afghan nation building good 2ac blocks

7/29/2019 Afghan Nation Building Good 2ac Blocks

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170977266.doc Dartmouth

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2AC Afghanistan Good Blocks***TOPICALITY***.................................................................................................................................................250% T....................................................................................................................................................................... 3Combat T..................................................................................................................................................................4***CASE***..............................................................................................................................................................5

AT: Squo Solves....................................................................................................................................................... 6AT: Stability............................................................................................................................................................. 7AT: Withdrawal Bad................................................................................................................................................ 8AT: Pakistan Turn.................................................................................................................................................. 10***COUNTERPLANS***........................................................................................................................................11Balancing CP.......................................................................................................................................................... 12Consult NATO........................................................................................................................................................ 14Consult Japan......................................................................................................................................................... 16Eradication PIC...................................................................................................................................................... 18Legalize CP............................................................................................................................................................. 19Legalize CP Not Popular.....................................................................................................................................21Surge CP................................................................................................................................................................. 23DOD CP.................................................................................................................................................................. 24

***DISADS***........................................................................................................................................................ 25Allied Proliferation DA.......................................................................................................................................... 26Appeasement Terrorism DA............................................................................................................................... 28Appeasement China DA..................................................................................................................................... 30Compensation DA (ABL).......................................................................................................................................32Compensation DA (FCS)........................................................................................................................................34CMR DA.................................................................................................................................................................36Politics Jobs Bill................................................................................................................................................. 40Politics Midterms Obama Good (Cap and Trade)..............................................................................................42Politics - Midterms Obama Bad (SKFTA).............................................................................................................44Redeployment Afghanistan DA.............................................................................................................................45Taliban Negotiation DA.........................................................................................................................................46

Terrorism DA......................................................................................................................................................... 471AR Extension........................................................................................................................................................ 49***KRITIKS***...................................................................................................................................................... 50Security................................................................................................................................................................... 51Fem IR....................................................................................................................................................................55Terror Talk............................................................................................................................................................. 57

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***TOPICALITY***

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50% T1. We meet: counter-insurgency troops are the driving force behind Afghanistan troop deployment;

means its more than 50% of troops thats why Afghanistan is always in the news

2. The neg has no evidence saying were less than 50% of troops dont buy their analytics

3. Counter interpretation Substantially means large in size or importance

Cambridge Dictionary of American English 2000

substantial/adj large in size, value or importance. He took a substantial amount of money. They do a substantial portion oftheir business by phone

4. Standards

A. Predictability dictionary definitions are good because accessible and intuitive

B. Contextual definitions are bad their definition proves

The military has no contextual definition for substantially the bill your evidence talks about never

passed

MilitaryDictionary.org 2008, http://www.military-dictionary.org/substantial cp

Definition Of: Substantial There is no definition for this term.C. Education broad topic knowledge good key to real world application

5. Brightline theres no brightline for what a substantially increase means key to fairness

6. Default to reasonability good should be good enough there is lit and clash which is key to a good

debate

7. T is not a voter you shouldnt vote on potential abuse

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Combat T1. We meet: counter-insurgency troops share the same doctrines as non-combatant troops

Karsten Friis, 2/2010, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency Two of a Kind? inInternational Peacekeeping Vol 17 Issue 1

This article demonstrates that there are more similarities between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency

than often recognized. In today's 'war among the people', the counter-insurgent cannot succeed withoffensive military capabilities alone and must seek to apply also non-kinetic and defensive methods; whereas thepeacekeeper often is forced to apply 'robust' and kinetic means to implement a mandate . As a result, thetwo concepts seem to be converging and share some commonalities. The article compares the UN Department of

Peacekeeping Operations 'capstone doctrine' and the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual to argue that the twodoctrines share similarities in six areas: (1) a focus on civilian solutions; (2) a need for protection ofcivilians; (3) international coherence; (4) host-nation ownership; (5) use of intelligence in support ofoperations; (6) limitations on the use of force. The article suggests areas where the two doctrines could mesh witheach other.

2. Presence includes all deployed troops.

MacMillan Dictionary 2010 [Macmillan Publishers Limited, "definition of presence," accessed June 2010 | VP]

a. a group of people, especially soldiers orthepolice, who are in a place for a particular purposeWe intend to maintain a presence in the country until there is peace.

military/police presence:There is still a large U.S. military presence in the region.

3. Solves limitsmilitary presence is limited to four topic areas- their interpretation allows vague actions

like defending US interests, gaining intelligence, training troops, and improving inter-operability of U.S

forces. Intelligence gathering alone makes CIA operations into Pakistan topical.

4. Limits are a pre-requisite to precision- a precise definition is determined by how adequately and

clearly it distinguishes between topical and untopical cases.

5. Research burden inevitable- combat troops just becomes a counterplan. Prefer as aff. ground.a. Resolution basis- ignoring combat troops nullifies one third of the resolution because

Afghanistan and Iraq are considered theatres of combat

b. Combat troops key to solve relations- these are at the core of the topic and key to clash and

education over hegemony and the USs role in the world.

6. Reasonability: If we have contextual literature, were reasonably topical. Competing interpretations is

designed to arbitrarily exclude the aff, killing topic-specific education

7. T isnt a voter cant vote on potential abuse

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***CASE***

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AT: Squo Solves1. Extend BBC News ev Obama will NOT adhere to the pullout timeline July is just a date to begin atransition phase at best he wants to maintain a hard power approach

2. Immediate Withdrawal Goodtroops are counter-productive and drones are able to do the job

Zachary 10/09 G. Pacal Zachary, former senior staff writer for the Wall Street Journal, editor of In These Times, 10/9/2009. [InThese Times, Get Out Now: The Case for an Immediate Withdrawal from Afghanistan].

Yet the case for withdrawing from Afghanistan makes tactical, strategic and moral sense, chiefly becauselegitimate U.S. security needs can be achieved more effectively through other means. As Bacevich has written, InAfghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to vigorously pursue the wrong mission. If

there is a right mission in Afghanistan , it can only be to deny al-Qaeda and its friends the opportunityto attack Americans at home and abroad. After eight years in Afghanistan, U.S. troops (aided by muchsmaller forces from Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy and other allied countries) havent accomplished this. Yettargeted attacks by U.S. and allied forces are killing terrorists, highlighting an alternative to groundtroops and an Afghan quagmire.

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AT: Stability1. Nationbuilding in Afghanistan solves instability concerns- their evidence doesnt assume the plan

Regehr 2007 [Ernie, Adjunct Prof. Peace and Conflict Studies @ Conrad Grebel U College - U of Waterloo, "It's not really amatter of hate," Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 9, http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2007/5/its-not-really-matter-hate]

Conflicts in which the rights and political/social viability of particular communities are central issuesare not evidence of ethnic chauvinism or of hatred for "the other". Such conflicts are reflections of amore fundamental social conflict, borne out of a community's experience of economic inequity,political discrimination, human rights violations, and pressures generated by environmentaldegradation. Identity conflicts emerge with intensity when a community loses confidence in mainstream politicalinstitutions and processes and, in response to unmet basic needs for social and economic security, resolves to strengthen itscollective influence and to struggle for political recognition as a community.

In Afghanistan , in other words, achieving relative peace is not a matter of overcoming age-old hatreds; itis more a matter of addressing communal and regional wariness. The southern Pashtun are of coursewary of a Kabul Government that has been constructed in such a way that it is regarded as unable, or atleast unlikely, to understand and cater to the needs and interests of all Afghans.You don't defeat that wariness; it has to be dispelled through concrete acts of inclusion and

accommodation. Military commanders, Afghan and NATO, make the point, over and over again, that the struggle inAfghanistan is not ultimately a military struggle, but neither they nor their respective political masters have yet managedthe wit or the will to give priority to the non-military struggle.

Behind ethnic or communal or regional conflicts are basic economic, social, and political grievances.Failure to redress them has made group solidarity an increasingly attractive political strategy, throwsome religious zeal and easy-to-use and easy-to-get small arms into the mix and the result is persistentsocial/political chaos and public violence - conditions that can be expected to bestir hatred, but that makes it asymptom not a cause. Does it make a difference that conflict is much more likely to be rooted in distrust thanhate? Yes it does - a lot. It means solving conflict doesn't require a change in human nature, just in humaninstitutions. And institutions can be built, and built to function according

2. Their evidence doesnt cite NATO, only the Dutch. And, the Dutch troops are being withdrawalpre-plan it is unlikely that they would change their strategy

3. Withdrawal solves the impact- insurgencies are only fueled by US occupation; once we leave they lose

their recruiting base

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AT: Withdrawal Bad1. Withdraw now

A. NATO is falling apart and Afghanistan troops are the key point in their cohesion

B. Warlords are gaining more and more control we need to pull out now to stop them from

gaining more power from peasant drug money

2. Original critics of a fast pullout now believe that withdrawing is the best option

Dimascio 6/29 Jen Dimascio, Staff writer for Politico, 6/29/2010.

Chairman Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) voiced his support for the July 2011 date, arguing it provides anincentive for the Afghans to assume responsibility for their own security. Levin has also been a criticof how fast security forces have been trained and whether enough security forces are positioned inKandahar, an upcoming offensive Levin considers critical. Within four months of his confirmation, Petraeuspledged to review the size of the Afghan security forces. I will make my own assessment of the need for any increase,provide that recommendation to the U.S. and NATO chains of command, and continually assess the appropriate size andstructure of the ANSF to ensure that we do all possible to enable transition of security tasks to Afghan forces as soon as ispossible, he said.

3. Withdrawal goodwithdrawing from Afghanistan allows the US to focus on more important issuesSmith 11/09 Lee Smith, Staff writer for the Hudson Institute, Chasing Ghosts, 11/26/2009.

Think of it like this: ifthe Americans are obliged to stay and fight in Afghanistan because if they dontOsama Bin Laden will call them cowards, then where else will Americas enemies draw the battlelines? Yemen? Somalia? Venezuela? Instead of focusing its energies on strategically important venues ,like Iran for instance, the US will spread its forces thin and get dragged into battles of someone elsesdesign. If all of the USs enemies were to join together and plot for a year they could not dictate a disinformationcampaign as destructive as the one the Americans have forced upon themselves: your enemy is not the MiddleEastern regimes and their regional assets that war against you openly, but is rather bearded men in darkcaves who embody radical Islam. Keep chasing ghosts, you infidel dogs, while we fight for real strategic interests,like oil, ports and states.

4. Immediate withdrawal helps Pakistan to eradicate terrorism


An end to war in Afghanistanand increased stability as a consequence of peaceful co-existence with the Talibanwould benefit Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants are believed to be living in a remotecity. Secular political forces in Pakistan, which possesses nuclear weapons, are battling to keep the country out of the hands

of religious fundamentalists who already exert profound influence. Anti-American feeling is extraordinarily highin Pakistan; even secular elites blame Americans for inflaming and exaggerating their domesticproblems. The U.S. government , which is currently debating how much to increase financial assistance to Pakistan,would provide more effective help without troops in Afghanistan.

5. Withdraw necessaryUS troops are becoming counter-productiveInnocent 9 Malou Innocent, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies specializing in the Middle East and thePersian Gulf Region, December 2009. [Cato Institute, Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?]

The issue is not whether we can but whether we should. Only recently has the debate moved to this question. Should weremain in Afghanistan? The answer when stacked against our objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeatingal Qaeda is clearly no. Going after al Qaeda does not require a large-scale, long-term military presence for severalreasons. First, we must keep in mind that the military is wonderful for killing bad guys withdisproportionate firepower, destroying enemy troop formations, or bombing command centers,but not for finding

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AT: Withdrawal Badhidden killers. The scalpel of intelligencesharing and close cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies has donemore to round up suspected terrorists than the sledgehammer of military force. Second, whether we withdraw orwhether we stay, al Qaeda can twist our choice into a victory . If we withdraw, we appear weak eventhough America is responsible for almost half of the world's military spending, can project its power to the most

inaccessible corners of the globe, and wields one of the planet's largest nuclear arsenals. But America also looks weakif it remains in the region too long. The military will appear bogged down, the strategy aimless, and,despite our best efforts, military operations will continue to kill Afghan civilians , eroding support for ourpresence among the population. Third, our policy toward Afghanistan is undermining core U.S. interests inPakistan. Drone operations have successfully killed a number of high-value targets and may haveseriously degraded al Qaeda's global capabilities. But our policies are alsopushing the region's powerfuljihadist insurgency over the border into Pakistan. As early as 2007, in response to repeated Pakistani armyincursions, along with a growing number of U.S. missile strikes, an amalgamation of over two dozen tribal-based groupscalling themselves "the Taliban" began to emerge in the Pakistani border region. Unfortunately, present U.S. policy is

pushing militants deeper into Pakistani cities, strengthening the very jihadist forces we seek to defeat, andpressing this weak but nuclear-armed country in the direction of civil war. Nonetheless, I think perhaps the worstthing we can do is turn our back on this region entirely. That's what we did after nearly a decade of funding the

mujahedeen, and we paid for it dearly eight years ago. But there are costs to remaining in the region, not simplyin manpower and resources, but in giving al Qaeda what it wants, pushing the conflict into Pakistan,and looking weak by remaining and possibly accomplishing little. America should scale down its combatpresence, continue open relations and intelligence sharing with all countries in the region, deploy Special Forces fordiscrete operations against specific targets, and engage in intensive surveillance as it already does today.

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AT: Pakistan Turn1. In the status quo, there will be a coup in Pakistan its try or die for the aff to solve

2. Plan solves only chance for Pakistani instability is spill over from Afghanistan solving Afghan

instability solves for Pakistani escalation

2. Immediate withdrawal helps Pakistan to eradicate terrorism


An end to war in Afghanistanand increased stability as a consequence of peaceful co-existence withthe Talibanwould benefit Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants are believed to beliving in a remote city. Secular political forces in Pakistan, which possesses nuclear weapons, arebattling to keep the country out of the hands of religious fundamentalists who already exert profoundinfluence. Anti-American feeling is extraordinarily high in Pakistan; even secular elites blameAmericans for inflaming and exaggerating their domestic problems. The U.S. government, which iscurrently debating how much to increase financial assistance to Pakistan, would provide more effective helpwithout troops in Afghanistan.

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***COUNTERPLANS***

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Balancing CP1. The un-underlined part of their Page evidence says that the call for a troop surge

wouldnt be enough, this contradicts their argument of implying an offshore approach

2. Their card is a generic US occupation bad card; prefer our solvency evidence that is

specific to our advantages- they provide no counterplan solvency

3. Perm Do Both- The aff embraces an offshore approach; we withdraw troops to

advocate a strategy of mitigated involvement

4. The perm solves best- A reduction in counter-terrorist force posture coupled with a

focus on nation-building and offshore balancing curtails Anti-American backlash and

facilitates stability.Pape 2009 [Robert A., Prof. Poli. Sci. @ UChicago, former Prof. Int'l Relations @ Dartmouth, To Beat the Taliban, Fight FromAfar, October 14, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/opinion/15pape.html?_r=1 | VP]

AS President Obama and his national security team confer this week to consider strategies forAfghanistan, one point seems clear: our current military forces cannot win the war. Gen. StanleyMcChrystal, the top American commander there, has asked for 40,000 or more additional United States troops, which many

are calling an ambitious new course. In truth, it is not new and it is not bold enough. America will best serve itsinterests in Afghanistan and the region by shifting to a new strategy of off-shore balancing, whichrelies on air and naval power from a distance, while also working with local security forces on theground. The reason for this becomes clear when one examines the rise of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in recent years.General McChrystals own report explains that American and NATO military forces themselves are a majorcause of the deteriorating situation, for two reasons. First, Western forces have become increasinglyviewed as foreign occupiers; as the report puts it, over-reliance on firepower and force protectionhave severely damaged the International Security Assistance Forces legitimacy in the eyes of the

Afghan people. Second, the central government led by Americas chosen leader, Hamid Karzai, isthoroughly corrupt and viewed as illegitimate: Local Afghan communities are unable to hold localofficials accountable through either direct elections or judicial processes, especially when thoseindividuals are protected by senior government officials. Unfortunately, these political facts dovetailstrongly with developments on the battlefield in the last few years. In 2001, the United States toppled theTaliban and kicked Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan with just a few thousand of its own troops, primarily through thecombination of American air power and local ground forces from the Northern Alliance. Then, for the next several years,the United States and NATO modestly increased their footprint to about 20,000 troops, mainly limiting the mission toguarding Kabul, the capital. Up until 2004, there was little terrorism in Afghanistan and little sense that things were

deteriorating. Then, in 2005, the United States and NATO began to systematically extend their militarypresence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time,eradicate poppys crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were

deployed in all major regions, including the Pashtun areas in the south and east, and today haveballooned to more than 100,000 troops. As Western occupation grew, the use of the two most worrisomeforms ofterrorism in Afghanistan suicide attacks and homemade bombs escalated in parallel. There were norecorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. According to data I have collected, in the immediateaftermath of Americas conquest, the nation experienced only a small number: none in 2002, two in 2003, five in 2004 and

nine in 2005. But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase by an order of magnitude with 97 in 2006, 142in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage of thesuicide attacks (80 percent) has been against United States and allied troops or their bases rather than

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Balancing CPAfghan civilians, and nearly all (95 percent) carried out by Afghans. The pattern for other terrorist attacks isalmost the same. The most deadly involve roadside bombs that detonate on contact or are set off by remote control.Although these weapons were a relatively minor nuisance in the early years of the occupation, with 782 attacks in 2005,their use has shot up since to 1,739 in 2006, nearly 2,000 in 2007 and more than 3,200 last year. Again, these attacks

have for the most part been carried out against Western combat forces, not Afghan targets. The picture is clear: the moreWestern troops we have sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents have viewed themselves asunder foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. (We see thispattern pretty much any time an outside armed force has tried to pacify a region, from the West Bank to Kashmir to Sri

Lanka.) So as General McChrystal looks to change course in Afghanistan, the priority should be not tosend more soldiers but to end the sense of the United States and its allies as foreign occupiers. Ourpurpose in Afghanistan is to prevent future attacks like 9/11, which requires stopping the rise of a newgeneration of anti-American terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists, who are super-predators able tokill large numbers of innocent people. What motivates suicide attackers, however, is not the existence of aterrorist sanctuary, but the presence of foreign forces on territory they prize. So its little surprise thatWestern forces in Afghanistan have provided a key rallying point for the insurgency,playing a central role in theTalibans recruitment campaign and propaganda, which threaten not only our troops there but also our

homeland. The presence of our troops also works against the stability of the central government, as itcan rely on Western protection rather than work harder for popular support. Fortunately, the UnitedStates does not need to station large ground forces in Afghanistan to keep it from being a significant safehaven forAl Qaeda or any other anti-American terrorists. This can be achieved by a strategy that relies onover-the-horizon air, naval and rapidly deployable ground forces, combined with training andequipping local groups to oppose the Taliban. No matter what happens in Afghanistan, the UnitedStates is going to maintain a strong air and naval presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean formany years, and these forces are well suited to attacking terrorist leaders and camps in conjunctionwith local militias just as they did against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001. The United States has a stronghistory of working with local groups, particularly the Tajiks and Uzbeks of the old Northern Alliance, who wouldensure that the Taliban does not recapture Kabul and the northern and western regions of Afghanistan .

And should more substantial threats arise, our offshore forces and allies would buy time and protectspace for Western ground forces to return. Further, the United States and its allies have made someefforts to lead Pashtun tribal militias in the southern and eastern areas to abandon their support for theTaliban and, if not switch to Americas side, to at least stay neutral. For instance, the largest British gains in the southwestcame from winning the support of Mullah Salam, a former Taliban commander who is the district governor of Musa Qala.

Early this year the United States started what it calls the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program,offering monthly stipends to tribal and local leaders in exchange for their cooperation against theTaliban insurgency. The program is financed at too low a level approximately $20 million a year tocompete with alternatives that the Taliban can offer like protection for poppy cultivation that is worthsome $3 billion a year. One reason we can expect a strategy of local empowerment to work is that thisis precisely how the Taliban is gaining support. As General McChrystals report explains, there is little ideological

loyalty between the local Pashtuns and the Taliban, so the terrorists gain local support by capitalizing on vastunemployment by empowering the young and disenfranchised through cash payments, weapons, andprestige. Well have to be more creative and rely on larger economic and political carrots to win over the hearts andminds of the Pashtuns. Changing strategy does not mean that the United States can withdraw all itsmilitary power from Afghanistan immediately. As we are now seeing in Iraq, changing to an approach thatrelies less on ground power and more on working with local actors takes time . But it is the best strategyfor Afghanistan. Otherwise we will continue to be seen and mistrusted as an occupying power, and thewar will be lost.

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Consult NATO1. Some NATO countries will say no

Hook 08-contributor to the International Studies Review journal (December 2008, Steven, Review: Falling out: The United States in the GlobalCommunity, International Studies Review, Vol. 10 No. 4, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121520292/PDFSTART, BD)

This European discontent is the subject of Giovanna DellOrtos provocative book, The Hidden Hand of the American

Dream. Her central argument is that the United States has long been admired by Europeans as an imaginedcommunity that is more a concept than a country. Specifically, the United States has been historicallyperceived in Europe as a land of plenty of opportunity that beckons people of goodwill everywhere(p. 7). But this exceptionalist view was ruptured on two occasions: during the Spanish American War and duringthe Bush administrations war on terror. In both cases, she finds, self-serving and aggressive US actionscontradicted the governments moralistic rhetoric. As a result, many Europeans were forced to abandon theirperception of the United States as a benign hegemon. The disillusion that resulted was short-lived in the firstcase, as the United States regained its lofty reputation during the world wars. It is too early to tell how long thelatest crisis of European confidence will last.

2. Not all NATO countries have to say yes to the plan to solve the NATO advantage what is necessary to

solve is a coherent strategy that doesnt mean all will support the plan though

3. Perm: do the plan and consult NATO

4. Perm: do the plan and genuinely consult NATO on an issue of equal or greater importance. Not an

opportunity cost of the plan. No reason we cant pass the plan and consult on something else; its most

real world

5. Consult Bad

a. Steals aff ground aff is liable for all disads to the plan means we should be exclusively

entitled to our advantages

b. Thousands of countries theres an infinite number of combinations of agencies the neg could

chose to consult we cant prep for them all

c. Artificially competitive the CP doesnt prove that the plan is a bad idea the net benefit isnt

intrinsic to the plan

d. Consult is un-educational there is no literature on NATO having say over US policies the aff

cant research

6. Justifies perm do the counterplan

7. Delayed action means case is a DA to the CPa. Drug War

b. NATO

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Consult NATO8. Turn: NATO is overburdened consulting will kill the alliance

Kober 09 Research Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and received his Ph.D

from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. (Winter/Spring 09, Stanley, Global Dialogue, NATO: The End of the PermanenAlliance,http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=449, MEF)

As if all these problems were not enough, NATO members now face the worst financial crisis since thealliances inception. Countries that were not meeting NATOs target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence beforeare certainly not going to meet it in the future. The implications for NATO have been underlined by itsoperational commander, General John Craddock. Theyre expecting to be asked to do more, he told apress briefing in Washington in January 2009, referring to US allies. I think its going to be harder for them to do itbecause of decreasing defense budgets.18 Precisely. NATOs problem has been the enunciation ofstrategy and the assumption of commitments without any reference to capability . That is what is so unrealabout the discussion of Georgian membership. Imagine that Georgia had been a member of NATO. What could the alliancehave done to defend it against the Russian attack? Georgia borders Russia and is far away from the United States and theother NATO members, who have their hands full elsewhere. Even as NATO faces an existential crisis in Afghanistan, there

are calls for it to return to the traditional mission of defending its members. Nobody will be asking for a wholesalestrategic rethink that reduces Natos commitment to Afghanistan , an anonymous senior NATO official told

theFinancial Times. But some states may be looking to strike a new balance between Natos currentfocus on expeditionary operations and the need to defend Nato territory.19 But how will a new balance bestruck? There are only two ways: increasing resources and devoting them to the traditional mission, orredirecting resources from out of area missions to the traditional one. Which will it be? Increasing resourcesseems near impossible in these times of financial stringency. But if resources are redirected, what happens to the out ofarea missions? What, specifically, happens to Afghanistan? Many [NATO members] have defence budgets that are solow, and coalition governments that are so precarious, that they cannot provide the quantity or type of forces needed for thiskind of fight, US defence secretary Robert Gates has lamented.20 That is the situation now. It will not improve if further

missions are added. Indeed, it is apparent that NATO is already overburdened .

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Consult Japan1. Japan will say no-Obama has already pushed for troop increase

USA Today 09 [Obama joins Japan PM in call for change.Afghanistan is a complicating factor in the trip to a rapidly changing Asia reordering itself around China's surgingeconomic and diplomatic clout. Obama's chief goal, the White House has said, is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to theregion. Aside fromJapan, Obama will travel to Singapore, for meetings with Southeast Asian leaders, and then China and

South Korea. Many governments are keen to see a revitalized U.S. engagement in part to counterbalance China, and even anewly powerful Beijing says it welcomes a continuing U.S. role in the region. Japan, long billed by Washington as thecornerstone of U.S. Asia policy, is caught up in these shifts. Hatoyama came to power calling for a more equal partnershipwith Washington and a more positive embrace of China, which will soon supplant Japan as the world's No. 2 economy. In apre-trip interview with Japan's NHK network, Obama sought to minimize any friction and likened the election ofHatoyama's and hisDemocratic Party of Japan after nearly 50 years of rule by another party to a "political earthquake." "Ithink that it is perfectly appropriate for the new government to want to re-examine how to move forward in a newenvironment," Obama said. "I don't think anybody expects that the U.S.-Japan relationship would be the same now as it was50 years ago or 30 years ago or 20 years ago." As part of an effort to shift focus away from difficult security issues, Obamaand Hatoyama are expected to discuss and issue a statement on climate change, nuclear disarmament and other globalissues. Attempts to coax nuclear-armedNorth Korea which occasionally threatens Japan with fiery rhetoric to returnto disarmament negotiations are likely to feature prominently, as is Iran's nuclear program. The stickiest issue in relations the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on the southern island of Okinawa is likely to be glossed over.

Hatoyama has suggested moving Futenma off Okinawa while the U.S. wants to move the base to a more remote location onthe island, as part of a 2006 agreement on relocating 47,000 American troops in Japan. Trying to relieve some of thestrain on relations, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign MinisterKatsuya Okada agreedearlier this week to form a new committee to resolve the base issue. Tokyo also announced a new $5billion aid package for Afghanistan, even as it reaffirmed a pledge to end the Indian Ocean refuelingmission in January. Obama's visit would likely increase pressure on Japan to come up with a morerounded contribution to the Afghanistan war, Japanese media said. "Counterterrorism in Afghanistan isthe most important foreign policy for the Obama administration. The U.S. expects Japan will presentan alternative, which will replace Japan's naval refueling mission," said the liberal Asahi Shimbun,which ran a special page Friday that included a profile on Obama and his inauguration speech

2. Perm: do the plan and consult Japan

4. Perm: do the plan and genuinely consult Japan on an issue of equal or greater importance. Not an

opportunity cost of the plan. No reason we cant pass the plan and consult on something else; its most

real world

5. Consult Bad

a. Steals aff ground aff is liable for all disads to the plan means we should be exclusively

entitled to our advantages

b. Thousands of countries theres an infinite number of combinations of agencies the neg could

chose to consult we cant prep for them all

c. Artificially competitive the CP doesnt prove that the plan is a bad idea the net benefit isnt

intrinsic to the plan

d. Consult is un-educational there is no literature on Japan having say over US policies the aff

cant research

6. Justifies perm do the counterplan

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7. Delayed action means case is a DA to the CP

a. Drug War

b. NATO

8. US threat credibility prevents war over TaiwanPlate 98 (Tom, Prof. Pol. Sci. UCLA, Los Angeles Times, Chinas Dangerous Perception Error, 2-24

http://articles.latimes.com/1998/feb/24/local/me-22441)If that's the actual Chinese belief, then the gap between the reality of U.S. military capabilities andChina's perception of them is wide. Worse yet, Mulvenon's informed melancholy is shared in Washington. A recentPentagon study, "Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions," agrees that, despite all the recent military-to-militarycontacts between Chinese officers and their U.S. counterparts, the true picture of America apparently isstill fuzzy. Says the Pentagon report: "China's leadership holds a number of dangerous misconceptions thatmay well cause serious political friction or even military conflict with the United States. Theconsequences of China consistently underestimating the military power of potential opponentscomplicates any effort to deter China."

9. Nuke war.

Johnson 1(Chalmers, Pres. Japan Policy Research Institute, The Nation, Time to Bring the Troops Home (Page 2) 4-26http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010514/johnson/2)

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious USmilitarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against theoverwhelming US powerarrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads).Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on

earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstepin Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Sucha war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory,given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreignaggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust

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Eradication PIC1. Their evidence isnt qualified- its from a blog. Even if we have the same author, ours goes through

publication and fact checking. Also, we postdate, suggesting a change in the opinion of the author, prefer

our recency

2. Forced eradication counter-narcotics approaches misinterpret the situation and have the causalitybackward; the counterplan doesnt solve

Rubin and Sherman 2008 [Barnett R., BA Yale, PhD UChicago, and Jake, Research Asst. @ CIC, Counter-Narcotics toStabilize Afghanistan: The False Promise of Crop Eradication, February]

Both globally and within Afghanistan, the location of narcotics cultivation is the result not the cause ofinsecurity, as shown by the expansion of poppy cultivation into a destabilized Iraq. The essential condition forCounter-Narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan implementing counter-narcotics policy is a state thatworks.17 Counter- narcotics can succeed only if political efforts establish the basis for policing, lawenforcement, and support for development. Unlike military action, policing and law enforcementrequire the consent of the population. State building includes military action to defeat armed opponents of theproject, but in a weak state such as Afghanistan it succeeds only by limiting the scope of state activityand gaining sufficient legitimacy and capacity so that the population consents to the states authorityover those areas in which it acts. Winning consent for counter-narcotics requires providing greater liciteconomy opportunities, and providing security for people to benefit from those opportunities . Scarceresources for coercion should be reserved for targeting political opponents at the high end of the value chain, rather than

farmers and flowers. Winning a counter-insurgency while engaging in counter-narcotics also requiresacknowledging that the transition from a predominantly narcotics-based economy to a licit one willtake years. It is not possible to win the consent of communities to state authority while treating theirlivelihoods as criminal even where alternatives are not yet reliable . Proponents of escalating forcederadication argue that the government and its international supporters do not have years if the drug economy continues

to expand the whole effort will fail. Escalating forced eradication, however, will only make the effort failmore quickly.18 Escalating forced eradication does not integrate counter-narcotics with counter-insurgency: it makes counter-narcotics a recruiter for the insurgency . What drives rural communities to align

themselves with the Taliban is not illicit drugs, but a program to deprive those communities of their livelihoods before alternativesare available. An internationally supported effort to help Afghan communities gradually to move out of dependence on the drug tradewithout being stigmatized as criminals during the transition will integrate counter- narcotics with counter-insurgency and peace

building.Many of the substitute crops being suggested by the USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program (ALP)and others, such as saffron, pomegranates, apricots, and roses, have maturation periods of several years duringwhich they will not provide income.

3. Plan inclusive counterplans are a voting issue a. They moot the 1AC speech time by using our advantages as offenseb. They encourage vague plan text writing, this kill education

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Legalize CP1. US presence is the root cause of Afghani drug plan is a prerequisite to solving drug wars

2. The counterplan is more controversial than the plan; it will trigger the link to the net benefit

3. International narcotics experts say Afghanistan too unstable for legalization itll make conditionsworse

Alix Kroeger, Journalist, November 5 2007, BBC News

But officials working to stem the opium trade from Afghanistan are appalled. "Poppy is supporting terrorism anddrug dealers," says Afghanistan's acting narcotics minister, Khodaidad (who, like many Afghans, hasonly one name). "The Senlis Council and the European Parliament are supporting insecurity inAfghanistan." Afghanistan's mullahs issued a fatwa (decree), saying people must not grow poppy because it is haram(forbidden in Islam), he says. Opium is banned under the Afghan constitution, and the government opposes any form of

legalisation. Licensing the sale of poppy for medical purposes won't get rid of the demand for illegalopium, warn s a British narcotics official in Afghanistan who preferred not to be named. In fact, he believesit would just create a new cash crop for farmers, meaning that even more opium would be grown .Many farmers grow poppy under duress, he points out. The Afghan police would be hard-pressed tostop drug traffickers from forcing farmers to divert part or all of their crop for heroin. "Afghanistanneeds a rule-of-law structure to stop people growing opium," he says. "But if it had a rule-of-lawstructure, it wouldn't have an opium problem in the first place." A European Commission (EC) documentobtained by the BBC argues that buying poppy from farmers could have a perverse effect. "Farmers could see this asan incentive to further expand production. This would not be an appropriate use of resources for theinternational donor community or the Afghan government." And the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)has serious reservations. "At the moment, in the Afghan context, any proposal should be taken with utmost caution," saysJean-Luc Lemahieu, the head of UNODC's Europe and West and Central Asia desk. The idea of laboratories in the villagesis problematic, he says. "Where will the precursor chemicals [needed to convert poppy into opiates] come from, and who

will control them?" he asks. "Who would ensure they're not diverted to other frameworks?" The Senlis Council saysthere's a shortage of medical opiates on the world market, especially in developing countries, which

Afghanistan can fill. But the British narcotics official disputes this. The International NarcoticsControl Board, which licenses countries to produce opiates legally, has a two-year surplus, he says."Developing countries don't have opiates, but they don't have penicillin or aspirin, either," he adds.And he questions the economic benefits the Senlis scheme would bring. The price of legal opiates onthe world market is $35 to $40 a kilogram. Illegal opiates fetch nearly three times as much, around$100 a kilo. The EC says "exorbitant subsidies" could be needed to bridge the gap between legal andillegal prices. In the end, the British official says,poppy-for-medicine would undermine the authorityof the Afghan government. It would be impossible to justify allowing one village to grow poppy underlicence while eradicating the same crop just a few kilometres away . Counter-narcotics experts acknowledgethat similar schemes have worked in other countries which used to have a serious drug problem, such as Pakistan and

Thailand. But Afghanistan, they say, just isn't ready. With violence and instability still wracking the country,

they fear that any move to legitimise poppy production could make a bad situation even worse .

4. Perm: do the plan and legalize opium in Afghanistan for the purpose of medical drugs

5. NATO advantage outweighs Afghanistan

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Legalize CP6. GAME OVER world of the counterplan still has illegal drug production reproducing our impacts

James A. Nathan 2009, Auburb Univeristy in Alabama, Poppy Blues: The Collapse of Poppy Eradication and the Road Ahead inAfghanistan 1/28/09, Defense And Security Analysis

But a close reading of the Senlis proposals is complicated. Senlis village-based pilot efforts would use a

specialized form of opium seed. Senlis appeared to offer yet another crop substitution program by anothername.Village leaders, Senlis suggested would be issued internationally sanctioned licenses to produce their medicallyspecialized opium, a form more suited for codeine than heroin. All the planting and processing would be done inAfghanistan.Afghanistans traditional collective village responsibility, Senlis hoped, would discipline the planting and

production. In the end, the product would be sold to the Third World, where pain medications do notcompete with the current licit products. The Senlis plan appears incomplete , and some of the StateDepartment criticisms appear well founded. That is, even if some manufacturer could be found, oreven if an Afghan system of village production could be established, and even if the internationaledifice of multilateral and bilateral agreements with legally produced opium in Turkey and India couldbe renegotiated, there would still be illegal planting. The StateDepartment argued, perhaps rightly, Afghanistanwould be obligated to purchase opium stocks, resulting in the crops exponential expansion as more farmers take advantageof a guaranteed source of income.

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Legalize CP Not PopularOverwhelming opposition to legalization of opium

Romesh Bhattacharji, South Asian counternarcotics expert @ CFR, 12/20/07http://www.cfr.org/publication/15117/bhattacharji.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F122%2Fsociety_and_culture#

Why are people so against licensing opium production in Afghanistan, other than the U.S. stance that there is not enough

morphine demand? Whats the blockhere? The money being made out of enforcement. Last year theyspent $700 million on enforcement and the results were nothing. It's a very easy way of funding acontractual system. Thats my way of looking at it. Apart from that, [some think] that enforcement is all, that its theonly way to answer the illicit cultivation; whereas, it hasnt succeeded anywhere. There was the thought that inBurma, [drug trafficking] was under control, but this year a report (PDF) says that there has been atremendous increase in Burma also. You know, this mind-set has to be changed because here, year afteryear we are seeing dismal failure in eradication and enforcement of narcotic trafficking, yet nothing ishappening. They dont want to see anything new, test out new ideas.

Massive political interests oppose the plan

Scott McPherson, @ Liberty Unbound, 7 [Fight Terrorism: Legalize Heroinhttp://libertyunbound.com/archive/2007_01/mcpherson-heroin.html]

If opium production were legalized, pharmaceutical companies rather than al Qaeda terrorists would berunning the opium show in the Helmand Province, creating booming local economies and raising the living standardsof Afghan peasants. Then Bayer or Dowpharma or Sandoz rather than Osama bin Laden would be profiting from the $11billion Americans spend on heroin each year. Note that none of those companies currently sells heroin, and terrorists dontmanufacture headache tablets, despite the enormous profit potential in both businesses. With the government workingalongside international pharmaceutical giants, the agricultural economy would be protected, and very likely expand,offering more jobs to locals. Instead of arresting local officials, spraying poppy fields with dangerous chemicals, andsending Special Forces operatives to kick down doors, a collaborative, mutually beneficial relationship could be developedbetween poor peasants and the new government in Kabul that would undermine al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. The worstthing that could happen to narcoterrorists is legalization of their trade. Unfortunately, theres no reason to expect a much-

needed radical shift in policy. The United Nations blames heavy rainfall for the spike in opium production;Karzai blames a lack of support from western governments; Britains opposition Conservative Party

blames low troop levels; and the U.S. government blames Karzai. Legalization is the last thing on theirminds. Just as there is big money for terrorists in the drug trade, there is big money, power, and prestige for governmentofficials in continuing to fight this unwinnable war on drugs. While they rationalize failures,point fingers, call formore funding, and declare yet another crackdown, the poppies are in full bloom and terrorists are using theprofits to plan murders.

Plan requires a substantial conflict with the India Lobby

Vanda-Felbab Brown, Fellow @ Brookings, 7, [http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/felbab-brown200708.pdf]Assuming that the current official demand is satiated, the only way Afghanistan could sell opium to current customers

would be if other suppliers diminished their output. The current large suppliers include Turkey and India forwhom the United States guarantees a substantial market underthe so-called 80-20 rule (which guarantees that theUS buy 80% of opium containing morphine from these two countries), as well as several other countries, including

prominently Australia. Turkey and India would of course object to any reduction in demand for theiropium. Moreover, if opium licenses were redistributed away from India and Turkey, diversion into the illegaldrug trade there may increase. The difficulties of the political renegotiation of current arrangements and deals wouldbe substantial.

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Legalize CP Not PopularLegalizing now would make Afghanistan worse

Vanda-Felbab Brown, Fellow @ Brookings, 7, [http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/felbab-brown200708.pdf]

However, the current conditions in Afghanistan, including the lack of state presence and the lack of security andstability in major areas of the country, as well as other legal, political, and economic obstacles in both Afghanistan and the

international arena do not easily permit the current implementation of such a large-scale licensing scheme .Many ofthe obstacles detailed above are not inevitably permanent and could possibly be overcome with systematicand dedicated effort that may well take several years. But under the current conditions, these obstaclesseriously compromise the viability of any licensing scheme other than very limited pilot projects. Suchprojects may be valuable in generating information about the overall desirability and feasibility of a larger licensingscheme in the future, the unforeseen difficulties to such a scheme, and ways of overcoming them. But such pilotprojects would not reduce the level of illicit cultivation. Implementing a licensing scheme on a scale that wentbeyond very limited pilot projects in the more stable northern part of Afghanistan, while denying license to thePashtun belt areas plagued by insurgency and eradicating there, would not be desirable . Such selectivelicensing would thicken the bond between the affected Pashtun population and the Taliban, increasingthe insurgency, delegitimizing the central government and NATO, and exacerbating tribal and ethnic

tensions.

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Surge CP1. Literally doesnt solve any part of case

A. US Troops are the root cause of terrorism more troops only exacerbates the problems even

if more troops can solve some terrorist scenarios, there will be an increase in terrorism and in

time, power will shift to the warlords Pakistani coup leads to nuclear war

B. NATO countries want a cohesive strategy for Afghanistan and Canada and the Netherlandshave already decided to leave we need to pull out now or else NATO will lose all credibility

leads to nuclear war

2. Troop surges faillook at the most recent surge, it has made things worse

Diehl 6/14 Jackson Diehl, Deputy editorial page editor for the Washington Post, 6/14/2010.

What these fragments of news revealed is that three disabilities that have hobbled Obama's surge all alongnot only remain unfixed but seem to be getting worse.One is the failure of European governments to followthrough on pledges to contribute in crucial areas such as training. Gates also said that McChrystalhadn't figured out how to replace Canadian and Dutch combat troops that are withdrawing fromAfghanistan this summer. A second is the divergence between U.S. interests and those of Karzai, despite a make-up

session between the two governments last month in Washington. The Afghan leader had reasons to fire the two pro-American ministers, including their resistance to negotiations with the Taliban. But U.S. sources said he had been gunningfor the two men, along with Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak, ever since Washington insisted they be included in hiscabinet after his reelection last year. Karzai seems determined to minimize American influence.

3. Afghani civilians can fight for themselves when the U.S. leavesnot necessary for troops to stayMoselle 10/09 Tyler Moselle, former Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights and Foreign Policy, masters inpolitics from Harvard, 10/1/2009. [Carr Center for Human Rights, Homeland Security Insight and Analysis, Responsible WithdrawalFrom Afghanistan p. 2].

Misapplication of the 1990's model. Critics of a troop drawdown argue that this was the same strategythe US pursued in Afghanistan in the early 1990s but they overlook the fact that the Taliban at the timewere a young and relatively unknown political movement. Many Afghans have direct, harsh

experience of life under the Taliban and would oppose such a movement from coming back intopower unlike the 1990s when many Afghans passively supported the Taliban to bring peace during thecivil war.

*4. Surge unpopular links to politics just as hard

Newsweek 7/4 (7/4/10, " A Timetable for Withdrawal in Afghanistan ", http://www.newsweek-interactive.org/2010/07/03/t-minustwo-years.html?from=rss)

Petraeus has immense stature, of course, and after the firing of two commanding generals in a row (Gen. David McKiernanwas relieved in early 2009), Obama cant get rid of him without a firestorm. But the general knows that with Afghanistanalready the longest war in American history, he has only a small window in which to combine military force with creative

diplomacy in a way that yields real improvement on the ground. If he cant do it fast enough , the president willconclude that 100,000 troops actually harm progress by making the U.S. look like occupiers. At whichpoint hell revert to the Biden Plankill Al Qaeda operatives with dronesand forget about Petraeuss theories of

counterinsurgency. The country simply cannot afford a trillion-dollar commitment to nation building. Theonly way funding will continue much longer is if Republicans take control of Congress this fall. Eventhen, the war remains unpopular with the public, a point that wont be lost on the GOP (as RNC chairMichael Steeles antiwar comments last week attest). And Obama is hardly oblivious to the electoral implications. Lets saythat Petraeus insists that the July 2011 timeline be pushed back a year, which is quite possible considering the currentproblems on the ground. That means the de-escalationand the political windfallwill begin around the summer of 2012,just in time for the Democratic National Convention. In other words, Americans should get used to it: we aint staying long.

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DOD CP1. DOD is still part of the Executive BranchEven if the plan is headed by the DOD, it still is attached to

Obama and other areas of the Executive means the CP still drains political capital and the politics DA

is triggered

2. The counterplan proves the desirability of plan action vote aff

3. Agencies link to politics Obama gets credit/blame for the statements and policies of other executive

departmentsthey're considered an extension of him

Cohen & Collier *99 (Jeffrey & Ken, professor of political .science at Fordham University&assistant professor atthe University of Kansas, Presidential Policymaking: An End of Century Assessment ed Shull, P 42)

One of the president's most important sources of political influence may be his ability to structure theagenda. While the literature on presidential agenda setting is not highly developed. 1 there are suggestions that this type ofpresidential influence may exceed his often restricted ability lo affect congressional decision making In his study of the

agenda-setting process, Kingdon finds that respondents cite the president and his administration as perhaps themost important actor with agenda influence As Kingdon states, there is little doubt that the presidentremains a powerful force in agenda setting particularly compared to other action.' 'Moreover, the viewsof department heads and others associated with the administration are usually thought of as thepresident's or as having the president's stamp of approval. When thev socak. it is for the administrationand the president Thus, the president has many "voices'

4. Infinitely regressivethere are an infinite number of agencies that can be advocated through the

federal government, all of which still link to Obama. This counterplan focuses the aff to defend the

implementer of the plan, and not the actual policy thats a voter

5. Perm: do the plan and have the DOD withdraw troops from Afghanistan

6. Their Global Security evidence is shit one, the CENTCOM is not the entire DOD means CP flaw and

two, the military responsibility that USCENTCOM assumed was for peace keeping engagement planning andprogram execution these are not counter-insurgent forces the DOD has no jurisdiction

7. DOD badwastes trillions of dollars and is immune from budget cuts proves they shouldnt be giventhis much say in military deployments

Landau 3/8 Saul Landau, Professor Emeritus at California State University, senior fellow at and vice chair of the Institute forPolicy Studies, 3/8/2010. [Institute for Policy Studies, DOD: The Biggest Corporation of All]

Obama also declared as untouchable the Pentagon budget of $1.5 trillion (including hidden costs in other governmentbranches), which dwarfs the rescue package for the financial oligarchs. Both payouts, however, used the same logic: Congress taking from the have-notsand giving it to the have-mores. Indeed, the economic, political and military potentates depend on the federal budget to transfer taxpayer resources to

them. This evolving military-industrial complex, a partnership of interlocking government and corporatenetworks, has used public wealth to enrich itself. The manufacturing part of this complex rarely produces anything people live in,

wear, or eat. Despite National Rifle Association claims, armaments do not meet civilian needs. In fact, there exists a dramatic gulf between a healthyeconomy and a social order based on military spending. During the very period (1998-2008) when the US economys share of global output dropped from32 to 23%, the Defense budget doubled. (Loren Thompson, QDR Cant Solve Three Biggest Defense Challenges, Lexington Institute, January 28, 2010)

The Defense Departments eschewal of economic reality finds its counterpart in its disinterest in accountability. The dramatic admission ofthis statement of priorities came from Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who admittedpublicly that that DOD could not find $2.3 trillion. The money is still missing. (The War on Waste:Defense Department Cannot Account for 25% of Funds $2.3 Trillion, CBS Evening News, January 29, 2002)

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***DISADS***

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Allied Proliferation DA1. Empirically denied European nuclear reductions occurred without triggering your impact

Yost 09 (David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR; text from USC, International Affairs, Assurance andUS extended deterrence in NATO, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europereduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level

reached during the Cold Warhave been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part tothe continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the importantfunctions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute theultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the

worlds first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidencein essence, Europeandoubts about Americas will to defend its allies, given the risk ofprompt intercontinental nuclearretaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressedanxieties about US strategic capabilitiesas during the bomber gap and missile gap controversiesin the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early1980s.

2. Only plan solves US forces invite, not deter, enemies and conflict current forces not enough

Layne 97 (Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Prof. Naval Postgraduate School, International Security; text taken from FromPreponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, 22:1, Summer 1997, p. 108)

For example, it is unlikely that the United States would ever bolster the credibility of security guarantees (should they, infact, be given) to states like Ukraine, the Baltics, or even Taiwan each of which is threatened potentially by a nuclear rivalby deploying ground forces as tokens of its resolve. Indeed, assuming NATO expansion goes forward, Washington hastaken an ambivalent stance with respect to whether the United States will deploy troops or tactical nuclear weapons or bothin Poland (which, because of its proximity to Russia, would be an expanded NATO's most vulnerable member state). At

currently projected force levels, moreover, the American presence in Europe and East Asia probably will be toosmall to make extended deterrence credible in the early twenty-first century; a challenger, with good reason,may question whether the United States has either the capability or the intent to honor its deterrentcommitments. U.S. forward-deployed forces could constitute the worst kind of trip wire one thatinvites challenges rather than deterring them.

3. No link we are removing the counter-insurgent forces who are eradicating the poppy fields

4. Nuclear weapons not needed for extended deterrence conventional weapons enough

Davis et al 09 (Jacquelyn Davis, Ex. VP Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. IFPA and Prof. Intl.Sec. Studies Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir.Studies IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper,Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear"Wannabes", February 2009, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8)

As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrencestrategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to

our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long asthe United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely onnuclear weapons to deter the threat of a majorconventional attack.

5. Americas allies will not proliferate because they are afraid of prolif

Foreign Affairs Committee 9, Foreign Affairs Committee - Fourth Report Global Security: Non-Proliferation, House ofCommons, 7/14/09, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm

17. During the course of our inquiry Barack Obama was sworn in as the 44th US President. There has been widespread

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expectation that his election will be positive for arms control efforts. Nicholas Sims of the LSE told us that: the coming-inof the new Administration in the United States gives the UK and other NATO countries an enormous, almostunprecedented opportunity to re-engage the United States in a much more wholehearted, reinvigorated multilateralism inthis field, as in others.[29] [] Within the Democrat camp, there have been encouraging signs that the US would be muchmore engaged in multilateral endeavours generally.[30] Bill Rammell, Minister of State at the FCO, was similarly

confident: The prospects for disarmament under President Obama are much greater and stronger than

they were under President Bush. How do I adduce that in evidence? You can look, for example, at[Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton's confirmation hearings, when she talked about the importance ofrebuilding staffing and financing the relevant bureaus within the State Department. Obama has made itclear that he wants to ratify, and have negotiations on, the fissile material cut-off treaty. All that I see andhear is very positive and I have belief in President Obama.[31] There is speculation that a change of attitude in the USmight lead other states to alter their positions, with Bill Rammell telling us that when he was recently in Beijing "interestingdiscussions were taking place and there was a desire to know what the intentions of the Obama Administration were."[ 32]However, in relation to treaties, as Mr Rammell pointed out: There is a caveat: in the American system, you have to getthose treaties through the Senate as well. I think that with the degree of support that the President has and the politicalmake-up of the Senate at the moment, the grounds for that are optimistic, but it is not as simple as saying that the Presidentdecrees and it happens.[33] 18. In early 2009, President Obama appointed Gary Samore, previously of the Council onForeign Relations, as coordinator for policy on weapons of mass destruction (including non-proliferation), based in theNational Security Council.

6. Case outweighs - Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves

Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war

that will escalate

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http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note29http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note30http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note31http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note32http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note33http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note29http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note30http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note31http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note32http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/222/22205.htm#note33


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Appeasement Terrorism DA1. Non-uniquetheir Schmitt and Shane evidence is from over a year ago since then, Karzais

government has practically collapsed troops arent deterring strikes anymore; they are instigating them

when they eradicate the poppy fields

2. Plan solves the impact we are removing the root cause of why terrorists are causing instabilityCenter for Defense Information 2001 [Lessons from history: US Policy towards Afghanistan 1978-2001,http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm]

In his statements and speeches since Sept. 11, U.S. President George W. Bush has been careful to distinguish themembers of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and the Taliban, from the people of Afghanistanand Muslims of the world.Still, with military action in Afghanistan expected soon, it is necessary tolook hard at Afghanistan's past two decades of turmoil and seek to learn lessons from that past. Andwhile there are many factors leading to the dismal situation of Afghanistan today, it also is the casethat missteps in U.S. foreign policy are, in part, to blame. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Russia and theregion during the 1980s helped, at least indirectly, nurture the growth of anti-American and fundamentalistforces now controlling Kabul, and indeed, even some of the terrorists now being sought by the UnitedStates for the Sept. 11 attacks against New York and Washington. In planning for intervention in Afghanistannow, the Bush administration must work hard to avoid the mistakes of the past.

3. Appeasement now Obama is destroying US credibility reliance on negotiations with rogues makes

US look weak

John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, New York Daily

News, May 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/05/12/2010-0512_obama_fiddles_a_rogue_schemes_the_us_strategy_toward_north_korea_leaves_us_in_da.html

Why, if North Korea's threat remains grave, have we heard so little about it from the Obama administration? Ironically,Obama's negotiating posture with the North is, so far at least, somewhat less objectionable than that of the Bushadministration's last years. Bush's negotiators were, in effect, negotiating with themselves, making unforced concessions tocreate the illusion of diplomatic progress, while North Korea did little or nothing. By contrast, the Obama team, at leastoptically, has seemed more prepared to have China make the grease payments necessary to persuade Kim's regime to

resume the long-stalled six-party talks. But beneath the optics is a disturbing reality. Obama'sunderlying strategyremains fixed in the belief that once everyone returns to the bargaining table, progress on denuclearizing NorthKorea is still possible. It is a major article of faith, closely linked to Obama's view that negotiationswith Iran might actually divert the mullahs from their determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. This makes theUnited States weaker. Both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il fully understand the Obamaadministration's obsession with the process of negotiations over the substance of actually stoppingnuclear weapons programs - and will continue exploiting this insistence on talk essentially for its own sake.

4. Plan solves building relations with Arab states key to solve

Kathleen J. McInnis, coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a research associate at CSIS, 2005,Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East

U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagementthan to Washingtons well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupledwith growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations . As thenUnder Secretary of State forArms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, Iranian nuclear capabilities would change theperceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms ofdeterrence and defense.3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatileMiddle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities,

including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key nuclear dominos in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt,decide that U.S.

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Appeasement Terrorism DA

security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. AU.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physicalcapability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its alliesin the region, creating a uniquely dangerous situation.

5. No internal link to global war; its empirically denied Russias failure to commit and withdrawal

from Afghanistan did not lead to worldwide aggression or instability

6. Case outweighs Plan ensures NATO cohesion thats key to deter nuclear attacks and plan solves

Afghan warlord power warlords spill over to Pakistan and begin a coup resulting in civil nuclear war

that will escalate

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Appeasement China DA1. No link Afghanistan isnt considered a part of Chinas Asian sphere of influence China wouldnt

perceive a US pullout as confrontational

2. The only part of their uniqueness evidence about the US a quote from the editors of the Journal they

arent qualified to say what place the US has in foreign policy in China

3. Appeasement now and not impact Obama is destroying US credibility reliance on negotiations with

rogues makes US look weak

John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, New York Daily

News, May 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/05/12/2010-0512_obama_fiddles_a_rogue_schemes_the_us_strategy_toward_north_korea_leaves_us_in_da.html

Why, if North Korea's threat remains grave, have we heard so little about it from the Obama administration? Ironically,Obama's negotiating posture with the North is, so far at least, somewhat less objectionable than that of the Bushadministration's last years. Bush's negotiators were, in effect, negotiating with themselves, making unforced concessions tocreate the illusion of diplomatic progress, while North Korea did little or nothing. By contrast, the Obama team, at leastoptically, has seemed more prepared to have China make the grease payments necessary to persuade Kim's regime to

resume the long-stalled six-party talks. But beneath the optics is a disturbing reality. Obama'sunderlying strategyremains fixed in the belief that once everyone returns to the bargaining table, progress on denuclearizing NorthKorea is still possible. It is a major article of faith, closely linked to Obama's view that negotiationswith Iran might actually divert the mullahs from their determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. This makes theUnited States weaker. Both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il fully understand the Obamaadministration's obsession with the process of negotiations over the substance of actually stoppingnuclear weapons programs - and will continue exploiting this insistence on talk essentially for its own sake.

4. No risk of China escalation our economies are too intertwined

5. Their Khalilzad evidence is non-unique since then 9/11 reshaped foreign relations completely US-

China relations have drastically become more intertwined in the past 11 years

6. China Paper Tiger- feared for its military and paper economy but China is harmless thanks to WTO

Jagdish Bhagwatiis, Council on Foreign Relations and a university professor at Columbia in New York City, 2/19/02http://www.cfr.org/publication/4351/why_china_is_a_paper_tiger.html?id=4351

Alone among developing nations, China commands attention and awe. The country is feared for its military might. Italso alarms the world, and Asia much more, because of its growing economic and trade clout . True, the fabled"China market" has long been a holy grail for foreign investors and exporters. But China's exports are anothermatter. They inspire as much fearas Japan's did in the 1930s, when an explosion of cheap products like hurricanelanterns and $1 blouses provoked a slew of quantitative restrictions on Japanese exports and led to charges of a looming"yellow peril." China's size and rapid growth have deepened the sense

afghan nation building good 2ac blocks

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