bene$icial relations with ey allies even i$ NAT7 collapses

Galla%her "special relationshipA with the Unite0:ing0om. -he Unite0 States also has strong relations with such nations as (taly, -urey, =ermany, the Netherlan0s,Denmar, an0 Norway. Some claim that N/-& is the foremost e2pression of U.S. commitment to 7urope. -he Unite0 States, however, ai0e07urope in two worl0 wars, an0 stoo0 firmly by 7uropes si0e 0uring the Col0 War L this commitment surpasses 0iplomatic formalities. -he Unite0States will not isolate itself from 7urope merely because N/-& 0isban0s. /00itionally, 7uropeannations 0o not nee0 a formal security lin to the Unite0 States. 7ven with N/-& gone, >there is still

plenty of life in, an0 nee0 for, #the Unite0 States37urope security partnership.A

+4 6onsultation counterplans are a voter4

a4 In$initely re%ressive O they could consult any nu'ber o$ countries or %roups

b4 Topic education O shi$ts discussion $ro' 'ilitary presence to consultation O we lose all relevant

education

c4 Readin% relations net bene$its as a disad solves4

4 Relations non-uni!ue O Their Wittes and Rosenber% evidence says 7ba'a is actin% unilaterally

now O that9s an%erin% NAT7 O should have caused the disadvanta%e4


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AT 2olitics O *obs 0ill L&=M

&4 Non O uni!ue O their Di%ital News evidence says 6on%ress is worin% on the bill O but no where

conclusively says it will pass or that it is even liely to pass4

54 Wont 2ass - De'ocrats not on board4;ae )her'an, staff writer, #-ore $allout would happen i$ we didn9t honor our a%ree'ent4

=4 Non uni!ue No obs bill8De'ocrats not on board4

;ae )her'an, staff writer, #-


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AT 2olitics O *obs 0ill L5=M

?4 2lan increases 2olitical 6apital4 Withdrawal popular O ey con%ress'en thin the war was a 'istae

8Paul ;oseph Watson, staff writer, MK&", Prison Planet, >Congressman off the tableA. &bama now has more /merican troops

0eploye0 than at any time un0er Gush. -he 0ate for with0rawing troops from (ra' is continually pushe0 bac,an0 even then it is a0mitte0 that a >resi0ual forceA of tens of thousan0s of troops will remain to occupythe country. Now that the vast maIority of Be"'

%%


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AT 2olitics O *obs 0ill Lont%o'ery 8staff writer for the Washington Post, ;5;5!, httpBwww.washingtonpost.comwp0yncontentarticle!5!!MK/


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AT 2olitics O *obs 0ill L==M

+4 Turn Winners win O political leadership in tou%h $i%hts builds capital)in%er

8;onathan, 6y Direct Democracy, >Gy 72pen0ing Capital, &bama =rows ?is CapitalA, *3*3%,httpBwww.my00.comstory!!%**5%5)K!$)9

From the latest NGC News3Wall Street ;ournal surveyB Despite the country1s struggling economy an0 vocal opposition to some of his policies, Presi0ent&bama1s favorability rating is at an all3time high. -wo3thir0s feel hopeful about his lea0ership an0 si2 in 5! approve of the Iob he1s 0oing in the White

?ouse. RWhat is amaEing here is how much political capital &bama has spent in the first si2 wees,R sai0 Democratic pollsterPeter D. ?art, whocon0ucte0 this survey with @eie u6">Be"'

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&4 Non-uni!ue - A$%hanistan is already destroyin% 6>R4

addic%$ # @eie u6">Be"'

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AT 6>R DA L5R is Resilient O Gates and hi%h ranin% Generals will respect any 7ba'a decision and shield it

$ro' opposition4

)chae, fellow at the ?oover (nstitution an0 hol0s the Distinguishe0 Chair in (nternational Security Stu0ies at the Unite0 States

6ilitary /ca0emy, %3$33 8:ori, >So far so goo0 for civil military relations un0er &bama,A Foreign PolicyhttpBsha0ow.foreignpolicy.composts!!%!%!$sofarsogoo0forcivilmilitaryrelationsun0erobama9

Crucial to Feingol01s argument is that the /fghan people resent our military involvement. Goth 6cChrystal, an0 now =ates,are persua0e0 that is not true. -hey argue that how we operate in /fghanistan will 0etermine /fghan support to a muchgreater 0egree than the siEe of the force. =ates for the first time yester0ay signale0 his support for further force increases onthat basis, in0icating he will not be a political firewall for the White ?ouse if 6cChrystal an0 6ullen a0vocate politicallyuncomfortable increases./fghanistan was always going to be a central national security issue, because Presi0ent &bama ha0 campaigne0 an0 carrie0over into governance his argument that it was the RrightR war an0 negligently un0er3resource0 0uring the Gusha0ministration. 7ven with 0omestic anti3war sentiment on the rise an0 a potential rebellion by Congressional Democrats

against fun0ing the /fghan mission, &bama is seemingly trappe0 into supporting the military comman0er1s

troop re'uests. ?ar0 to imagine the ?ou0ini contortion that lets him sustain his claim that hispre0ecessor neglecte0 the most important war an0 then refuse troops to a comman0er who you put intoposition an0 who is supporte0 by a well3respecte0 Defense Secretary.et the Presi0entmay 33 an0perhaps shoul0 33 0o e2actly that, an0 for reasons that are lau0able in oursystem of civil3military relations. -he /merican way of organiEing for warfare has 0istinct responsibilities for thelea0ing military an0 civilian participants. -o wor up the la00er, it1s the military comman0er1s Iob to survey there'uirements for success an0 mae recommen0ations. (t1s the Iob of the Chairman of the ;oint Chiefsof Staff to evaluate the military Iu0gment of that strategy an0 resourcing, a0vising the Secretary an0 thePresi0enton its soun0ness an0 other possible courses of military action. (t1s the Secretary of Defense1s Iob tofigure out how to provi0ethoseresources from a limite0 poolof people an0 e'uipment, to i0entify an0 managethe ris it creates for other operations an0 obIectives 8e.g., (ra', managing China1s rise, 0eterring North :orea, etc9. (t is

the Comman0er in Chief1s Iob to establish the war1s obIectives an0 0etermine whether they merit theresources it woul0 re'uire to be successful. ?e may 0etermine the obIectives are too costly in themselves, or thatachieving them woul0 0istract too much effort from other national priorities, or that we 0o not have the necessary partnersin the :arEai government to achieve our obIectives.

(t shoul0 go without saying that it is not the National Security /0visor1s Iob to intimi0ate militarycomman0ers into 0ialing 0own their re'uests to politically comfortable levels, although that is what ;im ;ones is reporte0to have 0one when visiting /fghanistan 0uring the 6cChrystal review. Such politiciEation of military a0vice ought to beespecially no2ious to someone who10 been both the Comman0ant of the 6arine Corps an0 a Combatant Comman0er. Whenthe Gob Woo0war0 article recounting ;ones1 attempte0 manipulation as publishe0, Secretary =ates an0 /0miral 6ullencommen0ably 0efen0e0 6cChrystal1s in0epen0ence. (t is also curious that the one person invisible in this 0ebate, as in the0ebate about relieving =eneral 6c:iernan, is the C7N-C&6 comman0er, =eneral Petraeus.

Gut beneficially an0 importantly for our country, policy 0ebates over the war in /fghanistan in0icate that thesystem of civil3military relations is clearly woring as 0esigne0 . We owe much to =ates , 6ullen, an06cChrystal for shiel0ing the process from politiciEation an0 provi0ing military a0vice the Presi0entnee0s to mae 0ecisions only he can mae.


&(


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AT /aser DA L&5M

&4 6ontractors would have already been worried when 7ba'a announced the withdrawal $ro' Ira!, no

reason the a$$ 'aes this proble' worse O this 'eans the disad is non-uni!ue4

54 De$ense spendin% low now


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AT /aser DA L55M

;4 No internal lin O contractors will as $or 'issile de$ense pro%ra's

)eattle Ti'es ;&" 8Dan ;oling, /ssociate0 press writer, >Qochee0 6artin to see missile 0efense contractAhttpBseattletimes.nwsource.comhtmlbusinesstechnology!55$K*%!apusmissile0efense.html4syn0ication9

/NC?&


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AT Iran Redeploy'ent DA

&4 Non-uni!ue - Their Eley evidence which was written three years a%o does not tae into account the

current withdrawal date that 7ba'a has declared O this should have at least tri%%ered the announce'ent

o$ such a plan to increase troop presence in Iran

54 The Ira! war has destroyed our credibility and he%e'ony worldwide O that9s innebusch O this 'eans

that 7ba'a would never re-enter into another possibly lon% and unpopular war in the >iddle East which

would $urther destroy his and the ()9 position in the world

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AT A$%hanistan Redeploy'ent DA

&4 Their >artine1 evidence concedes that the withdrawal date set $or 5"&& in A$%hanistan would lead to a

'ore strate%ic place'ent o$ troops but there would still be a net decrease o$ troops 'eanin% no

redeploy'ent

54 Non-(ni!ue - the sur%e into A$%hanistan was a redeploy'ent o$ 'any troops $ro' Ira! to A$%hanistan

but the lin and i'pact were not tri%%ered

Silwarlor0A (smail :han, but sprouts of liberalism

increasingly can be seen in ?erat. For instance, though women are e2pecte0 to cover their hair, womensorganiEations have proliferate0 an0 gaine0 public acceptance. Yiolence is minimal, though an iddle East which

would $urther destroy his and the ()9 position in the world

?4 7ba'a9s withdrawal date is evidence that A$%hanistan is at least relatively stable which 'eans that

there would be no point to increasin% troop presence and resent'ent

;4 The only reason to redeploy troops would be to increase stability but withdrawin% $orces $ro' Ira!

would lead to increased stability which would then spill over to create a 'uch 'ore stable >iddle East

'eanin% there would be no reason to redeploy O that9s Ad Ali


&$


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AT Allied 2roli$

&4 Non-uni!ue O we have pulled out 'ore than &"",""" troops over the past $ew years but other countries

have not started their nucleari1ation or proli$

54 Non-uni!ue O 7ba'a9s announce'ent o$ a withdrawal date should have led to a loss in credibility andthe perception $ro' our allies that we are wea in Ira! and would not be able to deter con$licts

Be"'

&%


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AT Appease'ent DA

&4 The Record "+ card read in the &N6 only shows that i$ a%%ression in the world is le$t uncheced it will

lead to war O it doesn9t address the ta% and doesn9t provide a clai', warrant, or even in$or'ation inside

the card $or () co''it'ents si%nal opposition to a%%ression or why revoin% these would lead to con$lict

54 Troop presence not ey to credibility in the >iddle East4 0uildin% relations with Arab states 'ore

i'portant

:athleen ;. >cInnis, coor0inator of the ProIect on Nuclear (ssues an0 a research associate at CS(S, !"?,Eten#e# DeterrenceJ T)e ;.S. Cre#i4i'it+ G"& in t)e i##'e E"t

U.S. relationships in the 6i00le 7ast, however, have a striingly 0ifferent character, more ain to hesitant engagement than

to Washingtons well3establishe0 partnerships in /sia./ rising ti0e of (slamic fun0amentalism, couple0 withgrowing anti3U.S. sentiment, has straine0 thesetenuous relations. /s thenLUn0er Secretary of State for /rms Control an0(nternational Security ;ohn Golton recently state0, >(ranian nuclear capabilities woul0 change the perceptions of the military balance in the region an0coul0 pose serious challenges to the #Unite0 States in terms of 0eterrence an0 0e3 fense.A* &ne such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powersemerging in an alrea0y volatile 6i00le 7ast. -he outcome of this scenario 0epen0s in part on the capacity an0 cre0ibility of U.S. strategic capabilities,

inclu0ing the nuclear 0eterrent. Ultimately,if ey >nuclear 0ominosA in the region , such as Sau0i /rabia an0 7gypt,0eci0ethat U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempte0 to ac'uire their own nuclear

weapons . / U.S. e2ten0e0 0eterrent policy in the 6i00le 7ast woul0 lac cre0ibility, not 0ue to a lacof physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relationswith its allies in the region, creat3 ing a uni'uely 0angerous situation.

iddle East and speci$ically Ira! breed resent'ent which $uels terroris' in

the re%ion

=4 6on$lict is driven by lac o$ co''unication, not perceptions o$ weaness4 I'proved so$t power

prevents their i'pactLieuten"nt Co'one' W"+ne . han-s? .nite# t"te Army, Str"te*+ to Incre"e ;S Cre#i4i'it+, 38(%)tt&J$$$.#tic.0i'c*i>4inGetTRDocMADADA%%81%Loc"tion;2#ocGetTRDoc.(

(nformation, as an element of national power, must be effectively integrate0 with the other elements of national power to accomplish ey provisions within

the Unite0 States =overnments 8US=9"ational Security Strategy 8NSS9.-he publics mistrust of the Unite0 States is born out ofa wi0esprea0 misun0erstan0ing an0 mistrust of its policies an0 a lac of US= cre0ibility , especially in the=reater 6i00le 7ast. / coor0inate0 strategy of policy a0Iustments an0 an integrate0 communication plangroun0e0 in soun0 communication practices, using cultural e2pertise an0 all available communicationmeans, shoul0 increase the US=s cre0ibility . Cre0ibility will improve US= ability to successfullyinform 0omestic an0 international au0iences an0 may 0ispel a portion of the mistrust an0 hate for itsactions an0 policies.-he purpose of this paper is to e2plore the informational element of national power, e2amine current public relations

processes for 0eveloping communication strategy, 0iscuss potential national security policy implications which affect the US=s cre0ibility, an0 offer

recommen0ations for a long3term strategy to increase US= cre0ibility. / main premise use0 in this paper is that the root of most of theUS=s cre0ibility issues is ine2orability line0 to the mistrust of the US=s policies or actions an0 that aneffective communication strategy will 0ecrease that mistrust by increasing a relative un0erstan0ing of those policies an0 actions.(nformation, as an element of national power, must be effectively integrate0 with the other elements of national power to accomplish ey provisions

within the Unite0 States =overnments 8US=9 "ational Security Strategy 8NSS9. -he publics mistrust of the Unite0 States, currentlyleverage0 by e2tremist groups to foster violence an0 hatre0, is born out of a wi0esprea0 misun0erstan0ing an0 mistrust ofthe its policies an0 a lac of US= cre0ibility, especially in the =reater 6i00le 7ast.5 Several national security policy areas an0 their associate0actions appear counter to i0eals outline0 in the NSS an0 ris serious 0amage to US= cre0ibility worl0wi0e when those perceptions polariEe various

publics an0 increase negative perceptions of the US government./ coor0inate0 strategy of selecte0 policy a0Iustments an0an integrate0 communication plan groun0e0 in soun0 communication practices, using culturale2pertise an0 all available communication means, shoul0 increase the US=s cre0ibility. 6redibilitywill i'prove ()G ability to success$ully in$or' do'estic and international audiences and 'ay

dispel a portion o$ the 'istrust and hate $or its actions and policies4


&&


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AT Israel 6o'pensation DA L&5M

&4 The only warrant in their )usser "= card $or why Israel would de'and co'pensation is that they

would be a$raid o$ Iranian proli$eration4 This is solved by the plan O withdrawin% troops is necessary to

open tals with Iran, and the subse!uent ne%otiations are ey to endin% Iranian proli$eration, that9s our

:u%el'an "; and :upchan and Taeyh "; evidence4 This taes out their disad because Israel will nolon%er have any reason to want co'pensation4

54 Israel is already receivin% 'ilitary aid $ro' the (4)4

Associated 2ress &" 8*!5!>Despite anger, US unliely to cut military ai0 to (srael it benefits both si0esAhttpBr0mag.comNewsFee0s/P!5!!*manufacturing30espite3anger3us3unliely3to3cut3military3ai03to3

-he U.S. steppe0 up fun0ing to (srael after the /rab3(sraeli warsof 5%M" an0 5%"*, at a time when the SovietUnion was arming the /rabs. Following the 5%"% (sraeli37gyptian peace treaty, Washington guarantee0 (srael woul0continue receiving annual military an0 civilian ai0 in a *B ratio with ai0 given to 7gypt. Since then,(srael1s share has range0 between ^.5 billion an0 ^*." billion a year. &ver the last 0eca0e, as (srael1seconomy has grown, the U.S. has converte0 the whole pacage to military fun0ing, un0er an

agreement to have it at ^*.5K billion a year by fiscal !5* an0 eep it at that level until !5). -hepacage amounts to only about per cent of (srael1s annual gross 0omestic pro0uct, compare0 with 5$ per cent in 5%)K. Gutfor a country with hostile neighbours, an0 where military spen0ing rans si2th in the worl0 proportional to siEe of economy,

that ai0 is vital. (t represents about ! per cent of the country1s annual 0efence bu0get. 7'ually important, it gives (sraelrea0y access to a0vance0 an0 uni'ue har0ware. R(srael has 0evelope0 its own military in0ustry, butthere are things you can only get from the Unite0 States,R sai0 7ytan =ilboa, an e2pert on (sraeli3/merican relations at (srael1s Gar3(lan University. /ccor0ing to (sraeli 0efence sources an0 U.S. congressionalreports, (srael spen0s the bul of its ai0 on warplanes such as F35Ks an0 F35Ms, Iet fuel, high3en0 munitions an0 missile0efence systems + weaponry the (sraeli military woul0 fin0 0ifficult to replace or 0o without. R(f ai0 were to stop, itwoul0 0irectly affect (srael1s security an0 have an in0irect effect on its economy,R sai0 /rie /rnon, an economics professorat Gen =urion University near Geersheba. With that potential influence in min0, a0vocacy groups such as /mnesty(nternational calle0 on the U.S. to withhol0 ai0 0ollars from (srael after its offensive in =aEa last year, arguing that the

money was paying for weapons that were illing Palestinian civilians.

syste's, but

the i'pact is based o$$ o$ buner buster bo'bs O the two are co'pletely di$$erent weapons syste's

=4 (4)4 has already co''itted to %ivin% Israel buner busters

World Tribune "; 8Worl0 -ribune, U.S. rushing buner3bustersto (srael, "$!M9httpBwww.worl0tribune.comworl0tribune!Mfront$K*%$5.!".html

W/S?(N=-&N + -he Unite0 States has approve0 an (sraeli re'uestfor Raccelerate0 0eliveriesR of precision3gui0e0 air munitions to (srael. &fficials sai0 the Gush a0ministration approve0 an (sraeli re'uest forbuner3buster weapons 0ays after the outbrea of the ?iEbullah war on ;uly 5 . -hey sai0 the (srael /ir

Force conclu0e0 that its heavy air stries on ?iEbullah stronghol0s aroun0 Qebanon have beenineffective. &fficials sai0 the (srael /ir Force faile0 to 0estroy ?iEbullah hea0'uarters in southern Geirut. &n ;uly 5%,(sraeli F35K( an0 F35M( fighters 0roppe0 * tons of munitions on ?iEbullah1s comman0 an0 control buner, but faile0 to

0estroy the har0ene0 facility, 6i00le 7ast Newsline reporte0. R-he a0ministration an0 Congress alrea0yapprove0 the P=6 sale,R an official sai0. RWe1re taling about accelerate0 0eliveries.R &n 6on0ay, theQon0on3base0 /3Shar' /l /wsat sai0 the U.S. /ir Force woul0 transfer the =GU3) buner3busters to (srael.-he newspaper sai0 the air force woul0 tae bombs store0 in Central Comman0 hea0'uarters in @atar.


&'
http://rdmag.com/News/FeedsAP/2010/03/manufacturing-despite-anger-us-unlikely-to-cut-military-aid-to-/http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/front2453941.072222222.htmlhttp://rdmag.com/News/FeedsAP/2010/03/manufacturing-despite-anger-us-unlikely-to-cut-military-aid-to-/http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/front2453941.072222222.html


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AT Israel 6o'pensation DA L55M

?4 Even i$ they win Israel will %et buner busters, they won9t strie Iran

aaria G./., ale University, Ph.D., ?arvar0 University, Newswee Iournalist ?& 8K5%!5! >Gibis GlusterhttpBwww.newswee.com!5!!*5)bibi3s3bluster.html9

Gut after watching Netanyahu1s government over the past year, ( have conclu0e0 that he is actually not seriousabout the (ranian threat. (f tacling the rise of (ran were his paramount concern, woul0 he have allowe0 acollapse in relations with the Unite0 States, the country whose military, political, an0 economic help is in0ispensable inconfronting this challenge4 (f taing on (ran were his central preoccupation, woul0n1t he have subor0inate0 petty0omestic consi0erations an0 0one everything to bolster ties with the Unite0 States4 Gibi lies to thin ofhimself as Winston Churchill, warning the worl0 of a gathering storm.Gut he shoul0 bear in min0 that Churchill1s singleobsession 0uring the late 5%*!s was to strengthen his alliance with the Unite0 States, whatever the costs, concessions, an0compromises he ha0 to mae.

;4 Israel has already perceived us as withdrawin% $ro' Ira! due to 7ba'a9s pled%e, even thou%h we

aren9t withdrawin% in the status !uo Israel thins we are, thus the lin to the disad should have been

tri%%ered already4


&9


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'(

T72I6A/IT.


'(


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'!

5A6 T O 6o'bat Troops

&4 We >eet we withdraw support troops, not co'bat troops4

2lan only e$$ects support troops4 6o'bat troops will be %one by Au%ust4

6NN " 8"!% CNN. >&bama to pull combat troops from (ra' by /ugust !5!httpBwww.cnn.com!!%P&Q(-(CS!Mobama.troops9

Presi0ent &bama tol0 congressional lea0ers -hurs0ay he1s planning to pull all combat troops out of (ra' by/ugust !5!, accor0ing to three congressional officials. Presi0ent &bama says he plans to eep up to K!,!!!support troops in (ra' after combat troops leave in !5! . Un0er this scenario, all combat troops will bewith0rawn within 5% months of &bama1s ;anuary inauguration, three months longer than his promise on the campaign trail.(n a meeting at the White ?ouse -hurs0ay evening, &bama also tol0 lawmaers that he plans to eep a range of *K,!!! toK!,!!! support troops on the groun0 in (ra' after combat troops are out, the officials sai0.

54 6ounter Interpretation >ilitary 2resence includes bases where intelli%ence %atherin%, trainin%, and

'ilitary-led develop'ent aid can be $ound4

Transnational Institute, "8;uly, >Foreign 6ilitary Gases an0 the =lobal Campaign to close themA httpBwww.tni.orgprimerforeign3military3bases3an03global3campaign3close3them9

&ver the past 0eca0es, there has been a slow 0ecline in the total number of foreign military bases, largely as a result of the

en0 of the Col0 War. Gut at the same time, there has been a rapi0 growth in the number of countries [hostinga foreign military presence. (n other wor0s, the new strategy seems to be to have smaller 0etachmentsin ever increasing number of countries.-ogether with the shift towar0s smaller bases in more countries, there has also been a shift away frommassive troop 0eployments to smaller sprea03out facilities, where intelligence gathering, training, an0military3le0 0evelopment ai0 can be combine0.-he recent sprea0 of bases is a clear in0ication of what are consi0ere0 the new international battle groun0sB Central /sia,the 6i00le 7ast, an0 /frica.

2ac iraq aff - withdraw military

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